PAGE 1

1. GENERAL CONCEPTS
PANGASINAN TRANSPO v PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
Historical and Consti Considerations | Date | Ponente ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. W/N the powers granted to the Public Service Commission is unconstitutional?—NO
Digest maker: FPY a. Re: 25 years limitation
SUMMARY: Petitioner was a grantee of certificates of public convenience to operate its i. In issuing a certificate, the Commission must be satisfied that the
transportation business. It applied for authorization to operate ten new trucks but was given operation of the service under said certificate during a definite
two conditions for such operation. Petitioner alleged that these conditions were period fixed therein "will promote the public interests in a proper
unconstitutional. SC held that the conditions were constitutional and there was no undue and suitable manner."
delegation of legislative power. 1. The only limitation is that it cannot exceed 50 years
(Sec 8, Art XIII Consti)
DOCTRINE: With the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects a. However, since there was no hearing about
of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a why the limit was 25 years, the case needs to
constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature, and be remanded
toward the approval of the practice by the court.
b. Commonwealth Act No. 454 is valid and constitutional because it is a valid
FACTS: delegation of legislative power
 Petitioner has been engaged for the past 20 years in the business of transporting i. All that was delegated to the Commission is the administrative
passengers in Pangasinan and Tarlac by means of TPU buses function to promote the public interest (“subordinate legislation”)
o The Public Utility Commission had issued petitioner certificates of public ii. It is not a complete abdication by the Legislature of its functions
convenience to operate 1. Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern
 Petitioner filed with the Public Service Commission an application for authorization life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental
to operate ten additional new Brockway trucks on the ground that they needed to regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering
comply with the terms of their existing certificates and as a result of the application the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward
of the Eight Hour Labor Law the delegation of greater powers by the legislature, and
 PSC granted the application with two additional conditions, as provided for by toward the approval of the practice by the court
Commonwealth Act No. 454:
o The certificates would be valid for a duration of 25 years RULING: The decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case remanded to the Public
Service Commission for further proceedings in accordance with law and this decision.
o The Commonwealth can acquire the business upon payment of proper
compensation
 Petitioner was not agreeable to the two new conditions so it filed a motion for
reconsideration
o PSC denied the MR
 Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari to question the constitutionality of
Commonwealth Act No. 454, among others
o Arguments of petitioners:
 1.That the legislative powers granted to the Public Service
Commission by section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454,
without limitation, guide or rule except the unfettered discretion
and judgment of the Commission, constitute a complete and total
abdication by the Legislature of its functions in the premises
 2. That even if it be assumed that section 1 of Commonwealth
Act No. 454, is valid delegation of legislative powers, the Public
Service Commission has exceeded its authority because:
a) The Act applies only to future certificates and not to
valid and subsisting certificates issued prior to June 8,
1939, when said Act took effect, and
b) the Act, as applied by the Commission, violates
constitutional guarantees

Admin (1. General Concepts)

PAGE 2
Leveriza v. IAC
G.R. No. L-66614 | January 25, 1988
Bidin, J.
Topic: General Concepts
Doctrine: Statutory construction mandates that general legislation must give way to special
legislation on the same subject, and generally be interpreted as to embrace only cases in which
the special provisions are not applicable. As such, specific statutes prevail over general
statutes, and where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one
designed therefor specially should prevail.
Petitioners: Primitivo Leveriza, Fe Leveriza, Parungao & Antonio C. Vasco
Respondents: Intermediate Appellate Court, Mobil Oil Philippines & Civil Aeronautics
Administration
Case Summary: The Republic of the Philippines, through the Civil Aeronautics
Administration (CAA) entered into 3 contracts of lease with Rosario Leveriza and Mobil
Oil Philippines. Since the leases were overlapping, the 3 entities took these to court, with
(1)Leveriza contending that Contract A was not validly rescinded therefore it was still
subsisting, it was C which was invalid because it had no approval of the persons indicated
in Sec 567&568 of the RAC; and (2)CAA conceded to A’s validity but wanted the contract
cancelled due to the former’s violations, they also said that Contract C was valid by virtue
of RA 776. Court ruled that C was valid because CAA has the power to execute such deeds
or contracts involving leases of real properties belonging to the Republic of the Philippines
by virtue of RA 776. the CAA admin falls under the 3 rd category of Sec 567, RAC, which
states that officers expressly vested by law may execute contracts.
Facts:
 The Republic of the Philippines, through the Civil Aeronautics Administration
(CAA) entered into 3 contracts of lease with Rosario Leveriza and Mobil Oil
Philippines.
o Contract A — a lease contract dated April 2, 1965 over a parcel of land
containing an area of 4,502 square meters, for 25 years.
o Contract B — a lease contract (in effect a sublease) dated May 21, 1965
between Rosario C. Leveriza and MOP over the same parcel of land, but
reduced to 3,000 square meters for 25 years; and
o Contract C — a lease contract dated June 1, 1968 between CAA and MOP
over the same parcel of land, but reduced to 3,000 square meters, for 25
years.
o Basically - CAA leased the land to Leveriza (Contract A). Leveriza leased
the land to MOP (Contract B). then CAA leased the land to MOP (Contract
C).
 MOP sought the rescission of Contract A and Contract B on the ground that Contract
A from which Contract B is derived has already been cancelled by CAA.
o They also maintain that Contract C (MOP x CAA) is the only contract
valid and subsisting.
 The Leverizas claim that Contract A was never legally cancelled and is therefore
valid and subsisting. It is Contract C which is invalid.
Admin (1. General Concepts)
 CAA concedes that Contract A is valid and subsisting, but they are also asking for its
cancellation by virtue of Leveriza’s violation, which is to lease it to MOP w/o their
consent.
o CAA also asserts that Contract C is not valid due to it not being approved
by the Director of Public Works and Communications.
 RTC held that Contracts A and B are cancelledt, while C is still valid and subsisting.
o IAC, upon the appeal of the parties, affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issues + Held:
1. W/N Contract A is still subsisting after its cancellation by CAA on the ground of a
sublease executed by the Leverizas w/ MOP w/o CAA’s consent, and the subsequent
execution of Contract C – NO.
 Leveriza contends that A is still subsisting because B is a valid sublease and is not a
ground for A’s cancellation. C however is null and void for lack of the Dept Sec’s
approval.
o They cite Sections 567 and 568 of the Revised Admin Code which requires
that contracts should be executed by the President of the Philippines or by
an officer duly designated by him, unless authority to execute the same is
by law vested in some other officer
 MOP asserts that both A and B are already cancelled. C is the only valid one and that
approval of the Department Head is not necessary under Section 32 (par. 24) of the
Republic Act 776 which expressly vested authority to enter into such contracts in the
Administrator of CAA.
 CAA asserts that:
o A is still subsisting as its cancellation is ineffective without the approval of
the Department Head but said contract is not enforceable because of
Leveriza subleasing it to someone else without their consent.
o C is not valid bc it was not approved by the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications.
o But CAA also made a complete turnabout and adopted the IAC decision
which said that the CAA Administrator has the power to execute the deed
or contract of lease involving real properties under its administration
belonging to the RP w/o the Dept Head’s approval, as provided in Sec 32
(24), RA 776.
 Contract A had specific provisions detailing that:
o Leveriza may transfer her rights to the property but there needs to be
consent of the CAA.
o Violation of the contract is sufficient ground for revocation.
 As Leveriza failed to secure CAA’s consent when she rented it out to MOP, the
Airport General Manager of CAA wrote a letter to cancel Contract A.
o Leveriza and CAA assail this cancellation, saying that Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, acting for the President, or by delegation of
power, the Director of Civil Aeronautics Administration could cancel the
contract.
o SC: this is untenable – The terms and conditions under which such
revocation or cancellation may be made, have already been specifically
provided for in Contract "A" which has already been approved by the
Department Head, It is evident that in the implementation of aforesaid
contract, the approval of said Department Head is no longer necessary if
not redundant.
PAGE 3

 Leveriza claims that Contract B was a mere sublease, and as such, requires no prior
consent from the CAA. They assert that the prohibition to sublease must be
expressed and cannot be merely implied or inferred (Art 1650, CivCode).They also
claim that it was contemplated in Contract A that MOP would own the gas station on
the leased land, so they must be given the right to use and occupy it in the form of a
sublease.
o SC: it was stated in Contract A that it was Leveriza who will manage and
operate the gasoline station.
 Mention of MOP in the contract was not intended to give
approval to a sublease. They were mentioned because it must be
understood by the parties involved that after expiration of the
lease, improvements built there shall be relinquished to CAA.
Sec. 32. Powers and Duties of the Administrator. — Subject to the general control and
supervision of the Department Head, the Administrator shall have, among others, the following
powers and duties:
(24) To administer, operate, manage, control, maintain and develop the Manila International
Airport and all government aerodromes except those controlled or operated by the Armed
Forces of the Philippines including such power and duties as: ... (b) to enter into, make and
execute contracts of any kind with any person, firm, or public or private corporation or entity;
(c) to acquire, hold, purchase, or lease any personal or real property; right of ways, and
easements which may be proper or necessary: Provided, that no real property thus acquired and
any other real property of the Civil Aeronautics Administration shall be sold without the
approval of the President of the Philippines. ...

2. W/N the CAA administrator can execute a valid contract of lease over real property
owned by the RP without the Dept Sec’s approval - YES.
 Leveriza: CAA Admin cannot execute by virtue of Secs 567 and 568 of the RAC.
 CAA: CAA Admin has the authority to execute such contract by virtue of Section 32
(24), RA 776
 SC:
o RAC is a general law while RA 776 is a special law.
o Under Sec 567, contract must be executed: (1) by the President, or (2) by
an officer duly designated by him or (3) by an officer expressly vested by
law.
o In the case, the CAA admin falls under the 3 rd category. CAA therefore has
the power to execute such deeds or contracts involving leases of real
properties belonging to the Republic of the Philippines by virtue of RA
776.
o Statutory construction mandates that general legislation must give way to
special legislation on the same subject, and generally be interpreted as to
embrace only cases in which the special provisions are not applicable. As
such, specific statutes prevail over general statutes, and where two statutes
are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed
therefor specially should prevail.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision of
the Court of Appeals appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto.

Notes:
SEC. 567. Authority of the President of the Philippines to execute contracts relative to real
property. — When the Republic of the Philippines is party to a deed conveying the title to  real
property or is party to any lease or other contract relating to real property belonging to said
government, said deed or contract shall be executed on behalf of said government by the
President of the Philippines or by an officer duly designated by him, unless authority to
execute the same is by law expressly vested in some other officer. (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 568. Authority of national officials to make contract. — Written contracts not within the
purview of the preceding section shall, in the absence of special provision, be executed, with
the approval of the proper Department Head, by the Chief of the Bureau or Office having
control of the appropriation against which the contract would create a charge; or if there is no
such chief, by the proper Department Head himself or the President of the Philippines as the
case may require.
Section 32 (24) of Republic Act 776
Admin (1. General Concepts)
PAGE 4
Mecano v. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 103892 – 11 December 1992
Campos, Jr., J.
Topic: General Concepts
Doctrine: The intent of the legislature in enacting the Administrative Code of 1987 was not to
supplant in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code of 1917. Absent a showing of express
repeal (by identifying the specific provisions of the old law the new law was to repeal) or of
implied repeal (by showing that the there are irreconcilable differences between the new law or
old law, or by showing that the new law is to completely substitute the old law), Sec. 699 of the
old law must still be considered to be in effect.
Petitioners: Antonio A. Mecano
Respondents: Commission on Audit
Case Summary: Petitioner wanted to claim the benefits he alleged he was entitled to under
Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code. While this claim was initially approved by
Director Lim, Undersecretary Bello III denied such request, stating that the provision relied
by petitioner was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987. Thus, the issue in this case is
whether the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed in its entirety the Revised Administrative
Code of 1917. The Court held that the latter was not repealed in its entirety by the former
law, as the new Code does not cover nor attempt the cover the entire subject matter of the old
Code.
Facts:
· Petitioner Mecano, Director II of the NBI, was hospitalised for cholecystitis 1 for
about a month.
o He incurred medical and hospitalization expenses, the amount of which he
is claiming from COA.
· Petitioner based his claim for reimbursement on Sec. 699 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917 (RAC), which details Allowances in case of injury,
death, or sickness incurred in the performance of duty.
o Under this provision, the Department head may, in his discretion, authorize
the payment of hospital fees if the sickness is caused by or directly
connected with the performance of the public officer’s duty.
· Petitioner’s claim was initially found to be acceptable by the Committee on Physical
Examination of the Department of Justice.
o However, Undersecretary of Justice Bello III returned petitioner’s claim,
holding that the provision of the RAC being relied upon was repealed by
the Administrative Code of 1987.
· Petitioner resubmitted his claim, attaching the Opinion of the Secretary of Justice
Drilon.
1
Cholecystitis (ko-luh-sis-TIE-tis) is inflammation of the gallbladder. . . . In most cases,
gallstones blocking the tube leading out of your gallbladder cause cholecystitis. This results in
a bile buildup that can cause inflammation. Other causes of cholecystitis include bile duct
problems, tumors, serious illness and certain infections. If left untreated, cholecystitis can lead
to serious, sometimes life-threatening complications, such as a gallbladder rupture. Treatment
for cholecystitis often involves gallbladder removal
Admin (1. General Concepts)
o Drilon held that the ‘issuance of the Administrative Code did not operate
to repeal or abrogate in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code,
including Sec. 699 of the latter.’
o However, upon endorsement of the claim to the COA Chairman, Chairman
Domingo denied the claim.
▪ Domingo held that Sec. 699 of the RAC had been repealed by the
Administrative Code.
▪ Domingo also held that the claim may be filed with the
Employees’ Compensation Commission, as petitioner’s sickness
had occurred after the effectivity of the Administrative Code.
· Petitioner’s claim was eventually returned, with the advice that he elevate the matter
to the Supreme Court.
o Petitioner still anchors his claim on Sec. 699.
▪ He also argues that even if his claim is filed with the Employees’
Compensation Commission, he Is not barred from filing a claim
under Sec. 699.
o Respondent COA strongly maintains that the enactment of the
Administrative Code operated to supplant in its entirety the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917.
▪ It argues that the whereas clause tells of the intent of the
legislature to repeal the old Code.
Issues + Held:
1. Whether the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of
the Revised Administrative Code of 1917. — NO, not in its entirety.
o The Court first holds that the question of whether a particular law has been
repealed or not by a subsequent law depends on the intent of the
legislature.
▪ A repeal is express if a repealing provision expressly and
specifically states the particular law (or portions of law) that are
intended to be repealed.
▪ Such express repeals usually identify the number or title of the
law to be repealed.
▪ All other repeals not falling under the above are considered to be
implied repeals.
o In the case of the Administrative Code, its repealing provision does not
identify or designate the act or acts that are intended to be repealed.
▪ As stated in the Opinion of Drilon, this is a general repealing
provision.
▪ For old laws to be repealed, there must be a substantial conflict
between the prior law and the existing law.
• Failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that
the intent of the legislature was not to repeal any
existing law unless there is an irreconcilable
inconsistency.
▪ Before there can be an implied repeal, there must be a clear
showing on the part of the lawmaker that the intent in enacting
the new law was to abrogate the old one.
o The Court also discusses the two categories of implied repeals.
▪ The first implied repeal is where provisions of the two acts on the
same subject matter are irreconcilable.
PAGE 5
▪ The second implied repeal is if the later act covers the whole
subject of the earlier one and is clearly meant to be a substitute.
o In the instant case, the new Code clearly does not cover or attempt to cover
the entire subject matter of the old Code.
▪ COA also failed to show that the provisions of the two Codes on
the subject matter of the claim are irreconcilable.
o There is no conflict, because Sec. 699 was not carried over into the
Administrative Code.
▪ The Court rejects COA’s citation of the whereas clause of the
Administrative Code which states that it shall be a unified
document.
▪ If the intent of the legislature is not shown to be that of express
repeal, the later enactment may be considered as cumulative, or a
continuation of the old law.
o Furthermore, the Administrative Code does not fall under the second
category of implied repeals.
▪ According to the Opinion of Drilon, it is clear that the intent of
the legislature was only to cover those aspects of government
that pertain to administration, organisation, and procedure.
o Lastly, the Court holds that it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction
that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored.
▪ The legislature is presumed to know the existing law on the
subject, and it must be presumed that they are not enacting
inconsistent or conflicting statutes.
Admin (1. General Concepts)
Malaga v Panaches
GR No. 86695 Sept. 3, 1992
J. Cruz
Topic: General Concepts
Petitioners: MARIA ELENA MALAGA, under B.E. CONSTRUCTION; JOSIELEEN
NAJARRO, under BEST BUILT CONSTRUCTION; JOSE N. OCCEÑA, under THE FIRM
OF JOSE N. OCCEÑA; and the ILOILO BUILDERS CORPORATION
Respondents: MANUEL R. PENACHOS, JR., ALFREDO MATANGGA, ENRICO TICAR
AND TERESITA VILLANUEVA, as Chairman and Members of PBAC-BENIGNO
PANISTANTE, in his capacity as President of Iloilo State College of Fisheries; and HON.
LODRIGIO L. LEBAQUIN
Doctrine: 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as “any agency of
the National Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special
functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering
special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term
includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and government-owned or controlled
corporations”
Case Summary: A restraining order was issued against ISCOF for changing the deadlines of
the bidding process which caused the disqualification of petitioners. The respondents argue that
ISCOF was a state instrumentality covered by PD 1818 which prohibits injunctions & ROs
against it. The SC held that while ISCOF is a government instrumentality, the prohibition in
PD 1818 was intended for facts/exercise of discretion in technical cases. The present case does
not fall within the law.
Facts:
● Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualification, Bids and
Awards Committee (PBAC) caused the publication in the Western Visayas Daily an
Invitation to Bid for the construction of the Micro Laboratory Building.
○ Last day of submitting pre-qualification reqts: Dec 2, 1988
○ Bids would be opened - Dec 12, 1988 3PM
● Malaga & Najarro submitted their documents 2PM of Dec. 2, 1988. Occena
submitted on Dec 5.
● Malaga, Najarro and Occena weren’t allowed to participate because they were
considered late b/c of the 10AM cut off.
● Dec 12, 1988 - petitioners filed a complaint with the RTC against the chairman and
members of PBAC, claiming that PBAC refused without just cause their documents.
○ They sought to reset the Dec 12 bidding and acceptance of their
documents.
● Judge Lebaquin issued a restraining order to stop PBAC from doing the
bidding.
● Dec. 16, 1988 - defendants filed a motion to lift the order alleging that the court
was prohibited from issuing such orders, injunctions by PD 1818.
○ They also claimed that the injunction was moot because the RO was
received late at 2PM on Dec 12 after the bidding was conducted at 11:30
AM.
● Plaintiffs argued PD 1818 doesn’t apply. While ISCOF was a state college, it had
its own charter and separate existence and wasn’t part of the national
government/any local political subdivision.
○ Even if PD 1818 applies, the prohibition presumed a valid government
project, not one tained with anomalies like ITC.
PAGE 6
● Jan 2, 1989 - TC lifted the RO and denied the petition for PI. The building was an
infrastructure project falling within the PD 1818. Further the RO was served after the
bidding was held.
● Plaintiff again reiterates that PD 1818 DOESN’T apply to ISCOF because of its
separate corporate personality. The PI is not yet moot because even if bids were
opened, there was no award yet. Lastly, project was with irregularities:
○ No time deadline as to submission of pre-qualif documents but there was a
10AM cut off
○ Bidding was said to be done at 3PM, but was really done at 10AM.
○ The Invitation to Bid form did not contain the needed particulars.
● Respondents: the board of trustees of ISCOF are all govt officials under PD 1523 and
since the operations are provided for in the General Appropriations Law, it is a
government institution.
○ They posted on the ISCOF bulletin 10AM deadline for the pre-qualif docs
and the 1PM opening of bids. Even when the petitioners were informed of
their disqualification which had become final, they didn’t take any
immediate action.
W/N ISCOF is a govt instrumentality? YES. It is a chartered institution BUT the
injunction can lie.
● 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as “any agency of
the National Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested
with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate
powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually
through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and
government-owned or controlled corporations” (Sec. 2 (5) Introductory Provisions).
● Same code describes a chartered instituion to “refers to any agency organized or
operating under a special charter, and vested by law with functions relating to
specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes the state
universities and colleges, and the monetary authority of the state” (Sec. 2 (12)
Introductory Provisions).
● BUT! it doesn’t follow that ISCOF is auto covered by PD 1818.
● In Datiles v Sucaldito: the prohibition pertains to the issuance of injunctions against
administrative acts in controversies involving facts/exercise of discretion in
technical cases. On issues outside this & questions of law, the law can’t prevent the
power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.
● There are 2 irregularities done by PBAC that justifies the injunction:
○ It changed deadlines w/o prior notice. It merely posted at the Bulletin
Board.
○ PBAC was required to issue to pre-qualified applicants the plans,
specifications and proposal book forms for the project 30 days before the
date of bidding if the project cost is between 1-5M.ITC, it was only 10
days before the bidding that they issued the same.
● ITC, what is involved is not discretionary acts/technical matters. It is non-
compliance with procedural rules on bidding.
● PD 1818 was not intended to shield from judicial scrutiny irregularities of admin
agencies. Hence, the RO was properly issued by the judge.
Ruling: RO is not covered by prohibition in PD 1818.
Admin (1. General Concepts)
CHIONGBIAN v. ORBOS
Creation & Conversion| June 22, 1995 | MENDOZA, J.
Nature of Case: Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition challenging the validity of a provision in
R.A. 6734, or the Organic Act for the ARMM
Digest Maker: PCL
SUMMARY: Pursuant to the Constitution, Congress passed a law creating the ARMM
composed of the 4 provinces which through a plebiscite expressed their votes that they
wanted to be included in the said region. A total of 13 provinces and 9 cities participated in
the plebiscite. As the said law that created ARMM also allowed the President (Aquino) to
merge the provinces who voted NOT to be included in the ARMM to be merged into
existing regions, EO 429 was issued transferring certain provinces to other regions. The
transfer of these provinces was questioned, they alleged that Art. XIX, §13 of R.A. No.
6734 is unconstitutional.
DOCTRINE: Regrouping involves separating of administrative regions for the purpose of
facilitating the administrative supervision of local government units by the President and
insuring the efficient delivery of essential services. Administrative regions are mere
groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes, not for political
representation
FACTS:
 Pursuant to Art. X, Sec. 18 of the 1987 Constitution, Congress passed R.A. No. 6734,
the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, calling for a
plebiscite to be held in provinces in Mindanao2.
 Nov 16 1989: In the plebiscite, 4 provinces voted in favor of creating an autonomous
region. These are the provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi.
o In accordance with the constitutional provision, these provinces became the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).
o On the other hand, with respect to provinces and cities not voting in favor of the
Autonomous Region, Art. XIX, Sec. 13 of R.A. No. 6734 provides:
 The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in
the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions:
Provided, however, that the President may, by administrative determination,
merge the existing regions.
 Pursuant to the above provision, Pres. Cory Aquino issued EO 429, "Providing for the
Reorganization of the Administrative Regions in Mindanao.” 3
2
Basilan, Cotabato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Palawan,
South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur,
and the cities of Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto
Princesa and Zamboanga.
3
(1) Misamis Occidental, at present part of Region X, will become part of Region IX.
(2) Oroquieta City, Tangub City and Ozamiz City, at present parts of Region X will become
parts of Region IX.
(3) South Cotabato, at present a part of Region XI, will become part of Region XII.
(4) General Santos City, at present part of Region XI, will become part of Region XII.
(5) Lanao del Norte, at present part of Region XII, will become part of Region IX.
(6) Iligan City and Marawi City, at present part of Region XII, will become part of Region IX.
PAGE 7
 The petitioners are Congressmen representing those provinces not part of the ARMM,
contending that:
o RA 6734 is unconstitutional because (1) it unduly delegates legislative power to the
President by authorizing him to "merge [by administrative determination] the
existing regions" or at any rate provides no standard for the exercise of the power
delegated and (2) the power granted is not expressed in the title of the law.
 The Solicitor General defends the reorganization of the regions:
o As merely the exercise of a power "traditionally lodged in the President," as held in
Abbas v. COMELEC, and as a mere incident of his power of general supervision
over local governments and control of executive departments, bureaus and offices
under Art. X, Sec. 16 and Art. VII, Sec. 17 of the Consti
o There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only a grant of the power to
"fill up" or provide the details of legislation because Congress did not have the
facility to provide for them.
o The power of the President to “merge existing regions” as embraced in RA 6734 is
not limited to the merger of those regions in which the provinces and cities which
took part in the plebiscite are located but that it extends to all regions in Mindanao
as necessitated by the establishment of the autonomous region.
o PD 1416 and PD 1772 also provides the President shall have continuing authority to
reorganize the National government, guided by generally accepted principles of
good government and responsive national government, as well as guidelines for a
more “efficient, effective, economical, and development-oriented governmental
framework.”
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1: W/N the power to "merge" administrative regions is legislative in character, as
petitioners contend, or whether it is executive in character, as respondents claim it is –
EXECUTIVE.
Ratio:
1. The SC first recalls the nature of administrative regions and the basis and purpose for their
creation.
o RA 5435 was passed authorizing the President, with the help of a Commission on
Reorganization, to reorganize the different departments, bureaus, agencies, etc., to
promote simplicity, economy, and efficiency in government. The Commission is
required to submit its Reorganization Plan the the President and the President will
submit it to Congress. The Plan would become effective upon approval of Congress.
o The Reorganization Commission prepared an Integrated Reorganization Plan which
divided the country in 11 administrative regions, and this was approved and made
part of the law through P.D. No. 1.
2. Thus, pursuant to P.D. No. 1, the creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative
regions by the President is pursuant to authority granted to him by law.
o Congress, in approving the Plan, merely followed the pattern set in previous
legislation dating back to the initial organization of administrative regions in 1972.
o The choice of the President as delegate is logical because the division of the country
into regions is intended to facilitate not only the administration of local governments
but also the direction of executive departments which the law requires should have
regional offices.
o Abbas ruling: "while the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly
provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged
Admin (1. General Concepts)
with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over
local governments [see Art. X, Sec. 4 of the Constitution]."
3. There is, therefore, no abdication by Congress of its legislative power in conferring on the
President the power to merge administrative regions.
4. The question is whether Congress has provided a sufficient standard by which the
President is to be guided in the exercise of the power granted and whether in any event the
grant of power to him is included in the subject expressed in the title of the law.
ISSUE #2: Whether Art. XIX, Sec. 13 is invalid because it contains no standard to guide
the President's discretion – NO, Sec. 13 is not invalid as it provides a standard.
Ratio:
1. A legislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply be gathered or implied. Nor
need it be found in the law challenged because it may be embodied in other statutes on the
same subjects as that of the challenged legislation.
o With respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions, the standard is to
be found in the same policy underlying the grant to the President in R.A. No. 5435 of
the power to reorganize the Executive Department, to wit: "to promote simplicity,
economy and efficiency in the government…”
o As the original 11 administrative regions were established in accordance with this
policy, it is logical to suppose that in authorizing the President to "merge [by
administrative determination] the existing regions" in view of the withdrawal from
some of those regions of the provinces now constituting the Autonomous Region, the
purpose of Congress was to reconstitute the original basis for the organization
of administrative regions.
o Also, the reorganization of the remaining administrative regions is germane to
the general subject of R.A. No. 6734, which is the establishment of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.
o Non-assenting provinces and cities are to remain in the region as
designated upon the creation of the Autonomous Region, may nevertheless
be regrouped with contiguous provinces forming other regions as the
exigency of administration may require.
2. The regrouping is done only on paper. It involves no more than a redefinition of the lines
separating administrative regions for the purpose of facilitating the administrative
supervision of local government units by the President and insuring the efficient delivery
of essential services. There will be no "transfer" of local governments from one region to
another.
3. Regrouping involves separating of administrative regions for the purpose of facilitating
the administrative supervision of local government units by the President and insuring the
efficient delivery of essential services.
o Administrative regions are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for
administrative purposes, not for political representation
o It is not even analogous to a redistricting or to the division or merger of
local governments, which all have political consequences on the right of
people residing in those political units to vote and to be voted for. It cannot
be overemphasized that administrative regions are mere groupings of
contiguous provinces for administrative purposes, not for political
representation.
4. The reorganization of administrative regions in E.O. No. 429 is based on relevant criteria,
to wit: (1) contiguity and geographical features; (a) transportation and communication
facilities; (3) cultural and language groupings; (4) land area and population; (5) existing
PAGE 8

regional centers adopted by several agencies; (6) socio-economic development programs Preclaro V. Sandiganbayan
in the regions and (7) number of provinces and cities. GR No. 111091 | 21 Aug 1995
J. Kapunan
Ruling/Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petitions for certiorari and prohibition are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Preclaro was caught accepting money from a contractor of a DOST
construction project by the NBI. Thecontractors reported to the NBI that he
asked for the amount of P200,0000 from the contractor in exercise of his
function as the project manager handling the construction in the DOST
Compound.
Case
As an employee based on a contract (job order), Preclaro assails before the
Summar
Court the jurisdiction of the SB which charged him with violation of Sec 3(a)
y
of the Annti-Graft Act (RA 3019) claiming that he was not a public officer as
was defined by the law.
The Court dismissed his petition for lack of merit as the word of the law is
clear that his position is included under the definition of a public officer. He
was declared by the court to be a part of the non-career service.
 Sec 2(b) RA 3019 "Public officer" includes elective and appointive
officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the
classified or unclassified or exempt service receiving compensation,
even nominal, from the government as defined in the preceding
subparagraph.
 Non-career service in particular is characterized by —
(1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual test of merit and fitness
utilized for the career service; and (2) tenure which is limited to a period
specified by law, or which is coterminous with that of the appointing authority
or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a particular
project for which purpose employment was made.
 The Non-Career Service shall include:
Doctrine (1) Elective officials and their personal or confidential staff;
(2) Secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their positions at
the pleasure of the President and their personal or confidential staff(s);
(3) Chairman and members of commissions and boards with fixed terms of
office and their personal or confidential staff;
(4) Contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in
accordance with a special contract to undertake a specific work or job,
requiring special or technical skills not available in the employing agency, to
be accomplished within a specific period, which in no case shall exceed one
year, and performs or accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own
responsibility with a minimum of direction and supervision from the hiring
agency; and
(5) Emergency and seasonal personnel

RELEVANT FACTS
 14 june 1990: Preclaro was charged before the Sandiganbayan (SB) with violation of Sec
3(a) of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)
 Preclaro was the Project Manager/Consultant of the Chemical Mineral Division
under a component of the Industrial Development Institute (IDI), an agency of
DOST. He was hired under written contract to supervise construction of a building
on the DOST compound in Taguig.
 contract to remain in effect up to end of the construction period unless sooner
terminated

Admin (1. General Concepts)

PAGE 9
 Jaime Sta Maria Construction undertook construction of the building in Bicutan,
Taguig worth P17,695, 000 jointly funded by PH and Jap Govts
 Offense committed in relation to performance of official duties: Preclaro, before
the project was completed, requested/demanded for himself and for another
P200,000 claimed to be part of the expected profit of P460,000 in connection witht
he construction wherein Preclaro intervened in his capacity as Project
Manager/Consultant of the construction.
 ARRAIGNMENT: Preclaro pled “not guilty”
 2ND DIVISION OF SB JUDGEMENT: found Preclaro guilty and sentenced him to
suffer indeterminate penalty ranging from 6yrs 1month to. 10yrs and a day and perpetual
disqualification from public office
 Event of Violation as narrated in comment of SolGen
 May 1990: Alexander Resoso, Proj Engnr of Sta Maria Construction Company, was
approached by Preclaro. Prelaro made overtures that expenses in the Change Order
will be deductive (charged to contractor by deducting from contract price) instead
of additive (charged to the owner). Preclaro intimated that he can forget about the
deductive provided he be given P200,000 from the contractor’s profit
 7 June 1990: Sta Maria Sr. And Resoso went to NBI to report the incident
 NBI entrapment plan: Sta Maria Sr was made to prepare P50,000 to represent the
grease money which was dusted by NBI with fluorescent powder. Resoso then
proceeded to meet Preclaro at the designated place (Wendy’s)
 CONFRONTATION AND APPREHENSION (aka where it gets sketchy)
 Jimmy Sta Maria allegedly handed the enveloped containing the grease
money to Preclaro who received them and placed them under his left armpit.
At that time, NBI accosted Preclaro so that the envelopes fell. When he was
instructed by NBI to pick them up, he refused prompting the NBI men to pick
them up and bag them.
 NBI Forensics Chemistry Section: Preclaro’s palm was tested positive of
fluorescent powder but his shirt and pants did not have any on them.
 PRESENT PETITION FOR REVIEW filed by Preclaro
RATIO DECIDENDI
Issue Ratio
W/N SB erred NO, the court was right to take cognizance of the case for he is a
in taking public officer as defined under RA 3019
cognizance of
the case, instead  Sec 2(b) RA 3019 "Public officer" includes elective and
of dismissing it appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary,
for lack of JD whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt service
(Preclaro receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government
alleged he was as defined in the preceding subparagraph.
not a public  Preclaro asserts he’s not a public officer as defined above as
officer) he is neither appointed nor elected to a public office And
that he is merely hired on contractual basis
 INTERPRETATION OF COURT: term “include” in the
provision means that the definition is not restrictive
 PD 807 reclassified the old categories (“classified,
unclassified, or exempted service” ) into Career and Non-
Career Service (see doctrine for defn)
 Preclaro falls under non-career service category of the Civil
Admin (1. General Concepts)
Service and is thus a public officer as defined under RA 3019.
The fact that he was not required to record his working hours or
that he was not made tot ake an oath of office in unnecessary
because the provision clearly included him within the definition
of a public officer
W/N SB erred NO
in not ruling  Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts
that not all or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law,
elements of the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
offense officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: 
charged/guilt of (b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present,
Preclaro have share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in
been established connection with any contract or transaction between the
beyond Government and any other part, wherein the public officer in his
reasonable official capacity has to intervene under the law.
doubt  Preclaro’s duties as project manager includes evaluation of
contractor’s accomplishment reports /billings. This means he has
privilege and authority to make a favorable recommendation and
act in behalf of the government. Thus, all the elements of the
offense under the provision are present.
 Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean absolute certainty
but rather moral certainty or that proof produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind
 Preclaro questioned the credibility of the witness’s testimony and
the evidence
 Regarding the testimony, the court ruled that there was
merely misinterpretation or misunderstanding which
resulted to slightly conflicting testimonies
 As to the lack of documentation during the turnover of the
money, the court admitted the declaration of the defense
that there are numerous witnesses who saw the exchange
and the fluorescent powder on his hand was telling
 Preclaro claimed he had no fluorescent powder on his hands
but failed to produce evidence to support his claim
RULING
From the foregoing, the conclusion is inescapable that on the basis of the testimonial and
documentary evidence presented during the trial, the guilt of petitioner has been established
beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Sandiganbayan is hereby AFFIRMED. SO
ORDERED.
PAGE 10
LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK V. ASSOCIATION OF LDB EMPLOYEES
G.R. 120319 – October 6, 1995
J. Romero
Topic: General Concepts
Doctrine: The CA shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and
decisions made by quasi-judicial instrumentalities.
Petitioners: Luzon Development Bank (LDB)
Respondents: Association of LDB Employees (ALDBE) and Atty. Ester Garcia in her capacity
as Voluntary Arbitrator
Case Summary: An arbitration case between LDB and ALDBE was decided on by the
Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Ester Garcia. Said decision was in favor of the ALDBE, and so
the bank filed a petition for certiorari directly to the SC to set aside said decision. The SC
ruled that voluntary arbitrators or a panel of such arbitrators are likened to a “quasi-judicial
instrumentality.” On decisions and awards by quasi-judicial instrumentalities, the CA has
concurrent appellate jurisdiction with the SC, so because of this, the SC referred the case
back to the CA for a proper disposition of the case.
Facts:
 There was an arbitration case between LDB and ALDBE on whether or not the
company violated a CBA provision and the MOA dated April 1994 regarding
promotions
o At a conference, the parties agreed on the submission of their respective
position papers
o Atty. Ester Garcia in her capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator (VA) received
ALDBE’s paper on January 18, 1995
 LDB failed to submit a paper despite reminders from the VA to
do so
o May 24, 1995: Without LDB’s position paper, the VA rendered a decision:
 “WHEREFORE, finding is hereby made that the bank has NOT
adhered to the CBA provision nor the MOA on promotion…”
o Because of the decision from the VA, LDB filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition seeking to set aside the decision of the VA
 In labor law context:
o Arbitration is the reference of a labor dispute to an impartial third person
for determination on the basis of evidence and arguments presented by
such parties
 Arbitration is either compulsory or voluntary
o Compulsory arbitration: A system whereby the parties to a dispute are
compelled by the government to forego their right to strike and are
compelled to accept the resolution of their dispute through arbitration by a
third party
 A disinterested third party comes up with a decision that is final
and binding on the parties, and such third party is normally
appointed by the government
o Voluntary arbitration: A referral of a dispute by the parties, pursuant to a
voluntary arbitration clause in their collective agreement
Admin (1. General Concepts)
 An impartial third person makes a decision and said decision is
binding and final
 Pursuant to said agreement, the parties have chosen a mutually
acceptable arbitrator who shall hear and decide the case
 The parties mutually agreed to be bound by said arbitrator’s
decision
 In the PH context:
o The parties CBA are required to include provisions for a machinery for the
resolution of grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation
of the CBA or company personnel arising from the interpretation or
implementation of the CBA or company personnel policies
 For this purpose, the parties to a CBA shall name and designate
the VA or a panel of arbitrators, or include a procedure for their
selection, preferably from those accredited by the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board
o Art. 261 of the LC provides for exclusive original jurisdiction of such VA
or panel over (1) interpretation or implementation of the CBA, and (2)
interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies
o Art. 252 of the LC authorizes them, but ONLY UPON AGREEMENT OF
THE PARTIES, to exercise jurisdiction over other labor disputes
o Art. 217 of the LC states that the labor arbiter has jurisdiction over the ff.
cases:
 Unfair labor practices; termination disputes; if accompanied with
a claim for reinstatement; those cases which involve wages, rates
of pay, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of
employment; claims for damages arising from EER relations;
cases arising from a disputes regarding legality of strikes and
lockouts; EXCEPT claims for Employees compensation, SSS,
Medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims arising from
EER involving an amount exceeding P5,000 regardless of
whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement
o Based on the laws stated above, jurisdiction conferred by law on a VA or a
panel is quite limited compared to that of the labor arbiter and the appellate
jurisdiction of the NLRC
o The law states that “the award or decision of the VA… shall be final and
executory after 10 calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or
decision by the parties”
 On the other hand, “the decision, awards, or orders of the LA
are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission
within 10 calendar days from receipt…”
o Hence, while there is an express mode of appeal from decisions of the
Labor Arbiter, RA 6715 is silent with respect to appeals from decisions of
VA or its panel
 Past practice shows that decision by VA is more often than not
elevated to SC on a petition for certiorari  in effect, equating
the VA with the NLRC and CA  this is illogical and imposes
an unnecessary burden upon the SC
Issues + Held:
3. Which Court has jurisdiction for the appellate review of adjudications of quasi-
judicial entities – Supreme Court
PAGE 11
 Sec. 9 of BP 129, as amended by RA 1902 states that the COURT OF APPEALS
SHALL EXERCISE:
o (B) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments and decisions
of RTCs and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards, the SEC,
and the CSC, except those falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
SC in accordance with the Constitution, Labor Code, and the Judiciary Act
of 1948
 Assuming arguendo that the VA or the panel may not be strictly considered as a
“quasi-judicial agency”, we can comprehend that is within the concept of a “quasi-
judicial instrumentality”
o A quasi-judicial instrumentality is anything used as a means or agency
o Governmental agency or instrumentality are synonymous in the sense that
either them is a means by which a government acts, or by which a certain
government act or functions is performed
o The word “instrumentality” with respect to a state, contemplates an
authority to which the state delegates governmental power for the
performance of a state function
o The VA no less performs a state function pursuant to a governmental
power delegated to him under the provisions in the LC, and therefore, he
falls within the contemplation of the term “instrumentality”
 Having said this, the decision or award of the VA or the panel should likewise be
appealable to the CA
 In the same vein, under Sec. 22 of RA 876, the Arbitration Law, arbitration is
deemed a special proceeding of which the court specified in the contract or
submission, or if none be specified, the RTC for the province or city in which one of
the parties resides or is doing business, or in which the arbitration is held, shall have
jurisdiction
o In effect, this equates the decision of the VA with that of the RTC
o Therefore, in the petition for certiorari from that award or decision of the
VA, the CA must be deemed to have concurrent jurisdiction with the SC
 As a matter of policy, the case shall be remanded to the CA for
proper disposition
Ruling: Refer the case to the CA
Admin (1. General Concepts)
Iron and Steel Authority vs CA
Parties | October 25, 1995|Feliciano, J.
Digest maker: Ysabel M.
SUMMARY: During the eminent domain proceedings for a tract of land to be used for the
development of a steel mill, petitioner ISA’s statutory term expired. Owner of land MCFC
filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging the lack of a juridical person against whom judgment
may be rendered. SC allowed for the substitution of the Republic of the Philippines as party
to the case.
DOCTRINE: When the statutory term of a non-incorporated agency expires, the powers,
duties and functions as well as the assets and liabilities of that agency revert back to, and are
re-assumed by, the Republic of the Philippines, in the absence of special provisions of law
specifying some other disposition thereof
FACTS:
 Petitioner Iron and Steel Authority ("ISA") was created by Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 272 in order to develop and promote the iron and steel industry in the PH.
 ISA’s powers included: “(j) to initiate expropriation of land required for basic iron
and steel facilities for subsequent resale and/or lease to the companies involved…”
 ISA’s original term of 5 years expired; extended for another 10 years by EO 555
 The National Steel Corporation (NSC), subsidiary of the National Development Corp
owned by the national government, embarked on an expansion program involving the
construction of an integrated steel mill in Iligan City
 Proclamation No. 2239 was issued withdrawing from sale or settlement a large tract
of public land located in Iligan City, and reserving that land for the use and
immediate occupancy of NSC.
 Certain portions of the land was occupied by private respondent Maria Cristina
Fertilizer Corp (MCFC) so Letter of Instruction was issued directing the NSC to
"negotiate with the owners of MCFC, for and on behalf of the Government, for the
compensation of MCFC's present occupancy rights on the subject land."
 Negotiations between NSC and MCFC failed. ISA commenced eminent domain
proceedings in RTC. A writ of possession was issued by RTC in favor of ISA. ISA
placed NSC in possession and control of the land occupied by MCFC.
 While trial was ongoing, statutory existence of ISA expired.
 MCFC filed Motion to Dismiss, contending no valid judgment could be rendered
against ISA which had ceased to be a juridical person. Motion to Dismiss was
granted, anchored on the provision of the Rules of Court stating that "only natural or
juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil case."
 ISA moved for reconsideration, urging that the Republic of the Philippines, being the
real party-in-interest, should be allowed to be substituted for petitioner ISA
 MR denied. CA affirmed TC dismissal:
o Petitioner ISA, "a government regulatory agency exercising sovereign functions,"
did not have the same rights as an ordinary corporation and that the ISA, unlike
corporations organized under the Corporation Code, was not entitled to a period
for winding up its affairs after expiration of its legally mandated term
o Action for expropriation could not prosper because the basis for the proceedings,
the ISA's exercise of its delegated authority to expropriate, had become
ineffective as a result of the delegate's dissolution, and could not be continued in
the name of Republic of the Philippines
PAGE 12

Issues and Ratio:

W/N the Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted for ISA in view of the
expiration of ISA’s term - YES
 ROC Rule 3, Sec. 1: Who May Be Parties. — Only natural or juridical persons or
entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action.
 ISA was vested with some of the powers or attributes normally associated with
juridical personality. There is, however, no provision in P.D. No. 272 recognizing
ISA as possessing general or comprehensive juridical personality separate and
distinct from that of the Government.
 ISA is a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Republic, its powers,
duties, functions, assets and liabilities are properly regarded as folded back into the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines and hence assumed once again by the
Republic, no special statutory provision having been shown to have mandated
succession thereto by some other entity or agency of the Republic.
 ISA instituted the expropriation proceedings in its capacity as an agent or delegate
or representative of the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to its authority under
P.D. No. 272. The present expropriation suit was brought on behalf of and for the
benefit of the Republic as the principal of ISA
o ROC Sec. 3. Representative Parties. — A trustee of an expressed trust, a
guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by statute
may sue or be sued without joining the party for whose benefit the action is
presented or defended;
 The expiration of ISA's statutory term did not by itself require or justify the dismissal
of the eminent domain proceedings.
 E.B. Marcha Transport Company vs IAC: RP held to be a proper party to sue for
recovery of possession of property although the "real" or registered owner of the
property was the Philippine Ports Authority
o It can be said that in suing for the recovery of the rentals, the Republic of
the Philippines acted as principal of the Philippine Ports Authority,
directly exercising the commission it had earlier conferred on the latter as
its agent
o Dismissing the complaint on the ground that the Republic of the
Philippines is not the proper party would result in needless delay in the
settlement of this matter and also in derogation of the policy against
multiplicity of suits. 
 No new legislative act is necessary should the Republic decide, upon being
substituted for ISA, in fact to continue to prosecute the expropriation proceedings.
o The legislative authority, a long time ago, enacted a continuing delegation
of authority to the President of the Philippines to exercise, or cause the
exercise of, the power of eminent domain on behalf of the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines.
o Revised Admin Code of 1987: Sec. 12. Power of eminent domain. —
The President shall determine when it is necessary or advantageous to
exercise the power of eminent domain in behalf of the National
Government, and direct the Solicitor General, whenever he deems the
action advisable, to institute expopriation proceedings in the proper court. 

CA decision to the extent that it affirmed TC dismissal is Reversed and Set Aside. Case is
Remanded to allow substitution of the Republic of the Philippines for petitioner Iron and Steel
Authority and for further proceedings.
Admin (1. General Concepts)
PAGE 13
Ignacia Balicas v. Fact-Finding & Intelligence Bureau (FFIB)
G.R. 145972 – March 23, 2004
J. Quisumbing
Topic: General Concepts (EO292, Sec. 2)
Doctrine: The responsibility of monitoring housing and land development projects is not
lodged with the DENR, but with the HLURB as the sole regulatory body for housing and land
development.
Petitioners: Ignacia Balicas
Respondents: Fact-Finding & Intelligence Bureau (FFIB), Office of the Ombudsman
Case Summary: Petitioner Ignacia Balicas was a DENR Senior Enviromental
Management Specialist who was charged to monitor the development of the Cherry Hills
Subdivision in Antipolo City. The complaint against her was lodged after said subdivision
was buried due to a landslide. The herein respondents allege that Balicas was remiss in her
duties. The SC ruled in favor of Balicas. It said that the duty of monitoring the development
of housing and development projects is not lodged with the DENR. Instead, such
monitoring duty is with the HLURB.
Facts:
 This case is about the Cherry Hills Subdivision [CHS] tragedy that happened on
August 3, 1999. Note: The case did not mention what the “tragedy” was, but
according to wiki, there was a massive landslide that damaged the subdivision. It
resulted to 60 deaths and the burying of 378 houses in the subdivision. CHS was
located in Antipolo City.
 August 1990: Philjas Corporation [Philjas], the developer of CHS, was registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC] with the primary purpose of
developing and providing low-cost housing for the poor.
 The case has a portion that talked about the involvement of several respondents
probably from the appealed cases. The instant case is a separate appeal from the
petitioner, Balicas.
o Daniel Garcia: The Mayor of Antipolo City who endorsed CHS to the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board [HLURB]
o Tungpalan: Then HLURB commissioner (July 1991) who issued the
Development Permit for “land development only” for the entire land area
of 12.1 hectares.
o Jasareno: The person who allowed the leveling/earth-moving operations
of the development project
o Amado Deloria: Then HLURB commissioner (November 1991) who
issued the Certificate of Registration in favor of CHS, with license to sell
1,007 units in the subdivision
o Pollisco: The person who issued the Small Scale Mining Permit [SSMP] to
Philjas to extract 10,000 cu. Meters of filling materials from the area
o Balicas (Herein petitioner): A DENR officer who prepared the field
evaluation for the issuance of CHS’ Environmental Compliance Certificate
[ECC].
o Principe: The DENR Regional Executive Director who approved Balicas’
evaluation, and subsequently awarded the ECC.
Admin (1. General Concepts)
 Balicas’ involvement: She was a DENR senior environmental management
specialist assigned in the province of Rizal. Records show that she monitored the
implementation of the CHS Project Development to check compliance with the
conditions in the ECC. The charge against her filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman involved her supposed failure to monitor and inspect the development
of CHS.
o Balicas’ defense: She monitored the development of CHS. This was
evidenced by three (3) monitoring reports made within 1994-1995. She
also averred that she conducted subsequent compliance monitoring of the
ECC’s terms and conditions. She reported that there were no violations.
Lastly, she claimed good faith and exercise of due diligence insisting that
twhat occurred was a fortuitous event.
 Ombudsman Ruling: Ruled against Balicas. Imposed the “supreme” penalty of
dismissal from office for gross neglect of duty. The three monitoring reports were
insufficient to prove she had done what was necessary with the regular performance
of her duties. It was also incumbent upon her to check the surrounding mountainside
and its stability to see if it poses a hazard to the subdivision.
 CA Ruling: Affirmed the Ombudsman’s ruling.
Issues + Held:
4. W/N there had been a gross neglect of duty on the part of Balicas [NONE]
 The Court first looked at what her lawfully prescribed duties were as a Senior
Environmental Management Specialist [SEMS]. Unfortunately, DENR regulations
are silent on the duties of such position. What the regulations talked about was the
function of the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office [PENRO].
 However, a letter from DENR Region IV’s chief of personnel revealed such duties 4
of a SEMS. What is noticeable is that there was no monitoring duty whatsoever
mentioned in such letter.
 The regulations show that it was the PENRO who is mandated to “(1) monitor
project compliance with the conditions set in the ECC; and…5.”
o The rules show that the PENRO’s monitoring duties mainly deal with
broad environmental concerns, particularly pollution abatement. This
general monitoring duty is applicable to all types of physical developments
that may adversely impact on the environment, whether housing projects,
industrial sites, recreational facilities, or scientific undertakings.
 The Court then talked about the duties of the HLURB. On the outset, the Court set
that it was the HLURB who had a more specific duty to monitor such developments
given that it is the sole regulatory body for housing and land development
4
(1) Conducts investigation of pollution sources or complaints; (2) Review[s] plans and
specifications of proposes (sic) or existing treatment plants and pollution abatement structures
and devices to determine their efficiency and suitability for the kind of pollutants to be
removed and to recommend issuance or denial of permits; (3) Conducts follow-up inspection of
construction of pollution abatement/work and structures to oversee compliance with approved
plans and specifications; (4) Recommends remedial measures for the prevention, abatement
and control of pollution; (5) Prepares technical reports on pollution investigation and related
activities; and (6) Performs related work as assigned.
5
(2) monitor compliance with the Environmental Management Plan (EMP) and applicable
laws, rules and regulations; and (3) provide a basis for timely decision-making and effective
planning and management of environmental measures through the monitoring of actual project
impacts vis-à-vis predicted impacts in the EIS
PAGE 14
o The Court looked at PD1586, Sec. 4 6. The legal duty to monitor housing
projects, like the Cherry Hills Subdivision, against calamities such as
landslides due to continuous rain, is clearly placed on the HLURB, not on
the petitioner as PENRO senior environmental management specialist.
o The responsibility of monitoring housing and land development projects is
not lodged with the DENR, but with the HLURB as the sole regulatory
body for housing and land development.
Ruling: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions, hereby
DENIED.
6 
PD1586, Sec. 4: Presidential Proclamation of Environmentally Critical Areas and Projects.
— The President of the Philippines may, on his own initiative or upon recommendation of the
National Environment Protection Council, by proclamation declare certain projects,
undertakings or areas in the country as environmentally critical. No person, partnership or
corporation shall undertake or operate any such declared environmentally critical project or
area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by the President or
his duly authorized representative. For the proper management of said critical project or area,
the President may by his proclamation reorganize such government offices, agencies,
institutions, corporations or instrumentalities including the re- alignment of government
personnel, and their specific functions and responsibilities.
For the same purpose as above, the Ministry of Human Settlements [now HLURB] shall: (a)
prepare the proper land or water use pattern for said critical project(s) or area(s); (b)
establish ambient environmental quality standards; (c) develop a program of
environmental enhancement or protective measures against calamitous factors such as
earthquake, floods, water erosion and others; and (d) perform such other functions as
may be directed by the President from time to time.
Admin (1. General Concepts)
FUNA v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
G.R. No. 191672 – November 25, 2014
J. Bersamin
Topic: Executive Department – The President – Power of Appointment
Petitioner: Dennis A.B. Funa (Taxpayer, Concerned Citizen, Lawyer)
Respondents: Francisco T. Duque III (Chairman, CSC) and Leandro R. Mendoza (Executive
Secretary)
FACTS:
 Jan 11 2010: President Arroyo appointed Francisco T. Duque III as Chairman of the
Civil Service Commission (CSC).
 Feb 3, 2010: Commission on Appointments confirmed Duque’s appointment
 Feb 22, 2010: President Arroyo issued EO 864
o This made Duque a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the
following GOCCs: (a) GSIS; (b) PHILHEALTH; (c) ECC; (d) HDMF
 April 8, 2010: Petitioner Dennis A.B. Funa filed the instant petition assailing the
constitutionality of EO 864, as well as Sec 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 (EO 292).
o Funa also questioned the constitutionality of the designation of Duque as a
member of Board of Directors or Trustees of the GOCCs mentioned above
(in an ex officio capacity).
o Funa alleged that these were clear violations of Sec 1 and Sec 2, Art IX-A
of the 1987 Constitution, which prohibits Members of the CSC, during
their tenure, from holding any other office or employment
Petitioner:
 EO 864 and Sec 14 EO 292 violate the independence of the CSC, which was
constitutionality created to be protected from outside influences and political
pressures
o Further breach of independence: CSC is not part of the Executive
department, but said GOCCs are considered instrumentalities of the
Executive branch
EO 834 and EO 292 unconstitutionally expands the role of the CSC
 President may not amend the charters, which are enacted by Congress, by mere
issuance of an EO
 EO 834 and EO 292 violate the prohibition imposed upon members of constitutional
commissions from holding any other office or employment (conflict of interest)
Respondent:
 Duque’s membership in the governing Boards of the GOCCs is constitutional
 EO 864 and EO 292 preserve the independence of CSC considering that GOCCs with
original charters are excluded from the supervision and control that secretaries and
heads exercise over the departments to which these GOCCs are attached.
 Furthermore, GOCCs mentioned are exempt from President’s control
 There is no conflict of interest; Duque is just one member of CSC and matters may
be resolved with or without the participation of Duque
 The prohibition of not holding any other office does not cover positions in ex officio
capacities (cited Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Seretary)
PAGE 15

o Duque’s membership in the governing bodies merely imposes additional
duties and functions as incident and necessary consequences of his CSC
chairmanship
 EO 864/292 and the charters of the GOCCs are consistent with each other.
o The enactment of the subsequent law is not deemed to repeal/ amend
charters of GOCCs
ISSUES:
1. W/N the petitioner has legal standing
2. W/N Duque’s designation as member of the governing boards of the GSIS, PHIC,
ECC and HDMF is unconstitutional
3. W/N Duque was a De Facto Officer during his tenure as Director or Trustee of the
GOCCs
HELD:
1. YES. OSG only disputes the locus standi of petitioner who filed as a taxpayer,
concerned citizen, and lawyer; and this is a case of transcendental importance.
 Taxpayer (No): must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds
(No)
 Voters (No): must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the
election law in question
 Citizens (Yes): Issues raised must be of transcendental importance and
settled early
 Legislators (No): claim of official action that infringes legislators’
prerogatives
 The case now is of TRANSCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE, since it has obvious “far
reaching implications” and there is need to promulgate rules to guide the court for
future similar cases.
 The Court assumes liberal stance and allow the petitioner to institute the instant
petition.
NOTE: During the pendency of this petition, Duque’s designation as Director or Trustee
could have terminated or been rendered invalid by the enactment of Republic Act No.
10149 = case is MOOT AND ACADEMIC
 But Court still exercised its power of judicial review for the guidance of and as a
restraint upon the future, the Court will not abstain its power, for the cessation of the
controversy withstanding.
2. MAIN ISSUE: YES. Duque’s designation as member of the governing boards of
the GOCCs mentioned is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
 Sec 1, Art IX-A of the 1987 : ALL Constitutional Commissions are
INDEPENDENT:
o Although functions are executive in nature, they are not under the control of the
President of the Philippines
o Each Constitutional Commission conducts own proceedings and rules in the
exercise of its own discretion
o Sec 7, ART IX-A: Decisions, rulings, and orders = subject to review on
certiorari by the court
o Sec 2, Art IX-A of the 1987 Constitution: There are certain inhibitions and
disqualifications upon the Chairmen members (to protect independence)
Take Note: Being an appointive public official who does not occupy a cabinet
position, Duque is covered by Sec 7(2), Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution.
Thus, he can hold any other office or employment in the government during his
tenure as the Chairperson of CSC.
 Sec 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292: CSC Chairman membership in a
governing body is dependent on the condition that the functions of the government
entity where he will seat of Board member must affect the “career development,
employment status, rights, privileges, and welfare of government employees”.
o The Court held that these are among the primary functions of the CSC, so there
is no irregularity in the provision stated.
o Sec 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 IS CONSTITUTIONAL.
 Furthermore, GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC, and HDMF are also tasked to perform
other corporate powers and functions that are not personnel-related.
o When CSC chairman sits as member of the governing Boards of GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC, and HDMF, he may exercise powers and functions which
are not derived anymore from his position as CSC chairman.
o He also becomes entitled to receive per diem a form of additional compensation
that is not allowed by an ex officio position, which proscription is provided by
Sec 2, Art IX-A of the 1987 Constitution
o UNCONSTITUTIONAL
 Duque’s appointment also VIOLATES INDEPENDENCE of CSC.
o Contrary to the above mentioned claims of the respondents;
o GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC, and HDMF and the members of their
respective governing Boards are under the control of the President.
o CSC chairman cannot be a member of a government entity that is under the
control of the President.
o UNCONSTITUTIONAL
3. YES. Duque was a de facto officer during his tenure as a Director or Trustee of
the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF.
 A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable
authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is
valid on its face.
o in possession of an office, and is discharging its duties with authority
o such authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or informal,
so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer
o acts of the de facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de
jure officer
 ALL official actions of Duque as a Director or Trustee of GOCCs were PRESUMED
VALID, binding and effective as if he was the officer legally appointed and qualified
for the office.
o This is in order to protect the sanctity and integrity of the dealings entered
into
RULING: Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court UPHOLDS THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY of Sec 14 EO 292, but ANNULS AND VOIDS EO 864 and the
designation of Duque as member of the governing bodies of the GOCC for being
UNCONSTITUTIONAL and VIOLATIVE of Sec 1 and Sec 2 Art IX-A 1987 Constitution.

Admin (1. General Concepts)

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Admin (1. General Concepts)