Reyes, Joselle J.

Law 312 – Public International Law

Digest
(Topic 1. General Principles)
Kuroda v. Jalandoni
G.R. No.L-2662, March 26, 1949
Doctrine of incorporation
Facts: Kuroda was a Japanese general stationed in the Philippines.
He was being prosecuted for committing atrocities during World War II
pursuant to the Geneva Convention. He interposed the defense that he
cannot be tried because there is no Philippine law punishing war crimes
and the Philippines was not a signatory to the said convention.
Issue/s: Whether or not Kuruda can be tried in the Philippines?
Ruling: Yes, pursuant to the doctrine of incorporation. It cannot be
denied that the rules and regulations of The Hague and Geneva
Conventions form part of Philippine law since it is wholly based on the
generally accepted principles of international law. In fact these rules and
principles were accepted by the two belligerent nations, the United States
and Japan, who were signatories to the convention. Such rules and
principles, therefore, form part of the law of our nation even if the
Philippines was not a signatory to the convention embodying them, for our
constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is
not confined to the recognition of rules and principles of international law as
contained in treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a
signatory.
Lo Ching v. Archishop
81 Phil 601

FACTS:
On August 30, 1940, the Archbishop of Manila through the Bank of the Philippine Islands leased a farm
to Lo and So Yun Ching Chong Co. with Nos. 1095 with 1101 R. located at de la Calle Hidalgo, Manila,
under a monthly income of P500 by the end of three years counting from the first of September 1940,
extendable to two years (two years upon agreement of the parties). The tenant took the property by
setting it in a hotel.

In February 1942, the Japanese army echoed the tenants of the property and delivered the latter to
German Otto Schulze who worked until January 1945 at the advent of the liberation army.

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In early February 1945, tenant reoccupied the property and paid the monthly rental fee. Before the end
of August of that year, the landlord required the tenants to vacate the property, however, they refused.

Therefore, the landlord on September 8, 1945 filed for an application for eviction in the Municipal Court
of Manila. On October 8, 1945, it ordered the tenants to vacate the property and pay its monthly rent of
P625 from the first September 1945, plus damages in the amount of P500 and legal expenses.

The appellants contend that they are entitled to occupy the property for three full years, the occupation
must be effective, and continuous material, which should not be deprived of the use and enjoyment of
the property, and the appellants are entitled to deduct that period of three years, all the time that no
longer have the lease available to the Japanese army.

Issue/s:

1. Whether or not Hague Convention of 1907 allows occupation and seizure of private lands.

2.Whether or not Japanese soldiers occupied the farm in dispute.

Held:

1.No. The Hague Convention of 1907 does not allow an occupying army to seize private property in the
territory invaded. In contrast, states that: "Family honor and rights, the lives of persons, and private
property, as well as religious convictions and practice, must be respected. Private property cannot be
confiscated." (Article 46).

2.The farm is not even used as army barracks, and there is no evidence that it was seized by military
necessity, what can be deduced that the Japanese soldiers disposed of the property, not in the
legitimate exercise the authority of an occupying army, but spurred on by uncontrolled and
uncontrollable desire to take over other people.

Borovsky v. Commissioner of Immigration

G.R. No L-4362, September 28, 1951
Doctrine of incorporation
FACTS:

Victor A. Borovsky, petitioner, claims to be a stateless citizen, born in Shanghai, China, of Russian
parentage. He came to the Philippines in 1936 and had resided herein ever since, if the period of his
detention be included.

On June 24, 1946, by order of the Commissioner of immigration of the Philippines the petitioner was
arrested for investigation as to his past activities. A warrant for deportation was issued by the
Deportation Board on the grounds that he has been found to be an undesirable alien, a vagrant and
habitual drunkard.

Petitioner was deported to China but he was not provided with an entry visa because he was not a a
national of China. He was therefore brought back to Manila and was confined to the new Bilibid Prison

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in Muntinlupa. On December 8, 1947, was granted provisional release by the President through
Secretary of Justice for a period of six months. Before the expiration of that period, the Immigration
department rearrested him and brought him to Cebu for the purpose of placing him on board a Russian
vessel carrying out the deportation order issued against him. However, said deportation failed to
materialize as the captain of the ship refused to take him on board without permission from the Russian
government. As such, petitioner was again detained. The Immigration Officials however alleged that
while in detention, they have been taking steps regarding the disposition of those foreigners subject to
deportation while awaiting availability of transportation or arrangements to the place where they may
be sent.

Petitioner then filed for a writ of habeas corpus to which the court denied as mainly on the ground that
such detention was merely temporary. Over two years had elapsed since the decision was promulgated,
but still the Government had not found ways and means of removing the petitioner out of the country.
Hence this second petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner be continuously detained without a fix period pending deportation.

Held: NO. Aliens illegally staying in the Philippines have no right of asylum therein (Soewapadji vs.
Wixon, Sept. 13, 1946, 157 F. ed., 289, 290), even if they are "stateless," which the petitioner claims to
be. Foreign nationals, not enemy, against whom no criminal charges have been formally made or judicial
order issued, may not indefinitely be kept in detention. The protection against deprivation of liberty,
without due process of law and except for crimes committed against the laws of the land is not limited
to Philippine citizens but extends to all residents, except enemy aliens, regardless of nationality.
Whether an alien who entered the country in violation of its immigration laws may be detained for as
long as the Government is unable to deport him, is beside the point and we need not decide. There is no
allegation that the petitioner's entry into the Philippines was not lawful; on the contrary, the inference
from the pleadings and the Deportation Board's findings is that he came to and lived in this country
under legal permit.

Moreover, by its Constitution (Art. II, sec. 3) the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of Nation." And in a resolution entitled "Universal Declaration of
Human Rights" and approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations of which the Philippines is
a member, at its plenary meeting on December 10, 1948, the right to life and liberty and all other
fundamental rights as applied to all human beings were proclaimed. lt was there resolved that "All
human beings are born free and equal in degree and rights" (Art. 1); that "Everyone is entitled to all the
rights and freedom set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, nationality or social origin, property, birth, or other status
(Art. 2) ; that "Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts
violating the fundamental rights granted him by the Constitution or by law" (Art. 8); that "No one shall
be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile" (Art. 9) etc.

Laguna lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 110120, March 16, 1994

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Facts:
The Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish,
Caloocan City filed a letter-complaint with the Laguna Lake Development
Authority (LLDA) seeking to stop the operation of the 8.6-hectare open
garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City due to
its harmful effects on the residents and the environment.
It was found out that the City Government of Caloocan (CGC) was
maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin area without first securing
the documents as required by law.
A Cease and Desist Order was issued by the LLDA to completely halt, stop
and desist from dumping any form or kind of garbage and other waste
matter at the Camarin dumpsite.
The dumping operation was forthwith stopped by the CGC. However, the
dumping operation was resumed after a meeting was conducted and the
parties concerned failed to settle the problem.
The LLDA issued another order reiterating its first order and issued an Alias
Cease and Desist Order enjoining the CGC from continuing its dumping
operations at the Camarin area.
Pending its motion, the CGC filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City (RTCC) an action for the declaration of nullity of the cease and desist
order with prayer for the issuance of writ of injunction. The CGC sought to
be declared as the sole authority empowered to promote the health and
safety and enhance the right of the people in Caloocan City to a balanced
ecology within its territorial jurisdiction.
The Executive Judge of the RTCC issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the LLDA from enforcing its cease and desist order.
The LLDA, for its part, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground, among
others, that under Republic Act No. 3931, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 984, otherwise known as the Pollution Control Law, the cease
and desist order issued by it which is the subject matter of the complaint is
reviewable both upon the law and the facts of the case by the Court of
Appeals and not by the Regional Trial Court.
Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio (Judge Serapio) consolidated the civil cases
earlier filed but LLDA maintained that the foregoing cases, being
independent of each other, should have been treated separately. Judge

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Serapio, after hearing the motion to dismiss, issued in the consolidated
cases an order denying LLDA's motion to dismiss and granting the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the LLDA, its agent
and all persons acting for and on its behalf, from enforcing or implementing
its cease and desist order.
The LLDA filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer
for restraining order with the Supreme Court seeking to nullify the aforesaid
order.
The Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition.
The Court of Appeals dismissed Civil Case, preliminary injunction issued
was set aside; the cease and desist order of LLDA was likewise set aside
and the temporary restraining order enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan
and/or the City Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping
its garbage at the subject dumpsite was lifted. Hence, the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the LLDA has the power and authority to issue a "cease
and desist" order under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws?
Held:
The irresistible answer is in the affirmative. The cease and desist order
issued by the LLDA requiring the City Government of Caloocan to stop
dumping its garbage in the Camarin open dumpsite found by the LLDA to
have been done in violation of Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, and
other relevant environment laws, cannot be stamped as an unauthorized
exercise by the LLDA of injunctive powers. By its express terms, Republic
Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927,
series of 1983, authorizes the LLDA to "make, alter or modify order
requiring the discontinuance or pollution." 24 (Emphasis supplied) Section
4, par. (d) explicitly authorizes the LLDA to make whatever order may be
necessary in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
To be sure, the LLDA was not expressly conferred the power "to issue and
ex-parte cease and desist order" in a language, as suggested by the City
Government of Caloocan, similar to the express grant to the defunct
National Pollution Control Commission under Section 7 of P.D. No. 984
which, admittedly was not reproduced in P.D. No. 813 and E.O. No. 927,
series of 1983. However, it would be a mistake to draw therefrom the
conclusion that there is a denial of the power to issue the order in question

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when the power "to make, alter or modify orders requiring the
discontinuance of pollution" is expressly and clearly bestowed upon the
LLDA by Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983.

Assuming arguendo that the authority to issue a "cease and desist order"
were not expressly conferred by law, there is jurisprudence enough to the
effect that the rule granting such authority need not necessarily be express.
While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such
powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that
an administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied
in the exercise of its express powers. 26 In the exercise, therefore, of its
express powers under its charter as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body
with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of
the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied.
Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a "toothless" paper agency.
Secretary of Justice V. Judge Lantion
G.R No. 139465, January 18, 2000
Doctrine: The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most
fundamental maxims of international law, requires the parties to a treaty to
keep their agreement therein in good faith.
Facts: On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the
Department of Foreign Affairs of the United States requesting for the
extradition of Mark Jimenez for various crimes in violation of US laws. In
compliance with the related municipal law, specifically Presidential Decree
No. 1069 “Prescribing the Procedure for Extradition of Persons Who Have
committed Crimes in a Foreign Country” and the established “Extradition
Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the Government of
the United States of America”, the department proceeded with proceeded
with the designation of a panel of attorneys to conduct a technical
evaluation and assessment as provided for in the presidential decree and
the treaty.
The respondent requested for a copy of the official extradition request as
well as the documents and papers submitted therein. The petitioner denied
the request as it alleges that such information is confidential in nature and
that it is premature to provide such document as the process is not a

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preliminary investigation but a mere evaluation. Therefore, the
constitutional rights of the accused are not yet available.
Issues:
1. Whether or not private respondent, Mark B. Jimenez, be granted access
to the official extradition request and documents with an opportunity to file a
comment on or opposition thereto
2. Whether or not private respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing
during the evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the
legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition
Treaty
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the private respondent be furnished a
copy of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to give him a
reasonable period of time within which to file his comment with supporting
evidence. In this case, there exists a clear conflict between the obligation of
the Philippine Government to comply with the provisions of the treaty and
its equally significant role of protection of its citizens of its right of due
process.
The processes outlined in the treaty and in the presidential decree already
pose an impending threat to a prospective extraditee’s liberty as early as
the evaluation stage. It is not an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very
imminent one. On the other hand, granting due process to the extradition
case causes delay in the process.
The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental
maxims of international law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their
agreement therein in good faith. The doctrine of incorporation is applied
whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which there
appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the
provisions of the constitution or statute of a local state. Efforts should be
done to harmonize them. In a situation, however, where the conflict is
irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international
law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be
upheld by the municipal courts. The doctrine of incorporation decrees that
rules of international law are given equal standing, but are not superior to,
national legislative enactments.
In this case, there is no conflict between international law and municipal
law. The United States and the Philippines share a mutual concern about

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the suppression and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions. At
the same time, both States accord common due process protection to their
respective citizens. In fact, neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law
precludes the rights of due process from a prospective extradite.
Lao H. Ichong vs Jaime Hernandez
101 Phil 105
Facts:
Chinese businessman, Lao Ichong, entered the country to take advantage
of business opportunities in the Philippines. His type of business
particularly is a retail business. He and his fellow Chinese businessmen
enjoyed a “monopoly” in the local market in Pasay. But in June 1954,
Congress passed the Republic Act No. 1180 or the Retail Trade
Nationalization Act. In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business. The
main provisions of the Act are:
a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against
associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not
wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or
indirectly in the retail trade;
an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged
in said business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engaged
therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until
their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten
years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of
juridical persons; an exception there from in favor of citizens and juridical
entities of the United States;
a provision for the forfeiture of licenses for violation of the laws on
nationalization, control weights and measures and labor and other laws
relating to trade, commerce and industry;
a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually
engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail
business,
a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to
present for registration with the proper authorities a verified statement
concerning their businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature of the
business, their assets and liabilities and their offices and principal offices of

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judicial entities; and a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in
the retail business who die, to continue such business for a period of six
months for purposes of liquidation.
Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents’
corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of
Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration
that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and
all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal
treasurers, from enforcing its provisions.
Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that: it denies
to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of
their liberty and property without due process the subject of the Act is not
expressed in the title the Act violates international treaties and obligations
the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail
business thru hereditary succession
Issue:
Whether or not the Act violates international treaties and obligations.
Held:
NO. It cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty
obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject
and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or
any other conventional agreement.
The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the
Republic of China of April 18, 1947 is also claimed to be violated by the law
in question. All that the treaty guarantees is equality of treatment to the
Chinese nationals “upon the same terms as the nationals of any other
country.” But the nationals of China are not discriminating against because
nationals of all other countries, except those of the United States, who are
granted special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging
in the retail trade. But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said
treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a
subsequent law.
We find no merit in the Nations Charter imposes no strict or legal
obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects (Hans Kelsen,
The Law of the United Nations, 1951 ed. pp. 29-32), and the Declaration of

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Human Rights contains nothing more than a mere recommendation or a
common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations (Id. p. 39.)
That such is the import of the United Nations Charter aid of the Declaration
of Human Rights can be inferred the fact that members of the United
Nations Organizations, such as Norway and Denmark, prohibit foreigners
from engaging in retail trade, and in most nations of the world laws against
foreigners engaged in domestic trade are adopted.
Nicaragua v. United States
ICJ Rep 14, June 27, 1986
Doctrine of incorporation

Facts: The United States challenged the jurisdiction of the I.C.J when it was
held responsible for illegal military and paramilitary activities in and against
Nicaragua in the suit the plaintiff brought against the defendant in 1984.
Though a declaration accepting the mandatory jurisdiction of the Court was
deposited by the United States in a 1946, it tried to justify the declaration in
a 1984 notification by referring to the 1946 declaration and stating in part
that the declaration “shall not apply to disputes with any Central American
State….”
Apart from maintaining the ground that the I.C.J lacked jurisdiction, the
States also argued that Nicaragua failed to deposit a similar declaration to
the Court. On the other hand, Nicaragua based its argument on its reliance
on the 1946 declaration made by the United states due to the fact that it
was a “state accepting the same obligation” as the United States when it
filed charges in the I.C.J. against the United States. Also, the plaintiff intent
to submit to the compulsory jurisdiction of the I.C.J. was pointed out by the
valid declaration it made in 1929 with the I.C.J’s predecessor, which was
the Permanent Court of International Justice, even though Nicaragua had
failed to deposit it with that court. The admissibility of Nicaragua’s
application to the I.C.J. was also challenged by the United States.
Issue/s: (1) Is the jurisdiction to entertain a dispute between two
states, if they both accept the Court’s jurisdiction, within the jurisdiction of
the International Court of Justice?
(2) Where no grounds exist to exclude the application of a state, is the
application of such a state to the International Court of Justice admissible?

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 Ruling: (1) Yes. The jurisdiction of the Court to entertain a dispute
between two states if each of the States accepted the Court’s jurisdiction is
within the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. Even though
Nicaragua declaration of 1929 was not deposited with the Permanent
Court, because of the potential effect it had that it would last for many
years, it was valid.
Thus, it maintained its effect when Nicaragua became a party to the Statute
of the I.C.J because the declaration was made unconditionally and was
valid for an unlimited period. The intention of the current drafters of the
current Statute was to maintain the greatest possible continuity between it
and the Permanent Court. Thus, when Nicaragua accepted the Statute, this
would have been deemed that the plaintiff had given its consent to the
transfer of its declaration to the I.C.J.
(2) Yes. When no grounds exist to exclude the application of a state, the
application of such a state to the International Court of Justice is
admissible. The five grounds upon which the United States challenged the
admissibility of Nicaragua’s application were that the plaintiff failed because
there is no “indispensable parties” rule when it could not bring forth
necessary parties, Nicaragua’s request of the Court to consider the
possibility of a threat to peace which is the exclusive province of the
Security Council, failed due to the fact that I.C.J. can exercise jurisdiction
which is concurrent with that of the Security Council, that the I.C.J. is
unable to deal with situations involving ongoing armed conflict and that
there is nothing compelling the I.C.J. to decline to consider one aspect of a
dispute just because the dispute has other aspects due to the fact that the
case is incompatible with the Contadora process to which Nicaragua is a
party.

North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v.

Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v. Netherlands)
ICJ Rep 3, 1969
Maritime Territory
Facts: That the boundaries between their respective areas of the
continental shelf in the North Sea and the area claimed by the Federal
Republic of Germany, should be determined by the application of the
principle of equidistance as set forth in Article 6 of the Geneva Convention
of 1958 on the Continental Shelf, which by January 1, 1969 had been

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ratified or acceded to by 39 states but to which Germany was not a party,
was the basis of Denmark’s and the Netherland’s contention.
Because the use of the delimitation method was not merely a conventional
obligation, but a rule that was part of the corpus of general international law
and like other rules of general or customary international law, which was
binding automatically on Germany, independent of any specific assent,
direct or indirect, given by Germany, Denmark and the Netherland’s
contended that Germany was bound to accept the delimitation on an
equidistance basis.
Issue: Must delimitation be the object of an equitable agreement
between the states involved?
Ruling: Yes. Delimitation must be the object of an equitable
agreement between the states involved. As stipulated in Article 6 of the
Geneva Convention, equidistance principle is not part of customary
international law. Article 6 makes the obligation to use the equidistance
method a secondary one which comes into play only when agreements
between the parties are absent. Although the principle of equidistance is
not given a fundamental norm-creating character by Article 6, which is
necessary to the formation of a general rule of law.
In this case, after taking into consideration all relevant circumstances, the
delimitation here is to be excused by equitable agreement.
Anglo – Norwegian Fisheries Case
ICJ Rep 116, 1951
Straight Baseline Principle
Facts: In 1935 by a government decree Norway defined its Territorial
sea connecting 48 points of land, Norway’s Territorial Sea was not
measured from the low water line along the coast, but from straight
baselines linking the outermost points on the extremities of the islands and
headlands of the coast. Therefore, the Southern portion of the lines
embraced clusters of islands. The Northern portion covered a heavily
indented coastline. Therefore the UK challenged the decree of Norway,
saying that it’s in contradiction with principle of international law.
Issue: Whether the delimitation Norway contradict any international
law or not?

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 Ruling: No. It held that the method employed in the delimitation of the
fisheries zone by the Royal Norwegian decree of the 12th July 1935 is not
contrary to international law.
The Court is led to conclude that the method of straight lines,
established in the Norwegian system, was imposed by the peculiar
geography of the Norwegian coast; that even before the dispute arose, this
method had been consolidated by a constant and sufficiently long practice,
in the face of which the attitude of governments bears witness to the fact
that they did not consider it to be contrary to international law.
Hilao v. Estate of Marcos
25 F.3d 1467
Straight baseline principle
Facts: The district court instructed the jury that it could find the Estate
liable if itfound either that (1) Marcos directed, ordered, conspired with, or
aidedthe military in torture, summary execution, and "disappearance" or(2)
if Marcos knew of such conduct by the military and failed to use hispower to
prevent it.The Estate challenges the latter basis for liability,arguing that
liability is not imposed under such conditions in analogous U.S. law claims,
that "no international law decision ... has ever imposedliability upon a
foreign official" on those grounds, and that the districtcourt essentially
made the Estate liable on a respondeat superior theorythat is inapplicable
in intentional torts.
Issue: Whether or not the district court’s instruction on the second
category of liability was proper under international law?
Ruling: No. It held that the method employed in the delimitation of the
fisheries zone by the Royal Norwegian decree of the 12th July 1935 is not
contrary to international law.
The Court is led to conclude that the method of straight lines,
established in the Norwegian system, was imposed by the peculiar
geography of the Norwegian coast; that even before the dispute arose, this
method had been consolidated by a constant and sufficiently long practice,
in the face of which the attitude of governments bears witness to the fact
that they did not consider it to be contrary to international law.

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Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v.
Health Secretary Francisco T. Duque
G.R. No. 173034

Doctrine: The transformation method requires that an international law be

transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such
as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere
constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of
domestic law.
Facts: Named as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries,
and Assistant Secretaries of the Department of Health (DOH). For
purposes of herein petition, the DOH is deemed impleaded as a co-
respondent since respondents issued the questioned RIRR in their capacity
as officials of said executive agency.1Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code)
was issued by President Corazon Aquino on October 28, 1986 by virtue of
the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom
Constitution. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that
the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of
Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World
Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted
several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported,
promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and
health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. In 1990, the
Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties should take
appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that
all segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the
advantages of breastfeeding. On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein
assailed RIRR which was to take effect on July 7, 2006.
Issue: Whether or not Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing
Rules and Regulations (RIRR) issued by the Department of Health (DOH)
is not constitutional?
Ruling: Yes. Under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come
into force for members, in the same way that conventions or agreements

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under Article 19 and regulations under Article 21 come into force. Article 23
of the WHO Constitution reads:
Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make
recommendations to Members with respect to any matter within the
competence of the Organization for an international rule to be considered
as customary law, it must be established that such rule is being followed by
states because they consider it obligatory to comply with such rules.
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the
sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The
transformation method requires that an international law be transformed
into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local
legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional
declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.
Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the
WHA Resolutions into domestic law. The provisions of the WHA
Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can be
implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by
the legislature

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