G.R. No.

L-19313             January 19, 1962

DOMINADOR R. AYTONA, petitioner,
vs.
ANDRES V. CASTILLO, ET AL., respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N.

BENGZON, C.J.:

Without prejudice to the subsequent promulgation of more extended opinion, the Court adopted today, the
following resolutions: .

On December 29, 1961, then President Carlos P. Garcia appointed Dominador R. Aytona as ad
interim Governor of the Central Bank. On the same day, the latter took the corresponding oath.

On December 30, 1961, at noon, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office; and on December
31, 1961, he issued Administrative Order No. 2 recalling, withdrawing, and cancelling all ad
interim  appointment made by President Garcia after December 13, 1961, (date when he, Macapagal, had
been proclaimed elected by the Congress). On January 1, 1962, President Macapagal appointed Andres
V. Castillo as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank, and the latter qualified immediately.

On January 2, 1962, both appointed exercised the powers of their office, although Castillo informed
Aytona of his title thereto; and some unpleasantness developed in the premises of the Central Bank.
However, the next day and thereafter, Aytona was definitely prevented from holding office in the Central
Bank.

So, he instituted this proceeding which is practically, a quo warranto, challenging Castillo's right to
exercise the powers of Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona claims he was validly appointed, had
qualified for the post, and therefore, the subsequent appointment and qualification of Castillo was void,
because the position was then occupied by him. Castillo replies that the appointment of Aytona had been
revoked by Administrative Order No. 2 of Macapagal; and so, the real issue is whether the new President
had power to issue the order of cancellation of the ad interim appointments made by the past President,
even after the appointees had already qualified.1äwphï1.ñët

The record shows that President Garcia sent to the Commission on Appointments — which was not then
in session — a communication dated December 29, 1961, submitting "for confirmation" ad
interim appointments of assistant director of lands, councilors, mayors, members of the provincial boards,
fiscals, justices of the peace, officers of the army, etc.; and the name of Dominador R. Aytona as
Governor of the Central Bank occupies number 45, between a justice of the peace and a colonel of the
Armed Forces.

Another communication of President Garcia bearing the same date, submitted a list of ad
interim appointments of Foreign Affairs officers, judges, fiscals, chiefs of police, justices of the peace,
mayors, councilors, etc. number 63 of which was that of Dominador R. Aytona for Governor of the
Philippines in the Boards of International Monetary Fund, International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, etc.

A third communication likewise dated December 29, 1961, addressed to the Commission on
Appointments submitted for confirmation 124 names of persons appointed as judges of first instance,
members of provincial boards, and boards of government corporations, fiscals, justice of the peace, even
one associate justice of this Court occupying position No. 8 and two associate justices of the Court of
Appeals (9 and 10) between an assistant of the Solicitor-General's Office, and the chairman of the board
of tax appeals of Pasay City, who in turn are followed by judges of first instance, and inserted between
the latter is the name of another associate justice of the Court of Appeals.

There were other appointments thus submitted by President Garcia on that date, December 29, 1961. All
in all, about three hundred fifty (350) "midnight" or "last minute" appointments.

In revoking the appointments, President Macapagal is said to have acted for these and other reasons: (1)
the outgoing President should have refrained from filling vacancies to give the new President opportunity
to consider names in the light of his new policies, which were approved by the electorate in the last
elections; (2) these scandalously hurried appointments in mass do not fall within the intent and spirit of
the constitutional provision authorizing the issuance of ad interim appointments; (3) the appointments
were irregular, immoral and unjust, because they were issued only upon the condition that the appointee
would immediately qualify obviously to prevent a recall or revocation by the incoming President, with the
result that those deserving of promotion or appointment who preferred to be named by the new President
declined and were by-passed; and (4) the abnormal conditions surrounding the appointment and
qualifications evinced a desire on the part of the outgoing President merely subvert the policies of the
incoming administration.

It is admitted that many of the persons mentioned in the communication to the Commission on
Appointments dated December 29, 1961, did not qualify. There is evidence that in the night of December
29, there was a scramble in Malacañan of candidates for positions trying to get their written appointments
or having such appointments changed to more convenient places, after some last minute bargaining.
There was unusual hurry in the issuance of the appointments — which were not coursed through the
Department Heads — and in the confusion, a woman appointed judge was designated "Mr." and a man
was designated "Madam." One appointee who got his appointment and was required to qualify, resorted
to the rush of asking permission to swear before a relative official, and then never qualified.

We are informed, it is Malacañan's practice — which we find to be logical — to submit ad

interim appointments only when the Commission on Appointments is in session. One good reason for the
practice is that only those who have accepted the appointment and qualified are submitted for
confirmation. Nevertheless, this time, Malacañan submitted its appointments on the same day they were
issued; and the Commission was not then in session; obviously because it foresaw the possibility that the
incoming President would refuse to submit later the appointees of his predecessor. As a result, as already
adverted to, some persons whose names were submitted for confirmation had not qualified nor accepted
their appointments.

Because of the haste and irregularities, some judges of first instance qualified for districts wherein no
vacancies existed, because the incumbents had not qualified for other districts to which they had been
supposedly transferred or promoted.

Referring specifically to judges who had not qualified, the course of conduct adopted by Former Chief
Justice Moran is cited. Being ambassador in Spain and desiring to return to this Court even as associate
justice, Moran was tendered an ad interim  appointment thereto by President Quirino, after the latter had
lost the election to President Magsaysay, and before leaving the Presidency. Said Ambassador declined
to qualify being of the opinion that the matter should be left to the incoming newly-elected President.

Of course, nobody will assert that President Garcia ceased to be such earlier than at noon of December
30, 1961. But it is common sense to believe that after the proclamation of the election of President
Macapagal, his was no more than a "care-taker" administration. He was duty bound to prepare for the
orderly transfer of authority the incoming President, and he should not do acts which he ought to know,
would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his successor. The time for debate had passed; the electorate
had spoken. It was not for him to use powers as incumbent President to continue the political warfare that
had ended or to avail himself of presidential prerogatives to serve partisan purposes. The filling up
vacancies in important positions, if few, and so spaced to afford some assurance of deliberate action and
careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly
be permitted. But the issuance of 350 appointments in one night and planned induction of almost all of
them a few hours before the inauguration of the new President may, with some reason, be regarded by
the latter as an abuse Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken being apparently a mere partisan effort to
fill all vacant positions1 irrespective of fitness and other conditions, and thereby deprive the new
administration of an opportunity to make the corresponding appointments.

Normally, when the President makes appointments the consent of the Commission on Appointments, he
has benefit of their advice. When he makes ad interim  appointments, he exercises a special prerogative
and is bound to be prudent to insure approval of his selection either previous consultation with the
members of the Commission or by thereafter explaining to them the reason such selection. Where,
however, as in this case, the Commission on Appointments that will consider the appointees is different
from that existing at the time of the appointment2 and where the names are to be submitted by successor,
who may not wholly approve of the selections, the President should be doubly careful  in extending such
appointments. Now, it is hard to believe that in signing 350 appointments in one night, President Garcia
exercised such "double care" which was required and expected of him; and therefore, there seems to be
force to the contention that these appointments fall beyond the intent and spirit of the constitutional
provision granting to the Executive authority to issue ad interim appointments.

Under the circumstances above described, what with the separation of powers, this Court resolves that it
must decline to disregard the Presidential Administrative Order No. 2, cancelling such "midnight" or "last-
minute" appointments.

Of course, the Court is aware of many precedents to the effect that once an appointment has been
issued, it cannot be reconsidered, specially where the appointee has qualified. But none of them refer to
mass ad interim appointments (three-hundred and fifty), issued in the last hours of an outgoing Chief
Executive, in a setting similar to that outlined herein. On the other hand, the authorities admit of
exceptional circumstances justifying revocation3 and if any circumstances justify revocation, those
described herein should fit the exception.

Incidentally, it should be stated that the underlying reason for denying the power to revoke after the
appointee has qualified is the latter's equitable rights. Yet it is doubtful if such equity might be successfully
set up in the present situation, considering the rush conditional appointments, hurried maneuvers and
other happenings detracting from that degree of good faith, morality and propriety which form the basic
foundation of claims to equitable relief. The appointees, it might be argued, wittingly or unwittingly
cooperated with the stratagem to beat the deadline, whatever the resultant consequences to the dignity
and efficiency of the public service. Needless to say, there are instances wherein not only strict legality,
but also fairness, justice and righteousness should be taken into account.

WHEREFORE, the Court exercising its judgment and discretion in the matter, hereby dismiss the action,
without costs.

Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes and De Leon, J.J., concur.