Economic and Political Studies

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The Belt and Road Initiative and the influence of

Islamic economies

W. Travis Selmier II

To cite this article: W. Travis Selmier II (2018) The Belt and Road Initiative and the
influence of Islamic economies, Economic and Political Studies, 6:3, 257-277, DOI:
10.1080/20954816.2018.1498989

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ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STUDIES
2018, VOL. 6, NO. 3, 257–277
https://doi.org/10.1080/20954816.2018.1498989

RESEARCH ARTICLE

The Belt and Road Initiative and the influence of

Islamic economies
W. Travis Selmier II
Department of Political Science, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, USA

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

While the name ‘Silk Road’ connotes significant Chinese influence, Received 8 April 2018
in fact since the eighth century the old land route ran mostly Accepted 27 May 2018
through Islamic countries and areas, from present-day Xinjiang to
KEYWORDS
Istanbul, and the old sea route passed through Islamic trading
Islamic economics; BRI and
principalities for centuries. Modern Islamic economies, and con- Silk Road; China;
cepts of Islamic economics, will exert considerable impact on the Kazakhstan; Pakistan; Iran;
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI, also known as OBOR) development infrastructural investment
programmes. Although a non-Muslim majority country, China has
a longer, deeper and more influential history of cultural inter-
action with Islam than any other large country or major culture,
save perhaps India and Indian culture. The new ‘West’ for China
consists of countries with great variety of Islamic economies, and
so I argue that China has certain unique advantages to engage
with Islamic economies and utilise Islamic banking and finance.
Using Kazakhstan, Pakistan and Iran as examples, this paper
argues that variation across modern views of ‘Islamic economics’
not only results in challenges but also holds promise for BRI
development strategies in countries with Muslim majorities.

Introduction
God has granted his beneficence to three human organs: the brains of the Greeks, the
hands of the Chinese, and the tongues of the Arabs.
—Andalusian author al-Maqarri, 17th century, quoted in Saliba (2008, 13)
During much of the Yuan Dynasty, the administrative and economic impacts of
Islam stretched along the Silk Roads and over the seas from Yunnan and Guangdong
westward through the Indian subcontinent, and north-westward across Central Asia,
on past Byzantium towards Europe and the Maghreb (Abu-Lughod 1989; Frank 1998,
255–257; Kauz 2006). Recognising the administrative, economic and military skills of
Persians, Central Asians and Uighurs – nearly all of whom were Muslim – the
Mongols, who founded the Yuan Dynasty, employed tens of thousands skilled
Muslims to manage parts of their extensive empires (Rossabi 1990; Liu 2010,
115–123; Waugh 2011). Modern China is now in a unique position to reincorporate

CONTACT W. Travis Selmier II wselmier@indiana.edu Department of Political Science, Indiana University,

Bloomington, USA
ß 2018 Economic and Political Studies
258 W. T. SELMIER II

Map 1. Cities and modern Countries on the Silk Roads. Data source: Mercator Institute for China
Studies (MERICS), March 2017 (https://www.merics.org/sites/default/files/2017–08/170515_MERICS_
China_Mapping_BRI_March_2017_0.jpg/).

and utilise this shared Asiatic cultural heritage into Chinese plans for developing the
modern Silk Roads (‘Belt and Road Initiative’, BRI, also known as ‘One Belt One
Road’, OBOR, or Yidai Yilu in Chinese). This paper sketches this Islamic heritage on
the old Silk Roads, examines modern Islamic economic concepts and their influence
on Islamic finance and banking, and compares these Islamic economic influences in
Kazakhstan, Pakistan and Iran.
The BRI constitutes a massive project, planned and engineered predominantly
throughout Asia and into Europe, but also with components in Africa and the
Americas (see Map 1).1 Total cost estimates for all planned, proposed and con-
structed projects or those under construction have ranged between US$4–8 trillion.
The overwhelming majority of these projects fall under infrastructural investment,
with a special focus on redevelopment or new construction of trade infrastructure
consisting of ports, railroads, roads and airports, as well as energy transmission and
generation, and information system backbones (Zhang and Belgibayev 2014; Lu 2016;
Shaikh, Ji, and Fan 2016; Amighini 2017; Higgins 2018). Naturally with such large
investments, finance plays a key role (Selmier 2013; Yu 2017; Li and Jin 2018).
The name ‘Silk Road’ connotes significant Chinese influence, yet in fact since the
eighth century the old land routes ran mostly through Islamic countries from pre-
sent-day Xinjiang to Istanbul, and the old sea routes passed through Islamic trading
principalities for centuries. In effect the Battle of Talas River, and the immediate
chaos caused by the An Lushan Rebellion just a few years after that battle, turned the
 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STUDIES 259

Silk Roads into Muslim-intermediated roads. In an economic sense, Chinese culture

and Islamic culture have been engaged as trading partners since this period. The BRI
as presently structured has not yet embraced the great impact of modern Islamic
economies, and this paper argues that development plans should consider the influ-
ence of modern Islamic economies and their respective historical roots.
Islamic economics may seem to be a comprehensive and coordinated system at
first glance. Certain products are banned and certain services prohibited (haram),
general communal aspects such as charity (zakat, a tax levied on income and wealth)
are encouraged, and riba is forbidden in financial transactions (Rethel 2011; Khan
2015, 51–62; Mansour and Ishaq Bhatti 2018). Yet riba, which plays an important
role in this paper given the centrality of the BRI’s infrastructural investments’ need
for financing, is complex; the debates around riba represent the varied, heterodox
nature of broader conceptualisations of Islamic economics. Riba is characterised by
some Islamic financial scholars as usury, and by others as interest in any form (Khan
1929; Kuran 2005; Rethel 2011). Islamic scholars who argue that riba is interest in
any form call for an Islamic form of banking and finance which eschews all forms of
interest (Nomani 2003; Khan 2015, 51–62).2 And Islamic economics is actually a
modern construction (Warde 2001; Hefner 2006; Rethel 2011) even though Islam has
always been a commerce-embracing religion (Udovitch 1975; Nasr 1993; Warde
2001). A more appropriate term to consider in the context of the BRI would be
Islamic economies, as what may be accepted practice in some countries or commun-
ities is not accepted in others (Udovitch 1985; Nomani 2003; Rethel 2011).
The first section sketches a selective history of the old Silk Roads with an emphasis
on Islamic influence, China’s historical relationship to this influence, and important
trade and ideational developments which sometimes led to Islamic cultural unity and
sometimes led to cultural variance. Differing economic and political developments –
and differing geographies – over the long history of the Silk Roads led to quite differ-
ent modern economic forms which, in turn, influence how each country’s leadership
and scholar community define Islamic economics in the present day. This section
sketches the impacts of Islamic-intermediated trade and governance on the Silk
Roads and on China. These impacts must be understood in geographical, cultural
and political context, which requires us to understand how China viewed its ‘West’
and how that West, which came to be predominantly Muslim, viewed China in terms
of trade and culture.
The section following outlines Islamic economics with a focus on banking and
finance, then uses three country cases to examine how each interprets Islamic eco-
nomics and how that interpretation may affect the BRI buildout and management.
The country cases are, first, the re-emergence of Iran in international economic rela-
tions, and the ongoing debate on what Islamic economics really means in Iranian
context. Second, development of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC),
linking Xinjiang’s Kashgar with Pakistan’s deepwater port of Gwadar, may provide a
seaport outlet for much of Central Asia. Pakistan, argued by some to be the origin of
Islamic economics (Khan 2015), presents a tense, contested country for the BRI. And
third, the crucial role of Kazakhstan as transportation hub and energy producer is
further enhanced by its central geopolitical location and its secular orientation
260 W. T. SELMIER II

Table 1. Demographic and economic comparison of China, Iran, Kazakhstan and Pakistan.
China Iran Kazakhstan Pakistan
Area (1,000 sq. km) 9,596 1,648 2,724 796
Coastline (km) 14,500 2,440
0^ 1,046
Selected demographic information
Population (mill) 1,379.3 82.0 18.6 204.9
Median age 37.4 years 30.3 years 30.6 years 23.8 years
Population growth rate 0.41% 1.24% 1.04% 1.43%
Urban population 57.9% 74.4% 53.2% 39.7%
Life expectancy at birth 75.7 years 74 years 71.1 years 68.1 years
Total fertility rate (children born/woman) 1.6 1.97 2.25 2.62
Literacy (total population) 96.4% 86.8% 99.8% 57.9%#
Economic overview
GDP (PPP, in USD trillions) 23.12 1.631 0.474 1.056
GDP (real growth rate) 6.8% 3.5% 3.3% 5.3%
GDP (per capita, PPP, in USD) 16,600 20,000 26,100 5,400
GDP by composition
Agriculture 8.2% 9.8% 4.8% 24.7%
Industry 39.5% 35.9% 34.4% 19.1%
Services 52.2 % 54.3% 60.8% 56.3%
GINI index 46.5 (2016) 44.5 (2006) 26.3 (2013) 30.7 (2013)
Notes: #Considerably wider spread in female 45.8% versus male 69.5% literacy rates; other three countries’ spread in
low single digits.
Additional 740 km on Caspian Sea. ^Borders Aral Sea and Caspian Sea.
Data source: From CIA Handbook, 2017. All figures are 2017 estimates unless noted.

towards Islam and Islamic economics. These countries’ unique respective global posi-
tions in Islamic economics – a secular state with Muslim majority (Kazakhstan), dem-
ocracy under Islamic law wherein a contentious economic ‘Islamisation’ continues
with fits and starts (Pakistan), and a theocratic state seeking to develop its economy
(Iran) – provide a tableau wherein the BRI must embrace a range of Islamic eco-
nomic considerations. Table 1 displays the additional complications presented by the
huge differences in income levels and economic structures, and Islam’s varying influ-
ence across the three countries studied in this paper compared to China. I conclude
by suggesting how China may integrate and employ parts of this Islamic economies
and economics into BRI development projects.

The Silk Roads, Islam and China’s quest to the West

A Heavenly Horse Soars across the Sky!3
—Chinese idiom attributed to Han Gu [32–92 CE], Han Dynasty poet, historian,
politician (Hu 2015)
Late 19th-century German geographer Von Richthofen coined the term die
Seidenstrasse to describe the wonder and rekindled knowledge in China and in the
‘West’ of each endpoint, or pole, of a long trading route (Christian 2000; Waugh
2007, 2011, 9; Hu 2015). He named these trading routes ‘Silk Roads’ because the
Greeks and later Romans valued silk highly and called China Serica, the land of silk
(Waugh 2007; Liu 2010; Waugh 2011). But much more was transported along the
Silk Roads, including jade, horses, agricultural goods, art, ideas, and people and slaves
(Elverskog 2010; Liu 2010; Hansen 2012; Park 2012). Early Chinese trading interests
lay in obtaining the legendary ‘heavenly horses’ of Central Asia initially for military
 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STUDIES 261

purposes but, as horses became so loved in China, these bloodlines were acquired
and admired for their beauty as well (Liu 2010, 4, 17–18; Hu 2015).
China was already a continental power some 2,500 years ago as trade began along
the Silk Roads, and it has long looked to China’s West and Northwest for trade and
to resist incursion from nomadic peoples (Wang 2012; Wang 2013; Beng 2014,
12–14). Eminent historian Wang Gungwu noted: ‘The only enemies of China who
really were a threat and actually conquered China were the horsemen of the Steppe-
Land. So the Chinese built the Great Wall instead of a navy’ (Wang 2013, 10).
A glance at the Great Wall’s progression towards China’s West shows not only the
threats but the promise of westward trade: while the Xiongnu threatened from the
north-west, the Yuezhi and, later, Uighurs and other peoples further west were gener-
ally less contentious, beckoning for Chinese goods. Stretching well west of Dunhuang
by the mid-Han Dynasty, Chinese leaders’ thoughts were to protect that westward
trade while fending off the northward aggressors.
Migratory shifts of peoples over the trading routes enabled some, like the Sogdians
and the Arabs, who controlled much of the spice trade in Western Asia and traded
to the Indian subcontinent, to expand and manage much of the long-distance trade
(Christian 2000; Hansen 2012). Religions and ideas spread along the Silk Roads
through these migratory shifts and via the traders’ convoys (Frank 1992; Menges
1994, 65–67; Frank 1998; Hansen 2012). Expansion of Manichaeism, Hinduism,
Buddhism and other religions (Liu 2010, 63–76; Waugh 2011; Hansen 2012) provided
precursors to the rapid spread of Islam which would come during the eighth through
tenth centuries.
After the Battle of Talas River (751 CE), the Tang Dynasty’s suzerainty contracted
eastward while the newly established Abbasid Caliphate also looked to the east toward
China (Frank 1992; Liu 2010, 100–102; Park 2012). Within a half-century, the trade
routes of the Silk Roads turned into Muslim-intermediated routes as Islam was car-
ried along with goods through Central Asia into the Tarim Basin and to the Tang
Capital at Xi’an. Talas River is forgotten in Chinese history, largely because the disas-
trous and much-remembered An Lushan rebellion (Anshi Zhiluan) broke out a few
years after the battle, crippling the Tang Dynasty’s control of China proper. Although
the rebellion was largely over within a decade, residual rebel power and the debilitat-
ing effects from the destruction lingered in China for many decades. The Tang
Emperors’ gaze turned inward and Tang influence receded even as Muslim leaders in
Central Asia and further west looked eastward towards China.
The Abbasids, with their power base first rising from the north-eastern Persia,
looked eastward towards China as well as westward to Anatolia and the Maghreb as
they consolidated their power. The second Abbasid Caliph displayed his interests in
the East when he built his new capital at Baghdad in part because he ‘thought he
would gain a tremendous advantage on account of its proximity to the Tigris
River … emphasiz[ing] that this gave him ready access to trade with China’ (Saliba
2008, 11). His economic interests reflected the sophisticated tastes on display in his
capital’s construction (Hirth and Rockhill 1911, 135; Saliba 2008), as Chinese artisans
engaged before the battle at Talas River were soon joined by other artisans who were
captured at the battle and transported to Baghdad. These artisans brought Chinese
262 W. T. SELMIER II

technologies to use in the Caliphate’s painting, ceramics, weaving and metalworking

industries, which were already quite advanced. Rapid expansion of trade, encouraged
by the Caliphate and Central Asian emirates, continued to fuel demand for Chinese
goods and ideas over the next centuries. And demand for silk led to planting of mul-
berry trees across the Caliphate and development of a sophisticated silk industry
(Liu 2010, 100). Tang China’s Muslim population initially grew through immigration
of Arabs and Persians into Southeast China, and expatriate merchant peoples like the
Sogdians settling in China, especially in the capital (Gladney 2003, 453–454). Gradual
conversion of the Uighurs, continued migration of peoples from Central Asia, and
some conversion among Chinese occurred later (Gladney 2003, 453–454). While the
loss of northern China to northern nomadic tribes mid-way through the Song
Dynasty curtailed China’s direct access to the Silk Roads, trade continued.
The Mongol invasions across Eurasia during the latter half of the 13th century cre-
ated two opposing vectors in Islamic governance systems. On the one hand, establish-
ing a unified political structure expanded and improved an Asia-wide economic
structure through strong support for trade (Rossabi 1990; Frank 1998, 255–257; Kauz
2006). Not only did the Mongol Khans create an elite cohort of wide-ranging Muslim
merchants by issuing to them official certificates to purchase on behalf of the
extended royal families and leaders (Liu 2010, 116–117). The Mongol administration
also gave rise to a ‘pax Mongolica’ (Elverskog 2010, 162) through imposition of peace
and religious tolerance backed by a powerful, well-administered state (Abu-Lughod,
1989; Frank 1998, 255–257) complete with an extensive system of postal stations
(Rossabi 1990, 353), including the tolerance, even encouragement, of travel across
Asia and from Europe (Curtin 1984, 106–108; Hirth and Rockhill 1911; Harold 2008;
Saliba 2008). And within this state – in fact managing much of it – the Khanates
employed Muslim soldiers, traders, scholars and artisans (Liu 2010, 115–123; Waugh
2011), including senior military leaders like Sayyid Ajall Omer Shams Al-Din, who
later led Mongol armies in China, governed Beijing, and pacified Yunnan, where he
is still revered seven centuries later (Liu 2010, 116).
But on the other hand, the Mongols destroyed the Abbasid Caliphate and its gov-
erning institutions in 1258 CE and implemented in its place a khanate political order.
This severed the relationship between Islamic political power – which, geographically,
had been centred on Baghdad and influenced much of the Islamic world – and cultural
and economic institutions of Islam. This gradual separation had been ongoing before the
sacking of Baghdad, of course. Muslim conquerors had swept into India in the eighth
and ninth centuries, and accepted much of local culture into their governing and even
religious practices (Elverskog 2010). Central Asian Islam had developed local political
autonomy and some degree of religious independence, in part because Islam’s nature
encourages local ulema to interpret and adjudicate (Udovitch 1985; Nasr 1993; Elverskog
2010). And the Sunni–Shia split had occurred six centuries before. But what was different
this time was the imposition of a pan-Asian imperial political power.
When this power split up in the mid-14th century into four khanates, trade
became more difficult as the khanates adjusted to very different geographical and cli-
matic conditions (Abu-Lughod 1989; Allworth 1994, 19–22; Liu 2010, 121–127). As
Islam was becoming a globe-spanning religion, local variations due in part to local
 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STUDIES 263

cultures, in part due to the Sunni–Shia schism, encouraged local practices. European
imperial expansion increased variation across Islamic economies, with one major
exception. Islam-linked resistance to Western imperial expansion rose across the
Islamic world and remains today. This legacy is discussed more in the next section in
some Pakistani reactions to the BRI and modern Iranian economic responses to
Western colonial pressures. From a trade perspective, Western European colonial
establishment helped pull some land-based trade towards the sea, while the growing
Russian economy pulled trade to the north through the steppe routes (Rossabi 1990;
Frank 1998, 120–122; Christian 2000).
Competition between Russian and British imperial interests arose in many areas
with large Muslim populations. By the mid-19th century, Russian economic interests,
a fear of falling behind Europe after the Crimean War disaster, and the search for
more land catalysed Russian conquest of Central Asia (Saray 1982, 5–8; Allworth
1994, 11–40; d’Encausse 1994a). But the Russians, who had ‘a profound ignorance of
the region’ (d’Encausse 1994b, 151), struggled to govern Central Asia. The Bolshevik
revolution brought little attempt to integrate Central Asia until the 1930s, and then
the attempts were violent and forceful (Saray 1982; d’Encausse 1994c, 232–257). Fifty
years of Russian and Soviet inward migration by Russians, Ukrainians, Germans and
Koreans added heterogeneity to create a very different cultural mix and deepened
human capital for the stunningly rapid industrial growth catalysed by Second World
War. Evacuating heavy industry plants from the Ukraine and areas of Russia vulner-
able to German invasion, then shipping and reassembling them in southern Central
Asia created a huge industrial base in a few years, which necessitated immediate
investment in railroads, mines and mineral processing facilities, more industrial
plants and power plants (Matley 1994; d’Encausse 1994d). While some Russian polit-
ical influences remained in Central Asia after the collapse of the Soviet Union in
1991 (Nixey 2012; Zhang and Belgibayev 2014; Contessi 2015, 2016; Kembayev 2018),
cultural diversity combined with a century and a half of enforced Islamic secularism
have created a pragmatic approach to Islamic economics quite different from what is
seen in Pakistan, for instance.

A diversity of Islamic economies both simplifies and makes complex

The Prophet has said, “The difference of view among the scholars (ulema) of my
community is a blessing from God.”
—Quoted in Nasr (1993, 431)
Variance across what may be considered as a truly Islamic economy has resulted
from many factors. One is the nature of Islam as a communal religion, where schol-
ars (ulema) have always debated, analysed and adjudicated on economic matters
(Udovitch 1975, 1985; Behdad 1989; Nasr 1993, 443–444; Nomani 2003; Kuran 2005).
Another is the vast geographic spread in which Muslims practice their religion and
the varied local cultures where they live. Related to this are the ways in which eco-
nomic lives have been led – pastoral and nomadic, settled and agricultural, urban and
industrial – which influence Muslims’ production and consumption habits (Nasr
1993, 435–439; Behdad 1994; Warde 2001). And yet another factor is the historical
264 W. T. SELMIER II

and modern political influences, both local (Udovitch 1975, 1985; Nasr 2001; Kuran
2005), as well as the impacts of colonial and imperial pasts (Kuran 2005; Hefner
2006; El-Gamal 2017) and how these influence present economies.
In the context of 1,400 years of Islam and 2,500 years of the Silk Roads, perhaps
‘the first and most important fact to underscore about Islamic economics is its unques-
tionable modernity’ as Hefner (2006, 17) notes. This is not to say that commercial rela-
tionships are recent in Islam – the Prophet Mohammed was also a merchant and,
from the Quran to the present day, there have been extensive injunctions and rulings
to deal with economic transactions. ‘What is called economics today has always been
considered in Islam in relation to ethics’ (Nasr 1993, 443), and so the modern concept
of Islamic economics arose in part to provide an alternative to so-called Western eco-
nomics due to ethical considerations (Nomani 2003, 37–40; Khan 2015, 60–67;
El-Gamal 2017). Behdad (1989, 186) suggests it is not really an economic system but
rather a ‘third way’ between capitalism and socialism, wherein the ‘methodology of
Islamic economics is a juxtaposition of neoclassical-Keynesian analysis with a world
view shaped by utopian thoughts and bounded by Islamic scholasticism’.
Within this methodology, debates are often centred on financial transactions and
providing alternatives to Western finance. It is important to note that modern foun-
dations of Islamic economics were laid in the Indian subcontinent in the late 19th
through mid-20th century (Khan 2015; El-Gamal 2017), that many of the founda-
tional scholars became residents of Pakistan upon its founding and that Pakistani
scholars and bankers are prominent throughout the world of Islamic banking and
finance (Khan 2015, 2–6, 35–42). Islamic economics generally, and conceptualisation
of Islamic finance specifically, arose in part as an explicit rejection of Western influ-
ence (Behdad 1989; Keddie 1994; Khan 2015; El-Gamal 2017). Islamic banking and
finance, given its central role in financing BRI-linked infrastructure projects, is woven
throughout the three country cases in this section in a tapestry of conceptual develop-
ment and possible application to BRI projects.
In a much-cited World Bank Policy Research working paper, El-Hawary, Grais,
and Iqbal (2004, 5–6, with my comments in parentheses) delineate four principles of
Islamic banking and finance:

a. ‘Risk-sharing – the terms of financial transactions need to reflect a symmetrical

risk/return distribution each participant to the transaction may face (which tends
to lead toward partnership structures and equity held by lenders).
b. Materiality – financial transaction needs to have a ‘material finality’, that is, it is
directly or indirectly linked to a real economic transaction (this is often inter-
preted to ban all or most derivative transactions).
c. No exploitation – a financial transaction should not lead to the exploitation of
any party to the transaction (which tends to embed social responsibility into
financial economics).
d. No financing of sinful activities, such as the production of alcoholic beverages’.

Principles a and c provide the grist to debates about riba and what riba constitutes
(i.e. is riba interest or is it usurious interest).
 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STUDIES 265

With this rough background, we can compare the three country cases and then
examine each case, delving further into Islamic economics by seeing how the principles
manifest in each country. Table 2 provides geographic, political and economic bases
for comparison. Within this sample, Iran is a medium-sized, middle-income country in
population terms with considerable energy resources and seaport facilities, but the one
of the three which does not border China. Pakistan has a large, comparatively lower-
income population, lacks energy resources and shares an important border with China
which is allowing the two countries to develop an extensive integrated economic
corridor ending at Pakistan’s second seaport at Gwadar, where an integrated port,
import/export facility and liquified natural gas (LNG) storage complex are under devel-
opment. Kazakhstan is a geographically large, landlocked country with a small popula-
tion and strategic borders with China and with Russia. Its large industrial base, energy
and mining resources, and central location enhance its high per capita income.
Development of ports in each country also provides interesting comparisons. In
Kazakhstan, the world’s largest dry port has been built; Pakistan’s Gwadar is a potential
game changer in Indian Ocean shipping, and a possible rival Indian Ocean port has
been discussed in Iran at Chabahar. Each country seeks possibilities to further develop
the ‘four critical forms of distribution: runway, road, rail and river/sea’ (Cox 2009).
Politically all are classified as democracies, with Iran a theocracy, Pakistan an
Islamic law-linked government and Kazakhstan a secular government with a majority
(70% Muslim population). This religio-political variance across the three provides
some scope for discussion of Islamic economics’ impact on Initiative projects as well
as their respective relationship with China. Wider political relationships are also key,
and comparisons of each country’s relationship with China, Russia, Europe and the
United States are touched upon.

Table 2. Bases for comparison.

Iran Pakistan Kazakhstan Notes
Access to sea Yes, littoral state Yes No
Bordering China No Yes Yes
Port access to China No Seaport access Dry port access
Potential hub airport Yes No Yes Flights between East
and Southeast Asia
and Europe/
North America
Oil/energy producing Yes No Yes
Four ‘Rs’ of Rail and river/sea, yes. Road, rail and river/ Runway, road, rail ‘four critical forms of
distribution Runway and sea all under well-developed. distribution: runway,
road, improving development. Little Minimal river/sea road, rail and river/
hope for runway through Caspian sea’ (Cox 2009)
distribution ferry projects
Islamic impact Theocracy Islamic Secular government
on government law-linked
government
Relationship with Very weak Contentious Good
United States
Relationship Wary, long-time rivals, Wary, but share Good
with Russia but improving interests in
Central Asia
Population size Medium Large Small See Table 1
Per capita income Middle Lower Upper See Table 1
Data sources: Multiple sources including CIA (2017), Cox (2009), and author.
266 W. T. SELMIER II

Iran
As Behdad (1994, 776) wrote 25 years ago, ‘the study of Islamic economics in Iran is
an exploration in the limits and viability of Islamic radicalism’ given ‘the momentum
for establishing an Islamic social order … (and the) rare opportunity afforded few
reformist movements in history’ after the 1979 revolution. At the risk of oversimplifi-
cation, his elegant argument is that a long-time struggle between Shariati and his fol-
lowers, and Sadr, Mutahhari and the scholars supporting their ideas, resulted in a
still-contested dominance of Sadr and his supporters’ ideas. This struggle frames an
ongoing global debate in Islamic economics regarding social responsibility.
Shariati explicitly links his criticism of conservative clerics with his ideas of an
Islamic economy, echoing and developing many ideas of Jamal ad-Din Afghani,4
including extensions into Marxist thought, or at least Marxist-tinged economic con-
cepts (Behdad 1994, 776–781; see Khomeini’s view of Shariati on pp. 808–809).
Concepts of social justice – particularly how to deal with riba (further discussed
below in Pakistan subsection) and inequality which is increased in a capitalist system
– drive part of the economic debate in Iran and within Islamic economics generally
(Khan 1929; Behdad 1994; Khan 2015, 51–58).
Shariati extends his theories into re-engineering of the social fabric, while Sadr
(and Mutahhari) sees the guiding hand of an Islamic state as not only smoothing
inequality but also providing social justice, where a proper Islamic system would be
‘based on three principles: mixed ownership, limited economic freedom, and social
justice’ (Behdad 1994, 787): ‘Sadr envisions a world of small farmers, merchants, and
crafts workers, with a large and powerful state that intervenes extensively in the econ-
omy to assure that the market transactions adhere to the precepts of Islam’ (Behdad
1994, 790).
China would recognise this ‘Red versus Expert’ debate over economics, which has
occurred in China over the same time period as it has occurred in Iran. But in China
it has evolved into more of a policy debate between Marxist/Maoist revolutionaries
versus pragmatists, rather than debate between Islamic philosophers and jurispru-
dence scholars. In Iran, ‘Khomeini’s dilemma (and that of his successors] … is that
he accepts capital but rejects great wealth, that he accepts market relations but rejects
capitalism’, as Behdad (1994, 807) puts it.
With Iran’s unique position in modern Islamic economics as a backdrop, modern
Sino-Iranian relations under the lens of the BRI provide a fascinating case given that
these two cultural centres were the poles of the Silk Roads during part of the trade
route’s existence (Waugh 2007; Liu 2010, 63–65; Green 2015). Iran’s geostrategic pos-
ition has not changed over this long history, during which Iran’s access to the sea
was as important as its continental position. In commenting on two millennia of
trade between Africa and Southwestern Asia and the Indian subcontinent, Curtin
(1983, 232) writes that when the Portuguese came to trade around 1500 CE, the
nexus of trade flows – the Persia Gulf – remained the same as the Portuguese estab-
lished their colony in Goa: ‘the shift in trade destinations was therefore from the
Persian Gulf to south India, not from the Persian Gulf to Europe’ as shipping contin-
ued to flow through entrep^ ot ports in the Gulf.
 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STUDIES 267

But by the 19th and 20th centuries, the Persian Gulf was no longer a major destin-
ation for traded goods, and longer-distance shipping combined with the decline in
the Silk Roads (under Russian and Soviet rule) ‘was a major contributor to the long
economic stagnation of Iran before the twentieth century’ (Esfahani and Pesaran
2009, 197). This stagnation was exacerbated by political turmoil caused in part by oil
politics (Yergin 1992, ch. 7; Farmanfarmaian 1997) and the economic sanctions
imposed by the US government (Esfahani and Pesaran 2009). As a result, ‘Iran has
one of the highest rates (in the world) of emigration of people with university
degrees’ (Esfahani and Pesaran 2009, 192), in part because the strong technical skills
of Iranian university graduates are not absorbed into the Iranian economy.
For Chinese entrepreneurs like Zuoru Lin, ‘Iran is at the centre of everything’ in
terms of Chinese outbound trade and investment (Erdbrink 2017). The welcome
investment from these entrepreneurs contrasts with the often state-guided domestic
‘private’ investment in Iran because a significant amount is actually channelled
through state-owned foundations (Esfahani and Pesaran 2009; Lu 2016). Asghar
Fakhrieh Kashan, the urbane Deputy Minister for Roads and Urban Development,
comments, ‘ … if they (Chinese government and investors) want to save time and
money, they will choose the shortest route … There are also political advantages to
Iran, compared to Russia’ (Erdbrink 2017). Pursuing that ‘shortest route’, China has
invested in a 2,000-mile-long rail line stretching from Urumqi (Xinjiang’s capital) to
Tehran, with the last quarter between Mashhad and Tehran to be upgraded in 2019,
and China has become Iran’s largest trading partner (Lu 2016; Erdbrink 2017).5
Geopolitics plays an important role in Iran–China relations, with Russia and the
United States anxiously watching (Nixey 2012; Kim and Indeo 2013; Lu 2016). Russia
and the United States sparred for influence over Iran during much of the 20th cen-
tury (Yergin 1992; Farmanfarmaian 1997), and Russia would still like closer economic
ties as well as to finally succeed in a centuries-long quest for access to ports on Asia’s
southern coast. But presently Russia’s major advantage comes only through trading
weapons. The Iran–US relationship colours nearly all of Iran’s international economic
relationships (Behdad 1989; Lu 2016; Ahmad, Ali and Shah 2017) and makes even
domestic investment more difficult and costly (Esfahani and Pesaran 2009; Lu 2016).
A prime example is the long-considered Iran–Pakistan pipeline which, while clearly
an economically sound project, has coloured the Iran–Pakistan relationship. While
other factors such as Shi’ite/Sunni tensions, turmoil in Balochistan and which country
leads the Islamic revolution are other complicating factors, the United States has
acted as a veto player in the on-again, off-again nature of this pipeline project
(Cohen, Curtis, and Graham 2008; Lu 2016; Ahmad, Ali, and Shah 2017), as dis-
cussed more in the next section.

Pakistan
First conceived in the 1950s, the so-called ‘peace’ LNG pipeline plans have shifted
between Iran–Pakistan, Iran–Pakistan–India (IPI), Turkmenistan–Iran–Pakistan–India
and other pipeline path variations (Cohen, Curtis, and Graham 2008; Panda 2015;
Ahmad, Ali, and Shah 2017). Formal plans were first inked in 1993, and Iran shortly
268 W. T. SELMIER II

thereafter suggested including India in an ‘IPI’ project which would run from the
South Pars gas field through Balochistan and into India (Cohen, Curtis, and Graham
2008). The requirements for energy in Pakistan and India are immense, and equally
immense are the resources in Iran and Turkmenistan. A variety of LNG pipelines
linking into Central Asian gas fields have been proposed or are under construction
(Nixey 2012), including a ‘TAPI’ (Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India) project
with Asian Development Bank backing, which is expected to be operational by 2019
on present buildout. Some of the pipelines are meant to link directly into the
Xinjiang-Gwadar LNG pipeline (Shaikh, Ji, and Fan 2016; Wolf 2017). While China
has offered assistance in the IPI pipeline project (Panda 2015; Wolf 2017), other
countries are muddying Pakistan–Iran cooperation and forcing a go-slow approach
from China. The United States supports the TAPI pipeline instead, partially to dis-
rupt Iran’s plans; India is also complicating things, but by attempting to alienate
Pakistan while becoming closer to Iran (Shah 2016; Ahmad, Ali, and Shah 2017;
Wolf 2017).
India has backed away from the IPI pipeline, but agreed in 2016 to invest US$500
million in Iran’s Chabahar port to bypass Gwadar (Arif 2016), even though a senior
Pakistani Prime Ministerial advisor said: ‘Pakistan did not see Chabahar as a rival
and was in fact exploring the possibility of developing links with Gwadar’ (Arif
2016). However, there are considerable points of economic and political contention
between Pakistan and Iran. Both Gwadar and Chabahar, as nearby ports on the
Indian Ocean, would certainly compete. Present LNG pricing through the IPI pipeline
disadvantages Pakistan, which would pay a high price even as Iran imports from
Turkmenistan at a very low price (Panda 2015). And, more fundamentally, Pakistan
and Iran each claim to be the standard bearer for Islamic economics and the leader
in a pan-Islamic movement. Iran’s position, bolstered by its modern Islamic econom-
ics debate and a true theocracy, is challenged by Pakistan’s claim to Islamic scholar
Syed Abul Ala Maududi (1903–1979), often called the father of Islamic economics,
and a 60-year attempt to Islamise the economy and institute an Islamic financial sys-
tem and industry (Keddie 1994, 485–486; Khan 2015; see also El-Gamal 2017, 4–5).
Development of Pakistan’s deepwater port of Gwadar would expand the south-
western terminus of the CPEC, linking Gwadar’s port access to Xinjiang’s Kashgar in
a 1,200-mile-long transport/industry/energy/communications development (Shaikh, Ji,
and Fan 2016; Mohammad 2017; Wolf 2017). Gwadar is key to not only the CPEC
scheme, but also acts as a geo-economic nexus as it is the closest seaport to most of
Central Asia and Afghanistan. Gwadar also illustrates all the political issues of the
CPEC: uncomfortable colonial/imperial overtones; extreme levels of debt, with some
arguing that the CPEC buildout may encumber Pakistan with a bleak future; and
upsetting other countries watching these developments with alarm, including Russia,
India and the United States.
Launching the first ship from Gwadar containing a shipment of Chinese goods
which had been transported down the CEPC highway, one Pakistani reporter com-
mented (Khurram 2016):
In one video, for example, the corridor project was described by the (Pakistani
Government) narrator as ‘giving Pakistan a position no less than that of a jewel in the
 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STUDIES 269

crown’. It was an awkward choice of words given the colonial past it evokes (India was
described as the ‘jewel in the crown’ of the British Empire by Queen Victoria).
Wolf (2017) and other critics have suggested the CPEC presents a destabilising
economic development programme rife with overinvestment and debt. Concern about
lack of tax revenues compounds these worries. Some commentators have suggested
the CPEC will ‘turn Pakistan into China’s “client state”’ (Shams 2016). Adding to the
CPEC complications is the Balochi resistance to Gwadar and to the original path of
the CPEC superhighway, which has led to a proposed rerouting of the route
(Mohammad 2017; Wolf 2017). A Gwadar free trade zone has been granted to China
on a 43-year lease; the entire CPEC projects contain extensive tax breaks on customs,
sales, income, withholding and other concessions (Shah 2016).
While these types of financial arrangements are common in major infrastructural
projects, Pakistanis may be more easily incensed due to perception of exploitation
and risk sharing in the context of Islamic banking and finance. Chinese interests are
in a damned-if-you-do, damned-if-you-don’t situation. Not only is the CPEC a very
high risk investment, the interlinked nature of road, rail, telecommunications, pipe-
line and electricity generation and distribution necessitate very tight and systematic
coordination, which often requires long-term leases and guarantees of return.
Engineering of the overall project is quite complex and socially disruptive, but could
bring enormous benefits to Pakistan and China, as well as neighbouring countries
(Shaikh, Ji, and Fan 2016; Mohammad 2017), including very favourable environmen-
tal benefits (Shaikh, Ji, and Fan 2016, 255–256). Unofficial American acknowledge-
ment of the economic efficiency of the CPEC transportation came from a request ‘to
allow NATO shipments to Afghanistan through Gwadar’, which was denied by the
Pakistani Government due to ‘US-Pakistan ties … (being) in a bad phase right now’
according to Pakistan’s Minister for Ports and Shipping, Hasil Bizenjo (Shams 2018).

Kazakhstan
Both Kazakhstan and Pakistan are central to BRI development plans, as both border
China in strategic spots: Pakistan offers access to the Indian Ocean, and Kazakhstan
offers access to Europe through either the Caspian or through Russia. Development and
expansion of Gwadar have a parallel in the Khorgos Gateway in landlocked Kazakhstan,
where Kazakhstan and China have built the largest dry port in the world (Feng and Foy
2017; Higgins 2018). Both Kazakhstan and Pakistan are important to western China’s
energy needs as well, as the CPEC includes a pipeline to transport LNG into Kashgar in
western China. Kazakhstan–China Oil Pipeline, a 50:50 joint venture between China
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and KazMunayGas, the Kazakh national oil
company, completed its 1,400-mile-long main trunk oil pipeline from western
Kazakhstan into China in 2009. This pipeline not only improved Kazakhstan’s export
position (prior to the opening, the only export outlet was through Russia’s state-owned
pipeline company Transneft) but also greatly increased secure sourcing for oil from
Central Asia into western China (Feng and Foy 2017; Hydrocarbons Technology 2018).
In 2017, 12.2 million tonnes of oil was transported from oil fields near Atasu to
CNPC’s complex in Alashankou, Xinjiang (Kazakhstan-China Pipeline, LLC 2018),
270 W. T. SELMIER II

which was then piped to the nearby Dushanzi refinery. A sister joint venture company
transships natural gas from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan through Kazakhstan; in
October 2017, Kazakhstan also began shipping natural gas from western Kazakh gas
fields through this pipeline.
If Pakistan’s prospects for the Initiative from a Chinese perspective are potentially
problematic, complex and complicated by Islamic economic considerations,
Kazakhstan’s prospects are simpler, secular and conditioned by pragmatic foreign pol-
icy. Kazakhstan’s foreign relations have been following a ‘balancing’ strategy through
a well-engineered portfolio of foreign policy tactics (Contessi 2015, 2016), and China
is the key partner in Kazakhstan’s efforts. These efforts are clearly demonstrated by
the Khorgos Gateway project. At Khorgos, three of Cox’s (2009) ‘Four Rs’ transport
systems come together: road, rail and runway (river/sea is the fourth). Chinese leaders
have suggested Shenzhen as a model. But Khorgos, in tight linkage with other loca-
tions in Kazakhstan, could offer a more complete package of transport, logistics and
finance than Shenzhen did in its initial decades. Shenzhen began as a low-cost pro-
duction centre, tied to Hong Kong’s port, financial and servicing capacity. A more
complete analogy for a Khorgos–Almaty–Astana linkage may be Dubai. Khorgos, in
combination with Almaty (180 miles away), offers the possibility of a massive free
port: ‘In some cases, the free port can become the main driver of national economic
development, as the case of Dubai illustrates by combining port, airport and real
estate development and creating a free port in a relatively closed regional context’
(Lavissiere and Rodrigue 2016, 6).
In a modern free port, more developed finance and business services are required
(Lavissiere and Rodrigue 2016) to develop synergies through interlinkages between
logistics and finance (O’Connor 2010; Kasarda 2015; Selmier 2017). Not only does
Almaty have a vibrant financial services sector, but in Kazakhstan’s capital, Astana,
the Astana International Financial Center (AIFC) officially opened on 1 January
2018. The AIFC operates under British legal standards, which would provide a large
advantage (nearest geographic alternatives would be Singapore, Hong Kong, offshore
operations in UAE, and in Europe). While a high-risk venture, the AIFC has four fac-
tors which favour its success: (1) the AIFC’s affiliated stock exchange is linked to a
strategic partner, the Shanghai Stock Exchange, which holds a 25% ownership share;
(2) NASDAQ is providing the technology platform for trading; (3) the AIFC has
named well-known and respected foreign jurists and senior administrative officers;
and (4) the AIFC was scheduled to host the 14th annual World Islamic Economic
Forum (WIEF) in July 2018 (Voloshin 2017; Jenkins and Perzadayeva 2018; Norton
Rose Fulbright 2018).6
Offering to host the WIEF signals that the AIFC seeks to establish its position as
‘a regional hub for Islamic finance, creating favourable conditions for the operation
and development of Islamic financial institutions’.7 Kazakhstan’s government is near
final stages of legislation and registration to allow a full range of Islamic financial
products, including a sovereign sukuk bond which is expected to be issued in later
2018 (Vizcaino 2018). The AIFC operates under Islamic Financial Services Board
standards; based in Malaysia, the Islamic Financial Services Board is recognised in
Islamic banking and finance as a somewhat more permissive standards body
 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STUDIES 271

(Nomani 2003; Chong and Liu 2009; El-Gamal 2017).8 The AIFC faces stiff inter-
national competition from Malaysia, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which together have
captured roughly 80% of the market in sukuks. This competition was likely a factor
in the AIFC’s decision to operate under British legal standards. If successful, the
AIFC not only could provide BRI-linked financing for Central Asian projects, but
could develop into a broader platform for both conventional and Islamic finance for
BRI-linked projects around the world.
A hub airport is also a key part of a dynamic modern free port such as seen in
Dubai and Istanbul (Kasarda 2015; Selmier 2017). Both Kazakhstan and China may
benefit from investing in a smaller hub at Almaty or Astana. These two cities com-
bine the advantages of optimal location between Europe and East and Southeast Asia,
sound diplomatic relationships between China and Kazakhstan, well-developed busi-
ness services and land transport options, and the possibility for robust financial mar-
kets (many business travellers either work in finance or travel to negotiate financial
contracts). In contrast, Pakistan’s location, lower per capita income and lack of infra-
structural development preclude it from developing a hub airport; Tehran’s position
is geographically optimal, but the United States still exercises some veto power over
aircraft financing options and other issues.9
Chinese investment into Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries has
increased Russian concerns about growing Chinese influence in Central Asia (Tang
2000; Nixey 2012; Kim and Indeo 2013). But Kazakhstan and China have managed to
dampen Russian concerns while acting as successful partners:
Revealingly, China’s active diplomacy and extraordinary economic growth that led to the
creation of the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) gave also a significant
impetus to regional integration in Eurasia and almost coincided with the establishment
of the EurAsEC on 10 October 2000 (today’s EAEU [Eurasian Economic
Union]) … (Kembayev 2018, 39)
As argued in the conclusion, this success could be extended into arranging Islamic
financing for BRI projects in the more relaxed, British law governed AIFC, which
could provide China with a convenient off-shore financing facility.

Integrating (parts of) Islamic economics into the BRI

The Silk Roads were originally defined by Richthofen narrowly and since have
become such a ubiquitous term that one wonders what it really means. Obscurity can
help a concept as well as hurt it, and so the Chinese (and Americans and others)
have adopted it for their own meanings. But one critical concept which is not obscure
concerns the many Muslim countries through which the new routes must run. These
countries – and their cultures and forms of Islamic economics – must be considered.
While the complexity and variety of Islamic economics and economies may initially
complicate Chinese BRI investments, upon careful analysis we see that this variance
may benefit Chinese development policies for BRI projects.
China has a capacity to engage with Islamic economies which is simply unrivalled
in the world: first, there is a longer, deeper and more influential history of cultural
interaction between China and Islam than any other large non-Islamic country or
272 W. T. SELMIER II

major culture – save perhaps India and Indian culture – possesses. Second, China’s
location, bordering five predominantly Muslim countries on its western border, fur-
ther establishes China as the major non-Muslim actor in Asia and perhaps in the
world. These direct borders also demonstrate to the Islamic World that China is not
the ‘West – rather, China is the prototypical East which has always drawn interest,
admiration and trade from China’s Islamic ‘West’ (see, for instance, Xi and Chen
2016). Third, perceived distance from American policies and a bellicose American
President serve to point out China’s distinction. And fourth, China’s continued rapid
growth and interest in developing continental Asia make it a ready, willing, and usu-
ally supportive senior partner in the BRI.
But the BRI will remain a lightning rod for criticism due to the scale of the
projects, the debts incurred, increasing Chinese influence throughout Asia and other
places where BRI projects are constructed, and the inevitability of some failures even
with the best planning and execution. Pakistan provides a classic example of
these four issues, and resulting comments include criticism of Chinese ‘imperial’
policy and suggestions that Pakistan may become a ‘client state’ of China. While I
have argued that China, Chinese MNEs and those partnering with China are in a
no-win situation with some of these critics, four lessons can be drawn from the
Pakistani experience as to how China may deal with Islamic economics and with
Islamic economies.
First, recognise that all parties cannot be satisfied. In an interlinked set of con-
struction projects as complex as the CPEC, it will be impossible to dodge all criticism.
China and Chinese MNEs thus far have generally downplayed criticism while keeping
on with the business at hand, and sometimes shifting location or facility development
helps ameliorate tensions. In this regard, it helps understand the differences between
Islamic economics and Islamic economies and to employ those differences in business
and development policies.
Second, engaging in disputes about what constitutes Islamic finance – what is
accepted, what is not – provides little benefit. BRI-linked Islamic financing may best
be done with quiet but well-distributed public notification, using Islamic financing
centres which follow less restrictive standards such as those of the Malaysia-based
Islamic Financial Services Board. Malaysia is a global centre for sukuk bond issuance
as well as other creative Islamic financing structures.
Third, expand AIIB ties with Islamic finance experts such as the former Governor of
Bank Negara (Malaysia’s central bank) Tan Sri Zeti, who was appointed to the AIIB’s
International Advisory Panel shortly after her retirement in 2016. Long-considered
among the world’s top central bankers and presently the Chancellor of the International
Centre for Education in Islamic Finance in Kuala Lumpur, she would provide expertise
and guidance on Islamic finance to the AIIB.
Fourth, utilise those Islamic financial products that fit BRI project risk manage-
ment, and choose appropriate jurisdictions in which to arrange financing. Limited
partnerships, sukuk and other bonds, and utilisation of offshore vehicles would both
satisfy many Islamic finance experts while fitting into the BRI’s financing strategy.
Along these lines, the AIFC could be assisted to develop Islamic finance products
tailored to BRI requirements.
 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STUDIES 273

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes
1. The Australian Government has resisted generally participation in BRI projects. For
background, see Coorey (2018) and Laurenceson and Shi (2017).
2. Khan (2015, 59–60) contrasts Indian Subcontinent Islamic Scholar Syed Abul Ala
Maududi (1903–1979) – often called the father of Islamic economics – with another
scholar’s views on riba/interest: ‘For Yusuf Ali the opposite of charity is usury; for
Maududi the opposite is interest’.
3. Tianma Xingkong in Chinese, author’s translation.
4. Late 19th-century leader of Islamic Modernism movement who called for a unification
among Muslims to counter Western influence.
5. Note that an alternative route, mentioned in Kazakhstan section, involves train-to-ferry
to Baku, where a newly upgraded railroad runs to Kars (Turkey) for shipping onward
(Economist 2018).
6. The WIEF was postponed after the Malaysian election in May 2018 and has not been
rescheduled as of this date.
7. Please visit the AIFC website at https://www.aifc.kz/.
8. Note that El-Hawary, Grais, and Iqbal (2004, 27) note: ‘ … the Malaysian Islamic
Banking Act (1993) refers to banking as a “lending business” and investment accounts
are considered to be liabilities’.
9. Deputy Minister Fakhrieh-Kashan has been juggling attempts for three years to arrange
financing for the purchase of 100 new aircraft from Boeing and Airbus for Iran Air.
When the Iran Nuclear Agreement was signed, Boeing and Airbus quickly agreed to the
sale and to provide assistance with financing. The United States has forced both out of
their earlier promises, and only three aircrafts were delivered. At year-end 2017, the
Iranian lead economic newspaper Financial Tribune (2017) announced China would fund
purchase, but back channel US pressure may make it difficult for either Boeing or Airbus
to deliver. Such pressure not only keeps Iran Air’s average fleet-age at over 20 years old,
but retards or even removes the possibilities of servicing incoming newer planes should
Tehran attempt to build on its hub position.

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