CALIFORNIA CLOTHING v. SHIRLEY G.

QUIÑONES
GR No.175822, DIVISION, October 23, 2013, PERALTA, J.
A person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise, he
opens himself to liability. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for
which it was established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh. In this case, petitioners
obviously abused their rights.It is evident from the circumstances of the case that petitioners
went overboard and tried to force respondent to pay the amount they were demanding. In the
guise of asking for assistance, petitioners even sent a demand letter to respondent's employer not
only informing it of the incident but obviously imputing bad acts on the part of respondent.

FACTS:
On July 25, 2001, respondent, a Reservation Ticketing Agent of Cebu Pacific Air, went inside
the Guess USA Boutique of Robinson's Department Store in Cebu City. She fitted four items:
two jeans ,a blouse and a shorts, then decided to purchase the black jeans. Respondent
allegedly paid to the cashier evidenced by a receipt issued by the store. While she was
walking through the skywalk connecting Robinson's and Mercury Drug Store, a Guess
employee approached and informed her that she failed to pay. She, however, insisted that
she paid and showed the employee the receipt. She then suggested that they talk about it at
the Cebu Pacific Office located at the basement of the mall.

When she arrived at the Cebu Pacific Office, the Guess employees allegedly subjected her to
humiliation in front of the clients of Cebu Pacific and repeatedly demanded payment. They
supposedly even searched her wallet to check how much money she had, followed by
another argument.

On the same day, the Guess employees allegedly gave a letter to the Director of Cebu Pacific
Air narrating the incident, but the latter refused to receive it as it did not concern the office
and the same took place while respondent was off duty. Another letter was allegedly
prepared and was supposed to be sent to the Cebu Pacific Office in Robinson's, but the
latter again refused to receive it. Respondent also claimed that the Human Resource
Department of Robinson's was furnished said letter and the latter in fact conducted an
investigation for purposes of canceling respondent's Robinson's credit card. With the above
experience, respondent claimed to have suffered physical anxiety, sleepless nights, mental
anguish, fright, serious apprehension, besmirched reputation, moral shock and social
humiliation. She thus filed the Complaint for Damages against petitioners. The RTC found
no evidence to prove bad faith on the part of the Guess employees to warrant the award of
damages. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are guilty of abuse of right. (YES)

RULING:
The issuance of the receipt notwithstanding, petitioners had the right to verify from
respondent whether she indeed made payment if they had reason to believe that she did
not. However, the exercise of such right is not without limitations. Any abuse in the
exercise of such right causing damage or injury to another is actionable under the Civil
Code. The elements of abuse of rights are as follows: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2)
which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
In this case, it is evident from the circumstances of the case that petitioners went
overboard and tried to force respondent to pay the amount they were demanding. In the
guise of asking for assistance, petitioners even sent a demand letter to respondent's
employer not only informing it of the incident but obviously imputing bad acts on the part
of respondent. Petitioners accused respondent that not only did she fail to pay for the jeans
she purchased but that she deliberately took the same without paying for it and later
hurriedly left the shop to evade payment. These accusations were made despite the
issuance of the receipt of payment and the release of the item purchased. There was,
likewise, no showing that respondent had the intention to evade payment. Contrary to
petitioners' claim, respondent was not in a rush in leaving the shop or the mall. This is
evidenced by the fact that the Guess employees did not have a hard time looking for her
when they realized the supposed non-payment. It can be inferred from the foregoing that in
sending the demand letter to respondent's employer, petitioners intended not only to ask
for assistance in collecting the disputed amount but to tarnish respondent's reputation in
the eyes of her employer. In view of the foregoing, respondent is entitled to an award of
moral damages and attorney's fee.

Joyce V. Ardiente Vs. Spouses Javier and Ma. Theresa Pastofide

G.R. No. 161921. July 17, 2013 J. Peralta
Article 20 provides that "every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes
damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same." It speaks of the general sanctions of
all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for its own sanction. When a right is
exercised in A manner which does not conform to the standards set forth in the said provision
and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer
must be responsible. Thus, if the provision does not provide a remedy for its violation, an action
for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper. In the
present case, intention to harm was evident on the part of petitioner when she requested for the
disconnection of respondent spouses’ water supply without warning or informing the latter of
such request.

FACTS:
Petitioners, Joyce V. Ardiente and her husband Dr. Roberto S. Ardiente are owners of a
housing unit at Emily Homes, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City.Joyce entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement (selling, transferring and conveying in favor of Ma. Theresa
Pastorfide all their rights and interests in the housing unit at Emily Homes in consideration
of P70,000.00. For four (4) years, Ma. Theresa's use of the water connection in the name of
Joyce Ardiente was never questioned nor perturbed. Later on, the water connection of Ma.
Theresa was cut off. Cagayan de Oro Water District (COWD) told Ma. Theresa that she was
delinquent for three (3) months corresponding to the months. A certain, Mrs. Madjos later
told her that it was at the instance of Joyce Ardiente that the water line was cut off . Ma.
Theresa paid the delinquent bills. On the same date, through her lawyer, Ma. Theresa wrote
a letter to the COWD to explain who authorized the cutting of the water line. COWD,
through the general manager, [respondent] Gaspar Gonzalez, Jr., answered the letter
dated March 15, 1999 and reiterated that it was at the instance of Joyce Ardiente that the
water line was cut off. Ma. Theresa Pastorfide and her husband filed a complaint for
damages against petitioner, COWD and its manager Gaspar Gonzalez. RTC ruled in favor of
respondents. CA affirmed. Petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez filed their respective Motions for
Reconsideration, but these were denied by the CA COWD and Gonzalez filed a petition for
review on certiorari with this Court. However, based on technical grounds and on the
finding that the CA did not commit any reversible error in its assailed Decision, the petition
was denied via a Resolution. COWD and Gonzalez filed a motion for reconsideration, but
the same was denied with finality. Petitioner, on the other hand, timely filed the instant
petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages under
Article 20 or other applicable provision of law

RULING:
It is true that it is within petitioner's right to ask and even require the Spouses Pastorfide to
cause the transfer of the former's account with COWD to the latter's name pursuant to their
Memorandum of Agreement. However, the remedy to enforce such right is not to cause the
disconnection of the respondent spouses' water supply. The exercise of a right must be in
accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not be excessive or
unduly harsh; there must be no intention to harm another. Otherwise, liability for damages
to the injured party will attach. In the present case, intention to harm was evident on the
part of petitioner when she requested for the disconnection of respondent spouses’ water
supply without warning or informing the latter of such request. Petitioner claims that her
request for disconnection was based on the advise of COWD personnel and that her
intention was just to compel the Spouses Pastorfide to comply with their agreement that
petitioner's account with COWD be transferred in respondent spouses' name. If such was
petitioner's only intention, then she should have advised respondent spouses before or
immediately after submitting her request for disconnection, telling them that her request
was simply to force them to comply with their obligation under their Memorandum of
Agreement. But she did not. What made matters worse is the fact that COWD undertook the
disconnection also without prior notice and even failed to reconnect the Spouses
Pastorfide’s water supply despite payment of their arrears. There was clearly an abuse of
right on the part of petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez. They are guilty of bad faith. The
principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every
person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. This article, known to
contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain
standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights, but also in the
performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give
everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a
primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set
forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or
granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a
right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article
19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for
the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not
provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20
or Article 21 would be proper.

Corollarilly, Article 20 provides that "every person who, contrary to law, willfully or
negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same." It speaks of
the general sanctions of all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for its
own sanction. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform to the
standards set forth in the said provision and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible. Thus, if the provision
does not provide a remedy for its violation, an action for damages under either Article 20
or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper. The question of whether or not the
principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or
other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINE ,vs. HON. NORMELITO J. BALLOCANAG, , GR 163794,

November 28, 2008

FACTS:
Sometime in 1970, [private respondent Danilo] Reyes bought the subject 182,941-square-
meter land at Bgy. Banus, Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro [subject land] from one Regina
Castillo in whose name it was titled under Original Transfer Certificate of Title. Right after
his purchase, Reyes introduced improvements and planted the land with fruit trees. He also
had the title transferred in his name and was issued TCT No. 45232.Unfortunately, it turned
out that about 162,500 square meters of this land is part of the timberland of Oriental
Mindoro and, therefore, cannot be subject to any disposition or acquisition under any
existing law, and is not registrable. The plotting shows that the 162,000 square meters
purchased by Reyes are entirely inside the 140hectares of the Agro-Forestry Farm Lease
Agreement in favor of Atty. Marte, which was issued in 1986,and the alienable and
disposable area of Castillo's land is only around two (2) hectares; The RTC ordered
defendant Danilo to surrender the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 45232 and to vacate
the premises and directing the defendant Register of Deeds of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro,
to cancel the title as null and void ab initio; On February 4, 1998, Reyes filed a Motion
to Remove Improvements Introduced by Defendant Danilo D. Reyes on the Property which
is the Subject of Execution. Meanwhile, on March 2, 1998, Atty. Marte filed a Complaint for
Injunction With an Ancillary Prayer for the Immediate Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order against But the respondent RTC dismissed the said complaint in the assailed Joint
Order and ruled in favor of Reyes. Petitioner, through the OSG, filed its Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC.

Aggrieved, petitioner went to the CA via Certiorari ascribing to the RTC grave abuse of
discretion and acting without jurisdiction in granting Reyes' motion to remove
improvements. However, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari, and affirmed the
ruling of the RTC.

ISSUES: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC holding that the
motion to remove improvements by private respondent is but an incident of the reversion
case over which the trial court still has jurisdiction despite the fact that the decision in the
reversion case had long become final and executory.

RULINGS:

To order Reyes to simply surrender all of these fruit-bearing trees in favor of the State --
because the decision in the reversion case declaring that the land is part of inalienable
forest land and belongs to the State is already final and immutable -- would inequitably
result in unjust enrichment of the State at theexpense of Reyes, a planter in good faith.
Nemo cum alterius detrimento locupletari potest. This basic doctrine on unjust
enrichment simply means that a person shall not be allowed to profit or enrich himself
inequitably at another's expense. There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly
retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of
another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience.
Article 22 of the Civil Code states the rule in this wise: ART. 22. Every person who, through
an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of
something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to
him.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 4, 2004 of the Court
of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that:1) The Regional Trial Court of
Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 41, is hereby DIRECTED to determine the actual
improvements introduced on the subject land, their current value and the amount of the
expenses actually spent by private respondent Danilo Reyes for the said improvements
thereon from 1970 until May 13, 1987 with utmost dispatch.2) The Republic, through the
Bureau of Forest Development of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
is DIRECTED to pay private respondent Danilo Reyes the value of such actual
improvements he introduced on the subject land as determined by the Regional Trial Court,
with the right of subrogation against Atty. Augusto D. Marte, the lessee in Agro-Forestry
Farm Lease Agreement No. 175.
 RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI),Petitioner, vs. ALFONSO
VERCHEZ, GRACE VERCHEZ-INFANTE, MARDONIO INFANTE, ZENAIDA VERCHEZ
CATIBOG, AND FORTUNATO CATIBOG

Facts:

On January 21, 1991, Editha Hebron Verchez (Editha) was confined at the Sorsogon
Provincial Hospital due to an ailment. On even date, her daughter Grace Verchez-Infante
(Grace) immediately hied to the Sorsogon Branch of the Radio Communications of the
Philippines, Inc. (RCPI) whose services she engaged to send a telegram to her sister
Zenaida Verchez-Catibog (Zenaida) who was residing at 18 Legal St., GSIS Village, Quezon
Cityreading: “Send check money Mommy hospital.” For RCPI’s services, Grace paid
P10.50for which she was issued a receipt. As three days after RCPI was engaged to send the
telegram to Zenaida no response was received from her, Grace sent a letter to Zenaida, this
time thru JRS Delivery Service, reprimanding her for not sending any financial aid.

Immediately after she received Grace’s letter, Zenaida, along with her husband Fortunato
Catibog, left on January 26, 1991 for Sorsogon. On her arrival at Sorsogon, she disclaimed
having received any telegram. In the meantime, Zenaida and her husband, together with
her mother Editha left for Quezon City on January 28, 1991 and brought Editha to the
Veterans Memorial Hospital in Quezon City where she was confined from January 30, 1991
to March 21, 1991. The telegram was finally delivered to Zenaida 25 days later or on
February 15, 1991. On inquiry from RCPI why it took that long to deliver it, a messenger of
RCPI replied that he had nothing to do with the delivery thereof as it was another
messenger who previously was assigned to deliver the same but the address could not be
located, hence, the telegram was resent on February 2, 1991, and the second messenger
finally found the address on February 15, 1991.

Editha’s husband Alfonso Verchez (Verchez), by letter of March 5, 1991, demanded an

explanation from the manager of the Service Quality Control Department of the RCPI, Mrs.
Lorna D. Fabian, who replied, by letter of March 13, 1991. On April 17, 1992, Editha died.

On September 8, 1993, Verchez, along with his daughters Grace and Zenaida and their
respective spouses, filed a complaint against RCPI before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Sorsogon for damages. In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that, inter alia, the delay in
delivering the telegram contributed to the early demise of the late Editha to their damage
and prejudice, for which they prayed for the award of moral and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees.

After its motion to dismiss the complaint for improper venue was denied by Branch 5 of the
RTC of Sorsogon, RCPI filed its answer, alleging that except with respect to Grace, the other
plaintiffs had no privity of contract with it; any delay in the sending of the telegram was
due to force majeure, “specifically, but not limited to, radio noise and interferences which
adversely affected the transmission and/or reception of the telegraphic message”;the
clause in the Telegram Transmission Form signed by Grace absolved it from liability for
any damage arising from the transmission other than the refund of telegram tolls; it
observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees; and at all events,
any cause of action had been barred by laches.

The trial court, observing that “although the delayed delivery of the questioned telegram
was not apparently the proximate cause of the death of Editha,” ruled out the presence of
force majeure. Respecting the clause in the telegram relied upon by RCPI, the trial court
held that it partakes of the nature of a contract of adhesion.

Issue:

(1) “Is the award of moral damages proper even if the trial court found that there was no
direct connection between the injury and the alleged negligent acts? And

(2) “Are the stipulations in the ‘Telegram Transmission Form,’ in the nature “contracts of
adhesion” (sic)?

Held:

In culpa contractual the mere proof of the existence of the contract and the failure of its
compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief. The law, recognizing the
obligatory force of contracts, will not permit a party to be set free from liability for any kind
of mis-performance of the contractual undertaking or a contravention of the tenor thereof.
A breach upon the contract confers upon the injured party a valid cause for recovering that
which may have been lost or suffered. The remedy serves to preserve the interests of the
promissee that may include his “expectation interest,” which is his interest in having the
benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the
contract been performed, or his “reliance interest,” which is his interest in being
reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on the contract by being put in as good a position as
he would have been in had the contract not been made; or his “restitution interest,” which
is his interest in having restored to him any benefit that he has conferred on the other
party. Indeed, agreements can accomplish little, either for their makers or for society,
unless they are made the basis for action. The effect of every infraction is to create a new
duty, that is, to make recompense to the one who has been injured by the failure of another
to observe his contractual obligation unless he can show extenuating circumstances, like
proof of his exercise of due diligence or of the attendance of fortuitous event, to excuse him
from his ensuing liability. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

For the defense of force majeure to prosper

It is necessary that one has committed no negligence or misconduct that may have
occasioned the loss. An act of God cannot be invoked to protect a person who has failed to
take steps to forestall the possible adverse consequences of such a loss. One’s negligence
may have concurred with an act of God in producing damage and injury to another;
nonetheless, showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury was a
fortuitous event would not exempt one from liability. When the effect is found to be partly
the result of a person’s participation – whether by active intervention, neglect or failure to
act – the whole occurrence is humanized and removed from the rules applicable to acts of
God.

The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are
employed or on the occasion of their functions.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.

The failure of RCPI to deliver the telegram containing the message of appellees on time,
disturbed their filial tranquillity. Family members blamed each other for failing to respond
swiftly to an emergency that involved the life of the late Mrs. Verchez, who suffered from
diabetes.

(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another.

RCPI’s negligence in not promptly performing its obligation undoubtedly disturbed the
peace of mind not only of Grace but also her co-respondents. As observed by the appellate
court, it disrupted the “filial tranquillity” among them as they blamed each other “for failing
to respond swiftly to an emergency.” The tortious acts and/or omissions complained of in
this case are, therefore, analogous to acts mentioned under Article 26 of the Civil Code,
which are among the instances of quasi-delict when courts may award moral damages
under Article 2219 of the Civil Code.

In fine, the award to the plaintiffs-herein respondents of moral damages is in order, as is

the award of attorney’s fees, respondents having been compelled to litigate to protect their
rights.

Hing v. Choachuy, GR 179736, June 6, 2013

FACTS:

On August 23, 2005, petitioner-spouses Bill and Victoria Hing filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Mandaue City a Complaintfor Injunction and Damages with prayer for
issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO), docketed as Civil Case MAN-5223 and raffled to Branch 28, against respondents
Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan Choachuy.

Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land (Lot 1900-B)
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 42817 situated in Barangay Basak, City of
Mandaue, Cebu;that respondents are the owners of Aldo Development & Resources, Inc.
(Aldo) located at Lots 1901 and 1900-C, adjacent to the property of petitioners;that
respondents constructed an auto-repair shop building (Aldo Goodyear Servitec) on Lot
1900-C; that in April 2005, Aldo filed a case against petitioners for Injunction and Damages
with Writ of Preliminary Injunction/TRO, docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-5125;that in that
case, Aldo claimed that petitioners were constructing a fence without a valid permit and
that the said construction would destroy the wall of its building, which is adjacent to
petitioners property;that the court, in that case, denied Aldos application for preliminary
injunction for failure to substantiate its allegations;that, in order to get evidence to support
the said case, respondents on June 13, 2005 illegally set-up and installed on the building of
Aldo Goodyear Servitec two video surveillance cameras facing petitioners property;that
respondents, through their employees and without the consent of petitioners, also took
pictures of petitioners on-going construction;and that the acts of respondents violate
petitioners right to privacy.Thus, petitioners prayed that respondents be ordered to
remove the video surveillance cameras and enjoined from conducting illegal surveillance.

In their Answer with Counterclaim,respondents claimed that they did not install the video
surveillance cameras,nor did they order their employees to take pictures of petitioners
construction.They also clarified that they are not the owners of Aldo but are mere
stockholders.

On October 18, 2005, the RTC issued an Ordergranting the application for a TRO.

Respondents moved for a reconsiderationbut the RTC denied the same in its Orderdated
February 6, 2006.

Aggrieved, respondents filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court with application for a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

On July 10, 2007, the CA issued its Decisiongranting the Petition for Certiorari. The CA
ruled that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued with grave abuse of discretion
because petitioners failed to show a clear and unmistakable right to an injunctive writ.The
CA explained that the right to privacy of residence under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code was
not violated since the property subject of the controversy is not used as a residence. The CA
alsosaid that since respondents are not the owners of the building, they could not have
installed video surveillance cameras.They are mere stockholders of Aldo, which has a
separate juridical personality.Thus, they are not the proper parties.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not there is a violation of petitioners right to privacy?

2. Whether or not respondents are the proper parties to this suit?

RULLING:
Right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code covers business offices where the
public are excluded therefrom and only certain individuals are allowed to enter.
Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand, protects an individuals right to privacy
and provides a legal remedy against abuses that may be committed against him by other
individuals. It states:

Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not
constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and
other relief:

(1) Prying into the privacy of anothers residence;

This provision recognizes that a mans house is his castle, where his right to privacy cannot
be denied or even restricted by others. It includes "any act of intrusion into, peeping or
peering inquisitively into the residence of another without the consent of the latter."The
phrase "prying into the privacy of anothers residence," however, does not mean that only
the residence is entitled to privacy. As elucidated by Civil law expert Arturo M. Tolentino:

Our Code specifically mentions "prying into the privacy of anothers residence." This does
not mean, however, that only the residence is entitled to privacy, because the law covers
also "similar acts." A business office is entitled to the same privacy when the public is
excluded therefrom and only such individuals as are allowed to enter may come in.

Thus, an individuals right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be
confined to his house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to
exclude the public or deny them access. The phrase "prying into the privacy of anothers
residence," therefore, covers places, locations, or even situations which an individual
considers as private. And as long as his right is recognized by society, other individuals may
not infringe on his right to privacy. The CA, therefore, erred in limiting the application of
Article 26(1) of the Civil Code only to residences.

Liwayway Vinsons Chato v. Fortune Tobacco Corp., GR 141309, December 23, 2008

This is a case for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code filed by Fortune against
Liwayway as CIR.

FACTS:
On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which provided that locally
manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55% shall be charged
an ad valorem tax of “55% provided that the maximum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos
per pack.” Prior to effectivity of RA 7654, Liwayway issued a rule, reclassifying “Champion,”
“Hope,” and “More” (all manufactured by Fortune) as locally manufactured cigarettes
bearing foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. Thus, when RA 7654 was passed,
these cigarette brands were already covered.
In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune contended that the issuance of the
rule violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of
law and the right to equal protection of the laws.

For her part, Liwayway contended in her motion to dismiss that respondent has no cause of
action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function
and within the scope of her authority. She claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the
Republic and therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts. She also contended
that the complaint states no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith.

The order denying the motion to dismiss was elevated to the CA, who dismissed the case on
the ground that under Article 32, liability may arise even if the defendant did not act with
malice or bad faith.

Hence this appeal.

ISSUES:

Whether or not a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts
done in connection with the discharge of the functions of his/her office

Whether or not Article 32, NCC, should be applied instead of Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative
Code

HELD:

On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which a
person may suffer arising from the just performance of his official duties and within the
scope of his assigned tasks. An officer who acts within his authority to administer the
affairs of the office which he/she heads is not liable for damages that may have been caused
to another, as it would virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to
judgment for monetary claims without its consent. However, a public officer is by law not
immune from damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being
outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for
official actions.

Specifically, under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil liability may arise where there
is bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part of a superior public officer. And, under
Sec. 39 of the same Book, civil liability may arise where the subordinate public officer’s act
is characterized by willfulness or negligence. In Cojuangco, Jr. V. CA, a public officer who
directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued for
damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice
or bad faith.

Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her
private capacity for acts done in the course of the performance of the functions of the office,
where said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2) where the
public officer violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff.

On the second issue, SC ruled that the decisive provision is Article 32, it being a special law,
which prevails over a general law (the Administrative Code).

Article 32 was patterned after the “tort” in American law. A tort is a wrong, a tortious act
which has been defined as the commission or omission of an act by one, without right,
whereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property or
reputation. There are cases in which it has been stated that civil liability in tort is
determined by the conduct and not by the mental state of the tortfeasor, and there are
circumstances under which the motive of the defendant has been rendered immaterial. The
reason sometimes given for the rule is that otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged
wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine whether the act was wrongful. Presence
of good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act
which is otherwise an invasion of another’s legal right; that is, liability in tort in not
precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil intent.

MEYNARDO BELTRAN, petitioner, -versus- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and

HON. JUDGE
FLORENTINO TUAZON, JR., being the Judge of the RTC, Branch 139, Makati City,
respondents.
G.R. No. 137567, SECOND DIVISION, June 20, 2000, BUENA, J.

The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial question
to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the
suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the
said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that
in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined. In Domingo vs. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that the
import of Article 40 of the Family Code is that for purposes of remarriage, the only legally acceptable
basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable. So that in a
case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner, need not present a final judgment declaring
his remarriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other
than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void.

FACTS
On February 7, 1997, after twenty-four years of marriage and four children, petitioner filed a
petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code. In her Answer to the said petition, petitioner's wife Charmaine Felix alleged that it
was petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman. Charmaine
subsequently filed a criminal complaint for concubinage against petitioner and his paramour before
the City Prosecutor's Office who, in a Resolution dated September 16, 1997, found probable cause
and ordered the filing of an Information against them. On March 20, 1998, petitioner, filed a Motion
to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case. Petitioner
argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a
prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case. Petitioner submits that the possible
conflict of the courts' ruling regarding petitioner's marriage can be avoided, if the criminal case will
be suspended, until the court rules on the validity of marriage; that if petitioner's marriage is
declared void by reason of psychological incapacity then by reason of the arguments submitted in
the subject petition, his marriage has never existed; and that, accordingly, petitioner could not be
convicted in the criminal case because he was never before a married man.

ISSUE
Whether or not the review the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage
based on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code is a prejudicial question that
should merit the suspension of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him by his wife. (NO)

RULING
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has
two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not
the criminal action may proceed. The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's
marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered
prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final
determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same
facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the
issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined. Article 40 of the Family Code provides: "The absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void." In Domingo vs. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled
that the import of said provision is that for purposes of remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis
for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable.
So that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner need not present a final
judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity
of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void. With regard to
petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his marriage
be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that
his marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense.

Analogous to this case is that of Landicho vs. Relova cited in Donato vs. Luna where this Court held
that: ". . . Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner,
that fact would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case. Parties to the marriage
should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted
to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is
that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the rst marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy."
Thus, in the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage should not be permitted to
judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent
courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as
there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes.
Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of
the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage. The lower court therefore, has
not erred in affirming the Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court ruling that pendency
of a civil action for nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial question in a criminal case for
concubinage.

TE VS. COURT OF APPEALS and LILIANA CHOA

G.R. NO.126746 November 29, 2000 346 SCRA 327
Kapunan J.

Case Doctrine:

A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate
from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence
of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said
case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would
be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the
guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. The rationale behind
the principle of suspension a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two
conflicting decisions.

The prevailing rule is found in Article 40 of the Family Code, which was already in
effect at the time of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent in September 1988. Said
article states that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may not be invoked for
purposes of remarriage unless there is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void. Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed
valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.

Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment necessitate the suspension of the
administrative proceeding before the PRC Board. The concept of prejudicial question
involves a civil and a criminal case. The SC previously ruled that there is no prejudicial
question where one case is administrative and the other is civil.

FACTS:

Petitioner Arthur Te and private respondent Liliana Choa were married in civil rights on
September 14, 1988. They did not live together after the marriage although they would
meet each other regularly. Liliana Choa gave birth on April 21, 1989 and petitioner stopped
visiting her. On May 20, 1990, while his marriage with private respondent was subsisting,
petitioner contracted a 2nd marriage with a certain Julieta Santella. Private respondent
charged petitioner with bigamy that was filed with the RTC of Quezon City.

Meanwhile, petitioner filed in the RTC of Quezon City an action for the annulment of his
marriage to private respondent on the ground that he was forced to marry her. He alleged
that private respondent concealed her pregnancy by another man at the time of their
marriage and that she was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential martial
obligations. Private respondent also filed with the PRC an administrative case against
petitioner and Santella for the revocation of their respective Engineering licenses.

After the prosecution rested its case in the criminal case for bigamy, petitioner filed a
demurrer to evidence with leave of court. The trial court in its Order denied petitioner’s
Demurrer to Evidence stating that the Demurrer could not be granted because the
prosecution had sufficiently established a prima facie case against the accused.

Petitioner also filed with the Board of the PRC a Motion to suspend the proceedings in view
of the pendency of the civil case for annulment of his marriage and the criminal case for
bigamy. The Board denied the Motion. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the
Court of Appeals. The CA affirmed the RTC’s and the Board’s decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
WON the pendency of a civil case give rise to a prejudicial question in a criminal case for
bigamy

WON there would be a prejudicial question if one of the cases is administrative in nature

HELD: No.
The CA did not err when it ruled that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of
marriage filed by petitioner against private respondent did not pose a prejudicial question
which would necessitate that the criminal case for bigamy be suspended until said civil
case is terminated.

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent
had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal
case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the
first marriage be subsisting at the time the 2nd marriage is contracted. Petitioner’s
argument that the nullity of his marriage to private respondent had to be resolved first in
the civil case before the criminal proceedings could continue, because a declaration that
their marriage was void ab initio would necessarily absolve him from criminal liability, is
untenable.

The ruling in PEOPLE VS. MENDONZ (95 Phil 843) and PEOPLE VS. ARAGON (100 Phil
1033) cited by petitioner that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a
marriage which is void ab initio has been overturned. The prevailing rule is found in Article
40 of the Family Code, which was already in effect at the time of petitioner’s marriage to
private respondent in September 1988. Said article states that the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may not be invoked for purposes of remarriage unless there is a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one
which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial
proceeding.

In LANDICHO VS. RELOVA (22 SCRA 731) the SC held that “Parties to a marriage should not
be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for this must be submitted to the judgment
of competent courts and only when the nullity of a marriage is so declared can it be held as
void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption of marriage exits.

Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment necessitate the suspension of the
administrative proceeding before the PRC Board. The concept of prejudicial question
involves a civil and a criminal case. The SC previously ruled that there is no prejudicial
question where one case is administrative and the other is civil.

Pimentel v. People, GR 172060, September 13, 2010

DOCTRINE:

Annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is not a prejudicial question in
a criminal case for parricide.

FACTS:

On 25 October 2004, Maria Pimentel y Lacap(private respondent) filed an action for

frustrated parricide against Joselito Pimentel (petitioner) before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City.

On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial
Court of Antipolo City for the pre-trial and trial of a civil case (Maria Pimentel v. Joselito
Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code on the
ground of psychological incapacity.

On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before
the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner
asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in
parricide, the outcome of the civil case would have a bearing in the criminal case filed
against him before the RTC Quezon City.

The RTC Quezon City held that the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a
prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order before the Court of Appeals. However, The Court of
Appeals ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be
declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration
of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had already been
committed.

ISSUE:
Whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question
that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against
petitioner.

HELD:

No.

RATIO:

Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that elements of a
prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar
or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

In the case at bar, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case
for frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules
on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing
of the criminal action.

The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of
parricide, which punishes any person “who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse.” However,
the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in
the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the
victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is
whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case,
since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed
all the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioner’s will. At the
time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The
subsequent dissolution of their marriage will have no effect on the alleged crime that was
committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage

between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally
liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to
respondent.

We cannot accept petitioner’s reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals that “the judicial
declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts
to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses
is concerned x x x.” First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of
nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on a
criminal liability for bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial question in that case.
Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that “[t]here is x x x a recognition written into the law
itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences.” In
fact, the Court declared in that case that “a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s
penal laws are concerned.”

Quimiging v. Icao, GR 26795, July 31, 1970

FACTS:

Carmen Quimiguing (petitioner) and Felix Icao (defendant) were neighbors, and had close
and confidential relations. The defendant, although married, succeeded in having carnal
intercourse with petitioner several times by force and intimidation, and without her
consent. As a result she became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by defendant,
and petitioner had to stop studying. Hence, she claimed support at P120.00 per month,
damages and attorney’s fees.

The defendant contended that the case be dismissed since it did not allege that the child
had been born. After hearing arguments, the trial judge sustained defendant’s motion and
dismissed the complaint. Petitioner moved to amend the complaint that as a result of the
intercourse, she gave birth to a baby girl but the court ruled that “no amendment was
allowable since the original complaint averred no cause of action”.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner has the right to claim for support and damages.

RULING:

A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its
own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors.

It is thus clear that the lower court’s theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code declaring that
support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate children “does not contemplate support
to children as yet unborn,” violates Article 40 aforesaid, besides imposing a condition that
nowhere appears in the text of Article 291. It is true that Article 40 prescribing that “the
conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it” adds
further “provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article” (i.e.,
that the foetus be alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother’s womb).

Auxiliary reason: A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a
married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust constitutes a clear violation
of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused.
Says Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines:

ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.

The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same Code:

ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts
Hence, the girl has a cause of action.

ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner, -versus- THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR
LAZO,
respondents. G.R. No. L-16439, EN BANC, July 20, 1961, REYES, J.B.L., J.

The Supreme Court believed that the minimum award of P3000 for the death of the person, does not
cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality. Since an action for pecuniary
damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see
that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the
injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even
if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal
death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from one that lacked juridical personality (or
juridical capacity, as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional
personality of a conceived child (conceptus pr nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because
that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child
should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the
following article". In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from
its mother's womb. The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and is generally held
that recovery can not be had for the death of an unborn child.

FACTS
The litigation was commenced by respondent Oscar Lazo, the husband of Nita Villanueva, against
petitioner Geluz, a physician. Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant Antonio Geluz for the
first time in 1948 through her aunt. In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband before
they were legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent, she had herself
aborted by the defendant. After her marriage with the plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As she
was then employed in the Commission on Elections and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient,
she had herself aborted again by the defendant. Less than two years later, she again became
pregnant. On February 21, 1955, she again repaired to the defendant's clinic. Nita was again
aborted, of a two month old fetus, in consideration of the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine currency.
The plaintiff was at this time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the
provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his consent to, the abortion. It is the third and last
that constitutes plaintiffs basis in filing the action and award of damages. The trial court and the CA
predicated the award of damages in the sum of P3000 upon the provisions of the initial paragraph
of Article 2206 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE
Whether or not Oscar Lazo, the husband of the woman who voluntarily procured her abortion,
could recover damages from the physician who cased the same.

RULING
The Supreme Court believed that the minimum award of P3000 for the death of the person, does
not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality. Since an action for
pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it
is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on
account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or
heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was
extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from one that
lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity, as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no
answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pr nato habetur)
under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such provisional
personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it
be born later with the conditions specified in the following article". In the present case, there is no
dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb. The prevailing American
jurisprudence is to the same effect; and is generally held that recovery can not be had for the death
of an unborn child. This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all.
But such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or
violation of the rights of the deceased, his right to life and physical integrity. Because the parents
cannot expect either help, support or services from an unborn child, they would normally be limited
to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the spes hominis that was the
fetus, i.e. on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their
parental expectations (Civ. Code, Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances
should warrant them (Art. 2230). But in the case before us, both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals have not found any basis for an award of moral damages, evidently because the appellee's
indifference to the previous abortions of his wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly
indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections. The
lower court expressly found, and the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals did not contradict it,
that the appellee was aware of the second abortion; and the probabilities are that he was likewise
aware of the first. Yet despite the suspicious repetition of the event, he appeared to have taken no
steps to investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure the punishment of the responsible
practitioner. Even after learning of the third abortion, the appellee does not seem to have taken
interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the appellant. His only concern appears to
have been directed at obtaining from the doctor a large money payment, since he sued for P50,000
damages and P3,000 attorneys fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the circumstances of record,
was clearly exaggerated. It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion of
appellee's wife, without medical necessity to warrant it, was a criminal and morally reprehensible
act, that can not be too severely condemned; and the consent of the woman or that of her husband
does not excuse it. But the immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an award of damages
that, under the circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis.

Ramon Joaquin v. Antonio Navarro, GR L-5426, may 29, 1953

F: On 2/6/45, while the battle for the liberation of Mla. was raging, the spouses Joaquin Navarro, Sr.
(JN, Sr.) and Angela Joaquin (AJ), together w/ their 3 daughters and their son Joaquin, Jr. (JN, Jr.)
and the latter's wife, sought refuge in the ground floor of the building known as the German Club.
During their stay, the bldg. was packed w/ refugees, shells were exploding around, and the Club
was set on fire. Simultaneously, the Japanese started shooting at the people inside the bldg,
especially those who were trying to escape. the 3 daughters were hit and fell on the ground near the
entrance; and JN, Sr. and his son decided to abandon the premises to seek a safer haven. They could
not convince AJ, who refused to join them, and so JN, Sr. and his son, JN, Jr. and the latter's wife
dashed out of the burning edifice. As they came out, JN, Jr. was shot in the head by a Japanese
soldier and immediately dropped. The others lay flat on the ground in front of the Club premises to
avoid the bullets. Minutes later, the Club, already on fire, collapsed, trapping many people,
presumably including AJ. JN, Sr., Mrs. JN, Jr. managed to reach an air raid shelter nearby and stayed
there for about 3 days, until they were forced to leave bec. the shelling tore it open. They fled but
unfortunately met Japanese patrols who fired at them, killing the two.
The trial court found the deaths to have occurred in this order: 1st. The Navarro girls; 2nd. JN, Jr.;
3rd. AJ; 4th. JN, Sr. The CA found that the deaths occurred in the following order: 1st. The Navarro
girls; 2nd. AJ; 3rd. JN, Jr.; 4th JN, Sr.

HELD: Where there are facts, known or knowable, from w/c a rational conclusion can be made, the
presumption (in the Rules of Court) does not step in, and the rules of preponderance of evidence
controls.
Are there particular circumstances on record from w/c reasonable inference of survivorship bet. AJ
and her son can be drawn? Is Francisco Lopez' (the sole witness) testimony competent and
sufficient for the purpose?
It is our opinion that the testimony contains facts quite adequate to solve the problem of
survivorship bet. AJ and JN, Jr. and keep the statutory presumption out of the case. It is believed that
in the light of the conditions painted by Lopez, a fair and reasonable inference can be arrived at,
namely: that JN, Jr. died before his mother.
While the possibility that the mother died before the son can not be ruled out, it must be noted that
this possibility is entirely speculative and must yield to the more rational deduction from proven
facts that it was the other way around. JN, Jr., was killed, while running, in front of, and 15 meters
from the Club. Still in the prime of life, 30, he must have negotiated that distance in 5 seconds or
less, and so died w/in that interval from the time he dashed out of the bldg. AJ could have perished
w/in those 5 or fewer seconds, but the probabilities that she did seem very remote.
According to Lopez' testimony, the collapse of the club occurred about 40 minutes after JN, Jr. died,
and it was the collapse that killed AJ. The CA said that the interval bet. JN, Jr.'s death and the
breaking down of the edifice was "minutes." Even so, it was much longer than 5 seconds, long
enough to warrant the inference that AJ was still alive when her son expired.
The CA mentioned several causes, besides the bldg's collapse, by which AJ could have been killed.
All these causes are speculative. xxx Nor was AJ likely to have been killed by falling beams bec. the
bldg. was made of concrete and its collapse, more likely than not, was sudden. As to fumes, these do
not cause instantaneous death; certainly, not w/in the brief space of 5 seconds bet. her son's
departure and his death.
It will be said that all this is indulging in inferences that are not conclusive. Sec. 69 (ii) of R 123 does
not require that the inference necessary to exclude the presumption therein provided be certain. It
is the "particular circumstances from w/c it (survivorship) can be inferred" that are required to be
certain as tested by the rules of evidence. In speaking of inference the rule can not mean beyond
doubt, for "inference is never certainty, but it may be plain enough to justify a finding of fact."
In conclusion, the presumption that AJ died before her son is based purely on surmises,
speculations, or conjectures w/o any sure foundation in evidence. The opposite theory is deduced
from established facts w/c, weighed by common experience, engender the inference as a very
strong probability. Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by w/c civil cases are
decided, this inference ought to prevail.

David v. SET, Poe-Llamanzares, GR 221538, September 20, 2016

 FACTS:

   Grace Poe was found abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by Edgardo
Militar in 1968. Parental care and custody over her was passed on by Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano
Militar and his wife. Emiliano reported and registered Grace Poe as a foundling with the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Iloilo City. Fenando Poe, Jr. and Susan Roces adopted Grace Poe.
         1991 – Poe went to the US to be a permanent resident therein
         2001 – She became a naturalized US citizen
         First quarter of 2005 – she came back to the Philippines to permanently reside herein
         February 14, 2006- she went back to the US to dispose family belongings
         July 18, 2006 – she re-acquired Filipino citizenship
         According to Poe in her 2013 COC for Senator, before the May 13, 2013 election, she has been a resident
of the Philippines for 6 years and 6 months (reckoned from year 2006 when she  re-acquired her
Filipino citizenship under RA 9225). 
         Poe filed her COC for Presidency for the May 9, 2016 elections (hence, computing from May, 2013, she
has been a resident in the Philippines for 9 years and 6 months only)
         However, in her COC, Poe declared that she is a natural born and her residence in the Philippine up to
the day before election would be 10 years and 11 months counted from May 24, 2005 (when she
returned from the US to the Philippines for good).

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT

Poe is qualified to be a candidate for President in the National and Local Election on May 9, 2016.

1)       Is Poe, a foundling, a natural-born citizen? Yes, based on:

a)      Circumstantial evidence
b)      Legislation
c)       Generally accepted principles of international law

Circumstantial evidence
There is more than sufficient evidence that Poe has Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-born
Filipino. xxx. [T]here is a high probability that her parents are Filipinos. The Solicitor General offered
official Statistics from the Philippine Statistics office that from 1965 to 1975, the total number of
foreigners born in the Philippines was 15,985. While the Filipinos born in the country were more than 10
Million. On this basis, there is a 99% chance that the child born in the Philippines would be a Filipino
which in turn, would indicate more than ample probability that Poe’s parents are Filipinos.

Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of Poe’s parents are the fact that:
1. She was abandoned in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo
2. She has typical Filipino features.

There are disputable presumptions that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature.
On this basis, it is safer to assume that Poe’s parents are Filipinos. To assume otherwise is to accept the
absurd.

Legislation
Foundlings are as a class, natural born citizens.  
  The amendment to the Constitution proposed by constitutionalist Rafols to include foundlings as natural
born citizens was not carried out, not because there was any objection to the notion that persons of
unknown parentage are not citizens, but only because their number was not enough to merit specific
mention. There was no intent or language that would permit discrimination against foundlings. On the
contrary, all three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws.
  Likewise, domestic laws on adoption support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do
not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee, rather, the adoptee must be Filipino in
the first place to be adopted.
  Recent legislation all expressly refer to “Filipino children” and include foundlings as among Filipino
children who may be adopted.

Generally accepted principles of international law

The common thread of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Rights of
the Child and the International Convent on Civil and Political Rights obligates the Philippines to
grant nationality from birth and to ensure that no child is stateless. The principles stated in the:
1.       Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relation to the Conflict of Nationality laws (that a foundling is
presumed to have the nationality of the country of birth)
2.       Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country
where he is found)
bind the Philippines although we are not signatory to these conventions.

Poe’s evidence shows that at least 60 countries in Asia, North and South America and Europe have passed
legislation recognizing foundlings as its citizens. 166 out of 189 countries accept that foundlings are
recognized as citizens. Hence, there is a generally accepted principle of international law to presume
foundlings as having been born and a national of the country in which it is found.

2)      After renouncing her American citizenship and after having taken her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines, has Poe re-acquired her status as a natural-born Filipino citizen?  Yes, Poe’s
repatriation resulted to reacquisition of natural born citizenship.

A natural born citizen before he lost his Philippine nationality will be restored to his former status as
natural born Filipino after repatriation (Benson v. HRET, Pareno v. Commission on Audit etc).

3)      Has Poe satisfied the 10 year residency requirement? Yes, she will have been a resident for 10
years and 11 months on the day of the election.

[T]here is overwhelming evidence that leads to no to other conclusion that Poe decided to permanently
abandon her US residence and reside in the Philippines as early as May 24, 2005.

Poe presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned their US domicile and
relocated to the Philippines for good. These evidence include former US passport showing her arrival on
May 24, 2005 and her return to the Philippines every time she travelled abroad, email correspondences
with freight company to arrange for the shipment of household items as well as with the pet Bureau;
school records of her children showing enrolment in the Philippine to the Philippine schools starting on
June 2005 etc. xxx These evidence, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine
citizenship is clear that when she returned in May 2005, it was for good.

Poe was able to prove that her statement in her 2013 COC was only a mistake in good faith. As explained
by Grace Poe, she misunderstood the date required in the 2013 COC as the period of residence as of the
day she submitted that COC in 2012. She said that she reckoned residency from April-May 2006 which
was the period when the U.S. house was sold and her husband returned to the Philippines. In that regard,
she was advised by her lawyers in 2015 that residence could be counted from 25 May 2005. Such a
mistake could be given in evidence against her but it was by no means conclusive considering the
overwhelming evidence submitted by Poe.
 Niko Hotel v. Roberto Reyes, G.R. No. 154259, February 28, 2005

FACTS:

There are two versions of the story:

Mr. Reyes: On the eve of October 13, 1994, Mr. Reyes while having coffee at the lobby of Nikko
Hotel was approached by Dr. Violet Filart, a friend several years back. According to Mr. Reyes, Dr.
Filart invited him to join a birthday party at the penthouse for the hotel’s former General Manager,
Mr. Tsuruoka. Plaintiff agreed as Dr. Filart agreed to vouch for him and carried a basket of fruits, the
latter’s gift. He lined up at the buffet table as soon as it was ready but to his great shock, shame and
embarrassment, Ruby Lim, Hotel’s Executive Secretary, asked him to leave in a loud voice enough
to be heard by the people around them. He was asked to leave the party and a Makati policeman
accompanied him to step-out the hotel. All these time, Dr.Filart ignored him adding to his shame and
humiliation.

Ms. Ruby Lim: She admitted asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not in the manner claimed by
the plaintiff. Ms. Lim approached several people including Dr. Filart’s sister, Ms. ZenaidaFruto, if Dr.
Filart did invite him as the captain waiter told Ms. Lim that Mr. Reyes was with Dr. Filart’s group. She
wasn’t able to ask it personally with Dr. Filart since the latter was talking over the phone and doesn’t
want to interrupt her. She asked Mr. Reyes to leave because the celebrant specifically ordered that
the party should be intimate consisting only of those who part of the list. She even asked politely with
the plaintiff to finish his food then leave the party.

During the plaintiff’s cross-examination, he was asked how close Ms. Lim was when she approached
him at the buffet table. Mr. Reyes answered “very close because we nearly kissed each other”.
Considering the close proximity, it was Ms. Lim’s intention to relay the request only be heard by him.
It was Mr. Reyes who made a scene causing everybody to know what happened.

The trial court dismissed the complaint, giving more credence to the testimony of Ms. Lim that she
was discreet in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. The trial court likewise ruled that Mr. Reyes
assumed the risk of being thrown out of the party as he was uninvited. However, the Court of
Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court as it found more commanding of belief the testimony of
Mr. Reyes that Ms. Lim ordered him to leave in a loud voice within hearing distance of several
guests. CA held petitioner liable for damages to Roberto Reyes aka “AmangBisaya”, an
entertainment artist.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners acted abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party.

RULING:

No. Supreme Court held that petitioners did not act abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party.
Plaintiff failed to establish any proof of ill-motive on the part of Ms. Lim who did all the necessary
precautions to ensure that Mr. Reyes will not be humiliated in requesting him to leave the party.
Art. 19. of the Civil Code states that: “Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith”. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in
Article and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be responsible. The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain standards which
must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties.
These standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and
good faith. Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its elements are
the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole
intent of prejudicing or injuring another.

Art. 21. of the Civil Code also states that: “Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in
a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage”.Article 2165 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1) There is
an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy;
and (3) it is done with intent to injure.

As applied to herein case Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms. Lim was driven by animosity against
him. The manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave was likewise acceptable and humane
under the circumstances. Ms. Lim having been in the hotel business for twenty years wherein being
polite and discreet are virtues to be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the
contrary does not inspire belief and is indeed incredible. Thus, the lower court was correct.
Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for the latter to leave the
party was made such that they nearly kissed each other, the request was meant to be heard by him
only and there could have been no intention on her part to cause embarrassment to him.

Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was not invited,
cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily,
neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that of its
employees.

SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC. and JOSE MARCEL PANLILIO, Petitioners, vs.
ROGELIO S. SOLUTA, JOSELITO SANTOS, EDNA BERNATE, VICENTA DELOLA,
FLORENTINO MATILLA, and GLOWHRAIN-SILAHIS UNION CHAPTER, Respondents.

Facts:
Petitioner Jose Marcel Panlilio (Panlilio) was the Vice President for Finance of
his co-petitioner Silahis International Hotel, Inc. (hotel), while respondents
Rogelio Soluta (Soluta), Joselito Santos, Edna Bernate (Edna),Vicenta Delola
(Vicenta), and Florentino Matilla (Matilla) were employees of the hotel and
officers of the Glowhrain-Silahis Union Chapter, the hotel employees union
(the union).
Petitioners’ version:
In late 1987, as Coronel Floro Maniego (Maniego), General Managerof the
Rapier Enforcement Professional Investigation and Security Agency, Inc.
(REPISA) which the hotel contracted to provide its security force, had
beenreceiving reports that sale and/or use of marijuana, dollar smuggling,
andprostitution were going on in the union office at the hotel and that there
existeda theft syndicate, he conducted a surveillance, with the approval of
Panlilio, ofsuspected members and officers of the union.In the morning of
January 11, 1988, Panlilio, his personal secretaryAndy Dizon, Maniego,
Bulletin reporter Nonoy Rosales, and REPISA securityguard Steve Villanueva
(Villanueva) entered the union office located at the hotelbasement, with the
permission of union officer Henry Babay (Babay) who wasapprised about the
suspected illegal activities, and searched the premises in thecourse of which
Villanueva found a plastic bag under a table. When opened, theplastic bag
yielded dry leaves of marijuana.

Panlilio thereupon ordered Maniego to investigate and report the matter to

the authorities.
Respondents’ version:
On January 10, 1988, Loida Somacera (Loida), a laundrywoman of the hotel,
stayed overnight at the female locker room at the basement of the hotel. At
dawn of January 11, 1988, she heard pounding sounds outside, prompting her
to open the door of the locker room upon which she saw five men in barong
tagalog whom she failed to recognize but she was sure were not employees of
the hotel, forcibly opening the door of the union office.

She even saw one of the men hid something behind his back. She then closed
the door and went back to bed. Soon after she heard the door of the union
office opened. In the morning of January 11, 1988, as union officer Soluta was
trying in vain to open the door of the union office, Loida narrated to him what
she had witnessed at dawn. Soluta thus immediately lodged a complaint
before the Security Officer. And he fetched a locksmith, Efren Guevarra, who
tried to assist him, Edna, Arnold Ilustrisimo and Ed Bautista open the door. At
that instant, men in barong tagalog armed with clubs arrived and started
hitting Soluta and his companions, drawing them to run to the female locker
room, and to thereafter proceed to the Engineering Office where they called
for police assistance.While awaiting the arrival of the police, Babay and
Panlilio, on thelatters request, met. At the meeting, Panlilio told Babay that
they proceed to theunion office where they would settle the mauling incident,
to which Babayreplied that the door of the office could not be opened. Panlilio
thereuponinstructed Villanueva to force open the door, and the latter did.
Once inside,Panlilio and his companions began searching the office, over the
objection ofBabay who even asked them if they had a search warrant.

A plastic bag was found containing marijuana flowering tops. After discovery
of the marijuana in the union office and the police investigation conducted, a
complaint against 13 union officers was instituted for violation of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6425, as amended by B.P. Blg. 179 (TheDangerous Drugs Act).
However, the RTC acquitted the accused due to inadmissibility of evidence
coupled by the suspicious circumstance of confiscation. Thereafter, Soluta and
his fellow union officers filed a Complaint against respondents including the
prosecuting Fiscal and attorney who assisted in the prosecution of the case
against them, for malicious prosecution and violation of their constitutional
right against illegal search. RTC held Panlilio ,Maniego and Villanueva jointly
and severally liable for damages as a result of malicious prosecution and
illegal search of the union office. On appeal, CA affirmed the decision with
modification. It ruled that petitioners, et al. civilly liable for damages for
violation of individual respondents constitutional right against illegal search,
not for malicious prosecution. Hence, the present petition.
Issue:
WON CA erred in ruling that petitioners are liable for damages under Art.32
of the Civil Code and the search was unreasonable
Held: No.
Article 32 of the New Civil Code provides: ART. 32. Any public officer or
employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs,
defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following
rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for
damages :x x x x(9) The right to be secure in ones person, house, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures; Petitioners had, by their
own claim, already received reports in late1987 of illegal activities allegedly
undertaken in the union office and Maniego conducted surveillance of the
union officers. Yet, in the morning of January 11,1988, petitioners and their
companions barged into and searched the union office without a search
warrant, despite ample time for them to obtain one, and notwithstanding the
objection of Babay. The course taken by petitioners and company stinks in
illegality, it not falling under any of the exceptional instances when a
warrantless search is allowed by law. Petitioners’ violation of individual
respondents constitutional right against unreasonable search thus furnishes
the basis for the award of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. The
Court rejected the petitioners’ claim that property rights by the hotel as the
owner of the room where the union office holds justified the search because it
recognizes the respondents (union officers) as the lawful occupants. It did not
accept their statement that Babay allowed them to enter the union office and
ruled that Babay’s testimony on the mauling incident was more credible. The
right to waive against unreasonable searches and seizure is a personal right,
which may be waived expressly or impliedly, a waiver by implication cannot
be presumed. No clear and convincing evidence was established. There must
be proof of the following: (a) that the right exists; (b) that the person involved
had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right;
and, (c)that the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. In
other words, the waiver must be voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently
made. Furthermore, petitioners’ claim that being a private person, they are
not covered by the standards set forth in the People vs Aruta as the
constitutional protection against illegal searches and seizures is not meant to
be invoked against private individuals. According to SC, citation of the
Aruta case of the appellate court was not erroneous as it did not justify the
petitioners’ liability but to rule out the legality of the search in the union office
as the search was not done as an incident of a lawful arrest. Hence, violation of
one’s constitutional right against illegal search and seizure can be the basis for
the recovery of damages under Article 32 in relation to Article 2219(6) and
(10) of the New Civil Code. Moreover, Article 32 speaks of an officer or
employee or person directly or indirectly responsible for the violation of the
constitutional rights and liberties of another. Hence, it is not the actor alone
who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly
responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the
aggrieved party. Such being the case, petitioners, together with Maniego and
Villanueva, the ones who orchestrated the illegal search, are jointly and
severally liable for actual, moral and exemplary damages to individual
respondents ina ccordance with the provision of Article 32, in relation to
Article 2219(6) and(10) of the Civil Code.

Continental Steel Marketing v. Voluntary Arbitrator, G.R. No. 182836,

October 13, 2009
Facts:
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing
Corporation (Continental Steel) and a member of respondent Nagkakaisang
Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in the
Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed a claim for Paternity
Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent,
pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded between
Continental and the Union. This, after his wife, Marife, had a pre-mature
delivery which resulted to the death of their unborn child.
Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave
but denied his claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits,
consisting of the death and accident insurance. It posited that the express
provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus,
without legal personality.

Issue:
Whether or not Hortillano is entitled to bereavement benefits on the death of
his unborn child.

Ruling:
Yes, Hortillano is entitled to bereavement benefits.
The Court emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are
granted to an employee to give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the
said employee and his family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be
said that the parents’ grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their
unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died
during delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child was born alive but
died subsequently.
The court also emphasized that life is not synonymous with civil personality.
One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a
child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution
recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must protect
equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the
cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.

FACTS:
Judgement for Civil Case T-662 was rendered on February 28, 1962 ordering
defendants Soliven, Pedro Oria, Laurencio, Sumalbag and Darang to pay
solidarity Quality Plastics the sum of P3,667.03 plus legal rate of interest from
November 1958 before its decision became final or else Quality Plastics is
hereby authorized to foreclose the bond. Defendants failed to pay the amount
before the limit given. Oria's land, which was covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 28732 and has an area of nine and six-tenths hectares, was levied
upon and sold by the sheriff at public auction on September 24, 1962 which he
has given as security under the bond.

Apparently, Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960. Quality
Plastics was not aware on Oria’s death. The summons and copies of complaint
was personally served on June 24, 1960 by a deputy sheriff to Soliven which
the latter acknowledged and signed in his own behalf and his co-defendants.

Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and all
testamentary heirs in Oria's duly probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products,
Inc on March 1, 1963 for the annulment of the judgment against Oria and the
execution against his land (T-873). Dionisio also sued in his capacity as
administrator of Oria’s testate estate.
ISSUE: Whether judgment against Oria and execution against his land be
annulled on the ground of lack in juridical capacity.
HELD: Quality Plastics upon receiving the summons on T-873 just learned that
Oria was already dead prior case T-662 was filed. The Dumalaos’ agreed in
their stipulation that indeed Quality Plastics was unaware of Oria’s death and
that they acted in good faith in joining Oria as a co-defendant.
However, no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, thus, the judgment against
him is a patent nullity. Lower court’s judgment against Oria in T-662 is void
for lack of jurisdiction over his person as far as Oria was concerned. He had
no more civil personality and his juridical capacity which is the fitness to be
the subject of legal relations was lost through death.
The fact that Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastics in order to annul the
judgment against Oria does not follow that they are entitiled to claim
attorney’s fees against the corporation.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. Its
judgment in Civil Case No. T-662 against Pedro Oria is declared void for lack of
jurisdiction. The execution sale of Oria's land covered by OCT No. 28732 is
also void.

Tenchavez v. Escano, GR L-19671, November 29, 1965

FACTS:
Vicenta Escañ o, 27 years of age (scion of a well-to-do and socially prominent Filipino family
ofSpanish ancestry and a "sheltered colegiala"), exchanged marriage vows with Pastor
Tenchavez, 32years of age,
without the knowledge of her parents.
Mamerto and Mena Escañ o were surprised,because Pastor never asked for the hand of
Vicenta, and were disgusted because of the great scandalthat the clandestine marriage
would provoke. The following morning, the Escañ o spouses soughtpriestly advice. Father
Reynes suggested a recelebration to validate what he believed to be an invalidmarriage,
from the standpoint of the Church. The recelebration did not take place, because on
26February 1948 Mamerto Escañ o was handed by a maid, a letter disclosing an amorous
relationshipbetween Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta thereafter would not agree
to a new marriage.As of June, 1948 the newlyweds were already estranged.Vicenta had
gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape from the scandal that her marriagestirred in
Cebu society. There, a lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then Senator
EmmanuelPelaez, to annul her marriage. She did not sign the petition and the case was
dismissed withoutprejudice because of her non-appearance at the hearing.On 24 June
1950, she applied for a passport, indicating in her application that she was single, thather
purpose was to study, that she was domiciled in Cebu City. The application was approved,
andshe left for the United States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for
divorce againstthe Tenchavez in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in
and for the County ofWashoe, on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in
character". On 21 October 1950, adecree of divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in
open court by the said tribunal. In 1951Mamerto and Mena Escañ o filed a petition with the
Archbishop of Cebu to annul their daughter'smarriage to Pastor. On 10 September 1954,
Vicenta sought papal dispensation of her marriageOn 13 September 1954, Vicenta married
an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now liveswith him in California, and, by
him, has begotten children. She acquired American citizenship on 8August 1958.
On 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court
of FirstInstance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escañ o; her
parents, Mamerto and Mena Escañ o, whom he charged with having dissuaded and
discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her affections, and against
the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the
annulment of the marriage. He asked for legal separation and one million pesos in damages.
Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff on a foreign country and an equally valid
marriage to her present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her parents denied that they
had in anyway influenced their daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.

ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the divorce obtained by Vicenta abroad was valid and binding in the
Philippines;
2.) Whether or not Tenchavez is entitled to legal separation and to moral damages.

HELD:
1.) No. The Court held that under Philippine law, the valid marriage between Tenchavez
and Escañ o remained subsisting and undissolved notwithstanding the decree of absolute
divorce that the wife sought and obtained in Nevada. Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines which was already in force at the time expressly provided that “Laws relating
to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.” Here, at the time
the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. She
was then still subject to Philippine law, which does not admit absolute divorce. Thus, under
Philippine law, the divorce was invalid.
2.) Yes. The Court ruled that it can be gleaned from the facts and considerations that
Tenchavez is entitled to a decree of legal separation on the basis of adultery as provided
under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code. Since our jurisdiction does not recognize
Vicenta’s divorce and second marriage as valid, her marriage and cohabitation with the
American is technically “intercourse with a person not her husband” from the standpoint of
Philippine Law. Her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and
her desertion of her husband also constitute in law a wrong for which the husband is
entitled to the corresponding indemnity. Thus, the latter is entitled to a decree of legal
separation conformably to Philippine law.

As to moral damages the Court assessed Tenchavez’s claim for a million pesos as
unreasonable, taking into account some considerations. First, the marriage was celebrated
in secret, and its failure was not characterized by publicity or undue humiliation on his
part. Second, the parties never lived together. Third, there is evidence that Tenchavez had
originally agreed to the annulment of the marriage, although such a promise was legally
invalid, being against public policy. Fourth, the fact that Tenchavez is unable to remarry
under our law is a consequence of the indissoluble character of the union that he entered
into voluntarily and with open eyes. Therefore, he should recover P25,000 only by way of
moral damages and attorney’s fees.

FRANCISCO HERMOSSISIMA, plaintiff vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et.al., defendant No.L-

14628. September 30, 1960

FACTS:
The complainant Soledad Cagigas is thirty six years old, a former high school teacher and a
life insurance agent. The petitioner Francisco Hermosisima is ten years younger than
complainant, and an apprentice pilot. Intimacy developed between them and thus
sometime 1953 after coming from the movies, they had sexual intercourse in his cabin. In
February 1954, the woman advised the man that she is pregnant whereupon the man
promised to marry her. Their daughter Chris Hermosisima was born June 1954 in a private
clinic. However, subsequently the man married one Romanita Perez. Hence, Soledad filed a
complaint against Francisco for acknowledgement of her child as a natural child of the
petitioner, as well as for support of said child and moral damages for alleged breach of
promise to marry. The CFI declared the child a natural daughter of the defendant, ordered
Francisco to support the child by giving a monthly alimony, awarded actual damages and
moral damages. On appeal of the petitioner, the CA affirmed the assailed decision however
increased the amount for actual and moral damages.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the award for moral damages is valid.

RULING:
The Supreme Court held that no moral damages can be had in the instant case because it
was the woman who virtually seduced the man by surrendering herself to him because she
a girl ten years older was overwhelmed by her love for him, she wanted to bind him by
having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.

Cecilio Pe v. Alfonso Pe, GR L-17396, May 30, 1962

FACTS:
Defendant, Alfonso Pe was a married man and an agent of the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette
Factory, carried an illicit affair with Lolita Pe, who was unmarried. The defendant was
adopted by PeBeco, a collateral relative of Lolita’s father. Given that the defendant had the
same last name with Lolita made them close and frequented her house to teach her how to
pray the rosary. Eventually both of them fell in love and conducted the clandestine trysts
which eventually reached the ears of the Lolita’s parents. Defendant, a Chinese national
was filed with deportation by plaintiffs (Lolita’s parents and siblings) but the affair
continued nonetheless. Lolita disappeared but found a note with the defendant’s
handwriting.

Plaintiffs filed damages for causing injury in a manner contrary to morals, good customs
and public policy. The trial court considered their complaint not actionable for the reason
that they failed to prove that defendant deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita’s
affection, thus was dismissed. Plaintiffs then appealed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not defendant is liable to Lolita’s family on the ground of moral, good custom
and public policy due to their illicit affair?

RULING:

Yes, the defendant is liable. Alfonso committed an injury to Lolita’s family in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs and public policy contemplated in Article 21 of the Civil
Code. The defendant took advantage of the trust of Cecilio and even used the praying of
rosary as a reason to get close with Lolita. The wrong caused by Alfonso is immeasurable
considering the fact that he is a married man.

Art. 21. “Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.”

In the case at bar, Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has the following
elements: 1) There is an act which is legal; 2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom,
public order, or public policy; 3) and it is done with intent to injure. Thus, under any of
these three (3) provisions of law, an act which causes injury to another may be made the
basis for an award of damages. The decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is
hereby sentenced to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00 as
attorney’s fees and expenses of litigations. Costs against appellee.

LEONILO C. DONATO v. HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF

FIRST INSTANCE OF MANIIA, BRANCH XXXII HON. JOSE FLAMINIANO, CITY FISCAL OF
MANILA; PAZ B. ABAYAN G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988, GANCAYCO, J.

The civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage does not determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused, and is thus not a prejudicial question in the crime of bigamy. Parties to the marriage
should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the
judgment of the competent courts; otherwise, the presumption is that the first marriage exists.

Facts:
Paz B. Abayan and Leonilo C. Donato lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of
wedlock for at least five (5) years. In 1978, Paz married Leonilo, without knowing that the latter
had a subsisting marriage with another woman. Upon discovering the truth, Paz left Leonilo and
filed a criminal complaint for bigamy. Before Leonilo was arraigned, Paz filed a civil action for
declaration of nullity of her marriage with Leonilo. Taking advantage of the situation, Leonilo
moved to suspend the criminal proceedings on the ground that civil case for nullity of marriage
Bled by private respondent raises a prejudicial question.
Issue:
Whether or not the civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage poses a prejudicial question to
the criminal case.

Ruling:
No. A prejudicial question is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. For a
prejudicial question to suspend the criminal action, it must appear that (1) the civil case involves
facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, and that (2)
the resolution of the issue/s raised in the civil case would necessarily determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused.

The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. The civil case does not
determine Leonilo’s guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy. Parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the
competent courts; otherwise, the presumption is that the Brst marriage exists. Therefore, he who
contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the Brst marriage assumes
the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

SPOUSES ANTONIO PAHANG and LOLITA PAHANG, petitioners, -versus- HON.

AUGUSTINE A. VESTIL, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court — Branch 56,
Mandaue City, DEPUTY SHERIFF, Regional Trial Court — Branch 56 and
METROPOLITAN BANK and TRUST COMPANY, respondents. G.R. No. 148595, SECOND
DIVISION, July 12, 2004, CALLEJO, SR., J.

A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the
issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It generally comes into
play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the
former an issue that must be pre-emptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the
guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial
question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. In the present case, the complaint of the petitioners for
Annulment of Extrajudicial Sale is a civil action and the respondent's petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession of Lot No. 3-A, Block 1, Psd-07- 021410, is but an incident in the land registration case and,
therefore, no prejudicial question can arise from the existence of the two actions.
FACTS
The petitioners, Spouses Antonio and Lolita Pahang, received a short-term loan of P1,500,000.00
from the respondent Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company. The loan was covered by Non-
Negotiable Promissory Note and was, likewise, secured by a real estate mortgage on a parcel of
land. As the petitioners failed to pay the loan, the interest and the penalties due thereon, the
respondent foreclosed the real estate mortgage extrajudicially. As a consequence, the mortgaged
property was sold at public auction to the respondent bank as the highest bidder. Instead of
redeeming the property, the petitioners filed a complaint for annulment of extrajudicial sale against
the respondent bank docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-3454. Therein, the petitioners alleged that the
respondent bloated their obligation of P1,500,000.00 to P2,403,770.73. After the expiration of the
one-year redemption period, the respondent consolidated its ownership over the foreclosed
property. The respondent filed a Petition for Writ of Possession docketed as LRC Case No. 3. The
petitioners, citing the ruling of this Court in Belisario v. The Intermediate Appellate Court, opposed
the petition on the ground that the core issue in their complaint in Civil Case No. MAN-3454
constituted a prejudicial question, which warranted a suspension of the proceedings before the
court. RTC granting the petition and ordering the issuance of a writ of possession in favour of the
respondent cited the case of Javelosa v. Court of Appeals, and Gawaran v. Court of Appeals, the RTC
ruled that since the petitioners failed to redeem the property within one year from the foreclosure,
the respondent was entitled to a writ of possession as a necessary consequence of the
readjudication of ownership and the corresponding issuance of the original certificate. The CA
affirmed the decision of the lower court.

ISSUE
Whether or not the complaint of the petitioners in Civil Case No. MAN-3454 for annulment of
extrajudicial sale is a prejudicial question to the petition of the respondent bank for the issuance of
a writ of possession. (NO)

RULING
A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of
the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It generally
comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there
exists in the former an issue that must be pre-emptively resolved before the criminal action may
proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative
juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the
principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.

In the present case, the complaint of the petitioners for Annulment of Extrajudicial Sale is a civil
action and the respondent's petition for the issuance of a writ of possession of Lot No. 3-A, Block 1,
Psd-07-021410, is but an incident in the land registration case and, therefore, no prejudicial
question can arise from the existence of the two actions. The focal issue in Civil Case No. MAN-3454
was whether the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage executed by the petitioners in
favor of the respondent bank and the sale of their property at public auction for P2,403,770.73 are
null and void, whereas, the issue in LRC Case No. 3 was whether the respondent bank was entitled
to the possession of the property after the statutory period for redemption had lapsed and title was
issued. Our ruling in Belisario has no application in this case because in the said case, no prejudicial
question was involved. We merely held therein that the filing of an action to enforce redemption
within the period of redemption is equivalent to a formal offer to redeem, and should the Court
allow the redemption, the redemptioner should then pay the amount already determined. In fine,
the filing of an action by the redemptioner to enforce his right to redeem does not suspend the
running of the statutory period to redeem the property, nor bar the purchaser at public auction
from procuring a writ of possession after the statutory period of redemption had lapsed, without
prejudice to the final outcome of such complaint to enforce the right of redemption.

It bears stressing that the proceedings in a petition and/or motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession, after the lapse of the statutory period for redemption are summary in nature. The trial
court is mandated to issue a writ of possession upon a finding of the lapse of the statutory period
for redemption without the redemptioner having redeemed the property. It cannot be validly
argued that the trial court abused its discretion when it merely complied with its ministerial duty to
issue the said writ of possession.
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, petitioner, -versus- COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
ROMMEL ARNADO and LINOG BALUA, respondents. G.R. No. 195649, EN BANC, July 2,
2013, SERENO, J.

There is likewise no doubt that the use of a passport is a positive declaration that one is a citizen
of the country which issued the passport, or that a passport proves that the country which issued
it recognizes the person named therein as its national. It is unquestioned that Arnado is a
natural born Filipino citizen, or that he acquired American citizenship by naturalization. There
is no doubt that he reacquired his Filipino citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance to the
Philippines and that he renounced his American citizenship. It is also indubitable that after
renouncing his American citizenship, Arnado used his U.S. passport at least six times. If there is
any remaining doubt, it is regarding the efficacy of Arnado's renunciation of his American
citizenship when he subsequently used his U.S. passport. The renunciation of foreign citizenship
must be complete and unequivocal. The requirement that the renunciation must be made through
an oath emphasizes the solemn duty of the one making the oath of renunciation to remain true to
what he has sworn to. Allowing the subsequent use of a foreign passport because it is convenient
for the person to do so is rendering the oath a hollow act. It devalues the act of taking of an
oath, reducing it to a mere
ceremonial formality.

FACTS
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his
subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino
citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the
Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008. On the same day an Order of Approval of
his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favour. On 3 April 2009
Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation of his foreign citizenship. On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate
of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. On 28 April 2010, respondent
Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado
and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy. Balua presented a travel record indicating that
Arnado has been using his US Passport in entering and departing the Philippines. The said
record shows that Arnado left the country on 14 April 2009 and returned on 25 June 2009,
and again departed on 29 July 2009, arriving back in the Philippines on 24 November 2009.
The COMELEC First Division granted the Petition for Disqualification. Arando sought
reconsideration of the Resolution from the COMELEC En Banc, wherein petitioner
Maquiling intervened. The COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the First
Division. Hence, the petition for certiorari assailing the Resolution of the COMELEC En
Banc, and raising the issue of whether or not the use of foreign passport after renouncing
foreign citizenship affects one's qualifications to run for public office., in which the
Supreme Court held in affirmative. Thus, the present Resolution which resolves the Motion
for Reconsideration filed by respondent for the reversal of the Court’s decision dated April
16, 2013.

ISSUE
Whether or not respondent was able to advance any argument to support his plea for the
reversal of the Court’s Decision dated April 16, 2013. (NO)

RULING
Respondent failed to advance any argument to support his plea for the reversal of this
Court's Decision dated April 16, 2013. Instead, he presented his accomplishments as the
Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and reiterated that he has taken the Oath of
Allegiance not only twice but six times. It must be stressed, however, that the relevant
question is the efficacy of his renunciation of his foreign citizenship and not the taking of
the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Neither do his accomplishments as
mayor affect the question before this Court. Respondent cites Section 349 of the
Immigration and Naturalization Act of the United States as having the effect of expatriation
when he executed his Affidavit of Renunciation of American Citizenship on April 3, 2009
and thus claims that he was divested of his American citizenship. If indeed, respondent was
divested of all the rights of an American citizen, the fact that he was still able to use his US
passport after executing his Affidavit of Renunciation repudiates this claim.
The Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws, which must be presented as public
documents of a foreign country and must be "evidenced by an official publication thereof.”
American law does not govern in this jurisdiction. Instead, Section 40 (d) of the Local
Government Code calls for application in the case before us, given the fact that at the time
Arnado filed his certificate of candidacy, he was not only a Filipino citizen but, by his own
declaration, also an American citizen. It is the application of this law and not of any foreign
law that serves as the basis for Arnado's disqualification to run for any local elective
position. With all due respect to the dissent, the declared policy of Republic Act No. (RA)
9225 is that "all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be
deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act." This
policy pertains to the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Section 5 (2) requires those
who have re-acquired Philippine citizenship and who seek elective public office, to
renounce any and all foreign citizenship. This requirement of renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship, when read together with Section 40 (d) of the Local Government Code
which disqualifies those with dual citizenship from running for any elective local position,
indicates a policy that anyone who seeks to run for public offie must be solely and
exclusively a Filipino citizen. To allow a former Filipino who reacquires Philippine
citizenship to continue using a foreign passport — which indicates the recognition of a
foreign state of the individual as its national — even after the Filipino has renounced his
foreign citizenship, is to allow a complete disregard of this policy.

Further, we respectfully disagree that the majority decision rules on a situation of doubt.
Indeed, there is no doubt that Section 40 (d) of the Local Government Code disqualifies
those with dual citizenship from running for local elective positions.
There is likewise no doubt that the use of a passport is a positive declaration that one is a
citizen of the country which issued the passport, or that a passport proves that the country
which issued it recognizes the person named therein as its national. It is unquestioned that
Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen, or that he acquired American citizenship by
naturalization. There is no doubt that he reacquired his Filipino citizenship by taking
his Oath of Allegiance to the Philippines and that he renounced his American citizenship. It
is also indubitable that after renouncing his American citizenship, Arnado used his U.S.
passport at least six times. If there is any remaining doubt, it is regarding the efficacy of
Arnado's renunciation of his American citizenship when he subsequently used his U.S.
passport. The renunciation of foreign citizenship must be complete and unequivocal. The
requirement that the renunciation must be made through an oath emphasizes the solemn
duty of the one making the oath of renunciation to remain true to what he has sworn to.
Allowing the subsequent use of a foreign passport because it is convenient for the
person to do so is rendering the oath a hollow act. It devalues the act of taking of an oath,
reducing it to a mere ceremonial formality.

The dissent states that the Court has effectively left Arnado "a man without a country". On
the contrary, this Court has, in fact, found Arnado to have more than one. Nowhere in the
decision does it say that Arnado is not a Filipino citizen. What the decision merely points
out is that he also possessed another citizenship at the time he filed his certificate of
candidacy. It must be stressed that what is at stake here is the principle that only those who
are exclusively Filipinos are qualified to run for public office. If we allow dual citizens who
wish to run for public office to renounce their foreign citizenship and afterwards continue
using their foreign passports, we are creating a special privilege for these dual citizens,
thereby effectively junking the prohibition in Section 40 (d) of the Local Government Code.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, -versus- CHULE Y. LIM, respondent.

G.R. No. 153883, FIRST DIVISION, January 13, 2004, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

The Republic avers that respondent did not comply with the constitutional requirement of
electing Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority. It cites Article IV, Section
1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, which provides that the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a
Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching
the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. Likewise, the Republic invokes the
provision in Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625, that legitimate children born of Filipino
mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be
signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths,
and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid
statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."
Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship
apply only to legitimate children. These do not apply in the case of respondent who was
concededly an illegitimate child, considering that her Chinese father and Filipino mother were
never married. As such, she was not required to comply with said constitutional and statutory
requirements to become a Filipino citizen. By being an illegitimate, child of a Filipino mother,
respondent automatically became a Filipino upon birth. Stated differently, she is a Filipino since
birth without having to elect Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority.

FACTS
In her petition, respondent claimed that she was born on October 29, 1954 in Buruan,
Iligan City. Her birth was registered in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte but the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Kauswagan transferred her record of birth to Iligan City. She alleged that both
her Kauswagan and Iligan City records of birth have four erroneous entries, and prays that
they be corrected. During the hearing, respondent testified thus:
First, she claims that her surname "Yu" was misspelled as "Yo". She has been using "Yu" in
all her school records and in her marriage certificate. She presented a clearance from the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to further show the consistency in her use of the
surname "Yu". Second, she claims that her father's name in her birth record was written as
"Yo Diu To (Co Tian)" when it should have been "Yu Dio To (Co Tian)." Third, her
nationality was entered as Chinese when it should have been Filipino considering that her
father and mother never got married. Only her deceased father was Chinese, while her
mother is Filipina. She claims that her being a registered voter attests to the fact that she is
a Filipino citizen. Finally, it was erroneously indicated in her birth certificate that she was a
legitimate child when she should have been described as illegitimate considering that her
parents were never married. The trial court granted respondent’s petition. The Republic of
the Philippines appealed the decision to the CA which affirmed the trial court’s decision.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in ordering the correction of the citizenship of respondent
from “Chinese” to “Filipino” despite the fact that respondent never demonstrated any
compliance with the legal requirements for election of citizenship.
RULING
To digress, it is just as well that the Republic did not cite as error respondent's recourse to
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court to effect what indisputably are substantial corrections and
changes in entries in the civil register. To clarify, Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The
proceedings under said rule may either be summary or adversary in nature. If the
correction sought to be made in the civil register is clerical, then the procedure to be
adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of
a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. This
is our ruling in Republic v. Valencia where we held that even substantial errors in a civil
registry may be corrected and the true facts established under Rule 108 provided the
parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding.
An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted,
proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where
opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and
where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered.

The Republic avers that respondent did not comply with the constitutional requirement of
electing Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority. It cites Article IV, Section
1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, which provides that the citizenship of a legitimate child born
of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon
reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. Likewise, the Republic
invokes the provision in Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625, that legitimate children
born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a
statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized
to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall
accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the
Government of the Philippines."
Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship
apply only to legitimate children. These do not apply in the case of respondent who was
concededly an illegitimate child, considering that her Chinese father and Filipino mother
were never married. As such, she was not required to comply with said constitutional and
statutory requirements to become
a Filipino citizen. By being an illegitimate, child of a Filipino mother, respondent
automatically became a Filipino upon birth. Stated differently, she is a Filipino since birth
without having to elect Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority.

This notwithstanding, the records show that respondent elected Filipino citizenship when
she reached the age of majority. She registered as a voter in Misamis Oriental when she was
18 years old. The exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises
constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In its second assignment of
error, the Republic assails the Court of Appeals' decision in allowing respondent to use her
father's surname despite its finding that she is illegitimate. The Republic's submission is
misleading. The Court of Appeals did not allow respondent to use her father's surname.
What it did allow was the correction of her father's misspelled surname which she has been
using ever since she can remember.

In this regard, respondent does not need a court pronouncement for her to use her father's
surname. While judicial authority is required for a change of name or surname, there is no
such requirement for the continued use of a surname which a person has already been
using since childhood. The doctrine that disallows such change of name as would give the
false impression of family relationship remains valid but only to the extent that the
proposed change of name would in great probability cause prejudice or future mischief to
the family whose surname it is that is involved or to the community in general. In this case,
the Republic has not shown that the Yu family in China would probably be prejudiced or be
the object of future mischief. In respondent's case, the change in the surname that she has
been using for 40 years would even avoid confusion to her community in general.

ISABELP APA, MANUEL APA and LEONILO JACALAN, petitioners, -versus- HON.
RUMOLDO R.
FERNANDEZ, HON. CELSO V. ESPINOSA, and SPS. FELIXBERTO TIGOL, JR. and ROSITA
TAGHOY
TIGOL, respondents. G.R. No. 112381, SECOND DIVISION, March 20, 1995, MENDOZA, J.

A prejudicial question is a question which is based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that its resolution is determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.To
justify suspension of the criminal action, it must appear not only that the civil case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution is based but also that the decision of the
issue or issues raised in the civil case would be decisive of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In the
criminal case, the question is whether petitioners occupied a piece of land not belonging to them but to
private respondent and against the latter's will. As already noted, the information alleges that "without
the knowledge and consent of the owner, ROSITA TIGOL" petitioners occupied or took possession of a
portion of " her property"by building their houses thereon and "deprived [her] of the use of a portion of
her land to her damage and prejudice." Now the ownership of the land in question, known as Lot 3635-B
of the Opon cadastre covered by TCT No. 13250, is the issue in Civil Case 2247-L now pending in
Branch 27 of the RTC at Lapu-Lapu City. The resolution, therefore, of this question would necessarily be
determinative of petitioners' criminal liability for squatting.

FACTS
Criminal Case No. 012489 is a prosecution for violation of PD 772 otherwise known as the Anti-
Squatting Law. The information alleges that petitioners Isabelo Apa, Manuel Apa and Dionisio
Jacalan, without the knowledge and consent of the owner, Rosita Tigol, occupied and possessed a
portion of her real property, Lot No. 3635-B. Petitioners moved for the suspension of their
arraignment on the ground that there was a prejudicial question pending resolution in another case
being tried in Branch 27 of the same court. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 2247-L and entitled
"Anselmo Taghoy and Vicente Apa versus Felixberto Tigol, Jr. and Rosita T. Tigol, et al.," concerns
the ownership of Lot No. 3635-B. 1 In that case, petitioners seek a declaration of the nullity of TCT
No. 13250 of Rosita T. Tigol and the partition of the lot in question among them and private
respondent Rosita T. Tigol as heirs of Filomeno and Rita Taghoy. The case had been filed in 1990 by
petitioners, three years before May 27, 1993 when the criminal case for squatting was filed against
them.

ISSUE
Whether or not the question of ownership of Lot No. 3635- B, which was pending in Civil Case No.
2247-L, is a prejudicial question justifying suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case
against petitioners. (YES)

RULING
A prejudicial question is a question which is based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime
but so intimately connected with it that its resolution is determinative of the guilt or innocence of
the accused. To justify suspension of the criminal action, it must appear not only that the civil case
involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution is based but also that
the decision of the issue or issues raised in the civil case would be decisive of the guilt or innocence
of the accused. 2 Rule 111, S. 5 provides:
Sec. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. — The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial
questions are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not
the criminal action may proceed. In the criminal case, the question is whether petitioners occupied
a piece of land not belonging to them but to private respondent and against the latter's will. As
already noted, the information alleges that "without the knowledge and consent of the owner,
ROSITA TIGOL" petitioners occupied or took possession of a portion of " her property"by building
their houses thereon and "deprived [her] of the use of a portion of her land to her damage and
prejudice."

Now the ownership of the land in question, known as Lot 3635-B of the Opon cadastre covered by
TCT No. 13250, is the issue in Civil Case 2247-L now pending in Branch 27 of the RTC at Lapu-Lapu
City. The resolution, therefore, of this question would necessarily be determinative of petitioners'
criminal liability for squatting. In fact it appears that on February 23, 1994, the court trying the civil
case rendered a decision nullifying TCT No. 13250 of private respondent and her husbandand
declared the lot in question to be owned in common by the spouses and thepetitioners as their
inheritance from their parentsFilomeno and Rita Taghoy. While private respondents claim that the
decision in that case is not yet final because they have filed a motion for new trial, the point is that
whatever may be the ultimate resolution of the question of ownership, such resolution will be
determinative of the guilt or innocence of petitioners in the criminal case. Surely, if petitioners are
co-owners of the lot in question, they cannot be found guilty of squatting because they are as much
entitled to the use and occupation of the land as are the private respondent Rosita T. Tigol and her
family.

Private respondents argues that even the owner of a piece of land can be ejected from his property
since the only issue in such a case is the right to its physical possession. Consequently, the contend,
he can also be prosecuted under the Anti- Squatting Law. The contention misses the essential point
that the owner of a piece of land can be ejected only if forsome reason, e.g ., he has let his property
to the plaintiff, he has given up its temporary possession. But in the case at bar, no such agreement
is asserted by private respondent. Rather private respondent claims the right to possession based
on her claim of ownership. Ownership is thus the pivotal question. Since this is the question in the
civil case, the proceedings in the criminal case must in the meantime be suspended.

ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO and JOSE FARLEY BEDENIA
v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. L-39999, May 31, 1984, GUTIERREZ JR., J.

What Article 29 clearly and expressly provides is a remedy for the plaintiff in case the
defendant has been acquitted in a criminal prosecution on the ground that his guilt has not
been proved beyond reasonable doubt. It merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages
is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act or
omission.

Facts:
Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdones, Ismael Gonzalgo, and Jose Farley (Padilla et al) herein
petitioners, were charged with the crime of Grave Coercion by one Antonio Vergara
(Vergara) for allegedly preventing the latter from closing his stall at the public market and
by subsequently forcibly opening the door of the said stall and thereafter brutally
demolishing and destroying the same. The RTC found Padilla et al guilty beyond reasonable
doubt. On appeal with the CA, acquitted Padilla et al on the ground of reasonable doubt but
were ordered to pay jointly and severally the amount of P9,600.00 as damages. To this,
Padilla et al appealed as regards the civil aspect of the case. Hence this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not Padilla et al may be held civilly liable for damages despite their acquittal
Ruling:
Yes, they may still be held civilly liable. There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code
provision in the rendition of a judgment of acquittal and a judgment awarding damages in
the same criminal action. The two can stand side by side. A judgment of acquittal operates
to extinguish the criminal liability. It does not, however, extinguish the civil liability unless
there is clear showing that the act from which civil liability might arise did not exist. We
further note the rationale behind Art. 29 of the Civil Code in arriving at the intent of the
legislator that they could not possibly have intended to make it more difficult for the
aggrieved party to recover just compensation by making a separate civil action mandatory
and exclusive.

A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be

established or more evidence must be adduced or where the criminal case has been
fully terminated and a separate complaint would be just as efficacious or even more
expedient than a timely remand to the trial court where the criminal action was
decided for further hearings on the civil aspects of the case. The offended party may,
of course, choose to file a separate action. These do not exist in this case.
Considering moreover the delays suffered by the case in the trial, appellate, and
review stages, it would be unjust to the complainants in this case to require at this
time a separate civil action to be Bled.

ALFRED FRITZ FRENZEL, petitioner, vs. EDERLINA P. CATITO, respondent.

G.R. No. 143958. July 11, 2003, SECOND DIVISION, J. CALLEJO, SR .

Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or
comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall
return the same to him. This provision does not apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed by the
Constitution or by the application of the pari delicto doctrine.

FACTS:
Petitioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel is an Australian citizen of German descent. Sometime in February
1983, Alfred arrived in Sydney, Australia for a vacation. He went to King's Cross, a night spot in
Sydney, for a massage where he met respondent EderlinaCatito, a Filipina and a native of Bajada,
Davao City. Unknown to Alfred, she resided for a time in Germany and was married to Klaus Muller,
a German national.. Alfred followed Ederlina to the Philippines where they cohabited together in a
common-law relationship. During the period of their common-law relationship, Alfred acquired in
the Philippines real and personal properties valued more or less at P724,000.00. Since
Alfred knew that as an alien he was disqualified from owning lands in the Philippines, he agreed
that only Ederlina's name would appear in the deeds of sale as the buyer of the real
properties, as well as in the title covering the same. Alfred and Ederlina's relationship deteriorated.
Alfred wrote Ederlina's father complaining that Ederlina had taken all his life savings and because
of this, he was virtually penniless. He further accused the Catito family of acquiring for themselves
the properties he had purchased with his own money. He demanded the return of all the amounts
that Ederlina and her family had "stolen" and turn over all the properties acquired by him and
Ederlina during their coverture. Alfred filed a complaint against Ederlina with the Regional Trial
Court, Davao City, for specific performance, declaration of ownership of real and personal
properties, sum of money, and damages. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Ederlina.
Alfred appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC.
Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE:
W/N Article 22 of the NCC is applicable to the case at bar( NO)

RULING:
Even if, as claimed by the petitioner, the sales in question were entered into by him as the real
vendee, the said transactions are in violation of the Constitution; hence, are null and void ab initio.
A contract that violates the Constitution and the law, is null and void and vests no rights and creates
no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. The petitioner, being a party to an illegal contract,
cannot come into a court of law and ask to have his illegal objective carried out. Futile, too, is
petitioner's reliance on Article 22 of the New Civil Code which reads:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or
comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return
the same to him.

The provision is expressed in the maxim: "MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER DETREMENTO PROTEST"
(No person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another). An action for recovery of
whathas been paid without just cause has been designated as an accion in rem verso. This provision
does not apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the application of
the pari delicto doctrine. It may be unfair and unjust to bar the petitioner from filing an accion in
rem verso over the subject properties, or from recovering the money he paid for the said
properties, but, as Lord Mansfield stated in the early case of Holman vs. Johnson: "The objection
that a contract is immoral or illegal as between the plaintiff and the defendant, sounds at all times
very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the objection is ever
allowed; but it is founded in general principles of policy, which the defendant has the advantage of,
contrary to the real justice, as between him and the plaintiff."

VICENTE RELLOSA, CYNTHIA ORTEGA assisted by husband Roberto Ortega, petitioners ,vs.
GONZALO PELLOSIS, INESITA MOSTE, and DANILO RADAM, respondents G.R. No.
138964, August 9, 2001, THIRD DIVISION, J. VITUG

The abuse of rights rule established in Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person to act with
justice, to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. When a right is exercised in a
manner which discards these norms resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for
which the actor can be held accountable. In this instance, the issue is not so much about the existence of
the right or validity of the order of demolition as the question of whether or not petitioners have acted in
conformity with, and not in disregard of, the standard set by Article 19 of the Civil Code.
At the time petitioners implemented the order of demolition, barely five days after respondents received a
copy thereof, the same was not yet final and executory.

FACTS:
Respondents were lessees of a parcel of land owned by Victor Reyes. In 1986, Victor informed
respondents that, for being lessees of the land for more than twenty (20) years, they would have a
right of first refusal to buy the land. However, in the early part of 1989, without the knowledge of
respondents, the land occupied by them was sold to petitioner Cynthia Ortega who was able to
ultimately secure title to the property in her name. After the sale, Cynthia Ortega filed a petition for
condemnation of the structures on the land. After due hearing in the condemnation case, the Office
of the Building Official issued a resolution ordering the demolition of the houses of respondents.
However, due to the timely intervention of a mobile unit of the Western Police District, the intended
demolition did not take place following talks between petitioner Rellosa and counsel who pleaded
that the demolition be suspended since the order sought to be implemented was not yet final and
executory

On 11 December 1989, respondents filed their appeal contesting the order of the Office of the
Building Official. On 12 December 1989, petitioners once again hired workers and proceeded with
the demolition of respondents' houses. Resultantly, respondents filed a case praying that
petitioners be ordered to pay moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees, for the
untimely demolition of the houses. After trial, the court dismissed the complaint of respondents and
instead ordered them to pay petitioners moral damages. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, reversed
the decision of the trial court and ordered petitioners to pay respondents moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:
W/N the premature demolition of the respondents’ houses entitled them to the award of damages
(YES)

HELD:
A right is a power, privilege, or immunity guaranteed under a constitution, statute or decisional law,
or recognized as a result of long usage, constitutive of a legally enforceable claim of one person
against another. Petitioner might verily be the owner of the land, with the right to enjoy and to
exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof, but the exercise of these rights is not
without limitations. The abuse of rights rule established in Article 19 of the Civil Code requires
every person to act with justice, to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith.
When a right is exercised in a manner which discards these norms resulting in damage to another, a
legal wrong is committed for which the actor can be held accountable. In this instance, the issue is
not so much about the existence of the right or validity of the order of demolition as the question of
whether or not petitioners have acted in conformity with, and not in disregard of, the standard set
by Article 19 of the Civil Code.

At the time petitioners implemented the order of demolition, barely five days after respondents
received a copy thereof, the same was not yet final and executory. The law provided for a fifteen-
day appeal period in favor of a party aggrieved by an adverse ruling of the Office of the Building
Official but by the precipitate action of petitioners in demolishing the houses of respondents (prior
to the expiration of the period to appeal),the latter were effectively deprived of this recourse. The
fact that the order of demolition was later affirmed by the Department of Public Works and
Highways was of no moment. The action of petitioners up to the point where they were able to
secure an order of demolition was not condemnable but implementing the order unmindful of the
right of respondents to contest the ruling was a different matter and could only be held utterly
indefensible.

GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and HERBERT C. HENDRY v. THE
HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS and RESTITUTO M. TOBIAS GR No. 81262, DIVISION, August 25, 1989,
CORTES, J.
Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the NCC are known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of
abuse of rights, which sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's
rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice;
to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. In this case, the petitioners clearly failed
to exercise in a legitimate manner their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the right to recover
damages under Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code.The imputation of guilt without basis
and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human
conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code.

FACTS:
Restituto M. Tobias (Tobias) herein private respondent was an employee of Globe Mackay Cable
and Radio Corp (GMCRC) herein petitioner. Herbert Hendry (Hendry) herein petitioner, was the
Executive Vice-President and General Manager of GMCRC. Sometime in 1972, GMCRC discovered
fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions for which it lost several thousands of pesos.
Thereafter, Hendry ordered Tobias to take a force leave so as to have Tobias investigated. Hendry
declared that Tobias was their number one suspect in the anomaly. Thus, criminal complaints for
estafa were filed against Tobias. These charges were, however, dismissed for lack of probable
cause.Subsequently, Hendry dismissed Tobias from employment. Claiming that he was illegally
dismissed, Tobias filed a complaint for damages against GMCRC and Hendry with the RTC.
The RTC decided in favor of Tobias. On appeal, the CA affirmed. Now, GMCRC and Hendry assail the
decision of the CA. It asseverates that the dismissal of Tobias was in lawful exercise of its right.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not GMCRC and Hendry exercised lawfully their right to dismiss Tobias. (NO)

RULING:
An employer who harbors suspicions that an employee has committed dishonesty might be
justified
in taking the appropriate action such as ordering an investigation and directing the employee to go
on a leave. Firmness and the resolve to uncover the truth would also be expected from such
employer. But the high-handed treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was certainly uncalled
for. The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of
Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. The
Court has already ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an employee should not be
confused with the manner in which the right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the
dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is liable for damages to the employee. Under the
circumstances of the instant case, the petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a legitimate manner
their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the right to recover damages under Article 19 in
relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code.

SOLEDAD CARPIO, petitioner, vs. LEONORA A. VALMONTE, respondent G.R. No.

151866, September 9, 2004, SECOND DIVISION, J.TINGA

To find the existence of an abuse of right, the following elements must be present: (1) there is a legal
right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent or prejudicing or injuring
another. When a right is exercised in a manner which discards these norms resulting in damage to
another, a legal wrong is committed for which the actor can be held accountable.
In the case at bar, petitioner's verbal reproach against respondent was certainly uncalled for
considering that by her own account nobody knew that she brought such kind and amount of jewelry
inside the paper bag. This being the case, she had no right to attack respondent with her innuendos
which were not merely inquisitive but outrightly accusatory. By openly accusing respondent as the only
person who went out of the room before the loss of the jewelry in the presence of all the guests therein,
and ordering that she be immediately bodily searched, petitioner virtually branded respondent as the
thief. Her firmness and resolve to find her missing jewelry cannot justify her acts toward respondent. She
did not act with justice and good faith for apparently, she had no other purpose in mind but to prejudice
respondent.

FACTS:
Respondent Leonora Valmonte is a wedding coordinator. t about 4:30 p.m. on that day, Valmonte
went to the Manila Hotel where the bride and her family were billeted. When she arrived at Suite
326-A, several persons were already there including the bride, the bride's parents and relatives, the
make-up artist and his assistant, the official photographers, and the fashion designer. Among those
present was petitioner Soledad Carpio, an aunt of the bride who was preparing to dress up for the
occasion.

Upon entering the suite, Valmonte noticed the people staring at her. It was at this juncture that
petitioner allegedly uttered the following words to Valmonte: “Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto,
nasaan ang dala mong bag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto, ikaw ang
kumuha.” Petitioner then ordered one of the ladies to search Valmonte's bag. It turned out that after
Valmonteleft the room to attend to her duties, petitioner discovered that the pieces of jewelry
which she placed inside the comfort room in a paper bag were lost. The jewelry pieces consist of
two (2) diamond rings, one (1) set of diamond earrings, bracelet and necklace with a total value of
about one million pesos. Valmonte was allegedly bodily searched, interrogated and trailed by a
security guard throughout the evening. Later, police officers arrived and interviewed all persons
who had access to the suite and fingerprinted them including Valmonte. During all the time
Valmonte was being interrogated by the police officers, petitioner kept on saying the words
“Siyalanganglumabas ng kwarto.” Valmonte's car which was parked at the hotel premises was also
searched but the search yielded nothing.

Valmonte filed a suit for damages against her praying that petitioner be ordered to pay actual,
moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees.
The trial court dismissed Valmonte’s complaint for damages. CA ruled differently opining that
Valmonte has clearly established that she was singled out by petitioner as the one responsible for
the loss of her jewelry. Hence, this petition

ISSUE:
W/N Respondent is entitled to damages
RULING:
Incorporated into our civil law are not only principles of equity but also universal moral precepts
which are designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience and
which are meant to serve as guides for human conduct. First of these fundamental precepts is the
principle commonly known as “abuse of rights” under Article 19 of the Civil Code. It provides that
“Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.” To find the existence of an abuse of right,
the following elements must be present: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in
bad faith; (3) for the sole intent or prejudicing or injuring another. When a right is exercised in a
manner which discards these norms resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for
which the actor can be held accountable. One is not allowed to exercise his right in a manner which
would cause unnecessary prejudice to another or if he would thereby offend morals or good
customs. Thus, a person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his
right, that is when he acts with prudence and good faith; but not when he acts with negligence or
abuse. Complementing the principle of abuse of rights are the provisions of Articles 20 and 21 of
the Civil Code.
In the case at bar, petitioner's verbal reproach against respondent was certainly uncalled for
considering that by her own account nobody knew that she brought such kind and amount of
jewelry inside the paper bag. This being the case, she had no right to attack respondent with her
innuendos which were not merely inquisitive but outrightly accusatory. By openly accusing
respondent as the only person who went out of the room before the loss of the jewelry in the
presence of all the guests therein, and ordering that she be immediately bodily searched, petitioner
virtually branded respondent as the thief. True, petitioner had the right to ascertain the identity of
the malefactor, but to malign respondent without an iota of proof that she was the one who actually
stole the jewelry is an act which, by any standard or principle of law is impermissible. Petitioner
had willfully caused injury to respondent in a manner which is contrary to morals and good
customs. Her firmness and resolve to find her missing jewelry cannot justify her acts toward
respondent. She did not act with justice and good faith for apparently, she had no other purpose in
mind but to prejudice respondent. Certainly, petitioner transgressed the provisions of Article 19 in
relation to Article 21 for which she should be held accountable.

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and

MARILOU T.GONZALES, respondents. G.R. No. 97336, February 19, 1993,
THIRD DIVISION, J. DAVIDE, JR.

The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. This
notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept
of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of
moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute
books. Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied-in a breach of promise
to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction

FACTS:
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid
trial court a complaint for damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their
agreement to get married. She alleges in said complaint that petitioner courted and proposed to
marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they would get married; they therefore
agreed to get married after the end of the school semester, which was in October of that year;
petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in Bañ aga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure
their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with
him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living with him; a week before the
filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated and
threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries, during a
confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the
complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him
anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private
respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of
not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees
and costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable.
The lower court applying Article 21 of the Civil Code ruled in favor of respondent. The CA affirmed
the decision in toto.

ISSUE:
W/N Article 21 is applies to the case at bar
RULING:
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. Congress
deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it
so. This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to
expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for
the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically
enumerate and punish in the statute books. In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21,
We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate
cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise
thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof
that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme
or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual
act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry
but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation
which followed thereafter.

It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy. In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the
petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that
made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and
sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on
appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him
preparatory to their supposed marriage." In short, the private respondent surrendered her
virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral
seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its example earlier adverted to.
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied-in a breach of promise to
marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction.

Cecilio Pe, et al. v. Alfonso Pe L-17396, May 30, 1962

FACTS: A married man, who was the adopted son of a relative of a girl’s father and who had the same
family name as the girl, became very close to the girl and her family. In fact, the members of the family
considered him as one of them. In 1952, the man thus frequented the house of the girl (Lolita) on the
pretext of desiring to teach her how to pray the rosary. The two eventually fell in love, and met each
other in clandestine trysts, over the objections of the family. One day in 1957, the man wrote Lolita a
note asking her to have a date with him. Lolita went to him. Her parents, brothers, and sisters now sue
the defendant under Art. 21.

HELD: The Supreme Court, applying Art. 21 ruled that indeed he, a married man, has seduced Lolita
through an ingenious and tricky scheme, to the extent of making her fall in love with him. Verily, he has
committed an injury to Lolita’s family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.
He was, therefore, ordered to pay P5,000 as damages and P2,000 as attorney’s fees, in addition to the
expenses of the litigation.