McNeill Heidegger

Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal
Volume 14, Number 2 -Volume 15, Number 1,1991
Porosity: Violence and the

Question of Politics in Heidegger's
Introduction to Metaphysics
Willialll McNeill
"Then it spoke to me again without voice: 'What do you

matter, Zarathustra? Speak your word and shatter!'"
- Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra,
"The Stillest Hour"l
The year is early 1935. Heidegger, lecturing on Hölderlin's hymns

"Germania" and "The Rhine" since the autumn of1934, has set himself
the task ofrevealing the historical Dasein ofthe German people (Volk)
via an interpretation of Hölderlin's poetry. For Hölderlin is the "poet of
the Germans."2 This poet knows, as Heidegger himself must surely
have known by now (the distance of a year can indeed be sobering),
that "Nothing is more difficult to learn than the free use of the
national."3 The struggle for the free use of "the national" requires that a
people engage in the intimate conflict between their endowment (das
Mitgegebene)-a ghostly shadow, to be sure4-and what is allotted them
as a task (das Aufgegebene). In the case of the Germans, this means
confronting the Greek experience of being, their "raging proximity to
the fire of the heavens" (GA39 , 292). And Heidegger concludes the lec-
ture course on a cautious if somewhat ominous note:
The hour of our history has struck. We must first take our endow-
ment into pure safekeeping (Verwahrung) again, but only in order
to grasp and take hold ofwhat is allotted us as a task, i.e., to ques-
tion our way towards and through it. The violence of beyng (Die
Gewalt des Seyns) must first really become a question again with
regard to our ability to apprehend it. (GA39, 294)
It is almost superfluous to mention that the thematic and mood of
the entire course could hardly be more politically charged. And yet
Heidegger, discussing the history of the German people, feels it neces-
sary to insist that what is at issue is:
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... 'politics' in the highest and proper sense (im höchsten und
eigentlichen Sinne), so much so that whoever effects anything here
has no need to talk ofthe 'political'. (GA39, 214)
Such aremark would only seem to confirm what we already know:
that Heidegger has little or nothing to say of politics, nothing to say
about the essence of political activity. Yet Heidegger does talk of the
political-and not just after 1945, in his retrospective comments on the
events ofthe war years and his involvement in those events. No: it is in
the very same year, in the summer semester of 1935, that Heidegger
feels compelled to break his silence on this subject. Why this change of
tack? Like Nietzsche before hirn (and he was undoubtedly very much
involved with Nietzsche at this time), Heidegger was acutely aware of
the risk in breaking one's silence. And one might here be tempted to
assurne that there was a sudden change of mood on Heidegger's part.
However, reflection upon the above quotation readily shows that
Heidegger, in the Hölderlin course, had already talked, was already
talking of the political even in not talking about it, even in his attempt
to think politics in the sense indicated. And that, likewise, in the sum-
mer semester of 1935, Heidegger will talk not-precisely not-of the
political, but of politics in the highest and proper sense.
Now this talk of politics, I believe, occurs in 1935 as a risking oneself
into and in the ambiguity of language-a risk which corresponds to the
discovery of the f.lEAOs of Ianguage as Dichtung. The risk of an ambigu-
ity which is neither "fallen" nor "inauthentie," no more than the 'politi-
ca!' referred to here is simply being opposed to the "proper" or "authen-
tic" (eigentlich) sense of politics. Such a thesis-which I will defend at
greater length elsewhere5-faces the abyssal, perhaps unfathomable,
difficulty of the power structures operative in such a risk, of the vio-
lence (Gewaltsamkeit) inherent (as Heidegger was only too weIl aware)
in all interpretation. 6 This present essay is underway to posing such
questions. What is this "highest and proper sense" of politics for
Heidegger at this specific hour of German history? What hour are talk-
ing about here? What does Heidegger understand by politics in 1935?
And what does this issue have to do with the violence ofbeing?
Heidegger's aversion to the word 'politics' goes back a long way. In his
Introduction to Being and Time, he lists aseries of questions concerning
human existence in order expressly to differentiate them from the funda-
mental ontology of Dasein: the questions of philosophical psychology,
anthropology, ethics, "politics," poetry, biography, and historiography.7 It
is indeed conspicuous that of these categories of existentiell interpreta-
tion, politics is the one that stands out: it is the only one that Heidegger
suspends in scare quotes. This seems to indicate, if not a priority or
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MCNEILIlPOROSITY: VIOLENCE AND THE QlJESTION OF POLITICS
privileging, at least a certain danger: the word 'politics' names the realm
whose thematic, already in 1927, seems most questionable.
Eight years later in 1935-two years after the Rectorial Address and
some twelve months after his resignation as rector of the University of
Freiburg-such danger must have been haunting Heidegger. So far as I
am aware, it is in the lecture course of the summer semester of 1935,
entitled Einführung in die Metaphysik-a seminal course in the unfold-
ing ofthe question ofbeing itself-that the question ofpolitics is explic-
itly confronted for the first time. It is here, in the Introduction, too, that
we find the meditation called for on the "violence ofbeing." And, at this
point, I wonder whether the evident suspension of the word 'politics' in
1927 perhaps already presages the possibility of an other politics. That
is, is there perhaps a certain continuity traceable between the displace-
ment of politics in Being and Time and Heidegger's caution with that
term in 1934-35? To substantiate this suspicion would entail a lengthy
series ofreflections on metaphysics, fundamental ontology, and meton-
tology, which lie beyond the scope ofthis essay.
The reading presented here of the Introduction, which is often
regarded (along with the Rectorial Address) as Heidegger's "Nazi" text
par excellence, does not attempt to deny the presence of aNational
Socialist discourse in this text and of a language which, on the surface,
cannot but seem dangerously sympathetic to, if not entirely in complic-
ity with, the Third Reich. However, I shall attempt to question the
place and rhythm-the measure-of that discourse with respect to the
unfolding ofthe question ofthe "violence" ofbeing in the Introduction. 8
Is there such a measure on earth? Presumably not. Yet perhaps it is to
be found alongside (bei) the earth, in and through the place of human
existence. In this essay, I shall try to stake out this place and shall do so
by focusing on the dis-placing of the question of politics in general. What
are the dangers of that question? Between what scare quotes must the
word 'politics' be(dis-)placed?
As an initial response to this question, I shall concentrate here on
attempting a close reading ofHeidegger's interpretation ofthe 1tOAtc: in
the Introduction. The scope of my essay is modest; its role merely
preparatory. In particular, I shall not comment on Heidegger's inter-
pretations of the political elsewhere,9 nor shall I consider the conse-
quences of such a conception of politics. Finally-and this is important,
for a satisfactory appraisal of the issue would have to take such mat-
ters into account-I will not have room here to comment on the overall
unfolding of the course, nor even to consider in detail the general con-
text in which the political question is raised (namely, the discussion of
the traditional opposition between thinking and being). Instead, I shall
confine my interpretation to the immediate context-Heidegger's read-
185
ing of the first chorus of Sophocles' Antigone-and its declared aim,

namely, a clarification of the Greek experience of human existence
which is to be "decisive" (EM, 133) and to open up a "concealed directive"
(EM, 156) for Heidegger's own meditation on the essence ofthe human.
~Etvov the Violent

Before considering Heidegger's interpretation, we should first listen
to his translation of the chorus lO :
Vielfältig das Unheimliche, nichts doch

über den Menschen hinaus Unheimlicheres ragend sich regt.
Der fährt aus auf die schäumende Flut
beim Südsturm des Winters
und kreuzt im Gebirg
der wütiggeklüfteten Wogen.
Der Götter auch die erhabenste, die Erde,
abmüdet er die unzerstörlich Mühelose,
umstürzend sie von Jahr zu Jahr,
hintreibend und her mit den Rossen
die Pflüge.
Auch den leichtschwebenden Vogelschwarm
umgarnt er und jagt
das Tiervolk der Wildnis
und des Meeres einheimisch Gerege
der umher sinnende Mann.
Er überwältigt mit Listen das Tier,
das nächtigt auf Bergen und wandert,
den rauhmähnigen Nacken des Rosses
und den niebezwungenen Stier
mit dem Holze umhalsend
zwingt er ins Joch.
Auch in das Getöne des Wortes
und ins windeilige Allesverstehen
fand er sich, auch in den Mut
der Herrschaft über die Städte.
Auch wie er entfliehte, hat er bedacht,
der Aussetzung unter die Pfeile
der Wetter, der ungattigen auch der Fröste.
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MCNEILUPOROSITY: VIOLENCE AND THE QUESTION OF POLITICS
Überall hinausfahrend unterwegs, erfahrungslos ohne Ausweg

kommt er zum Nichts.
Dem einzigen Andrang vermag er, dem Tod,
durch keine F'lucht je zu wehren,
sei ihm geglückt auch vor notvollem Siechtum
geschicktes Entweichen.
Gewitziges wohl, weil das Gemache
des Könnens, über Verhoffen bemeisternd,
verfällt er einmal auf Arges
gar, Wackeres zum anderen wieder gerät ihm.
Zwischen die Satzung der Erde und den
beschworenen Fug der Götter hindurch fährt er.
Hochüberragend die Stätte, verlustig der Stätte
ist er, dem immer das Unseiende seiend
der Wagnis zugunsten.
Nicht werde dem Herde ein Trauter mir der,
nicht auch teile mit mir sein Wähnen mein Wissen,
der dieses führet ins Werk.
(EM, 112-113; Antigone, lines 332-375)11
I shall not take it upon myself here to attempt a translation of
Heidegger's translation: a futile aspiration, since precisely the latter is
the focus ofmy interest here. Indeed, it could be shown that Heidegger's
translation ofthe word &lVOV names nothing other than the problem of
translation as SUCh. 12
Heidegger's reading, which he claims is "of necessity inadequate"
(EM, 113), is also extremely complex-indeed, it is among his most diffi-
cult. The interpretation falls into three phases, each of which relates to
the others and each having its own internal structuring. The first
phase attempts to highlight the theme structuring and permeating the
whole chorus. Already in this phase, the analysis must bring to light, in
a preliminary manner, the entire realm opened up by the poetizing.
This realm will then be delimited more precisely in the second phase
with respect to human existence. The third and final phase will
attempt "to gain a stand in the middle ofthe whole, in order to weigh up
who the human being is according to this poetic saying" (EM, 113-114).13
The analysis comprising the first phase of the interpretation itself
falls into three parts corresponding to what Heidegger identifies as the
three essential moments of the chorus that leap out at uso Together
these moments articulate the whole that permeates and sustains the
chorus, and in their unity "shatter from the outset all everyday mea-
sures of questioning and determining" (EM, 114). At stake, then, is a
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GRADUATE FAClJLTY PHILOSOPHY JOURNAL
radical displacement of questioning itself, insofar as the latter remains

determined by the measures of everydayness. This displacement is in fact
none other than that intimated in the unfolding of the basic question of
metaphysics with which the lecture begins. No less important-in respect
ofthe ambiguity ofthe language ofthe Introduction-is the displacement,
indeed, the shattering, of the everyday measures ofdetermining.
At each point of the interpretation, Heidegger's analysis keeps in
view the whole of the realm to be delimited. The movement of the anal-
ysis thoughtfully transforrns and circumscribes this whole with every
step, whence its density. Thus, the meditation on the first of the three
moments describing the initial phase of the interpretation already
opens up the essential moments of the whole theme. According to this
first moment, the human being is identified "in one word" as 'to ÖE1VO-
'tu'tOV, which Heidegger translates as das Unheimlichste and which I
shall translate-for reasons that will become apparent-as "the most
unhomely."14 This word, Heidegger states, grasps the human being in
terms of "the most extreme limits" and the "sudden abysses" of his or
her existence (EM, 114).
Heidegger immediately follows his translation of 'to ÖE1VO'tU'tov not
with any attempt to justify it, but by clarifying it within the perspective
of an inexplicit preview (Vorblick) of the whole song, the preview guid-
ing his interpretation. In what does this preview consist? Heidegger
outlines it as folIows:
The Greek word ÖEtVOV is ambiguous in that unhomely ambiguity
with whieh the saying of the Greeks fathoms the eounter-turning
eonfrontations of being (die gegenwendigen Aus-einander-setzungen
des Seins). (EM, 114)
The ambiguity of ÖE1VOV is no straightforward ambiguity, for this
ambiguity, as such, is "unhomely" and in this unhomely ambiguity, an
ambiguity in which it is not at horne, ÖE1VOV is ambiguous. ~E1VOV is
caught by an un-homely double fold of ambiguity.
The first fold that catches ÖE1VOV becomes visible in the naming of
ÖE1VOV as "the frightful" (das Furchtbare):
~EtVov is the frightful in the sense of the overwhelming prevailing

(des überwältigenden Waltens) that in the same way eompels panie
terror, true anxiety, and gathered, silent awe oseillating in itself.
(EM, 114-115)
For an appropriate understanding of Heidegger's interpretation of
ÖE1VOV given here, it is essential to see that ÖE1VOV is nothing other than
a word for the being ofbeings, for being itselfin its essential relation to
beings as a whole as such, with particular regard to how this relation
occurs as the Da of Dasein, of the being of the human being who stands
188
in the midst of beings. Only from here can we begin to think how &tvov
"compels (erzwingt) in the same manner" those kinds of attunement
which for Heidegger mark key moments in the epochal disclosure of
being's history. In addition to fear (Furcht), three attunements are
named here: terror (Schrecken), anxiety (Angst), and awe (Scheu).15 The
reference to these indicates, first, that the interpretation of ÖEtVOV
demands to be thought in terms of Heidegger's Aus-einander-setzung
with being itself; and, secondly, the way in which (at a level of supreme
complexity) the whole of the realm of this confrontation is implicitly
assembled in this preliminary determination of ÖEtVOV. For this single
sentence already thinks the double fold of ÖEtVOV.
According to this first essential determination, ÖEtVOV means the
frightful in the sense of the overwhelming prevailing (des überwälti-
genden Waltens). It is primarily in this respect, therefore, that we must
think the compelling determination of ÖEtVOV. We can already see that
in the prevailing that holds sway in the overwhelming there occurs a
certain excess of prevailing, an Über-wältigen, an excess that compels.
But how are we to understand ÖEtVOV as the overwhelming? Heidegger
states:
The violent, the overwhelming is the essential character of prevail-
ing itself. (EM, 115)
The overwhelming means the essential character of prevailing
(Walten)-"prevailing" here being thought in terms of <\>ucrtt: as the
being of beings as a whole. As overwhelming prevailing, ÖEtVOV, the
frightful, is das Gewaltige: the violent. The word das Gewaltige indi-
cates, no doubt, that in this violence of excessive prevailing there reigns
a certain gathering of prevailing, a gathering of being itself. In accor-
dance with the counter-turning confrontations in which being speaks in
the Greek tragedy, ÖEtVOV as the essential character of prevailing thus
shows a certain ambiguity insofar as it involves a counter-turning gath-
ering and excess.
The first fold of the twofold counter-turning of gathering and excess
refers to the being of beings as a whole. The second meaning of ÖEtVOV
is also given as "the violent" (das Gewaltige), but this time:
...in the sense ofthe one who needs to use violence (Gewalt braucht),
not merely has violence at his order (über Gewalt verfügt), but is
actively violent (gewalt-tätig) insofar as needing to use violence is the
basic trait not only ofhis actions, but ofhis Dasein. (EM, 115)
LlEtVOV as the violent is now being thought with respect to the being
of human beings, in terms of the human essence as Dasein.
Gewaltbrauchen can mean both to use and to need violence. I shall here
render it as "needing to use violence." In this second twist of ambiguity,
189
the human as ÖE1VOV not only has violence at his order, but, at the same
time, needs violence: he both holds order over and needs a certain vio-
lence, a certain gathering of prevailing. Heidegger hyphenates the word
Gewalt-tätigkeit, violent activity, to indicate that neither the need for
violence nor even the human's use of violence (in the sense of having
violence at one's disposal) are here to be thought in terms of the every-
day understanding ofviolence, according to which it means 'roughness',
'wantonness', 'disturbance', and 'injury'. For in that case, violence would
be understood in terms of that realm in which beings themselves were
the measure of the human, of that realm in which, accordingly, from
the perspective of relations between human beings "agreement on par-
ity and mutual provision fumishes the measure (Maßstab) of Dasein."
Whereas, it is a matter ofthinking the activity ofviolence in its "meta-
physical" significance as the ambiguous relation of Dasein to the violent
gathering ofprevailing. The violent is to be determined as.the decisive
characteristic of the human's relation to being itself in the prevailing of
beings as a whole, and not simply one's relation to other beings.
Corresponding to this doubly ambiguous determination of OE1VOV
(OE1VOV as the overwhelming and OE1VOV as the one who is actively vio-
lent), Heidegger then introduces a third determination: the human
being (der Mensch) is ÖE1VOV on the one hand as the actively violent
one, and, on the other, as exposed to the overwhelming. The latter
characteristic---exposure to the overwhelming---eannot, as I shall show,
simply be thought within the ambiguity of the second determination of
OE1VOV given by Heidegger. In truth, this "third determination," as I
have called it, is not a "third" determination at all, but is nothing other
than the hidden fold of the double fold of ambiguity, the interweaving
ofthe first two determinations of ÖE1VOV, each ambiguous in itself. This
fold is marked by a unique kind of singularity, that singularity, indeed,
which enabled both initial determinations of OE1VOV to be translated as
"the violent" (das Gewaltige). It is by the folded singularity of the vio-
lent, furthermore, that the human may be designated not merely as
ÖE1VOV, but (in one word) as to OE1VOtatOv, the superlatively violent (das
Gewaltigste):
The human being is the actively violent one not in addition to and
besides other things, but solely in the sense that, in and on the
basis of his violent activity against the over-whelming (gegen das
Über-wältigende), he needs to use violence. Because he is twice
ÖE1VOV in an originally unitary sense, he is 'to ÖE1VO'tU'tov, the most
violent (das Gewaltigste): actively violent in the midst of the over-
whelming. (EM, 115)
The superlative nature ofthe human OE1VOV is not due to a quantita-
tive increase in intensity of its violent character, but marks and brings
190
to the fore the innermost trait of ÖE1VOV: as the most violent, the human
is the most unhomely. The unhomely (das Unheimliche) as a trait of
ÖE1VOV, like the term das Gewaltige, is meant to think the relation of
the human being to being, only from another angle, as it were. More
precisely, as we shall see later, it is intended to focus on the decisive
trait ofthe violent: the fold ofthe double fold ofambiguity.
What is meant by 'the unhomely'? Heidegger defines 'the un-homely'
(das Un-heimliche) as that which throws us out of the 'homely', out of
that which is familiar in a homely way (aus dem "Heimlichen," d.h.
Heimischen), that which is habitual, ordinary, and unendangered (EM,
115-116). The distinctive characteristic ofwhat is overwhelming is to be
found precisely in the fact that "that which is not familiar in a homely
way does not let us be at horne (das Unheimische läßt uns nicht ein-
heimisch sein)" (EM, 116).16 The human as das Unheimlichste, as the
most unhomely, does not only live in the midst of(inmitten) the prevail-
ing ofbeings as a whole in such a way that he or she cannot be at horne
in and among them, but:
...as the actively violent one, exceeds the limit of what is homely
and familiar (die Grenze des Heimischen) and does so precisely in
the direction of the unhomely in the sense of the overwhelming.
(EM, 116)
We can already perceive at this point that the superlative nature of
'to ÖE1VO'tU'tov rests essentiallyon the way in which the "in the midst of'
is to be thought, since the term inmitten articulates the relation of vio-
lent activity among beings as a whole as such to being as the over-
whelming prevailing ofbeings. For already in the naming ofthe human
as the most violent, 'to ÖE1VO'tU'tov was pronounced as "actively violent
in the midst of the overwhelming" (EM, 115). And all that follows in
Heidegger's interpretation is in fact an attempt to think what is articu-
lated in the words "in the midst of," inmitten being Heidegger's favored
term (from at least 1928 on) for Dasein's relation to nature. 17
Porosity
Heidegger finds the way in which the human being exists in the
midst of the overwhelming prevailing of beings as a whole voiced in
two phrases of the first chorus of Antigone (lines 332-383), one in the
middle of the second strophe (line 359), the other at the heart of the sec-
ond antistrophe (line 370). The location of each phrase within the stro-
phe and antistrophe is identical, the two standing in perfect symmetry
to one another, and each consisting of two words which, in naming
human existence, seem to turn against one another.
The first words are nuv'tonopos änopos, located in the line nuv'to-
nopos änopos En' OUÖEV EPXE'tUl (line 359), which Heidegger translates as:
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Überall hinausfahrend unterwegs, erfahrungslos ohne Ausweg

kommt er zum Nichts.
Everywhere voyaging forth underway, without experience and with
no escape he comes to Nothing.
According to Heidegger, 1tOPOC means:
Durchgang durch , Übergang zu , Bahn.
Passage through , transition to , track.
In all encounters with beings, in all movements and activities in the
midst of beings as a whole, in all attempts to cut tracks through beings
as a whole, the human being is flung off all such tracks. This does not
happen, however, merely because the human being as the actively vio-
lent one pushes him- or herself beyond what is habitual, normal, and
homely; rather, the human being first becomes the most unhomely:
.. .insofar as, as the one who on all paths is without escape, he is now
thrown out of every relation to the homely, and ätll, ruin [or corrup-
tion: der Verderb], the disastrous (das Unheil) comes over hirn. (EM,
116)
The way in which the words 1tav'to1t0pOC ä1topoC are to be thought is
indicated by Heidegger's more detailed discussion in the second phase
of his interpretation (EM, 117f.), which attempts to "listen" to how the
being of the human being "unfolds" in the course of the strophes. I shall
here only highlight the essential moments of his interpretation.
The first strophe and antistrophe of the chorus name the realm of
the overwhelming. The overwhelming is identified as the sea, the
earth, and the animals. The human being as the actively violent one is
depicted in an emergence (Aufbruch) into the overwhelnling, a breaking
out (Ausbrechen) into the sea as "the groundless surging," which occurs
together with a breaking into (Einbruch) the prevailing of earth-the
earth as "the highest of the gods," i.e., in its proximity to the over-
whelming prevailing-and a tuming over (Umbruch) ofthe soil. Living
creatures (das Lebendige) belong within this realm of sea and earth;
they are "ordered" (eingefügt) in accord with the prevailing of the over-
whelming, and as such are trapped and mastered by humans. Together
sea, earth, and animallife constitute:
...the overwhelming in all its overwhelming violence which the one who
is actively violent lets break into openness (Offenbarkeit). (EM, 119)18
Whereas the first strophe and antistrophe name sea, earth, and ani-
mallife, the second strophe on the surface appears to move to a depic-
tion of human beings. Yet, Heidegger emphasizes-and this is particu-
larly important-that just as the first strophe and antistrophe do not
192
merely name the realm of nature in the narrow sense (but nature
(<pucrv::-) with respect to the human being's confrontation with it in its
overwhelming prevailing), so the second strophe does not merely name
the realm of the human. On the contrary, the elements named in the
second strophe-Ianguage, understanding, mood, passion, and build-
ing-belong no less to the overwhelmingly violent (EM, 119). But
whereas sea, earth, and animal life are what prevail in surrounding
the human being (den Menschen umwaltet) as he or she dweIls in their
midst, language, understanding, and attunement are wh~t prevail
through hirn or her (ihn durchwaltet) as those elements he or she must
take upon him- or herselfin order to be him- or herself. In so doing, the
human being must exercise violence and needs such violence in order to
counter their overwhelming character:
Thereby what is unhomely about language and the passions merely
conceals itself as that into which the human being is ordered (gefügt)
as historical, whereas it appears to hirn as if he were the one who
maintained order over (verfügt über) them. The unhomeliness of
these powers (Mächte) lies in their apparent intimacy and familiar-
ity. They only give themselves over to the human being directly in
their non-essence and in this way drive hirn out of his essence and
hold hirn there. (EM, 120)
The first strophe and antistrophe of the chorus focus primarily on the
sea, earth, and animallife, not simply as beings which one might inter-
pret as nature in the narrow sense of nature versus the historical, but
with respect to the overwhelming way in which they prevail. Yet, the
depiction not only evokes these beings in their overwhelming prevail-
ing-these beings which are not human beings-but highlights the
human being's confrontation with them in existing in their midst. Seen
from the midst of these beings as they prevail in surrounding (umwal-
ten) humans, this confrontation occurs as "breaking out and breaking
up, ...capture and conquest (Ausbruch und Umbruch, ...Einfang und
Niederzwang)" (EM, 118). Sea, earth, and animallife as the overwhelm-
ing let the human being "break into openness" in violent confrontation
with them (EM, 119). Heidegger says ofthis confrontation:
This breaking out, breaking up, capturing, and conquering is in
itself the first opening up of beings as sea, as earth, as animal.
Breaking out and breaking up only happen insofar as the powers
(Mächte) of 1anguage, of understanding, of attunement, and of build-
ing are themselves prevailed over (bewältigt) in violent activity. The
violent activity of poetic saying, of the project of thinking, of the for-
mations of building, of the action that creates astate, is not some
activating of capabilities that the human being has, but is a har-
nessing and ordering (Fügen) of those violent forces (Gewalten) by
means of which beings disclose themselves as such in the human
193
being's entering into them. This disclosedness of beings is that vio-

lence (Gewalt) which the human being has to prevail over (bewälti-
gen) in order first to be hirnself in violent activity in the midst of
beings, i.e., to be historical. (EM, 120)19
The seeond strophe, aeeording to Heidegger's interpretation, shifts the
foeus to the human, but only to the extent that it examines those ele-
ments belonging to the overwhelmingly violent (das überwältigende
Gewaltige) that the human being as the aetively violent one (der
Gewalt-tätige) has to prevail over (bewältigen) in order to exist in the
midst ofthe overwhelming prevailing ofbeings as a whole (EM, 119). To
exist as human in the midst of the overwhelming means to break into
that openness in whieh beings first show themselves as such.
The use ofviolent aetivity with respeet to those elements oflanguage
and attunement whieh the human being must violently eonfront is nec-
essary in order to "pave (bahnen) the ways into the beings prevailing
around hirn," and herein, says Heidegger, lies "the unhomeliness of all
that is aetively violent" (EM, 120-121). Thus eutting paths through
beings as a whole in aetive violenee, the human being is 1t<XVt01t0POs,
everywhere underway. Yet, as 1t<XVt01t0POs, the human is at the same
time cl1tOPOs, without any way out or through. In what does this cl1tOPOs
eonsist? Thus underway, 1t<XVt01t0POs, the human being is not cl1tOPOs in
the sense of meeting a baITier and being unable to proeeed. The human
being is rather &1tOPOC in being "thrown back" on his or her own paths,
in beeoming entangled in them. In this entanglement (Verfängnis),
humans beeome eaught up in semblanee and thereby shut themselves
offfrom being (EM, 121).
And yet this cl1tOPOs cannot be the most original cl1tOPOs whieh, in its
eounter-turning relation to 1t<xvt01tOPOC, must think the innermost trait
of 1tOpos. For this cl1tOPOs manifests not a eounter-turning (Gegen-
wendigkeit), but rather a turning in many direetions (Vielwendigkeit).
The human being who, underway through beings as a whole, is cl1tOPOs
in this way is preeisely not "hurled off all paths (aus aller Bahn
geschleudert)" (EM, 116), but "turns in all direetions within his own eir-
eIe (dreht sich vielwendig im eigenen Kreis)" (EM, 121).20 This implies a
failure to engage with that eounter-turning whieh belongs to the deep-
est kind of cl1tOpos. For the human being, in violent eonfrontation with
and passage through beings as a whole, is the most unhomely:
... not merely by the fact that as the actively violent one he drives
hirnself beyond what is homely für hirn [for this already occurs in
the first experience of &1t0P0l;], in all this he first becomes the most
unhomely insofar as he is now-as the one who on all his ways is
without escape-thrown out of every relation to the homely and &'t11,
decay, the disastrous comes upon hirn. (EM, 116; emphasis added)
194
MCNEILlJPOROSITY: VIOLENCE AND THE QUESTION OF POLITICS
In this deeper sense of ä1topos, human beings are not entangled in

their own paths and ways, they are not thrown back (zurückgeworfen;
EM, 121) upon them, but "thrown out" (herausgeworfen) of"every" rela-
tion to the homely. The word ä1topoc, in its relation to 1tUVt01t0POs is
thus ambiguous. What is this second sense of ä1topos? It lies in the
experience of the Nothing, of death. For the violent activity over which
the human being as 1tUVt01t0POs disposes directly shatters only against
death. Death is that un-homely thing (dieses Un-heimliche; EM, 121) that
casts us once and for all out of all that is homely. In the face of death, the
human being has no way out; human beings are ä1topos not simply at
the end oflife, but "constantly and essentially," as long as they exist. It is
as this ä1topos before death that humans in their essence exist:
So far as the human being is, he stands with no way out in death.
Thus Da-sein is un-homeliness itselfin its happening. (EM, 121)
How are we to understand this essential happening of human exis-
tence? To do so, we must first return to the initial phase of Heidegger's
interpretation and consider the second counter-turning characteriza-
tion of the human being in the Antigone chorus.
The Politics of TExvll

According to this second characterization, the human being is
u'lli1tOAls ä1tOAls; these words appear in the middle of the second anti-
strophe and are symmetrically placed vis-a-vis the words 1tuvt01t0POs
ä1topos. However, this designation, Heidegger teIls us, "speaks in
another direction of beings" (EM, 116), in thinking the human not in
terms of 1tOpOs, but with regard to 1tOAls. As the ground or basis of
human existence--of Dasein-1tOAls, on Heidegger's reading, does not
simply mean the city-state or state:
Rather, 1tOAtc; means the place (die Stätte), the "there" (das Da),
wherein and as which Da-sein is as historical. The 1tOAtc; is the
place of history, the Da, in which, out of which, and for which his-
tory happens. To this place of history there belong the gods, the
temples, the priests, the festivals, the games, the poets, the
thinkers, the ruler, the council of elders, the people's assembly, the
armed forces, and the ships. (EM, 117)
What makes the poets and thinkers political, just as much as the
rulers and the people's assembly, is not simply that they enter into a
concrete relation with statesmen and the business ofthe state:
Rather, those named are political, i.e., at the place ofhistory, in, for
example, the poets only, but then really being poets, the thinkers
only, but then really being thinkers, the priests only, but then
really being priests, in the rulers only, but then really being rulers.
195
Being-this means, however: needing to use violence as ones who

are actively violent, and coming to tower in historical being as cre-
ators, as active ones. Towering within the place of history, they
become at the same time &1tOAll;, without city or place (ohne Stadt
und Stätte), lone-some (Ein-same), un-homely ones, without escape
in the midst of beings as a whole, at the same time without statute
or limit (ohne Satzung und Grenze), without edifice or order (ohne
Bau und Fug) , because as creators they must in each case first
ground all this. (EM, 11 7)
Heidegger is here describing the nature of the Greek 1tOAls. According
to this interpretation, to be political means to need to use violence in
being actively violent, and to become towering within the 1tOAls as the
place in which history happens-to become, that is, U'tfl1tOAls. Yet to
become U'tfl1tOAls means simultaneously to become ä1tOAls, without his-
torical place, un-homely, and lone-some, without escape in the midst of
beings as a whole. At this point, however, it must be asked whether
this being without escape and this un-homeliness of the human being
with respect to the 1tOAls is equivalent to either of the two senses of
ä1topos, given that the interpretation provided in the chorus here
"points in a different direction." In order to think the sense ofhaving no
way out that pertains to the 1tOAls itself, we must-just as in the case of
ä1topos-ponder the counter-turning in the relation U'tfl1tOAls ä1tOAls.
For this purpose, it is important to recognize that, in the counter-turn-
ing that characterizes being political, both U'tfl1tOAls and 1tOAls belong to
and are being thought in terms of the nature of the creators (die
Schaffenden), the ones who are active (die Täter). To understand the
counter-turning that marks the innermost trait of the political, we
must therefore first ask what Heidegger means by creators.
The essence of creating is explicated by Heidegger in his analysis of
the second antistrophe, which he provides in the second phase of his
interpretation. The realm of creative activity of the one who is actively
violent is named in the chorus by the words tO ~axavoEv, which
Heidegger translates as Machenschaft, "machination." The essential
trait of tO ~axavoEv is tEXVll, which for Heidegger means primarily nei-
ther 'art', 'skill', nor 'the technical', but a kind ofknowledge-not a the-
oretical knowledge, or Erkennen, but Wissen. The kind of knowing per-
taining to tEXVll is "being able to set being into the work as the being of
a being that in each case is thus and thus (das Ins-Werk-setzen-können
des Seins als eines je so und so Seienden)" (EM, 122). The Greeks think
of art in terms of tEXVll not because the work of art is something pro-
duced or made, says Heidegger, but because the artwork "ef-fects (er-
wirkt) being in a being." To ef-fect means to bring being as <\>Ucrls, pre-
vailing emergence, to shine in that which appears. The work is thus the
opening up ofbeings as such, that which provides their measure:
196
MCNEILIlPOROSITY: VIOLENCE AND THE QUESTION OF POLITICS
Through the artwork as being in being (das seiende Sein), all that
otherwise appears and can be found, first becomes confirmed and
accessible, interpretable and understandable, as a being or else as a
non-being. (EM, 122)
It is crucial to realize here that this apparent privileging of art does
not mean that all beings are to be measured according to the work of
art in the narrow sense. Rather, because the artwork in the narrow
sense "brings being to a stand and to shine forth in the work as a being
(das Sein im Werk als Seiendes zum Stand und Vorschein bringt)," the
word 'art' can be used as a translation of tEXVll "pure and simple
(schlechthin)" (EM, 122). TEXVll as the know-how of being able to set to
work is the "opening ef-fecting being in beings," "beings" here precisely
not referring to the artwork in the narrow sense.
TExvll, as the entire realm within which the actions ofthe actively vio-
lent one occur, characterizes this activity as creative. The discussion of
tExvll primarily thinks the activity of the creator with respect to the work
as a being. But in order to effect the work as a work, i.e., in order to set
being into the work as a being, the violent activity ofthe creator needs to
use violence against being, "for violent activity is needing to use violence
against the overwhelming" (EM, 122): The creator must "do battle"
(Erkämpfen) in order to bring being-which until now has been closed off
(verschlossen; EM, 122)-into appearance in the work. 21 This "against"
(gegen) belongs to the very essence of that creating which marks the
counter-turning (Gegenwendigkeit) inherent in the 1tOAtc: as such.
The overwhelming, that against which the violent activity of the cre-
ator turns, is identified by Heidegger, in a word, as ÖtKll, which like tO
J..laxaVOEv appears in the second antistrophe of the chorus. As in the
case of 1tOAtc:, Heidegger resists the conventional translation of ÖtKll as
"justice," insisting that a juristic or moral interpretation of the term
robs the Greek word of its metaphysical weight. Heidegger, in under-
standing ÖtKll as being, as the overwhelming prevailing of <puatc:, trans-
lates it as fügender Fug: the ordering order (EM, 123).22
~tKl1, as the overwhelming, and tExvll, as active violence, thus corre-
spond to the two senses of ÖEtVOV outlined in the first phase of
Heidegger's interpretation. The inter-relation of these two, the original
unitary ambigl1ity of ÖEtVOV, is what characterizes the human as tO
bEtvotatov: the most violent one, the superlatively un-homely one (EM,
123). This inter-relation between the two senses of ÖEtVOV, the way in
which tfxVll turns against ÖtKll, also belongs to the essence ofthe creator.
How is this inter-relation to be thought? The way in which tEXVll and
ÖtKll stand over against (gegenüber) one another is not to be conceived as
the opposition oftwo things at hand (vorhanden), but as consisting:
197
...rather in the fact that t€XV11 irrupts (aufbricht) against 8t1<:11 ,

which, for its part as order (Fug), maintains order over (verfügt über)
aB t€xv11. The mutual "over against" is (Das wechselweise Gegenüber
ist). It is only insofar as the most unhomely, the being ofthe human,
happens in the human being's essential prevailing as history (indem
der Mensch als Geschichte west). (EM, 123)
In the breaking out or irruption of tExvll against ÖtKll, the two unean-
23
nily turn against and somehow towards one another, against and into
one another, and this turning, this eounter-turning, is the happening of
the most unhomely as history.
The essenee of the human as tO ÖEtvotutov is to be found in the
inter-relation between the human being's violent aetivity and the pre-
vailing of the overwhelming, in the irruption of tEXVll against and
towards ÖtKll. This irruption, however, distinguishes the aetivity of the
ereator as the ef-feeting of being in the work. The ereator is the one
who is politieal, who dweIls in the 1tOAtt: as the plaee of history where
the essenee of the human being as Da-sein happens. I1oAtt: names the
plaee in whieh the eonfrontation between tEXVll and ÖtKll oeeurs as the
happening of human existenee, of the being of the most unhomely one.
The happening of tO ÖEtVOtUtOV must therefore be thought in terms of
the 1tOAtt:.
The ereator, the one who dweIls in the 1tOAtt:, exposes him- or herself
to the eonfrontation between tEXVll and ÖtKll, and, in this eonfrontation
as the happening of history, the ereative is tO ÖEtVOtUtOV, the most
unhomely one. Dwelling in the 1tOAtt: at the same time entails being
unhomely, ä.1tOAtt: (EM, 117). The more some are ereators, the more
politieal they are, the more they stand in turmoil, in jeopardy (tOAJ.lU;
EM, 123), the more they open themselves to being ä1tOAtt::
The more towering the peak of historical Dasein, the more gaping
the abyss (Abgrund) for the sudden tumble into the unhistorical
that can only drive itself to distraction in confusion that offers no
escape and, at the same time, lacks any pIace (in der ausweglosen
und zugleich stätte-losen Wirrnis). (EM, 123)
Dasein, the essenee of the human, is the 1tOAtt:. The more the human
being enters the 1tOAtt:, beeomes u'tfi1tOAtt:, the more he finds himself
ä1tOAtt:. The essential happening ofthe 1tOAtt:, of Dasein, lies in the way
in whieh u'tfi1tOAtt: and ä1tOAtt: turn against and toward, or into, one
another. But how are we to think this ä1tOAtt:, the unhomeliness of the
politieal human being?
198
The Aporia of the Political

According to Heidegger's interpretation thus far, the 1tOAlt: is the Da
in which human existence happens as history. The nature of the politi-
cal, of the political activity of the human being, must then be inter-
preted in terms of the 1tOAlt: as the place of history. 'Politics' can then
no longer be thought of merely as that realm of human activity con-
cerned with the running and administration of the city-state or state.
But before considering positively what this dis-placement of politics
involves, we must first try to gain a clearer understanding of what is
meant by the 1tOAlt: as the place of history. My interpretation will here
follow in two parts: first, I shall examine the essence of the 1tOAlt: more
closely by focusing on the counter-turning, the Gegenwendigkeit announced
in the words U'lfl,1tOAlt: cX1tOAlt:. I shall do this via a brief exposition of the
third phase of Heidegger's reading of the Antigone chorus, which implic-
itly brings together everything presented in the first two phases. Second,
I shall point beyond what is explicitly said by Heidegger, in attempting
to follow through the implications of the counter-turning ambiguity
characterizing the 1tOAlt:.
(1) The Counter-turning Essence of the nOAlt:: Heidegger's inter-
pretation proceeds, as noted, in such a way that each of its three phases
always keeps the whole of human existence, as depicted in the chorus, in
view. The three phases "each go through the whole ofthe chorusfrom a
different perspective each time" (EM, 113). The first phase looks at those
words that carry the entire force of the chorus. These words come to
light in the threefold characterization ofthe human being as !O &lVO!U-
!OV, as 1tUV!01tOpot: cX1tOpot:, and as U'Ifl,1tOAlt: cX1tOAlt:. The second phase
works through the sequence of strophes and antistrophes and delimits
"the whole realm" opened up by the chorus (EM, 113). This second phase
mentions neither the words 1tUV!01tOpot: cX1tOpot: nor U'Ifl,1tOAlt: cX1tOAlt:
explicitly, but begins by providing an interpretation ofthe way in which
the human being exists in the midst of beings as a whole. It then pro-
ceeds to highlight the fundamental trait of !O ÖElVO!U!OV in terms of the
inter-relation between !EXVll and ÖtKll, which Heidegger finds intimated
in the final strophe. Yet, ifthis second phase delimits the whole realm of
the chorus, it must certainly point to the force of what is to be thought
in the words 1tUV!01tOpot: cX1tOpot: and U'lfl,1tOAlt: cX1tOAlt:.
The third phase ofHeidegger's interpretation seeks to gain a stand in
the middle of the whole chorus, in order to assess how it depicts the
essence of the human being. As in the second phase, it contains no
explicit mention of human being either as 1tUV!01tOpot: cX1tOpot: or as
U'Ifl,1tOAlt: cX1tOAlt:, but confines itself to interpreting the essence of !O
&lVO!U!OV, which is to be found in the "counter-turning relation" (gegen-
199
wendiger Bezug) of 'tExvll and ÖtKll. Phase three goes decisively beyond
what has been explicated hitherto, but does so, according to Heidegger,
"only in a particular respect in accordance with our proper task and,
indeed, only in a few steps" (EM, 124). These few steps are, I shall argue,
concerned with the interpretation of the experience of &1tOAls belonging
to the essence of the 1tOAls.
The counter-turning confrontation between ÖtKll and 'tExvll happens
in the violent activity of the creator as the one who dweIls in the 1tOAls.
But the creator whose activity thus consists in bringing being to shine
in the work does not simply face the possibility of becoming &1tOAls, of
plunging into astate ofbeing "without escape and without place... : ruin
[or corruptionJ (das Ausweg- und Stätte-lose... : der Verderb)" (EM, 124);
this becoming &1tOAls does not simply rest on a failure or shortcoming
ofhuman (violent) activity. Rather, Heidegger emphasizes, such &1tOAls
happens of necessity:
...this corruption prevails and attends from the ground up in the
counter-turning ofthe overwhelming and violent activity. (EM, 124)
The necessity (Notwendigkeit) of shattering that lies in such counter-
turning, however, entails that the human being as the actively violent
one who dweIls in the 1tOAls is needingly compelled (genötigt) by being
itself as the overwhelming prevailing, because the overwhelming:
.. .needs to use (braucht) the pIace of openness [the nOAtc;] for itself
in order to shine in its prevailing [i.e., in beingsJ. (EM, 124)
The need (die Not) that speaks in this necessity (Notwendigkeit), does
not belong, in other words, to the human being, but to being itself:
Understood from the perspective of this need, the need impelled
(ernötigt) by being itself, the essence of human existence opens
itself to us for the first time. Da-sein of the historical human being
means: being posed as the breach which the overwhelming violence
of being (die Übergewalt des Seins) breaks into in appearing, so
that this breach itself shatters against being. (EM, 124)24
What is being thought in this decisive turn toward the necessity of the
shattering (Zerbrechen) of that creative violent activity which distin-
guishes the human being? Precisely in the experience that the need of
this necessity does not simply belong to human existence, but "is" the
need ofbeing itself, the essence ofhuman existence first becomes mani-
fest. If the essence of human existence is the Da of Da-sein as the his-
torical place (Stätte) of openness, and if this place is to bear the name
1tOAls, then the most original essence of the 1tOAls will only become
apparent ifwe think its relation to the &1tOAls, to that lack ofplace per-
taining to the counter-turning essence ofthe 1tOAls, in terms of a turn-
ing towards the need ofbeing itself.
200
MCNEILIJPOROSITY: VIOLENCE AND THE QUESTION OF POLITICS
For the determination of the human being as U'JIl1tOAls &1tOAls

named the essence of human existence as dwelling in the 1tOAls, the
Da. The more human beings entered and became eminent in this place,
the more they became U'Jli1tOAls, the more they were said to become "at
the same time" &1tOAls, without place (EM, 117). According to what has
been said in the third phase of Heidegger's interpretation, however,
this &1tOAls-or being without place-thought more originally, does not
arise on account of the violent activity of the creator as the human
being of the 1tOAls; it is not a consequence of 'tEXV11, but a necessity of
being itself. A1tOAls shows itselfin its most original necessity (the turn-
ing of need: Notwendigkeit) in the counter-turning relation of 'tExvll to
ÖIKll, in the counter-turning (Gegenwendigkeit) ofbeing as overwhelm-
ing prevailing, as Fug, and the violent activity ofhuman existence.
nOAls names the realm of human existence. To this realm belong, as
we have seen, those elements that prevail through human beings (das
Durchwaltende), namely, those which have to be taken on if humans
are to exist as such: language, understanding, attunement, passion,
and building. These elements-perrneating human beings-belong to
the overwhelmingly violent (das überwältigende Gewaltige; EM, 119);
they constitute the realm into which human beings are ordered (gefügt)
as historical (EM, 120). L\tKll, as overwhelming order (Fug), orders (fügt)
human beings into their historical place in the realm of that which pre-
vails through them, although it seems to human beings in their violent
activity as though they held order over (verfügt über) these elements
(EM, 120). Thus, even as human beings assume this realm in their vio-
lent activity, this ~Exvll is dependent upon ÖtKll, it needs ÖtKll and, as
such, is necessarily delivered over to the overwhelming: "for violent
activity is needing to use violence against/towards the over-whelming
(denn die Gewalt-tätigkeit ist das Gewalt-brauchen gegen das Über-
wältigende)" (EM, 122). In the violent activity of creating (of effecting
being as the overwhelming in the work as a being), in his confrontation
with being in the realm of U'JIi1tOAls, the inhabitant of the 1tOAls finds
him- or herself &1tOAls, outside the realm of mere human violent activ-
ity, insofar as the"1tOAls as the place of openness is needed and used by
being in order to appear in the work.
And, yet, this reading would miss the entire weight of Heidegger's
interpretation. To see the essential thrust of Heidegger's argument, we
must, like Heidegger's own interpretation of the Antigone chorus, go
beyond what is explicitly highlighted in the text.
(2) The Twofold Understanding of the nOAls: To what extent is
this preliminary interpretation of the 1tOAls inadequate? On the one
hand, this reading has failed to take into account the fact that in the
201
counter-turning relation of ÖtKll and 'tExvll, ÖtKll not only pervades those
elements prevailing through human existence (das Durchwaltende), but
is thought in terms ofthe overwhelming prevailing ofbeings as a whole.
The ä1tOAls that happens in the relation of 'tExvll and ÖtKll is to be
located in "the counter-turning ofthe overwhelming prevailing ofbeings
as a whole and the actively violent Dasein of the human being" (EM,
124). Being as ÖtKll does not merely turn toward the actively violent being
ofthe human being, but towards the prevailing ofbeings as a whole.
On the other hand, the interpretation we have given has neglected
the fact that the essence of human beings in the Antigone chorus is said
not only to be u't'i1tOAls ä1tOAls, but is also named in the words 1tav-
't01tOPOs ä1topos. To understand the full essence of human existence as
articulated in the chorus, we must also take this latter determination
into account.
A closer consideration shows that while 1tOAls as the essential realm
of the counter-turning of u't'i1tOAls ä1tOAls indeed primarily thinks the
realm of human existence, "not all the tracks into the realms of beings
are named, but the ground and location of the Dasein of the human
being..." (EM, 117). This determination is therefore not exhaustive. Yet,
the 1tOAls is not only the realm of human existence, but "the crossing-
point of all these tracks." The Da as 1tOAls is the place in which the
paths that the human being cuts through all realms ofbeings meet and
cross. The relation of human existence to these paths, however, was
named in the words 1tav'to1t0pOs ä1topos. In thinking the human paths
through beings as a whole, 1tav'to1t0pOs names two essential realms of
beings: on the one hand, language, understanding, attunement, passion,
and building, Le., those elements which prevail through humans-in
short, the realm ofthe historical-and, on the other, the sea, the earth,
and the animal, Le., that which prevails around human beings-in
short, nature. However, 1tav'to1topOs names neither of these realms
merely in the narrow sense, but with respect to their belonging
together in the overwhelmingly violent (das überwältigende Gewaltige;
EM, 119). Accordingly, the full essence ofthe human being, of'to ÖE1VO-
'ta'tov as articulated in the counter-turning relation of the overwhelm-
ing prevailing of beings as a whole (ÖtKll) and human violent activity
('tEXVll) demands that we think the essential crossing or intersection of
1tav'to1topOs ä1topos and u't'i1tOAls ä1tOAls. In what way do these two
determinations cross?
Sea, earth, and animal life constitute that which "prevails around
and carries, affiicts and fires the human being (den Menschen umwaltet
und trägt, bedrängt und befeuert)" (EM, 119). In violent activity, the
human being exists in the midst ofthe overwhelming prevailing ofthese
beings by breaking out and breaking up, capturing, and conquering
202
(Ausbrechen und Umbrechen, Einfängen und Niederzwingen). This, says

Heidegger, "is in itselfthe first opening up ofbeings as sea, as earth, as
animaI" (EM, 120). Human violent activity in the realm ofthe prevailing
of nature first opens up these beings as such. Yet, for the opening up of
beings as such to occur, this violent activity must, at the same time,
take on that which prevails through it:
Breaking out and breaking up happen only insofar as the powers
(Mächte) of language, of understanding, of attunement, and of build-
ing are themselves prevailed over (bewältigt) in violent activity.
(EM, 120)
Human violent activity must first confront and prevail over the over-
whelming prevailing of beings as a whole in order to disclose beings as
such, that is, in order for the human being first to be able to exist in the
midst ofbeings, to be historical (EM, 120). The human being who is thus
underway in the midst of beings as a whole, 1tavto1topO~, accordingly
needs the place ofopenness, the place ofhistory, i.e., the 1tOAt~ in which
beings are disclosed, so as to make his or her way through all realms of
beings. As 1tavto1topO~, however, he or she is at the same time ä1topo~
in not seeing the place of openness as such, but becoming entangled in
the paths in and among beings, so that the human being in this way
becomes caught up in semblance (Schein), and, thereby, "closes himself
offfrom being" (EM, 121).
Human beings first experience their need ofthe 1tOAt~ in encountering
that against which all violent activity must shatter, namely, death (EM,
121). In the face of the death in which the human being stands "con-
stantly and in his essence," no violent activity can break through. Here,
there is no 1tOPO~, no passage through, but only the ultimate ä1topo~,
where there is no way out, no escape. The aporia of this ä1topo~ belongs
to human existence: "Insofar as the human being is, he stands in death
where there is no way out" (EM, 121). In encountering this ä1topoc, the
Nothing of death, the actively violent one is cast out of all that is homely
and experiences an essential unhomeliness. The experience of the hap-
pening of this unhomeliness is at the same time an experiencing of the
need of the 1tOAt~, the entry into the 1tOAt~, becoming u'Jli1tOAt~ in enter-
ing into the place of happening of unhomeliness. In the counter-tuming
between the ultimate ä1topo~ and 1tavto1topO~, in the experience of the
happening of ä1topo~, 1tOPO~ shows its innermost trait as transition
(Übergang; EM, 116) to the place of history. From this place, indeed, it
can be seen that 1tOPO~ as transition is nothing other than this happen-
ing of history. For there belongs to this 1tOPO~ the happening of ä1topo~:
ätll, corruption (Verderb), the disastrous (das Unheil; EM, 116),just as to
the happening of 1tOAt~ there belongs ä1tOAt~: encountering no escape
203
and no place: corruption (das Ausweg- und Stätte-lose... : der Verderb;

EM, 124). nopoe: and 1tOAte: thus think the same thing.
In encountering the <l1tOpoe: of death, humans being discover that
1tOpoe:, the happening of the openness of beings, belongs to their own-
most existence. In discovering their need of 1tOpoe:, of porosity, i.e., their
need of 1tOAte: as the place of openness and of history, the realm of all
human violent activity, they simultaneously experience the need, the
lack (die Not)-what is needing-in all violent activity. For all violent
activity is needing, must shatter insofar as <l1tOpoe:, <l1tOAte: belong to
its happening. Humans being need violence-for it belongs to the hap-
pening of their existence-but all such violence is needing.
The experience of <l1tOpoe: in the face of the Nothing of death casts
the actively violent one beyond the realm of the homely in the direction
of the overwhelming prevailing of beings as a whole (see EM, 116). Flung
beyond the realm of the homely into the unhomely, in becoming
U'Jli1tOAte:, human violent activity finds itself turned against the over-
whelming. The 1tOAte: as the place of this violent activity must shatter
against this overwhelming, must become <l1tOAte:. Why? Because in the
experience of <l1tOpoe:, the turning toward and into the happening of
1tOpoe: is in itself the experience of the happening of being as the over-
whelming in the realm of the 1tOAte: of human violent activity. In this
realm, being as the overwhelming happens in that, through the violent
activity of the human being as the creative one, it announces itself and
shines in the work as a being. The happening of violent activity, the
1tOAte:, is <l1tOAte: insofar as the 1tOAte: as the place of openness is used by
being in order to shine forth in the work. The experience of being used
by the overwhelming in the counter-turning of U'JIi1tOAte: <l1tOAte:, how-
ever, is not yet the experience of this happening as need (Not). It
means, rather, one way of standing in tOAJlU, jeopardy or peril
(Wagnis), namely, as the constant threat of becoming <l1tOAte:, of being
thrown out of the 1tOAte: even to the extent of being driven into "confu-
sion without place (stätte-lose Wirrnis)" (EM, 123):
The actively violent one, the creator, who moves out into the un-said,
breaks into the un-thought, who compels the unhappened and makes
the unseen appear, this actively violent one stands at all times in
peril (tOAJ..LU, line 371). In risking a prevailing over (Bewältigung)
heing, he must take a risk with regard to the onrush of non-being, J..L1l
KaAOV, with regard to disintegration, un-constancy, lack of structural
order (das Un-gefüge) and disorder (Unfug). (EM, 123)
To see the way in which the place of openness is used by being as a
need of being itself involves a further decisive step, the one intimated in
the third phase of Heidegger's interpretation. For up to this point, the
204
shattering of violent activity in being used by being has only been seen
from the perspective of human existence in the 1t6At~. From this perspec-
tive, it shows itself as the happening of ä-1tOAt~ (in its counter-tuming
relation to i)\J1i1tOAt~). To see this happening as the need of being itself
means to see the withdrawal-the '0.-' of ä-1tOAt~-as the happening or
"history" of being itself. Hence, it is stated in the third phase: "The over-
whelming, being, in the work confirms itself as history" (EM, 125). What
does this insight entail? In the concluding section of this essay, I shall
deliberate on this, asking specifically what it entails for the being of the
human being as the dweIler of the 1t6At~. In this respect, we must go
beyond what is explicitly said by Heidegger.
"Only Poets..., Only Thinkers..."

The 1t6At~, the Da, is the place ofhistory (Geschichte), says Heidegger:
.. .in which and as which [my emphasis] Da-sein is as historical.
The 1tOAtt: is the place of history, the Da, in which, {rom out o{
which, and tor which history happens. (EM, 11 7)
Following what has already been said, however, the 1t6At~ is not simply
the pIace in which and as which the happening of Dasein as human
existence happens, but is the place in which and as which existence
itself happens as history. For the 1t6At~ is the place of openness in
which all paths through all realms of beings cross, and the word 1to.v-
'to1t6po~ names both the realm of the human and that of nature as
belonging to being itself, to the overwhelmingly violent. Happening as
the 1tOA1C, the human being stands in, or better, happens as the midst
of the overwhelming prevailing of beings as a whole. In this happen-
25
ing, human activity is finite, confined to the violent activity which dis-
tinguishes humans as creative. The human being is actively violent to
the extent of using and needing being: the violence (Gewalt) used is
taken from being as the violent (das Gewaltige; EM, 115). The knowing,
or 'tExvll, pertaining to human violent activity is ''being able to set being
to work as the being of a being that is in each case thus and thus" (EM,
122). In his work-like activity on a particular being:
...the knower (der Wissende) forges into the midst ofthe order (Fug),
tears (reißt) being into beings, and yet is never able to prevail over
the overwhelming (das Überwältigende zu bewältigen). (EM, 123)
If, however, the 1t6At~ is not merely the happening of human exis-
tence, but the pIace ofhappening ofbeing itself, and ifthis very happen-
ing is itself withdrawal, then the human being's ultimate inability to
prevail must be nothing other than the withdrawal ofbeing itself. Being
itself, however, is thought with respect to the overwhelming prevailing
205
of beings as a whole. In the withdrawal of being in the prevailing of

'tExvll with respect to the work, there lies a withdrawal ofbeings as such
and as a whole. The astonishing implication of Heidegger's interpreta-
tion is that this withdrawal-the experiencing of eX'tll (decay and cor-
ruption), the disastrous (das Unheil), the onrush of non-being (J.lll
KUAOV), disintegration, un-constancy, lack of structural order (das Un-
gefüge), and disorder (Unfug), in short, the superlative unhomeliness of
'to &lvo'tu'tov-is the very 1tOpoc: of nature in its intimacy with <l>UcrlC::
emerging overwhelming prevailing ofthe violent (das Gewaltige).
Because creative effecting ofthe work of art belongs to the happening
of being as the overwhelmingly violent prevailing of beings as a whole,
the work can serve as a "measure" of beings in general. Insofar as being
is effected in the work as a particular being, there occurs a refusal of the
openness ofbeings as a whole. But in coming to shine in the work, being
shows itself precisely as this refusal or withdrawal. In the shining of
this refusal in the artwork, in the shining of the work not as a being, but
(named in a preliminary way) as "das seiende Sein," ''being in being," the
work proclaims that being which is thus effected in it never belongs
solely to the preserve of human existence. The work is never simply the
result ofhuman activity, ofpure 'tExvll. What is brought into the work is
precisely the happening ofthe "in the midst of' (inmitten), ofhistory: tl~e
happening ofthe openness ofbeings. The work is thus measure:
Through the artwork as being in being (das seiende Sein), every-
thing that otherwise appears and is discovered, first becomes con-
firmed and accessible, interpretable and understandable as a being
or else as a non-being. (EM, 122)
A non-being (das Unseiende) does not mean that which simply is no
being at all, but that which belongs to beings as a whole in the very
withdrawal of this "as a whole."26 The actively violent setting of being
into the work thus responds to the need or refusal of being itself so as
"thereby to hold open beings as a whole" (EM, 125), namely, in their
possibility of appearing in the 1tOAlC:. Here, it becomes evident that the
withdrawal that necessitates the setting ofbeing into the work is not in
the first place the need of the human being, but that of being itself as
the overwhelming which "needs to use (braucht) the place of openness
for itselfin order to appear in its prevailing" (EM, 124).
The effecting ofbeing itselfin the work holds open beings "as beings"
(EM, 122) and holds them open as a whole (EM, 125), not in the sense
that it provides an ultimate ground for them, bllt only insofar as this
happening of violent activity maintains- the 1tOAlC: as the open place or
site (Stätte), the porosity of a history in which beings can appear. The
happening ofthis history, however, is thought by Heidegger as the hap-
206
pening ofbeing itself as withdrawal. In the insight that this history, as

the need for violent activity, is the need not of human beings, but of
being itself, the possibility emerges that the human being in his violent
activity may turn not simply against (gegen) being itself as withdrawal,
but simultaneously towards (gegen) this excess ofprevailing ofthe over-
whelming as such. In the experience of such twofold counter-turning
(Gegenwendigkeit) of violent activity and the overwhelming, of tEXVll
and ÖtKll, the human being first becomes visible as tO ÖE1VOtUtOv.
Where does Heidegger's meditation on this ä-nopoc of tO &lVOtUtOV
leave us? In turning towards the need ofbeing's withdrawal, the human
being turns around to dweIl in the nOAls as the nopos of history. But his
or her dwelling is that of the most un-homely one (das Un-heimlichste).
no
AB dwelling in the Als, as political, human beings are "only poets, only
thinkers..." (EM, 117). What does this 'only' mean? The 'only' refers pre-
cisely to the withdrawal ofbeings as a whole and as such in the aporetic
happening of the nopos that the nOAls itself iso Commensurate with the
twofold ambiguity of &lVOV, this 'only' must be thought on two levels:
first, as the human being's becoming finite, his or her factical finitude in
each case with respect to every other being (whether fellow humans or
"nature" in the narrow sense); second, this finitization, which corresponds
to the violent activity of tExVll, must nevertheless be thought not in ternls
ofbeings, but in terms ofthe finitude ofbeing itself(ÖtKll), as the need or
withdrawal of being. Third, however, the decisive step of Heidegger's
interpretation consists in thinking these two senses of finitude (of the
"only") in one, as the uncanny singularity of ambiguous &lVOV: tO ÖE1VO-
1'(x1'OV, the counter-turning of 1'EXVll and ÖtKll. My claim is that 1tOPOC
names precisely such singularity. As the historical site of the counter-
turning of tEXVll and ÖtKll, politics in the "highest and proper" sense is
thus conceived by Heidegger as what I would call a ''politics ofporosity."
The experience of this counter-turning is the acknowledgment of the
risk of tOAJ.1U as such, of the tOAJ.1U of risk. Is such risk not the risk that
Heidegger himself takes here, in this work, in speaking of politics?
Awareness ofthis risk qua risk entails acknowledgment ofthe necessity
of shattering that attends in all creative knowing. Creative knowing, or
tEXVll, as the potentiality for setting being into the work (das Ins-Werk-
setzen-können des Seins) is a potentiality thoroughly attended by a
fatality, adestiny. In the light of such recognition, the created work
shows itself as "something disordered," more terrible still as "that
crapJ.1u," that heap ofmanure or dung heap (Misthaufen).27 In his desire
for the unheard of, the violent creator:
...casts aside all help. Downgoing (Der Untergang) is for hirn the
deepest and most far-ranging "yes" to the overwhelming. In the shat-
tering (Zerbrechen) ofthe wrought work, in that knowledge that it is
207
something disordered and that O'ap~a (dung heap), he leaves the

overwhelming to its order (Fug). Yet all this... singularly (einzig) in
the manner ofthe setting-into-the-work itself. (EM, 125)
This acknowledgement on the part of 'to &tvo'tu'tov, the "'yes' to the
overwhelming" as Untergang, affirms the deepest pathos of the most
unhomely as that of a tragic downgoing. 28 It proclaims the ambiguous
tragedy of the Heideggerian story, or Geschichte, in a pathos that will
announce itself ever more strongly in the corpus of Heidegger's works
from 1935 onwards. 29
NOTES
1. ''Da sprach es wieder ohne Stimme zu mir: 'Was liegt an dir, Zarathustra?
Sprich dein Wort und zerbrich!'" Friedrich Nietzsche, Also Sprach
Zarathustra, ''Die stillste Stunde" Sämmtliche Werke 4 (Berlin: de Gruyter,
1980). Translation mine.
2. Martin Heidegger, Hölderlins Hymnen "Germanien" und "Der Rhein",
Gesamtausgabe 39 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1980), p. 214. Henceforth,
the Gesamtausgabe volumes are cited as GA with volume number, fol-
lowed by page reference. All translations of Heidegger's texts are my own.
3. Friedrich Hölderlin, letter to Böhlendorff, December 4, 1801, cited in
GA39, p. 290.
4. Such an endowment being haunted by the gift/poison of its dowry or
Mitgift. See GA39, p. 293.
5. In a study currently underway, tentatively entitled: Readings through the
Threshold: Heidegger's Hölderlin and the Politics ofHeimat.
6. See the remarks, of course, in Being and Time and Kant and the Problem of
Metaphysics, as weIl as Einführung in die Metaphysik (Tübingen: Niemeyer,
1987), p. 124 et passim. Henceforth, the latter text is cited as EM with page
reference, but referred to as Introduction in the body ofthe text.
7. Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1984), p. 16.
Henceforth, cited as SZ with page reference. Other references to the politi-
cal in SZ are found on p. 193, where Heidegger also places the words "polit-
ical action" in quotation marks, and on p. 400 in a quotation from Yorck.
8. Such a measure may, for example, furnish us with a perspective from
which to re-assess the notorious comment on the "inner truth and great-
ness" ofNational Socialism (EM, 152). It neither can, nor should, be denied
in any way that this phrase----and it is only one of many similar statements
made by Heidegger around this period-has meaning in and for "everyday
understanding" (if the latter designation be permitted for the moment),
meaning that is dissociable from a "philosophical" level of discourse (but
what is that...?). Yet, neither can it, nor should it, be denied that this state-
ment was spoken in a (more) speci{ic context from which it may not simply
208
be extricated. It belongs to a discourse which has set itself the task of first
finding its own measure. And there is the possibility that such a measure
may dislocate any straightforward opposition between everyday and philo-
sophical meaning, while nevertheless remaining fully aware of the dangers
and the risks of such a venture. Perhaps, then, we must risk such a reading
that takes the context and measure ofthis context into account. Such a per-
spective (discounting for the moment Heidegger's retrospective, parentheti-
cal interpretation of the statement and the question of whether the "move-
ment" or the "party" is at stake) might suggest the following outline of an
interpretation (as is indirectly indicated in the body of my essay): that the
"inner truth" referred to cannot mean a mere "intrinsic value" (the same
paragraph clearly dismisses any straightforward interpretation of tnlth as
value), but must be thought in terms of the historical (geschichtlich) truth
(emergence into unconcealment) of being as it appears in the work created
by historical human beings. Likewise, "greatness" (Größe) cannot simply
mean quantitative size (the paragraph is equally dismissive of values as
"totalities" (Ganzheiten), which Heidegger scorns as "half-measures"
(Halbheiten)), but must be understood in terms of the historical dimension
of "political" activity, activity whose measure is to be sought in relation to
and in confrontation with the history of being. The very mention of Größe (in
whatever sense) begs this question of its measure. See here the (far from
unproblematic) article by Christian Lewalter, ''Wie liest man 1953 Sätze von
1935?" (Die Zeit, August 13,1953) and Heidegger's (even more problematic)
endorsement ofLewalter's interpretation (Die Zeit, September 24,1953).
9. The confrontation with the question of politics undertaken in the
Introduction will be further developed by Heidegger during the following
decade. See especially the lectures: Hölderlins Hymne "Der Ister" (1942),
Gesamtausgabe 53 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1984), and Parmenides (1942-
43), Gesamtausgabe 54 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1982).
10. Readers should note that this is not Heidegger's original translation of
1935, but rather a later, amended version. For the original version, see
the recently published Martin Heidegger-Karl Jaspers. Breifwechsel
1920-1963 (Frankfurt/Munich: Klostermann/Piper, 1990), pp. 158-160.
11. Editors' note: For those readers who do not possess a knowledge of German, we
present Manheim's English translation of Heidegger's translation ofthe first cho-
rus of Sophocles' Antigone, which is found in An Introduction to Metaphysics
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), pp. 146-148, with only two changes
('non-heing and 'what is' replace 'nonessent' and 'essent', respectively):
There is much that is strange, but nothing
that surpasses man in strangeness.
He sets sail on the frothing waters
amid the south winds of winter
tacking through the mountains
and furious chasms of the waves.
He wearies even the noblest
of gods, the earth,
indestructible and untiring,
overturning her from year to year,
driving plows this way and that
with horses.
209
And man, pondering and plotting,

snares the light-gliding birds
and hunts the beasts of the wilderness
and the native creatures of the sea.
With guile he overpowers the beast
that roams the mountains by night as by day,
he yokes the hirsute neck of the stallion
and the undaunted bull.
And he has found his way
to the resonance of the word,
and to wind-swift all-understanding,
and to the courage ofrule over cities.
He has considered also how to flee
from exposure to the arrows
of unpropitious weather and frost.
Everywhere journeying, inexperienced and without issue,
he comes to nothingness.
Through no flight can he resist
the one assault of death,
even ifhe has succeeded in cleverly evading
painful sickness.
Clever indeed, mastering
the ways of skill beyond all hope,
he sometimes accomplishes evil,
sometimes achieves brave deeds.
He wends his way between the laws of the earth
and the adjured justice of the gods.
Rising high above his place,
he who for the sake of adventure takes
the non-being for what is loses
his pIace in the end.
May such a man never frequent my hearth;
May my mind never share the presumption
of hirn who does this.
12. See especially the remarks on translation-specifically in the context of
ÖElvov-in the course, Hölderlins Hymne "Der [ster," GA53, § 12, pp. 74ff.
13. I am using "human being" to translate der Mensch, and "human exis-
tence" to render das Sein des Menschen.
14. The German word unheimlich is usually rendered as "strange" or "uncanny";
Heidegger, however, wishes to stress the underlying root heim, meaning
'horne'.
15. See here especially the Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis),
Gesamtausgabe 65 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1989); it would be necessary to
ponder the way in which fear or fright (Furcht), problematically character-
ized as an "inauthentic disposition" (uneigentliche Befindlichkeit; SZ, 341) or
"inauthentic anxiety" (SZ, 189), here appears to be more original than anxi-
ety-the unheimliche Befindlichkeit par excellence in the analytic of
Dasein!-insofar as it somehow "compels" anxiety.
210
MCNEILIlPOROSITY: VIOLENCE AND THE QUESTION OF POLITICS
16. The word einheimisch normally means native, indigenous, or local, close to
heimisch, which can also mean 'familiar' or 'at horne' in a place. Heimlich
normally means 'secret' or 'concealed'.
17. See especially the footnote in "Vom Wesen des Grundes," Wegmarken
(Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1978), p. 154.
18. Note that the terms aufbrechen, ausbrechen, and einbrechen are already
used in 1930, in the course that deals precisely with, among other things,
the problem of human beings' relation to nature. See, for example, Die
Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik, Gesamtausgabe 29/30 (Frankfurt:
Klostermann, 1983), p. 531; The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics,
trans. W. McNeill and N. Walker (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1992). See also note 22 below. On this displacement, see my "Metaphysics,
Fundamental Ontology, Metontology 1925-1935," Heidegger Studies 8
(1992, forthcoming).
19. It is significant that the term 'disclosedness' (Erschlossenheit) is now used to
refer to the openness of beings in general, not just of Dasein as in SZ. This
is in keeping with the displacement of questioning-that is, ultimately of
the status of Dasein itself-initiated in the beginning of the course.
20. Compare the notions of Verfängnis and Wirbel, SZ, § 38.
21. See EM, pp. 75ff, and what is said on the notion of Raub and Beraubung
in SZ and ''Vom Wesen der Wahrheit." The Kampf (struggle) of erkämpfen
is, of course, the Heraclitean 1tOAEf.lOC: or Aus-einander-setzung; see espe-
cially EM, pp. 47,87, 100f.
22. Heidegger asserts a threefold sense of BiKll; his characterization, need-
less to say, is here virtually untranslatable:
Wir verstehen hier Fug zuerst im Sinne von Fuge und Gefüge;
sodann Fug als Fügung, als die Weisung, die das Uberwältigende
seinem Walten gibt; schließlich Fug als das fügende Gefüge, das
Einfügung und Sichfügen erzwingt. (EM, 123)
I render this as follows:
We here understand order first in the sense of ordered joint and
structural order; then order as ordering, as the directive that the
overwhelming gives to its prevailing; finally order as the ordering
structured order that compels adapting to order and complying
with order.
One could here initiate a discussion of the question of violence and ethics,
by way of the correlation between Heidegger's threefold translation of öi K11
and the twofold ambiguity of öetvov.
23. Note that the term Aufbrechen, which I have translated as "irruption," can
mean 'to break forth or (violently) open out', as in a bud bursting open or
unfolding. It can, however, also have the negative connotation of something
breaking open or breaking up, such as a wound or a road surface, the
appearing of a crack or Riß (for example, in ice). In this second intransitive
usage, it carries the sense of the breakdown (also of a system or a social
211
order). It could be argued that Heidegger also has this latter sense of rup-
turing in mind when, in 1928, he talks of the Aufbrechen of (temporal) hori-
zons in the context of the project of destruction (Metaphysische
Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz, Gesamtausgabe 26
(Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1978), § 10, Anhang, p.198).Aufbrechen, although
a more "violent" term, is not without certain paralleIs to Heidegger's double
use of the word Aufgehen. The latter is used: (1) to translate <Irumc:: emer-
gence, and (2) to characterize Dasein's absorption in its environment
(Umwelt)-a phenomenon ultimately traceable to a certain breaking up or
dissolution of temporal horizons.
24. ''Von dieser durch das Sein selbst ernötigten Not her verstanden, eröffnet
sich uns erst das Wesen des Menschseins. Da-sein des geschichtlichen
Menschen heißt: Gesetzt-sein als die Bresche, in die die Ubergewalt des
Seins erscheinend hereinbricht, damit diese Bresche selbst am Sein zer-
bricht."
25. Hence, Heidegger, in 1942, describes the 1tOAtc: of Dasein as "the pole (Pol),
the turbulence (Wirbel) in and around which everything turns" (GA53, 100:
§ 14).
26. See GA53, § 15, pp. 107ff.
27. See EM, p. 102, where Heidegger cites Heraclitus, Fragment 124, aAA'
roa1tEp acipJ.lu EtKTt KEXUJ.lEVOV 6 KUAAtatoc: KOaJ.loc: ("the most beautiful
world is like a heap of dung, tossed down in confusion"). Being as AOyOC: is
there characterized as the "gatheredness" (Gesammeltheit) ofthe "counter-
turning unease (gegenwendigen Unruhe)" OfAOYOC: and acipJ.lu. The knowl-
edge of tOAJ.lU as risk belongs to the 1tOAtc: as the crossing point of the
three paths (Dreiwegkreuzung) or tracks (Bahnen) that must be negoti-
~tted: the three paths to being, to non-being, and to semblance. See EM,
pp. 75ff., especially pp. 84-87.
28. A downgoing that will be traced further from the Nietzsche lectures of
1936 onwards and is perhaps nowhere more telling than in the Beiträge
zur Philosophie (1936-1938). See also the reference to Untergehen and its
relation to Aufgehen, EM, p. 88.
29. The basis ofthis essay was conceived at the Collegium Phaenomenologicum,
Perugia, Italy, July/August 1989, a meeting devoted to "Heidegger: The
Work ofthe 1930s."
212

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Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal

Volume 14, Number 2 -Volume 15, Number 1,1991

Porosity: Violence and the

"Then it spoke to me again without voice: 'What do you

The year is early 1935. Heidegger, lecturing on Hölderlin's hymns

ing of the first chorus of Sophocles' Antigone-and its declared aim,

~Etvov the Violent

Vielfältig das Unheimliche, nichts doch

Überall hinausfahrend unterwegs, erfahrungslos ohne Ausweg

radical displacement of questioning itself, insofar as the latter remains

~EtVov is the frightful in the sense of the overwhelming prevailing

Überall hinausfahrend unterwegs, erfahrungslos ohne Ausweg

being's entering into them. This disclosedness of beings is that vio-

In this deeper sense of ä1topos, human beings are not entangled in

The Politics of TExvll

Being-this means, however: needing to use violence as ones who

...rather in the fact that t€XV11 irrupts (aufbricht) against 8t1<:11 ,

The Aporia of the Political

For the determination of the human being as U'JIl1tOAls &1tOAls

(Ausbrechen und Umbrechen, Einfängen und Niederzwingen). This, says

and no place: corruption (das Ausweg- und Stätte-lose... : der Verderb;

"Only Poets..., Only Thinkers..."

of beings as a whole. In the withdrawal of being in the prevailing of

pening ofbeing itself as withdrawal. In the insight that this history, as

something disordered and that O'ap~a (dung heap), he leaves the

And man, pondering and plotting,

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