CIVIL PROCEDURE

BY: BONGAT, MA. CARLEEN S.

CASE DIGESTS 2018073111

MOTIONS TO MODES OF DISCOVERY

 G. MOTIONS
Motions in General – Omnibus Motion Rule

Case: Home Dev’t Mutual Fund v. Sps. See, G.R. No. 170292, June 22, 2011

FACTS:
• Respondent-spouses were the highest bidders in the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of a property that was mortgaged to
petitioner. They paid the bid price in cash to respondent Sheriff Arimado which was acknowledged by the sheriff. In turn,
respondent-spouses received a Certificate of Sale.
• Despite the expiration of the redemption period, Pag-ibig refused to surrender its certificate of title to the respondent-
spouses because it had not received the respondent-spouses’ payment from Sheriff Arimado who failed to remit the
same despite repeated demands.
• Considering petitioner’s refusal to recognize their payment, respondent-spouses filed a Complaint for Specific
Performance with Damages against petitioner before the RTC-Branch 3 of Legaazpi City.
• Petitioner insisted that it has no duty to deliver the certificate of title to respondent-spouses unless it actually receives
the bid price.
• When the case was called for pre-trial conference, the parties submitted their Compromise Agreement. The Compromise
Agreement states that “in the event that Sheriff Arimado fails to pay petitioner or respondent-spouses, the respondent-
spouses shall be entitled to an immediate writ of execution and the issue whether petitioner shall be liable for the release
of the title to respondent-spouses shall continue to be litigated upon in order that the Honorable Court may resolve the
legality of said issue.”
• The trial court approved the Compromise Agreement. Sheriff Arimado failed to pay on or before October 31, 2001, the
trial court proceeded to rule on the issue, as stated on the Compromise Agreement.
• The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent-spouses and ordered petitioner to deliver the documents of ownership to the
respondent-spouses. Petitioner’s MR was denied.
• On May 24, 2002, petitioner filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 in order to annul and set aside
RTC’s Decision which the CA. The CA stated that petitioner’s remedy was to appeal the RTC Decision and not a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65, stating that the remedy of certiorari was not a substitute for a lost appeal.
• Petitioner argues that it was denied due process when no trial was conducted for the reception of evidence. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not petitioner was entitled to a trial prior to the rendition of February 21, 2002 Decision of the RTC.

RULING:
No, petitioner is not entitled to a trial prior to the rendition of the February 21, 2002 Decision of the RTC. In its ruling, the
Court noted that petitioner did not object to the absence of a trial when it sought for reconsideration of the February 21, 2002
Decision. Under the Omnibus Motion Rule embodied in Sec. 8, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, all available objections that are not
included in a party’s motion shall be deemed waived. Therefore, petitioner’s argument regarding his entitlement to a trial prior
to the rendition of the RTC Decision must fail.

CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS (MOTIONS TO MODES OF DISCOVERY) FOR JD4201 UNDER ATTY. JEDREK NG
BY: BONGAT, MA. CARLEEN S. – 2018073111
 G. MOTIONS
Motion to Dismiss – Grounds

Case: Aqualab Phils., Inc. v. Heirs of Pagobo, G.R. No. 182673, October 5, 2009

FACTS:
• Subject of the complaint initiated by respondents are Lots 6727-Q and 6727-Y of the Opon Cadastre situated in Punta
Engaño, Lapu-lapu City, Mactan Island, Cebu. The lots used to be part of Lot 6727 owned by respondents’ great
grandfather, Juan Pagobo. OCT RO-1277 and OCT RO-2246 were issued in the name of Juan Pagobo.
• After the issuance of OCT RO-1277 and OCTRO-2246, the subject lots were subsequently sold to Tarcela de Espina from
one Antonio Alcantar. Espina then sold the subject lots to Rene Espina. Rene Espina then sold it to Anthony Gaw Kache.
Anthony Gaw Kache then sold it petitioner Aqualab.
• On August 10, 1994, respondents filed a Complaint for Partition, Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Cancellation of
TCTs, Reconveyance with Right of Legal Redemption, Damages and Attorney’s Fees against Aqualab. They allege that
Aqualab has disturbed their peaceful occupation of subject lots in 1991.
• On September 12, 1994, Aqualab filed its Motion to Dismiss on the ff. grounds: (1) the actions had already prescribed;
(2) no cause of action for partition and legal redemption of the mother title of subject lots, since it had already been
subdivided and several conveyances made of the subdivided lots.
• The RTC granted Aqualab’s motion and dismissed respondent’s complaint on the ground of prescription.
• Upon appeal with the CA by the respondents, the CA reversed the RTC’s decision and declared that the sale of the subject
lots is null and void. It remanded the case to the trial court for partition proceedings.
• Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S: W/N the RTC erred in granting petitioner’s motion to dismiss.

RULING:
Yes, the RTC erred in granting petitioner’s motion to dismiss. In its ruling, the Court explained that prescription, as a
ground for a motion to dismiss, is adequate when the complaint, on its face, shows that the action has already prescribed. The
prescriptive period for the reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property is 10 years, reckoned from the date of the
issuance of the certificate of title, if the plaintiff is not in possession. In the present case, respondents have duly averred continuous
possession until 1991 when such was allegedly disturbed by Aqualab. Being in possession of the subject lots, respondents’ right
to reconveyance or annulment of title has not prescribed. Since respondents filed their complaint in 1994, or three years after
their possession was allegedly disturbed, it is clear that prescription has not set in, either due to fraud or constructive trust.
On the second ground raised by petitioner, the Court further explained that in order to sustain a motion to dismiss for
lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist rather than a claim has been defectively
stated or is ambiguous, indefinite, or uncertain. However, such does not show in the present case. A perusal of the respondents’
Complaint shows that respondents’ action before the RTC has sufficiently stated a cause of action.
Given the explanation stated by the Court, the trial court therefore committed an error of judgment in granting Aqualab’s
motion to dismiss.

CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS (MOTIONS TO MODES OF DISCOVERY) FOR JD4201 UNDER ATTY. JEDREK NG
BY: BONGAT, MA. CARLEEN S. – 2018073111
Case: Palmiano-Salvador v. Angeles, G.R. No. 171219, September 3, 2012

FACTS:
• Respondent Angeles is one of the registered owners of a parcel of land in Sampaloc, Manila. The subject parcel of land
was occupied by one Jelly Galiga from 1979 to 1993 as a lessee with a lease contract.
• Subsequently, Fe Salvador alleged that she bought on September 7, 1993 the subject parcel of land from Galiga who
represented that he was the owner, being one in possession. Petitioner Salvador remained in possession of said subject
property from November 1993 up to present.
• On November 18, 1993, the registered owner, the respondent Angeles sent a letter to petitioner Salvador demanding
that the latter vacate the subject property. The letter was not heeded by petitioner.
• Respondent Angeles then filed a Complaint for Ejectment, through one Rosario Diaz, against petitioner with the MeTC of
Manila, Branch 16. The MeTC ruled in favor of Angeles.
• Upon appeal with the RTC, petitioner alleged that Diaz, who filed the complaint for ejectment, had no authority from
respondent Angeles at the time of the filing of the suit. The said appeal was denied by the same court.
• Petitioner elevated the case to the CA via a petition for review but the said petition was dismissed for lack of merit. The
CA affirmed the factual findings of the both the MeTC and the RTC.
• Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S: W/N Rosauro Diaz has authority to represent respondent in filing the complaint with the MeTC.

RULING:
No, Rosauro Diaz does not have the authority to represent respondent in filing the complaint with the MeTC.
Jurisprudence states that if a complaint is filed for and in behalf of the plaintiff by someone who is not authorized to do so, the
complaint is not deemed filed. An unauthorized complaint does not produce any legal effect. Hence, the court should dismiss the
complaint on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the complaint and the plaintiff. In the present case, the complaint before
the MeTC was filed in the name of the respondent, but it was one Rosauro Diaz who executed the verification and certification
dated October 12, 1994, alleging therein that he was respondent’s attorney-in-fact. However, there was no copy of any document
attached to the complaint to prove Diaz’s allegation regarding the authority supposedly granted to him. While it was true that
respondent attached to his Reply and/or Comment a document entitled Special Power of Attorney (SPA) supposedly executed by
respondent in favor of Rosauro Diaz, the said SPA was executed only on November 16, 1994 or more than a month after the
complaint was filed. Therefore, the MeTC never acquired jurisdiction over this case and all proceedings before it were null and
void.

CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS (MOTIONS TO MODES OF DISCOVERY) FOR JD4201 UNDER ATTY. JEDREK NG
BY: BONGAT, MA. CARLEEN S. – 2018073111
 G. MOTIONS
Motion to Dismiss – When grounds pleaded as affirmative defenses

Case: Spouses Rasdas v. Estenor, G.R. No. 157605, December 13, 2005

FACTS:
• The case involves a parcel of land located in Ilagan, Isabela. On October 29, 1992, respondent filed a Complaint for
Recovery of Ownership and Possession With Damages against petitioners. In the same Complaint, respondent asserted
that he was the owner of the subject property which was then in possession of petitioners.
• On November 6, 1995, the RTC decided in favor of petitioners. However, on September 25, 1997, the CA reversed the
judgment of the RTC and declared respondent as the owner of the subject property. Petitioners were ordered to vacate
the land. The same decision became final and executory.
• Petitioners then filed a Complaint dated July 6, 1999 against respondent for just compensation and preliminary injunction
with TRO. Notwithstanding the earlier pronouncement of the CA, petitioners asserted therein that they were the lawful
owners of the subject property.
• Respondent countered with a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that petitioners’ complaint was barred by res judicata, owing
to final and executory judgment of the CA. Said motion was denied by the RTC and pre-trial ensued.
• However, before trial proper ensued, respondent filed a motion for preliminary hearing on the affirmative defense of
lack of jurisdiction and res judicata. The RTC granted the motion. The said court also declared itself “constrained to apply
the principle of res judicata”. The RTC ordered the dismissal of petitioners’ complaint.
• The finding of res judicata was affirmed by the CA. Petitioners now argue that since respondent’s Motion to Dismiss on
the ground of res judicata had already been denied, the consequent preliminary hearing on the special defenses which
precluded the dismissal of the complaint was null and void.
• Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S: W/N the RTC erred in ordering the dismissal of petitioners’ complaint.

RULING:
No, the RTC did not err in ordering the dismissal of petitioners’ complaint. In its ruling, the Court noted that the RTC’s act
of staging preliminary hearing on the affirmative defense of lack of jurisdiction and res judicata is not in regular order. Under Sec.
Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, the allowance of preliminary hearing, while left in the discretion of the court, is authorized only if
no motion to dismiss has been filed but any of the grounds for a motion to dismiss had been placed as an affirmative defense in
the answer. In the present case, respondents had filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata, but the same was denied.
They then filed an answer alleging res judicata as a special affirmative defense, but later presented a Motion for Preliminary
Hearing which was granted, leading to the dismissal of the case.
The general rule must be reiterated that the preliminary hearing contemplated under Sec. 6, Rule 16 applies only if no
motion to dismiss has been filed. However, an exception was carved out in California and Hawaiian Sugar Company v. Pioneer
Insurance, wherein the Court noted that while Sec. 6 disallowed a preliminary hearing of affirmative defenses once a motion to
dismiss has been filed, such hearing could nonetheless be had if the trial court had not categorically resolved the motion to dismiss.
In the present case, the Court noted that the judge who heard the motion to dismiss was different from the judge who later
authorized the preliminary hearing. With this event, the Court stated that if a judge disagrees with his/her predecessor’s previous
ruling denying a motion to dismiss, the proper recourse is not to conduct a preliminary hearing on affirmative defenses, but to
utilize the contested ground as part of the basis of the decision on the merits. Given the circumstances of the case, it could have
been said that the RTC erred in dismissing petitioners’ complaint, however, it is worth noting that the complaint in question is so
evidently barred by res judicata. Therefore, the RTC did not err in ordering the dismissal of petitioners’ complaint in this case.

CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS (MOTIONS TO MODES OF DISCOVERY) FOR JD4201 UNDER ATTY. JEDREK NG
BY: BONGAT, MA. CARLEEN S. – 2018073111
 I.PRE-TRIAL
Nature and purpose

Case: Pacaña -Contreras v. Rovila Water Supply, G.R. No. 168979, December 2, 2013

FACTS:

[same case appeared in an earlier Rule]

ISSUE/S: W/N Sec. 2, pars. G and I, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court is applicable to respondents’ motion to dismiss in order for it to
be valid.

RULING:
No, Sec. 2, pars. G and I, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court is not applicable in this case. In its ruling, the Court ruled that it is
Section 1 (g) and (j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court that is applicable in this case. The first paragraph of Sec. 1, Rule 16 provides for
the period within which to file a motion to dismiss under the grounds enumerated. Specifically, the motion should be filed within
the time for, but before the filing of, the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim. Equally important to this provision
is Sec. 1, Rule 9 which states that defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed
waived, except for the following grounds: (1) the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) litis pendencia; (3) res
judicata; and (4) prescription. Therefore, the grounds not falling under these four (4) exceptions may be considered as waived in
the event that they are not timely invoked. As the respondents’ motion to dismiss was based on the grounds which should be
timely invoked, material to the resolution of this case is the period within which they were raised. Rule 18 is, therefore, not
applicable in this case.

CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS (MOTIONS TO MODES OF DISCOVERY) FOR JD4201 UNDER ATTY. JEDREK NG
BY: BONGAT, MA. CARLEEN S. – 2018073111
 I.PRE-TRIAL
Notice of pre-trial

Case: Polanco v. Cruz, G.R. No. 182426, February 13, 2009

FACTS:
• Respondent Cruz, through her attorney-in-fact, Virgilio Cruz, filed a Complaint for Damages against petitioners for
allegedly destroying her crops. While she admitted that petitioners own the agricultural land she tilled, respondent
claimed that she was the lawful tenant thereof and had been in actual possession of it.
• Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, which was denied by the RTC on December 4, 2000. Petitioners simultaneously filed
an Answer to the complaint and a Motion for Reconsideration of the December 4, 2000 Order, which the trial court
denied for lack of merit on September 10, 2001.
• On January 9, 2002, the trial court dismissed the case due to respondent’s failure to prosecute. Respondent appealed to
the CA, wherein the CA ruled that the trial court erred in finding the parties failed to take necessary action regarding the
case. The CA noted that petitioners filed an Answer to the complaint while respondent filed an Opposition to the Motion
for Reconsideration.
• The CA also held that the previous acts of respondent do not manifest lack of interest to prosecute the case. It stated
that respondent filed an Opposition to petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss, an Answer to petitioners’ counterclaim and a
Comment to petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.
• The CA denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.
• Hence, this petition where petitioners allege that respondent failed to comply with the mandate of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure to promptly move for the setting of the case for pre-trial.

ISSUE/S: W/N respondent’s complaint should be dismissed on the ground of her failure to move for the setting of the case for pre-
trial.

RULING:
No, the respondent’s complaint should not be dismissed based on the grounds cited by petitioner. While Sec. 1, Rule 18
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure imposes upon the plaintiff the duty to promptly move ex parte to have the case set for pre-
trial after the last pleading has been served and filed, the Court cited A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC which states that: “Within five (5) days
from the date of filing of the reply, plaintiff must promptly move ex parte that the case be set for pre-trial conference. If the
plaintiff fails to file said motion within the given period, the Branch COC shall issue a notice of pre-trial.” As such, the Court noted
that the clerk of court of Branch 17 of the RTC of Malolos should issue a notice of pre-trial to the parties and set the case for pre-
trial.

CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS (MOTIONS TO MODES OF DISCOVERY) FOR JD4201 UNDER ATTY. JEDREK NG
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Case: Espiritu v. Lazaro, G.R. No. 181020, November 25, 2009

FACTS:
• On June 29, 1998, petitioners filed a Complaint for Recovery of Personal Property with Damages and Preliminary
Attachment against respondents. The trial court granted the prayer for preliminary attachment and the corresponding
writ was subsequently issued after petitioners posted a bond.
• Respondents filed an urgent motion to set aside and discharge the attachment. On February 12, 1999, the trial court
denied the motion to discharge the attachment and the two motions to dismiss and directed respondents to file their
Answer.
• On March 31, 2000, respondent Sison filed her Answer with Counterclaim and Crossclaim. Respondents Lazaro
questioned the February 12, 1999 Order in a petition for certiorari filed with the CA. Respondents elevated the case to
the Supreme Court when the CA did not rule favorably.
• The Supreme Court denied the petition on January 21, 2002. The Resolution became final and executory on July 17, 2002.
• On July 19, 2002, respondents Lazaro filed a Cautionary Answer with Manifestation and a Motion to File a
Supplemental/Amended Answer. On August 5, 2002, petitioners received a copy of the cautionary answer.
• On July 24, 2003, the trial court dismissed the complaint due to petitioners’ failure to prosecute for an unreasonable
length of time. The Court noted that despite the lapse of time since respondents filed a cautionary answer, petitioners
failed to file a motion to set the case for pre-trial, in accordance with Sec. 1, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court.
• The trial court denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration of the said Order. The CA also affirmed the dismissal of the
case.
• Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S: W/N it the dismissal by the trial court of petitioners’ complaint is proper.

RULING:
Yes, the dismissal by the trial court of petitioners’ complaint was proper. The Court stated that in every action, the
plaintiffs are duty-bound to prosecute their case with utmost diligence and with reasonable dispatch to enable them to obtain the
relief prayed for and, at the same time, to minimize the clogging of the court dockets. While petitioners here argue that A.M. No.
03-1-09-SC applies in their case, the Court noted that the incidents in the case occurred prior to the effectivity of said A.M.
Therefore, the prevailing rule at that time should be utilized in resolving the case, which is the Rules of Court.
Sec.1, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court imposes upon the plaintiff the duty to set the case for pre-trial after the last pleading
is served and filed. Under Sec. 3, Rule 17 of the same Rules, failure to comply with the said duty makes the cases susceptible to
dismissal for failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time or failure to comply with the rules. In the present case, there
was no justifiable reason for petitioners’ failure to file a motion to set the case for pre-trial. The case was already ripe for pre-trial.
As stated in the Rules, it clearly states that the case must be set for pre-trial after the last pleading is served and filed. The Court
found that respondents already filed a cautionary answer and petitioners did not file any reply to it. Therefore, by mere application
of the Rules, it is proper for the trial court to dismiss petitioners’ complaint.

CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS (MOTIONS TO MODES OF DISCOVERY) FOR JD4201 UNDER ATTY. JEDREK NG
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Case: PNB v. Sps. Perez, G.R. No. 187640, June 15, 2011

FACTS:
• In 1988, Sps. Perez (respondent) obtained a revolving credit line from PNB’s (petitioner) branch in Cauyan City, Province
of Isabel. The credit line was secured by several chattel mortgages over palay stocks inventory and real estate mortgages
over real properties.
• Respondents defaulted on their financial obligations, prompting petitioner to institute extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings over the securities on November 13, 2001. Thereafter, the sheriff instituted a Notice of Extra-Judicial Sale
for the mortgaged properties by public auction on December 20, 2001.
• On November 26, 2001, respondents filed an Amended Complaint for Release or Discharge of Mortgaged Properties,
Breach of Contract, Declaration of Correct Amount of Obligation, Injunction, Damages, etc., with a Prayer for the Issuance
of a Preliminary Mandatory Injunctive Writ and a TRO.
• At the hearing of the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, respondents and their counsel failed
to appear. Due to this, the prayer for injunctive relief was denied. At the pre-trial conference, Sps. Perez and their counsel
again failed to appear. Their MR was also denied. They then filed a Notice of Appeal which was denied as well. Their MR
to the denial of the Notice of Appeal was also denied.
• Respondents appealed the denial of their MR to the CA which was still denied. However, the CA issued an Amended
Decision granting the MR.
• The case was then remanded to the trial court. On January 20, 2006, the trial court issued an Order setting the case for
hearing on March 8, 2006. However, petitioner failed to receive a copy of the Order and was unable to attend the hearing.
• Notwithstanding that fact, the trial court decided in favor of respondents. Petitioner filed its MR which was denied for
having been filed outside the reglementary period.
• Petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorari with Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of an Ex-Parte TRO/Writ of Preliminary
Injunction before the CA, which the CA granted. However, respondents were able to effect the Order rendered by the
trial court before the issuance of the TRO.
• Petitioner then filed a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari with Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of an Ex-Parte Writ of
Preliminary Injunction seeking additional reliefs for the return of the garnished amount (which the respondents were
able to get from petitioner through the Order of the trial court).
• The CA granted the petition however, it failed to address petitioner’s prayer for the issuance of a writ of mandatory
injunction and the return of the garnished amount by respondents.
• Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S: W/N a pre-trial notice is mandatory and W/N the lack of notice of pre-trial voids a subsequently issued decision.

RULING:
Yes, a pre-trial notice is mandatory and lack of it voids a subsequently issued decision. Under Sec. 3, Rule 18 of the Rules
of Court requires that “the notice of pre-trial shall be served on counsel, or on the party, who has no counsel.” The notice of pre-
trial seeks to notify the parties of the date, time, and place of the pre-trial and to require them to file their respective pre-trial
briefs within the time prescribed by the rules. Its absence, therefore, renders the pre-trial and all subsequent proceedings null
and void. Jurisprudence pointed out that the absence of the notice of pre-trial constitutes a violation of a person’s constitutional
right to due process.
In the present case, the order issued by the trial court merely spoke of a hearing on March 8, 2006 and required petitioner
to prepare and complete x x x a statement of account; it never mentioned anything about a pre-trial to be conducted by the trial
court. There is no proof that the trial court, or that petitioner received, a notice of pre-trial. Therefore, the lack of notice of pre-
trial voids a subsequently issued decision and all subsequent orders issued pursuant to the said judgment are also null and void.

CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS (MOTIONS TO MODES OF DISCOVERY) FOR JD4201 UNDER ATTY. JEDREK NG
BY: BONGAT, MA. CARLEEN S. – 2018073111
 I.PRE-TRIAL
Appearance of parties; effect of failure to appear

Case: Perkin Elmer Singapore v. Dakila Trading, G.R. No. 172242, August 14, 2007

FACTS:
• Respondent entered into a Distribution Agreement5 on 1 June 1990 with Perkin-Elmer Instruments Asia Pte Ltd. (PEIA),
a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of Singapore and engaged in the business of manufacturing,
producing, selling or distributing various laboratory/ analytical instruments. PEIA appointed the respondent as the sole
distributor of its products in the Philippines.
• On 2 August 1997, however, PEIA unilaterally terminated the Distribution Agreement, prompting respondent to file
before the RTC of Mandaluyong City, Branch 212, a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages with Prayer
for Issuance of a Writ of Attachment against PEIA and PEIP.
• The RTC issued an Order,7 dated 26 March 1999, denying respondent’s prayer for the issuance of a writ of attachment.
• Respondent then filed Ex Parte Motions for Issuance of Summons and for Leave of Court to Deputize Respondent’s
General Manager, Richard A. Tee, to Serve Summons Outside of the Philippines, which the RTC granted in its Order, dated
27 April 2000.
• PEIP moved to dismiss the Complaint filed by respondent on the ground that it states no cause of action. Meanwhile, in
an Order, dated 10 October 2001, the RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss filed by PEIP, compelling the latter to file its
Answer to the Amended Complaint.
• Petitioner subsequently filed with the RTC a Special Appearance and Motion to Dismiss respondent’s Amended Complaint
on 30 May 2002 based on several grounds, which includes the ground that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the petitioner.
• Petitioner’s motion was denied. Its MR was also denied.
• Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S: W/N the trial court has acquired jurisdiction when petitioner made a special appearance in court.

RULING:
No, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction when petitioner made a special appearance in court. It is settled that a
party who makes a special appearance in court for the purpose of challenging the jurisdiction of said court, based on the invalidity
of the service of summons, cannot be considered to have voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. In the
present case, petitioner has been consistent in all its pleadings in assailing the service of summons upon it and the jurisdiction of
the RTC over its person. Thus, the petitioner cannot be declared in estoppel when it filed an Answer ad cautelam with compulsory
counterclaim before the RTC while the instant Petition was still pending before this Court. The petitioner was in a situation wherein
it had no other choice but to file an Answer; otherwise, the RTC would have already declared that petitioner had waived its right
to file responsive pleadings.37 Neither can the compulsory counterclaim contained in petitioner’s Answer ad cautelam be
considered as voluntary appearance of petitioner before the RTC. Moreover, even though the petitioner raised other grounds in
its Motion to Dismiss aside from lack of jurisdiction over its person, the same is not tantamount to its voluntary appearance or
submission to the authority of the court a quo. In sum, this Court finds that the petitioner did not submit itself voluntarily to the
authority of the court a quo; and in the absence of valid service of summons, the RTC utterly failed to acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the petitioner.

CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS (MOTIONS TO MODES OF DISCOVERY) FOR JD4201 UNDER ATTY. JEDREK NG
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 J. INTERVENTION
Requisites for Intervention

Case: PNB v. Aznar, G.R. No. 171805, May 30, 2011

FACTS:
• In 1985, RISCO ceased operations due to business reverses. In plaintiff’s desire to rehabilitate RISCO, they contributed a
total amount of PHP 212,720.00 which was used in the purchase of three (3) parcels of land. The titles to the lands were
issued in the name of RISCO. The amount contributed by plaintiffs constituted as liens and encumbrances as annotated
on the titles.
• The annotation was made pursuant to the Minutes of the Special Meeting of the Board of Directors of RISCO. Thereafter,
various subsequent annotations were made on the same titles, including the Notice of Attachment and Writ of Execution
in favor of PNB.
• As a result, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of PNB, being the lone and highest bidder of the three (3) parcels of
land. This prompted plaintiffs-appellees to file the instant complaint seeking the quieting of their supposed title to the
subject properties, declaratory relief, cancellation of TCT and reconveyance with temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction.
• They argued that the Final Deed of Sale and the TCT are null and void as these were issued only after 28 years and that
the right of PNB over the properties had long become stale. Aznar, et. al, filed a Manifestation and Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings on October 5, 1998.
• The trial court rendered a Decision against PNB. PNB appealed the ruling to the CA, which set aside the judgment of the
trial court. However, the CA opined that the monetary contributions of Aznar, et. al., to RISCO can only be characterized
as a loan secured by a lien on the subject lots.
• It also directed PNB to pay Azanar, et. al., the amount of their contributions plus legal interest from the time of acquisition
of the property until the finality of judgment.
• Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S: W/N Aznar, et. al., have a right to ask for the quieting of title over the properties.

RULING:
No, Aznar, et. al., have no right to ask for the quieting of title over the properties because they have no legal and/or
equitable rights over the properties that are derived from the previous registered owner which is RISCO, this is in accordance with
Sec. 2 of the Corporation Code (B.P. 68), which states that “a corporation is an artificial being created by operation of law, having
the right of succession and the powers, attributes and properties expressly authorized by law or incident to its existence.”
Therefore, a corporation has a personality separate and distinct from those of its stockholders and other corporations to which it
may be connected to.
In the case at bar, there is no allegation, much less any proof, that the corporate existence of RISCO has ceased and the
corporate property has has been liquidated and distributed to the stockholders. The records only indicate that, as per Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) Certification27 dated June 18, 1997, the SEC merely suspended RISCO’s Certificate of Registration
beginning on September 5, 1988 due to its non-submission of SEC required reports and its failure to operate for a continuous
period of at least five years. Verily, Aznar, et al., who are stockholders of RISCO, cannot claim ownership over the properties at
issue in this case on the strength of the Minutes which, at most, is merely evidence of a loan agreement between them and the
company. There is no indication or even a suggestion that the ownership of said properties were transferred to them which would
require no less that the said properties be registered under their names. For this reason, the complaint should be dismissed since
Aznar, et al., have no cause to seek a quieting of title over the subject properties.

CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS (MOTIONS TO MODES OF DISCOVERY) FOR JD4201 UNDER ATTY. JEDREK NG
BY: BONGAT, MA. CARLEEN S. – 2018073111
Case: Heirs of Medrano v. De Vera, G.R. No. 165770, August 9, 2010

FACTS:
• The case concerns a 463 sq. m. parcel of land covered by a TCT in the name of Flaviana De Gracia (Flaviana). In 1980,
Flaviana died intestate, leaving her half-sisters Hilaria and Elena as her compulsory heirs.
• In September 1982, Hilaria and Elena, by virtue of a private document, waived all their hereditary rights to Flaviana’s land
in favor of Francisca Medrano. When Hilaria and Elena died, some of their children affirmed the contents of the private
document executed by their deceased mothers. They executed separate Deeds of Confirmation of Private Document and
Renunciation of Rights in favor of Medrano.
• Due to the refusal of the other children to sign a similar renunciation, Medrano filed a Complaint for quieting of title
against these other children. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. U-7316.
• On August 29, 2001, Medrano filed an Amended Complaint impleading the widow and children of Antonio Alvarado (one
of the children who refused to sign a similar renunciation), in view of the latter’s death.
• On April 2, 2002, respondent De Vera filed an Answer with Counterclaim. He represented himself as a real party-in-
interest on the ground that some of the named defendants in the civil case had executed a Deed of Renunciation of Rights
in his favor on March 23, 2002. He also maintained that the private document executed by the sisters of Medrano was
null and void for want of consideration.
• Medrano filed a Motion to Expunge Answer with Counterclaim of De Vera and to declare Defendants in Default. She
argued that De Vera had no personality to answer the complaint since he was not authorized by the named defendants
to answer in their behalf.
• The trial court disagreed with Medrano’s argument and admitted De Vera’s Answer with Counterclaim. It also opined
that De Vera did not need a special power of attorney from the defendants because he did not answer the complaint in
their behalf.
• The trial court further opined that De Vera made a voluntary appearance in the case as the transferee of defendants’
rights to the subject property. It held that the admission of De Vera’s Answer with Counterclaim is proper in order to
avoid multiplicity of suits.
• Medrano filed a Motion to Set Reception of Evidence before the branch of Clerk of Court in order to present evidence ex
parte against the defaulting defendants. She also filed a Motion for Reconsideration, asking the court to order De Vera
to file a pleading-in-intervention so that he could be properly named as a defendant in the case.
• The Court ordered De Vera to file a pleading-in-intervention in accordance with Rule 19 of the Rules of Court. However,
it did not comply with the said order despite service upon his lawyer.
• The RTC then ruled that ownership over the titled property has vested in petitioners by virtue of good faith possession
for more than 10 years. De Vera filed his MR on the ground that he was an indispensable party who was not given an
opportunity to present his evidence in the case. The MR was denied by the trial court, stating that De Vera had no legal
personality to file a motion for reconsideration as he did not file a pleading-in-intervention.
• In his petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, De Vera insisted that he stepped into the defendants’ shoes with regard to
the subject property by virtue of the quitclaim that the defendants executed in his favor. Therefore, he argued that it was
improper for the trial court to have allowed Medrano to present her evidence ex parte because it had yet to rule on
whether De Vera had personality to participate in the proceedings. The CA agreed with De Vera. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S: W/N De Vera could participate in the Civil Case U-7316 without filing a motion to intervene.

RULING:
Yes, De Vera could participate in the Civil Case U-7316 without filing a motion to intervene. In its ruling, this Court stated
the trial court misjudged De Vera’s interest in the said case and held that De Vera’s right to participate in the case was independent
of the named defendants. The trial court’s approach is seriously flawed because De Vera’s interest in not independent of or
severable from the interest of the named defendants. De Vera is a transferee pendente lite of the named defendants. His rights
were derived from the named defendants and, as transferee pendente lite, he would be bound by any judgment against his
transferor under the rules of res judicata. The default of the original defendants should not result in the ex parte presentation of
evidence because De Vera filed the answer. To proceed with the ex parte presentation of evidence against the named defendants
after De Vera’s answer had been admitted would not only be a violation of the Rules of Court but would also be a gross disregard
of his right to due process. Petitioner’s insistence that De Vera could not have participated in the case because he did not file a
motion to interven is flawed. The purpose of the intervention is to enable a stranger to an action to become a party in order for
him to protect his interest and for the court to settle all conflicting claims. Intervention is allowed to avoid multiplicity of suits
more than on due process considerations. The intervenor can choose not to participate in the case and he will not be bound by
the judgment. In the present case, De Vera is not a stranger to the action but a transferee pendente lite. De Vera’s failure to file a
pleading-in-intervention will not change the long foregone violation of his right to due process.

CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS (MOTIONS TO MODES OF DISCOVERY) FOR JD4201 UNDER ATTY. JEDREK NG
BY: BONGAT, MA. CARLEEN S. – 2018073111
Case: Board of Regents of MSU v. Osop, G.R. No. 172448, February 22, 2012

FACTS:
• Respondent is the former Chancellor of the MSU who retired in 1987 under the Early Retirement Law. However, several
years after his retirement, he was appointed as a substitute for another professor who was on study leave until December
31, 1997. His appointment was renewed and was duly noted by the MSU Board of Regents.
• He was allowed to continue teaching at MSU-GSC even after December 31, 1997. He was also designated as Chairperson
of the Electrical Engineering Department, College of Engineering of MSU-GSC with a one-year term of office.
• However, on July 15, 1998, his appointing authority, Muslim, severed his appointment before the expiration of his term.
Thereafter, on July 21, 1998, Osop filed before the RTC a Complaint for Injunction with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary
Injunction/TRO, Damages and Attorney’s Fees against Muslim and one Ramos.
• The RTC then issued an Order for Osop to exhaust administrative remedies, and for him to write to Muslim first to ask
for reconsideration of Muslim’s letter and Order. As response to his letter, the MSU’s President affirmed Muslim’s
termination of Osop’s service in MSU.
• Muslim and Ramos filed before the RTC a Motion to Dismiss of Osop’s case, which the RTC granted through an Omnibus
Motion on September 10, 1998. The RTC denied Osop’s MR, prompting him to file with the CA a Petition for Certiorari
and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
• The CA granted the petition whereby it set aside the Omnibus Order of the RTC. It also remanded the case to the RTC.
On June 26, 2001, Osop filed an Amended Complaint before the RTC to implead MSU as a defendant in the case. The RTC
admitted the Amended Complaint.
• However, for its failure to file an answer to the Amended Complaint within the given period, Osop filed a Motion to
Declare Defendant MSU in Default. He also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. The RTC granted Osop’s Motion for
Summary Judgment and ruled in favor of Osop.
• The decision in the Summary Judgment was partially executed through the RTC’s directive that Muslim, et. al. give Osop
teaching load. In relation to this, Muslim, in his personal capacity, filed on January 12, 2004, filed a Petition for Certiorari
with the CA by stating that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion.
• After the parties filed their respesctive Memorandum, the CA issued a Resolution considering the case submitted for
decision. On January 14, 2005, MSU filed before the CA a Motion to Intervene. The CA then dismissed Muslim’s petition
for certiorari on March 14, 2006.
• The CA also denied MSU’s Motion to Intervene, stating that the case was already submitted for decision on October 6,
2004 and the MSU’s Motion was only filed on January 10, 2005. By mere application of the Rules, the motion to intervene
is a stray pleading and is deemed not filed.
• Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S: W/N the CA gravely erred in holding that petitioner’s motion for intervention was improvidently filed.

RULING:
No, the CA did not err in holding that petitioner’s motion for intervention was improvidently filed. In its ruling, the Court
stated that the MSU anchors its right to intervene on Sec. 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court. MSU stresses that it has a legal interest
in the controversy considering that, ultimately, it will be the one liable for the relief Osop prays for. As stated in the Rules, a party
may intervene if “it has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against
both…” Jurisprudence describes intervention as “a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings,
becomes a litigant therein to enable him, her or it to protect or preserve a right or interest which may be affected by such
proceedings.” “The right to intervene is not an absolute right; it may only be permitted by the court when the movant establishes
facts which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing it.” In the present case, the MSU has a legal interest in the outcome of
the case, it may not avail itself of the remedy of intervention simply because MSU is not a third party in the proceedings therein.
In Osop’s Amended Complaint before the RTC, MSU was already impleaded as one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 6381. MSU
came under the jurisdiction of the RTC when it was served with summons. When the RTC granted a summary judgment in Osop’s
favor in that case, MSU neither filed an appeal nor a Petition for Certiorari before the CA to challenge the adverse RTC Orders.
MSU sat on its rights.

CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS (MOTIONS TO MODES OF DISCOVERY) FOR JD4201 UNDER ATTY. JEDREK NG
BY: BONGAT, MA. CARLEEN S. – 2018073111
Case: Malvar v. Kraft Foods Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 183952, September 9, 2013

FACTS:
• On August 1, 1988, KFPI hired Czarina Malvar as its Corporate Planning Manager. She gradually rose from the ranks and
eventually became the Vice President for Finance in 1996 in the Southeast Asia Region of KFI, KFPI’s mother company.
• On November 29, 1999, respondent Bautista, Chairman of the Board of KFPI and concurrently the Vice President and
Area Director for Southeast Asia for KFI, sent Malvar a memo directing her to explain why no administrative sanctions
should be imposed on her for possible breach of trust and confidence and for willful violation of company’s R & R.
• Malvar submitted her written explanation and an investigating body was formed. She was placed under preventive
suspension with pay during the investigation. On March 16, 2000, she was served a notice of termination.
• She then filed a complaint for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal against KFPI and Bautista with the NLRC which found
and declared her suspension and dismissal illegal and ordered her reinstatement with payment of full backwages and
other benefits, incdg. attorney’s fees.
• The NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. KFPI and Bautista then assailed the decision of the NLRC before the
CA on certiorari, contending that the NLRC thereby committed grave abuse of discretion.
• The petition for certiorari was dismissed, however, the CA reversed the order and reinstatement and directed the
payment of separation pay to petitioner.
• After the judgment in her favor became final and executory on March 14, 2006, petitioner moved for the issuance of a
writ of execution. The Executive Labor Arbiter then referred the case to the RCU of NLRC for computation of the monetary
awards under the judgment.
• The RCU’s computation was reduced by Labor Arbiter Reyno which prompted both parties to appeal the computation to
the NLRC. The NLRC denied respondents’ MR. petitioner then filed a second motion for the issuance of a writ of execution
to enforce the decision of the NLRC rendered on April 19, 2007.
• Respondents then filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a TRO with the CA to assail the NLRC’s
setting aside of the computation of the Labor Arbiter Reyno. The petition was granted by the CA. Petitioner then went to
the CA to sought reconsideration but the CA denied her motion.
• While her appeal was pending with the Supreme Court, petitioner and respondents entered into a compromise
agreement. Petitioner then filed an undated Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw Case. Before the Court could act on Malvar’s
motion, the Court received on February 15, 2011, The Law Firm of Dasal, Llasos and Associates filed a Motion for
Intervention to Protect Attorney’s Rights.
• Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S: W/N the Motion for Intervention to protect attorney’s rights can prosper.

RULING:
Yes, the Motion for Intervention to protect attorney’s rights can prosper. The Court grants the Intervenor’s Motion for
Intervention to Protect Attorney’s Rights as a measure of protecting the Intervenor’s right to its stipulated professional fees that
would be denied under the compromise agreement.
In the present case, records reveal that on March 18, 2008, Malvar engaged the professional services of the Intervenor
to represent her in the case of illegal dismissal. Although a client may dismiss her lawyer at any time, the dismissal must be for a
justifiable cause if a written contract between the lawyer and the client exist. In the absence of the lawyer’s fault, consent or
waiver, a client cannot deprive the lawyer of his just fees already earned in the guise of a justifiable reason. Malvar not only
downplayed the worth of the Intervenor’s legal service to her but also attempted to camouflage her intent to defraud her lawyer
by offering excuses that were not only inconsistent with her actions but, most importantly, fell short of being justifiable. The
stipulations of the written agreement between Malvar and the Intervenors, not being contrary to law, morals, public policy, public
order or good customs, were valid and binding on her as it expressly gave rise to the right of the Intervenor to demand
compensation.

CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS (MOTIONS TO MODES OF DISCOVERY) FOR JD4201 UNDER ATTY. JEDREK NG
BY: BONGAT, MA. CARLEEN S. – 2018073111
Case: Pacaña -Contreras v. Rovila Water Supply, G.R. No. 168979, December 2, 2013

FACTS:

[same case appeared in an earlier Rule]

ISSUE/S: W/N the other heirs of the deceased spouses Pacaña should have been impleaded in the case instead of dismissing it.

RULING:
Yes, the other heirs of the deceased spouses Pacaña should have been impleaded in the case instead of dismissing it. At
the inception of the present case, both the spouses Pacaña were not impleaded as parties-plaintiffs. The Court notes, however,
that they are indispensable parties to the case as the alleged owners of Rovila Water Supply. Without their inclusion as parties,
there can be no final determination of the present case. They possess such an interest in the controversy that a final decree would
necessarily affect their rights, so that the courts cannot proceed without their presence. Their interest in the subject matter of the
suit and in the relief sought is inextricably intertwined with that of the other parties. the Court clarified in Republic of the
Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, et al., that the failure to implead indispensable parties is a curable error and the foreign origin of
our present rules on indispensable parties permitted this corrective measure. It is relevant in this context to advert to the old
familiar doctrines that the omission to implead such parties “is a mere technical defect which can be cured at any stage of the
proceedings even after judgment”; and that, particularly in the case of indispensable parties, since their presence and participation
is essential to the very life of the action, for without them no judgment may be rendered, amendments of the complaint in order
to implead them should be freely allowed, even on appeal, in fact even after rendition of judgment by this Court, where it appears
that the complaint otherwise indicates their identity and character as such indispensable parties.”
With these discussions as premises, the Court is of the view that the proper remedy in the present case is to implead the
indispensable parties especially when their non-inclusion is merely a technical defect. To do so would serve proper administration
of justice and prevent further delay and multiplicity of suits. Pursuant to Section 9, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, parties may be
added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action. If the plaintiff refuses to
implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, then the court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s failure
to comply with a lawful court order.75 The operative act that would lead to the dismissal of the case would be the refusal to
comply with the directive of the court for the joinder of an indispensable party to the case. Obviously, in the present case, the
deceased Pacañas can no longer be included in the complaint as indispensable parties because of their death during the pendency
of the case. Upon their death, however, their ownership and rights over their properties were transmitted to their heirs, including
herein petitioners, pursuant to Article 77477 in relation with Article 77778 of the Civil Code. In Orbeta, et al. v. Sendiong, the Court
acknowledged that the heirs, whose hereditary rights are to be affected by the case, are deemed indispensable parties who should
have been impleaded by the trial court.

CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS (MOTIONS TO MODES OF DISCOVERY) FOR JD4201 UNDER ATTY. JEDREK NG
BY: BONGAT, MA. CARLEEN S. – 2018073111
 L. MODES OF DISCOVERY
Depositions pending actions; depositions pending action or pending appeal – Uses; scope of examination

Case: Sales v. Sabino, G.R. No. 133154, December 9, 2005

FACTS:
• On February 20, 1995, respondent Sabino filed an amended complaint for damages against, among others, petitioner
Sales with the RTC of Pasig City. Before any responsive pleading could be filed, respondent, notified the defendants that
he will take the deposition of one Buaneres Corral before the Clerk of Court of RTC-Pasig City.
• On December 27, 1995 and resumed on January 3, 1996, the deposition on oral examination of Corral was taken before
the Clerk of Court of Pasig, in the presence and with the active participation of petitioner’s counsel, Att. Villacorta, who
even lengthily cross-examined the deponent.
• In the course of trial, respondent had the deposition of Corral marked as her Exhibits “DD” and “EE”. Likewise offered in
evidence as Exhibit “BB” is a certification from the Bureau of Immigration attesting to the May 28, 1996 departure for
abroad of Corral via Flight No. PR 658.
• Petitioner opposed the admission of Exhibits “DD” and “EE” and even asked that they be expunged from the records on
the ground that the jurisdictional requirements for their admission under Sec. 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court were not
complied with.
• The trial court, however, admitted, among other evidence, respondent’s Exhibits “DD”, “EE”, and “BB”. Petitioner filed
his motion for reconsideration which was denied by the trial court. Petitioner went on certiorari with the CA, imputing
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in admitting said Exhibits.
• The CA dismissed petitioner’s recourse and upheld the trial court’s ruling, explaining that petitioner’s active participation,
through counsel, during the taking of subject deposition and adopting it as his own exhibits, has thereby estopped him
from assailing the admissibility thereof as part of respondent’s evidence.
• Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA, hence, this petition with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE/S: (1) W/N the requirements of Sec. 4, Rule 24 of the Revised Rules of Court were satisfied by the respondent when it
presented a certification attesting to the fact that deponent has left the country; and (2) W/N the petitioner in cross-examining
the deponent during the taking of his deposition waived any and all objections in connections therewith.

RULING:
(1) Yes, the requirements of Sec. 4, Rule 24 of the Revised Rules of Court were satisfied by the respondent. This provision
should be read together with Sec. 4, Rule 23. In the present case, the trial court had determined that deponent Corral was abroad
when the offer of his deposition was made. This factual finding of absence or unavailability of witness to testify deserves respect,
having been adequately substantiated. As it were, the certification by the Bureau of Immigration – Exhibit “BB” – provides that
evidentiary support. It has been said to be customary for courts to accept statements of parties as to the unavailability of a witness
as a predicate to the use of depositions. Had deponent indeed returned to the Philippines subsequent to his departure via Flight
No. PR 658, petitioner could have presented evidence to show that such was the case. However, petitioner does not even assert
the return as a fact, only offering it as a possibility since no contrary proof had been adduced.
(2) It is really no longer determinative of the outcome of this case. As rule, the inadmissibility of testimony taken by
deposition is anchored on the ground that such testimony is hearsay, i.e., the party against whom it is offered has no opportunity
to cross-examine the deponent at the time his testimony is offered. As jurisprudence teaches, it matters not that opportunity for
cross-examination was afforded during the taking of the deposition; for normally, the opportunity for cross-examination must be
accorded a party at the time the testimonial evidence is actually presented against him during the trial or hearing. The act of cross-
examining the deponent during the taking of the deposition cannot, without more, be considered a waiver of the right to object
to its admissibility as evidence in the trial proper. Sec. 29, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court provides that while errors and irregularities
in depositions are deemed waived if not objected to before or during the taking of the deposition, objections to the competency
of a witness or the competency, relevancy, or materiality of testimony may be made for the first time at the trial and need not be
made at the time of the taking of the deposition, unless they could be obviated at that point.

CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS (MOTIONS TO MODES OF DISCOVERY) FOR JD4201 UNDER ATTY. JEDREK NG
BY: BONGAT, MA. CARLEEN S. – 2018073111
 L. MODES OF DISCOVERY
Written interrogatories to adverse parties – Effect of failure to serve written interrogatories

Case: Sps. Afulugencia v. Metrobank, G.R. No. 185145, February 5, 2014

FACTS:
• Petitioners filed a Complaint for nullification of mortgage, foreclosure, auction sale, certificate of sale and other
documents, with damages against respondents, Metrobank, a domestic banking corporation existing under Philippine
laws, and one Emmanuel Ortega, Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the Malolos RTC.
• After the filing of the parties’ pleadings and with the conclusion of pre-trial, petitioners filed a Motion for Issuance of
Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum to require Metrobank’s officers to appear and testify as the petitioners’ initial
witness during the August 31, 2006 hearing for the presentation of their evidence-in-chief, and to bring the documents
relative to their loan with Metrobank.
• Metrobank filed an Opposition arguing, among others, that the Motion must be denied as it is a litigated motion, that
pursuant to Secs. 1 and 6 of Rule 25 of the Rules of Court, Metrobank’s officers – who are considered adverse parties –
may not be compelled to appear and testify in court for petitioners since they were not initially served with written
interrogatories.
• On October 19, 2006, the trial court issued an Order denying petitioners’ Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum
Ad Testificandum. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was likewise denied by the RTC.
• Petitioners then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, asserting that the said Motion is not a litigated motion as it
does not seek relief but aims for the issuance of a mere process. They cited Rule 21 of the Rules which states that prior
notice and hearing only with respect to the taking of depositions and not to their request, therefore, notice and hearing
may be dispensed with.
• The CA held that the trial court did not err in denying petitioners’ Motion to secure a subpoena duces tecum/ad
testificandum, ratiocinating that Rule 25 is quite clear in proving that the consequence of a party’s failure to serve written
interrogatories upon the opposing party is that the latter may not be compelled by the former to testify in court to render
a deposition pending appeal.
• Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S: W/N the CA committed a reversible error in holding that the petitioners must first serve written interrogatories to
respondent bank’s officers before they can be subpoenaed.

RULING:
No. As a rule, in civil cases, the procedure of calling the adverse party to the witness stand is not allowed, unless written
interrogatories are first served upon the latter. This is embodied in Sec. 6, Rule 25 of the Rules of Court. One of the purposes of
the rule is to prevent fishing expeditions and needless delays; it is there to maintain order and facilitate the conduct of trial. It will
be presumed that a party who does not serve written interrogatories on the adverse party beforehand will most likely be unable
to elicit facts useful to its case if it later opts to call the adverse party to the witness stand as its witness. Instead, the process could
be treated as a fishing expedition or an attempt at delaying the proceedings; it produces no significant result that a prior written
interrogatories might bring. If a party cannot elicit facts or information useful to its case through the facility of written
interrogatories or other mode of discovery, then the calling of the adverse party to the witness stand could only serve to weaken
its own case as a result of the calling party’s being bound by the adverse party’s testimony, which may only be worthless and
instead detrimental to the calling party’s cause. Another reason for the rule is that by requiring prior written interrogatories, the
court may limit the inquiry to what is relevant, and thus prevent the calling party from straying or harassing the adverse party
when it takes the latter to the stand. the rule not only protects the adverse party from unwarranted surprises or harassment; it
likewise prevents the calling party from conducting a fishing expedition or bungling its own case. Using its own judgment and
discretion, the court can hold its own in resolving a dispute, and need not bear witness to the parties perpetrating unfair court
practices such as fishing for evidence, badgering, or altogether ruining their own cases. In the present case, petitioners seek to
call Metrobank’s officers to the witness stand as their initial and main witnesses, and to present documents in Metrobank’s
possession as part of their principal documentary evidence. This is improper. Petitioners may not be allowed, at the incipient
phase of the presentation of their evidence-in chief at that, to present Metrobank’s officers — who are considered adverse parties
as well, based on the principle that corporations act only through their officers and duly authorized agents— as their main
witnesses; nor may they be allowed to gain access to Metrobank’s documentary evidence for the purpose of making it their own.
This is tantamount to building their whole case from the evidence of their opponent. It is true that under the Rules, a party may,
for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice, be compelled to give testimony in court by the adverse party who has
not served written interrogatories.

CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS (MOTIONS TO MODES OF DISCOVERY) FOR JD4201 UNDER ATTY. JEDREK NG
BY: BONGAT, MA. CARLEEN S. – 2018073111
 L. MODES OF DISCOVERY
Production or inspection of documents or things

Case: Air Philippines Corp. v. Pennswell, Inc., G.R. No. 172835, December 13, 2007

FACTS:
• Petitioner Air Philippines Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of air transportation services.
On the other hand, respondent Pennswell, Inc. was organized to engage in the business of manufacturing and selling
industrial chemicals, solvents, and special lubricants.
• On various dates, respondent delivered and sold to petitioner sundry goods in trade, covered by several Sales Invoices
which correspond to various Purchase Orders.
• Under the contracts, petitioner’s total outstanding obligation amounted to PHP 449,864.98 with interest at 14% per
annum until the amount would be fully paid. For petitioner’s failure to comply with is contractual obligation, respondent
filed a Complaint for a Sum of Money on April 28, 2000with the RTC.
• In its Answer, petitioner contended that its refusal to pay was not without valid and justifiable reasons. It stated that the
items were misrepresented by respondent as belonging to a new line, but were in truth and in fact, identical with products
petitioner had previously purchases from respondent.
• During the pendency of the trial, petitioner filed a Motion to Compel respondent to give a detailed list of the ingredients
and chemical components of the products it ordered from respondent. The RTC granted petitioner’s motion but was later
reversed through respondent’s motion for reconsideration. The RTC stated that petitioner’s inquiry is privileged and that
the detailed list of ingredients or chemical components may not be the subject of mode of discovery under Sec. 1, Rule
27 of the Rules of Court.
• In its motion for reconsideration, respondent argued that it cannot be compelled to disclose the chemical components
sought because the matter is confidential. Petitioner’s inquiry constituted a trade secret which respondent cannot be
forced to divulge.
• Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. However, the CA affirmed the Order of the RTC and ruled that to
compel respondent to reveal in detail the list of ingredients of its lubricants is to disregard respondent’s rights over its
trade secrets.
• Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S: W/N respondent can be compelled to disclose the list of ingredients and chemical composition of its products under Rule
27 of the Rules of Court.

RULING:
No, respondent cannot be compelled to disclose the list of ingredients and chemical composition of its products as they
are considered as trade secrets and is considered a privileged matter under Rule 27 of the Rules of Court. In its ruling, the Court
stated that a trade secret is defined as a plan or process, tool, mechanism or compound known only to its owner and those of his
employees to whom it is necessary to confide it. The definition also extends to a secret formula or process not patented, but
known only to certain individuals using it in compounding some article of trade having a commercial value. A trade secret may
consist of any formula, patter, device, or compilation of information that: (1) is used in one’s business; and (2) gives the employer
an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not possess the information. Trade secrets constitute proprietary
rights. In the present case, the chemical composition, formulation, and ingredients of respondent’s special lubricants are trade
secrets within the contemplation of the law. The ingredients constitute the very fabric of respondent’s production and business.
No doubt, the information is also valuable to respondent’s competitors. To compel its disclosure is to cripple respondent’s
business, and to place it at an undue disadvantage.
Under Rule 27, the court may order any party: a) to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing of
any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, which are not privileged;
which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action; and which are in his possession, custody or
control; or b) to permit entry upon designated land or other property in his possession or control for the purpose of inspecting,
measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any designated relevant object or operation thereon. Rule 27 states that
the documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things that may be produced and inspected
should not be privileged. Several statutes and jurisprudence had already stated that trade secrets are of private character and
such matters are among the recognized restrictions to the right of the people to information as embodied in the Constitution. The
Court further stated that it found no reason to except respondent’s trade secrets from the application of the rule on privilege.
Trade secrets should receive greater protection from discovery, because they derive economic value from being generally
unknown and not readily ascertainable by the public. Petitioner was not able to show a compelling reason to lift the veil of
confidentiality which shields respondent’s trade secrets.

CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS (MOTIONS TO MODES OF DISCOVERY) FOR JD4201 UNDER ATTY. JEDREK NG
BY: BONGAT, MA. CARLEEN S. – 2018073111
Case: Eagleridge Dev’t Corp. v. Cameron Granville 3 Asset Mgt., G.R. No. 204700, April 10, 2013

FACTS:
• Petitioners Eagleridge Development Corporation and sureties Naval and Open are the defendants in a collection suit
initiated by Export and Industry Bank through a Complaint dated February 9, 2005 and currently pending proceedings
before the RTC of Makati City.
• By virtue of a Deed of Assignment dated August 9, 2006, EIB transferred petitioner’s outstanding obligations to herein
respondent, a special purpose vehicle.
• Thereafter, Cameron filed its Motion to Substitute/Join EIB dated November 24, 2006, which was granted by the trial
court.
• On February 22, 2012, petitioners filed a Motion for Production/Inspection of the Loan Sale and Purchase Agreement
(LSPA) dated April 7, 2006 referred to in the Deed of Assignment. Respondent Cameron filed its Comment and alleged
that petitioners have not shown “good cause” for the production of the LSPA.
• The trial court denied petitioners’ motion for production for being devoid of merit and ruled that there was failure to
show “good cause” for the production of the LSPA and failure to show that the LSPA is material or contains evidence
relevant to an issue involved in the action.
• Through a motion for reconsideration, petitioners alleged that the production of the LSPA – which would inform them of
the consideration for the assignment of their loan obligation – is relevant to the disposition of the case. The RTC denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
• Petitioners then filed their Petition for Certiorari with the CA which was dismissed. Its subsequent motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied.
• Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S: W/N the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying the production/inspection of the LSPA.

RULING:
Yes. Sec. 1, Rule 27 of the 1997 Rules of Court states: upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court
in which an action is pending may a) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or
on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible
things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his
possession, custody or control; xxxx
The provision on production and inspection of documents is one of the modes of discovery sanctioned by the Rules of
Court in order to enable not only the parties, but also the court to discover all the relevant and material facts in connection with
the case pending before it. Generally, the scope is to be liberally construed so as to provide the litigants with information essential
to the fair and amicable settlement or expeditious trial of the case. All the parties are required to lay their cards on the table so
that justice can be rendered on the merits of the case.
Although the grant of a motion for production of document is admittedly discretionary on the part of the trial court judge,
nevertheless, it cannot be arbitrarily or unreasonably denied because to do so would bar access to relevant evidence that may be
used by a party-litigant and hence, impair his fundamental right to due process.
Furthermore, under Section 17, Rule 132 of the 1997 Rules of Court, when part of a writing or record is given in evidence
by one party, the whole of the same subject may be inquired into by the other, and when a detached writing or record is given in
evidence, any other writing or record necessary to its understanding may also be given in evidence. Since the Deed of Assignment
was produced in court by respondent and marked as one of its documentary exhibits, the LSPA which was made a part thereof by
explicit reference and which is necessary for its understanding may also be inevitably inquired into by petitioners. In this light, the
relevance of the LSPA sought by petitioners is readily apparent. Fair play demands that petitioners must be given the chance to
examine the LSPA. Besides, we find no great practical difficulty, and respondent did not allege any, in presenting the document
for inspection and copying of the petitioners. Indeed, the insistent refusal of respondent to produce the LSPA is perplexing and
unacceptable to this Court.
Petition granted.

CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS (MOTIONS TO MODES OF DISCOVERY) FOR JD4201 UNDER ATTY. JEDREK NG
BY: BONGAT, MA. CARLEEN S. – 2018073111