1AC – Consolidation

1AC – Plan
The United States federal government should reduce its alliance commitments
with North Atlantic Treaty Organization member states by at least substantially
limiting the conditions under which its defense pact can be activated in the
Baltic region.
 1AC – Baltics
Scenario One is Invasion:
Russia will invade the Baltics to break NATO -- success is assured and will force
U.S. exit.
Veebel ’18 [Viljar; April 18; Researcher in the Department of Political and Strategic Studies at
the Baltic Defense College, Ph.D. in Political Science and M.A. in International Relations from the
University of Tartu; Defence Studies, “NATO options and dilemmas for deterring Russia in the
Baltic States,” vol. 18; RP]

Drawing on the past experience from Georgia and Ukraine, as well as Russia’s past strategy
against the Baltic countries, one hypothetical scenario why, when and how would Russia attack the
Baltic countries could be constructed. The most likely political aim of the potential aggression against the
Baltic countries would be to restore control over the territory of the former Soviet Union, or at least to break off their
relations with the Western countries. According to this logic, most of the energy will be invested into
delegitimizing of local national political authorities by using the tools of hybrid warfare. Ultimately, this
would lead to a situation where disappointedly the forces of the Alliance’s will decide to leave the
Baltics.

Russia’s aim during such a takeover in the Baltic region would most likely be to maintain as much
physical assets and legitimization as possible. This means that it will need to avoid aggressive military activities. Also
since the Russian-speaking community in Estonia and Latvia is relatively big, the takeover will have to take place without destroying
much of the local infrastructure. However, the
initiation of protests of “local women and children” against the
“imperialists”, including NATO is highly likely. This draws on Russia’s previous strategies used in
Ukraine in 2014 and in Estonia in 2007. With a “little help” from Russia, this should not be too difficult,
considering the public opinion of the local Russian-speaking community, at least in Estonia and Latvia.
And, by the same token, the falling out of the Russophones will be exacerbated by the suspicious attitude towards the latter still
prevalent among the Estonian and Latvian speaking communities. Here the most effective deterrence key would be building a
coherent and mutually respectful society. This presumes dealing rationally and systematically with the demographic outcomes of the
occupation. Alas, the difficulty is the animosity from the different ethnic sides in these two countries. Returning to the hypothetical
scenario, in recent years the Kremlin has tried its best to keep up the ill-feelings among the Baltic people
and minorities. Due to the relatively messy political, economic and social situation in the Baltics
referring to e.g. recent change of government and overall economic and social tensions related to the
current taxation policy in Estonia, problems with banking system in Latvia, the key element of Russia’s strategy is
focused on the Baltic countries not even being able to recognise the beginning of the attack. This
means that the latter will omit the opportunity to mobilize, both as far as the Baltic countries or the
Alliance is concerned. Should the Baltic countries/the Alliance still decide to mobilise themselves, Russia
would describe it as an example of the opponent’s aggressive behaviour, as well a justification to
interfere with the aim to protect the “peaceful local people” (Krickovic 2014, 504).

Thus, there exists a potential for Russia to succeed in the Baltic region due to its conventional
supremacy in the region, relatively radical views of local Russian-speaking communities, lack of the
credible deterrence elements, etc. Next to the opportunity that it offers to Russia, according to the view of the authors, the
attack against the Baltic countries could be also at least as strongly motivated by Russia’s wish to
ridicule the Alliance and the collective defence/deterrence network as a whole. Looking from this perspective,
there exist many a reason why Russia would select the Baltic countries for this purpose. First, this could happen
because of the logistic advantage for Russia. Russia has land border with this regions, and the
territories of the Baltic countries are also fully “covered” with Russia’s anti-aircraft and missile
defence systems (Frühling and Lasconjarias 2016). Second, as easy as it would be for Russia to bring
additional military supplies to the Baltic region, the more difficult it would be to do so for the leading
countries of the Alliance. Third, the relatively big Russian-speaking (and necessarily Russian-minded) community
could be easily mobilised to justify and support Russia’s aggressive ambitions in the Baltics.

The main reason why Russia could be successful in realising its aggressive ambitions in the Baltic
countries is the tendency among the Baltic countries to think of their security and of deterrence based on
rational (Smith 2017) logic (i.e. what would be reasonable risk and sacrifice to occupy the Baltics). At the same time, Russia is
thinking on both global and strategical scales where the limit for using its resources are only
territorial as far as the Baltic counties are concerned. This means that Russia has, in principle, more
resources available than it would be reasonable to maximally use to occupy the Baltic countries.
Finally, Russia appears to be also ready to use these resources.

The difference in scale poses enormous challenges to NATO when thinking of how to avoid
Russia’s further aggressive ambitions. Based on theoretical dilemmas and traps associated with the concept of
deterrence as well as taking into account country-specific circumstances, the authors would like to discuss some ideas about the
priorities of both the Baltic region and the collective-actor deterrence in changing the general security environment in Europe.

They’ll invade from Kaliningrad and Belarus -- makes counter-offensives

impossible and renders European presence patently incapable of defending the
Baltics -- but the debate over how to respond splits NATO.
Rogan ’17 [Tom; August 31; M.Sc. in Middle East Politics from SOAS University of London,
G.D.L. in Law from the University of Law at Guilford, and a B.A. in War Studies from King’s
College London; Washington Examiner, “Russia might be about to invade Europe. Here's how
America should respond,” https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/russia-might-be-about-to-
invade-europe-heres-how-america-should-respond; RP]

Between Sept. 14-20, the Russian

armed forces will conduct a major exercise, ZAPAD 2017. Employing
forces from various Russian commands, the exercise will test the military's ability to conduct a
combined arms offensive. That's exactly the kind of operation Russia would use to invade Europe.

While there's nothing new in the Russians carrying out a military exercise, this
situation is different due to the scale
and location of the forces involved. Russia claims under 10,000 personnel will be involved but as many as 100,000
Russian soldiers are actually expected to deploy. Their number will include armored and artillery
units, and strike fighter aircraft. As interesting, instead of training in Russia, the forces will conduct
their exercises in Belarus.

That geographic choice is designed to send a specific message to NATO.

After all, bordering NATO member Poland, Belarus

offers ZAPAD forces the means to rapidly strike into the
heart of NATO. Joining that threat is the Russian fortress-oblast of Kaliningrad, where reservists
have been called up.

Look closely at a map of northern part of eastern Europe, on the shores of the Baltic Sea, and you'll see Kaliningrad — it's
a
pocket of Russia that doesn't touch Russia, but is instead tucked between Poland and Lithuania. Kaliningrad
would be a crucial breaching and supply point for any invasion.
As my map below shows (the red lines exemplify offensive lines), were
Russia to invade Poland via Kaliningrad and
Belarus, it could encircle Polish forces on that country's eastern front.

The Russians know this and probably believe that they could reach Warsaw before a serious NATO
counter-offensive began. While Poland's competent and aggressive military would not yield, it would struggle to withstand a
Russian surprise attack by itself.

That said, Poland

isn't the only NATO state threatened by ZAPAD; the Baltic states of Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania face even greater vulnerability. For a start, Putin has long believed those nations are destined to be
feudal states of a new Russian empire. And again, the matching of ZAPAD forces in Belarus to Kaliningrad proves the danger.

Invading the Baltics, Putin could use forces in Kaliningrad and Belarus to block Polish/NATO
counter-offensives, as launchpads for a two-front invasion of Lithuania, and as distractions for
simultaneous invasions of Latvia and Estonia.

Putin might gamble that if his forces seized significant territory in short order, NATO would sue
for peace. His intent would be a limited victory that divided NATO between those pushing for
military response, and those, like Germany, who would probably assess a counter-offensive as too
risky.

Another complication is that NATO's force disposition against a Russian surprise attack remains weak.
While NATO would intercept Russian communications in the immediate buildup to an attack, if those orders were sent from
Moscow on short notice, there wouldn't be much NATO could do . In addition, as I've explained, NATO's
rapid reaction forces in Europe are patently incapable of defeating a Russian invasion. This is a
symptom of Europe's pathetic defense investment, and its consequences in rendering that continent one of largely
impotent militaries. Putin also loves the fact that many EU populations oppose their government's support for
NATO article 5 treaty obligations. Remember, where Germany leads, other NATO states like Italy and Spain might follow.

Baltic conflict goes nuclear -- even if we win, it ensures Russia first-strikes.

Kofman ’16 [Michael; May 12; Analyst at CNA Corporation and fellow at the Wilson Center’s
Kennan Institute, M.A. in International Security from the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign
Service at Georgetown University; War On The Rocks, “Fixing NATO Deterrence in the East Or:
How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love NATO’s Crushing Defeat by Russia,”
https://warontherocks.com/2016/05/fixing-nato-deterrence-in-the-east-or-how-i-learned-to-
stop-worrying-and-love-natos-crushing-defeat-by-russia/; RP]
What’s the Right Force Posture for Nuclear Oblivion?

The other problem with the fixation on conventional deterrence in the Baltic fight is that just as in
the old standoff between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, this battle is fraught with opportunities for nuclear
escalation. Most Russian experts I know in the military analysis community, including those in Russia, don’t
see much of a chance for conventional battle with NATO to stay conventional. RAND didn’t wargame
that out, since theirs was an AirLand Battle exercise, but it makes the debate over how many brigades to stick into
the Baltics somewhat moot. On any map, Russia’s exclave of Kaliningrad is a central problem in
keeping this a conventional fight, because this is a piece of Russian territory that NATO must either
bypass or neutralize to reinforce the Baltics. That’s not just a Russian fort, projecting long arcs
of anti-access and area denial weaponry between Poland and Lithuania — it’s also liable to be a nuclear
landmine.
There is a possibility that if
Russian forces are sufficiently degraded or defeated in Kaliningrad that
Moscow may resort to or threaten nuclear first use. Even if we fill all those hex squares with blue forces,
it doesn’t get around the issue that NATO’s prize for its victory is not necessarily the successful rescue
of the Baltics, but an inbound tactical nuclear warhead. RAND’s report alludes to the minor problem of
escalation (all of us dying in nuclear oblivion), but such thoughts get in the way of gaming out how many heavy
armor brigades one needs in on the eastern flank. Nuclear escalation is not assured, but given the impact of such an outcome,
perhaps the
best strategy is to make decisions that afford the most opportunities for managing
escalation dynamics. That means a force posture oriented toward strategic flexibility, not
entrenchment.

MAD doesn’t check -- the theatre’s unique.

Veebel ’18 [Viljar; April 18; Researcher in the Department of Political and Strategic Studies at
the Baltic Defense College, Ph.D. in Political Science and M.A. in International Relations from the
University of Tartu; Defence Studies, “NATO options and dilemmas for deterring Russia in the
Baltic States,” vol. 18; RP]

Particularly in
the context of nuclear deterrence that the field lines in the international political arena
are not as clear today as they used to be during the Cold War period which is also called “the first nuclear age”
(Haffa et al. 2009, 45), with a bipolar and constant competition between the two technologically sophisticated states and their allies,
large inventories of strategic nuclear weapons, continuing communications through arms control negotiations, escalation restraint,
and mutual rationality postulating that neither side would ultimately risk the destructive consequences of nuclear war. Nowadays,
as far nuclear capabilities are concerned, the competition is confined to more than two principal
players (including non-deterrable actors), there exist varied inventories of nuclear arsenals and only a
limited number of communication channels between the “owners” of nuclear capabilities, etc. In this
context, escalation and first-use of nuclear capabilities is considered to be a plausible option.
Furthermore, domestic pressure to acquire nuclear capabilities could outweigh external pressure
to discontinue nuclear weapon proliferation. Accordingly, in current “second nuclear age”, national interests in
terms of deterrence are understood in a more complex way, where political and moral dilemmas,
public support, analytical confusions, inadequacy of the available technical means and new
conceptual challenges play bigger role than in times of first nuclear age and bipolar world order (Haffa et al.
2009).

They’ll leverage indefensible provocations -- decimates credibility and paves

the way for further aggression.
Kofman ’16 [Michael; May 12; Analyst at CNA Corporation and fellow at the Wilson Center’s
Kennan Institute, M.A. in International Security from the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign
Service at Georgetown University; War On The Rocks, “Fixing NATO Deterrence in the East Or:
How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love NATO’s Crushing Defeat by Russia,”
https://warontherocks.com/2016/05/fixing-nato-deterrence-in-the-east-or-how-i-learned-to-
stop-worrying-and-love-natos-crushing-defeat-by-russia/; RP]
A Million Ways to Die in the East

NATO’s biggest challenge is not the balance of forces, but the fact that its credibility is attached to
every square meter of Baltic terrain. A much more likely scenario is one in which Russia deploys a
large land force on the borders as part of a snap exercise, as it did opposite Ukraine in early 2014, and
then seizes some unknown patch of dirt. Would NATO attack this offending Russian force over a
few square meters? It’s one thing to contemplate trading Washington for Vilnius — what about some farm house on the
Russian-Estonian border? Let’s take another option wherein Russia simply picks up the border and
moves it further into the Baltic states. That’s no fantasy. Moscow has been doing this to
Georgia in South Ossetia. On the one hand, NATO cannot let the Russians break its credibility
through salami-slicing tactics, but on the other hand, the Baltic states themselves might not be so
eager to pick a fight they can’t win over a few feet of real estate. Who is willing to attack a Russian
army on Russia’s border?
Plenty has been written on what would happen if Russian special forces tried to seize Baltic towns, leveraging the presumed
camaraderie of the local ethnic Russian population. This Crimea-like scenario is improbable, especially because Russia had forces in
place in Crimea from the very beginning, but it offers an important lesson that should drive NATO’s thinking about the Baltic high-
end fight. The challenge is not NATO’s deterrence against a hypothetical conventional war, which
is not only unlikely but wholly unnecessary for Russia to challenge NATO. The problem lies in
compellence, because there are numerous scenarios in which Russia can set up a challenge to
NATO’s credibility as an alliance and compel the West against a response, thereby leading to failure.

The reason Russia annexed Crimea without having to overcome resistance is in large part due to
conventional compellence. Russia’s military deployment and a directly issued threat compelled
Ukraine’s leaders to avoid even attempting resistance. There was no combat in Crimea. Those
arguing for forward deployments keep envisioning a scenario where Russian troops or special forces
cross the border and shoot first. That is one set of problems that militarily cannot be easily solved as
described above, but the more perilous cases are those in which NATO must shoot first when faced
with a large Russian conventional deployment. EUCOM’s true challenge is not deterrence — it’s
how to handle compellence by an advanced conventional adversary capable of combining special
forces and large-scale military operations.
As I’ve written elsewhere on War on the Rocks on the establishment’s obsession with hybrid warfare, the problem is also not a
hybrid one. Russia has re-forged its military as a useful instrument of national power and rediscovered how to
compel others using military power. Even if territorial defense was workable — a dubious prospect at best —
deterrence only works if the other side plans to attack you. A smarter approach for Moscow, and one conceptually
demonstrated in Crimea, is to create a crisis in which NATO’s credibility is tested on the choice
of whether or not to attack Russia first.

Our commitment to defense spurs a credibility trap that causes miscalculated

AND intentional nuclear escalation with Russia -- assurance increases risks of
deterrence failure and provokes a moral hazard.
Shifrinson ’17 [Joshua; Spring 2017; Assistant Professor of International Affairs with the Bush
School of Government at Texas A&M University, Ph.D. from the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology; The Washington Quarterly, “Time to Consolidate NATO?” vol. 40; RP]

Nevertheless, the United States would undoubtedly face calls for precisely such steps that might lead to
nuclear escalation in any losing conventional fight. Moreover, since any sustained effort to defend
or retake the Baltics requires NATO conventional operations close to the Russian homeland, it risks
attacks (accidental or otherwise) on Russian territory that invite an escalatory response. Russian
anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) assets used against reinforcements flowing into the region—to say nothing of
direct attacks on Poland—may also result in strikes on Russian-owned Kaliningrad, generating a similar
escalation problem. In short, NATO cannot readily defend its Eastern flank through conventional
means, faces implausibly large strategic risks if it tries, and so confronts an insoluble credibility
crisis.22 Indeed, that Estonia is now preparing to wage a lengthy guerilla war against a prospective Russian
occupying force, while Lithuania is slowly moving to reinstate a military draft suggests vulnerable states
recognize the United States’ credibility dilemma and are hedging their security bets as best they can.23

If anything, themain function of NATO deployments has been to antagonize a Russia that has far
more at stake in Eastern Europe for geographic and historical reasons than the United States.24 To
be clear, NATO expansion in and of itself did not cause East–West relations to deteriorate.25 However, U.S.-backed efforts
to expand NATO eastward and subsequently deploy military forces to the region have been met
with Russian pushback—Russian overflights of NATO airspace, diplomatic obfuscation, and
military deployments have all accelerated in recent years.26 Assuming NATO efforts in Eastern
Europe continue, Russian leaders are prone to respond with further bellicosity that generates
further strains in NATO–Russian relations.27 Paradoxically, the resulting insecurity spiral increases
the likelihood that efforts to deter Russia will result in deterrence failure.28 Combined with the
possibility that a NATO–Russia crisis may see Russia escalate the confrontation in order to de-
escalate the situation, the risk of miscalculation is clear.29 Collectively, this situation simultaneously
invites Russian actions designed to discredit the United States in the eyes of its allies, gives threatened
allies incentives to force events with Russia to tie American hands and deepen the United States’
involvement, and increases the risk of an action-reaction cycle.30

The net result is a dangerous standoff. To deter aggression, NATO relies on a collective security
promise ultimately capped by the pledge that the United States will risk its own survival by putting its
nuclear forces to use on behalf of its allies. For the Baltic states , Poland, and— potentially in the future—
NATO’s other post-Cold War additions, this pledge is no longer realistic on strategic or military grounds.
The steps the United States and its allies are taking to reassure the most vulnerable members of NATO,
however, increase the odds of a NATO– Russia crisis. Yet if and when a crisis erupts, the clarifying
effect of a prospective nuclear exchange is apt to cause cooler heads to prevail and encourage U.S.
efforts to restrain the dogs of war—revealing that American security guarantees to Eastern
Europe were not credible in the first place. The more the United States continues pretending that
its commitment to all NATO members is created equal, the more it risks creating a situation that
will reveal the shibboleth of the U.S. commitment.

Only U.S.-Russia war causes extinction -- other nuclear wars don’t.

Cotton-Barratt ’17 [Owen; February 3; Research Associate at the Future of Humanity
Institute, Lecturer in Mathematics at Oxford University, Ph.D. in Pure Mathematics from Oxford
University; Global Priorities Project, “Existential Risk,” https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf]
1.1.1 Nuclear war

The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrated the unprecedented destructive power of
nuclear weapons. However, even in an all-out nuclear war between the United States and Russia, despite
horrific casualties, neither country’s population is likely to be completely destroyed by the direct effects of the blast, fire, and
radiation.8 The aftermath could be much worse: the burning of flammable materials could send massive
amounts of smoke into the atmosphere, which would absorb sunlight and cause sustained
global cooling, severe ozone loss, and agricultural disruption – a nuclear winter.
According to one model 9, an all-out exchange of 4,000 weapons 10 could lead to a drop in global
temperatures of around 8°C, making it impossible to grow food for 4 to 5 years. This could leave some
survivors in parts of Australia and New Zealand, but they would be in a very precarious situation and the
threat of extinction from other sources would be great. An exchange on this scale is only
possible between the US and Russia who have more than 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons,
with stockpiles of around 4,500 warheads each, although many are not operationally deployed.11 Some models
suggest that even a small regional nuclear war involving 100 nuclear weapons would produce a nuclear winter serious
enough to put two billion people at risk of starvation,12 though this estimate might be pessimistic.13 Wars on this scale are
unlikely to lead to outright human extinction, but this does suggest that conflicts which are around an
order of magnitude larger may be likely to threaten civilisation. It should be emphasised that there is very large
uncertainty about the effects of a large nuclear war on global climate. This remains an area where increased academic research
work, including more detailed climate modelling and a better understanding of how survivors might be able to cope and adapt,
would have high returns.

It is very difficult to precisely estimate the probability of existential risk from nuclear war over the next century, and existing
attempts leave very large confidence intervals. According to many experts, the most likely nuclear war at present is between India
and Pakistan.14 However, given the relatively modest size of their arsenals, the
risk of human extinction is plausibly
greater from a conflict between the United States and Russia. Tensions between these countries
have increased in recent years and it seems unreasonable to rule out the possibility of them rising further
in the future.

Russia is defensive – aggressive, assertive behavior is ONLY in response to

NATO and the US.
Ploom et al ’20 – Illimar Ploom, associate professor at the Department of Strategic Studies
and Innovation at the Estonian Military Academy. He holds doctoral degree in modern history
(D.Phil.) from University of Oxford. Zdzislaw Sliwa, serves as the Dean of the Baltic Defence
College; he is also a visiting professor at the Latvian National Defence Academy. He holds
doctoral degree from Polish National Defence University and post-doctoral degree in Security
Studies from Polish Naval Academy. Viljar Veebel, researcher of the Department of Political and
Strategic Studies at the Baltic Defence College and a lecturer in Estonian School of Diplomacy.
He works also as associated national researcher for European Council on Foreign Relations
(ECFR). He holds doctoral degree in political science (Ph.D.) from University of Tartu. [“The NATO
“Defender 2020” exercise in the Baltic States: Will Measured Escalation Lead to Credible
Deterrence or Provoke an Escalation?,” Comparative Strategy, 6/30/2020, https://www-
tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/01495933.2020.1772626] KS

The first option can be called “the prelude for an upcoming geopolitical confrontation”. What
happened in the Baltic states and Georgia during the “Defender 2020” exercise is thereby seen as
an episode in a global neo-imperial dominance struggle, needing a decisive reaction
(preemptive decisive counterstrike) from Russia to avoid the following actions and provocations
against Russia next to their borders.30 According to this concept, the Russian leadership can translate
the “Defender 2020” exercise not as a regional assurance initiative or a land-grabbing affair but
as a start of a long-term active anti-Russian global strategy, challenging Russia as a Eurasian
power center. Hence, all efforts, actions, and reactions need to be evaluated and designed based on long-term strategic needs
and not based on the regional theater logic or a balance of powers. This might lead to a situation wherein NATO
starts its activities with a rather peaceful operational scenario (rational in terms of regional circumstances),
which is countered in a later stage from the Russian side by an agile strategic toolbox. Ex post
facto explanations that “we did not understand your intent” will not fix the damage, which will
mostly be inside of the hosting nations (the Baltic States). To be successful with this model, Russia has
sufficient assets on the table and minimal needs for reinforcements. The most important thing will be to show the
ability to lock the Baltic operational area to exclude NATO air assets and to block
reinforcements with a potentially high kill ratio. As a reward, Russia might receive a globally
visible victory over NATO and the United States as playing in their back yard with the best possible
logistical support.

The second option is “stopping the Western domination and humiliation campaign against
Putin”. By this script, NATO and the United States show to Putin the real balance of power. While
Russia has no real economic power to counter it, Putin has also no internal political credit to ignore it. While
partly relying on the aforementioned fact by which the Kremlin cannot simply survive the impression of being deterred, this model is
based on the game theory concept of repeated games.31 Here the opponent is given a painful lesson at the
first proper availability to ensure that it is not aggressive or supported by anybody in the field of play in
the future. Thereby, it is important to provoke Russia to a strategic escalation and confrontation by the offensive realist
logic and defeat it in front of international audience. This causes loss of respect for Putin, Russia, and its
military industry, and the Baltic States as a theater stage forms just a proper place for NATO to
challenge Russia in an open confrontation. However, this might also be a model with the highest probability for
success.

Russia will leverage hybrid warfare to ridicule NATO.

Tarallo ‘19 – Mark Tarallo, a veteran award-winning journalist. He has covered politics as a
newspaper reporter, international trade as a wire service reporter, and executive management
as a magazine writer. He also completed a journalism fellowship in the Middle East. He holds
degrees from UC-Berkeley and UT-Austin. [“Russia’s Geopolitical Campaign: Hybrid Warfare in
the Gray Zone,” ASIS Online,  11/1/2019, https://www.asisonline.org/security-management-
magazine/articles/2019/11/-russias-geopolitical-campaign-hybrid-warfare-in-the-gray-zone/] KS
Russia's hybrid warfare tactics are sometimes called gray zone tactics because they are
deployed in middling conflicts that cannot be considered conventional black-and-white forms of
open warfare or routine statecraft.
The hybrid tactics often combine instruments of state power with
both military and nonmilitary means to achieve different aims, such as influence, deterrence,
or intimidation. These tactics can include interference in political processes; economic and
energy exploitation; media manipulation; or the use of proxies, such as paramilitary forces.
And the tactics vary by region. In Eastern Europe and the Baltics, Russia’s primary interests “are
to maintain, or regain, its sphere of influence,” according to Jeremy W. Lamoreaux, an expert at Brigham Young
University–Idaho who is among the white paper contributors.

One of the ways Russia is pursuing this aim in the Baltics is by exploiting

the discontent simmering within the already large and growing community of ethno-linguistic
Russians who live in the Baltic countries, and then using that community as a kind of fifth
column. “This population extensively consumes much Russian media. The Kremlin, knowing
this, intentionally feeds these consumers pro-Russian, and anti-Western, content,” Lamoreaux
writes.“Additionally, anti-Russian legislation within the Baltic states simply serves to heighten the
discord.”
By heightening this discontent, “Russia effectively divides society, weakens civil society, and
undermines the potential... of a functioning democracy,”  Lamoreaux says. In the long-term, “…societal divisions
could become so dilapidating that Russia simply has to exaggerate and enhance differences  (effectively done
through social media) and then watch the West tear itself apart,” he adds.

NATO will be forced to respond.

Milevski ’16 – Lukas Milevski, Baltic Sea Fellow in the Eurasia Program at FPRI. [“Little Green
Men in the Baltic States Are an Article 5 Event,” FPRI,
1/5/2016, https://www.fpri.org/article/2016/01/little-green-men-in-the-baltic-states-are-an-
article-5-event/] KS
These same conditions would not be replicated if little green men should appear in the countries
many have speculated may be next—the Baltic States.  The Balts have learned from Crimea and
Donbas, and understand the appropriate response to a hypothetical appearance of little green
men.  As Minister of Defense, current President Raimonds Vējonis stated bluntly several times on the record that if little
green men appear in Latvia, military force will be employed: “we will shoot them.”  Nor would the
Baltic States be a media backwater should serious Russian-themed trouble occur.  The topic would force itself
onto the world’s—and especially NATO’s—immediate political agenda. 
An invocation would oblige NATO to confront the reality that the little green men directly
represent Russian military and state power and that a NATO constituent country is under direct
military attack.  Ultimately NATO remains an alliance committed to the mutual defense of its
member states.  If Article 5 is not upheld, the alliance loses not only its credibility, but also its desirability.  On 1-2
December 2015 in Brussels NATO recognized as much by adopting a policy which allows
invocation of Article 5 not just in response to overt invasion, but also in case of hybrid
warfare, as one choice among others (such as Article 4, consultation) open to member countries.

AND, it draws in great power and goes nuclear.

Trenin 19 (Dmitri Trenin PhD is the director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, a think tank and
regional affiliate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “Russian views of US
nuclear modernization.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 75:1, 14-18)
Unlike in the Cold War, the threat of a US-Russian nuclear war is not at the front and center of the current hybrid war confrontation.
To most people in both countries, the threat remains very remote, or appears to have vanished altogether. Certainly,
neither
America nor Russia intends to annihilate the other in a massive nuclear first strike. However,
the highly fluid and essentially borderless nature of the hybrid war – in a globalized
environment where the US-Russian relationship is no longer the dominant one – allows
for multiple conflicts and no overriding authority to stop or mitigate them. In this environment, a US-
Russian military collision might not be deterred by the paralyzing fear of a nuclear
Armageddon, as it was after the Cuban Missile Crisis. Once such a collision happens and is allowed
to escalate, however, a first use of nuclear weapons may become a reality.
 1AC – Arms Racing
Scenario One is Hypersonics:
Baltic defense drives Russian vertical proliferation – particularly, pushes them
to hypersonic use.
Ploom et al ’20 – Illimar Ploom, associate professor at the Department of Strategic Studies
and Innovation at the Estonian Military Academy. He holds doctoral degree in modern history
(D.Phil.) from University of Oxford. Zdzislaw Sliwa, serves as the Dean of the Baltic Defence
College; he is also a visiting professor at the Latvian National Defence Academy. He holds
doctoral degree from Polish National Defence University and post-doctoral degree in Security
Studies from Polish Naval Academy. Viljar Veebel, researcher of the Department of Political and
Strategic Studies at the Baltic Defence College and a lecturer in Estonian School of Diplomacy.
He works also as associated national researcher for European Council on Foreign Relations
(ECFR). He holds doctoral degree in political science (Ph.D.) from University of Tartu. [“The NATO
“Defender 2020” exercise in the Baltic States: Will Measured Escalation Lead to Credible
Deterrence or Provoke an Escalation?,” Comparative Strategy, 6/30/2020, https://www-
tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/01495933.2020.1772626] KS

At the same time, NATO is depicted in Russia as a threat if not straightforwardly aggressive. It was highlighted by
Gerasimov44 that NATO nations have been lately increasing their defence spending and are
conducting more active, large-scale exercises in Norway, Eastern Europe, including Baltic nations, Poland,
and on Baltic and Black Seas. It is causing concerns as, according to Gerasimov, their scenarios are presenting a
preparation of NATO forces to a large-scale military conflict.45 As a side effect, such developments
are seen as potentially leading to an undesired arms race, which could cause a significant risk of
escalation and potential conflict. A reaction came also from President Lukashenko of Belarus who considered how to
secure his nation facing such a large-scale exercise. He stated, “It is not normal”, and saw it as an evidence that
the current peace is not stable. President Putin during the Commonwealth of Independent States’ Summit in Ashgabat
stated that Russia will react “calmly”, but he recognized a need to discuss the situation with partners.46 These
statements were supported by Dmitry Peskov, the Press Secretary for the President of Russia, who
expressed also concerns about exercises and build-up of NATO infrastructure along the west
borders of Russia.47

These statements have been relatively mild, considering that in Russian political and military thinking, if a
Western power
has already deployed force for deterrence close to a nation’s borders, it is an aggressive sign
against which this nation should mobilize for over-proportional counter-reaction. Such a narrative
has been used during last two decades, mainly for internal audiences. Of course, Russian military leaders might be aware that such
deployed forces as NATO’s in “Defender 2020” are not a real threat in the military sense. Still, as the above reactions to the NATO
exercise demonstrate, it
is not acceptable politically that the West is building a presence in the former
Russian area of influence. Using Georgia, the three Baltic nations, and Poland as the area of the
exercise is a message to Russia that the United States is not giving up on those allies, and it is
undermining Russian ambitions to regain influence in parallel.

Indeed, the paradox is that what NATO depicts and designs as deterrence, Russia interprets as
a threat. This is explicit in the Russian Military Doctrine from 2014:
“[The] build-up of the power potential of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and
vesting NATO with global functions carried out in violation of the rules of international law,
bringing the military infrastructure of NATO member countries near the borders of the Russian
Federation, including by further expansion of the”.48

This threat-based thinking is used not only as a tool of foreign policy but also to shape the mind-
set of Russia’s population. As was seen in the reactions to the exercise, this perception acquires ever new
leases of life, not even in the light of its overwhelming capabilities that just in the West Military
District would allow Russia to not only effectively defend the country but also to conduct
decisive offensive operations to achieve limited operational objectives. The creation of the Federal
Service of the National Guard is even stronger in highlighting the development of the territorial defence capability. Thus, the
current Russian narrative is presenting an ever less amicable picture of its relationship with
NATO, reminiscent of the Cold War.

For Russia, NATO is intrinsically linked to the United States. As stated by Russian experts, NATO’s
symbolic capital lies in the association of the bloc with American leadership. In general, the United
States is NATO’s undebatable leader and possesses the largest political influence with the organization.49 From
Moscow’s viewpoint, the more the United States cements its presence in the Baltic Sea region,
the more tension will follow, and the likelihood of de-escalation in the contact line decreases.
There is also an additional layer of risk related to the exercise. Small aggressive foreign military force, which has
no practical threat, can still be seen as challenging Russia’s honor to humiliate and lower
Russia’s international status and respect to their leaders.50 This needs a decisive counteraction through
punishment against the provoking action and actors. As a counteraction, Defence Minister Shoigu announced
the deployment of Russia’s first cutting-edge hypersonic intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBM) “Avangard” to a missile division in central Russia’s Orenburg region .51
Crucially, what one can perceive is that for Russia, the Baltic states cease to represent mere regional choices but epitomize instead
global anti-Russian sentiments. Essentially, the
Baltic Sea region is being used as a convenient geographical
flashpoint from which to carry out the destabilization of Russia on NATO’s part .52 Therefore, it is likely
that the “Defender 2020” could be seen by Russia as an extension of this project. Thus, we can see the main challenge to any sort of
de-escalation attempt in the Baltic Sea region where mutual distrust results in a strategic misconnection. States in the Baltic Sea
region see Russia as an aggressive revisionist power conducting hybrid operations after its illegal annexation of Crimea. In
return,
Russia sees these states as means to an end for NATO’s (i.e., the United States’) global plot to
destabilize Russia from a relatively reinvigorated theater of operations . Afterall, Russia believes
that the military build-up in the Baltic Sea region is part of a long-term strategy to punish it for
its role in the Ukrainian conflict.53

Hypersonic weapons goad Russia into a fait accompli in Europe – that

emboldens Russian aggression via grey zone confrontation.
Cummings ’19 [Alan; November 12; Candidate for an M.A. focusing on Nuclear Strategy and
Emerging Technology at Tuft’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, served ten years on active
duty with the U.S. Navy, former research assistant with the Center for Global Security Research
at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; War On The Rocks, “Hypersonic Weapons: Tactical
Uses and Strategic Goals,” https://warontherocks.com/2019/11/hypersonic-weapons-tactical-
uses-and-strategic-goals/; RP]
Russian hypersonic weapon capabilities are addressed principally to two audiences: the West (especially
NATO) and Russia’s peripheral nations like Finland, the Baltics, Ukraine, and Georgia. Living
under the hypersonic gun makes locations in western Europe as vulnerable to strikes initiated from
within Russian territory as the Baltics, Ukraine, and Georgia have been in the sub-sonic age. Consider that Russia’s sub-
sonic Kalibr cruise missile, if launched from the Gulf of Finland, could range any country on Russia’s western border and would take
about two hours to hit Sofia, Bulgaria, 1,200 miles to the south. An air-launched Kinzhal hypersonic
glide
vehicle traveling Mach 10 could hit Sofia in 11 minutes from the same location. Re-orienting the firing
line to Russia’s western borders, a Kinzhal could reach London, Paris, or Rome equally quickly. To put it
another way, hypersonic weapons mean that a hypothetical target 1,200 miles away has the same opportunity for warning as those
within roughly 100 miles of a subsonic cruise missile. The
Mach 20 Avangard expands the threat umbrella to
cover ranges reportedly in excess of 3,700 miles with a flight time of around 20 minutes.

Up until now, the West has been fairly confident that their collective intelligence capabilities would
alert them to limited Russian aggression. Even if insufficient to fully interdict a Russian move, it
was understood that distance equates to time and thus warning. Russian hypersonic weapons offer a novel
way to overcome the tactical depth — the idea of where one’s vulnerabilities lie, where those vulnerabilities can be
exploited from, and how quickly effects can be inflicted — implicit in European defense thinking. Countries in
the Russian periphery feel the loss of depth in a different way: they are now quickly reachable from a vastly
increased number of firing locations. For example, sub-sonic munitions would take about 15 minutes to hit Donetsk from
the Russian border. Hypersonic weapons with the same flight time could now reach Donetsk from as far away as central (Kinzhal) or
eastern (Avangard) Russia.

This makes hypersonic weapons a helpful tool for a fait accompli, a move so decisive (perhaps unexpected)
that it instantly achieves the Clausewitzian “culminating point of victory” against opposition that is either
unable or unwilling to fight back. A robust hypersonic weapons capability would help Russia quickly
seize the initiative in escalating from rhetoric to kinetic action, quickly inflicting damage using units
that are well-dispersed and may appear unrelated to each other or to the conflict. Alternatively, the same
capabilities can be used to strike targets meant to deter Western leaders from a forceful
intervention. A single hypersonic weapon targeting an outlying military airfield may be enough of
a “pressure point” to warn without provoking, or without cornering political leaders to respond in kind.

Build up alone causes accidents – both technical failures AND miscalculation.

Klare ’19 [Michael; June 2019; Professor Emeritus of Peace and World Security Studies at
Hampshire College, Senior Visiting Fellow at the Arms Control Association; Arms Control
Association, “An ‘Arms Race in Speed’: Hypersonic Weapons and the Changing Calculus of
Battle,” https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-06/features/arms-race-speed-hypersonic-
weapons-changing-calculus-battle; RP]

Speed is also a significant factor in the nuclear attack and deterrence equation. Following the advent of
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in the late 1950s, which reduced to mere minutes the time
between a launch decision and catastrophic destruction on the other side of the planet, nuclear-armed
states have labored to deploy early-warning and command-and-control systems capable of
detecting a missile launch and initiating a retaliatory strike before their own missiles could be
destroyed. Preventing the accidental or inadvertent onset of nuclear war thus requires enough
time for decision-makers to ascertain the accuracy of reported missile launches and choose
appropriate responses. This is an imperative reinforced by several Cold War incidents in which launch
detection systems provided false indications of such action but human operators intervened to
prevent unintended retaliation.

Today, speed will alter the calculus of combat and deterrence even further with the imminent
deployment of hypersonic weapons—maneuverable vehicles that fly at more than five times the
speed of sound (Mach 5 and higher). China, Russia, and the United States are testing hypersonic weapons
of various types to enhance strategic nuclear deterrence and strengthen front-line combat units .
Existing ICBM reentry vehicles also travel at those superfast speeds, but the hypersonic glide vehicles now in development
are far more maneuverable, making their tracking and interception nearly impossible. Such dual-
use vehicles, capable of carrying nuclear or conventional warheads, are also being fitted on missiles
intended for use in a regional context, say , in a battle erupting in the Baltic region or the South China
Sea. With the time between launch and arrival on target dwindling to 10 minutes or less, the
introduction of these weapons will introduce new and potent threats to global nuclear stability.

Countries will integrate AI – that spirals into flash wars.

Klare ’19 [Michael; June 2019; Professor Emeritus of Peace and World Security Studies at
Hampshire College, Senior Visiting Fellow at the Arms Control Association; Arms Control
Association, “An ‘Arms Race in Speed’: Hypersonic Weapons and the Changing Calculus of
Battle,” https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-06/features/arms-race-speed-hypersonic-
weapons-changing-calculus-battle; RP]

All this points to yet another concern related to the impact of emerging technologies on the
future battlefield: the risk that nuclear-armed nations, fearing scenarios of just this sort, will entrust more and
more of their critical decision-making to machines, fearing that humans will not be able to make
reasoned judgments under such enormous time pressures. With hypersonic weapons in the arsenals
of the major powers, military leaders may conclude that sophisticated artificial intelligence (AI) systems
should be empowered to determine the nature of future missile attacks and select the
appropriate response. This is a temptation that can only increase as hypersonic weapons are
themselves equipped with AI systems, a capability being developed at Sandia National Laboratories, enabling
them to select and navigate to an array of potential targets.15 This convergence of advanced
technologies is one of the greatest concerns of analysts who fear the loss of human control over the pace of
combat. Paul Scharre, a program director at the Center for a New American Security, has warned of a “flash war”
erupting when machines misinterpret radar signals and initiate catastrophic, possibly nuclear
responses. “Competitive pressures in fast-paced environments threaten to push humans further
and further out of the loop,” he wrote. “With this arms race in speed come grave risks,” including “a
war that spirals out of control in mere seconds.”16

Scenario Two is Second Strike:

Achieving conventional parity in the Baltics is impossible, BUT the attempt
drives escalatory arms racing.
Veebel ’18 [Viljar; April 18; Researcher in the Department of Political and Strategic Studies at
the Baltic Defense College, Ph.D. in Political Science and M.A. in International Relations from the
University of Tartu; Defence Studies, “NATO options and dilemmas for deterring Russia in the
Baltic States,” vol. 18; RP]
4. Conclusions: How to increase the credibility of NATO’s deterrence?
The preceding analysis demonstrates the weaknesses of the Alliance’s deterrence strategy. The
overall idea of nuclear capabilities as a supreme guarantee of NATO’s credible deterrence does
not help to scale down Russia’s regional ambitions (Blank 2008). This is due to both morality arguments as well
as practical and rational reasons, such as territorial proximity of Russia and the Baltic counties,
difference in opinions and priorities within the Alliance, potential for the escalation of the conflict aspects,
etc. Russia is justifiably considered to have conventional supremacy in the Baltic region. The
conventional balance in the Baltic area is not achievable neither for the Baltic countries in total
nor with the additional forward positioned allied battalions, and the defence models of the Baltic
countries are, by its nature, fully nonaggressive, without any room for pre-emptive initiatives, extra
territoriality or hybrid tools (Andžāns and Veebel 2017, 30–31). What is more, as far as the Baltic countries are concerned,
also some signs of “self-deterrence” are visible, referring to unsubstantiated, if not somewhat naïve, views of the political and
military elite of the Baltic countries as well as relying on so-called deterrence by imagination. The
credibility of deterrence
is at risk also pending on different visions of the Alliance’s member states about what should be the values,
the focus and the threat perceptions of the organisation, and whether Russia should be treated as a potential
adversary, and a somewhat vague response of the Alliance to Russia’s political rhetoric. Similarly, the ethnic component
– a relatively big Russian-speaking community particularly in Estonia and Latvia – speaks mostly in favour of Russia
in a potential regional conflict. It must be acknowledged that this could to some extent also have a deterring effect. Last but
not least, as Russia is not suffering from a feeling of stigmatisation and reciprocity, the Alliance lacks
tools that would have an entangling or disciplining effect (Veebel and Markus 2016b, 138).
To answer the question of what should be done in the future to actually deter Russia and to avoid aggression from the Russian side,
first the essence of the potential conflict should be discussed. It is argued by this paper that the
more precise the aim
against to whom, what and when the deterrence is needed, the more cost-efficient the deterrence
is.
Russia’s past strategy against former Soviet republics can be judged as having been definitely well-thought, covering most of the
escape routes for potential “victims” (Veebel 2017b, 6). First, Russia has used
the approach based on the Gerasimov
doctrine which attempts to find a hybrid conflict model with a very low-intensity, without
alarming the tripwire for activating North Atlantic Treaty article 5 for collective defence (Fridman 2017, 42–
43). Among other things, that would devalue the Alliance’s credibility and allow to increase Russia’s
negative “bargaining power” in the international arena by occupying part of the opponent’s
territory and then deescalate the situation to frozen conflict. Since the costs of this type of confrontation are
low, Russia’s destabilising attempts will most probably continue, i.e. at least as long as NATO will not decide to
“punish” Russia. Second, Russia is simultaneously determined to respond to any regional initiatives of the
Alliance with its own respective activities and interventions which have already led to a regional
arms race. The reason why something like this has happened is the fact that Russia is strongly prioritizing national
and emotional categories (Suslov 2014, 606), whereas the current overall costs for the Alliance are low
enough giving no reason to worry yet. Also, even is the West contradicts the logic of the sphere of
interests, the Baltic States being situated in such proximity to Russia are de facto considered as
a zone where Russia needs to be allowed to retain high conventional advantage. Thus, there is a
risk that any additional conventional defence measure applied on the Eastern flank of NATO could
trigger an out-of-proportion arm-race or escalation from Russia. This dynamic is bound to work
in Russia’s favour, also in terms of providing moral high ground and ever more justification for its worries
and possibly a pre-emptive attack.
That lowers the threshold for nuclear first-use, causes global build-up, and
breaks the taboo.
Veebel ’18 [Viljar; April 18; Researcher in the Department of Political and Strategic Studies at
the Baltic Defense College, Ph.D. in Political Science and M.A. in International Relations from the
University of Tartu; Defence Studies, “NATO options and dilemmas for deterring Russia in the
Baltic States,” vol. 18; RP]
3. Analysis: The credibility of deterrence in discouraging Russia’s regional ambitions in terms of capability, cohesion, communication,
interdependence and acceptance of norms

3.1. Comparing the capabilities in the Baltic region: NATO versus Russia

3.1.1. Nuclear capability

Nuclear capabilities are considered to be integral to the strategy of deterrence of the Alliance (NATO
2010, 2012). It is expected that the Alliance’s nuclear weapons capabilities assure that any kind of aggression
against its members is not a rational option (NATO 2010). The Alliance’s Strategic Concept states that

the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of
the Alliance; particularly those of the United States; the independent strategic forces of the United Kingdom
and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies.
(NATO 2015)

Although NATO nuclear policy has adapted to the changing strategic circumstances, nuclear
aspects have still remained
the least changed part of the Alliance’s deterrence spectrum (Kulesa and Frear 2017). The Deterrence and
Defence Posture Review which was published in 2012 assessed that NATO’s nuclear force posture met the criteria for an effective
deterrence and defence posture (NATO 2012).

At this point, it is nevertheless relevant to notice that some arguments have been highlighted in analyses and reports
which refer to the overall vulnerability if not outright weakness of the idea of nuclear capabilities
being taken as a supreme guarantee of NATO’s credible deterrence. First, the Alliance itself does not
possess nuclear weapons and can’t, therefore, provide neither legal nor political assurances to its
member or other states on how nuclear weapons belonging to the specific member states might be used
(Chalmers 2011, 55–56). Moreover, among the owners of nuclear capabilities in NATO there is only partial
consensus over the extent to which nuclear forces are “assigned” to NATO. Whereas the nuclear
weapons of the UK have been formally assigned to NATO and the country has confirmed that the weapons will
be used for the purpose of international defence of the Atlantic Alliance in all circumstances, the nuclear weapons of
France are not assigned to NATO and are aimed to contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies. Of
course, France is also neither a member of the NATOʼs nuclear structures nor does it participate in
the Alliance’s collective nuclear planning. There is also no consensus within NATO on the precise
extent to which the US nuclear forces are assigned to NATO (Chalmers 2011, 56). Second, nuclear
issues are politically highly sensitive. Russia has used increasingly intimidating rhetoric which
creates concerns that it may lower the threshold for using nuclear weapons (Rathke 2016). The
purpose of its rhetoric could be interpreted as preparing not solely the international audience but its own
population to the situation where there would arise a need to find a handy justification. It is noteworthy that it
has already conducted some large-scale military exercises that included also a simulation of a
limited nuclear strike against the Alliance. The country has also invested in nuclear modernisation
and exercises involving nuclear forces to send signals to NATO. This means that the overall vision
of nuclear disarmament deal has been pushed into the background. This could seriously
endanger the respective international norms or amount to no lesser deed than breaking the
taboos currently preventing the usage of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, several countries make
attempts to gain nuclear weapons capability. This causes political tensions and imbalances in the
international arena and refers to the potential escalation and counterbalancing of nuclear
weapons. Third, in practice the role of nuclear weapons in the NATO doctrine has gradually decreased over
the past two-three decades. If the number of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe in the early-1990s was about 2500,
the figure has decreased since then and was 180 in 2016. Thus, should the US want to use these weapons, it
would take weeks or even months to be actually able to do it (Sauer 2016).

Nuclear capabilities in the Baltics are a key brink.

Veebel ’18 [Viljar; April 18; Researcher in the Department of Political and Strategic Studies at
the Baltic Defense College, Ph.D. in Political Science and M.A. in International Relations from the
University of Tartu; Defence Studies, “NATO options and dilemmas for deterring Russia in the
Baltic States,” vol. 18; RP]

The questions whether nuclear weapons could be used in possible warfare scenarios and
whether the Baltic countries could be in a particular danger in that regard have been addressed both
in the political and military circles as well as discussed in many studies and reports. For example, Luik and Jermalavičius
(2017, 237–238) emphasise that Russia’s political rhetoric includes nuclear threats towards the Baltic
countries making them particularly vulnerable. The report published by the RAND Corporation in 2016
argues that Russia’s next most likely targets are the Baltic countries and that the nuclear forces of
NATO do not have enough credibility to protect the latter (see, Shlapak and Johnson 2016, 7). Thompson (2016)
suggests some reasons why the greatest danger exists with regard to the Baltic countries, from the high
strategic significance to the future disposition of the Baltic countries to the incorporation of new
technologies into the forces on both Russia and NATO.

Russia will balance defense commitments by deploying theatre capabilities --

prompts U.S. modernization.
Mount ’17 [Adam; May 4; Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, Stanton Nuclear
Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Ph.D. in Government from Georgetown
University; Center for American Progress, “The Case Against New Nuclear Weapons,”
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2017/05/04/431833/case-new-
nuclear-weapons/; RP]

The more considered arguments for new warheads justify their recommendations as necessary to
dissuade Russia and other peer competitors from initiating and escalating a limited conflict. In accordance
with this view, the end of the Cold War and consequent adjustments in the structure and posture of
Russian strategic forces have caused the threat of a major nuclear exchange to recede. However, as
potential nuclear-armed adversaries, specifically Russia and China, expand their territorial claims to encroach
upon the interests of U.S. allies, the likelihood of limited regional conflict increases.64 Deterring these
conflicts requires the United States and its allies to jointly retain the capability to achieve their military and political objectives on
acceptable terms.

There is growing evidence that nuclear-armed U.S. adversaries plan to posture or employ their
nuclear forces as part of a strategy to prevail in a limited conflict.65 To take the most alarming case, Russia has
acknowledged deploying nuclear-capable Iskander missiles to Kaliningrad on the pretense of
exercises, has simulated nuclear attacks on NATO members, and its leadership has made repeated
references to the possibility of a nuclear alert or nuclear employment in response to subconventional
operations.66
For these reasons, the United States must ensure that it retains the capability not only to deter a limited conflict but also to deter an
adversary from escalating that conflict once it has begun—to deter a conventional conflict from going nuclear or a limited nuclear
employment from leading to a wider or more destructive nuclear attack. For
many strategists, this imperative requires
the United States to retain nuclear forces that can credibly be employed at each level of escalation.
For example, Elbridge Colby, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, has argued that “escalation advantage or
superiority, the position in which one can escalate more effectively, controllably, and decisively than one’s opponent, is crucial for
determining who will come out ahead in a limited conflict.”67 This theory underwrites Colby’s belief that “[t]he United States should
want to make its nuclear forces more usable and its threats credible.”68

In the literature on limited nuclear war, for a nuclear threat to be credible at low levels of conflict, it must:

 Be capable of discrimination between its intended target and other civilian, military, and political objects, so
that employment is not unintentionally escalatory and is politically and morally sustainable
 Be perceptibly distinct from a major employment of strategic nuclear forces that could
endanger the enemy’s ability to maintain control of its own arsenal or the state
 Signal a willingness to continue to escalate the conflict, while at the same time communicating a
desire to exercise restraint so that escalation does not occur

An increasing number of observers believe that the United States lacks nuclear options that can meet
these standards but that it is within our power to develop capabilities that would. In a recent National
Institute for Public Policy report, some argue that Russia perceives a lack of resolve and capability in NATO
deterrence posture and that this “constitutes a perceived exploitable advantage that threatens
deterrence.” 69 In short, Russia believes that it has “force posture advantages over the West” that
“range from much greater local conventional force capability and readiness in the short-run, to
nuclear escalation options to which NATO is thought to have no acceptable response.”70 While
conventional advantages can be redressed by prepositioning materials and deploying conventional forces, perceived gaps in
the U.S. nuclear structure require new nuclear capabilities.

New capabilities end secure second-strike -- causes adversarial first use.

Mount ’17 [Adam; May 4; Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, Stanton Nuclear
Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Ph.D. in Government from Georgetown
University; Center for American Progress, “The Case Against New Nuclear Weapons,”
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2017/05/04/431833/case-new-
nuclear-weapons/; RP]
That said, it is an altogether different matter to acquire nuclear delivery vehicles and munitions that represent new ways to hold
targets at risk. There are two primary ways a new system could do so. New
systems may appear to provide new
nonstrategic employment
options, whether because they are forward-deployed or because they have
shorter operational ranges, low yields, or special effects that may allow them to be more effective for use on
the battlefield. Upgrades that improve the discrimination of U.S. nuclear forces clearly fall into this category because they afford
leaders concerned with minimizing civilian casualties new options for nuclear employment. Alternatively, a
new system may
threaten an adversary’s ability to retaliate to a nuclear first strike. For example, cruise missiles with
hypersonic velocity or those that are deployed close to an adversary’s territory may decrease the
warning time that an adversary has of a nuclear attack or be more able to strike at mobile ballistic
missile launchers before they can fire.
Capabilities of this kind are destabilizing not only because they may negate an adversary’s second-
strike capability or lower the threshold for nuclear use but because they imply a change in U.S.
nuclear strategy. Both, in different ways, would be seen as a move away from thinking of nuclear
weapons as primarily useful for deterring an adversary’s first use toward an embrace of what is
sometimes called nuclear warfighting, which refers either to the belief that one could actually fight and prevail in
a nuclear exchange or that nuclear weapons could be employed during an essentially conventional conflict
for tactical purposes. Acquiring capabilities of this kind would also call into question the carefully
calibrated language in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review regarding the conditions in which the United States would
consider first use of nuclear weapons.ok t
 1AC – Solvency
Only limiting activation solves -- Russia will oscillate between outright
provocation AND hybrid warfare to paint NATO as the aggressor -- credibility
trap ensures forward-leaning AND retaliatory postures fail.
Veebel ’18 [Viljar; April 18; Researcher in the Department of Political and Strategic Studies at
the Baltic Defense College, Ph.D. in Political Science and M.A. in International Relations from the
University of Tartu; Defence Studies, “NATO options and dilemmas for deterring Russia in the
Baltic States,” vol. 18; RP]
1. Introduction

The cornerstone of NATO’s collective defence strategy is deterrence. According to the Alliance’s strategy,
“no one should doubt NATO’s resolve if the security of any of its members were to be
threatened” (NATO 2012). It is expected that the combination of the Alliance’s nuclear and conventional capabilities would
persuade the opponent(s) that an aggression would cause costs that are higher than the potential gains (NATO 2015, 2017a). In this
sense, credible deterrence acts as a guarantee for peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region. However, recent
events in
Ukraine and Georgia have revealed the potential weaknesses of the current deterrence models.
Without any overt fear of retaliation, we have seen Russia’s aggressions against its neighbours
which were planned and executed with great sophistication , initiative, agility and decisiveness. Indeed,
Russia has avoided any moral hesitation. What is more, in the international arena, there exists a political
consensus about Russia having initiated a wave of hybrid warfare which is reflected on all
possible levels and is constantly expanding in scope. Thus, drawing on the above one could also conclude that
Russia is in a consistent manner testing the credibility of the current international security
framework and the principle of deterrence by searching for low-intensive options to destabilize the
neighbouring countries.

Although contrary to Ukraine and Georgia which are not the members of the Alliance, Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania are
granted security guarantees in the NATO framework, the Baltic countries clearly constitute Russia’s
point of contact with NATO and are, therefore, also subject to the interests of Russia to test mutual
capabilities and to send strategic messages to the Alliance. In this context, the aim of the article is to
assess how credible is the deterrence posture provided by NATO in avoiding potential aggression
on the part of Russia against the Baltic countries, what would the likely aggression scenarios look
like, should Russia decide to attack the Baltic countries, and what could and should be done to increase the
credibility of NATO’s deterrence strategy to avoid aggression from the Russian side .

As an underlying thread, this paper would draw attention to the fact of interwovenness of the Russian and Western worlds in the
Baltics. It is ordinarily seen in territorial terms, but equally important is to acknowledge the civilizational or political aspect. The
large Russophone minorities especially in Estonia and Latvia, since not unmistakably “won over” by the two
neighbouring states, have been under a constant sophisticated pressure by the Kremlin to keep
representing its interests in the region. The Russian diaspora in the Baltics nevertheless only
represents an aspect of a wider game conducted by the Kremlin to re-establish its position in
the international arena. Thus, this paper wants to draw attention to the intricate relationship that NATO has with Russia.
Given the preceding discussion, following limitations are set on the current study, first, author is building-up own framework for the
analysis to cover both physical capabilities of potential parties to the conflict and behavioural-ethical aspects related to the current
circumstances. In this way, next to the comparison of both nuclear and conventional capabilities of Russia and NATO also the
cohesion of the Alliance (i.e. country-specific visions and perceptions), interdependence (i.e. mutual relations between Russia and
the Alliance) and reputational costs incurring through infringement of rules/ norms are discussed. Since the collective-actor
deterrence comprises both the deterrence provided by the alliance and by individual members of the group (Von Hlatky 2015, 3),
these aspects are discussed from the point of view of both NATO and the Baltic countries. Second, the study basically assumes that
Russia’s general aim is to devalue NATO’s credibility and to increase Russia’s negative “bargaining
power” in the international arena as well as to respond to any regional initiatives of the Alliance with its
own respective activities and interventions. However, as far as particular risk is concerned that Russia could
particularly attack the Baltic countries, the study focuses on the aim that Russia would like to restore
control over the territory of the former Soviet Union, or at least to break off the relations of the Baltic countries with
the Western world. This limitation seems to be reasonable in the way that it helps in the following sections to simulate the
essence of the potential conflict situation in the Baltic region.

2. Theoretical dilemmas of building-up a credible deterrence model

Deterrence is summarised as a state attempting to convince an adversary not to use military force,
either by threatening retaliation (deterrence by punishment/retaliation) or by thwarting the adversary’s
operational plans (deterrence by denial) (Von Hlatky 2015, 4–5). Retaliation can be executed both by target
country or its allies ensuring the trustworthiness of international stability and security. A would-be aggressor is
persuaded by other actor(s) that an aggression causes high costs and unacceptable damage, which
outweigh potential gains arising from the conflict or aggression (Paulauskas 2016, 1). The fear of
unaffordable consequences and the threat to use force would discourage the opponent(s) and prevent
or inhibit some actions which have not yet started but that the opponent longs for (Zagare 2013, Morgan 2017). Thus, deterrence
is related to costs. Still, the costs may not be limited to material ones and may not occur immediately. For example, the “cost” could
also be incurring either in terms of the loss of respect or credibility among certain groups in the future. It could also be based on an
actual fear that something will happen, or on a hopelessness to achieve something. Likewise, deterrence can be related to a belief
that a certain technology will be developed and become available for use. It could also be based on an emotional inability to leave
the conflict. In this sense, deterrence is a psychological phenomenon taking place in actors’ heads.

In the respective academic literature, deterrence is often In the respective academic literature, deterrence is often
associated with game theory models, combining expectations, availability of information,
asymmetry of mutual relations referring to relations between states with significantly different potential, and
strategic decisions. In these models, the credibility of deterrence is largely determined by the previous
“moves”, the roles of the players and their motivation. Game theory models which analyse the credibility
of asymmetric deterrence presuppose that the higher the perceived probability that a player
actually prefers to execute its deterrent threat, the higher is the credibility of deterrence (Zagare 1993, 25).
Intriguingly, according to some game theory models like the chicken game or the dollar auction game, being convincingly irrational
and emotionally unstable could contribute helping to deter the opponent more than being rational and stable (see, e.g. Veebel and
Markus 2016a, 464–465). The theory of deterrence also contains
a range of dilemmas that could lead to
inefficient deterrence measures, rise of tensions between opponents and provocations with pre-
emptive aggressive actions.
Paradoxically, deterrence means that certain capabilities need to be demonstrated to the opponent, while not revealing others
which need to be kept secret. At the same time, capabilities which are completely classified cannot often fulfil their deterring aims.
This brings us to the first dilemma of choosing between strategies to escalate or to de-escalate
the conflict. The preemptive escalation of the conflict may deter or stop the opponents, given that they
are following the ideas of offensive realism arguing that states have to compete with each other for the power, but they are acting
rational and, therefore, survival is their most important goal (see, Mearsheimer 1983). However,
the result could be just
the opposite, should the opponent be motivated by the idea of balancing, i.e. compensating for the
existing imbalance (see, e.g. Levy 2003). In this case, the escalation of conflict is interpreted by the opponent as being
provocative and hostile requiring a response. In respect to the current analysis, this dilemma is mostly
reflected in a situation where large-scale military capabilities located in the Baltic region with
the aim to deter Russia (e.g. deterrence by denial) are actually seen as being provocative from Russia’s
viewpoint, which may lead to conflict escalation.

The second dilemma concerns the balance between morality and efficiency which could similarly to the previous one lead both to
the lack of confidence, decisiveness and the lack of initiative. For example, one party to the conflict could easily find itself in a
situation where it has to choose between a pre-emptive decisive independent action and a passive and rather
defensive status as victim. Whereas the first may lead to a victory in a single battle yet risking to lose the war, the second
may bring short-term losses but nevertheless help to be successful in the conflict in general. Accordingly, a pre-emptive
strike cannot be chosen, should it be more important for the country to present itself as a non-
aggressive “player” or a victim and to keep its morals high and sacrificing potentially smaller losses in general.
Under the current circumstances, whereas striking first would help the Alliance to keep its initiative
during the conflict, it would also make NATO look highly aggressive, which contradicts the fundamentals of
the Alliance and would cause possible drop of public support. Moreover, deterrence by its nature is very dynamic:
once one party to the conflict succeeds in confusing and distracting the other and making the
adversary hesitate of whether to escalate or de-escalate the conflict, it may happen that the state has
already lost its advantage and is lacking initiative, because it has already revealed its capabilities and
has become predictable.

Third, there is also a dilemma between prioritizing either strategic defences or deterrence. If
deterrence is purely retaliatory, then its logic leads to a rejection of strategic defence, but if it
includes denial, then it may well be logical to deploy strategic defences (Buzan 1987, 135). One can detect a
zero-sum game between these two options. While progress in terms of strategic defence contributes mostly to deterrence by
denial, the funds allocated for strategic defences may well lead to a situation where investments into retaliation
capabilities will be diminished, which in turn decreases the potential of the deterrence by punishment.
Another dimension of prioritizing either strategic defences or deterrence in terms of costs is related to a pragmatic choice whether
in overall it would be more cost effective to rely on deterrence by punishment and to leave the country (or some of the allies)
vulnerable to partial aggression, or to exploit the resources for deterrence by denial and avoiding the aggression.