G.R. No.
5246 September 16, 1910 On the 16th of June, 1908, Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz filed a motion in the
MANUELA GREY ALBA, ET AL., petitioners-appellants, vs. ANACLETO R. DE LA
CRUZ, objector-appellee.
Ramon Salinas, for appellants.
Aniceto G. Reyes, for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
These petitioners, Manuela, Jose, Juan, and Francisco, surnamed Grey y
Alba, are the only heirs of Doña Segunda Alba Clemente and Honorato
Grey, deceased. Remedios Grey y Alba, a sister of the petitioners, was
married on the 21st day of March, 1903, to Vicente Reyes and died on the
13th of July, 1905, without leaving any heirs except her husband. The four
petitioners, as coowners, sought to have registered the following-described
property:
A parcel of land situated in the barrio of Talampas, municipality of
Baliuag, Province of Bulacan, upon which are situated three houses
and one camarin of light material, having a superficial area of 52
hectares, 51 ares, and 22 centares; bounded on the north by the
highway (calzada) of Talampas and the lands of Rita Ruiz Mateo;
on the east by the lands of the said Rita Ruiz Mateo, Hermenegildo
Prado, Policarpo de Jesus, and a stream called Sapang Buslut; on
the south by the same stream and the lands of the capellania; and
on the west by the stream called Sapang Buslut, and the lands of
Vicente de la Cruz, Jose Camacho and Domingo Ruiz Mateo.
This parcel of agricultural land is used for the raising of rice and sugar cane
and is assessed at $1,000 United States currency. The petition, which was
filed on the 18th of December, 1906, was accompanied by a plan and
technical description of the above-described parcel of land.
After hearing the proofs presented, the court entered, on the 12th of
February, 1908, a decree in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 6
of section 54 of Act No. 926, directing that the land described in the
petitioner be registered in the names of the four petitioners, as coowners,
subject to the usufructuary right of Vicente Reyes, widower of Remedios
Grey.
Court of Land Registration asking for a revision of the case, including the
decision, upon the ground that he is the absolute owner of the two parcels
of land which are described in said motion, and which, according to his
allegations, are included in the lands decreed to the petitioners. He alleged
that the decree of February 12, 1908, was obtained maliciously and
fraudulently by the petitioners, thereby depriving him of said two parcels of
land. He further alleged that he was the absolute owner of the two parcels
of land, having inherited them from his father, Baldomero R. de la Cruz, who
had a state grant for the same. He therefore asked, under the provisions of
section 38 of the Land Registration Act (No. 496), a revision of the case, and
that the said decree be modified so as to exclude the two parcels of land
described in said motion. The Land Court upon this motion reopened the
case, and after hearing the additional evidence presented by both parties,
rendered, on the 23rd of November, 1908, its decision modifying the former
decree by excluding from the same the two parcels of land claimed by
Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz. From this decision and judgment the petitioners
appealed and now insist, first, that the trial court erred in reopening the
case and modifying its decree dated the 12th of February, 1908, for the
reason that said decree was not obtained by means of fraud; and, second,
that the court erred in holding that the two parcels of land described in the
appellee's motion are not their property.
It was agreed by counsel that the two small parcels now in dispute forma
part of the land described in the petition and were included in the decree
of February 12, 1908, and that the petitioners are the owners of the
remainder of the land described in the said decree.
The petitioners inherited this land from their parents, who acquired the
same, including the two small parcels in question, by purchase, as is
evidenced by a public document dated the 26th of November, 1864, duly
executed before Francisco Iriarte, alcalde mayor and judge of the Court of
First Instance of the Province of Bulacan.
Baldomero R. de la Cruz, father of the appellee, obtained in march, 1895, a
state grant for several parcels of land, including the two parcels in question.
This grant was duly inscribed in the old register of property in Bulacan on the
6th of April of the same year.
It is admitted that at the time the appellants presented their petition in this
case the appellee was occupying the two parcels of land now in question.
It is also admitted that the name of the appellee does not appear in the
said petition as an occupant of the said two parcels. The petitioners insist
that the appellee was occupying these parcels as their tenant and for this
reason they did not include his name in their petition, as an occupant, while
the appellee contends that he was occupying the said parcels as the
absolute owner under the estate grant by inheritance.
The court below held that the failure on the part of the petitioners to
include the name of the appellee in their petition, as an occupant of these
two parcels of land, was a violation of section 21 of Act No. 496, and that
this constituted fraud within the meaning of section 38 of said Land
Registration Act. The trial court further held that the grant from the estate
should prevail over the public document of purchase of 1864.
The mother of the petitioners died on November 15, 1881; their father died
prior to that time. Manuela, the oldest of the petitioners, was about six years
of age when their mother died. So these children were minors when the
father of the appellee obtained the estate grant.
On the 13th of June, 1882, Jose Grey, uncle and representative of the
petitioners, who were then minors, rented the land owned by the
petitioners' deceased parents to one Irineo Jose for a period of three years.
On the 23d of March, 1895, the said Jose Grey, as the representative of the
petitioners, rented the same land for a period of six years to Baldomero R.
de la Cruz, father of the appellee. This rental contract was duly executed in
writing. This land was cultivated during these six years by Baldomero R. de la
Cruz and his children, one of whom is the appellee. On the 14th of
December, 1905, Jose Grey, for himself and the other petitioners, rented the
same land to Estanislao R. de la Cruz for a period of two years. Estanislao de
la Cruz on entering into this rental contract with Jose Grey did so for himself
and his brothers, one of whom is the appellee. While the appellee admits
that his father and brother entered into these rental contracts and did, in
fact, cultivate the petitioners' land, nevertheless he insists that the two small
parcels in question were not included in these contracts. In the rental
contract between the uncle of the petitioners and he father of the
appellee the land is not described. In the rental contract between Jose
Grey, one of the petitioners, and Estanislao R. de la Cruz, brother of the
appellee, the two small parcels of land in question are included, according
to the description given therein. This was found to be true by the court
below, but the said court held that as this contract was made by Estanislao
R. de la Cruz it was not binding upon Anacleto R. de la Cruz, the appellee.
The two small parcels of land in question were purchased by the parents of
the petitioners in 1864, as is evidenced by the public document of purchase
and sale of that year. The same two parcels of land are included in the
state grant issued in favor of Baldomero Ratilla de la Cruz in 1895. This grant
was obtained after the death of the petitioners' parents and while they
were minors. So it is clear that the petitioners honestly believed that the
appellee was occupying the said parcels as their lessee at the time they
presented their application for registration. They did not act in bad faith, nor
with any fraudulent intent, when they omitted to include in their application
the name of the appellee as one of the occupants of the land. They
believed that it was not necessary nor required that they include in their
application the names of their tenants. Under these circumstances, did the
court below commit an error in reopening this case in June, 1908, after its
decree had been entered in February of the same year?
The application for the registration is to be in writing, signed and sworn to by
the applicant, or by some person duly authorized in his behalf. It is to
contain an accurate description of the land. It shall contain the name in full
and the address of the applicant, and also the names and addresses of all
occupants of land and of all adjoining owners, if known; and, if not known,
it shall state what search has been made to find them. In the form of notice
given by statute, which shall be sworn to, the applicant is required to state
and set forth clearly all mortgages or encumbrances affecting said land, if
any, the rights and interests, legal or equitable, in the possession, remainder,
reversion, or expectancy of all persons, with their names in full, together with
their place of residence and post office addresses. Upon receipt of the
application the clerk shall cause notice of the filling to be published twice in
the Official Gazette. This published notice shall be directed to all persons
appearing to have an interest in the land sought to be registered and to
the adjoining owners, and also "to all whom it may concern." In addition to
the notice in the Official Gazette the Land Court shall, within seven days
after said publication, cause a copy of the notice, in Spanish, to be mailed
by the clerk to every person named in the application whose address is
known; to cause a duly attested copy of the notice, in Spanish, to be
posted in a conspicuous place on every parcel of land included in the
application, and in a conspicuous place on the chief municipal building of
the town in which the land is situated. The court may also cause other or
further notice of the application to be given in such manner and to such
persons as it may deem proper. The certificate of the clerk that he has
served the notice as directed by the court by publication or mailing shall be
conclusive proof of such service. Within the time allowed in the notices, if no
person appears and answers, the court may at once, upon motion of the
applicant, no reason to the contrary appearing, order a general default. By
the description in the published notice "to all whom it may concern," and
by express provisions of law "all the word are made parties defendant and
shall be concluded by the default an order." If the court, after hearing, finds
that the applicant has title, as stated in his application, a decree or
registration shall be entered.
Every decree of registration shall bind the land and quiet title
thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated in the following
section. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons,
including the Insular Government, and all the branches thereof,
whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation,
or included in the general description "to all whom it may
concern." Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the
absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected
thereby, nor by any proceedings in any court for reversing
judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person
deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of
registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land
Registration a petition for review within one year. . . . (Sec. 38 of Act
No. 496.)
The appellee is not included in any of the exceptions named in section 38
referred to above.
It will be seen that the applicant is required to mention not only the
outstanding interest which he admits but also all claims of interest, though
denied by him. By express provision of law the world are made parties
defendant by the description in the notice "to all whom it may concern."
Although the appellee, occupying the two small parcels of land in question
under the circumstances as we have set forth, was not served with notice,
he was made a party defendant by publication; and the entering of a
decree on the 12th of February, 1908, must be held to be conclusive
against all persons, including the appellee, whether his (appellee's) name is
mentioned in the application, notice, or citation.
The said decree of February 12, 1908, should not have been opened on
account of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected
thereby, and could have been opened only on the ground that the said
decree had been obtained by fraud. That decree was not obtained by
fraud on the part of the applicants, inasmuch as they honestly believed
that the appellee was occupying these two small parcels of land as their
tenant. One of the petitioner went upon the premises with the surveyor
when the original plan was made.
Proof of constructive fraud is not sufficient to authorize the Court of Land
Registration to reopen a case and modify its decree. Specific, intentional
acts to deceive and deprive anther of his right, or in some manner injure
him, must be alleged and proved; that is, there must be actual or positive
fraud as distinguished from constructive fraud.
The question as to the meaning of the word "fraud" in the Australian statutes
has been frequently raised. Two distinctions have been noted by the
Australian courts; the first is the distinction between the meaning of the
word "fraud" in the sections relating to the conclusive effect of certificates
of title, and its meaning in the sections relating to the protection of bona
fide purchasers from registered proprietors. The second is the distinction
between "legal," "equitable," or "constructive" fraud, and "actual" or "moral"
fraud. In none of the groups of the sections of the Australian statutes
relating to the conclusive effect of certificates of title, and in which fraud is
referred to, is there any express indication of the meaning of "fraud," with
the sole exception of that of the South Australian group. (Hogg on
Australian Torrens System, p. 834.)
With regard to decisions on the sections relating to the conclusive
effect of certificates of title, it has been held in some cases that the
"fraud" there mentioned means actual or moral fraud, not merely
constructive or legal fraud. In other cases "fraud" has been said to
include constructive, legal, and every kind of fraud. In other cases,
against, knowledge of other persons' right, and the deliberate
acquisition of registered title in the face of such knowledge, has
been held to be "fraud" which rendered voidable the certificates of
title so obtained; and voluntary ignorance is, for this purpose, the
same as knowledge. But in none of these three classes of cases was
there absent the element of intention to deprive another of just
rights, which constitutes the essential characteristics of actual — as
distinguished from legal-fraud. (Id., p. 835, and cases cited in notes
Nos. 85, 86, 87, 88, and 89 at bottom of pages 835 and 836.)
By "fraud" is meant actual fraud-dishonesty of some sort. (Judgment of Privy
Council in Assets Co. vs. Mere Roihi, and Assets Co. vs. Panapa Waihopi,
decided in March, 1905, cited by Hogg in his Supplementary Addendum to
his work on Australian Torrens System, supra.) The same meaning should be
given to the word "fraud" used in section 38 of our statutes (Act No. 496).
The question as to whether any particular transaction shows fraud, within
the meaning of the word as used in our statutes, will in each case be a
question of fact. We will not attempt to say what acts would constitutes this
kind of fraud in other cases. This must be determined from the fact an
circumstances in each particular case. The only question we are called
upon to determine, and have determined, is whether or not, under the
facts and circumstances in this case, the petitioners did obtain the decree
of February 12, 1908, by means of fraud.
It might be urged that the appellee has been deprived of his property
without due process of law, in violation of section 5 of the Act of Congress
of July 1, 1902, known as the Philippine Bill," which provides "that no law shall
be enacted in the said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law."
The Land Registration Act requires that all occupants be named in the
petition and given notice by registered mail. This did not do the appellee
any good, as he was not notified; but he was made a party defendant, as
we have said, by means of the publication "to all whom it may concern." If
this section of the Act is to be upheld this must be declared to be due
process of law.
Before examining the validity of this part of the Act it might be well to note
the history and purpose of what is known as the "Torrens Land Registration
System." This system was introduced in South Australia by Sir Robert Torrens in
1857 and was there worked out in its practicable form.
The main principle of registration is to make registered titles indefeasible. As
we have said, upon the presentation in the Court of Land Registration of an
application for the registration of the title to lands, under this system, the
theory of the law is that all occupants, adjoining owners, adverse claimants,
and other interested persons are notified of the proceedings, and have
have a right to appear in opposition to such application. In other words, the
proceeding is against the whole word. This system was evidently considered
by the Legislature to be a public project when it passed Act No. 496. The
interest of the community at large was considered to be preferred to that
of private individuals.
At the close of this nineteenth century, all civilized nations are
coming to registration of title to land, because immovable property
is becoming more and more a matter of commercial dealing, and
there can be no trade without security. (Dumas's Lectures, p. 23.)
The registered proprietor will no longer have reasons to fear that he
may evicted because his vendor had, unknown to him, already
sold the and to a third person. . . The registered proprietor may feel
himself protected against any defect in his vendor's title. (Id., p. 21.)
The following summary of benefits of the system of registration of
titles, made by Sir Robert Torrens, has been fully justified in its use:
First. It has substituted security for insecurity.
Second. It has reduced the costs of conveyances from pounds to
shillings, and the time occupied from months to days.
Third. It has exchanged brevity and clearness for obscurity and
verbiage.
Fourth. It has so simplified ordinary dealings that he who has
mastered the "three R's" can transact his own conveyancing.
Fifth. It affords protection against fraud.
Sixth. It has restored to their just value many estates held under
good holding titles, but depreciated in consequence of some blur
or technical defect, and has barred the reoccurrence of any
similar faults. (Sheldon on Land Registration, pp. 75, 76.)
The boldest effort to grapple with the problem of simplification of
title to land was made by Mr. (afterwards Sir Robert) Torrens, a
layman, in South Australia in 1857. . . . In the Torrens system title by
registration takes the place of "title by deeds" of the system under
the "general" law. A sale of land, for example, is effected by a
registered transfer, upon which a certificate of title is issued. The
certificate is guaranteed by statute, and, with certain exceptions,
constitutes indefeasible title to the land mentioned therein. Under
the old system the same sale would be effected by a conveyance,
depending for its validity, apart from intrinsic flaws, on the
correctness of a long series of prior deeds, wills, etc. . . . The object
of the Torrens system, them, is to do away with the delay,
uncertainty, and expense of the old conveyancing system. (Duffy &
Eagleson on The Transfer of Land Act, 1890, pp. 2, 3, 5, 7.)
By "Torrens" system generally are meant those systems of registration
of transactions with interest in land whose declared object . . . is,
 under governmental authority, to establish and certify to the
ownership of an absolute and indefeasible title to realty, and to
simplify its transfer. (Hogg on Australian Torrens system, supra, pp. 1,
2.)
Compensation for errors from assurance funds is provided in all countries in
which the Torrens system has been enacted. Cases of error no doubt will
always occur. The percentage of errors, as compared with the number of
registered dealings in Australia, is very small. In New South Wales there were,
in 1889, 209, 894 registered dealings, the average risk of error being only 2 ½
cents for each dealing. In Queensland the risk of error was only 1 ½ cents,
the number of registered dealings being 233,309. In Tasmania and in
Western Australia not a cent was paid for compensation for errors during
the whole time of operation, (Dumas's Lectures, supra, p. 96.) This system
has been adopted in various countries of the civilized world, including some
of the States of the American Union, and practical experience has
demonstrated that it has been successful as a public project.
The validity of some of the provisions of the statutes adopting the Torrens
system has been the subject of judicial decision in the courts of the United
States. (People vs. Chase, 165 Ill., 527; State vs. Guilbert, 56 Ohio St., 575;
People vs. Simon, 176 Ill., 165; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 71.)
Act No. 496 of the Philippine Commission, known as the "Land Registration
Act," was copied substantially from the Massachussetts law of 1898.
The Illinois and Massachusetts statutes were upheld by the supreme courts
of those States.
It is not enough to show a procedure to be unconstitutional to say
that we never heard of it before. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra;
Hurtado vs. California, 110 U. S., 516.)
Looked at either from the point of view of history or of the
necessary requirements of justice, a proceeding in rem dealing with
a tangible res may be instituted and carried to judgment without
personal service upon claimants within the State or notice by name
to those outside of it, and not encounter any provision of either
constitution. Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court over
the res. As we have said, such a proceeding would be impossible,
were this not so, for it hardly would do to make a distinction
between the constitutional rights of claimants who were known
and those who were not known to the plaintiff, when the
proceeding is to bar all. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra.)
This same doctrine is annunciated in Pennoyer vs. Neff (95 U. S., 714); The
Mary (9 Cranch, 126); Mankin vs. Chandler (2 Brock., 125); Brown vs. Levee
Commission (50 Miss., 468); 2 Freeman, Judgments, 4th ed., secs. 606, 611.
If the technical object of the suit is to establish a claim against
some particular person, with a judgment which generally, in theory
at least, binds his body, or to bar some individual claim or
objection, so that only certain persons are entitled to be heard in
defense, the action is in personam, although it may concern the
right to or possession of a tangible thing. If, on the other hand, the
object is to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make an
objection of any sort against the right sought to be established,
and if anyone in the world has a right to be heard on the strenght
of alleging facts which, if true, show an inconsistent interest, the
proceeding is in rem. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra.)
In the case of Hamilton vs. Brown (161 U. S., 256) a judgment of escheat was
held conclusive upon persons notified by advertisement to all persons
interested. In this jurisdiction, by the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure, Act No. 190, a decree allowing or disallowing a will binds
everybody, although the only notice of the proceedings given is by general
notice to all persons interested.
The supreme court Massachusetts, in the case of Tyler vs. Judges (supra),
did not rest its judgment as to the conclusive effect of the decree upon the
ground that the State has absolute power to determine the persons to
whom a man's property shall go at his death, but upon the characteristics
of a proceeding in rem. So we conclude that the proceedings had in the
case at bar, under all the facts and circumstances, especially the absolute
lack on the part of the petitioners of any dishonest intent to deprive the
appellee of any right, or in any way injure him, constitute due process of
law.
As to whether or not the appellee can succesfully maintain an action under
the provisions of sections 101 and 102 of the Land Registration Act (secs.
2365, 2366, Compilation) we do not decide.
For these reasons we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the judgment
appealed from should be, and the same is hereby reversed and judgment
entered in favor of the petitioners in conformity with the decree of the lower
court of February 12, 1908, without special ruling as to costs. It is so ordered.
[G.R. No. 14167. August 14, 1919. ]
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, petitioner and appellee.
ANTIPAS VAZQUEZ and BASILIO GAYARES, Petitioners-Appellants, v. RUFINA
ABURAL ET. AL., objectors-appellees.
Cohn & Fisher, for Appellants.
Hilado & Hilado, for Appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. LAND REGISTRATION; TORRENS SYSTEM; PURPOSE. — The prime purpose of
the Torrens System, as established in the Philippine Islands by the Land
Registration Law (Act No. 496), is to decree land titles that shall be final,
irrevocable, and indisputable.
2. ID.; CADASTRAL SYSTEM; PURPOSE. — The purpose of the offspring of the
Torrens System here known as the Cadastral System, as established in the
Philippine Islands by the Cadastral Act (No. 2259), is, like the purpose of the
Torrens System, proper incontestability of title. As stated in Section 1 of the
Cadastral Act, the purpose is to serve the public interest, by requiring that
the titles to any lands "be settled and adjudicated."cralaw virtua1aw library
3. ID.; ID.; PROCEEDINGS. — Many precautions are taken to guard against
injustice.
4. ID.; ID.; ID. — After trial in a cadastral case, three actions are taken. The
first adjudicates ownership in favor of one of the claimants. This constitutes
the decision — the judgment — the decree of the court. The second action
is the declaration by the court that the decree is final and its order for the
issuance of the certificates of title by the Chief of the Land Registration
Office. Such order is made if within thirty days from the date of receipt of a
copy of the decision no appeal is taken from the decision. The third and last
action devolves upon the General Land Registration Office.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; FINALITY OF DECREE. — For a decree to exist in legal
contemplation, it is not necessary to await the preparation of a so-called
decree by the Land Registration Office.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — Cadastral proceedings commenced. Notice published
in the Official Gazette. Trial judge also issued general notice. S asks for the
registration in his name of lot No. 1608. Hearing had. On September 21,
1916, the court in a decree awarded the lot to S. On November 23, 1916,
the time for an appeal having passed, the court declares the decree final.
On July 23, 1917, before the issuance by the Land Registration Office of the
so-called technical decree, V and G ask that the case be reopened to
receive proof relative to the ownership of the lot. Motion denied by the trial
court. Held: That since the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
September 21, 1916, has become final, and since no action was taken
within the time provided by law for the prosecution of an appeal by bill of
exceptions, the Supreme Court is without jurisdiction, and the appeal must
be dismissed.
7. ID.; ID.; RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT. — Whether Sections 113 and 513 of the
Code of Civil Procedure apply to cadastral proceedings, quare.
8. GENERAL LAND REGISTRATION OFFICE. — The General Land Registration
Office has been instituted "for the due effectuation and accomplishment of
the laws relative to the registration of land." (Administrative Code of 1917,
Sec. 174.)
DECISION
MALCOLM, J. :
The principal question which this appeal presents is — When does the
registration of title, under the Torrens System of Land Registration, especially
under the different Philippine laws establishing the Cadastral System,
become final, conclusive, and indisputable? The supplementary questions
are — At what stage of the cadastral proceedings does a decree exist in
legal contemplation? Does it exist from the moment that the court, after
hearing the evidence, adjudicates the land in favor of a person and then,
or later decrees the land in favor of this person, or does it exist when the
Chief of the Land Registration Office transcribes the adjudication in the
prescribed form?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Cadastral proceedings were commenced in the municipality of Hinigaran,
Province of Occidental Negros, upon an application of the Director of
Lands, on June 16, 1916. Notice of the proceedings were published in the
Official Gazette as provided by law. The trial judge also issued general
notice to all interested parties. Among others, Victoriano Siguenza
presented an answer asking for registration in his name of lot No. 1608. The
instant petitioners, Antipas Vazquez and Basilio Gayares, although said to
reside in this municipality, and although said to have participated in other
cadastral cases, did not enter any opposition as to this lot. Hearing was had
during September, 1916. On September 21 of this year, the court issued the
following decree:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is hereby decreed that, upon a previous declaration of general default,
the following lots be adjudged and registered in the names of those
persons whose names appear next after the lots, and in accordance with
the following conditions: . . .
"Lot No. 1608 with the improvements thereon to the conjugal partnership of
Victoriano Siguenza and Marcela Guanzon."cralaw virtua1aw library
On November 23 of the same year, the court declared final the foregoing
decree in the following language:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The decision rendered by the court in the above-entitled case having
become final on September 21, 1916, it is hereby ordered that the Chief of
the General Land Registration Office issue the decrees corresponding to
the lots adjudged by said decision.
"An appeal having however been interposed as to the lots enumerated as
follows, the decrees thereon, must be suspended until further order by this
court:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Lot No. 521.
Eight months later, that is, on July 23, 1917, but before the issuance by the
Land Registration Office of the so-called technical decree, Antipas
Vazquez and Basilio Gayares, the latter as guardian of the minor Estrella
Vazquez, came into the case for the first time. The petitioners, after setting
forth their right of ownership in lot No. 1608, and that it was included in their
"Hacienda Santa Filomena," and after stating that they were in complete
ignorance of the proceedings, asked that the judgment of the court be
annulled and that the case be reopened to receive proof relative to the
ownership of the lot. Counsel for Victoriano Siguenza answered by counter-
motion, asking the court to dismiss the motion presented on behalf of
Vazquez and Gayares. The court denied the motion for a new trial on the
theory that there being a decree already rendered and no allegation of
fraud having been made, the court lacked jurisdiction. It may also be
stated parenthetically that counsel for Vazquez and Gayares made an
unsuccessful attempt in the Supreme Court, through mandamus, to have
the record completed by the taking of evidence.
In order that the matter may not be confused, let it again be made clear
that counsel for petitioners have not raised the question of fraud as
provided for in Section 38 of the Land Registration Law, nor have they
asked to be relieved from a judgment or order, pursuant to Section 113 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, because of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect. As a matter of fact, they could not well claim fraud
because all the proceedings were public and free from any suspicion of
chicanery. As a matter of fact, also, any special reliance on Section 113 of
the Code of Civil Procedure would not get them anywhere because more
than six months had elapsed after the issuance of a judgment in this case.
The issue fundamentally becomes one of whether or not the Supreme Court
has jurisdiction over the appeal, since if the judgment and the
supplemental decree issued by the Judge of the Court of First Instance on
September 21, 1916, and November 23, 1916, respectively, have become
final, petitioners may no bring their appeal before this court, because the
time for the filing of their bill of exceptions has expired; while, if the
cadastral proceedings did not become final until the formal decree was
issued by the Land Registration Office, then it was proper for them to ask for
a reopening of the case, and it would, consequently, be just as proper for
this court to order the trial court to permit the same.
G.R. No. L-8936 October 2, 1915
CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO PRIETO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
N.M. SALEEBY, defendant-appellee.
Singson, Ledesma and Lim for appellants.
D.R. Williams for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
From the record the following facts appear:
First. That the plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots
in the district of Ermita in the city of Manila.
Second. That there exists and has existed a number of years a stone wall
between the said lots. Said wall is located on the lot of the plaintiffs.
Third. That the plaintiffs, on the 2d day of March, 1906, presented a petition
in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of their lot. After a
consideration of said petition the court, on the 25th day of October, 1906,
decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should be registered and issued to
them the original certificate provided for under the torrens system. Said
registration and certificate included the wall.
Fourth. Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the
Court of Land Registration for the registration of the lot now occupied by
him. On the 25th day of March, 1912, the court decreed the registration of
said title and issued the original certificate provided for under the torrens
system. The description of the lot given in the petition of the defendant also
included said wall.
Fifth. Several months later (the 13th day of December, 1912) the plaintiffs
discovered that the wall which had been included in the certificate
granted to them had also been included in the certificate granted to the
defendant .They immediately presented a petition in the Court of Land
Registration for an adjustment and correction of the error committed by
including said wall in the registered title of each of said parties. The lower
court however, without notice to the defendant, denied said petition upon
the theory that, during the pendency of the petition for the registration of
the defendant's land, they failed to make any objection to the registration
of said lot, including the wall, in the name of the defendant.
Sixth. That the land occupied by t he wall is registered in the name of each
of the owners of the adjoining lots. The wall is not a joint wall.
Under these facts, who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by
it?
The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for
the registration of the lot of the defendant was a judicial proceeding and
that the judgment or decree was binding upon all parties who did not
appear and oppose it. In other words, by reason of the fact that the
plaintiffs had not opposed the registration of that part of the lot on which
the wall was situate they had lost it, even though it had been theretofore
registered in their name. Granting that theory to be correct one, and
granting even that the wall and the land occupied by it, in fact, belonged
to the defendant and his predecessors, then the same theory should be
applied to the defendant himself. Applying that theory to him, he had
already lost whatever right he had therein, by permitting the plaintiffs to
have the same registered in their name, more than six years before. Having
thus lost hid right, may he be permitted to regain it by simply including it in a
petition for registration? The plaintiffs having secured the registration of their
lot, including the wall, were they obliged to constantly be on the alert and
to watch all the proceedings in the land court to see that some one else
was not having all, or a portion of the same, registered? If that question is to
be answered in the affirmative, then the whole scheme and purpose of the
torrens system of land registration must fail. The real purpose of that system is
to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of
the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the
certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose
of the law, it would seem that once a title is registered the owner may rest
secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting
in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land. Of
course, it can not be denied that the proceeding for the registration of land
under the torrens system is judicial (Escueta vs. .Director of Lands, 16 Phil.
Rep., 482). It is clothed with all the forms of an action and the result is final
and binding upon all the world. It is an action in rem. (Escueta vs. Director
of Lands (supra); Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. rep., 49
Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. Rep., 31; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 51 American
Land Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47.)
While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its consequences than
does an ordinary action. All the world are parties, including the
government. After the registration is complete and final and there exists no
fraud, there are no innocent third parties who may claim an interest. The
rights of all the world are foreclosed by the decree of registration. The
government itself assumes the burden of giving notice to all parties. To
permit persons who are parties in the registration proceeding (and they are
all the world) to again litigate the same questions, and to again cast doubt
upon the validity of the registered title, would destroy the very purpose and
intent of the law. The registration, under the torrens system, does not give
the owner any better title than he had. If he does not already have a
perfect title, he can not have it registered. Fee simple titles only may be
registered. The certificate of registration accumulates in open document a
precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its
owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and
shows exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with
very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed,
modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct proceeding
permitted by law. Otherwise all security in registered titles would be lost. A
registered title can not be altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in
a collateral proceeding and not even by a direct proceeding, after the
lapse of the period prescribed by law.
For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) providing for
the registration of titles under the torrens system affords us no remedy. There
is no provision in said Act giving the parties relief under conditions like the
present. There is nothing in the Act which indicates who should be the
owner of land which has been registered in the name of two different
persons.
The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree ordering the registration of
a particular parcel of land is a bar to future litigation over the same
between the same parties .In view of the fact that all the world are parties,
it must follow that future litigation over the title is forever barred; there can
be no persons who are not parties to the action. This, we think, is the rule,
except as to rights which are noted in the certificate or which arise
subsequently, and with certain other exceptions which need not be
dismissed at present. A title once registered can not be defeated, even by
an adverse, open, and notorious possession. Registered title under the
torrens system can not be defeated by prescription (section 46, Act No.
496). The title, once registered, is notice to the world. All persons must take
notice. No one can plead ignorance of the registration.
The question, who is the owner of land registered in the name of two
different persons, has been presented to the courts in other jurisdictions. In
some jurisdictions, where the "torrens" system has been adopted, the
difficulty has been settled by express statutory provision. In others it has
been settled by the courts. Hogg, in his excellent discussion of the
"Australian Torrens System," at page 823, says: "The general rule is that in the
case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the same land, the
earlier in date prevails, whether the land comprised in the latter certificate
be wholly, or only in part, comprised in the earlier certificate.
(Oelkers vs. Merry, 2 Q.S.C.R., 193; Miller vs. Davy, 7 N.Z.R., 155;
Lloyd vs. Myfield, 7 A.L.T. (V.) 48; Stevens vs. Williams, 12 V.L. R., 152; Register
of Titles, vs. Esperance Land Co., 1 W.A.R., 118.)" Hogg adds however that,
"if it can be very clearly ascertained by the ordinary rules of construction
relating to written documents, that the inclusion of the land in the
certificate of title of prior date is a mistake, the mistake may be rectified by
holding the latter of the two certificates of title to be conclusive." (See Hogg
on the "Australian torrens System," supra, and cases cited. See also the
excellent work of Niblack in his "Analysis of the Torrens System," page 99.)
Niblack, in discussing the general question, said: "Where two certificates
purport to include the same land the earlier in date prevails. ... In successive
registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a
particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior
certificates is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to
hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is
derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the
earliest certificate issued in respect thereof. While the acts in this country do
not expressly cover the case of the issue of two certificates for the same
land, they provide that a registered owner shall hold the title, and the
effect of this undoubtedly is that where two certificates purport to include
the same registered land, the holder of the earlier one continues to hold the
title" (p. 237).
Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that; "It (the decree of registration) shall
be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular
Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in
the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description
"To all whom it may concern." Such decree shall not be opened by reason
of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby,
nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees;
subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any
estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file
in the Court of Land Registration a petition for review within one year after
entry of the decree (of registration), provided no innocent purchaser for
value has acquired an interest.
It will be noted, from said section, that the "decree of registration" shall not
be opened, for any reason, in any court, except for fraud, and not even for
fraud, after the lapse of one year. If then the decree of registration can not
be opened for any reason, except for fraud, in a direct proceeding for that
purpose, may such decree be opened or set aside in a collateral
proceeding by including a portion of the land in a subsequent certificate or
decree of registration? We do not believe the law contemplated that a
person could be deprived of his registered title in that way.
We have in this jurisdiction a general statutory provision which governs the
right of the ownership of land when the same is registered in the ordinary
registry in the name of two persons. Article 1473 of the Civil Code provides,
among other things, that when one piece of real property had been sold to
two different persons it shall belong to the person acquiring it, who first
inscribes it in the registry. This rule, of course, presupposes that each of the
vendees or purchasers has acquired title to the land. The real ownership in
such a case depends upon priority of registration. While we do not now
decide that the general provisions of the Civil Code are applicable to the
Land Registration Act, even though we see no objection thereto, yet we
think, in the absence of other express provisions, they should have a
persuasive influence in adopting a rule for governing the effect of a double
registration under said Act. Adopting the rule which we believe to be more
in consonance with the purposes and the real intent of the torrens system,
we are of the opinion and so decree that in case land has been registered
under the Land Registration Act in the name of two different persons, the
earlier in date shall prevail.
In reaching the above conclusion, we have not overlooked the forceful
argument of the appellee. He says, among other things; "When Prieto et al.
were served with notice of the application of Teus (the predecessor of the
defendant) they became defendants in a proceeding wherein he, Teus,
was seeking to foreclose their right, and that of orders, to the parcel of land
described in his application. Through their failure to appear and contest his
right thereto, and the subsequent entry of a default judgment against
them, they became irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such
land to Teus. They had their day in court and can not set up their own
omission as ground for impugning the validity of a judgment duly entered
by a court of competent jurisdiction. To decide otherwise would be to hold
that lands with torrens titles are above the law and beyond the jurisdiction
of the courts".
As was said above, the primary and fundamental purpose of the torrens
system is to quiet title. If the holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in this
registered title then the purpose of the law is defeated. If those dealing with
registered land cannot rely upon the certificate, then nothing has been
gained by the registration and the expense incurred thereby has been in
vain. If the holder may lose a strip of his registered land by the method
adopted in the present case, he may lose it all. Suppose within the six years
which elapsed after the plaintiff had secured their title, they had
mortgaged or sold their right, what would be the position or right of the
mortgagee or vendee? That mistakes are bound to occur cannot be
denied, and sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable. It is the
duty of the courts to adjust the rights of the parties under such
circumstances so as to minimize such damages, taking into consideration al
of the conditions and the diligence of the respective parties to avoid them.
In the present case, the appellee was the first negligent (granting that he
was the real owner, and if he was not the real owner he can not complain)
in not opposing the registration in the name of the appellants. He was a
party-defendant in an action for the registration of the lot in question, in the
name of the appellants, in 1906. "Through his failure to appear and to
oppose such registration, and the subsequent entry of a default judgment
against him, he became irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating
such land to the appellants. He had his day in court and should not be
permitted to set up his own omissions as the ground for impugning the
validity of a judgment duly entered by a court of competent jurisdiction."
Granting that he was the owner of the land upon which the wall is located,
his failure to oppose the registration of the same in the name of the
appellants, in the absence of fraud, forever closes his mouth against
impugning the validity of that judgment. There is no more reason why the
doctrine invoked by the appellee should be applied to the appellants than
to him.
We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land
Registration Act, that the owner of the earliest certificate is the owner of the
land. That is the rule between original parties. May this rule be applied to
successive vendees of the owners of such certificates? Suppose that one or
the other of the parties, before the error is discovered, transfers his original
certificate to an "innocent purchaser." The general rule is that the vendee
of land has no greater right, title, or interest than his vendor; that he
acquires the right which his vendor had, only. Under that rule the vendee of
the earlier certificate would be the owner as against the vendee of the
owner of the later certificate.
We find statutory provisions which, upon first reading, seem to cast some
doubt upon the rule that the vendee acquires the interest of the vendor
only. Sections 38, 55, and 112 of Act No. 496 indicate that the vendee may
acquire rights and be protected against defenses which the vendor would
not. Said sections speak of available rights in favor of third parties which are
cut off by virtue of the sale of the land to an "innocent purchaser." That is to
say, persons who had had a right or interest in land wrongfully included in
an original certificate would be unable to enforce such rights against an
"innocent purchaser," by virtue of the provisions of said sections. In the
present case Teus had his land, including the wall, registered in his name.
He subsequently sold the same to the appellee. Is the appellee an
"innocent purchaser," as that phrase is used in said sections? May those
who have been deprived of their land by reason of a mistake in the original
certificate in favor of Teus be deprived of their right to the same, by virtue
of the sale by him to the appellee? Suppose the appellants had sold their
lot, including the wall, to an "innocent purchaser," would such purchaser be
included in the phrase "innocent purchaser," as the same is used in said
sections? Under these examples there would be two innocent purchasers of
the same land, is said sections are to be applied .Which of the two innocent
purchasers, if they are both to be regarded as innocent purchasers, should
be protected under the provisions of said sections? These questions
indicate the difficulty with which we are met in giving meaning and effect
to the phrase "innocent purchaser," in said sections.
May the purchaser of land which has been included in a "second original
certificate" ever be regarded as an "innocent purchaser," as against the
rights or interest of the owner of the first original certificate, his heirs, assigns,
or vendee? The first original certificate is recorded in the public registry. It is
never issued until it is recorded. The record notice to all the world. All
persons are charged with the knowledge of what it contains. All persons
dealing with the land so recorded, or any portion of it, must be charged
with notice of whatever it contains. The purchaser is charged with notice of
every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which
the record discloses .This rule is so well established that it is scarcely
necessary to cite authorities in its support (Northwestern National
Bank vs. Freeman, 171 U.S., 620, 629; Delvin on Real Estate, sections 710, 710
[a]).
When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is
constructive notice of its contents and all interests, legal and equitable,
included therein. (Grandin vs. Anderson, 15 Ohio State, 286, 289;
Orvis vs. Newell, 17 Conn., 97; Buchanan vs. Intentional Bank, 78 Ill., 500;
Youngs vs. Wilson, 27 N.Y., 351; McCabe vs. Grey, 20 Cal., 509;
Montefiore vs. Browne, 7 House of Lords Cases, 341.)
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined
every instrument of record affecting the title. Such presumption is
irrebutable. He is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record
and is presumed to know every fact which an examination of the record
would have disclosed. This presumption cannot be overcome by proof of
innocence or good faith. Otherwise the very purpose and object of the law
requiring a record would be destroyed. Such presumption cannot be
defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the record contains any
more than one may be permitted to show that he was ignorant of the
provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts
which the public record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute.
Any variation would lead to endless confusion and useless litigation.
While there is no statutory provision in force here requiring that original
deeds of conveyance of real property be recorded, yet there is a rule
requiring mortgages to be recorded. (Arts. 1875 and 606 of the Civil Code.)
The record of a mortgage is indispensable to its validity. (Art .1875.) In the
face of that statute would the courts allow a mortgage to be valid which
had not been recorded, upon the plea of ignorance of the statutory
provision, when third parties were interested? May a purchaser of land,
subsequent to the recorded mortgage, plead ignorance of its existence,
and by reason of such ignorance have the land released from such lien?
Could a purchaser of land, after the recorded mortgage, be relieved from
the mortgage lien by the plea that he was a bona fide purchaser? May
there be a bona fide purchaser of said land, bona fide in the sense that he
had no knowledge of the existence of the mortgage? We believe the rule
that all persons must take notice of what the public record contains in just
as obligatory upon all persons as the rule that all men must know the law;
that no one can plead ignorance of the law. The fact that all men know
the law is contrary to the presumption. The conduct of men, at times, shows
clearly that they do not know the law. The rule, however, is mandatory and
obligatory, notwithstanding. It would be just as logical to allow the defense
of ignorance of the existence and contents of a public record.
In view, therefore, of the foregoing rules of law, may the purchaser of land
from the owner of the second original certificate be an "innocent
purchaser," when a part or all of such land had theretofore been registered
in the name of another, not the vendor? We are of the opinion that said
sections 38, 55, and 112 should not be applied to such purchasers. We do
not believe that the phrase "innocent purchaser should be applied to such
a purchaser. He cannot be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" because
of the facts contained in the record of the first original certificate. The rule
should not be applied to the purchaser of a parcel of land the vendor of
which is not the owner of the original certificate, or his successors. He, in
nonsense, can be an "innocent purchaser" of the portion of the land
included in another earlier original certificate. The rule of notice of what the
record contains precludes the idea of innocence. By reason of the prior
registry there cannot be an innocent purchaser of land included in a prior
original certificate and in a name other than that of the vendor, or his
successors. In order to minimize the difficulties we think this is the safe rule to
establish. We believe the phrase "innocent purchaser," used in said sections,
should be limited only to cases where unregistered land has been
wrongfully included in a certificate under the torrens system. When land is
once brought under the torrens system, the record of the original certificate
and all subsequent transfers thereof is notice to all the world. That being the
rule, could Teus even regarded as the holder in good fifth of that part of the
land included in his certificate of the appellants? We think not. Suppose, for
example, that Teus had never had his lot registered under the torrens
system. Suppose he had sold his lot to the appellee and had included in his
deed of transfer the very strip of land now in question. Could his vendee be
regarded as an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Would his vendee be an
"innocent purchaser" of said strip? Certainly not. The record of the original
certificate of the appellants precludes the possibility. Has the appellee
gained any right by reason of the registration of the strip of land in the
name of his vendor? Applying the rule of notice resulting from the record of
the title of the appellants, the question must be answered in the negative.
We are of the opinion that these rules are more in harmony with the
purpose of Act No. 496 than the rule contended for by the appellee. We
believe that the purchaser from the owner of the later certificate, and his
successors, should be required to resort to his vendor for damages, in case
of a mistake like the present, rather than to molest the holder of the first
certificate who has been guilty of no negligence. The holder of the first
original certificate and his successors should be permitted to rest secure in
their title, against one who had acquired rights in conflict therewith and
who had full and complete knowledge of their rights. The purchaser of land
included in the second original certificate, by reason of the facts contained
in the public record and the knowledge with which he is charged and by
reason of his negligence, should suffer the loss, if any, resulting from such
purchase, rather than he who has obtained the first certificate and who
was innocent of any act of negligence.
The foregoing decision does not solve, nor pretend to solve, all the
difficulties resulting from double registration under the torrens system and
the subsequent transfer of the land. Neither do we now attempt to decide
the effect of the former registration in the ordinary registry upon the
registration under the torrens system. We are inclined to the view, without
deciding it, that the record under the torrens system, supersede all other
registries. If that view is correct then it will be sufficient, in dealing with land
registered and recorded alone. Once land is registered and recorded
under the torrens system, that record alone can be examined for the
purpose of ascertaining the real status of the title to the land.
It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have
acquired equal rights in the same thing, to hold that the one who acquired
it first and who has complied with all the requirements of the law should be
protected.
In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower court
should be and is hereby revoked. The record is hereby returned to the court
now having and exercising the jurisdiction heretofore exercised by the land
court, with direction to make such orders and decrees in the premises as
may correct the error heretofore made in including the land in the second
original certificate issued in favor of the predecessor of the appellee, as
well as in all other duplicate certificates issued.
Without any findings as to costs, it is so ordered.
G.R. No. 166838 June 15, 2011
STA. LUCIA REALTY & DEVELOPMENT, Inc., Petitioner,
vs.
CITY OF PASIG, Respondent,
MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, Intervenor.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
For review is the June 30, 2004 Decision1 and the January 27, 2005
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69603, which
affirmed with modification the August 10, 1998 Decision3 and October 9,
1998 Order4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 157, in
Civil Case No. 65420.
Petitioner Sta. Lucia Realty & Development, Inc. (Sta. Lucia) is the registered
owner of several parcels of land with Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos.
39112, 39110 and 38457, all of which indicated that the lots were located in
Barrio Tatlong Kawayan, Municipality of Pasig5 (Pasig).
The parcel of land covered by TCT No. 39112 was consolidated with that
covered by TCT No. 518403, which was situated in Barrio Tatlong Kawayan,
Municipality of Cainta, Province of Rizal (Cainta). The two combined lots
were subsequently partitioned into three, for which TCT Nos. 532250, 598424,
and 599131, now all bearing the Cainta address, were issued.
TCT No. 39110 was also divided into two lots, becoming TCT Nos. 92869 and
92870.
The lot covered by TCT No. 38457 was not segregated, but a commercial
building owned by Sta. Lucia East Commercial Center, Inc., a separate
corporation, was built on it.6
Upon Pasig’s petition to correct the location stated in TCT Nos. 532250,
598424, and 599131, the Land Registration Court, on June 9, 1995, ordered
the amendment of the TCTs to read that the lots with respect to TCT No.
39112 were located in Barrio Tatlong Kawayan, Pasig City.7
On January 31, 1994, Cainta filed a petition8 for the settlement of its land
boundary dispute with Pasig before the RTC, Branch 74 of Antipolo City
(Antipolo RTC). This case, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-3006, is still pending
up to this date.
On November 28, 1995, Pasig filed a Complaint,9 docketed as Civil Case
No. 65420, against Sta. Lucia for the collection of real estate taxes,
including penalties and interests, on the lots covered by TCT Nos. 532250,
598424, 599131, 92869, 92870 and 38457, including the improvements
thereon (the subject properties).
Sta. Lucia, in its Answer, alleged that it had been religiously paying its real
estate taxes to Cainta, just like what its predecessors-in-interest did, by virtue
of the demands and assessments made and the Tax Declarations issued by
Cainta on the claim that the subject properties were within its territorial
jurisdiction. Sta. Lucia further argued that since 1913, the real estate taxes
for the lots covered by the above TCTs had been paid to Cainta.10
Cainta was allowed to file its own Answer-in-Intervention when it moved to
intervene on the ground that its interest would be greatly affected by the
outcome of the case. It averred that it had been collecting the real
property taxes on the subject properties even before Sta. Lucia acquired
them. Cainta further asseverated that the establishment of the boundary
monuments would show that the subject properties are within its metes and
bounds.11
Sta. Lucia and Cainta thereafter moved for the suspension of the
proceedings, and claimed that the pending petition in the Antipolo RTC, for
the settlement of boundary dispute between Cainta and Pasig, presented
a "prejudicial question" to the resolution of the case.12
The RTC denied this in an Order dated December 4, 1996 for lack of merit.
Holding that the TCTs were conclusive evidence as to its ownership and
location,13 the RTC, on August 10, 1998, rendered a Decision in favor of
Pasig:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of [Pasig], ordering Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. to pay [Pasig]:
1) ₱273,349.14 representing unpaid real estate taxes and penalties
as of 1996, plus interest of 2% per month until fully paid;
2) ₱50,000.00 as and by way of attorney’s fees; and
3) The costs of suit.
Judgment is likewise rendered against the intervenor Municipality of Cainta,
Rizal, ordering it to refund to Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. the
realty tax payments improperly collected and received by the former from
the latter in the aggregate amount of ₱358, 403.68.14
After Sta. Lucia and Cainta filed their Notices of Appeal, Pasig, on
September 11, 1998, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC’s August
10, 1998 Decision.
The RTC, on October 9, 1998, granted Pasig’s motion in an Order 15 and
modified its earlier decision to include the realty taxes due on the
improvements on the subject lots:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration
is hereby granted. Accordingly, the Decision, dated August 10, 1998 is
hereby modified in that the defendant is hereby ordered to pay plaintiff the
amount of ₱5,627,757.07 representing the unpaid taxes and penalties on
the improvements on the subject parcels of land whereon real estate taxes
are adjudged as due for the year 1996.16
Accordingly, Sta. Lucia filed an Amended Notice of Appeal to include the
RTC’s October 9, 1998 Order in its protest.
On October 16, 1998, Pasig filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal, to
which both Sta. Lucia and Cainta filed several oppositions, on the assertion
that there were no good reasons to warrant the execution pending
appeal.17
On April 15, 1999, the RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of Execution
against Sta. Lucia.
On May 21, 1999, Sta. Lucia filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals to assail the RTC’s order granting
the execution. Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 52874, the petition was raffled
to the First Division of the Court of Appeals, which on September 22, 2000,
ruled in favor of Sta. Lucia, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby GIVEN
DUE COURSE and GRANTED by this Court. The assailed Order dated April 15,
1999 in Civil Case No. 65420 granting the motion for execution pending
appeal and ordering the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal is
hereby SET ASIDE and declared NULL and VOID.18
The Court of Appeals added that the boundary dispute case presented a
"prejudicial question which must be decided before x x x Pasig can collect
the realty taxes due over the subject properties."19
Pasig sought to have this decision reversed in a Petition for Certiorari filed
before this Court on November 29, 2000, but this was denied on June 25,
2001 for being filed out of time.20
Meanwhile, the appeal filed by Sta. Lucia and Cainta was raffled to the
(former) Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals and docketed as CA-G.R.
CV No. 69603. On June 30, 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision,
wherein it agreed with the RTC’s judgment:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the award of P50,000.00 attorney’s fees is DELETED.21
In affirming the RTC, the Court of Appeals declared that there was no
proper legal basis to suspend the proceedings.22 Elucidating on the legal
meaning of a "prejudicial question," it held that "there can be no prejudicial
question when the cases involved are both civil."23 The Court of Appeals
further held that the elements of litis pendentia and forum shopping, as
alleged by Cainta to be present, were not met.
Sta. Lucia and Cainta filed separate Motions for Reconsideration, which the
Court of Appeals denied in a Resolution dated January 27, 2005.
Undaunted, Sta. Lucia and Cainta filed separate Petitions for Certiorari with
this Court. Cainta’s petition, docketed as G.R. No. 166856 was denied on
April 13, 2005 for Cainta’s failure to show any reversible error. Sta. Lucia’s
own petition is the one subject of this decision.24
In praying for the reversal of the June 30, 2004 judgment of the Court of
Appeals, Sta. Lucia assigned the following errors:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING [WITH
MODIFICATION] THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN PASIG CITY
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT SUSPENDING THE CASE
IN VIEW OF THE PENDENCY OF THE BOUNDARY DISPUTE WHICH WILL FINALLY
DETERMINE THE SITUS OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
PAYMENT OF REALTY TAXES THROUGH THE MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA WAS
VALID PAYMENT OF REALTY TAXES
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT IN THE
MEANTIME THAT THE BOUNDARY DISPUTE CASE IN ANTIPOLO CITY REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT IS BEING FINALLY RESOLVED, THE PETITIONER STA. LUCIA
SHOULD BE PAYING THE REALTY TAXES ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES
THROUGH THE INTERVENOR CAINTA TO PRESERVE THE STATUS QUO.25
Pasig, countering each error, claims that the lower courts correctly decided
the case considering that the TCTs are clear on their faces that the subject
properties are situated in its territorial jurisdiction. Pasig contends that the
principles of litis pendentia, forum shopping, and res judicata are all
inapplicable, due to the absence of their requisite elements. Pasig
maintains that the boundary dispute case before the Antipolo RTC is
independent of the complaint for collection of realty taxes which was filed
before the Pasig RTC. It avers that the doctrine of "prejudicial question,"
which has a definite meaning in law, cannot be invoked where the two
cases involved are both civil. Thus, Pasig argues, since there is no legal
ground to preclude the simultaneous hearing of both cases, the suspension
of the proceedings in the Pasig RTC is baseless.
Cainta also filed its own comment reiterating its legal authority over the
subject properties, which fall within its territorial jurisdiction. Cainta claims
that while it has been collecting the realty taxes over the subject properties
since way back 1913, Pasig only covered the same for real property tax
purposes in 1990, 1992, and 1993. Cainta also insists that there is a
discrepancy between the locational entries and the technical descriptions
in the TCTs, which further supports the need to await the settlement of the
boundary dispute case it initiated.
The errors presented before this Court can be narrowed down into two
basic issues:
1) Whether the RTC and the CA were correct in deciding Pasig’s
Complaint without waiting for the resolution of the boundary
dispute case between Pasig and Cainta; and
2) Whether Sta. Lucia should continue paying its real property taxes
to Cainta, as it alleged to have always done, or to Pasig, as the
location stated in Sta. Lucia’s TCTs.
We agree with the First Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
52874 that the resolution of the boundary dispute between Pasig and
Cainta would determine which local government unit is entitled to collect
realty taxes from Sta. Lucia.26
The Local Government Unit entitled
To Collect Real Property Taxes
The Former Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals held that the resolution
of the complaint lodged before the Pasig RTC did not necessitate the
assessment of the parties’ evidence on the metes and bounds of their
respective territories. It cited our ruling in Odsigue v. Court of
Appeals27 wherein we said that a certificate of title is conclusive evidence
of both its ownership and location.28 The Court of Appeals even referred to
specific provisions of the 1991 Local Government Code and Act. No. 496 to
support its ruling that Pasig had the right to collect the realty taxes on the
subject properties as the titles of the subject properties show on their faces
that they are situated in Pasig.29
Under Presidential Decree No. 464 or the "Real Property Tax Code," the
authority to collect real property taxes is vested in the locality where the
property is situated:
Sec. 5. Appraisal of Real Property. — All real property, whether taxable or
exempt, shall be appraised at the current and fair market value prevailing
in the locality where the property is situated.
xxxx
Sec. 57. Collection of tax to be the responsibility of treasurers. — The
collection of the real property tax and all penalties accruing thereto, and
the enforcement of the remedies provided for in this Code or any
applicable laws, shall be the responsibility of the treasurer of the province,
city or municipality where the property is situated. (Emphases ours.)
This requisite was reiterated in Republic Act No. 7160, also known as the
1991 the Local Government Code, to wit:
Section 201. Appraisal of Real Property. – All real property, whether taxable
or exempt, shall be appraised at the current and fair market value
prevailing in the locality where the property is situated. The Department of
Finance shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations for the
classification, appraisal, and assessment of real property pursuant to the
provisions of this Code.
Section 233. Rates of Levy. – A province or city or a municipality within the
Metropolitan Manila Area shall fix a uniform rate of basic real property tax
applicable to their respective localities as follows: x x x. (Emphases ours.)
The only import of these provisions is that, while a local government unit is
authorized under several laws to collect real estate tax on properties falling
under its territorial jurisdiction, it is imperative to first show that these
properties are unquestionably within its geographical boundaries.
Accentuating on the importance of delineating territorial boundaries, this
Court, in Mariano, Jr. v. Commission on Elections30 said:
The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of
a local unit of government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries
must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local
government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only
within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts
are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local
government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental
powers which ultimately will prejudice the people's welfare. This is the evil
sought to be avoided by the Local Government Code in requiring that the
land area of a local government unit must be spelled out in metes and
bounds, with technical descriptions.31 (Emphasis ours.)
The significance of accurately defining a local government unit’s
boundaries was stressed in City of Pasig v. Commission on Elections,32 which
involved the consolidated petitions filed by the parties herein, Pasig and
Cainta, against two decisions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
with respect to the plebiscites scheduled by Pasig for the ratification of its
creation of two new Barangays. Ruling on the contradictory reliefs sought
by Pasig and Cainta, this Court affirmed the COMELEC decision to hold in
abeyance the plebiscite to ratify the creation of Barangay Karangalan; but
set aside the COMELEC’s other decision, and nullified the plebiscite that
ratified the creation of Barangay Napico in Pasig, until the boundary
dispute before the Antipolo RTC had been resolved. The aforementioned
case held as follows:
1. The Petition of the City of Pasig in G.R. No. 125646 is DISMISSED for
lack of merit; while
2. The Petition of the Municipality of Cainta in G.R. No. 128663 is
GRANTED. The COMELEC Order in UND No. 97-002, dated March 21,
1997, is SET ASIDE and the plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 to ratify
the creation of Barangay Napico in the City of Pasig is declared
null and void. Plebiscite on the same is ordered held in abeyance
until after the courts settle with finality the boundary dispute
between the City of Pasig and the Municipality of Cainta, in Civil
Case No. 94-3006.33
Clearly therefore, the local government unit entitled to collect real property
taxes from Sta. Lucia must undoubtedly show that the subject properties
are situated within its territorial jurisdiction; otherwise, it would be acting
beyond the powers vested to it by law.
Certificates of Title as
Conclusive Evidence of Location
While we fully agree that a certificate of title is conclusive as to its
ownership and location, this does not preclude the filing of an action for the
very purpose of attacking the statements therein. In De Pedro v. Romasan
Development Corporation,34 we proclaimed that:
We agree with the petitioners that, generally, a certificate of title shall be
conclusive as to all matters contained therein and conclusive evidence of
the ownership of the land referred to therein. However, it bears stressing
that while certificates of title are indefeasible, unassailable and binding
against the whole world, including the government itself, they do not
create or vest title. They merely confirm or record title already existing and
vested. They cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner, nor
can they be used as a shield for the commission of fraud; neither do they
permit one to enrich himself at the expense of other.35
In Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation v. Heirs of Vicente
Coronado,36 we set aside the lower courts’ ruling that the property subject
of the case was not situated in the location stated and described in the
TCT, for lack of adequate basis. Our decision was in line with the doctrine
that the TCT is conclusive evidence of ownership and location. However,
we refused to simply uphold the veracity of the disputed TCT, and instead,
we remanded the case back to the trial court for the determination of the
exact location of the property seeing that it was the issue in the complaint
filed before it.37
In City Government of Tagaytay v. Guerrero,38 this Court reprimanded the
City of Tagaytay for levying taxes on a property that was outside its
territorial jurisdiction, viz:
In this case, it is basic that before the City of Tagaytay may levy a certain
property for sale due to tax delinquency, the subject property should be
under its territorial jurisdiction. The city officials are expected to know such
basic principle of law. The failure of the city officials of Tagaytay to verify if
the property is within its jurisdiction before levying taxes on the same
constitutes gross negligence.39 (Emphasis ours.)
Although it is true that "Pasig" is the locality stated in the TCTs of the subject
properties, both Sta. Lucia and Cainta aver that the metes and bounds of
the subject properties, as they are described in the TCTs, reveal that they
are within Cainta’s boundaries.40 This only means that there may be a
conflict between the location as stated and the location as technically
described in the TCTs. Mere reliance therefore on the face of the TCTs will
not suffice as they can only be conclusive evidence of the subject
properties’ locations if both the stated and described locations point to the
same area.
The Antipolo RTC, wherein the boundary dispute case between Pasig and
Cainta is pending, would be able to best determine once and for all the
precise metes and bounds of both Pasig’s and Cainta’s respective territorial
jurisdictions. The resolution of this dispute would necessarily ascertain the
extent and reach of each local government’s authority, a prerequisite in
the proper exercise of their powers, one of which is the power of taxation.
This was the conclusion reached by this Court in City of Pasig v. Commission
on Elections,41 and by the First Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 52874. We do not see any reason why we cannot adhere to the same
logic and reasoning in this case.
The "Prejudicial Question" Debate
It would be unfair to hold Sta. Lucia liable again for real property taxes it
already paid simply because Pasig cannot wait for its boundary dispute
with Cainta to be decided. Pasig has consistently argued that the
boundary dispute case is not a prejudicial question that would entail the
suspension of its collection case against Sta. Lucia. This was also its
argument in City of Pasig v. Commission on Elections,42 when it sought to
nullify the COMELEC’s ruling to hold in abeyance (until the settlement of the
boundary dispute case), the plebiscite that will ratify its creation of
Barangay Karangalan. We agreed with the COMELEC therein that the
boundary dispute case presented a prejudicial question and explained our
statement in this wise:
To begin with, we agree with the position of the COMELEC that Civil Case
No. 94-3006 involving the boundary dispute between the Municipality of
Cainta and the City of Pasig presents a prejudicial question which must first
be decided before plebiscites for the creation of the proposed barangays
may be held.
The City of Pasig argues that there is no prejudicial question since the same
contemplates a civil and criminal action and does not come into play
where both cases are civil, as in the instant case. While this may be the
general rule, this Court has held in Vidad v. RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. 42,
that, in the interest of good order, we can very well suspend action on one
case pending the final outcome of another case closely interrelated or
linked to the first.
In the case at bar, while the City of Pasig vigorously claims that the areas
covered by the proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico are within its
territory, it can not deny that portions of the same area are included in the
boundary dispute case pending before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo.
Surely, whether the areas in controversy shall be decided as within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Cainta or the City of Pasig has
material bearing to the creation of the proposed Barangays Karangalan
and Napico. Indeed, a requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its
territorial jurisdiction to be properly identified by metes and bounds or by
more or less permanent natural boundaries. Precisely because territorial
jurisdiction is an issue raised in the pending civil case, until and unless such
issue is resolved with finality, to define the territorial jurisdiction of the
proposed barangays would only be an exercise in futility. Not only that, we
would be paving the way for potentially ultra vires acts of such barangays.
x x x.43 (Emphases ours.)
It is obvious from the foregoing, that the term "prejudicial question," as
appearing in the cases involving the parties herein, had been used loosely.
Its usage had been more in reference to its ordinary meaning, than to its
strict legal meaning under the Rules of Court.44 Nevertheless, even without
the impact of the connotation derived from the term, our own Rules of
Court state that a trial court may control its own proceedings according to
its sound discretion:
POWERS AND DUTIES OF COURTS AND JUDICIAL OFFICERS
Rule 135
SEC. 5. Inherent powers of courts. – Every court shall have power:
xxxx
(g) To amend and control its process and orders so as to make them
comformable to law and justice.
Furthermore, we have acknowledged and affirmed this inherent power in
our own decisions, to wit:
The court in which an action is pending may, in the exercise of a sound
discretion, upon proper application for a stay of that action, hold the
action in abeyance to abide the outcome of another pending in another
court, especially where the parties and the issues are the same, for there is
power inherent in every court to control the disposition of causes (sic) on its
dockets with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for
litigants. Where the rights of parties to the second action cannot be
properly determined until the questions raised in the first action are settled
the second action should be stayed.
The power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every
court to control the disposition of the cases on its dockets, considering its
time and effort, that of counsel and the litigants. But if proceedings must be
stayed, it must be done in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and prevent
vexatious litigations, conflicting judgments, confusion between litigants and
courts. It bears stressing that whether or not the RTC would suspend the
proceedings in the SECOND CASE is submitted to its sound
discretion.451avvphil
In light of the foregoing, we hold that the Pasig RTC should have held in
abeyance the proceedings in Civil Case No. 65420, in view of the fact that
the outcome of the boundary dispute case before the Antipolo RTC will
undeniably affect both Pasig’s and Cainta’s rights. In fact, the only reason
Pasig had to file a tax collection case against Sta. Lucia was not that Sta.
Lucia refused to pay, but that Sta. Lucia had already paid, albeit to
another local government unit. Evidently, had the territorial boundaries of
the contending local government units herein been delineated with
accuracy, then there would be no controversy at all.
In the meantime, to avoid further animosity, Sta. Lucia is directed to deposit
the succeeding real property taxes due on the subject properties, in an
escrow account with the Land Bank of the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The June 30, 2004 Decision
and the January 27, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 69603 are SET ASIDE. The City of Pasig and the Municipality of Cainta
are both directed to await the judgment in their boundary dispute case
(Civil Case No. 94-3006), pending before Branch 74 of the Regional Trial
Court in Antipolo City, to determine which local government unit is entitled
to exercise its powers, including the collection of real property taxes, on the
properties subject of the dispute. In the meantime, Sta. Lucia Realty and
Development, Inc. is directed to deposit the succeeding real property taxes
due on the lots and improvements covered by TCT Nos. 532250, 598424,
599131, 92869, 92870 and 38457 in an escrow account with the Land Bank
of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 180027 July 18, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
MICHAEL C. SANTOS, VANNESSA C. SANTOS, MICHELLE C. SANTOS and
DELFIN SANTOS, all represented by DELFIN C. SANTOS, Attorney-in-
Fact, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
For review1 is the Decision2 dated 9 October 2007 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 86300. In the said decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in
toto the 14 February 2005 ruling3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 15,
of Naic, Cavite in LRC Case No. NC-2002-1292. The dispositive portion of the
Court of Appeals’ decision accordingly reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed decision
dated February 14, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 15) in Naic,
Cavite, in LRC Case No. NC-2002-1292 is AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.4
The aforementioned ruling of the RTC granted the respondents’ Application
for Original Registration of a parcel of land under Presidential Decree No.
1529.
The antecedents are as follows:
Prelude
In October 1997, the respondents purchased three (3) parcels of
unregistered land situated in Barangay Carasuchi, Indang, Cavite.5 The 3
parcels of land were previously owned by one Generosa Asuncion
(Generosa), one Teresita Sernal (Teresita) and by the spouses Jimmy and
Imelda Antona, respectively.6
Sometime after the said purchase, the respondents caused the survey and
consolidation of the parcels of land. Hence, per the
consolidation/subdivision plan Ccs-04-003949-D, the 3 parcels were
consolidated into a single lot—"Lot 3"—with a determined total area of nine
thousand five hundred seventy-seven (9,577) square meters.7
The Application for Land Registration
On 12 March 2002, the respondents filed with the RTC an Application 8 for
Original Registration of Lot 3. Their application was docketed as LRC Case
No. NC-2002-1292.
On the same day, the RTC issued an Order9 setting the application for initial
hearing and directing the satisfaction of jurisdictional requirements pursuant
to Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. The same Order, however,
also required the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) to submit a report on the status of Lot 3.10
On 13 March 2002, the DENR Calabarzon Office submitted its Report11 to the
RTC. The Report relates that the area covered by Lot 3 "falls within the
Alienable and Disposable Land, Project No. 13 of Indang, Cavite per
LC12 3013 certified on March 15, 1982." Later, the respondents submitted a
Certification13 from the DENR-Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) attesting that, indeed, Lot 3 was classified as an
"Alienable or Disposable Land" as of 15 March 1982.
After fulfillment of the jurisdictional requirements, the government, through
the Office of the Solicitor General, filed the lone opposition14 to the
respondents’ application on 13 May 2003.
The Claim, Evidence and Opposition
The respondents allege that their predecessors-in-interest i.e., the previous
owners of the parcels of land making up Lot 3, have been in "continuous,
uninterrupted, open, public and adverse" possession of the said parcels
"since time immemorial."15 It is by virtue of such lengthy possession, tacked
with their own, that respondents now hinge their claim of title over Lot 3.
During trial on the merits, the respondents presented, among others, the
testimonies of Generosa16 and the representatives of their two (2) other
predecessors-in-interest.17 The said witnesses testified that they have been in
possession of their respective parcels of land for over thirty (30) years prior to
the purchase thereof by the respondents in 1997.18 The witnesses also
confirmed that neither they nor the interest they represent, have any
objection to the registration of Lot 3 in favor of the respondents.19
In addition, Generosa affirmed in open court a Joint Affidavit20 she
executed with Teresita.21 In it, Generosa revealed that the portions of Lot 3
previously pertaining to her and Teresita were once owned by her father,
Mr. Valentin Sernal (Valentin) and that the latter had "continuously, openly
and peacefully occupied and tilled as absolute owner" such lands even
"before the outbreak of World War 2."22
To substantiate the above testimonies, the respondents also presented
various Tax Declarations23 covering certain areas of Lot 3—the earliest of
which dates back to 1948 and covers the portions of the subject lot
previously belonging to Generosa and Teresita.24
On the other hand, the government insists that Lot 3 still forms part of the
public domain and, hence, not subject to private acquisition and
registration. The government, however, presented no further evidence to
controvert the claim of the respondents.25
The Decision of the RTC and the Court of Appeals
On 14 February 2005, the RTC rendered a ruling granting the respondents’
Application for Original Registration of Lot 3. The RTC thus decreed:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court confirming its previous
Order of general default, decrees and adjudges Lot 3 (Lot 1755) Ccs-04-
003949-D of Indang, Cadastre, with a total area of NINE THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED FIFTY SEVEN (9,577) square meters and its technical description as
above-described and situated in Brgy. [Carasuchi], Indang, Cavite,
pursuant to the provisions of Act 496 as amended by P.D. No. 1529, it is
hereby decreed and adjudged to be confirmed and registered in the
name of herein applicants MICHAEL C. SANTOS, VANESSA C. SANTOS,
MICHELLE C. SANTOS, and DELFIN C. SANTOS, all residing at No. 60 Rockville
Subdivision, Novaliches, Quezon City.
Once this decision has become final, let the corresponding decree of
registration be issued by the Administrator, Land Registration Authority.26
The government promptly appealed the ruling of the RTC to the Court of
Appeals.27 As already mentioned earlier, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
RTC’s decision on appeal.
Hence, this petition.28
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the RTC ruling granting original registration of Lot 3 in favor of the
respondents.
The government would have Us answer in the affirmative. It argues that the
respondents have failed to offer evidence sufficient to establish its title over
Lot 3 and, therefore, were unable to rebut the Regalian presumption in
favor of the State.29
The government urges this Court to consider the DENR Calabarzon Office
Report as well as the DENR-CENRO Certification, both of which clearly state
that Lot 3 only became "Alienable or
Disposable Land" on 15 March 1982.30 The government posits that since Lot
3 was only classified as alienable and disposable on 15 March 1982, the
period of prescription against the State should also commence to run only
from such date.31 Thus, the respondents’ 12 March 2002 application—filed
nearly twenty (20) years after the said classification—is still premature, as it
does not meet the statutory period required in order for extraordinary
prescription to set in.32
OUR RULING
We grant the petition.
Jura Regalia and the Property Registration Decree
We start our analysis by applying the principle of Jura Regalia or the
Regalian Doctrine.33 Jura Regalia simply means that the State is the original
proprietor of all lands and, as such, is the general source of all private
titles.34 Thus, pursuant to this principle, all claims of private title to land, save
those acquired from native title,35 must be traced from some grant, whether
express or implied, from the State.36 Absent a clear showing that land had
been let into private ownership through the State’s imprimatur, such land is
presumed to belong to the State.37
Being an unregistered land, Lot 3 is therefore presumed as land belonging
to the State. It is basic that those who seek the entry of such land into the
Torrens system of registration must first establish that it has acquired valid
title thereto as against the State, in accordance with law.
In this connection, original registration of title to land is allowed by Section
14 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, or otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree. The said section provides:
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or
abandoned river beds by right of accession or accretion under the
existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other
manner provided for by law. (Emphasis supplied)
Basing from the allegations of the respondents in their application for land
registration and subsequent pleadings, it appears that they seek the
registration of Lot 3 under either the first or the second paragraph of the
quoted section.
However, after perusing the records of this case, as well as the laws and
jurisprudence relevant thereto, We find that neither justifies registration in
favor of the respondents.
Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529
Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 refers to the original
registration of "imperfect" titles to public land acquired under Section 11(4)
in relation to Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, or the Public
Land Act, as amended.38 Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 and
Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 specify identical requirements
for the judicial confirmation of "imperfect" titles, to wit:39
 1. That the subject land forms part of the alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain;.
2. That the applicants, by themselves or through their predecessors-
in-interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide
claim of ownership, and;
3. That such possession and occupation must be since June 12,
1945 or earlier.
In this case, the respondents were not able to satisfy the third requisite, i.e.,
that the respondents failed to establish that they or their predecessors-in-
interest, have been in possession and occupation of Lot 3 "since June 12,
1945 or earlier." An examination of the evidence on record reveals so:
First. The testimonies of respondents’ predecessors-in-interest and/or their
representatives were patently deficient on this point.
None of them testified about possession and occupation of the subject
parcels of land dating back to 12 June 1945 or earlier. Rather, the said
witnesses merely related that they have been in possession of their lands "for
over thirty years" prior to the purchase thereof by respondents in 1997.40
Neither can the affirmation of Generosa of the Joint Affidavit be
considered as sufficient to prove compliance with the third requisite. The
said Joint Affidavit merely contains a general claim that Valentin had
"continuously, openly and peacefully occupied and tilled as absolute
owner" the parcels of Generosa and Teresita even "before the outbreak of
World War 2" — which lacks specificity and is unsupported by any other
evidence. In Republic v. East Silverlane Realty Development
Corporation,41 this Court dismissed a similar unsubstantiated claim of
possession as a "mere conclusion of law" that is "unavailing and cannot
suffice:"
Moreover, Vicente Oco did not testify as to what specific acts of dominion
or ownership were performed by the respondent’s predecessors-in-interest
and if indeed they did. He merely made a general claim that they came
into possession before World War II, which is a mere conclusion of law and
not factual proof of possession, and therefore unavailing and cannot
suffice.42 Evidence of this nature should have been received with suspicion,
if not dismissed as tenuous and unreliable.
Second. The supporting tax declarations presented by the respondents also
fall short of proving possession since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest
declaration submitted by the respondents i.e., Tax Declaration No.
9412,43 was issued only in 1948 and merely covers the portion of Lot 3
previously pertaining to Generosa and Teresita. Much worse, Tax
Declaration No. 9412 shows no declared improvements on such portion of
Lot 3 as of 1948—posing an apparent contradiction to the claims of
Generosa and Teresita in their Joint Affidavit.
Indeed, the evidence presented by the respondents does not qualify as the
"well-nigh incontrovertible" kind that is required to prove title thru possession
and occupation of public land since 12 June 1945 or earlier.44 Clearly,
respondents are not entitled to registration under Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529.
Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529
The respondents, however, make an alternative plea for registration, this
time, under Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529. Notwithstanding
their inability to comply with Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
the respondents claim that they were at least able to establish possession
and occupation of Lot 3 for a sufficient number of years so as to acquire
title over the same via prescription.45
As earlier intimated, the government counters the respondents’ alternative
plea by arguing that the statutory period required in order for extraordinary
prescription to set in was not met in this case.46 The government cites the
DENR Calabarzon Office Report as well as the DENR-CENRO Certification,
both of which state that Lot 3 only became "Alienable or Disposable Land"
on 15 March 1982.47 It posits that the period of prescription against the State
should also commence to run only from such date.48 Hence, the
government concludes, the respondents’ 12 March 2002 application is still
premature.49
We find the contention of the government inaccurate but nevertheless
deny registration of Lot 3 under Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No.
1529.
Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 sanctions the original
registration of lands acquired by prescription "under the provisions of
existing law." In the seminal case of Heirs of Mario Malabanan v.
Republic,50 this Court clarified that the "existing law" mentioned in the
subject provision refers to no other than Republic Act No. 386, or the Civil
Code of the Philippines.
Malabanan acknowledged that only lands of the public domain that are
"patrimonial in character" are "susceptible to acquisitive presecription" and,
hence, eligible for registration under Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree
No. 1529.51 Applying the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code,52 Malabanan
further elucidated that in order for public land to be considered as
patrimonial "there must be an express declaration by the State that the
public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial."53 Until then, the period of acquisitive
prescription against the State will not commence to run.54
The requirement of an "express declaration" contemplated by Malabanan
is separate and distinct from the mere classification of public land as
alienable and disposable.55 On this point, Malabanan was reiterated by the
recent case of Republic v. Rizalvo, Jr.56
In this case, the respondents were not able to present any "express
declaration" from the State, attesting to the patrimonial character of Lot 3.
To put it bluntly, the respondents were not able to prove that acquisitive
prescription has begun to run against the State, much less that they have
acquired title to Lot 3 by virtue thereof. As jurisprudence tells us, a mere
certification or report classifying the subject land as alienable and
disposable is not sufficient.57 We are, therefore, left with the unfortunate but
necessary verdict that the respondent are not entitled to the registration
under Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529.
There being no compliance with either the first or second paragraph of
Section 14 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, the Regalian presumption
stands and must be enforced in this case. We accordingly overturn the
decisions of the RTC and the Court of Appeals for not being supported by
the evidence at hand.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The 9 October 2007 Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86300 affirming the 14 February
2005 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, of Naic, Cavite in LRC
Case No. NC-2002-1292 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
respondents’ application for registration is, accordingly, DENIED.
Costs against respondents.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 171726 February 23, 2011
VICENTE YU CHANG AND SOLEDAD YU CHANG, Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR. J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, assails the Decision1 dated August 26, 2005 and
the Resolution2 dated February 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 67430. The CA reversed and set aside the April 28, 2000
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 31, in LRC
No. P-115, LRA Rec. No. N-68012, which granted petitioners’ application for
registration of title over two parcels of land, denominated as Lots 2199 and
2200 of Cad. 291, Pili Cadastre.
The antecedent facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On March 22, 1949, petitioners’ father, L. Yu Chang4 and the Municipality of
Pili, Camarines Sur, through its then Mayor, Justo Casuncad, executed an
Agreement to Exchange Real Property5 wherein the former assigned and
transferred to the Municipality of Pili his 400-square-meter residential lot in
Barrio San Roque, Pili, Camarines Sur, in exchange for a 400-square-meter
piece of land located in San Juan, Pili. Thereafter, L. Yu Chang and his
family took possession of the property thus obtained and erected a
residential house and a gasoline station thereon. He also declared the
property in his name under Tax Declaration No. 01794 6 and 017957 and paid
the real property taxes thereon as evidenced by twenty-eight (28) official
receipts from February 21, 1951 up to March 10, 1976. When L. Yu Chang
died on September 30, 1976, his wife, Donata Sta. Ana and his seven
children inherited the property and succeeded in the possession of the
property.
On March 1, 1978, a Deed of Transfer and Renunciation 8 of their rights over
the property was executed by L. Yu Chang's five children, Rafaela,
Catalina, Flaviana, Esperanza, and Antonio, in favor of herein petitioners.
After the transfer, petitioners had the subject property surveyed and
subdivided into two lots, Lot 21999 and Lot 220010 of Plan SWO-05-000888, Pili
Cadastre. Petitioners also declared the lots in their names for taxation
purposes as shown in Tax Declaration No. 0263311 and paid the real
property taxes thereon.
On February 21, 1997, petitioner Soledad Yu Chang, for herself and in
representation of her brother and co-petitioner, Vicente Yu Chang, filed a
petition12 for registration of title over the aforementioned lots under
the Property Registration Decree. In their petition, they declared that they
are the co-owners of the subject lots; that they and their predecessors-in-
interest "have been in actual, physical, material, exclusive, open,
occupation and possession of the above described parcels of land for
more than 100 years"13; and that allegedly, they have continuously,
peacefully, and adversely possessed the property in the concept of
owners. Hence, they are entitled to confirmation of ownership and issuance
and registration of title in their names.
In support of their application, petitioners submitted the following
documents, to wit:
1. Agreement to Exchange Real Property;
2. Deed of Transfer and Renunciation;
3. Approved Plan of Lot 2199 and Lot 2200, Cad. 291, Pili Cadastre;
4. Approved Technical Description of Lot 2199;
5. Approved Technical Description of Lot 2200;
6. Field Appraisal and Assessment Sheet (FAAS) A.R.P. No. 026-044
for Lot 2199 Cad. 291; and
7. Field Appraisal and Assessment Sheet (FAAS) A.R.P. No. 026-043
for Lot 2200 Cad. 291 Pili Cadastre.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed an
Opposition14 to the application, alleging, inter alia, that: (1) neither the
applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the land since June 12, 1945 or prior
thereto; (2) the muniments of title, tax declarations and tax receipts do not
constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of
the land; and (3) that the parcels of land applied for are portions of the
public domain and are not subject to private appropriation.
No other parties filed their opposition. Thus, on December 14, 1998, an
Order of General Default15 was issued by the trial court.
After hearing, the trial court rendered a Decision granting petitioners'
application. The fallo of the trial court’s decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, decision is hereby rendered as
follows:
1. Confirming the imperfect title of the herein applicants Vicente Yu
Chang and Soledad Yu Chang over the two (2) parcels of land
described in paragraph two (2) page 2 of the Petition, particularly
Lot 2199, Plans S"0-05-000888, Cad. 291, Pili Cadastre and Lot 2200,
Plan SWO-05-000888, Cad. 291, Pili Cadastre; both Filipino citizens,
residents of #14 Joaquin St., Corinthian Garden, Quezon City and
San Juan, Pili, Camarines Sur respectively;
2. Ordering the dismissal of the application in the Cadastral
proceeding with respect to Lots 2199 and 2200, Cad. 291, Pili
Cadastre under CAD Case No. N-9;
3. After finality of this decision, let the corresponding decree of
registration be issued by the Administrator, Land Registration
Authority to the herein applicants above-mentioned.
SO ORDERED.16
The Republic appealed the decision to the CA on the ground that the
court a quo erred in granting petitioners’ application for registration of Lots
2199 and 2200 despite their failure to show compliance with the
requirements of the law. In addition, the Republic asserted that the land
was classified as public forest land; hence, it could not be subject to
appropriation and alienation.
As aforesaid, the CA reversed the trial court's decision on August 26, 2005,
and dismissed petitioners’ application for land registration. The CA
considered the petition to be governed by Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141 or the Public Land Act, as amended,
and held that petitioners were not able to present incontrovertible
evidence that the parcels of land sought to be registered are alienable
and disposable.17 The CA relied on the testimony of Lamberto Orcena,
Land Management Officer III of CENRO, Iriga City, who testified that prior to
October 30, 1986, the entire area encompassing the right side of the Naga-
Legaspi Highway, including the subject properties, was classified as forest
land. According to the CA, even if the area within which the subject
properties are located is now being used for residential and commercial
purposes, such fact will not convert the subject parcels of land into
agricultural land.18 The CA stressed that there must be a positive act from
the government declassifying the land as forest land before it could be
deemed alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.19
Additionally, the CA noted that the lands sought to be registered were
declared disposable public land only on October 30, 1986. Thus, it was only
from that time that the period of open, continuous and notorious possession
commenced to toll against the State.
Aggrieved, petitioners are now before this Court via the present appeal,
raising the sole issue of whether the appellate court erred in dismissing their
application for registration of title on the ground that they failed to prove
compliance with the requirements of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act,
as amended.
Petitioners insist that the subject properties could no longer be considered
and classified as forest land since there are buildings, residential houses and
even government structures existing and standing on the land.20 In their
Memorandum,21 petitioners point out that the original owner and possessor
of the subject land was the Municipal Government of Pili which was
established in 1930. The land was originally part of the municipal ground
adjacent to the Municipal Building located at the right side of the Naga-
Legaspi National Highway.22 From 1949, when L. Yu Chang acquired the
property through barter and up to the filing of petitioners’ application in
1997, petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest had been in actual
physical and material possession of the land in the concept of an owner,
notorious and known to the public and adverse to the whole world.
The Republic, through the OSG, for its part, maintains that petitioners failed
to prove their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
subject lots for the period of time required by law. The OSG also submits that
the subject lands were declared as alienable and disposable only on
October 30, 1986.
We deny the petition for lack of merit.
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. 1073, under
which petitioners’ application was filed, provides:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands
of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may
apply to the Regional Trial Court of the province or city where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of
title therefor, under the Property Registration Decree, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors[-]in[-]interest
have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12,
1945, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.
x x x x23
Under this provision, in order that petitioners’ application for registration of
title may be granted, they must first establish the following: (1) that the
subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public
domain and (2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim
of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier.24 Applicants must overcome
the presumption that the land they are applying for is part of the public
domain and that they have an interest therein sufficient to warrant
registration in their names arising from an imperfect title.25
In the instant case, petitioners did not adduce any evidence to the effect
that the lots subject of their application are alienable and disposable land
of the public domain. Instead, petitioners contend that the subject
properties could no longer be considered and classified as forest land since
there are building structures, residential houses and even government
buildings existing and standing on the area. This, however, is hardly the
proof required under the law. As clarified by this Court in Heirs of Jose
Amunategui v. Director of Forestry,26 a forested area classified as forest land
of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because
loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land
classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted with
crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to
be on mountains or in out-of-the-way places. The classification of land is
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive
of what the land actually looks like.27 Unless and until the land classified as
forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it
may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the
rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.28 As aptly held by the
appellate court:
[T]he fact that the area within which the subject parcels of land are
located is being used for residential and commercial purposes does not
serve to convert the subject parcels of land into agricultural land. It is
fundamental that before any land may be declassified from the forest
group and converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or
other purposes, there must be a positive act from the government. A person
cannot enter into forest land and by the simple act of cultivating a portion
of that land, earn credits towards an eventual confirmation of imperfect
title. The Government must first declare the forest land to be alienable and
disposable agricultural land before the year of entry, cultivation and
exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an
imperfect title.291avvphil
Moreover, during the hearing of petitioners' application, the Republic
presented a Report30 of Rene Gomez, Land Investigator/Inspector, CENRO
No. V-2-3, which disclosed that the lots applied for by the petitioners were
classified as alienable and disposable under Project No. 9-E, L.C. Map No.
3393 and released and certified as such only on October 30, 1986. A
Compliance31 dated January 19, 1999 submitted by OIC-CENR Officer
Joaquin Ed A. Guerrero to the trial court also stated that Lots. 2199 and 2200
of Cad. 291 were "verified to be within Alienable and Disposable area
under Project No. 9-E, L.C. Map No. 3393, as certified on October 30, 1986
by the then Bureau of Forestry". Evidently, therefore, the subject lots were
declared alienable and disposable only on October 30, 1986. Prior to that
period, the same could not be the subject of confirmation of imperfect title.
Petitioners’ possession of the subject forest land prior to the date when it
was classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be
excluded from the computation of the period of possession.32 To reiterate, it
is well settled that possession of forest land, prior to its classification as
alienable and disposable land, is ineffective since such possession may not
be considered as possession in the concept of owner.33 The adverse
possession which can be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of
imperfect title cases cannot commence until after forest land has been
declared and alienable.34
Much as this Court wants to conform to the State’s policy of encouraging
and promoting the distribution of alienable public lands to spur economic
growth and remain true to the ideal of social justice, our hands are tied by
the law’s stringent safeguards against registering imperfect titles.35 Here,
petitioners failed to present "well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence necessary
to prove their compliance of the requirements under Section 48(b) of C.A.
No. 141. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing their
application for confirmation and registration of title.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated August 26,
2005 and the Resolution dated February 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 67430 are hereby AFFIRMED.
With costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 186961 February 20, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
EAST SILVERLANE REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This Court is urged to review and set aside the July 31, 2008 Decision1 and
February 20, 2009 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 00143. In its July 31, 2008 Decision, the CA affirmed the August 27, 2004
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40 of Cagayan De Oro
City. The dispositive portion thereof states:
WHEREFORE, premises foregoing, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit. The assailed Decision dated August 27, 2004 is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.3
In its February 20, 2009 Resolution, the CA denied the petitioner’s August 29,
2008 Motion for Reconsideration.4
The Factual Antecedents
The respondent filed with the RTC an application for land registration,
covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 9039 of Cagayan Cadastre,
situated in El Salvador, Misamis Oriental and with an area of 9,794 square
meters. The respondent purchased the portion of the subject property
consisting of 4,708 square meters (Area A) from Francisca Oco pursuant to
a Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 27, 1990 and the remaining
portion consisting of 5,086 square meters (Area B) from Rosario U. Tan Lim,
Nemesia Tan and Mariano U. Tan pursuant to a Deed of Partial Partition with
Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 11, 1991. It was claimed that the
respondent’s predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious,
continuous and exclusive possession of the subject property since June 12,
1945.
After hearing the same on the merits, the RTC issued on August 27, 2004 a
Decision, granting the respondent’s petition for registration of the land in
question, thus:
ACCORDINGLY, finding the application meritorious, and pursuant to
applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter, particularly the provisions
of P.D. 1529, judgment is hereby rendered granting the instant application.
The Land Registration Authority is hereby ordered to issue a decree in the
name of the applicant East Silverlane Realty Development Corporation
covering the parcel of land, Lot 9039, Cad 237, having an area of 9,794
square meters covered by the two (2) tax declarations subject of this
petition. Based on the decree, the Register of Deeds for the Province of
Misamis Oriental is hereby directed to issue an original certificate of title in
the name of the applicant covering the land subject matter of this
application.5
On appeal by the petitioner, the CA affirmed the RTC’s August 27, 2004
Decision. In its July 31, 2008 Decision,6 the CA found no merit in the
petitioner’s appeal, holding that:
It is a settled rule that an application for land registration must conform to
three requisites: (1) the land is alienable public land; (2) the applicant’s
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
thereof must be since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and (3) it is a bona fide claim
of ownership.
In the case at bench, petitioner-appellee has met all the requirements.
Anent the first requirement, both the report and certification issued by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) shows that the
subject land was within the alienable and disposable zone classified under
BF Project [N]o. 8 Blk. I, L.C. Map [N]o. 585 and was released and certified
as such on December 31, 1925.
Indubitably, both the DENR certification and report constitute a positive
government act, an administrative action, validly classifying the land in
question. It is a settled rule that the classification or re-classification of public
lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest land is now a
prerogative of the Executive Department of the government. Accordingly,
the certification enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence of
contradictory evidence. As it is, the said certification remains uncontested
and even oppositor-appellant Republic itself did not present any evidence
to refute the contents of the said certification. Thus, the alienable and
disposable character of the subject land certified as such as early as
December 31, 1925 has been clearly established by the evidence of the
petitioner-appellee.
Anent the second and third requirements, the applicant is required to prove
his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time
immemorial or since June 12, 1945.
xxxx
In the case at bench, ESRDC tacked its possession and occupation over the
subject land to that of its predecessors-in-interest. Copies of the tax
declarations and real property historical ownership pertaining thereto were
presented in court. A perusal of the records shows that in 1948, a portion of
the subject land was declared under the name of Agapito Claudel.
Subsequently, in 1957 until 1991 the same was declared under the name of
Francisca Oco. Thereafter, the same was declared under the name of
ESRDC. A certification was likewise issued by the Provincial Assessor of
Misamis Oriental that previous tax declarations pertaining to the said
portion under the name of Agapita Claudel could no longer be located as
the files were deemed lost or destroyed before World War II.
On the other hand, the remaining portion of the said land was previously
declared in 1948 under the name of Jacinto Tan Lay Cho. Subsequently, in
1969 until 1990, the same was declared under the name of Jacinto Tan.
Thereafter, the same was declared under the name of ESRDC. A
certification was likewise issued by the Provincial Assessor that the files of
previous tax declarations under the name of Jacinto Tan Lay Cho were
deemed lost or destroyed again before World War II.
In 1991 or upon ESRDC’s acquisition of the subject property, the latter took
possession thereto. Albeit it has presently leased the said land to Asia
Brewery, Inc., where the latter built its brewery plant, nonetheless, ESRDC
has its branch office located at the plant compound of Asia Brewery, Inc.
Corollarily, oppositor-appellant’s contentions that the court a quo erred in
considering the tax declarations as evidence of ESRDC’s possession of the
subject land as the latter’s predecessors-in-interest declared the same
sporadically, is untenable.
It is a settled rule that albeit tax declarations and realty tax payment of
property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are
good indicia of the possession in the concept of owner for no one in his
right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at
least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder
has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece
of property for taxation purposes manifests not only one’s sincere and
honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse
claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the
intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an act
strengthens one’s bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.
Finally, it bears stressing that the pieces of evidence submitted by
petitioner-appellee are incontrovertible. Not one, not even oppositor-
appellant Republic, presented any countervailing evidence to contradict
the claims of the petitioners that they are in possession of the subject
property and their possession of the same is open, continuous and exclusive
in the concept of an owner for over 30 years.
Verily, from 1948 when the subject land was declared for taxation purposes
until ESRDC filed an application for land registration in 1995, ESRDC have
been in possession over the subject land in the concept of an owner
tacking its possession to that its predecessors-in-interest for forty seven (47)
years already. Thus, ESRDC was able to prove sufficiently that it has been in
possession of the subject property for more than 30 years, which possession
is characterized as open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious in the
concept of an owner.7 (citations omitted)
The petitioner assails the foregoing, alleging that the respondent failed to
prove that its predecessors-in-interest possessed the subject property in the
manner and for the length of time required under Section 48 (b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the "Public Land Act"
(PLA), and Section 14 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as
the "Property Registration Decree" (P.D. No. 1529). According to the
petitioner, the respondent did not present a credible and competent
witness to testify on the specific acts of ownership performed by its
predecessors-in-interest on the subject property. The respondent’s sole
witness, Vicente Oco, can hardly be considered a credible and competent
witness as he is the respondent’s liaison officer and he is not related in any
way to the respondent’s predecessors-in-interest. That coconut trees were
planted on the subject property only shows casual or occasional cultivation
and does not qualify as possession under a claim of ownership.
Issue
This Court is confronted with the sole issue of whether the respondent has
proven itself entitled to the benefits of the PLA and P.D. No. 1529 on
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.
Our Ruling
This Court resolves to GRANT the petition.
Preliminarily, with respect to the infirmity suffered by this petition from the
standpoint of Rule 45, this Court agrees with the respondent that the issue of
whether the respondent had presented sufficient proof of the required
possession under a bona fide claim of ownership raises a question of fact,
considering that it invites an evaluation of the evidentiary record.8 However,
that a petition for review should be confined to questions of law and that
this Court is not a trier of facts and bound by the factual findings of the CA
are not without exceptions. Among these exceptions, which obtain in this
case, are: (a) when the judgment of the CA is based on a misapprehension
of facts or (b) when its findings are not sustained by the evidence on
record.
This Court’s review of the records of this case reveals that the evidence
submitted by the respondent fell short of proving that it has acquired an
imperfect title over the subject property under Section 48 (b) of the PLA.
The respondent cannot register the subject property in its name on the basis
of either Section 14 (1) or Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529. It was not
established by the required quantum of evidence that the respondent and
its predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the subject property for the prescribed statutory
period.
The PLA governs the classification and disposition of lands of the public
domain. Under Section 11 thereof, one of the modes of disposing public
lands suitable for agricultural purposes is by "confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles".9 On the other hand, Section 48 provides the grant to the
qualified possessor of an alienable and disposable public land. Thus:
SEC. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands
of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may
apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of
title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the
United States have applied for the purchase, composition or other
form of grant of lands of the public domain under the laws and
royal decrees then in force and have instituted and prosecuted the
proceedings in connection therewith, but have with or without
default upon their part, or for any other cause, not received title
therefor, if such applicants or grantees and their heirs have
occupied and cultivated said lands continuously since the filing of
their applications.
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application
for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves
or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether
disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least
30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in sub-section (b)
hereof.
Presidential Decree No. 1073 (P.D. No. 1073), which was issued on January
25, 1977, deleted subsection (a) and amended subsection (b) as follows:
SECTION 4. The provisions of Section 48 (b) and Section 48 (c), Chapter VIII
of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these
provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation by the applicant thru himself or thru his
predecessor-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945.
Notably, the first PLA, or Act No. 926, required a possession and occupation
for a period of ten (10) years prior to the effectivity of Act No. 2096 on July
26, 1904 or on July 26, 1894. This was adopted in the PLA until it was
amended by Republic Act No. 1942 on June 22, 1957, which provided for a
period of thirty (30) years. It was only with the enactment of P.D. No. 1073
on January 25, 1977 that it was required that possession and occupation
should commence on June 12, 1945.
P.D. No. 1529, which was enacted on June 11, 1978, codified all the laws
relative to the registration of property. Section 14 thereof partially provides:
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provision of existing laws.
 (3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or
abandoned river beds by right of accession or accretion under the
existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other
manner provided for by law.
Section 14 (1) and Section 14 (2) are clearly different. Section 14 (1) covers
"alienable and disposable land" while Section 14 (2) covers "private
property". As this Court categorically stated in Heirs of Malabanan v.
Republic of the Philippines,10 the distinction between the two provisions lies
with the inapplicability of prescription to alienable and disposable lands.
Specifically:
At the same time, Section 14 (2) puts into operation the entire regime of
prescription under the Civil Code, a fact which does not hold true with
respect to Section 14 (1).11
Property is either part of the public domain or privately owned.12 Under
Article 420 of the Civil Code, the following properties are of public
dominion:
(a) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers,
torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores,
roadsteads and others of similar character;
(b) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use,
and are intended for some public service or for the development
of the national wealth.
All other properties of the State, which is not of the character mentioned in
Article 420 is patrimonial property,13 hence, susceptible to acquisitive
prescription.14
In Heirs of Malabanan, this Court ruled that possession and occupation of
an alienable and disposable public land for the periods provided under the
Civil Code do not automatically convert said property into private property
or release it from the public domain. There must be an express declaration
that the property is no longer intended for public service or development of
national wealth. Without such express declaration, the property, even if
classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the State, and
thus, may not be acquired by prescription.
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of public
dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall
form part of the patrimonial property of the State." It is this provision that
controls how public dominion property may be converted into patrimonial
property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420 (2)
makes clear that those property "which belong to the State, without being
for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth" are public dominion property. For as
long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified as
alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if when it
is "intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth". (emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the
public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property,
even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public
dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by
prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are
expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service
or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive
prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law
duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where
the President is duly authorized by law.15
In other words, for one to invoke the provisions of Section 14 (2) and set up
acquisitive prescription against the State, it is primordial that the status of
the property as patrimonial be first established. Furthermore, the period of
possession preceding the classification of the property as patrimonial
cannot be considered in determining the completion of the prescriptive
period.
To prove that its predecessors-in-interest were in possession of the subject
property on or prior to June 12, 1945 or had completed the prescriptive
period of thirty (30) years, the respondent submitted the following tax
declarations:
a) Tax Declaration in the name of Agapita Claudel for the year
1948;
 b) Tax Declarations in the name of Francisca Oco for the years
1957, 1963, 1969, 1973, 1974, 1980, 1987, 1989 and 1991;
c) Tax Declarations in the respondent’s name for the years 1991,
1992 and 1994;
d) Tax Declarations in the name of Jacinto Tan Lay Cho for the
years 1948 and 1952;
e) Tax Declarations in the name of Jacinto Tan for the years 1969,
1973, 1974, 1980, 1989 and 1990; and
f) Tax Declarations in the respondent’s name for the years 1991,
1992 and 1994.
Pursuant to Agapita Claudel’s 1948 Tax Declaration, there were nineteen
(19) coconut and ten (10) banana trees planted on Area A. The coconut
trees were supposedly four years old, hence, the reasonable presumption
that she had been in possession even before June 12, 1945.16
The respondent also offered the following testimony of Vicente Oco:
"Q – Mr. Witness, If you know about what period your predecessor has
started to possess this land subject matter of this application?
A – Per my personal knowledge, it was before the second world war but the
Municipality of El Salvador was created on June 15, 1948 by virtue of RA 268
and it’s started to officially function only on August 2, 1948[.]
Q – From whom did you acquire this information?
A – From the seller and the adjoining lot owners."17
To prove that its predecessors-in-interest exercised acts of dominion over
the subject property, the respondent claimed that per Francisca Oco’s Tax
Declarations, the following improvements were introduced in Area A:
nineteen (19) coconut and ten (10) banana trees in Area A in 1957 and
1963; thirty-three (33) coconut trees in 1969 and 1973; thirty-three (33)
coconut trees, one (1) mango tree and three (3) seguidillas vines in 1974;
thirty-three (33) coconut trees in 1980; eighty-seven (87) coconut trees in
1987; and fifteen (15) coconut trees in 1989. Per Jacinto Tan’s Tax
Declarations, there were fifty-seven (57) coconut trees in Area B in 1973,
1974, 1980, 1989 and 1990.18
A reading of the CA’s July 31, 2008 Decision shows that it affirmed the grant
of the respondent’s application given its supposed compliance with
Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529. It ruled that based on the evidence
submitted, the respondent is not qualified to register the subject property in
its name under Section 14 (1) as the possession and occupation of its
predecessors-in-interest commenced after June 12, 1945. Nonetheless, as
the CA ruled, the respondent acquired title to the subject property by
prescription as its predecessors-in-interest had possessed the subject
property for more than thirty (30) years. Citing Buenaventura v. Republic of
the Philippines,19 the CA held that even if possession commenced after
June 12, 1945, registration is still possible under Section 14 (2) and possession
in the concept of an owner effectively converts an alienable and
disposable public land into private property.
This Court, however, disagrees on the conclusion arrived at by the CA. On
the premise that the application for registration, which was filed in 1995, is
based on Section 14 (2), it was not proven that the respondent and its
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the subject property in
the manner prescribed by law and for the period necessary before
acquisitive prescription may apply.
While the subject land was supposedly declared alienable and disposable
on December 31, 1925 per the April 18, 1997 Certification and July 1, 1997
Report of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO),20 the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) converted the same
from agricultural to industrial only on October 16, 1990.21 Also, it was only in
2000 that the Municipality of El Salvador passed a Zoning Ordinance,
including the subject property in the industrial zone.22 Therefore, it was only
in 1990 that the subject property had been declared patrimonial and it is
only then that the prescriptive period began to run. The respondent cannot
benefit from the alleged possession of its predecessors-in-interest because
prior to the withdrawal of the subject property from the public domain, it
may not be acquired by prescription.
On the premise that the application of the respondent is predicated on
Section 14 (1), the same would likewise not prosper. As shown by the tax
declarations of the respondent’s predecessors-in-interest, the earliest that
the respondent can trace back the possession of its predecessors-in-interest
is in 1948. That there were four-year old coconut trees in Area A as stated in
Agapita Claudel’s 1948 Tax Declaration cannot be considered a "well-nigh
controvertible evidence" that she was in possession prior to June 12, 1945
without any evidence that she planted and cultivated them. In the case of
Jacinto Tan Lay Cho, the earliest tax declaration in his name is dated 1948
and there is no evidence that he occupied and possessed Area B on or
prior to June 12, 1945. Furthermore, the testimony of the respondent’s lone
witness that the respondent’s predecessors-in-interest were already in
possession of the subject property as of June 12, 1945 lacks probative value
for being hearsay.
It is explicit under Section 14 (1) that the possession and occupation
required to acquire an imperfect title over an alienable and disposable
public land must be "open, continuous, exclusive and notorious" in
character. In Republic of the Philippines v. Alconaba,23 this Court explained
that the intent behind the use of "possession" in conjunction with
"occupation" is to emphasize the need for actual and not just constructive
or fictional possession.
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are
separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to
make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than
occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore,
the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing
effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to
highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be
a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of
acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise
over his own property.24 (citations omitted)
On the other hand, Section 14 (2) is silent as to the required nature of
possession and occupation, thus, requiring a reference to the relevant
provisions of the Civil Code on prescription. And under Article 1118 thereof,
possession for purposes of prescription must be "in the concept of an owner,
public, peaceful and uninterrupted". In Heirs of Marcelina Arzadon-
Crisologo v. Rañon,25 this Court expounded on the nature of possession
required for purposes of prescription:
It is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid
down by law, namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an
owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse. Possession is open
when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine. It is
continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or
occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive
dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and
benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known
and talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood. The party
who asserts ownership by adverse possession must prove the presence of
the essential elements of acquisitive prescription.26 (citations omitted)
This Court is not satisfied with the evidence presented by the respondent to
prove compliance with the possession required either under Section 14 (1)
or Section 14 (2).
First, the twelve (12) Tax Declarations covering Area A and the eleven (11)
Tax Declarations covering Area B for a claimed possession of more than
forty-six (46) years (1948-1994) do not qualify as competent evidence of
actual possession and occupation. As this Court ruled in Wee v. Republic of
the Philippines:27
It bears stressing that petitioner presented only five tax declarations (for the
years 1957, 1961, 1967, 1980 and 1985) for a claimed possession and
occupation of more than 45 years (1945-1993). This type of intermittent and
sporadic assertion of alleged ownership does not prove open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation. In any event, in the
absence of other competent evidence, tax declarations do not
conclusively establish either possession or declarant’s right to registration of
title.28 (emphasis supplied and citation omitted)
The phrase "adverse, continuous, open, public, and in concept of owner,"
by which the respondent describes its possession and that of its
predecessors-in-interest is a conclusion of law. The burden of proof is on the
respondent to prove by clear, positive and convincing evidence that the
alleged possession of its predecessors-in-interest was of the nature and
duration required by law.29 It is therefore inconsequential if the petitioner
failed to present evidence that would controvert the allegations of the
respondent. A person who seeks the registration of title to a piece of land
on the basis of possession by himself and his predecessors-in-interest must
prove his claim by clear and convincing evidence, i.e., he must prove his
title and should not rely on the absence or weakness of the evidence of the
oppositors.30
The respondent’s claim of ownership will not prosper on the basis of the tax
declarations alone. In Cequeña v. Bolante,31 this Court ruled that it is only
when these tax declarations are coupled with proof of actual possession of
the property that they may become the basis of a claim of ownership.32 In
the absence of actual public and adverse possession, the declaration of
the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership.33
Second, that the nineteen (19) coconut trees supposedly found on Area A
were four years old at the time Agapita Claudel filed a Tax Declaration in
1948 will not suffice as evidence that her possession commenced prior to
June 12, 1945, in the absence of evidence that she planted and cultivated
them. Alternatively, assuming that Agapita Claudel planted and
maintained these trees, such can only be considered "casual cultivation"
considering the size of Area A. On the other hand, that Jacinto Tan Lay Cho
possessed Area B in the concept of an owner on or prior to June 12, 1945
cannot be assumed from his 1948 Tax Declaration.
Third, that plants were on the subject property without any evidence that it
was the respondent’s predecessors-in-interest who planted them and that
actual cultivation or harvesting was made does not constitute "well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence" of actual possession and occupation. As this
Court ruled in Wee:
We are, therefore, constrained to conclude that the mere existence of an
unspecified number of coffee plants, sans any evidence as to who planted
them, when they were planted, whether cultivation or harvesting was
made or what other acts of occupation and ownership were undertaken, is
not sufficient to demonstrate petitioner’s right to the registration of title in
her favor.34
Fourth, Vicente Oco’s testimony deserves scant consideration and will not
supplement the inherent inadequacy of the tax declarations.1âwphi1 Apart
from being self-serving, it is undoubtedly hearsay. Vicente Oco lacks
personal knowledge as to when the predecessors-in-interest of the
respondent started to occupy the subject property and admitted that his
testimony was based on what he allegedly gathered from the respondent’s
predecessors-in-interest and the owners of adjoining lot. Moreover, Vicente
Oco did not testify as to what specific acts of dominion or ownership were
performed by the respondent’s predecessors-in-interest and if indeed they
did. He merely made a general claim that they came into possession
before World War II, which is a mere conclusion of law and not factual
proof of possession, and therefore unavailing and cannot
suffice.35 Evidence of this nature should have been received with suspicion,
if not dismissed as tenuous and unreliable.
Finally, that the respondent’s application was filed after only four years from
the time the subject property may be considered patrimonial by reason of
the DAR’s October 26, 1990 Order shows lack of possession whether for
ordinary or extraordinary prescriptive period. The principle enunciated in
Heirs of Malabanan cited above was reiterated and applied in Republic of
the Philippines v. Rizalvo:36
On this basis, respondent would have been eligible for application for
registration because his claim of ownership and possession over the subject
property even exceeds thirty (30) years. However, it is jurisprudentially clear
that the thirty (30)-year period of prescription for purposes of acquiring
ownership and registration of public land under Section 14 (2) of P.D. No.
1529 only begins from the moment the State expressly declares that the
public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial.37
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The July
31, 2008 Decision and February 20, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 00143 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the respondent’s
application for registration of title over Lot 9039 of Cagayan Cadastre is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 185092 June 4, 2014
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CORAZON C. SESE and FE C. SESE, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSGJ, assailing the November 21, 2007 Decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 81439, which dismissed its
appeal and affirmed the October 3, 2003 Decision2 of the Municipal Trial
Court of Pulilan, Bulacan (MTC), in LRC Case No. 026.
Factual and Procedural Antecedents:
Records show that on September 17, 2002, Corazon C. Sese and Fe C. Sese
(respondents) filed with the MTC an application for original registration of
land over a parcel of land with an area of 10, 792 square meters, situated in
Barangay Sto. Cristo, Municipality of Pulilan, Province of Bulacan, and more
particularly described as Lot 11247, Cad. 345, Pulilan Cadastre, under Plan
No. AP-03-004226.
Respondents alleged that on July 22, 1972, they acquired, through a
donation inter vivos from their mother, Resurreccion L. Castro
(Resurreccion), the subject agricultural land; that they, through their
predecessors-in-interest, had been in possession of the subject property;
and that the property was not within a reservation.
In support of their application, respondents submitted the following
documents, namely: (1) Tax Declaration No. 99-19015-01557 "in the name of
Corazon Sese and Fe Sese, minor, representing their mother Resurreccion
Castro, as her Natural Guardian"; (2) Certificate of Technical Description
which was approved on December 10, 1998 by the Land Management
Service, Region III, of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR); (3) Certification in lieu of lost Surveyor’s Certificate issued
by the same authority; (4) Official Receipt of payment of real property tax
over the subject property; (5) Certification from the Office of the Municipal
Treasurer of Pulilan, stating that the registered owners of a property under
Tax Declaration No. 99-19-015-01557 were Corazon Sese and others; and (6)
Survey plan of Lot 11247, CAD 345,Pulilan Cadastre, approved by the
Regional Technical Director of the Land Management Service, Region III, of
the DENR, stating that the land subject of the survey was alienable and
disposable land, and as certified to by the Bureau of Forestry on March 1,
1927, was outside of any civil or military reservation. On the lower portion of
the plan, there was a note stating that a deed of absolute sale over the
subject property was executed by a certain Luis Santos and Fermina Santos
(the Santoses) in favor of Resurreccion on October 4, 1950.
On the lower portion of the survey plan, a note stated, among others, that:
"This survey is inside the alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 20
LC Map No. 637 certified by the Bureau of Forestry on March 1, 1927. It is
outside any civil or military reservation." The said plan was approved by the
DENR, Land Management Services, Regional Office III, San Fernando,
Pampanga, on December 3, 1998.
Finding the application sufficient in form and substance, the MTC issued the
Order, dated October 10, 2002, setting the case for hearing with the
corresponding publication. After compliance with all the requirements of
the law regarding publication, mailing and posting, hearing on the merits of
the application followed.
During the trial on June 4, 2003, respondent Corazon C. Sese (Corazon)
testified on their claim over the subject lot. Thereafter, respondents
submitted their formal offer of evidence, after which the evidence offered
were admitted by the MTC in the Order, dated July 10, 2003, without
objection from the public prosecutor.
The OSG did not present any evidence to oppose the application.
On October 3, 2003, the MTC rendered its Decision,3 ordering the
registration of the subject property in the name of respondents. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the instant application to be sufficient in form and
substance and the applicants having established their right of ownership
over the subject parcel of land and are therefore entitled to registration
thereof, the Court thereby grants the petition.
Accordingly, the Court hereby orders the registration of the parcel of land
subject matter of this petition which is more particularly described in Plan
Ap-03-004226 Pulilan Cadastre and in their corresponding technical
descriptions in the name of Resureccion Castro.
Upon this decision becoming final, let an Order for the decree be issued.
SO ORDERED.
The MTC reasoned out that there was evidence to show that the subject
lots had been in open, continuous, adverse, and public possession, either
by the applicants themselves or their predecessor-in-interest. Such
possession since time immemorial conferred an effective title on the
applicants, whereby the land ceased to be public and became private
property. It had been the accepted norm that open, adverse and
continuous possession for at least 30 years was sufficient. The MTC noted
that evidence showed that the parcel of land involved was not covered by
land patent or a public land application as certified to by the Community
Environment and Natural Resources of Tabang, Guiguinto, Bulacan.
Moreover, it added that the technical descriptions of Lot 11247 were
prepared and secured from the Land Management Sector, DENR, Region
III, San Fernando, Pampanga, and were verified and found to be correct by
Eriberto Almazan, In-Charge of the Regional Survey Division.
On December 19, 2003, the OSG interposed an appeal with the CA,
docketed as CA-GR. CV No. 81439. In its brief,4 the OSG presented the
following assignment of errors: a) only alienable lands of the public domain
occupied and possessed in concept of owner for a period of at least thirty
(30) years is entitled to confirmation of title; and b) respondents failed to
prove specific acts of possession.
The OSG argued that there was no proof that the subject property was
already segregated from inalienable lands of the public domain. Verily, it
was only from the date of declaration of such lands as alienable and
disposable that the period for counting the statutory requirement of
possession would start.
Also, there was absolutely no proof of respondents’ supposed possession of
the subject property. Save for the testimony of Corazon that "at present, the
worker of (her) mother is occupying the subject property," there was no
evidence that respondents were actually occupying the subject tract of
land or that they had introduced improvement thereon.
On November 21, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision5 affirming the
judgment of the MTC ordering the registration of the subject property in the
name of respondents. The decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed decision dated October
3, 2003 of the MTC of Pulilan, Bulacan, in LRC Case No. 026 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
The CA reasoned out, among others, that the approved survey plan of the
subject property with an annotation, stating that the subject property was
alienable and disposable land, was a public document, having been
issued by the DENR, a competent authority. Its contents were prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to
establish that the subject property was indeed alienable and disposable.
With respect to the second issue, the CA was of the view that the doctrine
of constructive possession was applicable. Respondents acquired the
subject property through a donation inter vivos executed on July 22, 1972
from their mother. The latter acquired the said property from the Santoses
on October 4, 1950 by virtue of a deed of absolute sale. Further, respondent
Corazon testified that a small hut was built on the said land, which was
occupied by the worker of her mother. Moreover, neither the public
prosecutor nor any private individual appeared to oppose the application
for registration of the subject property.
The CA also stated that respondents’ claim of possession over the subject
property was buttressed by the Tax Declaration No. 99-19015-01557 "in the
name of Corazon Sese and Fe Sese, minor, representing their mother
Resurreccion Castro, as her Natural Guardian"; the official receipt of
payment of real property tax over the subject property; and the certificate
from the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Pulilan, stating that the
registered owner of a property under Tax Declaration No. 99-19015-01557
were respondents.
The CA added that although tax declaration or realty tax payments of
property were not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they
were good indicia of possession in the concept of owner.
Hence, the OSG filed this petition.
ISSUES
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN RULING THAT THE
APPROVED SURVEY PLAN IDENTIFIED BY ONE OF THE RESPONDENTS IS PROOF
THAT THE SUBJECT LAND IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN GRANTING THE
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION.
The OSG argues that unless a piece of land is shown to have been classified
as alienable and disposable, it remains part of the inalienable land of the
public domain. In the present case, the CA relied on the approved survey
indicating that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. It is
well-settled, however, that such notation does not suffice to prove that the
land sought to be registered is alienable and disposable. What respondents
should have done was to show that the DENR Secretary had approved the
land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable
and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration
fell within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO
or CENRO. In addition, they should have adduced a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy
by the legal custodian of the official records.
To bolster its argument, the OSG cites the case of Republic of the Philippine
v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,6 where the Court stated that the trial court should
not have accepted the contents of the certifications as proof of the facts
stated therein. Even if the certifications are presumed duly issued and
admissible in evidence, they have no probative value in establishing that
the land is alienable and disposable. Such government certifications do
not, by their mere issuance, prove the facts stated therein. As such, the
certifications are prima facie evidence of their due execution and date of
issuance but they do not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein.
With respect to the second assignment of error, the OSG argues that
respondents failed to present specific acts of ownership to prove open,
continuous, exclusive, notorious, and adverse possession in the concept of
an owner. Facts constituting possession must be duly established by
competent evidence. As to the tax declaration adduced by respondents, it
cannot be said that it clearly manifested their adverse claim on the
property. If respondents genuinely and consistently believed their claim of
ownership, they should have regularly complied with their real estate
obligations from the start of their supposed occupation.
Position of Respondents
On the other hand, respondents assert that the CA correctly found that the
subject land was alienable and disposable. The approved survey plan of
the subject property with an annotation, stating that the subject property is
alienable and disposable land, is a public document, having been issued
by the DENR, a competent authority. Its contents are prima facie evidence
of the facts stated therein and are sufficient to establish that the subject
property is indeed alienable and disposable.
Respondents cite the case of Republic v. Serrano,7 where the Court stated
that a DENR Regional Technical Director’s certification, which was
annotated on the subdivision plan submitted in evidence, constituted
substantial compliance with the legal requirement. The DENR certification
enjoyed the presumption of regularity absent any evidence to the contrary.
Anent the second assignment of error, respondents contend that the CA
correctly applied the doctrine of constructive possession because they
acquired the subject land from their mother, Resurreccion, through a
donation inter vivos, dated July 22, 1972.Their mother, in turn, acquired the
subject land from the Santoses on October 4, 1950 by virtue of an absolute
sale. They claim that a small hut was built in the said land and was
occupied by a worker of her mother. They countered that although tax
declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence
of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the
concept of owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a
property which is not in his actual or constructive custody.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The vital issue to be resolved by the Court is whether respondents are
entitled to the registration of land title under Section 14(1) of Presidential
Decree (P.D.)No. 1529, or pursuant to Section 14(2) of the same statute.
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 in relation to Section 48(b) of Commonwealth
Act No. 141,8 as amended by Section 4 of P.D. No. 1073,9 provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
xxxx
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may
apply to the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance
of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.
Based on the above-quoted provisions, applicants for registration of land
title must establish and prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the
disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; (2) that the applicant
and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and (3) that it is
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.10 Compliance with the foregoing requirements is indispensable for
an application for registration of land title, under Section 14(1) of P.D. No.
1529, to validly prosper. The absence of any one requisite renders the
application for registration substantially defective.
Anent the first requisite, respondents presented evidence to establish the
disposable and alienable character of the subject land through a survey
plan, where on its lower portion, a note stated, among others, as follows:
"This survey is inside the alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 20
LC Map No. 637 certified by the Bureau of Forestry on March 1, 1927. It is
outside any civil or military reservation." The said plan was approved by the
DENR, Land Management Services, Regional Office III, San Fernando,
Pampanga on December 3, 1998. The annotation in the survey plan,
however, fell short of the requirement of the law in proving its disposable
and alienable character.
In Republic v. Espinosa,11 citing Republic v. Sarmiento12 and Menguito v.
Republic,13 the Court reiterated the rule that that a notation made by a
surveyor-geodetic engineer that the property surveyed was alienable and
disposable was not the positive government act that would remove the
property from the inalienable domain and neither was it the evidence
accepted as sufficient to controvert the presumption that the property was
inalienable. Thus:
To discharge the onus, respondent relies on the blue print Copy of the
conversion and subdivision plan approved by the DENR Center which bears
the notation of the surveyor-geodetic engineer that "this survey is inside the
alienable and disposable area, Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623,
certified on January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry."
Menguito v. Republic teaches, however, that reliance on such annotation
to prove that the lot is alienable is insufficient and does not constitute
incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that it remains part
of the inalienable public domain.
"To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, petitioners relied on the printed
words which read: ‘This survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable Land
Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of
Forestry on January 3, 1968,’ appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-
13-000227).
This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,
provides: "All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum,
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by
the State..."
For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case)
must overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered
forms part of the public domain. Unless public land is shown to have been
reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of
the inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the concept
of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be
registered as a title." To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the land
sought to be registered remains inalienable.
In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor geodetic engineer’s notation
in Exhibit "E" indicating that the survey was inside alienable and disposable
land. Such notation does not constitute a positive government act validly
changing the classification of the land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor
has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on
the said surveyor’s assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the
land in question has been declared alienable." (Citations omitted and
emphases supplied)
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of
the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or
claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the
application (or claim) is alienable or disposable. The applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; or a legislative act or
a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the
government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required
number of years is alienable and disposable.14
Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.15 declared that a CENRO certification was
insufficient to prove the alienable and disposable character of the land
sought to be registered. The applicant must also show sufficient proof that
the DENR Secretary approved the land classification and released the land
in question as alienable and disposable.
Thus, the present rule is that an application for original registration must be
accompanied by (1) a CENRO or PENRO Certification; and (2) a copy of
the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as
a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.16
Here, the only evidence presented by respondents to prove the disposable
and alienable character of the subject land was an annotation by a
geodetic engineer in a survey plan. Although this was certified by the DENR,
it clearly falls short of the requirements for original registration.
With regard to the third requisite, it must be shown that the possession and
occupation of a parcel of land by the applicant, by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest, started on June 12, 1945 or earlier.17 A mere
showing of possession and occupation for 30 years or more, by itself, is not
sufficient.18
In this regard, respondents likewise failed. As the records and pleadings of
this case will reveal, the earliest that respondents and their predecessor-in-
interest can trace back possession and occupation of the subject land was
only in the year 1950,when their mother, Resurreccion, acquired the subject
land from the Santoses on October 4, 1950 by virtue of an absolute sale.
Evidently, their possession of the subject property commenced roughly five
(5) years beyond June 12, 1945, the reckoning date expressly provided
under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529. Thus, their application for registration of
land title was legally infirm.
The respondents cannot invoke Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529 which
provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. – The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
xxxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription
under the provisions of existing laws.1avvphi1 The case of Malabanan v.
Republic19 gives a definitive clarity to the applicability and scope of original
registration proceedings under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree. In the said case, the Court laid down the following rules:
We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:
xxxx
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree,
consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of
acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands
become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these
are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government
manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained
for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422
of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can
the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion
begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The
person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription
under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
 (b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial
property may be acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary.
Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires
ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least
ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary
acquisitive prescription, a person’s uninterrupted adverse
possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years,
regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership. (Emphasis
supplied)
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the
public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property,
even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public
dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and, thus, incapable of acquisition by
prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are
expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service
or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive
prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law
duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where
the President is duly authorized by law.20
all the more cannot apply for registration by way of prescription pursuant to
Section 14 (2) which requires possession for 30 years to acquire or take. Not
only did respondents need to prove the classification of the subject land as
alienable and disposable, but also to show that it has been converted into
patrimonial. As to whether respondents were able to prove that their
possession and occupation were of the character prescribed by law, the
resolution of this issue has been rendered unnecessary by the foregoing
considerations.
In fine, the Court holds that the ruling of the CA lacks sufficient factual or
legal justification.1âwphi1 Hence, the Court is constrained to reverse the
assailed CA decision and resolution and deny the application for
registration of land title of respondents.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The November 21, 2007 Decision and
the October 8, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No.
81439, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Application for
Registration of Title of Respondents Corazon C. Sese and Fe C. Sese in Land
Registration Case No. 026 is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

Thus, under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, for acquisitive prescription to
commence and operate against the State, the classification of land as
alienable and disposable alone is not sufficient. The applicant must be able
to show that the State, in addition to the said classification, expressly
declared through either a law enacted by Congress or a proclamation
issued by the President that the subject land is no longer retained for public
service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has
been converted into patrimonial. Consequently, without an express
declaration by the State, the land remains to be a property of public
dominion and, hence, not susceptible to acquisition by virtue of
prescription.21 The classification of the subject property as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as
property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. It is
still insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.22

For the above reasons, the respondents cannot avail of either Section 14 (1)
or 14 (2) of P.O. No. 1529. Under Section 14 (1), respondents failed to prove
(a) that the property is alienable and disposable; and (b) that their
possession of the property dated back to June 12, 1945 or earlier. Failing to
prove the alienable and disposable nature of the subject land, respondents