NATIONAL LAW INSTITUTE UNIVERSITY BHOPAL

THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AND A GROWING

LEGITIMATION CRISIS

POLITICAL SCIENCE PROJECT

ACADEMIC YEAR 2017-2018

SUBMITTED TO: SUBMITTED BY:

Dr. Raka Arya Rohit Makwana

PROFESSOR (POLITICAL SCIENCE) 2016BALLB111

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....................................................................................................................3

INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................................4

PRE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY ERA.........................................................................6

CLASSIFICATION OF STATES UNDER THE NPT................................................................................8

DISTRIBUTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.........................................................................................11

THREE PILLARS OF NPT................................................................................................................13

THE NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES AND ARTICLE VI NPT..............................................................15

ASYMMETRY OF RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES UNDER THE NPT.............................................19

THE NPT, LEGITIMATION CRISES, AND AUTHORITY.....................................................................23

CONCLUSION..................................................................................................................................24

BIBLIOGRAPHY...............................................................................................................................25

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 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Professor Raka Arya for cultivating my interest in international relations by
interweaving current issues with broader points of political study through class discourse. This
project would not have been possible without her guidance and insight particularly with regard to
the highly informative class lectures and the invaluable course material which helped me gain a
well-rounded understanding of the concept of legitimation crisis and its practical relevance.

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 INTRODUCTION
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (henceforth, referred to as ‘NPT’) entered into force in
March 1970 with the objective of seeking to inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons
technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to further the
goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. With a total of
189 state-parties, this treaty, which contains the only binding commitment to nuclear
disarmament in a multilateral treaty is considered as one of the most comprehensive statements
on international nuclear regimes and the politics that govern them after it was observed to act as
a catalytic agent for the en masse nuclear disarmament in the First World. More countries have
adhered to the NPT than any other arms limitation and disarmament agreement, such as the
Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, the GA: Committee I
(General Assembly: Disarmament and International Security Committee) resolutions regarding
guerrilla warfare, ICBMs (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles), tear gas, general arms control,
SALWs (Small Arms and Light Weapons), along with other nuclear weapon and energy specific
treaties such as the Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty). This in itself is a testament to the Treaty's significance.

Despite a massive success in containing and preventing the outbreak of a nuclear arms race,
today, the nuclear regime is widely perceived to be in crisis. While part of this crisis has to do
with direct challenges to the regime posed by the illicit nuclear programs of North Korea and
Iran, from the perspective of much of the developing world, the issues facing the
nonproliferation regime are overwhelmingly about the justice and fairness of the regime’s norms,
rules, and procedures. In this respect, it would be difficult to identify a modern-day security
regime where equity issues are more central to debates about its future. This becomes
particularly relevant because of the three regimes for controlling weapons of mass destruction
(chemical, biological, and nuclear), it is in the nuclear regime that issues of justice and fairness
appear most critical to long-term sustainability and viability.

At the core of the crisis is the fundamental asymmetry of the NPT and looming doubts among
nonnuclear states about whether this situation is destined to be permanent. Nonnuclear states
have long castigated the double standard embedded in the treaty that permits the five “declared”
nuclear states to possess nuclear weapons but denies such weapons to the majority of the world.
In contrast, the nuclear powers, for their part, have generally seen the primary problems of the
regime to lie in the weakness of the rules and enforcement mechanisms surrounding dual-use
technology, which have allowed states such as Iran and North Korea, and earlier Iraq and Syria,
to pursue nuclear weapons clandestinely under the veil of the treaty.

Being the ultimate maintainer of status quo in nuclear politics, which can be seen as a
microcosmic representation of international politics, this argued bias is severely detrimental to
the objectives of the NPT in the sense that it questions the legitimacy of the treaty thereby giving
rise to a legitimation crisis. This project shall attempt to critically analyse the NPT with the

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intention of ascertaining the existence, and if so the extent of the bias towards status quo in its
provisions and thereby, ascertaining if a legitimation crisis – as explained by Habermas – does or
shows great possibility to exist.

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 PRE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY ERA

In order to understand the significance of the NPT, we shall first make use of a timeline to
understand the developments that resulted in and out of the NPT.

Pre- 1950s

July 1945: US tests its first nuclear bomb “Trinity” at Alamogordo, New Mexico.

August 1945: US drops atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan.

1946: US promotes the Baruch Plan in an attempt to restrict the spread of nuclear weapons and
“internationalize the use of nuclear energy”

1950s

July, 1957: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) comes into existence with the
mission of promoting and overseeing the peaceful use of nuclear technology based on President
Eisenhower’s call for the creation of such an agency in his 1953 “Atoms for Peace” proposal. 

October, 1958: Ireland proposes the first resolution at the United Nations to prohibit the “further
dissemination of nuclear weapons.” 

1960s

December, 1961: The UN General Assembly unanimously approves Resolution 1665, which is
based on the 1958 Irish draft resolution. This resolution formed the basis of the NPT.

1962: The Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrates the serious threat posed by nuclear arms and their
proliferation prompting the US and the USSR to undertake serious diplomatic measures

March, 1963: Rising risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons amongst nations was noted by US
after a secret Department of Defense memorandum assessed that eight countries (Canada, China,
India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Sweden, and West Germany) would likely have the ability to produce
nuclear weapons within 10 years. The study also calculated that, beyond 10 years, the future
costs of nuclear weapons programs would diminish and that several more states would likely be
able to pursue nuclear weapons, especially if unrestricted testing continued. The risks of such
proliferation, which the existing nuclear powers sought to curtail or prevent, largely served as an
impetus for drafting the NPT.

June, 1968: The UN General Assembly adopts Resolution 2373, endorsing the draft text of the
nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) with a 95 to 4 vote and 21 abstentions.

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July, 1968: The NPT is opened for signature and is signed by the Soviet Union, the UK and the
US. Article IX of the treaty established that entry into force would require the treaty’s ratification
by those three countries (the treaty’s depositories) and 40 additional states.

1970s

March, 1970: The NPT enters into force with 46 states-parties.

May, 1974: India is the first non-nuclear-weapon state, as defined by the NPT, to conduct a
nuclear test.

May, 1975: The 91 states-parties to the NPT hold the treaty’s first review conference. The treaty
members decide to hold such conferences to review the implementation of the treaty every five
years.

1980s

The decade was dominated by the Cold War as tensions and the nuclear arms race heated up
between the Soviet Union and USA, leading to popular anti-nuclear protests worldwide and the
nuclear freeze movement in the United States. In this period, the NPT added 30 new states-
parties during the decade, including North Korea.

1990s

1991-1992: South Africa, China, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and France accede to the NPT in
that order.

March, 1993: North Korea announces its intention to withdraw from the NPT, but it suspends
that withdrawal on June 11, 1993.

April 11, 1995: The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 984 acknowledging the unilateral
pledges by the five nuclear-weapon states not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against
non-nuclear-weapon states-parties to the NPT.

May 11, 1995: NPT states-parties agree to the treaty’s indefinite extension. Non-nuclear-weapon
states, particularly developing countries belonging to the Nonaligned Movement, expressed
disappointment with the lack of progress toward nuclear disarmament and feared that a decision
to extend the treaty indefinitely would by default enable the nuclear-armed states to hold on to
their nuclear arsenals in perpetuity and avoid any accountability in eliminating them.

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 CLASSIFICATION OF STATES UNDER THE NPT

The NPT broadly classifies the nations of the world, as either Nuclear Weapons States (NSW) or
Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS). The importance of this distinction lies in the different
provisions for states that fall under both categories. Thus, while the states in the first category are
allowed to maintain an arsenal of nuclear weapons, trade in them, acquire them and maintain
associated research and development centres, those belonging to the second category, however,
are allowed none of these rights at present, or in the future, and if they possessed them at the
time of signing of the treaty, they are required to relinquish their armaments, retrospectively.
Apart from NSWs and NNSWs, there are those that are not signatories to the NPT that maintain
nuclear arsenals, for they have no treaty obligations prohibiting them from doing the same. They
are continuously criticized by the IAEA which requires that signatories to the NPT also do not
trade in either nuclear technology or information with them. This classification may be further
elaborated upon.

NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES

The NWSs are the five states—China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States—
officially recognized as possessing nuclear weapons by the NPT. Although the treaty legitimizes
these states’ nuclear arsenals, it also establishes that they are not supposed to build and maintain
such weapons in perpetuity. Article VI of the treaty holds that each state-party is to “pursue
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at
an early date and to nuclear disarmament.” In 2000, the five NWS committed themselves to an
“unequivocal undertaking…to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.” But for
now, the five continue to retain the bulk of their nuclear forces.

NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES

Although at the time of proposal, popular predictions of 25–30 nuclear weapon states within 20
years had been made, over forty years later only five states are not parties to the NPT while all
other states-parties ratified as NNWS. In order to achieve the NNWS status below the NPT.states
must agree to forgo developing or acquiring nuclear weapons

To this extent, a number of countries with an existing nuclear arsenal have been known to
disband them in order to join the treaty. Most notably, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine
inherited nuclear weapons following the Soviet Union’s 1991 collapse, but returned them to
Russia and joined the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states. South Africa secretly developed and
dismantled a small number of nuclear warheads and also joined the NPT in 1991. Iraq had an
active nuclear weapons program prior to the 1991 Persian Gulf War, but was forced to verifiably
dismantle it under the supervision of UN inspectors. The U.S.-led March 2003 invasion of Iraq
and subsequent capture of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein definitively ended his regime’s pursuit of

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nuclear weapons. Libya voluntarily renounced its secret nuclear weapons efforts in December
2003. Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, and Taiwan also shelved nuclear weapons programs.

STATES NOT PARTY TO NPT

There are three states that have voluntarily refrained from becoming signatories to the NPT for a
variety of reasons. These countries are India, Pakistan and Israel. While India and Pakistan
possess a legitimate and public nuclear weapons program and have never had any reservations
about the same, Israel on the other hand, pursues a nuclear policy of complete ambiguity or
opacity in order to escape any sort of legal sanction or displeasure despite belief that Israel has
been in possession of a nuclear arsenal since the late 1960s, and has thermonuclear warheads.
Based on the amount of fissile material (highly enriched uranium and plutonium), estimations of
nuclear weapons arsenal for India, Pakistan and Israel have been calculated to be between 90-
110, 100 to 120 and 75 to 200 nuclear warheads respectively.

In both India and Pakistan, nuclear power is used for military and civilian purposes, and
therefore, two-fold research is conducted. By maintaining a non-signatory stance, countries are
able to develop and test their nuclear power without any legal consequences.
Originally claiming its nuclear program to be for peaceful purposes, India first tested a nuclear
explosive device in 1974. This spurred Pakistan to work on its own secret nuclear weapons
program. This culminated in a round of public demonstrations of nuclear war capabilities by both
India and Pakistan with a round of nuclear tests in May 1998. India’s test was known as the
Smiling Buddha, at Pokhran while Chagai-I, Pakistan’s first nuclear test, was believed to be a
direct response to The Smiling Buddha. This quid pro quo incident was said to be reactionary to
the crisis in Kashmir that both countries were involved in at that point of time. It is commonly
thought that one of the primary reasons that both countries possess nuclear weapons is so that
they may act as a deterrent to each other, as well as try and maintain status quo in the SAARC.
India and Pakistan’s abstention from becoming signatories to the NPT is often seen as a mark of
protest against the bias that the NPT has towards the 5 nuclear weapons of the state, and Pandit
Jawaharlal Nehru, during the Non-Alignment Movement meetings often stated that India
becoming a signatory would probably be an acknowledgement and an acquiescence to the very
same, and no nation without true bloc alliances should kowtow to the same.

Israel, meanwhile, maintains a stance of opacity on its nuclear policy and neither accepts nor
declines the existence of their nuclear program. Israel has not publicly conducted a nuclear test,
does not admit to or deny having nuclear weapons and states that it will not be the first to
introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Nevertheless, Israel is universally believed to
possess nuclear arms. Despite public statements by Rabanik, Peres and Netanyahu that deny the
possession of any such arms, the veracity of such statements is doubtful as it is a known fact that
the U.S. is a financer to the very same, along with being a generous donor of technical know-
how, in collaboration with France and the UK. It is also commonly alleged that Israel was
responsible for aiding and abetting the Vela incident (1979), an illicit nuclear test that occurred

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in the deep southern part of the Indian Ocean, conducted by South Africa before it disbanded its
nuclear weapons program.

Apart from these countries, two other countries have also been recognized under this category:
North Korea and South Sudan. In 2003, North Korea became the first and only country to
withdraw from the NPT by revoking its rights under Article X of the treaty. This withdrawal is
however contested on grounds of legality and many countries still consider North Korea to be a
party to the NPT. Contrary to any such beliefs though, North Korea has been expanding its
nuclear weapon program and in 2006, North Korea tested its first nuclear device. Finally, South
Sudan - the world's newest state - is the only non-member state without a nuclear weapon
program. It is also the only African state outside the NPT.

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 DISTRIBUTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

CHINA: 
 About 260 total warheads. 

FRANCE: 
 About 300 total warheads. 

RUSSIA: 
 March 2016 New START declaration: 1,735 strategic warheads deployed on 521 ICBMs,
SLBMs, and strategic bombers.(Note: In March 2016, the U.S. State Department issued the
latest fact sheet on its data exchange with Russia under New START, sharing the numbers of
deployed nuclear warheads and New START-accountable delivery systems held by each
country.)

 The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) estimates: roughly 2,700 non-deployed

strategic and deployed and non-deployed tactical warheads. And 3,200 additional warheads
awaiting dismantlement.

UNITED KINGDOM: 
 About 120 strategic warheads, of which no more than 40 are deployed at sea on a nuclear
ballistic missile submarine at any given time. The United Kingdom possesses a total of four
ballistic missile submarines.

 Total stockpile is estimated up to 215 warheads.

UNITED STATES:
 March 2016 New START declaration: 1,481 strategic nuclear warheads deployed on 741
ICBMs, SLBMs, and strategic bombers.

 FAS estimates 2,570 non-deployed strategic warheads and roughly 500 deployed and
non-deployed tactical warheads.

 In May 2016 the Defense Department announced that as of September 30, 2015, the
United States possessed 4,571 active and inactive warheads. (Note: This number does not
include warheads awaiting dismantlement.)

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 The State Department announced in April 2015 that approximately 2,500 warheads are
retired and await dismantlement.

INDIA:

 Between 100-120 nuclear warheads

PAKISTAN:

 Between 110-130 nuclear warheads.

ISRAEL:

 An estimated 80 nuclear warheads, with fissile material for up to 200.

NORTH KOREA:

 Estimated to have material for approximately 6-8 plutonium based warheads as of 2016.

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 THREE PILLARS OF NPT

The legally-binding nuclear document consists of eleven articles that are generally interpreted as
being based upon three main pillars:

• Non-proliferation: preventing of the further spread and/or transfer of nuclear weapons and
technologies, or the expansion of existing arsenals;

• Disarmament: furthering the goal of achieving nuclear, and general and complete disarmament;

• Nuclear energy: recognizing the right of states to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and
promoting international cooperation.

NON-PROLIFERATION

This has been defined under Articles I, II and III. In essence, these Articles prohibit member
states from supplying or receiving nuclear devices, or assisting others in their development or
fabrication (Articles I and II) and stipulates that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
must safeguard and inspect responsibilities for NNWS governing their nuclear facilities (Article
III).

The five NWS as recognized by the NPT: China, France, Russia (assumed the obligations and
rights originally conferred to the Soviet Union), UK and US are required to not transfer "nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices" and "not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce"
a NNWS to acquire nuclear weapons. NNWS parties in turn must agree not to "receive,"
"manufacture" or "acquire" nuclear weapons or to "seek or receive any assistance in the
manufacture of nuclear weapons". NNWS parties also agree to accept safeguards by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify that they are not diverting nuclear energy
from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

The five NWS parties have made undertakings not to use their nuclear weapons against a non-
NWS party except in response to a nuclear attack, or a conventional attack in alliance with a
Nuclear Weapons State. However, these undertakings have not been incorporated formally into
the treaty, and the exact details have varied over time.

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DISARMAMENT

Article VI commits member states to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures
relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on
a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control”.

This Article represents the only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of
disarmament by the NWS and to someday achieve the conditions for a halt to the production of
nuclear weapons, and treaty on general and complete disarmament that liquidates, in particular,
nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles from national arsenals. That said, the wording of the
NPT's Article VI arguably imposes only a vague obligation on all NPT signatories to move in the
general direction of nuclear and total disarmament, which would mean that it does not strictly
require all signatories to actually conclude a disarmament treaty. Rather, it only requires them
"to negotiate in good faith." This was most correctly noted by the the International Court of
Justice (ICJ), in its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
issued on the 8th of July 1996 which unanimously interpreted the text of Article VI as implying
that "There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations
leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control."
This opinion notes that this obligation involves all NPT parties (not just the NWS) and does not
suggest a specific time frame for nuclear disarmament.

PEACEFUL USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY

This objective of the NPT is most accurately summarized in Article IV of the NPT which
recognizes the “inalienable right of NNWS to research, develop and use nuclear energy for non-
weapon purposes” The third pillar allows for and agrees upon the transfer of nuclear technology
and materials to NPT signatory countries for the development of civilian nuclear energy
programs in those countries, as long as they can demonstrate that their nuclear programs are not
being used for the development of nuclear weapons. This is based on the understanding that very
few nuclear energy states would be practically willing to abandon the use of nuclear energy in its
entirety and so, provides states with the possibility to do the same, but under conditions intended
to make it difficult to develop nuclear weapons.

From this aspect, the treaty recognizes the inalienable right of sovereign states to use nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes, but restricts this right for NPT parties to be exercised "in
conformity with Articles I and II".

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 THE NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES AND ARTICLE VI NPT

The nuclear-weapon states can also be fairly criticized for failing to fulfill their obligations under
Article VI, which requires measures toward eliminating nuclear arsenals. It is fashionable these
days to claim that there is no connection between the presence of nuclear weapons in the five
nuclear-weapon states recognized under the NPT and the desire by other countries to proliferate.
Although it is undoubtedly true that the existence of nuclear weapons in the nuclear-weapon
states is not the sole motivator of a proliferator, the presence of such weapons and the attitudes
toward them cannot help but have an impact on the decision of a non-nuclear-weapon state to
change its nuclear status. To the extent that nuclear weapons are seen by the nuclear-weapon
states as central to their strategic posture and foreign policy, the message being sent to the world
is that the commitment to Article VI is a sham, and that nuclear weapons bring international
prestige and other benefits.

Those who claim that Article VI has only a tenuous relationship to the health of the NPT should
recall the hard fact that the early proposals for the NPT were being aggressively attacked by
India and others as being unacceptably discriminatory in favor of the five nuclear-weapon states.
The addition of Article VI to the treaty blunted these attacks and allowed the treaty to go
forward, albeit without the Indians, who would not give up their right to make nuclear weapons.
Moreover, the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 was predicated in part on assurances of
continued commitment by the nuclear-weapon states to Article VI.

Although the vast majority of non-nuclear-weapon states evidently see sufficient value in their
membership in the NPT to give the nuclear-weapon states a wide berth in carrying out their
disarmament obligations, a substantial part of every NPT Review Conference is devoted to the
subject of Article VI. Complaints about the failure of the nuclear-weapon states to satisfy their
obligations have been rising with each successive conference, aided in part by a 1996 unanimous
opinion of the International Court of Justice that “[t]here exists an obligation to pursue in good
faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects
under strict and effective international control.” Unfortunately, the court did not define what is
meant by “good faith,” so it has been easy for the nuclear-weapon states either to ignore the court
or claim that their actions are in keeping with the goal of a nuclear-disarmed world.

To be sure, the end of the Cold War has ended the nuclear arms race between the United States
and Russia, has resulted in a reduction of the number of nuclear weapons in existence, and has
started the shutdown of fissile material production in the United States and Russia. START has
brought down the number of deployed strategic warheads to 6,000 (from a level of 10,000 each
for the United States and Russia), and the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT)
approved by the U.S. Senate on March 6, 2003, sets a goal for the two states of deploying no

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more than 2,200 warheads a piece by December 31, 2012. In addition, as a result of parallel
unilateral reductions by the United States and Russia, total U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons
have been reduced by nearly 90 percent.

All these happy facts do not present a complete picture of compliance with Article VI. For
example, under SORT the United States will be storing rather than dismantling thousands of
warheads removed from active deployment, thereby allowing fast redeployment whenever
desired. 

Additionally, the United States will still maintain large numbers of nonstrategic warheads.
Of course, it is not only the United States that is hedging on progress toward fulfillment of
Article VI. Russia will also be able to store rather than destroy strategic warheads, and it
currently deploys at least an estimated 3,500 nonstrategic nuclear weapons. In addition, Russia
has thousands more undeployed tactical nuclear weapons. As for the other weapon states, neither
France nor the United Kingdom has given any indication that they would be prepared to reduce
their own nuclear stockpiles commensurate with reductions undertaken by the United States and
Russia. China, despite claiming to support the opinion issued by the International Court of
Justice, has embarked on a substantial program of modernization of its nuclear weapon systems
and is expected to add to its stockpile of warheads. This may be motivated in part by India’s
nuclear buildup, plans by the United States to build ballistic missile defenses, and reports that
Taiwan may be interested in such defenses. However, it is unhelpful in the quest for progress on
Article VI. 

Most unhelpful of all are some policy decisions made by the Bush administration in the wake of
the 2000 NPT Review Conference, given the longtime U.S. leadership role on nonproliferation
efforts and contemporary U.S. military dominance. 

Recall that at the previous review conference in 1995, which unanimously approved the
indefinite extension of the NPT, the nuclear weapons states agreed to strengthen the NPT review
process and pursue specific principles and objectives for nuclear nonproliferation and
disarmament. In a follow-up to this agreement at the 2000 conference, the nuclear-weapon states
elaborated and strengthened the principles adopted in 1995. In particular, they agreed to an
“unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals,” along
with 13 “practical steps” to fulfill their earlier pledge for systematic and progressive efforts to
implement Article VI. Although the United States signed on to these steps at the 2000
conference, it has now reversed field and backed off a number of provisions, to wit:

Provision 1: The Bush administration has said it will not resubmit the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty to the U.S. Senate for ratification. The Senate rejected ratification in 1999 during the
Clinton administration. Because 44 countries designated as nuclear-capable states must ratify the
agreement, and neither India, Pakistan, nor North Korea has signed it while 10 others have

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signed but not ratified, the treaty is effectively dead regardless of the U.S. position. Although the
United States is maintaining its moratorium on testing, it is keeping alive the possibility of
testing if its stockpile deteriorates or officials believe that circumstances demand it. In addition,
the United States is considering the development of new low-yield nuclear weapons and other
new nuclear warheads with the intended purpose of attacking bunkers or other tough targets. The
development of such weapons might require testing for effectiveness.

Provision 5: SORT allows for the return to operational service of warheads that have been
removed and stored, ostensibly to take care of the possibility that some operational warheads
may need replacement on grounds of safety or reliability. Unlike previous U.S.-Russian treaties,
SORT is missing a key element of irreversibility, provisions requiring the destruction of
launchers for nuclear-tipped missiles. Also, the treaty’s invocation of “unforeseen changes in the
global security environment” has been cited as undermining the pledge of strict adherence to the
principle of irreversibility.

Provision 7: The United States has officially withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to
pursue nationwide missile defenses and has abandoned START II and START III in favor of
SORT. Among other things, this rescinds START II’s prohibition of multiple warheads on
missiles—multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles—and allows for storage rather than
destruction of warheads or delivery vehicles.

Provision 9(d): Although the currently ongoing storage and retirement of warheads fulfills the
letter of this provision, the fact that remaining strategic warheads are still on high alert presents
an unnecessarily dangerous situation. 

Provision 9(e): The Bush administration’s nuclear posture review projects retention of nuclear
weapons for the indefinite future, and the administration is also looking at new types of weapons
for new missions. For example, a key administration policy document unveiled in January 2003,
NSPD-17, more formally raises the possibility of using nuclear weapons to retaliate for a
chemical or biological weapons attack.

Whether the nuclear-weapon states, and particularly the United States, are in violation of their
Article VI commitments depends on how one defines “good faith.” The stated U.S. position is
still one of support for the NPT and for Article VI, but there is no question that the reversal of
the pledges made at the 2000 conference are serious matters deserving serious consideration in
world councils. Undoubtedly, the next NPT review conference in 2005 will devote considerable
attention to this issue. There is a tendency in some circles to deride all the attention given to
Article VI because it is seen by some as a utopian fantasy with no real prospect of
implementation in any time frame of relevance to the next few generations. Critics also point out

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that India, Pakistan, and Israel have nuclear weapons but are outside the NPT and therefore have
no Article VI obligations, but this should be a reason to find a way to bring those outliers into the
nonproliferation regime, not a reason to abandon the Grand Bargain that made the regime
possible in the first place.

Nonetheless, critics of Article VI have a point based on the behavior of the nuclear-weapon
states. It is certainly the case that the nuclear-weapon states give lots of lip service to Article VI
but do not appear to be making any significant security decisions that are driven by their
obligations under it. Does this matter if there are no resulting near-term defections from the NPT
by non-weapon states? I would argue that it does. The security issue that is now at the top of
everyone’s agenda, namely, international terrorism, will be affected eventually by policy
decisions that are relevant to the goals of Article VI. Can nuclear weapons protect us against
terrorists? If not, how prudent is it to possess indefinitely arsenals of nuclear weapons when
terrorists are known to be seeking them?

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 ASYMMETRY OF RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES UNDER THE NPT

With regard to the NPT, the governance challenge is how to balance the legitimate demands of
developing countries for access to nuclear technology with the legitimate interest of the
international community in controlling the spread of nuclear weapons. With regard to this,
however, there exists a disparity in the access and use of technology. The basic elements of the
regime require that the NWS agree not to share military nuclear technology, while NNWS agree
not to acquire nuclear arms. This asymmetry is supported by a “bargain” at the core of the
regime: in exchange for the agreement of the NNWS to forgo nuclear weapons, the nuclear-
armed states agree to pursue disarmament in good. The regime is thus one of formal inequality
with regard to the military uses of nuclear energy as it essentially permits five countries to
possess nuclear weapons for some unspecified length of time while the rest must abstain.

Although, international rules need not be exactly equal in their requirements, this is provided that
there exists a principled basis for the inequality. In the NPT, that principled basis is the so-called
grand “bargain” between the haves and the have-nots: nonproliferation for most states,
disarmament for the five declared nuclear powers. These inequities inherent within the regime
were tolerated during the special circumstances of the cold war, but after the end of the cold war
the NNWS became impatient to see more progress on obligations under Article VI. At the 1995
NPT ExConf, the Principles and Objectives document specified for the first time that the goal of
the treaty is to actually “eliminate all nuclear weapons, not just to negotiate in good faith”. Since
then, criticism of the failure of the NWS to pursue their disarmament obligations has been a
feature of every single meeting of the NPT. The most prominent paradigms of this inequity have
been enlisted below:

The non-possession norm vs. the norm of sovereign equality: As noted earlier, the non-
proliferation regime enshrines a norm of nonproliferation (non-possession) for a majority of
states of the world while permitting the five declared nuclear powers to possess nuclear weapons.
This asymmetrical arrangement violates the bedrock principle of equal rights to security, self-
defense and self-help (which include the possession of weapons) which all sovereign states are
entitled to. Thus while in Article I, NSWs undertake “not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive
devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-
nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons”, it is widely
believed that the United States routinely violates Article I in its cooperation with Israel's nuclear
program. Similarly, under Article II, the obligation falls on the NNSWs to refrain from
“receiving the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly;
not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other

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nuclear explosive devices.” This effectively ensures that the NNSWs will never break out of
status quo, and that World War era politics remain intact, when in reality, they are of little
relevance in light of the rise of the G-4 and the G-8 and the modernization of the Third World
and Tiger Economies.

Inspection norm vs. sovereignty: A credible non-proliferation regime requires relatively

intrusive inspections of nuclear facilities known as the ‘safeguards system’. It opens a state’s
domestic activities in nuclear technology to international scrutiny and comment, with the
attendant economic burden of inspections and the risk that proprietary information could be
revealed. Under the nuclear regime, all the nuclear facilities of a NNWS are subject to required
safeguards while in contrast, for the NWSs, participation in safeguards is voluntary and only a
tiny fraction of their facilities are inspected. This is particularly problematic in light of the fact
that all other chemical and biological weapons treaties subject all parties to identical bans and
requirements and to the same verification procedures.

Universality vs. particularism: The NPT regime aspires to universality, that is, all states should
be party to its norms. Yet the nonnuclear states perceive that some countries—India and Israel,
both of which are nuclear powers outside the NPT regime— get favorable treatment, while Iran,
an NPT member, is treated harshly for trying to do more or less what Israel and India have done.
These cases of “nuclear exceptionalism” undermine the ability of the regime to deal with non-
compliance, sending the message that different rules apply to different states.////Thus, over the
years the NPT has come to be seen by many Third World states as “a conspiracy of the nuclear
'haves' to keep the nuclear ‘have-nots’ in their place”. This argument has roots in Article VI of
the treaty which says “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in
good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date
and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict
and effective international control.” As this ‘obligation’ has been expressed is in plain language
here, it must be noted that the the Article in itself has no binding effect upon the NSWs. This is
particularly visible from US policy post 1970 in line with its obligations under Article 6: US
simply has not complied and has expressed no intention of ever complying with this article. As a
result of this, there has been disappointment amongst the NNSWs with the limited progress on
nuclear disarmament, where the five authorized nuclear weapons states still have 22,000
warheads between them and have shown reluctance to disarm further.

From this analysis, it may be concluded that there exists an inherent bias towards the NWSs with
regard to the duties and provisions under the NPT. This inherent asymmetry in capacities
amongst the NSWs and the NNSWs introduces a particularly strong compartmentalization
between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’ which adversely affects the legitimacy of the treaty as
whole. This shall be further analysed in the proceeding section.

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At the first meeting of the current NPT review cycle in May 2012, the 12-nation
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Initiative grouping (all of whom are non-weapon states)
proposed a reporting format that represented their judgement of what is required to make an
informed assessment of relative progress in meeting the treaty’s disarmament commitment. The
proposed format sought information on the number, types, and status of nuclear warheads held
by the weapon states; the number and types of delivery vehicles; specific information on
warhead and delivery system dismantlement and reductions; and the amount of fissile materials
(plutonium and highly enriched uranium) that are the key ingredients for nuclear weapons
produced for military purposes.

The International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) (of which the authors are all members)
offered its own recommendations for nuclear weapon states reporting in its Global Fissile
Material Report 2013: Increasing Transparency of Nuclear Warhead and Fissile Material
Stocks as a Step toward Disarmament.

For their part, the five NPT nuclear weapon states duly submitted their respective national
reports to the 2014 Preparatory Committee session and proclaimed their satisfaction with “the
achievement of … consensus on a common reporting framework.” Examined objectively,
however, these “achievements” offer little to crow about. In fact, it is likely that non-weapon
states at the NPT Review Conference will be significantly dissatisfied with these weapon-state
national reports. 

The only things common to the national reports provided by the nuclear weapon states in 2014
were their tables of contents. The five reports differed significantly in terms of structure,
reporting categories, and substance. While there are actual numbers and types of deployed forces
included in some reports, in others the descriptions lack the qualitative or quantitative specificity
that would permit comparative analysis. (See the IPFM report card on these five national reports
above.)

The Chinese report, for example, cites comments from Chairman Mao Zedong regarding the
“small number of atomic bombs” that China will produce and asserts that “China’s nuclear
arsenal is very limited in scale and is kept at the minimum level required for its national
security.” This is an affirmation that provides precious little insight into Chinese nuclear arsenals
or disarmament intentions, particularly given that Mao died nearly 40 years ago.  Fissile material
stockpiles are not addressed at all.

Russia’s report yields a few more numbers, but does not really provide a basis for assessing
contemporary action on nuclear disarmament. The report reiterates the limits set on strategic
nuclear forces by various arms reduction agreements over the decades and claims that “Russia’s

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non-strategic nuclear capability is no more than 25 per cent of the level of capability which the
USSR possessed in 1991.”  This seems an impressive sounding statement, but lacks sufficient
information to arrive at an answer as to current levels of these weapons. As for fissile materials,
Russia reported only that “[b]ack in 1989, our country ceased to produce highly enriched
uranium for nuclear weapons. Since 1994, Russia has not made plutonium for nuclear weapons.
The last reactor producing weapons-grade plutonium was stopped in the middle of 2010.”  No
mention is made either of historical or current stockpiles of fissile material.

Britain and France announced no significant new information in their 2014 reports, choosing
only to repeat previously declared upper limits on their nuclear arsenals. Britain reported that
"[t]oday we have fewer than 225 warheads, all of a single type" and that "[w]e have committed
to reducing this maximum stockpile to no more than 180 by the mid-2020s, with the requirement
for operationally available warheads at no more than 120." France reported that it "possesses a
total of less than 300 warheads" and “no non-deployed weapons. All its weapons are operational
and deployed.” Neither country reported on the size of national fissile material stockpiles. 

The United States offered more details, but here, too, there was a lack of complete and timely
information. The United States declared the number of nuclear weapons it held as of September
30, 2013 (the total stockpile of nuclear warheads declared to be 4,804). But, it reported
additionally a stockpile of “many thousands of nuclear warheads” that were retired and in the
dismantlement queue. The United States also reported its holdings of fissile materials, declaring
the size of stockpiles both of plutonium and of highly enriched uranium—but as of 2009 and
2004, respectively.

The NPT reports by the weapons states share a tendency to use reference points situated long in
the past to hide a reality: The pace of reductions and destruction of nuclear warheads has slowed
considerably between the two nuclear superpowers, and reductions by the other weapon states
are not transparent. Further, the nuclear weapon states are largely silent about any future nuclear
reductions and about the size and disposition of their fissile material stockpiles. The absence of
accurate, up to date, and complete information and standardized reporting categories obscures
the facts about disarmament by nuclear weapons states, both for other NPT states and for the
public

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 THE NPT, LEGITIMATION CRISES, AND AUTHORITY.

The concept of a legitimation crisis was first introduced by Jurgen Habermas in his book by the
same name, the ‘The Legitimation Crisis’ in 1973. According to Habermas, a legitimation
crisis is an identity crisis that results from a loss of confidence in administrative institutions,
which occurs despite the fact that they still retain legal authority by which to govern. In other
words, it is an input crisis that occurs when the legitimation system does not succeed in
maintaining the requisite level of mass loyalty; an identity crisis in which administrations are
unable to establish normative structures to the extent required for the entire system to function
properly. Legitimacy crises are most easily characterized by the loss of public confidence in the
regime.

With reference to the NPT regime, this loss of confidence as has already been explained
previously has been made increasingly vocal at the various review conferences stating that the
NPT regime was unfair and at a risk of total collapse. Critics – mainly the NNWSs argue that
security in the nuclear realm cannot be achieved unilaterally but requires taking into account the
security requirements of others. That is, arms control agreements can only be durable when they
balance the essential concerns of all parties, avoiding enhancing the national security of some at
the cost of others, and are mutually beneficial. Further, such agreements run on the basis of
mutual obligations and rights. Without addressing the inherent bias towards the NWSs, the
legitimacy of the NPT was continuously being corroded.

These unaddressed grievances about inequities in the regime have real consequences for
outcomes: nonnuclear states that actually support the NPT are reluctant to agree to additional
nonproliferation obligations that would strengthen the regime, including stronger safeguards,
strengthened provisions on withdrawal from the treaty, and proposals regarding multinational
fuel cycle arrangements. Further, the nuclear powers are unable to get the NNWS to care more
about the noncompliance of Iran and North Korea, the issue of most importance to the United
States and its allies. Not all of this unwillingness can be traced to the nuclear powers’ foot-
dragging on disarmament, of course. Security threats or economic interests may also play a role
in the reluctance of nonnuclear states to take on new obligations. Nevertheless, the evidence is
strong that nonnuclear states withhold cooperation on nonproliferation because proposed new
measures are perceived to impose unfair obligations, not because such measures would be
ineffective.

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 CONCLUSION

This project has characterized how the NPT is more of a puppet regime in the hands of the
NWSs so that, despite its lofty ideals regarding the complete non-proliferation and disarmament
of nuclear weapons, it acts more as an instrument in the hands of the original five nuclear power
wielding countries to maintain their supremacy in terms of nuclear power.

This bias has been increasingly demonstrated against by the other parties (the NNSWs) who
claim that the provisions of the treaty are inherently biased towards the NSWs and thus, isn’t
unfair. These arguments and criticisms have led to a general fall in the legitimacy of the entire
regime starting from the backing out of North Korea and a number of state-parties voicing
increased interest in also leaving the party following suit of North Korea to adopt a non-aligned
policy such as Pakistan and India.

The NPT which rests supremacy in the hands of the 5 NWSs is an example of an attempted effort
to morph traditional authority into rational-legal authority. However, due to the unfairness in its
procedures, this has met with a legitimacy crisis that threatens its very authority. This project
concludes that in order to retain this legitimacy, there needs to be a greater emphasis that is laid
on disarmament to end the expectation that the NWSs are subject to certain privileges and
thereby prevent the fostering of insecurity and instability.

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 BIBLIOGRAPHY

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPTtext.shtml

Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, [1996] ICJ Reports
226

British American Security Information Council (BASIC) reports

www.armscontrol.org

Justice and Fairness in the Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime, Nina Tannenwald

Habermas, Jurgen. Legitimation Crisis. Beacon Press, 1975.

Quora.com

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