Collective Action

Comparing Prisoner's Dilemma, Commons Dilemma, and Public Goods Provision Designs in
Laboratory Experiments
Author(s): David Goetze
Source: The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Mar., 1994), pp. 56-86
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Comparing Prisoner's Dilemma,
Commons Dilemma, and Public
Goods Provision Designs in
Laboratory Experiments
DAVID GOETZE
Utah State University
The ability to cumulateand comparefindings from laboratoryexperimentsis impededby

the wide varietyof designs employed in these studiesand by the differentincentive character-
istics embedded in those designs. This article attemptsto improve potential for comparing
findingsby proposingvariablesthat specify incentive featuresof collective action designs. For
many designs as seemingly disparateas those in prisoner'sdilemma, commons dilemma,and
public goods provision games, these specifications should enable different designs to be
representedas values along common incentive parameters.With this procedure,the influence
of incentives can be assessed and controlledacross disparateexperimentaldesigns as well as
the cumulativeinfluence of othervariables(for example, groupsize and identity,framing,and
socioeconomic characteristicsof subjects)that provokecollective action behavior.The article
also notes the limitationsof this procedureandotherobstaclesto the meaningfulcumulationof
findings on collective action. The proceduremay not, for example, allow easy comparisonof
findings from experimentaldesigns thathave disparatenonlinearreturnsto cost contributions.
In the social sciences, the term collective action has acquired a meaning
distinct from its more traditional reference to a group of people engaging in
actions directed toward a common end. The contemporary social science
sense includes the notion that incentives confronting individuals in a group
may not be consistent with achievement of cooperative or collective ends
that would benefit everyone in the group. This understanding implies that
cooperative actions by individuals generate benefits for everyone in the
group, but the self-interested individual benefits even more from choosing
not to cooperate (Elster 1989, 25; Axelrod 1984, 8; Dawes 1980, 169). In
AUTHOR'S NOTE: Thanks go to RobertaHerzberg,John Orbell, Randy Simmons, and

VeronicaWardforcommentson earlierversionsof this article.
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION,Vol. 38 No. 1, March1994 56-86
? 1994 Sage Publications,Inc.
56
Goetze/ COMPARINGDESIGNS 57
other words,the contemporarysense of collective actionrefersto situations

in which cooperationis desirablebut problematic.
As it turnsout, these dilemmasof collective action involve some of the
most fundamentalquestions of political and social order: are the various
groups who share common interestsin a society able to act in concerted
fashion to furtherthose interests?1How can society be organizedto produce
desirable and sometimes necessary goods (e.g., militarydefense and envi-
ronmentalregulation)when individualslack incentivesto contributevolun-
tarilyto theirprovision(e.g., by paying taxes)?The importanceof collective
action dilemmasto the functionor dysfunctionof humansocieties makesus
ask how humans behave in their presence. To what degree is the human
species, as a whole, inclinedto contributeto collective action?In general,do
people cooperateabouthalf of the time, one-thirdof the time, or most of the
time? Are some subgroupsin the populationmore inclined to contributeto
collective action thanothers?Or, are cooperationrates entirely situational?
Are theresubgroupsin the world'spopulationwho aretriggeredinto collec-
tive actionby a set of factorscompletelydifferentfromthe factorsthattrigger
othersubgroups?Does observedcooperationresultfromalterationof objec-
tive incentives so that cooperationis no longer rationallyproblematicor,
instead, from the presence of perceptual,moral, cultural,evolutionary,or
other nonrationalfactors? And, how general are these causal relations?
Moreover,how susceptibleis humanbehaviorto change?Are thereeffective
alternatives(perhapsmoraleducationorarrangementintocommunalgroups)
to the coercive forces of governmentfor makingpeople act in ways that are
ultimatelybeneficial in collective action situations?
Finding answers to these questions will, of course, involve a variety of
research strategies and multistep processes of data accumulation. Field
studies of naturallyoccurringcollective action dilemmas are and will be
importantcomponentsof a general approachto searchingfor answers.The
cases that make up these studies comprisepart of the real-worldproblems
we want to explain. Sole reliance on field studies is beset, however, by the
difficulties of isolating critical variables from the complex web of social
reality.
Consequently,many social scientists have turnedto laboratoryexperi-
mental methods on mostly human subjects as a means of isolating and
controllingthe variablesthatare thoughtto influence behaviorin collective
action situations.The greatercontrol in isolating, creating,and measuring
variablesgive the laboratoryexperimentmethod advantagesin operationa-
lizing andtestingtheory.When an experimentalistinvestigatesthe effects of
1. This is the key questionthat Olson (1965) addressedin his seminalwork on the Logic of
CollectiveAction and again in the Rise and Decline of Nations (1982, 17).
58 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
group size on cooperativeor noncooperativebehavior,for example, she or

he can be relativelyassuredthatany observedbehavioraldifferencesaredue
to manipulationsof the groupsize variableandnot due to the myriadof other
factorsthatwould necessarilycontaminatea field studyof collective action.
The rub on laboratoryexperiments,however, is that they are contrived
situationsthatmay not adequatelysimulatecircumstancesor reflectbehavior
in the real world. Laboratoryexperimentsare notoriousfor generatingthe
results desiredby the researchers,in part,because subjectsoften behave in
a way to "please"the people runningthe experiment.The applicabilityof
laboratoryresultsto the realworldmustalwaysbe questioned.Still, research-
ers have come a long way in resolvingsuchdifficulties,andtherecan be little
doubtaboutthe value of laboratoryresultsin providingfield researcherswith
clues about what variables to look for in real-world circumstances.The
usefulness of experimentsin providingclues will depend, however, on the
precisionandsoundnessof conclusionsthey generate.Experimentalistsmust
produceresults that are consistentacross experiments(or make clear what
variables produce inconsistencies) and develop conclusions that apply, at
least generally,to the circumstancesdefinedin the laboratory.
The present article focuses on laboratoryexperimentsand attemptsto
expand our capability for generalizing from their results by introducing
perspectivesand methodsthat,in futureapplication,should enable cumula-
tion and comparisonof resultsacrossa wide spectrumof diverseexperimen-
tal studies.
Importantfindings have already been attributedto laboratorystudies.
Commonlycited arethe criticalrole of smallgroupinteraction(Dawes 1988),
the relevance of repeatedexposureto collective action dilemmas (Marwell
and Ames 1980; Axelrod 1984), the effects of the framingof the situation
(Slovic and Lichtenstein 1983; Schwartz-Sheaand Simmons 1992), the
effects of groupsize (Chamberlin1974;IsaacandWalker1988), andthe role
of groupidentities(Turner1981; Kramerand Brewer 1984).
The impactof smallgroupinteractionon cooperativebehavioris probably
the most robustof the findings,yet some of the foremostresearchersin this
field are undecided on whether the development of group solidarity or
cognitive activitylike promisemakingis more responsiblefor the observed
effects (Orbell,van de Kragt,andDawes 1988). Enhancingour capabilityto
controlfor key variablesandto examine a rangeof studiesthatincorporates
these variablesmight help us addresscontroversiesof this sort and further
refine our theories.
Most of the otherfindingsfrom laboratoryexperimentshave been gener-
ated from uniquelydesigned studiesand have not been subjectedto system-
atic replication. A serious problem in interpretingfindings from isolated
studiesis thatwe areforcedto makeleapsof faithaboutwhetherothersubject

populationswould behave in the same way as the tested subjects.Sentiment
is widespreadthat individualsfrom differentcultures and subculturesare
disposed to cooperatedifferentlyin collective action situationsirrespective
of the particularexperimentaltreatmentsunderstudy.
This type of problemcan be addressedby repeatingstudieswith identical
designs, but with a wide variety of different subjects. However, identical
replications are not always attractive to potential grantors and are not
especially common.More important,identicalreplicationscan establishthe
robustnessof findings only acrosscharacteristicsof subjects.Because study
designs areinvariant,we findout little abouthow changesin design variables
might affect the centralrelationshipunderstudy.Supposecommunicationin
small groupsenhancescooperationin everyculture,butonly when the stakes
are low. Perhapsin some cultures,communicationstops having an effect on
cooperationwhenthe stakesreachsome thresholdlevel. If resultsweredrawn
only fromstudiesthatemployedsmall stakes,thenthe qualifiednatureof the
relationshipbetween communicationand cooperationwould not become
apparent.
Significantadvancesin addressingall of these problemscan probablybe
made simply by improvingthe comparabilityof existing studies, most of
which use a wide array of design features and an assortmentof subject
populations,andthe comparabilityof anyfutureones thatmightbe designed.
Many laboratoryexperimentsaddresssimilartheoreticalquestionsand,if we
were better able to control for differences among those studies, we could
comparetheirresults,significantlyexpandourdatabase,enhanceour ability
to refineandgeneralizefindings,andtest for therobustnessof those findings.
By using a broader array of studies and comparing their findings, we
automatically draw from a larger, more heterogeneous (with respect to
geographic, ethnic, national, social, and economic characteristics)subject
base and can begin to controlfor any culturallybased differencesin dispo-
sitions to cooperativebehavior.Hundreds,if not thousands,of experiments
have been conductedover the lastthreedecades,using subjectsfroma variety
of socioeconomic, ethnic, and nationalgroups(especially from Europe,the
United States, and Japan),yet little efforthas been made so far to cumulate
these dataso that they bearon fundamentaltheoreticalquestions.
Improvingcomparabilitymeans "gettinga handle"on how studiesdiffer,
anddesign featuresareoften the most difficultvariablesto assess. Especially
crucial are differencesin incentives, featuresthat actuallydefine collective
action dilemmas,and differencesin the way incentives arepresented.Labo-
ratoryexperimentsrepresentcollective actiondilemmasin a varietyof ways
as prisoner's dilemmas (Rapoport and Chammah 1965; Snyder 1971;
Rapoport1974;Rapoport,Guyer,andGordon1976;OrbellandWilson 1978;
Hardin 1982), commons dilemmas (Dawes, McTavish,and Shaklee 1977;
Hardinand Baden 1977; Edney 1980; Ostrom 1990; Ostrom,Walker,and
Gardner1992), andproblemsin the provisionof public goods (Bohm 1972;
Kamien, Schwartz, and Roberts 1973; Snidal 1979; Smith 1979, 1980;
Marwell and Ames 1979, 1980, 1981; Isaac andWalker1988).
Unfortunately,we lack a systematic method for clarifying how these
representationsdifferfromand are similarto one anotherin ways thatmight
permitus to (1) dismiss those differencesas unlikelyto affect behavioror (2)
control for those differences so as to begin to cumulate findings across
representations.2Some apparentdifferencesmay involve nothingmore than
superficialvariationin the presentationof game incentives, or theirdesigns
may comprise qualitativelydifferent incentive characteristicsthat render
comparisons and cumulationdifficult, if not impossible. This article dis-
tinguishesvariationsin presentationandinvestigateswhetherthe threegame
types shareincentive commonalitiesthatwould permitmeaningfulcompar-
ison andcumulation.If experimentscanbe understoodas beingarrayedalong
common incentiveparameters,then a means shouldexist for controllingfor
incentives-the most importantfeaturesof any experimentaldesign.
The articleconcludesthatcommonincentiveparametersdo exist among
prisoner'sdilemma(PD), commonsdilemma(CD), and public goods provi-
sion (PG) designs, and thatthese featuresare readilyidentifiablefor games
thathave linearreturnsto cost contributionsand "summation"technologies
for aggregatingcontributionsinto supply levels.3 In contrast,nonlinearity
and technologies other than summationcan sometimes generate a mix of
qualitativelydifferentincentivefeaturesthatmake cumulationdifficultwith
available methods. For those designs that are amenableto cumulation,the
article formulates methods for renderingfindings comparable.First, the
articleprovidesa more precise definitionof collective action dilemmas.
FEATURES OF COLLECTIVE ACTION DILEMMAS
A common way to define collective action dilemmas (CADs) so as to

emphasizeproblematicaspectsof cooperationis to distinguishsituationsin
2. Cumulationproblemsare accentuatedby the realitythatresearcherpreferencesfor one or
the otherrepresentationtendto follow disciplinarylines. Forexample,sociologists andpsychol-
ogists seem to prefer prisoner'sdilemmas whereas economists usually employ public goods
provision games.
3. In general,an aggregationtechnologyrefersto the mannerin which cost contributionsare
transformedintothe supplyof a nonexcludablegood. This conceptis closely relatedto Sandler's
(1992, 7, 36) notion of the "technologyof publicness."
which two or more actors are able to make choices between two or more
actionsandthe expectedoutcomeis Paretoinferiorto some otherobtainable
outcome (Taylor 1987, 19; Elster 1985, 1989, 25; Sandler 1992, 23). An
expected outcome is the result obtained when actors make rational,
uncoordinated choices that maximize self-gain. Expected outcomes for
nonrepeatedCADs, as defined here, are all Nash equilibria in which each
actor chooses his or her best strategy, given that other actors have done
likewise (Kreps 1990, 402-10). Having arrivedat an equilibrium,no actor
has an incentive to changestrategygiven the choices of otheractors(Sandler
1992, 15-17).
Pareto inferior outcomes are simply those for which anotheroutcome
exists thatmakesat least one personbetteroff withoutmakinganyoneworse
off. The latter outcome is Pareto superiorto the former.The discrepancy
between featuresof expected outcomes and featuresof outcomes that are
Paretosuperiorto themis whatmakesCADs interestingfor social scientists.
It defines a set of crucialsocial situationswhere incentiveslead individuals
away from cooperationthatwould have createdvalue for everyone (Dawes
1980, 169; Sandler1992, 45).
PARETO "BEST" OUTCOMES
Perhaps the most interestingcomparison among features of CADs is

between outcomes thatare both optimaland superiorto expected outcomes
andexpectedoutcomesthemselves.Foroptimaloutcomes,no otheravailable
outcome exists thatwould make at least one actorbetteroff withoutmaking
someone worse off (Sandler1992, 13). By standarddefinitions, however, a
CAD does not have a uniqueoptimum.4For example, in a 2 x 2 prisoner's
dilemma game such as found in Table 1, four outcomes are available, and
three of them (cells a, b, and c in Table 1) meet the conditions of Pareto
optimality(Cornesand Sandler1986, 139).
As it turns out, the presence of multiple optima is consistent with the
presence of an incentive dilemma.As in Table 1, each actorhas an incentive
to move off the cooperate/cooperateoutcometo anotheroptimum,butarrival
at any otheroptimummakes at least one actorworse off, and that actor will
preferanotheroptimum.Ultimately,theseconsiderationspush actorsintothe
defect/defect cell. Having arrived at this outcome, no actor gains from
unilaterallychanging his strategyfrom defect to cooperate, so the defect/
4. In contrastto collective action dilemmas,groupsthat are "fully privileged"in the sense
that one or more actorshas a dominantstrategyto cooperatedo have a uniqueoptimumthat is
superiorto all otheravailableoutcomes.This optimumis a Nashequilibrium.See Sandler(1992,
39) for a tabularcomparisonof the two game types.
TABLE 1
Illustrative Prisoner's Dilemma Game
Player2's choices
Player l's choices
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate a b
7.50,7.50 0, 11.25
Defect c d
11.25, 0 3.75, 3.75
SOURCE:Shaw and Thorslund(1975).
defect outcomeis stableand constitutesan equilibriumdespite the presence

of a superioroutcome (Taylor1987, 57, 63; Elster 1989, 8).
Only one outcome in a CAD is an optimum, is Pareto superiorto the
expected outcome, and is inferior to no other outcome. In Table 1, this
outcome is found in the cooperate/cooperatecell. Such outcomes are focal
because they are clearly superiorto the expected outcome, and everyone
would clearly be betteroff arrivingat the formerratherthanthe latter.
Despite the technical inaccuracy,an outcome that is an optimum and
superiorto the equilibriumoutcome and inferior to no other outcome is
commonly referredto as the optimumas thoughno othersexisted. To avoid
additionalconfusion, an outcome that has these featureswill be referredto
as a Paretobest outcome.
NONEXCLUDABLE GOODS
Incentive features of PD, PG, and CD games can be rendered more

comparableby addingto the standarddefinitionof CADs, the proviso that
incentive anomaliesbe generatedby the provision alternativesof a nonex-
cludable good. With the addition, the definition reads: collective action
dilemmas exist whenever,in interdependentchoice situations,the relations
among conceivable outcomes manifestan incentive structurein which ex-
pected outcomes are Pareto inferiorto obtainableones, and the provision
options of a nonexcludablegood provoke that patternby constitutingthe
availablechoices. A nonexcludablegood is one thatis availablefor consump-
tion to individualsotherthanthosewho contributeto the costs of its provision
(Hardin1982, 17; Ostromand Ostrom1977, 10). Hence individualscannot
feasibly be excluded from consumptionon the basis of willingness to pay
(Olson 1965, 28). The consequenceof defining CADs as involving nonex-
cludable goods and having inferiorequilibriais that we can distinguishthe

subsets of PG, PD, and CD games for which cooperationis unambiguously
problematic and have a common understandingof why that is so. Non-
excludabilitymakesnoncooperation(not contributingto the costs of provid-
ing a good) a dominantstrategyfor each individualbecause one is betteroff
either free riding on the cost contributionsof others, if others decide to
contribute,or simply avoiding a loss from one's own contribution,if no one
else makesa contribution.Theinferiorityof equilibriaensuresthatno rational
egoist actorgains from unilateralcooperation.Moreover,the additionof the
proviso on nonexcludablegoods to the definitionof CADs does not alterthe
domainof PG, PD, andCD games thatbelong in the category,thatis, games
for which cooperationis unambiguouslyproblematic.
Taylor (1987) recognized that subsets of PG, PD, and CD games have
importantoverlappingfeaturesthat might make them treatableas a single
class of games. PDs are typically defined by relations among outcomes
(includingthe inferiorityof equilibria)whereasPG games andCD games are
defined by the presenceof particulartypes of nonexcludablegoods, that is,
nonsubtractableand subtractableones, respectively(Head and Shoup 1969;
OstromandOstrom1977). Yetthe subsetof PD gamesfor whichcooperation
is unambiguouslyproblematiccan be understoodas shapedby the presence
of nonexcludablegoods.5Moreover,one of the relationsbetween outcomes
of the subsetof PG games andCD games for which cooperationis unambig-
uously problematicis characterizedby an equilibriumthatis inferiorto the
Paretobest outcome.
Choice situationsthatlack an outcome superiorto the expected outcome
or thatinvolve at least one actorwho confrontsincentivesthatdo not clearly
imply choices that lead to an inferior outcome are not collective action
dilemmas.Forpublic goods games, Olson (1965) refersto privilegedgroups
as situations in which one or more actors have an incentive to contribute
unilaterallyto provision of a public good.6An examinationof such games
from the perspectiveof a PD formatlends supportto the idea thatthey ought
not to be includedas CADs. In fact, PG games with privilegedgroups,when
5. PD games do not specify whetherbenefits createdfrom cooperationor contributionsto
good provisionare subtractable.Hence the values presentedin a PD matrixcan be regardedas
results for provision alternativesfor either a subtractablegood as in a CD game or for a
nonsubtractablegood as in a PG game.
6. Olson (1965, 28; 1982, 18) notes that groupsize defined in termsof numberof actorsis
relevantto whethera situationconstitutesa collective actiondilemma.He arguesthatprivileged
groupsare less likely where groupsize is large because benefits are sharedby a large number
of individualsandbecomeimperceptiblysmallforthe individualwhereascosts areborneentirely
by the contributingindividual.Hardin(1982, chap.2) statesthatthis relationshipbetween group
size and benefit size appearstrue for subtractable,"commons"goods, but need not be for
nonsubtractable,public goods.
TABLE2
ChickenandAssuranceGames
MatrixA. ChickenGame MatrixB. AssuranceGame

Cooperate Defect Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 3,3 2,4 Cooperate 4,4 1,2
Defect 4,2 1,1 Defect 2,1 3,3
SOURCE: Taylor (1987,18). ? CambridgeUniversity Press 1987 and Universitetsforlager

(NorwegianUniversityPress).Reprintedwith the permissionof CambridgeUniversityPress.
cast in a PD format,lack the requisiterelationsamongoutcomes and are not

prisoner's dilemmas at all. The defect alternativedoes not dominate the
cooperatealternativefor all players,meaningthatthe inequalitiesdefining a
prisoner'sdilemma (T > R > P > S as illustratedin Table 5) are not strictly
observed.The appropriatemodel for privilegedgroupsis the chicken game,
illustratedin matrixA of Table 2, not the prisoner'sdilemma. In chicken
games, one playerhas an incentiveto cooperateno matterwhatthe action(s)
of otherplayers. Completenoncooperation(defect/defect)ceases to be the
expectedoutcome(Taylor1987, 36-39). Two equilibriaexist in the game (the
lower left-handandupperright-handcells of matrixA in Table2) thatinvolve
cooperationfromat least one of the playersso thatcooperationis, in a partial
sense, less problematicthan in games that strictly fall in the category of
CADs.
Sandler (1992, 38-44) and Taylor (1987, chap. 2) also identify games
labeledassurance,or coordination(matrixB in Table2) thatarevery similar
in structureand presentationto prisoner'sdilemmasbut also lack dominant
strategiesfor defectionor noncooperationandhence clearlyinferiorequilib-
ria. In these games, the values availablefrommutualcooperationarehigher
than those from mutualdefection, yet each player prefers defection if the
other player defects. Public goods games that requirea thresholdlevel of
contributionbefore any of the good is providedembody similarincentives.
An individualhas an incentiveto contributeto the public good if othershave
contributedto a point where the individual's contributionis critical to
acquisitionof the good.7
In the simplerformatanalogousto PD games, assurancegamesrevealtwo
equilibria,one at cooperate/cooperate(upperleft-handcell of matrixB) and
one at defect/defect(lower right-handcell of matrixB), but bothplayersfare
betterat cooperate/cooperate,so it seems the morelikely outcome.Generat-
ing cooperation or desirable collective action for these situations is not
7. A single vote could determinethe outcome of an election or passage of a law.
withoutproblems,butprospectsarenotablybrighterthanfor strictcollective
action dilemmas. Our attention focuses on CADs because they involve
relatively pure forms of problematiccooperationand serve as good, unen-
cumberedexperimentalmodels for testingtheoriesaboutbehavior.
RELATIONS BETWEEN OUTCOMES
The relationalfeaturesof greatestconcern in CADs are the sizes of the

value discrepancybetween outcomes.8A comparisonof values from Pareto
best outcomeswith values fromequilibriumoutcomesyields a sense of value
lost fromnoncooperation.A comparisonof valuesthataccrueto anindividual
from the choice of differentstrategiesreveals the size of the incentives that
encourage inferior outcomes. This article is mostly about incentives, al-
thoughit drawssome brief conclusions aboutthe amountof value lost from
noncooperation.
Of primary interest are the degrees of discrepancy between payoffs
associated with the availablestrategychoices (levels of contributionto the
nonexcludablegood). This article arguesthat a single function, the returns
function, can in many instancescharacterizethese discrepanciesand affect
the differencein value betweenParetobest outcomes and Nash equilibrium
outcomes. The returnsfunctionis the relationshipbetween value or benefits
accruingto an actorfrom cost contributionsmade to a nonexcludablegood
and, as such, is relatedto the supplyfunction,thatis, how much of the good
is createdfor each cost contribution.For nonexcludablegoods, the returns
function implies a positive externalityfor other actors9because actors are,
by definition,able to free ride on others'contributions.Clearly,the value of
the returnsfunctionis basic to understandingthe incentive comparabilityof
PD, PG, and CD games.
8. Valuesreferhere andhereafterto objectivevalues, usuallymonetary,thatarerepresented
as availableto actorsin experimentalsettings.In experimentalstudies,knowledgeof subjective
value or preferencesis usually lacking a priori.Declareddiscrepanciesin value do not specify
quantitativewelfare or utility changes for an individual,nor do they presumeany aggregation
of utilities across individualactors.A legitimateutility aggregationis, of course, not possible
without assuming a social welfare function (Sandler 1992, 14, 16). Sometimes subjective
valuationsareinvokedas explanationsof why behaviorobservedin experimentsdivergesfrom
expected behavior.
9. A positive externalityis a value accruingto an individualor individualsfrom actions not
of theirown making.The actions(in this instance,the contributionof costsby others)areexternal
to their individualaccounting.How an externalityis divided among recipientsdepends on the
subtractabilityof the good being provided.For subtractablegoods, any objective value created
for a groupby a cost contributionmust be divided amongthe membersof the group.For pure
nonsubtractablegoods, the amountgeneratedfor one memberof the groupdoes not reduce or
alterthe amountmade availableto others,regardlessof theirnumber.Cost contributorssharein
these values, but for these individuals,the values are not "externally"generated.
PUBLIC GOOD PROVISION GAMES
Public goods are typically defined as nonsubtractablegoods for which

exclusion is not feasible. Theirprovisionresultsin benefits for everyone in
a group,includingthose who did not contributeto the costs of provision.
The formatin which PG games are typically presentedin experimental
researchpermitseasy identificationof the componentsof a returnsfunction,
making most of them recognizableas collective action dilemmas. Table 3
incorporatesan illustrativepublic good payoff matrix.The entries are the
monetarypayoffs (benefits less costs) accruingto a single individual that
result from one's choices and the interdependentcontributingchoices of
otherindividuals.A $1.00 cost contributionby any individualcreatesa unit
of a publicgood valuedat $.75. Eachnonsubtractable$.75 unitis nonexclud-
able and thereforeavailableto everyone irrespectiveof one's own level of
contribution.The Nash equilibriumoutcomeis locatedin the upperleft-hand
cell and the Paretobest outcomein the lower right-handcell.
Calculation of the value of the returnsfunction is a simple matter of
determiningthe ratio (b/c) of the value or benefit (b) created for a single
individualfrom contributionof a single cost unit (c) to the cost unit (Kim
and Walker1984; Isaac, Walker,and Thomas 1984). The functionalnature
of this relationshipcan be expressedalgebraicallyas
b = r(c)
where
b = benefitfromcontribution of a costunit,
c = sizeof theunitin whichcostcontributions canbe made,
r = a returnsfunctionrelatingbenefitsto costs.
For the examplein Table3, when c is equalto $1.00, as in the second cell
from the left in the top row, the benefit createdis $.75, so b/c and,hence r =
.75. In the last cell in the top row, four $1.00 cost units are contributedand
the benefitcreatedpercost unitis $3.00/4, so againb/c = .75. In this example,
the ratioof benefits to costs is always .75 no matterhow many cost units are
or have been contributed.1 Hence benefits are a linearfunctionof costs.
10. The ratio remainsthe same but may be less apparentin othercells where contributions
must be summedfromthe representativeindividualand others.In the second cell fromthe left
in the second row, $2.00 are contributed-$1.00 from the representativeindividualand $1.00
from others.The benefit createdis $1.50, as expected with an r value of .75. The entry in the
cell is only $.50, however, because the $1.00 cost contributionmade by the representative
individualhad to be subtractedfrom the total to yield the individual'snet payoff.
TABLE3
Payoffs to a RepresentativeIndividualin a
Three-PersonPublic Goods Game (returnto contribution= .75)
Representative
individual Otherscontribute
contributes
$0 $1.00 $2.00 $3.00 $4.00
$20 -0.5: :0 .
0750 1.50 2.25 3.00
$1.00 05 05 1.25 2.00 2.75
$2.00 -0.50 0.25 1.00 1.75 2.50
Moreover,the benefitcreatedfor any one individualby a contributionof a

cost unitis exactlythe sameas thatcreatedfor everyotherindividual(.75 times
the cost unit).Thusreturnsaresymmetricacrossindividualsreceivingbenefits.
Finally,the benefitcreatedby contributionof a cost unit(for each individual,
.75 times thecost unit)is the sameregardlessof who is doingthe contributing.
Returnsare symmetricacrosscost contributors.Sandler(1992, 36) refersto
publicgoods situationsof thissortin whichthereturnsare"perfectlysubstitut-
able" across beneficiaries and contributorsas incorporating"summation
technologies," emphasizing that provision levels of public goods can be
determinedby a straightforward additionof the contributionsof each actor.'1
Real-worldexamplesrarelyincorporatethese symmetries,however.Re-
turnsto beneficiariesmay vary from contributionof the same cost unit-a
cure for a disease provides the most benefit for the seriously afflicted, less
benefitfor the slightlyill, andno benefitat all for the unafflicted.'2Or,returns
11. To be precise, Sandler (1992, 7, 36) refers to a summationtechnology as one of the
differentways in which individual"provision"levels are aggregatedto yield the supply of the
nonexcludable good. These distinctions seem just as applicable to the aggregation of cost
contributions.His simplest aggregationtechnology,summation,would then give equal weight
to the contributionsof each actor.
12. Nearly all games will involve asymmetriesin subjective valuations, no matterhow
uniformthe objective returns.The divergencebetween objectiveand subjectivevalues may be
so severe that a situationrepresentedas a collective action dilemmaaccordingto the concrete
payoffs associated with choice alternativescould turn out not to be a strict collective action
dilemmawhen subjectivevaluationsare takeninto account(Hardin1982, 72-75).
Smith (1976) suggeststhatthe gapbetweenobjectiveandsubjectivevaluescan be narrowed
if we (1) use monetaryvalues in experimentalsituationsand (2) make the usually reasonable
assumptionthatpeople prefermoremoney to less money.As long as cost contributionsand the
publicgood itself arein the formof money,simplesummationscan be madeto determinevalues
of payoffs and outcomes.Preferringmore money to less, individualswill rankthese outcomes
in the same orderas a rankingof theirobjectivemonetaryvalues. If money is not used to express
costs and benefits or is not the mediumof exchange,then problemsinvolvingnonfungibilityor
noncommensurable objectsof valuecan frustrateeffortsto aggregatevalues(Hardin1982, 69-71).
may vary accordingto who is doing the contributingas when the amountof
defense good producedis mostly dependenton the effortof soldiersdefend-
ing a critical portion of a defense line (a "weakest-link"technology in
Sandler's [1992] terminology).13
DIFFICULTIES IN COMPARING EXPERIMENTS
An advantageof designs that incorporatesymmetriesin returnsacross

beneficiariesand contributorsis thatonly a single returnsfunctionis needed
to representthe game. Every actorhas the same capabilityfor effecting the
payoffs of other actors, and every actor confrontsthe same consequences
from the actions of others. Comparisonof results across experiments is
facilitatedwhen only a single functionneedsto be takeninto accountfor each
experiment.
If returnschange for a single game accordingto the personreceiving the
benefit and/orthe person paying the costs, then separatereturnsfunctions
exist for each actor (as depictedalgebraicallyin footnote 13). Even among
experimentsusing publicgoods designs, comparisonof resultsis difficult or
lacking in meaning when more than one returns function is needed to
characterizethe incentive structureof one of the experiments.Comparisons
could be made acrossexperimentsdesignedwith identicalsets of functions,
but very few pairs of this type are likely to be found among the universe of
experimentsalreadyconducted.Comparingexperimentsdesignedwith mul-
tiple, dissimilarreturnsfunctionswouldseem to requirethatreturnsfunctions
be specified for each separatesubject and that some averaging or other
summarizingmeasurebe usedto generatea single, comparablevaluefor each
experiment.The choice of any measurewould likely involve some arbitrar-
iness, however, and might create uncertaintyabout the meaning of the
comparisons.
Making comparisonsand controllingfor incentives across a wide range
of experimentsis conceivableonly if meaningcan be attachedto differences
in returnsfunctions.We would like to characterizeone incentivestructureas
13. Algebraically,asymmetriesand nonlinearitiescan be representedas follows:
m,n,p
bi = E rij(ck)
i=lj= l,k=
where
bi = the benefit to the ith individual,
ri = a returnsfunctionfor each beneficiarythatrelatesbenefitsto contributionof a cost unit
for each of thej contributors,
Ck = a cost unit for which k cost unitshave alreadybeen contributedby individualj.
more or less conducive to cooperationthananotherand be able to quantify

the difference.Quantificationis facilitatedif the value of a returnsfunction
is a constant14-as is the case with a linearfunction(every contributedcost
unit generatesthe samelevel of benefitregardlessof the numberof cost units
alreadycontributed).
For nonlinearfunctions, the prospectsfor quantifyingincentive differ-
ences are bleak-each portionof a curvilinearfunctioncan presentsubjects
with entirely different incentives and generate differentpredictionsabout
behavior. The author is currentlyunaware of a summary measure of a
nonlinear benefit-cost curve that could be used to provide a meaningful
comparisonwith the incentive structureposed by anothernonlinearcurve.
These problems are not attenuatedby differencesacross experimentsin
the discretenessof cost contributionsand the availabilityof income. Exper-
imentersspecify the units (amounts)in which costs can be contributedand
these units are necessarily noncontinuous.Moreover, a finite amount of
income is made availableto subjects so that only a limited numberof cost
units can be contributed.For the example in Table3, cost contributionscan
be made in $1.00 units only and each subjecthas only $2.00 in income-a
very restrictiveset of opportunities.Because experimentsdiffer so greatly
and so frequently in the values of these parameters,comparison seems
possible only if a given set of discretecontributionpossibilities and limited
incomes could be consideredpartof a largerset of continuouscontribution
possibilities and unlimitedincomes that had a uniformcharacterizationof
the returnsfunction all along its range;that is, a constantvalue associated
only with a linearfunction.
Przeworskiand Soares(1971, 65-68) arguethata smallportionof a curve
representingany nonlinearfunction will resemble a linear function. How-
ever, the best-fittinglinear function is likely to be very differentfrom the
best-fittinglinearfunctionthatcharacterizessome otherportionof the curve
and may be unrepresentativeof the curve as a whole. Hence there exists no
obvious, meaningful, and unique larger set that encompasses an experi-
mental design with discrete costs, limited incomes, and a nonlinear
returnsfunction.
Consequently,comparisonand cumulationof results across experiments
with nonidenticalincentive structuresappearfeasible only for designs with
linearreturnsfunctions.By definition,the ratioof benefitsto costs is constant
all along an infinite linear curve and this identicalityhas, I believe, import
for projectionsaboutbehavior.If incentivesmatter,then behavioralsimilar-
ities (differences)shouldbe observablefor experimentswith similar(differ-
14. To ensure the inferiorityof equilibriain collective action dilemmas, r must always be
less than 1.0. If r exceeds 1.0 for any individual,then the groupis privileged.
TABLE4
GeneralizedPublic Goods Game with
SummationTechnologyandLinearReturnsFunction
Individual Otherscontribute
contributes
0 c (n -j)c nc
0 0 b(n -j) bn
c b(n -j) + b - c bn + b - c
(m - i)c (m - i) (b - c) (m - i)(b - c) + b -
(m i) (b - c) + b(n -) m(b- c) + b(n -j)
mc m(b- c) m(b - c) + b b(n -j) + m(b - c) bn + m(b - c)
b = benefit from contributionof a cost unit to provisionof the nonexcludablegood;

c = size of the unit in which costs can be contributed;
m = total numberof cost units thatcan be contributedby the representativeindividual;
n = total numberof cost unitsthatcan be contributedby all otheractors;
n + m = total numberof units that can be contributed;
i = 1 to m - 2;
j = 1 to n - 2.
ent) benefit-costratios.Moreover,the differencesin ratioscan be quantified

and used to predictthe directionand degree of behavioraldifferences.
Fortunately,a significantportionof experimentson CADs buildin linear
returnsfunctionsas well as symmetricreturnsfunctionsacrossbeneficiaries
and contributors.Because comparisonand cumulationare most feasible for
this set of experiments,subsequentanalysisin this articlewill focus on how
to make comparisonsacross these design or game types. How this choice
limits our ability to understandreal-worldphenomena will be discussed
towardthe end of the article.
GENERALIZING PUBLIC GOODS GAMES
Calculatingthe value of a returnsfunctionis straightforwardfor designs

similar to the one illustratedin Table 3. In particular,values are easily
calculated for any PG game designed with a summationtechnology and
linearreturns.In these designs, linearityand the symmetryof returnsenable
description of a general form for payoff matrices that makes incentive
featuresreadilyapparent.Moreover,these incentivefeaturesareall derivable
fromthe componentsof the returnsfunction-the benefit(b) generatedfrom
contributionof a cost unit and the size of the cost unit (c) itself.
The matrixin Table3 illustratespayoffs for a summationtechnologywith
a linearreturnsfunction.The matrixin Table4 generalizespayoffs for such
designs involving actorsthat have equal incomes (the most common treat-
ment of income in laboratoryexperiments)and hence abilitiesto contribute
equal numberof cost units to provisionof the public good.
As noted, the formatof PG matriceslists payoffs for a single individual
whose payoff possibilities, at least for this design type, are identical to all
otherinvolved actors.Therows distinguishthe contributionchoices (number
of cost units that can be contributedto provision of a public good) for this
representativeindividual.The columnsdistinguishthe cumulativecontribu-
tion choices that can be made by all other actors. The cells of the matrix
indicate the payoff consequences for the representativeindividual of any
combinationof choices made by the individualand otheractors.
The upper left-handcell is the amountreceived by the individualwhen
the individualmakes zero contributionto the publicgood andwhen all other
actors contributezero as well. Nothing is venturedby any of the actors, so
nothingis gained.In thecell immediatelybelow is thepayoffto the individual
when the individualcontributesone cost unit to provisionof the public good
while all otheractorscontinueto contributenothing.The individualreceives
the benefit (b) from the public good generatedby her or his contributionof
one cost unit and loses the amountof the contribution(c). Proceedingdown
this column, the individual'spayoff is simply multipliedby the numberof
cost units she or he contributesup to the limits of her or his income (m cost
units).
In the cell immediatelyto the rightof the upperleft-handcell is the payoff
received by the individualwhen the individualcontributeszero cost units to
provisionof a public good andthe cumulativecontributionof all otheractors
is one cost unit. The individual receives the benefit (b) generatedby the
contributionof thatcost unit but does not sufferthe loss of thatunit (c). The
cost of that unit is borne by some other actor whose payoffs are not listed.
Proceedingacrossfrom the upperleft-handcell, the individual'spayoffs are
multipliedby the numberof cost units all other actors contributeup to the
cumulative limits of their incomes (n cost units). The individual would
receive the benefits of those contributionswhile sufferingnone of the costs.
The entries in all other cells of the matrixare determinedby summingthe
payoffs thatwould be generatedby the representativeindividual'schoice of
cost units to contributeand the payoffs that would be generated by the
cumulativecontributingchoices of all otheractors.
The upperleft-handcell containstheNash equilibrium.Moving down any
of the columns shows that an individual'schange in value or payoff for an
additionalunitcontributionis alwaysb - c. The definitionof a CAD specifies
thatthe cost mustbe greaterthanthe benefit (so as to ensurethatcooperating
or contributingis problematicfrom an incentiveperspective),so this termis
always negative (at least for PG games thatalso happento be CADs). Hence
any individualwould always be worse off making a unilateralmove away
from the zero contributionchoice (the upperleft-handcell).
The positive incentive to forego contributingan additionalcost unit to
provision of the nonexcludablegood (defect incentive) is the lost value
associatedwith an additionalcontributionof a cost unit-the absolutevalue
of b - c. The individual'stotal change in value for contributingall the units
she or he is capable of contributingis m(b - c), the lower left-hand entry
correspondingto the payoff she or he receives if no other actors contribute
to the public good. The change in value thatthe individualexperiences for
contributingall possible units is the same, no matterhow many units other
actors contribute,as confirmedby subtractingentries in the top row from
those in the bottomrow. The resultis always m(b - c).
More useful still as an indicatorof the incentiveto defect is the inverseof
the value of the returnsfunction, that is, 1 - b/c. The value of the returns
function(b/c) specifies what portionof the cost contributionis retainedas a
benefit on actual contributionto provision of the nonexcludable good,
whereas the inverse specifies what portion is lost and thus indicates the
relative degree to which contributionsare discouraged.For the example in
Table3, the value of the returnsfunctionwas $.75/$1.00 = .75 so the inverse
is 1.00 - .75 = .25. An individualloses one-fourthof every cost unit she or
he contributes.The inverse of the value of the returnsfunction is constant
irrespectiveof the numberof cost units contributed.It also is standardized
for the size of the cost unit andconsequentlyhas much appealas a summary
measurethat can be employed to comparedefect incentives across games
with differentstructures(althougheasy comparisonsstill requirethat all of
the games have summationtechnologies and linearreturns).
The lower right-handcell containsthe payoff associatedwith the Pareto
best outcome. It is the only outcome (the set of payoffs for all players) that
necessarilycreatesmore value thanthe Nash equilibriumfor all playersand
more value than any otheroutcome thatis superiorto the Nash equilibrium.
The upperright-handcell yields a higher payoff (bn) than the lower right-
handcell for the individualrepresentedin thematrix,butthe payoffsfor other
players would be worse because they would fail to benefit from the repre-
sented individual'slevel of cost contributions(zero). Someone will always
be made worse off wheneverthere is a decline in the numberof cost units
contributed.At the same time, a definitionalpresumptionof a CAD is that
some mannerof contributions(cooperation)by individualswill make every-
one betteroff thanin the absenceof contributions.As alreadynoted,to ensure
thateveryoneis betteroff fromadditionalcontributions,those additionsmust
be symmetricacross contributors(or someone might forfeit a cost contribu-
tion without receiving compensating benefits from the contributionsof

others). Returnsare linear,however. So if one additionalcontributionper
actormakeseveryonebetteroff, thentwo additionalcontributionsmustmake
everyone even better off. It follows that the symmetric contributionof
everyone's entire income endowmentmust be superiorto every other sym-
metric level of contribution.Hence the definitionalpresumption,the sym-
metries of the game, and the linearityof returnsensurethat the outcome in
which all playerscontributetheirentireincomes (associatedwith the payoff
in the lower right-handcell) createsmore value thanany otheroutcome that
does not also make some playerworse off.
The change in value potentiallyexperiencedby the representativeindi-
vidual by virtueof the Nash equilibriumbeing chosen over the Paretobest
outcome is the payoff entry associated with the Pareto best outcome (the
lower right-handcell). This entry indicates the amount of value change
simply because the payoff associatedwith the Nash equilibriumis zero. We
could obtainthe same amount,however,by summingthe changes in payoffs
that accrue from each increment in contributionlevels effected by the
individualand otheractors.15
The qualitativerelationshipbetween the size of the defect incentive and
value lost by choice of theNash equilibriumis apparentthroughexamination
of the payoff associatedwith the Paretobest outcome (the lower right-hand
cell of Table 4). As noted, the larger the defect incentive, the larger the
absolutesize of b - c. By definitionof a CAD, b - c is always negative (b is
always less than c). Its absolutevalue can grow across game designs when-
ever b declines while c remainsrelatively constantor whenever b remains
relatively constant while c increases. Whenever b declines, the value of
bn + m(b- c) must also decline and wheneverc increases,the value of bn +
m(b - c) must again decline. Hence the value lost from choice of the Nash
equilibriumis relatively small when the defect incentive is relatively large
and vice versa.
The implicationsof this relationare major.It suggests that when defect
incentives are large and collective actionis especially problematic,we need
worry relatively less about deficient outcomes because lost value, and
probablylost welfare, areminimal.In otherwords,when it mattersmost, the
incentive obstacles that must be overcome to achieve successful collective
action, at least in games with summationtechnologiesandlinearreturns,are
least severe. The most worrisomesituationshave only small defect incen-
tives, buthuge losses of value whenthoseincentivesresultin Nash equilibria.
The relative smallness of defect incentives in these latter situationsmeans
15. The total value change experiencedby all actors is obtainedby multiplyingthe value
change for this one individualtimes nlm + 1 (the total numberof actors).
that the dilemma of collective action may be relatively easy to overcome

throughstructuralalterationof incentivesor throughinvocationof solidarity,
altruism,or reciprocationnorms.The largepayoff fromresolvingthese latter
situationsalso arguesforgiving themthe highestpolicypriorityandattention.
PUBLIC GOOD PROVISION PROBLEMS

VERSUS COLLECTIVE ACTION DILEMMAS
Theprevioussectionfocusedon the generalizationof public goods games

that are also presumedto be collective action dilemmas. However, not all
public goods game areCADs. For anypublic goods game in which the value
of the returnsfunctionis at or above 1.00, an individual'scost from contrib-
utingdoes not exceed the value of the good thatcontributioncreates.At such
values, individualsface an incentive to choose strategiesthat lead to Pareto
best outcomes. Because expected outcomes may also be optimal, these
situationsare not CADs, althoughthe presenceof an externalitymeans that
they are still public good provisionsituations(Taylor1987, 8).16
PRISONER'S DILEMMAS
The typical definition of a prisoner'sdilemma emphasizes the relation-

ships betweenconceivableoutcomes(especiallythe dominanceof equilibria
over Pareto superioroutcomes), ratherthan the characterof the good that
might be provided from cooperativeor contributingactions. Nevertheless,
the argumenthere is thatprisoner'sdilemmaslargelybelong in the category
of collective action dilemmas, and the nature of the outcomes defining
prisoner's dilemmas can be understoodas generatedby the presence of a
nonexcludablegood. PD games aretypicallypresentedin a differentformat
thanPG games, andunveilingthose differenceshelps in makingapparentthe
structuralsimilaritiesof the two game types.
PRISONER'S DILEMMA VERSUS PUBLIC GOOD PROVISION GAMES
In contrast to PG games, PD games typically present only a limited

numberof choice permutations,specify outcomes for more thanone player,
16. The value of the returnsfunction may also indicate thresholdsat which public good
provisionsituationscease being collective action dilemmasbecause collective actionbecomes
undesirableand hence not very interesting.For summationtechnologies with linear returns
functions,the lowest value that the returnsfunctioncan assume and still imply a potential for
desirablecollective actionis whatevervalue times the numberof cost unitsexceeds 1.00. Below
thatthreshold,total benefits do not exceed total costs even when everyone contributes.
and specify "payoff wealth" ratherthan just payoffs resulting from cost
contributions.Hardin(1982) andTaylor(1987, 139) note thatPD games are
usually representedin a 2 x 2 matrixthat shows outcomes from two inter-
dependentchoices of two players,althoughN-persongames may be accom-
modated in the same matrix structureusually by designating one of the
playersas "allotheractors"who arepresumedto makeuniformchoices. Four
differentoutcomes are specified for an individualactor, which result from
the permutationsfor the single cooperateand not cooperatechoices of the
two players.If one understandscooperateto be synonymouswith contribut-
ing to a nonexcludablegood, thenthe PD game can be seen as allowing only
a single level of contributionto a nonexcludablegood in contrastto the
multiplelevels of contributionsthattypicallyconfrontplayersin PG games.
The preferencefor presentingPD games with only a single choice of
contributionprobablystems fromthe way in whichPD games aredefined-
by the nature of the inequalities among the four outcomes available to a
player.The neatnessof the inequalitieswoulddiminishwith additionallevels
of choice. In particular,PD games are typically defined as a matrix of
outcomesfor whichT > R > P > S whereTrefersto the (temptation)outcome
for individuali when i defects andthe otherplayercooperates;R refersto i's
(reward) outcome when both players cooperate; P refers to i's (punish-
ment) outcome when both players defect; and S refers to i's (sucker)
outcome when i cooperatesandthe otherplayerdefects (Axelrod 1984, 206;
Taylor 1987, 14).
MatrixA in Table5 depictsthese generaloutcomesandinequalities-the
arrowsindicate the directionof the relevantinequalities.The first entry in
each cell is the outcome for player 1; the second entryfor player 2. Matrix
B (drawnfrom Table 1) containsspecific outcomesthat are configuredas a
prisoner'sdilemma.The configurationof relationsin both matricesensures
thatdefect/defectis the Nash equilibriumandthatthe defect/defectoutcome
is Pareto inferior to cooperate/cooperate.Moreover, the set of relations
defining a PD can be interpretedas evident because the matrices involve
choices to contributeor not contributecost unitsto provisionof a nonexclud-
able good. Every contributionis presumed to involve a net loss for the
contributingindividual.Both T andP can be understoodas not contributing
choices, so net losses for contributingmeans that T must be greaterthan R
andP mustbe greaterthanS. Everycontributionalso resultsin a nonexclud-
able augmentationof value for the otherplayer(s)and as long as the returns
value is sufficiently high (see footnote 18), cooperate/cooperateis greater
thandefect/defectandR must thereforebe greaterthanP.
The outcomes specified in a PD game sometimes include a component
not presentin PG games. PG games usuallypresentto a playerthe payoffs,
TABLE5
Prisoner's Dilemma Game
MatrixA MatrixB
Cooperate Defect Cooperate Defect
Cooperate I, Cooperate ' 1

Cooperate) R, R S, T erate 7.50, 7.50 0, 11.25
(contribute) R4S, (contribute) '\1
Defect T,S P Defect

11.25,0 3.75,3.75
(not contribute) t (not contribute) A
that is, net changes in her or his wealth resulting from the different levels of
contributions that she or he and other players in the game can make. In
contrast, PD games typically specify possible payoff wealth, determined by
adding the initial income provided the actors to the payoffs created by
contributing costs to provision of the good. This composition of entries in a
PD matrix makes sense when reflecting on the similarities between defect
actions and not contributing actions. The term "defect" suggests a failure to
take some positive action in a PD game just as "not contributing" denotes
inaction in a PG game. Defect and not contributing are functionally equiva-
lent. Moreover, alternative actions in these games (cooperate and contribute)
have similar consequences for the players-they generate a return to the
acting individual and an external benefit to others.
The defect/defect cell of a PD game and the cell of a PG game in which
no one contributes to a nonexcludable good are not always recognized as
conceptually equivalent, in part because the latter registers zero value for the
payoff, whereas in PD games, defect/defect entries other than zero are quite
common. If defect/defect is truly equivalent to the absence of contributions
to a nonexcludable good, why should any value, positive or negative, be
registered in that cell? A compelling explanation of the difference is that the
cells of a PD matrix aggregate with payoffs the initial income of the players.
One can interpret the entries in the defect/defect cell of PD game not as
payoffs from provision of a good because no contributions to a good are
imagined in this cell, but solely as the amount of income with which the
players start the game.17 Other cells of a PD matrix can be understood as
17. Initialincome refersto income availableto an individualfor contributingin a particular
collective action situation.
combiningthe initialincome registeredin the defect/defectcell with payoffs

accruingfrom cost contributionsto provisionof a good (functionallyequiv-
alent to acts of cooperation).These combined values can be designated as
payoff wealth. If initial income values (entriesin the defect/defectcell) are
subtractedfromotherentriesin a PD matrix,thenthoseentriesareequivalent
to the payoffs of a PG game. There is, of course, no inherentreason why
players in a PG game could not have initial income includedin cell entries,
but PG formatstraditionallyomit income.
DETERMINING THE VALUE OF THE RETURNS FUNCTION FOR PD DESIGNS
The steps in convertinga game in PG formatto one in PD formatcan be

illustratedby using the shadedareaof Table3, which by itself constitutesa
2 x 2 public goods game, andtransformingit to a 2 x 2 PD game, as in Table
6. First,the cells of the PG game mustbe moved aroundto correspondto the
typical location of cells in a PD game. In particular,the equivalent of a
defect/defectcell (zero contributions)in PG games is located (as in most PG
games) in the upperleft-handcornerof the matrixandneeds to be placed in
the lower right-handposition commonto PD format.In parallelfashion,the
equivalent of cooperate/cooperate(everyone contributes) located in the
lower right-handcell needs to be placed in the upperleft-handcornerof the
PD matrix.Second,a player'sinitialincome (e) mustbe addedto the payoffs
in each cell so that the entriesconstitutepayoff wealth. Finally, the matrix
needs to list entriesfor a secondplayer(presumedto be symmetricto the first
player's entriesas requiredby a summationtechnology).
If one were startingout with a game in PD format,the value of the returns
function (blc) could be calculatedby subtractingincome (e) from the cell
entries and solving for the value of the cost variable.Less income, the first
entryin the lower left-handcell or the second entryin the upperright-hand
cell directlyprovidesus with the benefit componentof the returnsfunction.
From the example in Table 1, b + e = 11.25 and from the defect/defectcell
we know that e = 3.75, so b = 11.25 - 3.75 or 7.50. With knowledge of the
values of b and e, we can use the first entryin the upperright-handcell (b -
c + e) to determinethe value of c. In Table 1 these values add up to 0 and we
know the values of b and e, so c = 7.50 + 3.75 or 11.25. Therefore,r =
7.50/11.25 or .67.
The value of the returnsfunctionfor this exampleis slightly less thanthe
value of the returnsfunctionfor the public goods example depictedin Table
3 (.75). The two examples clearly differ in the size of the stakes (outcomes
rangingfrom 0 to 11.25 in the former,0 to 3.00 in the latter),in the number
TABLE6
GeneralizedPrisoner'sDilemma Game with
SummationTechnologyandLinearReturnsFunction
Player2
Player 1
Cooperate Defect
(contribute) (not contribute)
Cooperate
(contribute) 2b- c + e, 2b- c + e b - c + e, b+ e
Defect
(not contribute) b + e, b- c + e e, e
of available choices (two choices in the former-three in the latter),and in

the mannerof their presentation(PD versus PG format).If these potential
influences were temporarilyput aside, however, one might expect slightly
higher cooperation rates in the public goods game simply because the
temptationto defect is slightly smaller(1.00 - .75) thanin the PD game (1.00
- .67). At the very least, determiningthe value of the returnsfunctionallows
the defect incentive to be controlledacross differentgame types.
COMMONS DILEMMAS
A commons dilemma design differs from a PG design in the way the

incentive structureis presentedand in the natureof the good that is created
from collective action. The incentive structureof a CD is usually presented
as an inverted PG game in which contributionsto the provision of an
effectively nonexcludablegood resultfrom decisions to refrainfrom engag-
ing in actions that are personallyprofitable(Taylor1987, 16).18The cost of
a contributionis the amountforegoneby notengagingin theprofitableaction.
In Hardin's(1968) classic exampleof a commonsdilemma,shepherdsshare
access to a common pasture.The nonexcludablegood in the example is
maintenanceof the pasture,whereasthe cost contributionto provisionof this
good is a shepherd'ssacrificefromdecidingnot to graze an additionalsheep
on the pasture.
18. Gardner,Ostrom, and Walker(1990) observe that many importantproblems involve
provisionof the stock of a commonpool resourceandthataffirmativeactivitiessuchas repairing
an irrigationditch may be desirable,if not necessary,for maintainingor expandingthe stock.
Schwartz-SheaandSimmons(1993)havefoundthatbehaviorin experimentalsituationsdiffers
accordingto whetherindividualsanticipatemakinggains fromtheirchoices or avoidinglosses.
SUBTRACTABILITY
The goods providedby cost contributionsin a CD game arenot inherently

indivisible as they arein a PG game (OstromandOstrom1977). In the latter,
one person'sconsumptionof the good provideddoes not reducethe amount
of the good availableto others.One ship'suse of light froma lighthousedoes
not preventother ships from using the same light. In contrast,consumption
of the good in a CD game is subtractablein the sense that one person's
consumptionof the good reducesthe amountavailablefor othersto consume.
My use of a snowmobile in a wildernessareareducesyour ability to enjoy
the quiet solitude of a wildernessexperience.
Subtractabilityin a commons dilemma holds considerablesignificance
for the design of solutionsto the dilemmabecausethe good can theoretically
be divided and parceled out to individuals according to their individual
willingness to pay.A commonpasturecan be dividedandindividuallots sold
to interestedfarmers.Inotherwords,thegood canbe "privatized" andproperty
to or a In
rightsassigned quantities components good. practice,the division
of
of commonlyheld goods is frequentlynot feasible,however,due to cost (e.g.,
fencing for dividing a pasture)or otherconsiderations.19 As long as the good
is held in common, individualsmust still experience personal sacrifice for
maintainingit or contributingto its creation.Practicalnondivisibility and
hence nonexcludabilityensure that not contributingto the maintenanceor
provision of the good (exploiting the commons) is the dominant strategy
facing individualactors.
The presence or absence of subtractabilityalso plays an importantrole
in calculation of individual benefits received from provision of the good
with the result that the incentive structureof a CD game has a feature
qualitativelydistinctfrom a PG and a PD game, even when all threegames
fit within the category of collective action dilemmas. When subtractability
is absent, as with PG games, individual benefit (b) is equal to the public
benefit associatedwith the public good. When subtractabilityis presentand
symmetric distributionof benefits is assumed, individual benefit may be
calculatedby dividing the entire quantityof the benefit associated with the
generatedgood by the numberof affectedactors.As numerousanalystshave
indicated,20when subtractabilityis present, the size of the group plays a
directrole in determiningindividualbenefitandhence the specific incentive
that individualsface in consideringcontributionsto the good.
19. For a discussionof factorsthat affect the feasibility of dividinga commons, see Goetze
(1987).
20. Olson (1965, chaps. 1 and 2) typically assumedsubtractabilityin his analysis of size
effects, as did Hardin(1982) in his sequel to Olson's seminal study.
CALCULATING INCENTIVE VARIABLES
To makethe resultsof CD gamescomparableto PG games andPD games,

the benefit componentof the returnsvariablemust be understoodas having
a distinct quality-the total benefit createdby a cost contributionmust be
divided by the numberof actors to determinethe gain to any individual,
includingthe contributingindividual.Hence the value of the returnsvariable
is calculated as r = BINIcwhere B equals the total benefit accruing to all
relevantactors from contributionof a cost unit, N equals numberof actors,
and c equals the amountof a cost unit. As long as a small b presentedin a
matrixis understoodas BIN, then the matrixrepresentationof a commons
dilemmais functionallyequivalentto a PG design.
Typically,descriptionof a CD game provides informationabout initial
income endowments and some aspect of the benefits created from unit
contributionsto the good (either the total benefit created or the benefit
accruingto an individual).Informationaboutthe size of the units in which
cost contributionscan be made is also usually available from the values
specified as accruing to the individual from "exploiting the commons."
Again, these values are the amountsforegone when the individualrefrains
from an exploitive act andtherebycontributesto provisionof the effectively
nonexcludablegood.
In a laboratoryexperiment,Alcock andMansell(1977) presentedsubjects
with a pasture/cattlesituationthat can be used to demonstratethe incentive
commonalitiesof CD and PG games. The experimentwas designed so that
each subjectcould earneight cents for every cow addedto a pastureover a
series of thirtytrialsor plays of the game. Confiningour attentionto a single
trial,we see thateach subjectcould addonly one cow, so a cost contribution
to the nonexcludablegood is identifiableas eight cents-the amountfore-
gone by refrainingfromaddinga cow. Symbolicof the deterioratinggrazing
qualityof the pasture,each individuallost two cents for every cow addedto
the pasture by someone else or, conversely, gained two cents for every
decision not to add a cow (improvementor maintenanceof pasturequality).
This latter characteristicimplied that the quality of the pasture was, for
practicalpurposes, a nonexcludablegood from which no farmercould be
excluded.21
21. Whetherpasturequalityis subtractablecannotbe ascertaineddirectlyfrom information
available in the study. "Total"benefits are not indicated.One would expect pasturequality to
be subtractable.This mild ambiguitymerely points out that a public goods game can be and
sometimes is presentedin an invertedform normallyassociatedwith and usually labeled as a
commons dilemmagame.
The only crucial informationnot directlyprovidedwas the value of the

returnsfunction(r).22This value is easily calculatedby dividingthe individ-
ual benefit (two cents) generatedby contributionof a cost unit (eight cents).
Hence, r = b/c = .25, a much lower returnand a much greaterincentive
dilemmathanwas found in Shaw and Thorslund'sPD game (r = .67) and in
the PG game (r = .75).
As might be expected from the differencein r values, contributions23 in
the Alcock and Mansell (1977, 448) study are considerablylower (30% of
income) than contributionsin the Shaw and Thorslund(1975, 117) study
(approximately50%).24This observationis consistentwith the findings of
Kim andWalker(1984) and Isaac,Walker,andThomas(1984) that r values
reallydo influencepeople's behaviorin collective actionsituations,although
other variables might account for the difference in results across the two
studies cited above. The two studies differed in the numberof trials that
subjectsplayed and in the size of the game stakes,as well as in the natureof
the presentationof incentives(PD vs. CD). Nevertheless,gaining the ability
to arraythese game designs along common incentive parametersis a first
step in sortingout the explanatorypower of these variables.
WHEN COMMONS DILEMMAS ARE NOT COLLECTIVE ACTION DILEMMAS
Not all situationsinvolving subtractable,nonexcludablegoods arecollec-

tive action dilemmas. Just as with public goods, nonlinearitiesand supply
technologies involving asymmetriescan createcircumstanceswhere strate-
gies thatlead to Paretobest outcomesdominatestrategiesthatlead to inferior
ones. Gardner,Ostrom,and Walker (1990, 337) also note that cooperation
is problematic,thatis, a truedilemmaexists only when demandfor use of a
commonsexceeds some thresholdbeyondwhich one userinterfereswith the
22. The studyalso providedinformationon individualincome, therebypermittingtransfor-
mationto a prisoner'sdilemmaformat.Portionsof income were releasedonly on a trial-by-trial
basis. Because only one cow couldbe addedto the pasturepertrial,the effect of releasingincome
in incrementswas no differentthan allocating the entire income endowment ($2.50) to the
players at the game's outset.
23. A reasonablemeasurefor summarizingcontributionsto collective action is the mean
level of contributioncalculatedfromindividualcontributionsof all membersof a subjectgroup.
The measurecanbe standardizedacrossstudiesby makingit a percentageof therangeof possible
contributions.The contributionlevels expressedhere are calculatedusing this method.
24. Inthe Shaw andThorslundstudy,resultson levels of contributionsforthe gamepresented
here were included with the results from a series of other games. All of the other games had
identical values for the returnsfunction, although the unit contributionvaried widely. The
researchersalso distributedsubjectsacrossotherexperimentalconditions"nearlyequally."The
50% figure is an "eyeball"averagefor all of these results.
availabilityof the commonsfor otherusers or, in the extremecase, total use

begins to exceed the commons'carryingcapacity.Modest appropriationsof
fish from a trout-filledstreamwill have little effect on the availabilityof fish
for other fishermen.If all of the fishermenwant only to appropriatesmall
quantitiesof fish, the total amounttakenwill not interferewith the abilityof
the trout populationto rejuvenatethe following year. The supply is suffi-
ciently large that the actions of an individual fisherman have no conse-
quencesfor otherfishermen.Likewise,refrainingfromexploitingthe fishery
does not generateexternaleffects for the otherfishermen.Only as the supply
becomes constrictedrelative to demand does the potential for individual
actions to generateexternalitiesincrease.
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
The similaritiesand differencesbetween PD, CD, and PG games seem

more distinguishableand understandablewhen games are representedas
values alongcommonincentiveparameters.Representingthese games along
common incentive parametershelps to demonstratethat they are similarin
the sense that most involve expected outcomes that differ from Paretobest
ones, andthatmanycan be classed as collective actiondilemmas.The degree
to which objective incentives are thoughtto compel actorstowardinferior
outcomes is expressed in the value of the returnsfunction (or its inverse),
which canbe variedin parallelfashionfor any andall of the threegametypes.
Thus the results of many experimentsemploying a diversity of game types
can be comparedacrossincentive structures.
Representingsimplegamesas valuesalongcommonincentiveparameters
allows us to isolate the essence of collective actiondilemmas.In turn,we can
isolate the effects, if any, of the differentpresentationsof those incentive
values. Differentpresentationsmay influence behaviors.If they do not, our
databasefor studyingthe effects of still othervariableson collective action
behavioris instantlyexpanded.At the very least, we can begin to controlfor
the effects of differentpresentationsand decide what designs mightbe most
useful in futurestudies.
Prisoner's dilemmas present values as payoff wealth, do so for two or
moreplayers,andtypicallypermitindividualsonly a binarychoice of levels
of cooperationor contributionsto the nonexcludablegood. An advantageof
this formatis thatrelationshipsbetween outcomes are easily recognizedby
and for all actors.Experimentalwork by Frohlichand Oppenheimer(1984)
suggests that the relative allocation of values among actors can be an
importantdeterminantof choice behavior. In any case, hundreds,if not

thousands,of experimentshave alreadybeen conductedusing PD designs,
andthe datafromthose experimentsis valuablein developingunderstanding
of collective actiondilemmas.
Public goods games usuallyallow individualsmany choices aboutlevels
of cooperationand directlyreveal the value of the returnsfunction.Typical
presentationsof PG games include all informationneeded to specify the
incentive structureand payoffs to the contributingindividual,but not to all
relevant actors. Because of the many choices available in PG games, this
amountof informationcan be cumbersomeand might interferewith subject
understandingof the logic of incentives. Lacking direct information on
others'payoffs, the design may induce subjectsto focus on theirown relative
earningsfrom differentchoices andbias outcomestowardnoncooperation.25
Economistsare generallymore acceptingof a rationalegoist understanding
of humanbehaviorand have a clear preferencefor public goods designs in
conductinglaboratoryexperiments.Ironically,theirchoice of design might
help confirmthat belief.
Commons dilemmagames also allow multiplechoices, but contributing
actionsusuallyinvolve refrainingfromengagingin profitableactsratherthan
engaging in costly ones, and thisjuxtapositionof losses and gains probably
affects choice behavior (Schwartz-Shea and Simmons, 1993). The unin-
vertedPG formatseems to have a more straightforward logic and might be
preferable as a game design on those grounds. Nevertheless, their sub-
tractabilitygives CD a
games unique incentivefeatureandtheirexperimental
simulationshave many directcounterpartsin the real world (Ostrom1990).
Moreover,experimentalstudiesusing a CD design are also quite numerous,
especially as a simulationof resourceproblemswhere the dilemma centers
on how to maintainan alreadyexisting good.
Despite these differencesin format,this articlearguesthatall threegame
types sharecommonincentivefeaturesandthatmanyof themcan be classed
as collective actiondilemmas.Fordesignsthatarecollective actiondilemmas
andthatembodysummationtechnologieswithlinearreturnsto contributions,
meaningfulcomparisonsof empiricalresults can be made that expand our
ability to accumulateknowledge aboutbehavior.
25. In PG games with summationtechnologies, subjectscan usually comprehend,through

projectionof their own circumstances,the values othersmight obtain.The informationis not,
however,directandprobablyleaves some uncertaintyaboutthe strategiesandchoices of others.
Austen-Smith(1981) arguesthatuncertaintyaboutothers'availablestrategiesandactualchoices
has importantinfluences on collective action behavior.Uncertaintymay be greaterin public
goods provisionformats.
Comparingresultsfromgames employingothertechnologiesandnonlin-
ear returnsis, however,very problematic.This circumstanceis troublesome
because most real-worldcollective action dilemmas involve asymmetries
acrossactorsandnonlinearreturns.Importantempiricalfield studies26 of many
of thesesituationshavealreadybeenundertaken, butbecausetheymust accept
existing asymmetriesand nonlinearities,the resultsare not easily compared
with each other, much less with the results of laboratoryexperiments.
A large numberof laboratoryexperimentshave been conducted using
summationtechnologies and linear returnsso that meaningfulcomparison
and accumulationcan be accomplished with these studies alone. Their
symmetryandlinearityraisequestions,however,abouthow adequatelythey
representreal-worldsituationsand whetherresultsfrom these experiments
informus aboutreal-worldbehavior.27 My own surmiseis thatexperiments
with summationtechnologies and linearreturnsconfrontpeople with fairly
simple situationsthat are relatively unfetteredby strategiccomplications.
Simplicity helps people understandthe collective action characterof the
game and enables researchersto explore how people behave when they are
awarethatthey confronta collective action situation.
Moreover,use of these simple games is analogousto the physicist's use
of a vacuum for studyingthe laws of motion. In the real world (at least on
the earth'ssurface),vacuumsarenot naturallyencountered.Particlesbehave
in an environmentcomplicated by the effects of other particles and by
randomlyintrudingforces that are incidentalto fundamentalprocesses that
thephysicistwantsto identify.Thephysicistcannotisolatethese fundamental
processes in the real world, but she or he still knows that they are operating
and are fundamentalto understandingbehaviorsthat are observablein the
real world.The inducedvacuum,althoughcontrived,allows these processes
to be isolated and studied.Similarly,a game with a summationtechnology
and linear returnsis not naturallyencounteredin the real world, but the
contrived game allows us to isolate many of the fundamentalfeatures of
collective action dilemmasand to observe how people behave in response.
These recordedbehaviorsshouldgive us importantclues aboutwhy people
behave the way they do in more complicatedand sometimesindecipherable
real-worldenvironments.
26. Sandler(1992, chaps.4 and 5) reviewsthe extensive literatureon internationalalliances.

Ostrom(1990) conductsthe most extensive field researchon commons dilemmasandprovides
the most systematicreview of otherfield studiesof commonsdilemmas.A list of all field studies
would be quite extensive and include work in areas as diverse as contributionsto public
broadcastingstations,environmentalgroups,voting in public elections, school taxation,blood
donations,housing covenants,and environmentalagreements.
27. We can ask the same questionsaboutlaboratoryexperimentsper se. See Smith's (1976)
and Plott's (1979) discussions of the use andlimits of experimentsas researchtools.
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Comparing Prisoner's Dilemma, Commons Dilemma, and Public Goods Provision Designs in

The ability to cumulateand comparefindings from laboratoryexperimentsis impededby

AUTHOR'S NOTE: Thanks go to RobertaHerzberg,John Orbell, Randy Simmons, and

other words,the contemporarysense of collective actionrefersto situations

group size on cooperativeor noncooperativebehavior,for example, she or

studiesis thatwe areforcedto makeleapsof faithaboutwhetherothersubject

FEATURES OF COLLECTIVE ACTION DILEMMAS

A common way to define collective action dilemmas (CADs) so as to

PARETO "BEST" OUTCOMES

Perhaps the most interestingcomparison among features of CADs is

SOURCE:Shaw and Thorslund(1975).

defect outcomeis stableand constitutesan equilibriumdespite the presence

Incentive features of PD, PG, and CD games can be rendered more

cludable goods and having inferiorequilibriais that we can distinguishthe

MatrixA. ChickenGame MatrixB. AssuranceGame

SOURCE: Taylor (1987,18). ? CambridgeUniversity Press 1987 and Universitetsforlager

cast in a PD format,lack the requisiterelationsamongoutcomes and are not

RELATIONS BETWEEN OUTCOMES

The relationalfeaturesof greatestconcern in CADs are the sizes of the

PUBLIC GOOD PROVISION GAMES

Public goods are typically defined as nonsubtractablegoods for which

Moreover,the benefitcreatedfor any one individualby a contributionof a

DIFFICULTIES IN COMPARING EXPERIMENTS

An advantageof designs that incorporatesymmetriesin returnsacross

more or less conducive to cooperationthananotherand be able to quantify

b = benefit from contributionof a cost unit to provisionof the nonexcludablegood;

ent) benefit-costratios.Moreover,the differencesin ratioscan be quantified

GENERALIZING PUBLIC GOODS GAMES

Calculatingthe value of a returnsfunctionis straightforwardfor designs

tion without receiving compensating benefits from the contributionsof

that the dilemma of collective action may be relatively easy to overcome

PUBLIC GOOD PROVISION PROBLEMS

Theprevioussectionfocusedon the generalizationof public goods games

The typical definition of a prisoner'sdilemma emphasizes the relation-

PRISONER'S DILEMMA VERSUS PUBLIC GOOD PROVISION GAMES

In contrast to PG games, PD games typically present only a limited

Cooperate I, Cooperate ' 1

Defect T,S P Defect

combiningthe initialincome registeredin the defect/defectcell with payoffs

DETERMINING THE VALUE OF THE RETURNS FUNCTION FOR PD DESIGNS

The steps in convertinga game in PG formatto one in PD formatcan be

of available choices (two choices in the former-three in the latter),and in

A commons dilemma design differs from a PG design in the way the

The goods providedby cost contributionsin a CD game arenot inherently

CALCULATING INCENTIVE VARIABLES

To makethe resultsof CD gamescomparableto PG games andPD games,

The only crucial informationnot directlyprovidedwas the value of the

WHEN COMMONS DILEMMAS ARE NOT COLLECTIVE ACTION DILEMMAS

Not all situationsinvolving subtractable,nonexcludablegoods arecollec-

availabilityof the commonsfor otherusers or, in the extremecase, total use

SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS

The similaritiesand differencesbetween PD, CD, and PG games seem

importantdeterminantof choice behavior. In any case, hundreds,if not

25. In PG games with summationtechnologies, subjectscan usually comprehend,through

26. Sandler(1992, chaps.4 and 5) reviewsthe extensive literatureon internationalalliances.

Alcock, J. E., andD. Mansell. 1977. Predispositionandbehaviorin acollective dilemma.Journal

. 1981. Economistsfree ride, does anyoneelse?: Experimentson the provisionof public

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