Appendix G. Fire Protection Guidelines For New Projects: Chevron Corporation G-1 January 1997

Appendix G.
Fire Protection Guidelines for New Projects
Chevron Corporation G-1 January 1997

Chevron Appendix G
CONTENTS
1.0 SCOPE .......................................................................................................................................................... 3
2.0 USING THESE GUIDELINES ................................................................................................................. 4
REFERENCES .......................................................................................................................................................... 5
A. GENERAL.................................................................................................................................................... 6
B. UTILITIES ................................................................................................................................................. 13
C. COLUMNS AND VESSELS.................................................................................................................... 16
D. TANKS........................................................................................................................................................ 16
E. EXCHANGERS AND COOLING TOWERS....................................................................................... 26
F. FIRED EQUIPMENT............................................................................................................................... 28
G. PUMPS........................................................................................................................................................ 34
J. CRITICAL INSTRUMENTATION....................................................................................................... 37
K. COMPRESSORS/ENGINES.................................................................................................................. 41
L. PIPING........................................................................................................................................................ 45
N. FIREPROOFING...................................................................................................................................... 48
P. ELECTRICAL AREA CLASSIFICATION ......................................................................................... 51
R. BUILDINGS............................................................................................................................................... 53
S. MISCELLANEOUS SERVICES ............................................................................................................ 56
Copies of Appendix G without comment are available in both hard copy (paper) and electronic (MS Word for
Windows) format. To order, contact CRTC Technical Standards at either (510) 242-7232 or -7241.
Page 2 of 68 January 1997

Chevron Appendix G
INSTRUCTIONS TO USERS
1.0 SCOPE
1.1 These guidelines contain critical fire protection concerns which should be evaluated on new projects
to minimize the risk of incidents. The guidelines are based on Company and industry standards and
experience. Use of these guidelines in the design of new facilities can minimize cost over the project
life by:
• decreasing the number of releases and fires

• decreasing the magnitude of the loss
• minimizing processing losses from unscheduled plant or equipment down time
The Guidelines are worded similar to a specification for ease of use by the contractor. However, this
is not a compliance document or specification. The guidelines generally do not give instructions
on "how to" design a facility. In this way, contractor designs can be used when considering the
guidelines.
1.2 These guidelines should be used on all new projects and major modifications which could impact the
fire safety of a facility. They can be used by Company engineers or they can be given to design and
construction contractors for consideration in the contractor's designs.
Comment 1.2 Generally, contractors do not have the fire loss experience that the Company and
industry has; nor is it common for contractors to receive much feed back on their designs. By
incorporating Company and industry experience into new project scoping and design, the causes of
incidents which we have experienced in the past can be eliminated and future incidents prevented.
1.3 Exceptions taken to these guidelines shall be approved by the Company. Any questions can be
referred to the Fire and Process Safety Team in CRTC.
Comment 1.3 Exceptions taken to these guidelines may entail increased risk to the facility.
Consequently, it is important that the Company representative be involved in all decisions of this
nature. Documentation of these decisions is important for use on future projects, and in the event
these decisions are questioned in the future.
January 1997 Page 3 of 68

Chevron Appendix G
2.0 USING THESE GUIDELINES
2.1 General
These guidelines are intended to be tailored to the individual project and incorporated into the
project specifications during front end loading.
Comment 2.1 Feedback from the contractors indicate that incremental engineering and facility
costs related to these guidelines are minimized if the guidelines are discussed and incorporated at
the beginning of the project.
2.2 Comments
2.2.1 To help the engineer decide whether a provision is appropriate to include in the project
specification, italicized comments have been included explaining how that provision can
prevent fire-related incidents or lessen the impact of such incidents.
2.2.2 At the beginning of the comments, each provision is classified in one of the following
categories in order to help the engineer understand and prioritize the provisions:
• Legal Requirements - required by OSHA or other legal entities

• Industry Standard - accepted practice which is documented in industry specifications
(i.e. API, NFPA)
• Industry Practice - accepted practice which is not documented in industry
specifications
• Company Requirement - required by Chevron based on our experience
• Guideline - highly recommended by Chevron and important to consider in scoping the
project.
Along with the classification, for Company Requirements and Guidelines, the cost impact
on a project is also shown where it can be identified.
2.2.3 At the end of the comments, the appropriate Company and industry references have been
included in bold letters. A legend of all of the references used can be found in the
Reference section.

Chevron Appendix G
REFERENCES
Acronym Company Manual
CIV Civil and Structural

CMP Compressor
DRI Driver
ELC Electrical
EXH Heat Exchanger and Cooling Tower
FPM Fire Protection
HTR Fired Heater and Waste Heat Recovery
ICM Instrumentation and Control
IRM Insulation and Refractory
MAC General Machinery
MD&C Model Design and Construction Specification
PIM Piping
PMP Pump
PVM Pressure Vessel
SID Safety in Designs
TAM Tank
UTL Utilities
Industry References
API American Petroleum Institute

NFPA National Fire Protection Association
UFC Uniform Fire Code
UBC Uniform Building Code
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration

Chevron Appendix G
A. GENERAL
A.1 Spacing and Layout
The following site-specific conditions shall be considered in the site selection, spacing and layout of
plants handling flammable or toxic materials:
• Local weather conditions such as rainfall, lightning, freezing and prevailing winds
• Potential catastrophic events such as earthquakes, hurricanes, flooding, earth slides
• Proximity to public roads and populated areas
• Future development of adjacent properties
• Risk to/from adjacent facilities
• Storage quantities
• Topography of site including elevation and slope
• Environmental sensitivity of the area
• Availability of utilities
• Access for emergency response
• Local codes and regulations
Comment A.1 The focus should be on reduction of risks, prevention of incidents, and limiting
losses in the event of an incident along with economic considerations. For example, topographical
considerations include the potential for a hydrocarbon spill to drain into or away from a processing
area, and buildings should be put upwind of process areas.
A.1.1 Spacing
A.1.1.1 Figures 1300-1, Sheets 1 and 2, (located in the Fire Protection Manual) are
guidelines to aid in establishing plant-to-plant, plant-to-property line, plant-to-
building, and equipment spacing distances.
Comment A.1.1.1 Industry practice. Figures 1300-1, Sheets 1 and 2, have been
developed from Company experience and industry practice, and with significant
operating company review. They are similar to spacing guidelines used by other
oil companies. The Fire and Process Safety Team in CRTC is available to help
resolve these distances.
The plant-to-plant, plant-to-property line, and plant-to-building spacing guidelines

are intended to minimize the risk of a fire in one facility impacting other plants,
outside properties or buildings. Note that these spacing requirements pertain to
equipment setback lines, not plot limit lines. The equipment spacing guidelines
(i.e. pump-to-heat exchanger, etc.) are based on
• preventing an incipient stage fire at one piece of equipment impacting an

adjacent piece of equipment
• protecting against flammable vapor reaching sources of ignition
• providing access for control of fires FPM 1320

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A.1.1.2 Fired heaters and motor control centers shall be given additional spacing from
equipment which could have a flammable vapor release. Where practical, fired
heaters and MCCs should be located upwind of this equipment.
Comment A.1.1.2 Industry practice. A vapor release near a fired heater can be
drawn into the firebox with the combustion air resulting in ignition and flashback
to the source. FPM 1331
A.1.1.3 The minimum distance from an elevated flare to processing equipment handling
flammable hydrocarbons is 200 ft.
Comment A.1.1.3 Company requirement. The incremental costs are project-

specific. Flare spacing is normally based on radiant heat effects on adjacent
occupied facilities. However, the potential for liquid carryover impacting adjacent
facilities should also be considered. The 200 ft minimum spacing is similar to the
flare spacing requirements of other members of the oil industry. ICM 1244
A.1.1.4 Hydrocarbon pumps and compressors shall not be installed under overhead
pipeways. Hydrocarbon pumps placed alongside in-plant overhead pipeways shall
have the process end of the pump, including the seal area, located at least 5 feet
outside the extremities of the overhead pipeway.
Comment A.1.1.4 Industry practice. Pumps are a primary source of liquid

releases and fires. Locating the process end of the pump outside of the edge of the
pipeway can minimize the possibility of a fire at the pump involving the equipment
in the pipeway causing a much larger incident and lengthy shutdown.
Additionally, for LPG and "hot" pumps, consideration should be given to locating
the pumps on the outer sides of the plant where they are more accessible. FPM
1332
A.1.1.5 Pumps handling hydrocarbon above its auto-ignition temperature (or 600oF) shall
have the following additional spacing requirements:
• 5 feet minimum spacing between pump foundations

• 10 feet minimum spacing from equipment handling flammable material
• process end of pump located on the outer side of the plant or a minimum of 10
feet outside the extremities of the overhead pipeway.
Comment A.1.1.5 Industry practice. "Hot" pumps are a significantly greater

fire hazard than pumps operating below the auto-ignition temperature because 1)
the risk of a release in this type of service is greater, and 2) a release will likely
ignite. The greater separation is needed so that a packing gland or seal fire will
not expose adjacent equipment. FPM 1332

Chevron Appendix G
A.1.1.6 Minimum spacing requirements for tanks shall be in accordance with Chapter 2 of
NFPA 30, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code.
Comment A.1.1.6 Legal (NFPA 30) requirement. In many locations, NFPA 30

has been adopted as a code. NFPA 30 spacing requirements are considerably less
than those used by others in the industry and are considered to be absolute
minimums.
A.1.1.7 LPG storage vessels shall be spaced in accordance with API 2510, 3.1.2.
A.1.2 Layout
A.1.2.1 Control room location and the need for blast resistant construction shall be
specified by the Company and shall be evaluated in accordance with API-RP 752.
Comment A.1.2.1 Additional design information is in the Civil and Structural

Manual, Section 400. Because of the impact on operations, the Company should
be involved in all decisions related to control room siting and blast resistance.
Consult the CRTC Fire and Process Safety Team for the criteria and methodology
for building siting evaluations.
A.1.2.2 In accordance with Section D.5.4 of this guideline, hydrocarbon pumps shall not be
located within the local impound basin or drainage path of a tank.
A.1.2.3 Air-cooled exchangers should not be located above pumps and other mechanical
equipment handling hydrocarbon.
Comment A.1.2.3 Guideline. The incremental costs to space air coolers away
from pumps and mechanical equipment could be substantial. Air cooler fin fans
pull the heat from a fire up through the pipeway causing more damage to the
equipment in the pipeway and to the air cooler itself. FPM 1333
A.1.2.4 Process piping shall be run on above-ground pipeways. There shall be no

mechanical equipment handling hydrocarbons located directly under the pipeway.
Comment A.1.2.4 Industry practice. Above-ground pipeways splitting a plant

(or between two plants) provide excellent separation between equipment and
plants decreasing the risk of a fire impacting adjacent facilities. Above-ground
pipeways have the following advantages over below-grade pipeways:
• piping in above-ground pipeways can be inspected and leaks easily detected

reducing the risk of piping failures
• the area under above-ground pipeways can be kept clear of oil and debris
minimizing the risk of a fire spreading and involving the entire pipeway.

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Fires on mechanical equipment located underneath pipeways can damage the

power and control cables and piping in the pipeway, and the pipeway may impede
firefighting access. FPM 1334 and 2085
A.1.2.5 Critical instrumentation, conduit banks or cable trays housing control cables, and
critical power cables shall be located in accordance with Section J of this Guideline
A.1.2.6 Spacing and layout of fire fighting equipment shall be in accordance with Section
S.3 of this Guideline.
A.1.3 Roadway Layout and Restrictions
A.1.3.1 Plants shall be separated by roadways to give access to all major elements. Road
layout shall allow two ways to access the plant.
Comment A.1.3.1 Industry practice. Block layout and roads provide excellent
fire breaks between plants, and facilitate maintenance and emergency access.
FPM 1315
A.1.3.2 Any road within 25 feet of potential release sources of flammable or toxic material
shall be considered a restricted road with barricades and signs installed at the
entrances to the plant. Roads located more than 25 feet from release sources are
considered unrestricted.
Comment A.1.3.2 Company requirement. Additional costs of this requirement

would be minimal. Vehicles are ignition sources. Access on roads less than 25
feet from potential releases must be restricted to prevent ignition of flammable
vapor released in the area. Furnaces can be 15 feet from unrestricted roads
because furnaces are themselves an ignition source. FPM 1315
A.2 LPG Storage and Handling
A.2.1 References
• API Recommended Practice 2510, Design and Construction of Liquefied Petroleum

Gas (LPG) Installations
• API Recommended Practice 2510A, Fire Protection Considerations for the Design and
Operation of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Storage Facilities
• ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII
• Fire Protection Manual, Section 3500 and Appendix C
• Piping Manual, Section 1100, LPG Guidelines
Comment A.2.1 Chevron uses API 2510 and the additions/exceptions noted in the Piping
Manual, Section 1100 as the standard for LPG storage facilities. New and existing
facilities undergoing major modifications shall be designed and built to meet API 2510 with
the additions and exceptions noted.

Chevron Appendix G
A.2.2 LPG Tanks
A.2.2 LPG tanks shall comply with ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section
VIII. Vessels shall be designed to prevent brittle fracture at temperatures that would result
if the vessel's pressure were suddenly reduced from 100% to 40% of the maximum
allowable working pressure.
Comment A.2.2 Compliance with ASME Code is a legal requirement. Designing to

prevent brittle fracture is a Company requirement. The catastrophic effect of a brittle
fracture of an LPG tank justifies the use of the low temperature fracture resistant material.
Low temperature fracture resistant materials such as ASTM A516 are now available at
costs only slightly higher than ASTM A285C material. PIM 1100, Section 2.4.3
A.2.3 Appurtenances
A.2.3.1 Direct connections to the vessel shell shall be minimized. The first valve(s) below
the normal liquid level off a vessel shall be ANSI 300 lb. rated valves.
Comment A.2.3.1 Company requirement. The incremental costs of installing

higher ANSI rated piping through the first block valve is project-specific. The
piping and instrument connections are more likely to be a source of leaks than the
vessel itself. Leaks at these connections can cause direct flame impingement on an
LPG vessel. The intent of these requirements is to 1) minimize potential leak
sources and 2) provide isolation valves below the liquid level which are more
resistant to fire damage. PIM 1100, Section 2.5.4
A.2.3.2 All LPG tanks shall have protective instrumentation in accordance with API 2510,
Section 5. LPG tanks shall have high level alarms which are independent from the
level monitoring or control system.
Comment A.2.3.2 Industry standard. Automatic Tank Gauges (ATGs) are

intended to be used for the day-to-day operation of filling and emptying the vessels.
They should not be used as the high level alarm. The high level alarm should be
independent so that a single fault cannot result in both systems failing.
In high risk locations and tanks over 10,000 gallons, a second level indication
system should be considered along with a separate, independent high-high level
alarm/cut-off switch to shut down pumps and/or stop filling. High level alarm
systems should be tested frequently and the design should permit ease of operator
testing while the system is in service, (i.e., ease of access, isolation, etc.). PIM
1100, Sections 5.1 and 6.2.3.4; API RP 2510, Section 5.
A.2.3.3 Shut-off valves installed in accordance with API 2510, Section 5.1.7.3 shall have
remote activation from a safe location, shall close automatically on exposure to
fire, and shall activate pump shutdown systems. Installations with automatic
isolation and shutdown systems shall have an alarm in an attended location. As

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stated in API 2510, swing check valves on the dedicated fill lines fulfill this
requirement.
Comment A.2.3.3 Guideline. The incremental cost is project-specific. Shutting

off and isolating the source of fuel release is critical to extinguishing and
minimizing the loss associated with a fire. Remote activation capability can ensure
isolation is accomplished during emergency situations. It is not recommended to
extinguish an LPG fire without first isolating the source of fuel. API 2510, 5.1.7;
PIM 1100, 5.1.7.3.2
A.2.3.4 LPG tanks shall have pressure and vacuum relieving devices per API 2510, Section
5.1.6 and PIM 100, Section 5.1.6.
Comment A.2.3.4 Industry standard. It is preferable to vent relief valves to

atmosphere. However, some spheres are required to vent to a closed relief system.
The consequences of the closed relief system being damaged or not providing
sufficient relief capacity for the LPG tanks during an emergency may justify a
second relief valve vented to atmosphere. In addition, the second valve allows
maintenance and testing of the relief valves without taking the storage tank out of
service. PIM 5.1.6.4.5; API 2510, 5.1.6
A.2.3.5 Sample connections and water draws shall be routed out from under the vessel and
shall be adequately supported. Sample connections and water draws shall be
double valved, with the valve farthest from the vessel being a spring loaded, self
closing (or deadman) valve. Any atmospheric discharge points shall be routed so
the operator is not exposed to vented vapor and away from potential ignition
sources.
Comment A.2.3.5 Double valving is an industry standard; The use of a

deadman valve is a Company requirement. The additional cost of using a
deadman valve for the second valve is nominal. The depressuring of LPG can
result in water or condensate freezing around the outlet of piping and valves. Two
valves on sampling and water draw connections provides a second valve which
can be closed in the event the valve near the discharge end of the piping freezes up
and cannot be closed. The deadman valve requires the operator's presence while
material is being drained from the vessel. PIM 1100, 5.2.2.3; PIM-EF-403; API
2510, 5.2.2; API 2510A, 2.7.2
A.2.3.6 Restriction orifices shall be installed on all small fittings and instrumentation not
dependent upon flow rates.
Comment A.2.3.6 Restriction orifices minimize the release of LPG in the event of
a downstream component failure. PIM 1100,, 5.1.7.4; Standard Drawing GB-
J1223

Chevron Appendix G
A.2.4 Spacing and Spill Containment
A.2.4.1 LPG storage vessels shall be spaced in accordance with Section A.1.1.7.
A.2.4.2 The site design shall include drainage which slopes away from all vessels, tanks,
pumps and piping. Surface area of LPG spills collected in impoundments shall be
minimized by sloping the bottom of the impoundment. Intermediate weirs with
overflow spillways shall be included in the design of spill collection ditches and
swales. Remote impoundments shall be located a minimum of 50 ft. from any
storage tank and 200 feet away from other sources of ignition such as flare stacks
or furnaces. Drainage and impound facilities shall not be constructed of loose
materials such as gravel or rock.
Comment A.2.4.2 Guideline. Incremental costs are project-specific. In low

wind conditions, LPG liquid and vapors can travel and accumulate in low areas.
Therefore, drainage and spill containment should be designed to carry any spills
away from the storage vessels and piping manifolds to avoid damaging those
facilities and adding to the release. Remote impoundment is preferred over diking
the area surrounding the tanks. Since LPG volatizes readily, minimizing the
surface area of any collected spills in turn minimizes the evaporation rate.
Drainage collection ditches and swales are typically less expensive than walls.
Sloping the bottom of remote impounds and installing intermediate weirs in
collection ditches minimize the surface area of a spill and reduces the evaporation
rate of an LPG spill. PIM 1100, 3.2; API 2510, Section 3; API 2510A, 2.2, 2.3
and 2.4
A.2.5 Fire Protection for LPG Vessels and Related Piping
A.2.5.1 Design guidelines for fireproofing and fire water systems for LPG installations are
covered in API 2510, Section 8 and API 2510A, Sections 5 & 6.
A.2.5.2 Water flood connections shall be provided into the vessel in accordance with API
2510, Section 5.2.7 and API 2510A, Section 6.6.7.1. Water flood connections
must be visibly identified and the required injection pressure clearly indicated.
Comment A.2.5.2 Guideline. Incremental costs are project-specific. Water

flooding the vessel above the level of a leak will change the leak from LPG to
water. It is important to ensure that the water supply pressure is higher than the
pressure in the LPG vessel plus any line losses. Also, the quantity of water needs
to be sufficient to overcome the leak long enough to allow maintenance to stop the
leak without overfilling the vessel. It may not be possible to use the fill line to
pump water into vessels with a common fill/suction line with a thermally actuated
emergency isolation valve at the tank. API 2510, 5.2.7; API-2510A, 6.6.7.1
A.2.5.3 Fire water systems for LPG installations shall be provided in accordance with API
2510, Section 8. Fire water application rates and methods of application vary for
different types installations and different types of fire exposures. Unless specified

Chevron Appendix G
otherwise by the Company, LPG spheres shall have deluge or water spray
protection in accordance with API 2510, 8.5.2 & 8.6, and shall have monitor
coverage reaching the bottom of the vessel from at least 2 different directions.
Comment A.2.5.3 Industry standard. The deluge system is needed to provide

cooling from radiant heat exposure. The monitors provide direct fire water for
dispersing an LPG leak or for cooling areas of direct flame impingement. API
2510, Section 8; API 2510A, Section 5
A.2.6 LPG Loading Racks
A.2.6.1 LPG loading and unloading facilities shall be designed per API 2510, Section 7.
A.2.6.2 LPG loading racks shall restrict unauthorized traffic and provide ease of ingress
and egress. Spacing requirements shall be in accordance with Section A.1.1.1 of
this Guideline.
Comment A.2.6.2 Industry practice.
A.2.6.3 Emergency shutoff valves shall be provided to isolate loading, unloading and vapor
return piping per API 2510, Section 7.3.4.1.
Comment A.2.6.3 Industry standard. Excess flow valves have been found to be
unreliable and difficult to test or service. They have a tendency to slam closed
unexpectedly at high transfer rates and will not close for leak rates less than their
design low flow rate (i.e., if the transfer hose does not completely separate or the
piping downstream is partially obstructed). For these reasons, a more positive
means of isolating flow to the transfer piping should be provided.
A.2.7 Compressors
LPG compressors shall be designed per API 2510, Section 7.3.2.
A.2.8 Refrigerated Storage
A.2.8.1 API 2510, Section 9 describes the design requirements for refrigerated storage of
LPG.
B. UTILITIES
B.1 Reliability
Utility systems shall be designed for reliability. Redundant systems or spares should be provided
where it is necessary to minimize the risk of an unplanned shutdown of critical equipment or
processes.

Chevron Appendix G
Comment B.1 Utility system shutdowns can lead to facility upsets or shutdowns and conditions
which can cause fire or business interruption. Loss of utilities often produces the greatest load on
the relief system. The degree of reliability required shall be established by the Company.
B.2 Spacing and Layout
Minimum spacing shall be in accordance with Section A.1 of this document.
Comment B.2 Industry practice. Since utility systems normally affect more than one process
plant, they need to be located such that they will not be exposed to fire or explosions originating in a
process plant.
B.3 Boilers
Design for safe firing of boilers shall be in accordance with NFPA 8501, NFPA 85C, and Section F
of this document where applicable.
Comment B.3 Industry Standard. NFPA 8501 and NPFA 85C are the industry standards for the
design operation and maintenance of boilers related to safe firing. Specific Company requirements
are contained in Section F.
B.4 Fuel Gas
A liquid knockout drum shall be provided in each facility using fuel gas to remove liquid before the
fuel gas goes to the user. The drum shall be provided with a gage glass and high level alarm.
Facilities shall be installed to safely dispose of any accumulated liquid.
Comment B.4 Industry Practice. Fuel gas can vary widely in specific gravity and dew point
causing liquid to condense out. Liquid in the fuel gas system can cause erratic firing, plugging of
the burner tips, and possibly burner flame-out. A properly sized knockout pot can minimize liquid in
the fuel gas.
B.5 Utility Connections
B.5.1 Permits
All utility connections shall be discussed with and approved by the proprietary operating
organization of the Company.
Comment B.5.1 Company requirement. If the local operating organization does not
have its own form, MFG-632 or Figure 100-2 in the Utilities Manual can be used for this
purpose. UTL 160
B.5.2 Classification
B.5.2.1 Temporary Occasional-Use Connections: Connections used less than once per
week which will be completely removed after use.

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As a minimum, double block, double check, and intermediate drain valves shall be
installed. The manifold shall be installed in an easily accessible location and
painted an identifiable color - usually purple. The connection shall be removed
immediately after use.
B.5.2.2 Permanent Occasional-Use Connections: Connections used less than once per
week which remain after use and are positively isolated when not in service.
Turn spools and blinds shall be installed as a means of positive isolation. The
manifold shall be painted for easy identification. Where a connection is for
emergency use, a double block and bleed manifold or a double block and bleed
gate valve may be acceptable if approved by the Company.
B.5.2.3 Constant-Use Connections: Connections that are continuously required for normal
plant operation or are used more than once per week. The design of the connection
depends on the services being connected.
Unless a local standard exists, constant-use connections shall be installed in

accordance with Figure 100-1, Sheets 1-4 in the Utilities Manual.
Comment B.5.2 Guideline. Improperly designed utility connections, or

connections left in place after shutdowns can cause serious incidents and near
misses. The Utilities Manual, Section 160, is the primary Company reference on
utility connections. The information and figures Section 160 were originally
developed at the Richmond Refinery as part of their Refinery Instruction, RI-503,
Connections or Alterations to Refinery Utility Systems. The latest version of RI-
503 can be obtained from the Richmond Refinery.
B.5.3 Requirements
B.5.3.1 The following utility systems shall not be connected to process or other utility
systems:
• instrument air
• breathing air
• drinking water
• fire water
Comment B.5.3.1 Company requirement. The incremental costs are project

specific. Connections to these critical systems can result in extreme life safety and
fire risks. UTL 160

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C. COLUMNS AND VESSELS
Comment C Annually, columns, vessels and reactors account for $1.5MM in fire loss, 4-5 recordable
fires, and 1-2 injuries. 55-60% of the fire loss and 25% of the fires were design-related. Large quantities
of fuel stored in columns, vessels and reactors can significantly increase the fire loss if allowed to escape
uncontrolled.
C.1 References
• ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code

• CRTC Pressure Vessel Manual, Volume 1 (PVM1), and Volume 2 (PVM2)
• Fire Protection Manual, Section 2050, Columns and Vessels
C.2 Piping
The number of piping and instrument connections to the vessel shall be minimized. All connections
shall be welded up to the first valve or flange off the column or vessel. Small piping, sample
connections and other appurtenances shall be designed per Section L of this guideline.
Comment C.2 Guideline. 75% of the fire loss and 65% of the fires are due to external leaks,
usually at flanges. Piping connections are the primary locations for potential releases from the
vessel. Minimizing the number of direct connections to the vessel reduces the potential for releases.
FPM 2052
D. TANKS
Comment D The Company has 19-20 fires/year related to tanks accounting for around $500,000 in
annual fire loss and 1 injury. 51% of the fires and 69% of the fire loss occurs in downstream facilities.
With the exception of small steel and fiberglass production tanks where lightning is the major concern,
over 90% of the fire loss is related to the operating or maintenance procedures. There have been 3 fully
involved tank fires on large tanks in the last 10 years.
D.1 Spacing
Tanks shall be spaced in accordance with Section A.1.1.6.
D.2 Drainage and Impounding
D.2.1 Spills shall drain away from the tank and be contained in accordance with NFPA 30,
Section 2-3.3. The piping location and drainage pattern shall prevent spills from
accumulating or flowing under piping in the tank impound area.
Comment D.2.1 Legal (NFPA 30) requirement. A tank over-fill presents a very serious
fire risk potential. Drainage away from the tank in accordance with NFPA 30 prevents a
fire at the base of a tank and minimizes underside corrosion. Drainage away from the

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piping is a cost effective way of protecting the piping and manifolds from failure during a
fire.
NFPA 30, Section 2-3.3 allows either remote impounding or local impounding using dikes.
Remote impounding is preferred because spills or burning liquid are routed rapidly away
from the tank minimizing the risk to the tank or the tank piping. Remote impounding for a
portion of the required volume in combination with local impounding is preferred to only
local impounding. Where available space is limiting, the additional capacity of the
drainage channel may be used to obtain the necessary containment volume. NFPA 30, 2-
3.3, TAM 231,232
D.2.2 Drainage channels or culverts to remote impounding shall be sized to handle a tank overfill
at the maximum fill rate or a separation of the largest pipeline under pump pressure or
gravity-fed from the tank.
Comment D.2.2 Guideline. This section clarifies the sizing criteria for the drainage
channels or culverts which is not addressed in NFPA 30. An overflow of the channel or
culvert could lead to a spread of fire to adjacent facilities. Note that these systems are not
designed to handle a tank rupture because it so rarely occurs. TAM 231
D.2.3 Piping in sleeves through dikes shall be sealed at the dike wall with a fire-resistant seal.
Comment D.2.3 Company requirement. The sleeves need to be sealed to maintain the
integrity of the impoundage required by NFPA 30. This prevents spread of fuel to adjacent
facilities. TAM 233
D.2.4 Where water draw sumps and drains under mixer spill pads are connected to a closed drain
system, the system shall be designed so that major spills are confined to the impound area.
Comment D.2.4 Company requirement. This provision is needed to maintain the

integrity of the impoundage required by NFPA 30. This provision prevents a major spill
from escaping the tank impound via the drainage system and involving other facilities.
D.3 Fire Water Systems
Comment D.3 There is no industry standard for fire water systems in tank fields. These provisions
give criteria for sizing the fire water main and locating the hydrants.
D.3.1 In general, the fire main shall be designed for the largest of the following:
• the maximum foam required for a seal fire on the largest floating roof tank in the area,
and cooling the upper half of that tank's shell for 50% of the periphery, or
• a fully involved tank fire where cooling is required for 25% of the circumference of the
top half of up to 3 adjacent tanks which would be downwind and within 70 feet
distance.

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Comment D.3.1 Guideline. These criteria are used as the worse case fire scenario for
any single tank in the tank field. There is no justification for sizing the fire water system to
extinguish a fully involved tank fire. TAM 242, FPM 1620
D.3.2 Hydrants shall be located so that:
• all parts of the tank shell can be reached with a hose no longer than 500 feet,
• cooling can be provided to any tank from 2 directions, and
• the hydrant is at least 50 feet from the tank or the edge of the tank impound.
Comment D.3.2 Guideline. Beyond 500 feet, line losses and hose handling problems
become excessive. Cooling is needed from 2 directions so that firefighters can always
approach from upwind. The 50' minimum spacing is recommended so that the hydrant can
be safely accessed in the event of a tank or impound basin fire. TAM 242
D.4 Electrical Classification
Tank field areas shall be classified in accordance with API RP-500, Classification of Locations for
Electrical Installations in Petroleum Facilities. Electrical equipment shall be located away from
drainage paths and outside of impounding facilities.
Comment D.4 Industry standard. API RP-500 is the petroleum industry standard for area
classification. Locating electrical equipment outside of impound areas may allow installation of
unclassified equipment and reduces the risk of the electrical equipment being an ignition source or
being damaged by fire.
D.5 General Design Requirements
D.5.1 New tanks in hydrocarbon service shall be designed and constructed in accordance with
NFPA 30, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code, and one of the following standards:
API 12D Field Welded Tanks for Storage of Production Liquids (500-10,000 Bbls)
API 12F Shop Welded Tanks for Storage of Production Liquids (90-500 Bbls)
API 650 Welded Steel Tanks for Oil Storage
API 653, Tank Inspection, Repair, Alteration, and Reconstruction, shall be used if the
project includes alterations or reconstruction of an existing tank.
Comment D.5.1 Industry standard. Following these industry standards has resulted in
minimal (<$20,000/year) fire loss related to tank design.
D.5.2 Tanks shall have an automatic tank gage readable from the ground and, where applicable, in
the control room on the tank gaging system. Where applicable, overfill protection shall be
in accordance with NFPA 30, Section 2-10 and API-RP 2350. The Company shall review
and approve the Safe Oil Height calculations of the tank designer.
Comment D.5.2 Industry practice. Tank overfills create a serious fire hazard around the
tank and the tank piping. An automatic tank gage may not apply to small facilities where

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the risk of overflow is low such as production tank batteries or facilities which only use 1-2
tanks at low filling rates. The tank gaging system, used in conjunction with the local
automatic tank gage can be an effective means of avoiding overfills. Overfill protection is
generally installed in Marketing or Pipeline facilities where tanks are filled with no
personnel present. NFPA 30, API-RP 2350, 2-10; TAM 700; TAM 434; TAM-EF-880
D.5.3 Piping
D.5.3.1 Piping materials shall be in accordance with NFPA 30, Section 3-3.
Comment D.5.3.1 Legal (NFPA 30) requirement. Materials such as cast iron,
brass, and aluminum will fail when involved in a fire. Ductile iron has properties
similar to cast iron and is also not recommended. This requirement does not apply
to remotely located production tanks less than 3000 Bbls in capacity. NFPA 30,
3-3
D.5.3.2 Tank nozzles for filling, withdrawing, and water draw-off should not be installed
beneath stairways.
Comment D.5.3.2 Guideline. This protects the stairway access should one of the
nozzles leak and catch fire. TAM 261
D.5.3.3 The water draw manifold shall be located at least 15 feet from the fill and suction
nozzles.
Comment D.5.3.3 Guideline. The water draw manifold is an area with greater
risk of fire at the tank. This design avoids involving the larger fill and suction
nozzles in a fire at the water draw. TAM 212
D.5.3.4 Connections for external heater circulation piping shall be located at the tank
fill/suction manifold. Internal piping shall be used to return heated oil to the far
side of the tank.
Comment D.5.3.4 Guideline. The incremental cost for this design is nominal.
Locating all the valves in one area provides for faster isolation in the event of a
fire. It also reduces the potential fire exposure of piping inside the impound basin.
D.5.3.5 Piping shall be designed with enough flexibility to accommodate expected settling
of the tank and shell movement from thermal expansion or filling and emptying of
the tank. Flexible couplings shall only be used with the approval of the Company.
Resilient-sealed couplings shall not be used.
Comment D.5.3.5 Industry practice. Rigid piping can result in a nozzle or

flange failure if there is any tank movement. Flexible joints generally use
elastomers for sealing and are vulnerable in a fire. Resilient-sealed couplings
such as Dresser couplings have a history of failing and adding fuel to a fire. TAM
652

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D.5.3.6 Tank sample connections shall be designed with the root valve in an accessible
location.
Comment D.5.3.6 Guideline. A root valve allows isolation of the sample lines in
the event of a fire or line break at the sample manifold. Circulating side sample
systems should be considered for those tanks which need to be sampled at different
heights frequently. These systems eliminate spillage resulting in less emissions and
potential for fire. The incremental cost of a circulating side sample system is
around $30,000. TAM 261, TAM 664, TAM-EF 878
D.5.4 Hydrocarbon pumps shall not be located within the local impound basin at a tank containing
Class I, II, or IIIA liquids.
Comment D.5.4 Guideline. The incremental cost is installation-dependent. Locating a

pump inside the tank's local impound basin may result in:
• the pump not being accessible to pump the tank out in the event of a fire or over-flow
(there have been three fires in the last 10 years where this was required, and
• a pump failure causing a release of stock and fire around the tank and tank piping.
TAM 233
D.6 Cone Roof Tanks
D.6.1 Cone roof tanks shall not be used in services where the vapor space will be in the flammable
range the majority of the time. For cone roof tanks which could periodically operate in the
flammable range, the design shall include an inerting or enrichment systems.
Comment D.6.1 Company requirement. In the past 10 years, we have had 55 vapor
space ignitions, 90% of which are on small producing tanks. Generally, the vapor space of
tanks handling Class I materials will be above the flammable range, and the vapor space of
Class II or III materials will be below the flammable range. However, consideration
should be given to situations where this may not be the case (i.e. stock within 20oF of the
flash point). This is particularly important where the tanks have open vents or vent to a
closed system which contains a potential ignition source like a flare or vapor recovery
system.
D.6.2 Cone roof tanks shall have normal venting in accordance with NFPA 30, Section 2-3.4.
Pressure/vacuum vent valves shall be used on cone roof tanks in Class I liquid service.
Comment D.6.2 Legal (NFPA 30) requirement. P/V valves reduce the vapor loss by
minimizing the amount of venting. P/V valves discharging to atmosphere are also effective
flame arrestors. NFPA 30, 2-3.4; API 2000; TAM 681
D.6.3 Emergency venting for fire exposure shall be provided for all cone roof tanks in accordance
with NFPA 30, Section 2-3.5. Tanks over 15 feet in diameter shall be designed with a
"frangible" roof-to-shell joint for emergency venting in accordance with API 650.

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Comment D.6.3 Emergency venting is a legal (NFPA 30) requirement. Frangible joint
construction is a standard contractor design. There are no additional costs frangible
joints as long as it does not cause an increase in shell thickness. In a fire exposure, a
frangible joint will open up causing the tank to vent at the top of the tank rather than
rupturing the shell-to-bottom seam and releasing the tank contents. A frangible joint will
also act to vent the pressure resulting from an internal explosion. NFPA 30, 2-3.5; API
650, 3.10.2.5; TAM 471
D.7 Floating Roof Tanks
D.7.1 Floating roofs shall be double deck or single deck pontoon design in accordance with API
650, Appendix C. Pan roofs shall not be used.
Comment D.7.1 Industry standard. A sunken roof is the only condition that can result in
a fully involved tank fire. Therefore, floating roofs must be designed to minimize the risk of
sinking. Pan roofs will sink if the roof accumulates liquid by storm, fire water, or a single
leak in the pan. Pontoon roofs with pontoon surface areas greater than 30% are more
resistant to sinking if a pontoon leaks. Double deck roofs are the design least likely to sink
and is usually the economic choice above 170 foot diameter. API 650, App.C; TAM 472
D.7.2 Floating roof tanks greater than 120 feet in diameter shall have wind girders with handrails
for safe emergency access.
Comment D.7.2 Company requirement. The incremental cost is $150-$200/foot of

diameter. The handrails on the wind girder allow safe emergency access around the top of
the tank, and can also be used for roof and seal inspections. The seal area of tanks less
than 120 feet in diameter can be reached from the gager's platform. API 650, 3.9.4; TAM
693; TAM-MS-967, 3.9.4

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D.7.3 Fixed Foam Systems
Where required, fixed foam systems shall be installed in accordance with the following
guidelines:
Tank Diameter Design Criteria
≤ 120 feet No requirements for fixed foam systems.
121 - 150 feet A dry pipe riser from ground level to a point near the gager's
platform just above the wind girder with two 2-1/2" valved
outlets and an over-the top foam maker assembly to enable
firefighters to access the platform.
151 - 200 feet Three dry pipe risers with two 2-1/2" valved outlets - one near
the gager's platform and two 90o each way from the first. The
one near the platform shall have an over-the-top foam maker
assembly to enable firefighters to access the platform.
Over 200 feet A permanent over-the-top foam application facility around the
circumference of the tank designed in accordance with NFPA
11.
Comment D.7.3 Guideline. The incremental costs for these systems are $10M for the
single riser, $25M for the three risers, and $300-$400/foot of tank diameter for the over-
the- top system. Our fire history indicates that the seal fires and the fully involved tank fires
which we have had in the last 10 years have been extinguished using portable equipment.
NFPA 11, 3-2.11.1 states that fixed foam systems are generally not required because
trained personnel can extinguish seal fires using portable equipment. However, any of the
following criteria may justify the investment in a fixed foam system:
• system is required by the local jurisdiction

• the facility is located in a sensitive geographic area with public exposure
• the fire brigade are not trained to use portable equipment
For smaller diameter tanks, the pre-fire plan is to lay hoses up the stairs and apply foam
from the gager's platform. Tanks over 120 feet in diameter need varying degrees of fixed
foam equipment because these tanks are too wide to reach all of the areas with portable
foam lines from the gager's platform, and this equipment minimizes hose handling. NFPA
11, 3-2.11.1; TAM 243
D.7.4 Floating roof tanks with secondary seals shall have a continuous foam dam which extends at
least 6" above the top of the secondary seal designed with bottom drain slots in accordance
with NFPA 11, A-3-2.11.1.

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Comment D.7.4 Industry standard. Foam dams hold the foam next to the seal allowing
more effective use of foam in a seal fire. TAM-MS-968, 2.3.1.1; TAM 243
D.7.5 Secondary seals shall include lightning shunts installed above the secondary seal in
accordance with API RP 2003.
Comment D.7.5 Industry standard. Shunts bond the roof plate to the shell minimizing
the chance of ignitions at the seal both from direct and induced lightning. STD. DWG.
GB-D1O82; TAM 262
D.7.6 All pontoon compartments shall be made liquid tight in accordance with API 650, C.3.5 and
C.3.6.
Comment D.7.6 Industry standard. Liquid-tight manway cover and raised vent prevent
liquid entry from flooding or sinking. The goose neck vents are needed to vent the
compartment preventing solar-caused pressurization. Liquid can accumulate in individual
compartments as a result of seam leaks, hung-up or tipped roofs, or from high levels of
storm water of fire water on the roof. This provision protects against the roof sinking by
preventing liquid from one flooded compartment leaking into the next compartment. API
650, C.3.6; TAM-MS-968, 2.2.1.1; TAM 472
D.7.8 Floating roofs tanks shall have flexible pipe or swing joint fixed pipe roof drains. Tanks
over 120 feet in diameter shall have at least three closed roof drains. Double deck floating
roofs should also have at least 3 open ended emergency drains discharging into the tank.
Comment D.7.8 Closed drains are an industry standard. Emergency drains are a
Company requirement. The incremental cost of emergency drains is about $500 each.
Roof drains prevent water accumulation which could tilt or sink the roof. Spills can result
from leaking roof drains inside the tank. Emergency drains are insurance against plugged
or closed roof drains resulting in a sunken roof. It is important that the Company review
and approve the roof drain design. API 650, C.3.8; TAM-MS-968, 2.3.3; TAM 632
D.8 Internal Floating Roof Tanks
D.8.1 Internal floating roofs shall be designed in accordance with API Std 650, Appendix H. Pan
roofs shall not be used.
Comment D.8.1 Company requirement. The incremental cost of a non-pan roof is

installation dependent. Pan roofs will tip, flood, and sink if they develop a leak or
accumulate storm or fire water. API 650, App.H; TAM 472; TAM-MS-968, 3.0
D.8.2 Internal floating roof tanks shall have circulation vents with weather shields and screens
around the perimeter in the shell or fixed roof and at the high point center of the fixed roof
in accordance with API 650, H.6.2.2.
Comment D.8.2 Industry standard. Adequate venting prevents the accumulation of

flammable vapors above the roof. The Tank Manual, Section 472, gives guidance on

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designing the vents. Consider using low melting point material for the weather shield so
that the shield would melt during a fire. This allows the fire fighters to access the tank
vapor space through the ventilation openings for application of firefighting hose streams.
API 650, H.6.2.2; TAM-MS-968, 3.4.10; TAM 472
D.8.3 Overflow openings designed for the maximum pumping rate shall be provided in the shell.
Comment D.8.3 Company requirement. The incremental cost is installation dependent.

These openings are needed to prevent damage to the roof and potential roof collapse in the
event of an overfill of the tank. TAM-MS-968, 3.4.9; TAM 472
D.8.4 The floating roof shall be bonded to the tank by a minimum of 2 flexible cables from the
tank roof to the floating roof in accordance with API 650, H.4.2.4. All movable metal parts
shall be bonded to the roof.
Comment D.8.4 Industry standard. The floating roof is essentially insulated from the
shell by the roof seal. Bonding is required to prevent static accumulation which could
discharge to the shell causing a seal fire or vapor space explosion. API 650, H.4.2.4;
TAM 262
D.9 Elevated Temperature Tanks (>200oF)
Comment D.9 The primary risks in elevated temperature tanks are:
• water entering the tank causing a froth-over into the containment area
• sudden boiling of water accumulated on the tank bottom when hot stock enters the tank or
incoming oil mixes with the water.
• low flash stock or stock at temperatures above its flash point entering the tank resulting in a
flammable atmosphere or in overpressuring the tank.
• the formation of pyrophoric material which can be a source of ignition when air is introduced
into the tank. TAM 1200
D.9.1 If tank heating is required, the system used shall minimize the risk of water or steam
entering the tank.
Comment D.9.1 Guideline. Use of steam heating can result in condensate leaking into
the tank and possibly a froth-over. Use of a oil-based heat medium eliminates this risk.
TAM 1213
D.9.2 A cone down bottom with a center sump and a slope of 1-1/2% to 2-1/2% shall be installed.
Comment D.9.2 Guideline. The incremental cost is nominal. This type of bottom
prevents water accumulation around the perimeter of the tank, and protects against internal
corrosion at the bottom-to-shell joint. Locations where settling is a problem may not be
able to use this type of bottom. TAM 1213
D.9.3 The outlet line shall elbow down into the center sump.

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Comment D.9.3 Guideline. Incremental cost is installation dependent. This design

allows water to be continuously drawn off with the stock. The Tank Manual, section 1213
shows the design of this system. TAM 1213
D.9.4 The inlet fill line(s) shall have local temperature indicators and high/low temperature alarms
in the control room. The tank shell shall have a minimum of 2 local temperature indicators -
one close to the fill line and one 180o away.
Comment D.9.4 Guideline. The cost is $200 per indicator. Temperature indication is a
cost-effective way of determining if low temperature, light material or material at an
unusually high rundown temperature is entering the tank. TAM 1215
D.10 Fiberglass Reinforced Plastic (FRP) Tanks
D.10.1 FRP tanks shall be designed and constructed in accordance with API Specification 12P
Fiberglass Reinforced Plastic Tanks.
Comment D.10.1 Industry standard. In areas where a tank failure would pose a
significant hazard to personnel or the facilities, or could cause a substantial business
interruption, consideration should be given to using an engineering firm with FRP design
experience to develop a complete design/construction package. TAM 1242
D.10.2 Above ground FRP tanks shall not be used in flammable liquid service.
Comment D.10.2 Company requirement. Historically, FRP tanks have been prone to
failure when exposed to external fire or lightning-induced charges. In the 1/1982 - 12/1991
time period, we experienced 22 lightning-related fires on FRP tanks resulting in a fire loss
of $320M. Failure of an FRP tank in hydrocarbon service can add significantly to the
amount of fuel in a fire. TAM 267
D.10.3 In locations where the failure of an FRP tank presents a hazard to personnel or the facilities
and there is a possibility of flammable vapor in the tank, the tank shall be protected from
lightning-induced charges in accordance with Section 6-3.3 of NFPA 78. Protections shall
include:
• gas blanketing
• eliminating splash filling
• bonding all metallic objects on the tank such as manways, nozzles, gaging instruments,
or hatch covers together and grounding
• eliminating metal projections inside the tank which can act as a spark gap.
Comment D.10.3 Industry standard. Lightning-induced charges can accumulate on

metallic appurtenances which are not bonded and grounded. If the unbonded
appurtenance is above the liquid level and accumulates a high enough charge, it may
induce a spark to the conductive water layer igniting the flammable vapor in the tank. This
risk is most common in produced water tanks. NFPA 78, 6-3.3; API RP-2003, TAM 267

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E. EXCHANGERS AND COOLING TOWERS
Comment E In the 10 year period from 1982 - 1992, there were 20 recordable exchanger-related fires
causing $4,500,000 in fire loss with one incident accounting for 90% of the loss. 75 % of the fires result
from small flange leaks which soak insulation or ignite off hot surfaces. The two large-loss fires
(>$100,000) were caused by overpressuring the exchangers.
E.1 References
• Heat Exchanger and Cooling Tower Manual, Section 500 & Appendix G
• Fire Protection Manual (Vol.2) Section 1900
• Section A.1 - Layout and Spacing
E.2 Shell and Tube Heat Exchangers
E.2.1 Where possible, shell and tube cooling water exchangers shall be designed so that the
pressure on the process side is always lower than the pressure on the water side.
Comment E.2.1 Guideline. The incremental cost is project-specific. Having the water
side at a higher pressure prevents flammable liquids or gases from entering the water
stream and thereby traveling to the cooling tower where vapor may be released. In one
five-year period, Company plants experienced 12 cooling tower fires or explosions due to
releases from process plants through the cooling water system to the tower. FPM 2070
E.2.2 Heat exchanger body flanges shall be designed per Appendix G of the Heat Exchanger and
Cooling Tower Manual. Body flanges in services over 100oF should be insulated.
Comment E.2.2 Company requirement. The incremental cost will be substantial. Leaks
that result from process upsets, corrosion, and damage to the flange surfaces cause over
75% of the exchanger-related fires in the Company. Exchangers designed only to ASME
standards have been the source of many leaks during thermal and pressure excursions in
process upsets. Use of Appendix G procedures results in thicker flanges and higher
allowable gasket loading to prevent leakage due to upset conditions. Process controls may
also reduce the risk by minimizing rapid temperature changes that cause high bolt stress
and flange loosening. The project design team should develop torquing procedures to
prevent leaks.
Insulating the body flanges prevents leakage due to temperature gradients across the
flange. Refer to Section 554 in the Heat Exchanger and Cooling Tower Manual for
guidance on the insulation and bolting of exchanger flanges. EXH 532, 554 and
Appendix G
E.2.3 Heat exchangers shall be designed with overpressure protection on both the shell and tube
sides of the system.

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Comment E.2.3 Legal requirement. The ASME Code requires overpressure protection.
Section 500 of the Heat Exchanger Manual gives the criteria for pressure relief and thermal
relief of heat exchangers.
E.3 Air-Cooled Exchangers
E.3.1 Vibration switches shall shut the fan down before vibration reaches a destructive level.
Comment E.3.1 Guideline. The incremental cost is $10M - $15M per fan. Fan failure
can cause extreme vibration resulting in piping or tube leaks. Also, failed fan blades can
damage piping and endanger personnel. FPM 2070
E.3.2 Well labeled emergency shutdown switches shall be located at the motor control center or at
grade at least 50 ft from the cooler.
Comment E.3.2 Company requirement. Remote shutdown is critical to prevent damage

to the air cooler from a fire at grade. The motor starter located in the motor control center
can be used for emergency shutdown if it is conspicuously labeled.
E.4 Cooling Towers
E.4.1 Cooling water pumps shall be spared and the drivers shall use a reliable power supply or
steam.
Comment E.4.1 Industry practice. Like other utilities, the cooling tower is essential to a
safe operation. Cooling tower failure or loss of the cooling water flow can lead to
emergency shut-down and potential hydrocarbon leaks and fires elsewhere. FPM 2070
E.4.2 Electrical area classification of fan motors, pump motors and other electrical apparatus
associated with cooling towers shall be in accordance with API 500.
Comment E.4.2 Industry standard. There is a potential for hydrocarbon vapors at the
cooling tower due to process leaks from exchangers and other points into the cooling water
system. API 500, Fig. A.9; EXH 2220; FPM 2070
E.4.3 Vibration switches shall shut the fan down before vibration reaches a destructive level.
Comment E.4.3 Guideline. The incremental cost is $10M - $15M per fan. Fan failure
can cause extreme vibration resulting in piping or tube leaks. Also, failed fan blades can
damage piping and endanger personnel. FPM 2070
E.4.4 First-aid fire hose reels shall be spaced at 100 ft. intervals at the top deck. There shall be at
least two hose stations located at opposite ends of the cooling tower deck.
Comment E.4.4 Guideline. The incremental cost is $1,000 - $1,500 per reel. In cold
climates, the hose stations should be on a dry stand pipe arranged to be supplied by hose
from a hydrant. FPM 2070

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E.5 Heat Transfer Liquids In Closed Systems
Heat transfer liquids in closed systems shall be designed to operate below the autoignition
temperature of the fluid.
Comment E.5 Guideline. Salts, special high flash point liquid and hot oils are used as heat
transfer media in the petroleum industry. Fires involving these liquids can occur in spite of the high
flash point. If the heat transfer medium temperature is raised above the autoignition temperature
and leaks to the atmosphere, the liquid can autoignite. Process controls should be set to operate at
temperatures below the autoignition point when possible. FPM 2070
F. FIRED EQUIPMENT
Comment F The Company has 11-12 unplanned fires/year involving fired heaters. Of these, there are
4-5 incidents per year which involve significant fire loss or injuries. The $3MM/year fire loss (does not
include process loss) on the major incidents breaks down as follows:
• tube failures from overheating - 34% of the fires, 43% of the fire loss
• tube failures from corrosion - 19% of the fires, 40% of the fire loss
• firebox explosions - 22% of the fires, 17% of the fire loss
• fires external to the furnace - 25% of the fires, <1% of the fire loss
In Refining, the recommendations of the Furnace Safety Team establish the minimum standards for fired
heaters. This section complements and, if necessary, expands on those recommendations.
F.1 Firebox/Ducts/Stack
F.1.1 Stack dampers used to control air to the furnace shall be designed to open on air failure and
shall have mechanical stops or built-in clearances to prevent total closure.
Comment F.1.1 Company requirement. Total closure of the stack damper may over-
pressure the firebox endangering personnel from hot combustion gases and possibly
damaging the firebox structure. Total closure can also cause the firebox to become fuel-rich
resulting in a possible flameout and firebox explosion. HTR 450
F.1.2 Where more than one furnace use a common stack, individual stack dampers will be located
in the breeching from each furnace.
Comment F.1.2 Guideline. The incremental cost is project-specific. Individual furnaces

need individual dampers for draft control. Also, in the event of a tube rupture, this design
helps confine the fire to a single furnace. HTR 450
F.1.3 Furnaces shall be designed to either shutdown or go to natural draft on loss of the forced
draft fan.

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Comment F.1.3 Guideline. The incremental cost is project-specific. Loss of the forced
fan can cause a serious reduction in combustion air rate and the risk of a flame-out. Drop
out doors costing $10,000-$15,000/door can allow operation at reduced rates until the fan
is back in service. The doors will be located in a safe area and barricaded to prevent
access. In some cases, the design of the furnace (i.e. those with SCR's) may require a safety
shutdown system on loss of the FD fan.
F.2 Tubes and Headers
F.2.1 U-bend headers shall be used unless an alternative is approved by the Company.
Comment F.2.1 Guideline. There are 4-5 fires per year resulting from plug leaks. While
these fires rarely involve significant fire loss, they do cause plant shutdowns and significant
loss profit opportunity. On a new furnace, U-bends are a less expensive construction.
Plug-type headers are prone to leak and have been the cause of fires and unplanned
shutdowns. Also, U-bends can be installed in the firebox eliminating the need for header
boxes which are a source of air leakage into the furnace. HTR 424, API 560, 4.2-4.3
F.3 Piping
F.3.1 Fuel Gas
F.3.1.1 Individual burners shall have means for positive isolation when the burner is out-
of-service. In order of preference this includes:
• a double block and bleed manifold at each burner

• a single block with an operator blind downstream at each burner
Comment F.3.1.1 Industry practice. Firebox explosions have been caused by

single block valves on individual burners leaking by on start-up or shutdown.
Double block and bleed is the preferable system because the operator blinds can
be a source of fuel gas leakage due to poor seating of the blind or bolt-up of the
flanges. Leaking burner block valves have also been the cause of flashback fires
during blind turning. On furnaces with large numbers of burners (i.e. reforming
furnaces) it is acceptable to blind groups of burners at the header. HTR 331
F.3.1.2 Burner valves, lighting and viewing ports should be located to maximize the safety
of the operator during light-off. For floor-fired units, valves and burner isolation
blinds should be located at the side of the firebox.
Comment F.3.1.2 Guideline. The majority of operator injuries and near misses
on furnaces occur during light-off. Consider building a model of the burner and
piping so there can be agreement on the configuration which provides safe access
and egress and a high degree of light-off safety for the operators. HTR 472;
MD&C, F.4.e

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F.3.1.3 On furnaces or boilers which do not have continuous operating pilots, fuel control
valves shall have minimum fire bypasses. Minimum flow bypasses, manually set,
shall be installed on furnaces which operate with all of the burners in service all of
the time. Minimum pressure bypasses shall be installed on furnaces where burners
will be removed from service frequently.
Comment F.3.1.3 Company requirement if pilots are not used. The incremental
cost would be project-specific. Minimum fire bypasses have been a very reliable
way of preventing the flame from being extinguished by the fuel control valve
cycling closed unexpectedly. When burners go in and out of service, the minimum
flow to the furnace changes. A minimum pressure bypass will maintain this
pressure independent of the number of burners in service. HTR 643
F.3.2 Process Piping
F.3.2.1 All flanges to be used for blinding the furnace on shutdowns which are in process
or fuel oil service shall be outside the perimeter of the furnace in locations where
spillage will not flow onto or into the furnace.
Comment F.3.2.1 Guideline. Leakage of oil into the firebox from blinding
operations has caused fires and start-up delays as this oil burns off. HTR-MS-
1350,5.1.10
F.3.2.2 An isolation valve on the feed(s) to the furnace shall be located a minimum of 50 ft
from the firebox in a location accessible during a fire involving the furnace. An
isolation valve downstream of the furnace should be considered if there are large
volumes of hydrocarbons above their boiling point in the downstream process
which cannot be de-inventoried to storage or relief.
Comment F.3.2.2 Guideline. The incremental cost is project-specific. There

are 3-4 tube ruptures per year reported. This provision allows safe isolation of the
furnace in the event of a tube rupture minimizing the fire loss. The pass flow
valves are usually too close to the furnace and may not have tight shut-off. The
downstream isolation valve may need to be a remote-operated emergency block
valve if it is in close proximity to the furnace.
F.3.3 Smothering steam shall be provided for the radiant and convection sections and any header
boxes in accordance with API 560. Block valves shall be at grade in a location accessible
during a fire involving the furnace. The steam manifold shall have a steam trap to
continuously remove the condensate. The manifold shall be clearly labeled.
Comment F.3.3 Industry standard. Smothering steam can be an effective way to control
or extinguish a tube rupture fire in the firebox. The recommended amount is 2 lb/hr of
steam per cubic foot of combustion volume. HTR 474; API 560, 11.3.1

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F.4 Burners
F.4.1 Burners shall be supplied with gas pilots for light-off safety.
Comment F.4.1 Industry practice. Pilots are mandatory for fired boilers per NFPA 85B;
however, they are not required for process heaters. 33% of the operator injuries and 17%
of the fire loss on fired heaters are caused by firebox explosions mostly during light-off.
Properly maintained pilots used on start-up of the furnace can greatly decrease the risk
during start-up. The amount of fuel which enters the box prior to lighting a pilot is far less
than the amount of fuel from lighting the main burner. This is especially important for
large burners (≥2" fuel gas line size to burner). Also, the operator is not at risk from
inserting a lighted torch into the firebox to light the main burner. NFPA 85B, 4-1.2; API
560, 10.1.5; HTR 643
F.4.2 Burners shall be designed to operate with available draft without flame impingement at
above the design heat release in accordance with API 560, 10.1.3.
Comment F.4.2 Industry standard. This allows burners to be removed from service
without resulting in flame impingement. API 560, 10.1.3
F.4.3 Burners shall be removable for maintenance on the run.
Comment F.4.3 Industry standard. During a 2-3 year run, burners in fuel gas service
tend to plug. This can cause poor firing and flame impingement. API 560, 10.1.9; HTR
561; HTR-MS-1350, 10.1.4;
F.4.4 Burners shall be tested at the manufacturers facility for flame stability at the
minimum/maximum operating conditions specified.
Comment F.4.4 Guideline. The incremental cost is about $10,000 for each type of
burner tested. Burner tests aid in understanding the operating parameters of the burners
such as min/max operating pressures, stability at maximum draft, sound levels, flame
length, etc. Such tests are particularly helpful for burners with which the Company has no
prior experience. HTR 563; HTR-MS-1350, 13.5.4
F.5 Appurtenances
F.5.1 Gas testing ports shall be provided for combustible gas testing on start-up. These ports
extend through the refractory and are located in portions of the firebox where stagnant gas
can collect - usually the upper four corners.
Comment F.5.1 Company requirement. The incremental cost is $200/port excluding the
costs of platforms to access the ports. Firebox explosions can be caused by fuel gas leaking
into the firebox and not being purged out during the start-up process. Gas testing process
heaters prior to light-off is a Company requirement. The ports are used to obtain a
thorough gas test. HTR 331; HTR 475; HTR-MS-1350,11.1.3.5

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F.5.2 View ports with safe access shall be installed so that the entire length of each radiant section
tube and each burner can be observed.
Comment F.5.2 Industry standard. Visual observation of the tubes and burners is
important to prevent flame impingement and potential overheating of the tubes. The view
ports can also be used for routine thermographic surveys in those furnaces prone to coking.
API 560, 8.3.2.5
F.6 Instrumentation
API RP-550, Part III shall be used as the design standard for instrumentation on fired heaters. The
following sections clarify or are in addition to API RP-550.
F.6.1 Monitoring Instrumentation
F.6.1.1 Generally, a minimum of three skin point thermocouples shall be installed on each
pass in areas most prone to overheating. The leads to the thermocouples shall be
protected from flame impingement.
Comment F.6.1.1 Company requirement. The incremental cost runs $600-

$700/skin point. Three skin points are needed to identify passes that are beginning
to coke-up. The furnace manufacturer needs to investigate and recommend TI
locations which are most likely to overheat. The RefractoPad design has been
found to be the most reliable and durable. HTR 613; HTR-MS-1350, 11.4; GD-
J1201
F.6.1.2 If heater charge is single phase flow, each pass shall have manual or automatic
flow balancing valves and flow indication in the control room. Control valves shall
have minimum stops to prevent full closure.
Comment F.6.1.2 Company requirement. The incremental cost is $5,000-

$6,000/pass. Pass flow indication can be critical in preventing tube rupture from
low flow. The type of balancing system used depends on the stability of the flow
regime in the furnace. Tube ruptures can result from pass flow control valves
closing unexpectedly. Mechanical stops prevent full closure of the pass flow
control valves. API 550, PT.III, 1.5.3; HTR 622
F.6.1.3 Fuel flow to each firebox shall read out in the control room.
Comment F.6.1.3 Company requirement. The incremental cost for routing flow
indication to control room is $1,500-$2,000. Fuel flow is an important indicator of
a potential "bogged" or fuel rich firebox.
F.6.1.4 Flue gas O2 and possibly CO analyzers shall be installed between the convection
section and the radiant section. The design and type of analyzer shall be approved
by the Company.

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Comment F.6.1.4 Guideline. The incremental costs are $25,000-

$35,000/analyzer. Reliable flue gas analyzers can provide a continuous trend of
the stability and degree of combustion in the firebox. The sample point should be
located to minimize the possible sources of air leakage upstream of the sample
point. It is important from both a maintenance and operability standpoint that the
Company have input into the type of analyzer used. HTR 630
F.6.1.5 The furnace charge pump shall be backed up with a steam-driven spare on APS.
Comment F.6.1.5 Guideline. The incremental costs are project-specific. This

prevents loss of flow in the furnace from a pump failure. A spare pump may not be
needed if there is an automatic fuel shutdown on loss of process flow.
F.6.2 Alarms
As a minimum, the following alarms shall be installed. Those marked with an "*" are
considered critical, and shall be independent of any process control variable and totally
testable on the run.
• High stack temperature • Low O2

• High transfer line temperature* • Loss of FD/ID fans*
• High skin point temperature* • Low total feed to furnace*
• Low/high fuel gas pressure* • Low pass flow*
• Low draft
Comment F.6.2 Guideline. The incremental costs are $1,000-$1,500/alarm. The

specified alarms are necessary for the operator to understand a problem and react to it
before it becomes a major incident. Critical alarms need to be separate from the control
signals to prevent a single component failure from causing an upset and eliminating the
alarm capability. NFPA 85B,4-2.2.3; API 550 Pt.III, 1.9; HTR 650
F.6.3 Shutdowns
An automatic fail-safe system to chop all of the flow to the furnace shall be installed,
activated by the following:
• Low pass or total flow

• Low fuel gas pressure
• Loss of fan (if natural draft is not adequate)
• Manually from the control room
The shutdown system design and degree of reliability shall be approved by the Company.
Systems requiring high reliability shall be totally independent of the plant DCS, and shall be
designed to prevent spurious trips and to be testable on the run.
Comment F.6.3 Industry practice. Fuel chop systems, properly designed and tested, can
reduce fire losses on fired heaters and resulting process losses by 40-50%. These systems

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have been an industry standard for several years. They are required by the insurance
industry. They can be designed to be very reliable. The level of reliability required
depends on the criticality of the furnace and the consequences of a nuisance trip. Costs
range from $20,000 for a relay-based system to $500,000 for a triple redundant system. A
process hazards analysis must be conducted to determine the parameters which activate the
shutdown system and the level of reliability required. The CRTC Control Systems group
and the Fire and Process Safety Team can be consulted for assistance. HTR 332; HTR
650; API 550 Pt.III, 1.9, NFPA 85C
F.6.4 Boiler instrumentation and controls should be in accordance with NFPA 85C - Explosion
Prevention, Multiple Burner Boiler, Gas Fired
F.7 Access
F.7.1 Platforms for operator and maintenance access to burners should be at least 4 ft wide and
have two means of access.
Comment F.7.1 Guideline. The incremental costs are project-specific. The 4 foot width
can aid in pulling the burners and in quick egress in the event of an external fire during the
light-off procedure. HTR 480; HTR-MS-1350, 8.4.3
F.8 Fans
F.8.1 Forced or induced draft fans should be designed to operate in a power failure unless
allowances are made to go to natural draft.
Comment F.8.1 Guideline. The incremental costs are project-specific. A power failure
could cause a loss of flow to the furnace. The fan(s) are needed to cool the furnace down
quickly to prevent a tube rupture. MD&C F.4.g
G. PUMPS
Comment G From 1982 through 1991, pumps were an issue in 350 fires, with losses totaling
$38,212,000 (including a $25.3 MM fire in 1991). Seal failures were involved in 23% ($25,697,000
losses) of pump fires; bearing failures in 20% ($10,941,000 losses); and packing leaks, mechanical
failures, & piping failures in 2% each (about $700,000 losses) of pump fires. Operating/maintenance
procedures, electrical fires (mainly motors), housekeeping (oil soaked insulation), and fires of unknown
cause contributed less than 1% of losses, but 26% of incidents. Lack of isolation capability was a factor in
many of the large loss fires.
G.1 General
G.1.1 Pumps handling flammable or hazardous materials shall have steel or alloy cases suitable
for the service.

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Comment G.1.1 Industry standard. Cast iron cases should be limited to remote, non-
critical production facilities or to non-hazardous, non-critical service where exposure of
public and adjacent facilities is very low Cast iron pumps are likely to be damaged in the
event of a fire when installed in the drainage path of pumps handling flammable and
combustible liquids. Cast iron pumps must be installed in such a manner that connecting
piping will not excessively stress pump cases. Refer to the Pump Manual for pump selection
information. API 610; FPM 2010
G.1.2 Mechanical seals shall be specified for all hydrocarbon pumps.
Comment G.1.2 Industry practice. Although mechanical seals are more expensive to
install than packing, their higher installed cost is offset by reduced maintenance over their
[5 year] service life. Packed pumps require frequent surveillance and maintenance, and
may leak (a slight leak through the packing is necessary for lubrication). Mechanical seals
can reduce the risk of fire by eliminating packing leaks. Also, overly-tightened packing can
cause fires. Refer to the Pump Manual, Section 800 for seal selection criteria. PMP 800;
API 610; FPM 2010
G.1.3 Hydrocarbon pump cases should have non sparking throat and throttle shaft bushings.
Throttle bushings should be retained by shoulders, suitable dowel pins or screws. Throat
bushings should be pressed in from the fluid side.
Comment G.1.3 Company requirement. There are nominal incremental costs if specified
initially. Throat and throttle bushings prevent excessive flow to the atmosphere if a seal
leaks. The degree of clearance depends on the stock being pumped and the type of bushing
lubrication. PMP 255; FPM 2010
G.1.4 Where pumps are handling flammable liquids, liquids above their flash point, or liquids
above 600oF, small fittings for pressure gauges, sample connections, vapor vents and drains
shall be seal-welded to the pump case and up to the first valve. Minimum pipe size shall be
3/4" and fittings shall be close coupled to the pump case. Case openings which do not have
valves shall be plugged and seal welded.
Comment G.1.4 Company requirement. The incremental cost of seal/bridge welding is

project-specific. These requirements will minimize the vibration failure of long
unsupported small piping. Typical bridge-weld construction drawings can be found in the
Piping Manual (see Section 342) and should be used where vibration and metal fatigue
failures can occur. API 610; API 2510; FPM 2010
G.1.5 Seal oil piping shall not be run directly above the pump. Piping shall be run away from the
pump seal area and out of the drainage path from the pump. The seal oil system shall be
isolatable in an emergency.
Comment G.1.5 Guideline. There is no incremental cost. If the seal oil system fails in a
fire, large amounts of fuel can be released into the fire, increasing the damage. Kenco fire-
stop valves can be installed in the oil system to provide isolation. The valves contain a
fusible link which melts in a fire, isolating the seal oil system.

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G.1.6 For critical pumps, the following protective instrumentation should be considered:
• Low-suction pressure alarm

• Continuous vibration monitoring and shutdown
• High bearing temperature alarm
• High discharge pressure alarm
Comment G.1.6 Guideline. The incremental costs are project specific. Depending upon
the process, these same protections can be used for initiating automatic shutdowns. FPM
2010
G.1.7 Where water monitors are not available or may be blocked by equipment, water sprays
should be provided in accordance with Section S.3.8.
Comment G.1.7 Industry practice. Water sprays can provide effective cooling in the
event of a fire and limit losses to overhead equipment. FPM 1670; NFPA 15
G.2 Isolation
G.2.1 Pumps handling high vapor pressure stocks (greater than 15 psia), or liquids at temperatures
above autoignition, shall be equipped with a means of emergency isolation, provided the
pump is being fed by a vessel containing 2,500 gallons or more of stock.
Comment G.2.1 Industry practice. A vessel with 2,500 gallons or greater capacity is
considered a major source of fuel which, if released and ignited, is likely to involve
adjacent equipment. Pumps handling LPG have a high potential for a large loss if there is a
vapor release. Pumps operating above autoignition have a high likelihood of a fire if there
is a release. FPM 1830
G.2.2 Pump emergency block valves (EBVs) may be manual block valves where they are
accessible in a release or fire. If this is not possible then a fail-safe, remotely operated valve
shall be provided in accordance with Section J.6. EBV activation shall also result in
shutdown of the pump and other affected equipment.
Comment G.2.2 Guideline. The incremental cost is project-specific. Remotely operated

valves should only be considered where safe manual isolation is not possible (i.e. manual
valve <50 feet from the pump). The valve should be designed to close automatically in the
event of a fire (i.e. Fisher Posiseal butterfly valve with the Fire Sentry Actuator). Valve
actuation should also result in the pump shutdown to prevent damage to the pump. FPM
1830

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G.3 Drainage
G.3.1 Surface drainage around pumps shall be designed to drain spills away from the pumps and
away from the pump isolation valves in accordance with Section S.1.
Comment G.3 Company requirement. Adequate drainage can prevent the accumulation
of hydrocarbons around the pump and can quickly transport leaks to a safe location. FPM
2010; FPM 1420
G.3.2 Pump base plate shall be designed to be easily cleaned and to drain freely away from the
pump.
Comment G.3.2 Guideline. Oil and combustible material accumulation on the pump
base plate can significantly add to the fuel load during a fire. A system using a 1"x3"
channel to drain the base plate is superior to the typical 3/4" hole but will result in extra
costs.
J. CRITICAL INSTRUMENTATION
Comment J In the 1989-1991 time frame, inadequate or non-functional instrumentation had a

significant impact on one third of the major incidents (> $100,000). The potential decrease in fire loss
during this time period is $45MM-$50MM and breaks down as follows:
• inadequate or lack of instrumentation - 10 incidents/$32MM

• non-functional instrumentation - 4 incidents/$16MM
J.1 Scope
J.1.1 In this section, critical instrumentation is defined as instrumentation which, if it fails to

operate properly, could cause a major process hazard:
• personnel hazard (i.e. fire, explosion, overpressure, uncontrolled release of hazardous

materials)
• mechanical damage to major plant equipment
• significant environmental impact
J.1.2 Critical instrumentation includes:
• protective systems needed to safely shutdown and isolate a piece of equipment or a

facility, including:
• emergency shutdown systems and controls
• emergency block valves
• critical alarms
• large multi-cable conduit or cable trays (i.e. homeruns)

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J.2 Protection from Fire
Critical instrumentation systems shall be protected from fire by one of the following methods (listed
in order of Company preference):
• Locating outside fire-exposed envelope as defined in Section N and API 2218.

• Designing system to fail to a safe condition on loss of power or instrument air in accordance
with Section J.2.2.
• Using inherently fire-resistant designs (i.e. high temperature wiring)
• Fireproofing all of the system components located within fire-exposed envelope in accordance
with Section N.4 of this Guideline.
Comment J.2 Industry practice. A "total system approach" to protecting critical instrumentation
should be taken. All of the components (power and control wiring, solenoid valves, junction boxes,
valves and valve actuators, etc.) should be protected in the event of a fire.
Locating critical instrumentation outside of the fire-exposed envelope or designing the

instrumentation to "fail safe" are the most reliable, and often the most economical, ways to protect
critical instrumentation from fire. High temperature wiring is more costly than standard wiring, but
can be practical if only a small number of critical systems are being protected. Properly installed
fireproofing is reliable, but can be expensive. Fire water spray protection can be less reliable
because it is an "active" system which may not function properly and therefore must be tested
frequently. FPM 1732
J.2.1 Location
J.2.1.1 Switchgear housing and junction boxes for power and control of critical
instrumentation shall be located outside fire hazardous areas.
J.2.1.2 Power wiring, cable trays, and conduit banks shall either be routed underground or
on the upper levels of elevated pipeways at least 30 feet above the ground and
outside the drainage path of hydrocarbon spills.
Comment J.2.1.1/J.2.1.2 Industry practice. Damage to these systems can lead

to 1) loss of control in the plant increasing the potential for a serious process upset
and fire, and 2) a lengthy plant shutdown. Consequently, these systems should be
located at the highest levels of the pipeway where they gain some degree of
protection from the piping underneath. FPM 1738.
J.2.1.3 Manual controls (i.e. start/stop switches) for protective systems shall be accessible
during the emergency for which they are needed, and shall be well labeled and
visible from a distance.
Comment J.2.1.3 Industry practice. As a general rule, the controls are located
at least 50 feet from the protected equipment. More spacing may be required
depending on the layout of the plant and the type of hydrocarbon being handled.
FPM 1820

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J.2.2 Failure Modes
J.2.2.1 Unless specified otherwise by the Company, protective systems shall fail to a safe
condition on loss of power or instrument air.
Comment J.2.2.1 Industry practice. "Fail safe" designs can minimize the risk of
the protective systems not working when they are needed. However, false trips are
a concern with this type of system. These can be minimized through reliable
designs that can be tested and maintained. The failure mode should be considered
as part of the Process Hazards Analysis. FPM 1820, ICM 1340
J.2.2.2 Critical alarm and shutdown systems shall be designed with de-energize to trip
components.
Comment J.2.2.2 Industry practice. A de-energize to trip design causes an

alarm or shutdown to activate on the failure of any system component. De-
energize to trip designs can minimize the risk that a system will not operate when
needed. However, there may be an increased risk of false trips. ICM 1341
J.2.3 Fireproofing
J.2.3.1 Systems which are not "fail safe" and are located inside the fire-exposed envelope
shall be designed to operate under fire conditions. This requires that critical
controls, wires, actuators, etc. be protected in accordance with Section N.4.
Comment J.2.3.1 Industry practice. Energize-to-trip systems must be designed

for fire exposure or protected in the event of a fire because a loss of any system
component will prevent the system from tripping. The level of protection required
is discussed in Section N.4. FPM 1820, FPM 1731, FPM 1733
J.2.3.2 Cable trays or conduit banks shall be fireproofed if they contain critical
instrumentation cables for non-fail safe systems and are located inside the fire-
exposed envelope.
Comment J.2.3.2 Guideline. The incremental cost of fireproofing is installation

dependent. Fireproofing homeruns in the fire-exposed envelope prevents a
relatively small spill fire from damaging these facilities causing a lengthy plant
shutdown. Generally, it is most economic to segregate the non-fail safe critical
instrumentation leads from the rest of the controls and protect them separately. It
then becomes an economic decision as to whether or not fireproofing the cable
tray or conduit bank is justified. FPM 1738
J.3 General
J.3.1 Critical instrumentation systems shall be installed separate from process control functions.

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Comment J.3.1 Industry practice. Separating the protective systems from process
controls can eliminate the possibility of a fault in the process control system also causing a
malfunction of the protective system. For example, if a single level transmitter served both
a level controller and a low level alarm, a faulty high level signal from the transmitter
would cause the control valve to open and draw down the level. This same faulty signal
would prevent the low level alarm from activating. FPM 1820, ICM 1351
J.3.2 Protective systems and alarms must be designed so that in-service testing back to the
primary element and in-service maintenance/calibration can be performed.
Comment J.3.2 Industry practice. Protective systems and alarms must be periodically
tested back to the primary element to be reliable. For example, the reliability of a simple
level alarm can increase by a factor of 15 with monthly testing as opposed to testing on a 3
year turnaround. Testing should be done on energize-to-trip systems since a component
failure will not cause a shutdown or alarm. FPM 1820, ICM 1320,1342
J.4 Alarms
J.4.1 Critical alarms shall be connected to a dedicated, easily read and interpreted alarm
indication system.
Comment J.4.1 Guideline. The incremental cost is $200-$300/alarm. Critical alarms

must be quickly observed and reacted to by the operators to avoid a potential release, fire
or major process upset. Using a separate annunciator panel or alarm screen allows the
operator to differentiate between the critical alarms and non-critical, computer-generated
alarms.
J.5 Shutdowns
J.5.1 The need for shutdowns, their failure mode and the degree of reliability required shall be
specified by the Company. All shutdown logic shall be documented on logic diagrams
approved by the Company.
Comment J.5.1 The Company must be involved in the design of the shutdown system so
that the system meets our reliability requirements, and can be maintained through the
existing maintenance organization. Optimally, all shutdown systems at a given location
should be a standard design for ease of maintenance and testing. Logic diagrams aid in
ease of understanding and operator training. Ladder diagrams are not an acceptable
alternative.
J.5.2 Emergency shutdowns shall be equipped with pre-shutdown alarms to warn that a trip is
impending.
Comment J.5.2 Industry practice. Pre-shutdown alarms can enable the operator to take
corrective action before the shutdown occurs. ICM 1352

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J.5.3 Shutdown systems shall be provided with a manual reset so that the process remains
shutdown until it is manually cleared by the operator.
Comment J.5.3 Industry practice. A manual reset can eliminate the potential hazards of
the shutdown system clearing (and shutdown valve opening) before the condition which
caused the shutdown has been investigated and rectified. ICM 1371
J.6 Emergency Block Valves (EBVs)
J.6.1 EBVs are valves which 1) isolate a piece of equipment from a source of fuel and 2) operate
automatically or can be activated remotely in the event of an emergency. EBVs are required
for high fire potential equipment (as defined in API 2218, Section 2.2.1) where safe manual
isolation is not possible in the event of an emergency involving that equipment.
Comment J.6.1 Guideline. The incremental cost is project-specific. Isolation of the fuel
source minimizes the hazard to personnel and the equipment damage in the event of a fire.
EBVs should only be considered when safe manual isolation is not possible. FPM 1830;
ICM 1360
J.6.2 Unless specified otherwise by the Company, emergency block valves shall be remotely
actuated and shall be designed to fail to a safe position in the event of a fire.
Comment J.6.2 Industry practice. Remote actuation allows the operator to shut the valve
from a safe location. The "fail safe" design results in the valve automatically closing (or
opening) should a fire occur before the valve can be manually actuated. This can
significantly reduce the amount of hydrocarbon being fed to the fire.
J.6.3 Shutdown valves shall be designed for testing. If bypass systems are used, a management
system is required to ensure that the bypass valve remains in the proper position.
Comment J.6.3 Industry practice. Full closure testing of the shutdown valve should be
done in situations where tight shutoff is needed (i.e. fuel gas shutoff to furnace) or where
there is a history of fouling which could prevent full closure (i.e. HF/LPG block valves).
There have been incidents resulting from incorrect use of a bypass. ICM 1360
K. COMPRESSORS/ENGINES
This section applies to compressors, engines, and turbines handling flammable vapors and gases.
Comment K For the 10 year period of 1982 through 1991, 67 compressor-related fires resulted in fire
losses totaling $1,500,000 for an average loss per fire of $22,000. Design issues were identified in 13% of
fires, operations/maintenance/management issues in 62% of the fires.
Major incidents (loss greater than $100,000) have occurred when flammable mixtures filled compressor
rooms and were ignited. One of the following scenarios typically occurs to generate the large volumes of
flammable vapor necessary to cause a major fire:

Chevron Appendix G
• The fuel gas system leaks (usually the fuel valve)

• Established management controls are not followed (e.g. inadequate job planning and not following
established instructions/procedures)
• Unpredictable mechanical failures occur (e.g., gaskets blow out, or pistons/rods fail)
There were 77 engine and turbine fires in the 1982 - 1991 time period totaling $2,900,000. Major losses
have occurred on engines and turbines when supervisory controls were not followed. For example:
• A $1,500,000 fire occurred in 1982 when lube oil collected in an engine exhaust system. Operating
instructions were not followed correctly.
• A $975,000 fire occurred in 1987, due to job planning, when unburned fuel was allowed to enter
engine exhaust ducting.
• $175,000 loss occurred in 1987 when engine fueling instructions were not followed, resulting in a fuel
spill and fire.
Lube oil leaks are common cause of engine fires and in the severity of the fires. Inadequate inspection and
surveillance impacted 41% of the fires.
K.1 References
• Compressor Manual
• Driver Manual
• Fire Protection Manual
K.2 General
K.2.1 The area around and under compressors, engines, and turbines shall be designed to
minimize the accumulations of lube oil. This generally requires surfaces to be sloped a
minimum of 1" per foot to a closed drain system. Facilities should be provided to wash
down oily surfaces.
Comment K.2.1 Industry standard (API-2001). The 1:12 drainage slope is an industry
practice. The area around this type of equipment can accumulate lube oil which can be
ignited by a small gas release and flash fire. This may allow what would have been a very
minor incident to quickly become a very serious incident. In areas with limited access,
fixed nozzles may be required to provide effective washdown capabilities.
K.2.2 Sources of liquid that can add fuel to a fire shall not be located within the compressor
building except for reservoirs that are an integral part of the engine or compressor or are
located in the unit base plate. This includes fuel tanks, lube oil reservoirs, knockout pots that
carry a substantial liquid level, etc. Fuel gas pressure reduction or let-down stations shall be
located outside the compressor building. Engine starters utilizing fuel gas as the motive
force shall exhaust outside the compressor building.
Comment K.2.2 Company requirement. The incremental cost is project-specific.

Relatively minor fires have escalated to major fires destroying entire compressor buildings

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when lube oils or other liquids have become involved and spread the fire. Locating sources
of liquid fuel that could be released outside the compressor building can minimize the fuel
source should a fire occur.
K.2.3 Hydraulic and lube oil lines, valves, level controllers, and other components shall not be
made of low melting point or non-fire resistant materials. If these materials must be used,
fire stop valves shall be installed both upstream and downstream of this equipment that will
stop the flow of oil in case of a fire.
Comment K.2.3 Industry standard (NFPA-37). Reports from fires in compressor

buildings consistently point to lube oil fires needing extinguishment after gas fires are out.
Oil lines are often made of rubber or plastic, oil level controllers have aluminum bodies
with plastic lenses, valves are made of brass, etc. In case of a flash fire where the oil
accumulations are ignited, these materials will quickly fail, dumping lube or hydraulic oil
from the crankcase and reservoirs into the fire. Fire stop valves such those made by
KENCO in Tulsa, OK can isolate such equipment when exposed to fire.
K.2.4 Compressor stations shall be provided with an Emergency ShutDown (ESD) system that
will shutdown all compressors, block all incoming gas (including gas for the engines), and
blowdown piping and equipment to a remote flare or vent. ESD valves are to be fail safe.
The ESD shall be activated on fire detection, gas detection at 60% of LFL, or manually by
remotely located ESD switches. The gas detectors shall alarm at 20% of LFL.
Comment K.2.4 Industry standard (API-RP-14G) for offshore platforms. Industry

practice for onshore facilities. An ESD system that quickly de-pressures the compressor
section is very effective in controlling a gas fire. The remaining fires, if any, can then be
dealt with using other extinguishing means. This is primarily applicable to upstream
facilities. There have been many incidents where ESD activation at the onset of a fire has
isolated and de-pressured the facility, extinguishing the fire before a major loss occurred.
FPM 3730
K.2.5 Gas turbines and centrifugal compressors placed inside of individual machine enclosures
should be protected by full flood CO2, dry chemical, or water mist fire suppression systems
in accordance with Section S.3.10. The CO2 shall be capable of being released manually or
by any one or a combination of:
• UV optical flame detection,

• rate-of-rise thermal detection, and
• combustible gas detection.
Comment K.2.5 Industry practice. The incremental costs are project specific. Large loss
fires have resulted from leaks in lube oil or fuel systems. CO2 is currently the preferred
agent for fire suppression due to the mandated phase-out of halon and the fact that the
enclosures are not occupied except for maintenance. Dry chemical is an acceptable agent
if the turbine/compressor manufacturer agrees. Water mist systems have been approved for
gas turbine enclosures and have advantages over CO2 in several areas (i.e. testability, ease
of recharge, life safety).

Chevron Appendix G
K.2.6 Gas compressor and gas turbine buildings shall be outfitted with UV/IR optical flame
detection and combustible gas detection. The location of combustible gas detectors shall
take into account the specific gravity of the gas being compressed. If located near the
ceiling, as would be the case for lighter than air gases, the detector heads shall be outfitted
with devices to allow for calibrating from grade.
Comment K.2.6 Industry practice. The incremental costs are project specific. Most
manufacturers of combustible gas detectors make devices to allow for remote calibration.
Without remote calibration, detector heads located near the ceiling are very difficult to
access for calibration and may not be kept properly calibrated or maintained. FPM 3730
K.2.7 If water is available, foam hose stations with 60 gallons of foam concentrate capacity shall
be provided, preferably just outside the doors to the compressor building. In cold weather
areas, they can be placed just inside the access doors. Sufficient stations should be installed
to provide coverage of all compressors. If water is not available, 150# wheeled dry
chemical extinguishers should be supplied, the quantity and location dependent on the size
and configuration of the compressors and building.
Comment K.2.7 Company requirement. The incremental costs of suppression equipment

are small compared to installed cost of a compressor station. For example, a foam hose
reel station costs about $2000. Although the ESD system will quickly control the gas fire,
residual fires involving lube oil and combustible solids may have to be extinguished by
other means. Where possible, the extinguishers and hose reels should be located 50 feet
from the equipment they are protecting. Ready-to-use first aid fire suppression equipment
used by on-site personnel extinguish 75% of all Chevron fires before they result in damage.
K.3 Compressors
K.3.1 The distance pieces on reciprocating compressors located inside of a building shall be
enclosed and vented outside of the building.
Comment K.3.1 Industry standard API-618 specifies that distance pieces of

compressors be vented. It is an industry practice to pipe vents containing flammable
vapor outside the compressor building. This is necessary to prevent the accumulations of
flammable gases within the building. Consideration should be given to inert purging
distance pieces to prevent flammable mixtures.
K.3.2 Small piping, 3/4" to 1 1/2", attached to the compressor or its piping shall be minimized.
Connections which are required shall be close coupled, socket or seal welded and properly
supported. 1/2" or smaller piping shall not be installed.
Comment K.3.2 Industry standard (API-618). Due to the vibration of compressors,

screwed piping should be avoided as well as all piping ½" and smaller. Where the mass of
the attached valve or appurtenance may subject the supporting nipple and weld to
significant vibration stress, supporting gussets or braces shall be provided. Socket welded
pipe is preferred to seal welded screwed pipe because it is less prone to fatigue failures.

Chevron Appendix G
Vibration-induced failures have occurred with significant frequency and consequences to

warrant additional measures to reduce the risk. Four such failures resulted in $1,000,000
in direct fire loss, excluding lost production opportunities. FPM 2020
K.4 Gas Engines
K.4.1 Gas engine drivers for compressors shall have explosion relief devices supplied for each
crank throw to vent crankcase explosions.
Comment K.4.1 Industry practice. Explosion vents such as the Bicera type explosion
relief device provide a controlled means of venting an explosion in the crankcase to prevent
a catastrophic failure of the crankcase. These spring-loaded vents close to prevent air re-
entering the crankcase and causing a secondary explosion or sustaining a residual fire.
Crankcase explosions have seriously damaged engine crankcases, blown covers off, and
seriously injured personnel.
K.4.2 Engine air intake shall come from outside the building. Engine exhaust shall discharge
outside the building and above or beyond the eave. Both exhaust and intake shall be on the
opposite side of the building from the gas piping. If the exhaust pipe creates a thermal
hazard to personnel, expanded metal guarding is preferred over insulation.
Comment K.4.2 Industry standard (NFPA-37). With the air intake inside the building, a
gas release in the building could result in an engine back fire and ignition of the vapor or
over-speeding of the engine/compressor. The exhaust should be above or beyond the eave
line to avoid exhaust gases being an ignition source or a personnel hazard inside the
building. If there is a prevailing wind direction, the exhaust should be on the downwind
side of the building. Expanded metal guarding can eliminate the risk of oil-soaked
insulation fires. FPM 2020
K.4.3 Engine ignition systems shall be low tension (voltage), preferably with combination
coil/spark plug units for each cylinder. Shielded high tension (voltage) wires should be
avoided.
Comment K.4.3 Company requirement. The use of combination coil/spark plug units
eliminates high tension wiring and the chance of it sparking to the engine or supports.
Shielded wire can short to the shielding which can spark to the engine. This has been the
source of ignition in engine fires at leaking injectors and other leak sources. FPM 2020
L. PIPING
Comment L In the time period from 1982 - 1991, we have had 8 - 9 recordable fires per year related to
piping resulting in $190MM in fire loss. Three fires account for $170MM. Facility design played a role
in 25% of the fires and 62% of the fire loss. The primary causes of design-related fires breaks down as
follows:

Chevron Appendix G
• inadequate materials or pipe class - 6 fires - $104MM

• small piping fatigue - 3 fires - $5MM
• piping stress - 2 fires - $9MM
• other - 9 fires - $0.4MM
L.1 Materials
L.1.1 Seamless steel pipe and steel valves, flanges and fittings shall be used for hydrocarbon
service.
Comment L.1.1 Guideline. The incremental cost is project-specific, Butt-welded seams

(e.g. EFW, ERW) are more susceptible to leakage. Steel piping offers strength, flexibility,
ductility and weldability. Steel is better able to handle thermal shock, bending loads and
hydraulic and mechanical shock. However, steel may not be practical for some acids,
chemicals or for use at high temperature. Generally, cast iron should not be used oil and
gas service due to its brittleness. Brass, copper and aluminum should not be used due to
their low melting points. FPM 2080
L.1.2 All pipe class transition changes shall be reviewed with the Company representative both
during the design stage and after field installation. Positive material identification (PMI)
shall be used to verify that the specified alloys have been purchased and installed.
Comment L.1.2 Guideline. Transitions in pipe at the wrong location can result in the
wrong material being installed and the potential for a pipe rupture. PMI significantly
decreases the possibility that wrong materials will be installed during construction. This is
particularly important for high temperature chrome alloy piping.
L.2 Valves
L.2.1 Flangeless valves with exposed bolts, wafer-type bodies, shall not be used in liquid and gas
hydrocarbon, LPG or H2S service if they are in an area where they can be exposed to fire.
Comment L.2.1 Company requirement. In a fire, it has been observed that studs which
have more than 3" of their length exposed between the flanges quickly get hot, expand, and
allow the flange connection to leak, ultimately causing total failure of the connection and
allowing hydrocarbons to feed the fire. Most manufacturers also supply lug-body valves or
flanged valves. FPM 2080
L.2.2 Fire-safe valves with soft, non-metal seats, shall meet the requirements of API Standard
607, "Fire Test for Soft-Seated Quarter Turn Valves."
Comment L.2.2 Industry standard. When exposed to fire, rubber-like or teflon materials
used for sealing valve seats will fail much faster than the valve metal possibly allowing
leakage. FPM 2080

Chevron Appendix G
L.3 Threaded Piping
Threaded piping systems shall not be used in sizes larger than 2 inches in hydrocarbon or critical
utility services.
Comment L.3 Industry practice. Threaded piping connections can be susceptible to thread
disengagement by expansion when exposed to fire and can be more susceptible to vibration and
fatigue failure then welded or flanged connections. FPM 2080
L.4 Thermal Relief
Thermal relief shall be provided in accordance with Paragraph S.2.2.3.
L.5 Pipeways
Piping systems within process units shall be installed on aboveground pipeways.
Comment L.5 Industry practice. Grade or below grade pipeways should be avoided. They can be
fire hazards because they are difficult to keep clean and they obstruct free access. Also, because the
piping is difficult to inspect, there is a greater chance that external corrosion and leaks will go
undetected. FPM 2080
L.6 Sample Connections
Sample connections in flammable service shall be the 3-way recirculation type.
Comment L.6 Guideline. The cost of a recirculating sample system can run 75-100% more than a
dead-ended system. However, the recirculating sampler minimizes leakage and hazard to
personnel. These may also be required for environmental reasons in some areas. FPM 2080;
PIM-EF-403
L.7 Couplings
L.7.1 Victaulic couplings can be used in hydrocarbon service only if all the following conditions
apply:
• ANSI Class 150 piping system

• Rural or remotely located production facilities
• Fire resistant gasket is specified
• Low H2S service (less than 1% H2S by volume or .1 psia H2S partial pressure)
L.7.2 Dresser couplings shall not be installed in hydrocarbon service or in produced water service
if their failure during a fire would allow hydrocarbon liquid to feed the fire after the water
has drained out.
Comment L.7.2 Industry practice. Dresser couplings have resilient seals that can fail
quickly when exposed to fire. Also, a dresser coupling is placed over the two facing ends of

Chevron Appendix G
pipe. When the pipe is exposed to fire, bending stresses in the pipe, caused by uneven
heating become very high and can pull the coupling apart. FPM 2080
L.7.3 Unibolt connectors shall not be used in hydrocarbon service.
Comment L.7.3 Company requirement. The incremental costs are project-specific.

Unibolt connectors have not been fire tested. FPM 2080
N. FIREPROOFING
N.1 References
API Publication 2218 Fireproofing Practices in Petroleum and Petrochemical Facilities

UL Subject 1709 "Structural Steel Protected for Resistance to Rapid Temperature Rise Fires"
Fire Protection Manual, Section 1700
N.2 Definitions
N.2.1 Refer to API 2218, Section 2.2.1, for the definition of fire-exposed envelope and fire-
potential equipment.
Comment N.2.1 Industry standard. API 2218, Section 2.2.2, defines the fire-exposed
envelope as "one that extends 20-30 feet horizontally and 30-40 feet vertically from the
source of liquid fuel". Company experience indicates that this is appropriate for low
pressure, low volume facilities. For higher pressure (>100 psi), higher volume (>5000 gal
or >100 gpm) the horizontal distance should be extended to 50 feet. API 2218, Section
2.2; FPM 1700
N.2.2 Refer to Section J for definitions of critical instrumentation and homeruns.
N.3 Support Structures
N.3.1 Level of Protection Required
Fireproofing shall protect support structures from reaching 1000oF for three hours with fire
environment temperatures of 2000oF as defined by UL 1709.
Comment N.3.1 Industry standard. The UL 1709 rapid rise temperature profile is
representative of the temperatures equipment would be exposed to in a hydrocarbon spill
fire. The three hour protection (equivalent to 4 hours under the previously used ASTM E-
119 testing procedure) gives adequate protection of the high-valued equipment under
almost any reasonable fire scenario. If studies show that a fire's duration would always be
less than 3 hours, the fireproofing rating could be decreased. FPM 1720

Chevron Appendix G
N.3.2 Where Protection is Required
Refer to API 2218, Section 3, for determining where to install structural fireproofing.
N.3.2.1 Vessels or reactors with a "hot box" design at the shell-to-skirt joint shall be
fireproofed as specified by the Company.
Comment N.3.2.1 Company requirement. The "hot box" design requires

insulation for thermal stress reasons. Covering the insulation with heavy gage
stainless steel weatherjacketing can provide protection for the vessel skirt in that
area. The CRTC Pressure Vessel specialist should be contacted for this design.
FPM 1725
N.3.3 Types of Fireproofing Systems
Unless approved by the Company, a cementitious type fireproofing system shall be used.
Comment N.3.3 Industry practice. Cementitious fireproofing systems insulate the

structural steel from the fire and are very durable. Concrete is the most impact resistant
and is generally used in high traffic areas where the fireproofing could be damaged.
Proprietary cement-based products (i.e. Pyrocrete 241 or Fendolite M II)generally have
better fireproofing characteristics, are lighter, and may be more economical to install than
concrete. FPM 1724; FPM 1700, Figs. 1700-1&2
N.3.4 Application
Prior to fireproofing with concrete, the structural steel shall be abrasive blasted and primed
with a polyamide epoxy to provide protection against corrosion. For proprietary
fireproofing, the manufacturer's guidelines should be followed. The top of structure should
be sealed where fireproofing joins the steel.
Comment N.3.4 Industry practice. Water seeping between the fireproofing and the steel
can cause accelerated corrosion of the steel. The polyamide epoxy is considered the most
durable protection against corrosion by the CRTC Materials Division. FPM 1724; GA-
N33336; GD-N99994
N.4 Critical Instrumentation
N.4.1 Level of Protection Required
Critical instrumentation shall be fireproofed to permit emergency function for at least 20

minutes with fire environment temperatures of 2000oF as defined by UL 1709.
Comment N.4.1 Industry practice. Generally, 20 minutes is considered to be sufficient

time to safely de-pressure and isolate a process facility. Instrumentation which may need to
operate longer than 20 minutes for a safe shutdown should have fireproofing designed
appropriately. FPM 1731

Chevron Appendix G
N.4.2 Where Protection is Required
Section J of this Guideline outlines where fireproofing is required.
Comment N.4.2 Section J gives criteria for determining the protections required for the
critical instrumentation. This section assumes that the decision has been made to
fireproof the specified equipment. This section focuses on the types of fireproofing
systems used. In all cases the Company should review and have input into the type of
system used.
N.4.2.1 Valves
The valve shall be of a fire-safe design. The valve actuator shall be fireproofed
with Thermal Designs' K-Mass intumescent fireproofing.
Comment N.4.2.1 Guideline. The incremental cost of K-Mass is 30-40% higher

than a fireproofed enclosure. The K-Mass system should be considered before
using a box or blanket system in that the K-Mass is molded to the valve and allows
normal operator and maintenance access. The box or blanket systems need to be
removed or opened up to allow access. Fireproofing integrity is lost if the box or
blanket is not properly replaced. K-Mass can also be used to fireproof non fire-
safe valves such as soft-seated plug or ball valves. FPM 1733
N.4.2.2 Enclosures
Enclosures housing critical instrumentation and located in fire hazardous areas

shall be fireproofed with K-Mass fireproofing or equal.
N.4.2.3 Instrument and Electrical Cables
N.4.2.3.1 Critical pneumatic instrument tubing made of low melting point

material shall be fireproofed with calcium silicate insulation and stainless steel
jacketing.
Comment N.4.2.3.1 Guideline. For single runs of tubing using 2" calcium
silicate insulation with stainless steel jacketing is the most cost effective system.
The stainless steel weatherjacket can survive a fire and prevent the fireproofing
from being blown off by fire water or an impinging pressure fire. FPM 1737
N.4.2.3.2 Unless approved otherwise by the Company, critical instrument

cables and critical power wiring located in fire-exposed areas shall be installed
separate from the non-critical cables, and shall be fire resistant wiring.
Comment N.4.2.3.2 Industry practice. Fire resistant wiring (Pyrotenax MI

Cable, Whittaker SI Fire Cable, or equal) will maintain circuit integrity in a UL
1709 fire environment without additional fireproofing. This is generally less

Chevron Appendix G
expensive, easier to install and more reliable than normal wiring installed in
conduit and fireproofed. Installing critical wiring separate from the non-critical
wiring can eliminate the expense of fireproofing the homerun. Do not install high
temperature wiring in areas where it could be exposed to molten aluminum in a
fire (e.g. in or under cable trays). This has resulted in failure of the sheathing.
FPM 1737
N.4.2.4 Cable Trays and Conduit Banks
Where required (see Section J.2.3), cable trays and conduit banks shall be protected
with a fireproofing system tested and approved per Section N.4.1.
Comment N.3.3.4.3 Guideline. The incremental costs can run $100-200/foot for
an 18" x 4" cable tray. Only fireproofing systems tested in a UL 1709 fire
environment should be used. Section 1740 in the Fire Protection Manual lists some
of the approved systems. The Company should review the system to be used.
Additionally, cable tray supports need to be insulated to prevent conducting heat
inside the fireproofing during a fire. FPM 1738
P. ELECTRICAL AREA CLASSIFICATION
P.1 Industry Standards and Codes
Area classification shall be in accordance with:
API RP 500 Classification of Locations for Electrical Installations at Petroleum Facilities

NFPA 30 Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code
NFPA 70 National Electrical Code
NFPA 496 Purged and Pressurized Enclosures for Electrical Equipment
NFPA 497A Classification of Class I Hazardous Locations for Electrical Installations
In Chemical Process Areas
Comment P.1 The design engineer should verify compliance with all appropriate federal, state,
and local codes. The documents listed may represent legal requirements. API RP 500 is divided
into 3 sections, refining, production and pipeline, and gives guidance on the extent of area
classification within a facility. NFPA 497A also gives guidance on the extent of area classification
at smaller, low risk process areas. NFPA 30 gives guidance on recommended levels of ventilation.
NFPA 496 gives design requirements for ventilation and purging systems.
The Electrical Manual, Section 300, and the Fire Protection Manual, Section 1500, give guidance on
the Company's area classification policy and practices. Standard Drawing GF-P99987, located in
the Fire Protection Manual illustrates the Company's typical area classification practices in process
plants and tank fields. FPM 1500; ELC 300; GF-P99987
P.1.1 Area Classification drawing(s) shall be approved by Company.

Chevron Appendix G
Comment P.1.1 Industry standard. It is suggested that this drawing be done early in the
design phase so instrumentation and electrical equipment can be located outside the
classified areas as much as practical. The area classification drawing is used for electrical
purchase only, so it is not customary to extend the classification into adjacent roads, since
electrical equipment is not normally installed in roads.
P.2 Ventilation and Purging of Enclosed Process Areas
An enclosed area containing process equipment shall be considered adequately ventilated if it is

ventilated at a rate sufficient to maintain the concentration of vapors within the area at or below 25%
of the lower flammable limit (LFL). Methods of confirming adequate ventilation and design
requirements for ventilation systems shall be in accordance with NFPA 30, Paragraph 5-3.3 and
Appendix F.
Comment P.2 Industry standard. Open outdoor locations usually are considered adequately
ventilated. Note that 20% of LFL is required by the MMS in OCS areas. FPM 1530; NFPA 30, 5-
3.3 and Appendix F
P.3 Declassifying Enclosures by Purging
Unclassified electrical equipment can be used in buildings or enclosures located in classified areas
provided they are "pressurized" or "purged" in accordance with NFPA 496.
Comment P.3 Industry standard. Purging prevents flammable vapors from entering the building
or enclosure. NFPA 496 defines the type of purging and design requirements for a purged
enclosure. NFPA 496; FPM 1540
P.4 Piperacks
Outdoor, aboveground pipe racks which do not contain valve manifolds generally are not classified.
Comment P.4 Guideline. These installations have a low risk of leaks. FPM 1540
P.5 Hydrogen Processing Facilities
P.5.1 Adequately ventilated piping, vessels and exchangers containing hydrogen need not be
classified unless reciprocating or rotating mechanical equipment, sample draws, or
atmospheric vents are included in the equipment.
Comment P.5.1 Guideline. These systems are considered closed systems. Also, valve
packing leaks will either ignite or disperse so rapidly, that there is little probability that
electrical sources can or will increase the risk of ignition. FPM 1546
P.5.2 Hydrogen processing plants that include areas where Group D hydrocarbons are processed
shall be classified Class I, Group D. In addition, Group B classification shall apply in
specific areas where high concentration hydrogen leaks are most likely to occur, such as
around compressors and high pressure separators.

Chevron Appendix G
Comment P.5.2 Guideline. In areas where hydrocarbon and hydrogen are both present
(as in hydrocracking processes), Group B designations should be used for those areas
where high concentrations (>30%) of hydrogen are being handled. Wherever practical,
electrical equipment should be located outside Group B areas to enhance safety and
decrease project cost. FPM 1540
P.5.3 Battery rooms need not be classified Group B if adequately ventilated.
Comment P.5.3 Guideline. Generation of hydrogen from batteries is low, so adequate

natural ventilation is sufficient to ensure that the flammable mixture is less than 25 % LFL.
R. BUILDINGS
R.1 General Requirements
R.1.1 Buildings shall be designed and constructed in accordance with applicable legal
requirements. These may include NFPA 101, Life Safety Code, the Uniform Fire Code, the
Uniform Building Code and applicable local codes. Building siting shall be evaluated in
accordance with API RP-752.
Comment R.1.1 Legal requirements. The design engineer should verify all legal
requirements with the local authority having jurisdiction. Many locations have codes in
addition to those listed above.
R.1.2 Smoke detection is required for all occupied buildings. Sprinklers or other fixed fire
protection systems shall be considered for use in all buildings.
Comment R.1.2 Industry practice. The Fire Protection Manual gives guidance on when
sprinklers, CO2 and other fixed fire protection equipment may be appropriate. FPM 2134
and 2200
R.2 Control Houses
Comment R.2. Refer to Section A.1.2.1 in this specification for criteria regarding the use of blast
resistant construction.
R.2.1 The structural members, and the interior and exterior walls of control houses shall be
constructed of noncombustible materials. Combustible wall coverings, wood paneling,
trim, or cabinets shall not be used.
Comment R.2.1 Guideline. The incremental cost of non-combustible construction is low

if included at the beginning of the project. Combustible materials contribute to the fuel
load during a fire. Building code requirements may include fire resistive ratings of one
hour or longer for walls. Because of the reduction/elimination of full flood halon systems, it
is very important to minimize the combustible load in control rooms. FPM 2121

Chevron Appendix G
R.2.2 Control rooms for plants handling flammable liquids or combustible dusts shall not have
windows.
Comment R.2.2 Company requirement. This can provide additional protection against
explosion or fire for the control room and the people inside it. FPM 2121
R.2.3 Buildings which are located next to equipment handling flammable or toxic material, and
which need to be occupied in an emergency, shall be supplied with positive pressure
ventilation in accordance with NFPA 496. The air intake shall be taken from a safe, vapor-
free location at least 25 feet above grade. If flammable or toxic vapors can be drawn in by
the air system, a vapor detection system shall be provided on the air intake. If the control
room is inside a classified area, the system shall alarm in the control house at 20% lower
flammable limit (LFL) and cause automatic shutdown of the ventilation system or start
100% recirculation of the ventilating system at 60% LFL (or threshold limit value of H2S or
other toxic gas).
Comment R.2.3 Industry practice. These levels of alarm on the air intake will prevent
the control room air from reaching the IDLH for either hydrocarbon or H2S, thus providing
a safe haven for personnel in the event of a process upset in the plant area. FPM 2121;
NFPA 496, Chapter 3
R.2.4 A one-hour fire resistive wall shall separate the lab from the control areas. Entry into the
lab shall be through an outside door only. Fire resistive walls shall also separate the
electrical power equipment rooms, kitchen facilities and office areas from the control room,
rack room and computer rooms. Fire resistive walls shall extend from the foundation to the
roof.
Comment R.2.4 Company requirement. The incremental cost is project-specific. Fire

resistive walls extending from the floor slab to the roof protect the control area in the event
of a fire in one of the other areas. Doors between the lab and the control area are not
allowed because they reduce the fire safety of the building. FPM 2121
R.4 Temporary Buildings
R.4.1 Temporary buildings shall be limited to 8000 square feet, per Section 505 of the Uniform
Building Code.
Comment R.4.1 Guideline - may be a legal requirement in some areas. Temporary

buildings include trailers and prefabricated buildings often used as shutdown trailers,
construction offices, temporary offices or storage space. These buildings are usually of
light combustible construction. The size restriction is necessary to reduce the fire risk area.
Multiple buildings of 8000 sq ft can be used if there is 40 feet of separation between each
building. FPM 2140
R.4.2 Skirts shall be provided around elevated portable buildings.

Chevron Appendix G
Comment R.4.2 Guideline - Skirts help prevent the accumulation of combustible

materials underneath the trailer. FPM 2140
R.5 Shops and Garages
R.5.1 If flammable or combustible liquids are to be stored in the building, then the storage space
area shall be in accordance with NFPA 30, Chapter 4.
Comment R.5.1 Industry standard - in some areas, this may be a legal requirement.
NFPA 30 can be used to determine the method and quantity of liquid that can be stored,
access, fire protection and spacing requirements. FPM 2150
R.6 Living Quarters
R.6.1 Sprinklers shall be provided in multi-story living quarters.
Comment R.6.1 Industry standard - may be a legal requirement in some areas. The use
of sprinklers as life safety devices can be supported by insurance statistics.
R.6.2 Fixed dry chemical extinguishing systems shall be installed over cook tops and deep fat
fryers.
Comment R.6.2 Cook tops and fryers can start fires when left unattended.
R.7 Process Buildings
R.7.1 Process buildings shall be of noncombustible construction. Process buildings include

buildings located within plant process areas, as well as all field buildings that contain
hydrocarbon liquid and flammable gas piping and equipment.
Comment R.7.1 Industry standard. Some examples of process buildings are: analyzer
buildings, metering stations, pump stations, compressor buildings, and oil-water separation
stations.
R.7.2 If process buildings are fully enclosed, ventilation shall be provided to prevent the
accumulation of flammable vapors. The building exhaust vents shall be located to preclude
the accumulation of heavier than air vapors at low points, as well as lighter than air vapors
and gases at the ceiling. Detectors shall be provided to warn personnel of a fire and release
of flammable or toxic vapors within the building.
Comment R.7.2 Industry standard. Process buildings should be open on all sides
whenever practical to allow for natural ventilation and access by fire water streams in case
of fire. Ventilation may not required for buildings containing only tight piping systems.
Refer to NFPA 30, Section 5-3.3 for ventilation guidelines.

Chevron Appendix G
R.8 Warehouses
R.8.1 All warehouses shall be designed and constructed per NFPA 231, Standard for General
Storage. The storage of flammable and combustible liquids shall be in accordance with
NFPA 30, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code.
Comment R.8.1 Industry standard - may be a legal requirement in some locations.

FPM 3800
R.8.2 Smoke and heat venting shall be provided as calculated per NFPA 204.
Comment R.8.2 Industry standard. Venting can remove the smoke and heat from a
warehouse so that fire fighters can gain access to the seat of the fire. FPM 3820
S. MISCELLANEOUS SERVICES
S.1 Drainage
The primary objectives of the drainage system related to fire protection are to:
• isolate flammable liquids from manned areas, ignition sources and equipment
• isolate flammable vapors in drainage piping from ignition sources
• route burning liquids and fire water away from equipment that might rupture and add more fuel
to the fire
• provide clear access and reduce exposure of firefighters to flammable or combustible liquids
floating on fire water
• minimize exposure to adjacent plants or property by conducting leaks/spills to a safe location
S.1.1 References
• Civil and Structural Manual, Section 500.

• Fire Protection Manual, Section 1400
S.1.2 Process Unit Drainage
S.1.2.1 Surface Drainage
S.1.2.1.1 Surface drainage shall be designed to quickly remove spilled liquids

out from under pipeways, air coolers and overhead vessels; and away from oil
handling equipment such as pumps, manifolds and vessels. Areas shall be
sectioned to prevent the spread of a spill to other areas. Drainage patterns should
minimize pooling of liquid near equipment.
S.1.2.1.2 Place high points in the grade as follows:

Chevron Appendix G
• at the centerline of overhead pipeways or support structures

• between critical equipment and its spare
• between pumps handling flammable liquid and adjacent equipment
• through buildings
• on the centerlines of roads or access ways surrounding the plants
• personnel escape and emergency response access routes
Comment S.1.2.1.1/S.1.2.1.2 Company requirement. There is no additional

costs for these provisions if accounted for at the beginning of the project. Design
criteria for sectioning, sloping and draining a process area can be found in the
Civil and Structural Manual, Section 500.
S.1.2.2 Underground Drainage
Comment S.1.2.2 It is up to the individual operating location to determine the

type of underground drainage systems which should be used (i.e. segregated,
unsegregated, etc.). This section does not address that consideration.
S.1.2.2.1 Drainage trenches shall not be used in process areas.
Comment S.1.2.2.1 Company requirement. Trenches have been considered as a

means of secondary containment for process drains. Trenches can transmit
leaks/spills from one part of a facility to another part potentially spreading the fire
and increasing damage. Installing a system to foam the trench is not adequate
mitigation of this significant risk.
S.1.2.2.2 Drainage systems designed to contain spills on site shall have the
capability of being routed to the sewer in the event of a fire emergency. Valves
shall be accessible and well-labeled.
Comment S.1.2.2.2 Industry practice. Routing the surface run-off directly to the
sewer in a fire emergency can eliminate the possibility of backing up liquid and
floating burning liquid throughout the process area, decreasing the risk to
emergency response personnel and the potential for damage.
S.1.2.2.3 Catch basins and drain lines shall be sized for the maximum fire water
application rate or the design rainfall - whichever is greater.
Comment S.1.2.2.3 Industry Practice. Normally, fire water flow dictates the
hydraulic design of the drainage lines. A fire water flow of 0.20 gpm per square
foot is the rate generally required to absorb the heat of a hydrocarbon spill fire.
This fire water rate corresponds to catch basin design capacities of 500 gpm for a
50 foot square area or 1125 gpm for a 75 foot square area.
Mains are normally designed to carry away the maximum fire water rate. Larger
catch basins or drain lines may be needed in plants or around equipment with high
capacity fixed fire water systems.

Chevron Appendix G
The Civil and Structural Manual, Section 500, should be consulted for the
hydraulic design of drainage systems.
S.1.2.2.4 Catch basins, manholes and drain lines should be gas-sealed as

follows:
• All oily water drains or process area catch basins should be individually gas-
sealed, except that up to 6 drains can be connected unsealed to a common
lateral if the drains are in "line of sight" and serve equipment of similar service.
In this situation the lateral must be sealed at its first connection to another line
or manhole.
• Branches or laterals in oily water systems must enter main lines through a gas-
sealed manhole.
• Branches or laterals in clean or storm water systems may enter main lines
without gas seals if sealed catch basins are used.
• Main lines may intersect without seals if upstream catch basins or manholes
are gas-sealed.
• Main lines leaving a plot limit must be gas-sealed at the first offplot manhole.
• Oil-water separators should be gas-sealed from both inlet and outlet drain
lines.
Comment S.1.2.2.4 Guidelines. The incremental costs are project-specific. Gas

sealing is needed to prevent vapors released in one part of the facility from
spreading through the drainage system to other parts of the facility. Separators
should be sealed to prevent fire and explosions from propagating through the
system back to the separators.
S.1.2.2.5 Catch basins shall be designed so that they can be checked

periodically to verify that the liquid seal is in place. P-trap seals should not be
used.
Comment S.1.2.2.5 Guidelines. There are nominal incremental costs for catch
basins vs. P-traps. Standard Drawing GC-S78325 in the Civil and Structural
Manual shows a cast iron liquid sealed catch basin. P-trap seals are very difficult
to clean and to visually determine that there is a liquid seal.
S.1.2.2.6 Manholes shall be vented to a safe location.
Comment S.1.2.2.6 Industry practice. Venting is needed to relieve pressure and

to prevent the accumulation of flammable vapors. The Civil and Structural
Manual, Section 537 contains guidelines for location and sizing of manhole vents.
S.1.3 Offplot Drainage
S.1.3.1 Drainage in tank fields is covered in Section D.

Chevron Appendix G
S.1.3.2 Pipeway Drainage
S.1.3.2.1 The surface under a below grade or grade level pipeway shall slope to
a point on the outside edge of the pipeway with a minimum of a 1% slope.
Drainage shall be away from instrument leads and power cables.
Comment S.1.3.2.1 Guideline. This entails no additional cost if accounted for at

the beginning of the project. Sloping to one side results in spilled liquids quickly
draining out from under lines minimizing the risk of line rupture in the event of a
spill fire. FPM 1440
S.1.3.2.2 For below grade pipeways, fire stops shall be installed every 300 to
500 feet of pipeway. Each section separated by fire stops shall have a drain inlet to
carry the liquid away.
Comment S.1.3.2.2 Guideline. Additional costs are project-specific. Fire stops

can prevent the spread of spilled liquid or fire to other sections of the pipeway
minimizing the risk to the rest of the pipeway and to adjacent facilities. FPM 1440
S.2 Pressure Relief and Venting
S.2.1 Industry Standards and Codes
Pressure relief and venting systems shall be designed, fabricated, and installed in
accordance with:
API RP 14C Recommended Practice for Analysis, Design, Installation, and Testing
of Basic Surface Safety Systems for Offshore Production Platforms
API RP 520 Recommended Practice for the Design and Installation of Pressure
Relieving Systems in Refineries
API RP 521 Guide for Pressure-Relieving and Depressuring Systems
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII
Comment S.2.1 Industry standard. The following documents are intended for guidance,
but may also be enforced locally (e.g., in the form of state safety orders). The design
engineer should verify compliance with all appropriate federal, state, and local codes:
API Std. 526 Flanged Steel Safety-Relief Valves

API Std. 527 Commercial Seat Tightness of Safety Relief Valve with
Metal-to-Metal Seat
API Std. 2000 Venting Atmospheric and Low Pressure Storage Tanks
NFPA-30 Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code, Chapter 2,
"Tank Storage"
API Std. 2510A Design and Construction of Liquified Petroleum Gas (LPG)
Installations

Chevron Appendix G
S.2.2 Design Basis
S.2.2.1 The single emergency that results in the largest load on the relief and venting
system shall be the basis for design for the relief system.
Comment S.2.2.1 Industry standard. The single emergency that results in the
largest load on the relief and venting system is the basis for design because the size
and cost of facilities would be excessive if they were designed to handle every
conceivable emergency simultaneously. Fire, loss of cooling water, loss of power,
are examples of typical design bases. Note that the "worst case" emergency for a
single piece of equipment may be different than that for an entire relief system.
FPM 1910; API 520, 5.2
S.2.2.2 A relief valve protecting multiple vessels shall be designed as if it was protecting a
single vessel with the surface area and volume of all vessels combined.
Comment S.2.2.2 Industry standard. When more than one vessel is protected by
a single relief valve, the combined wetted surface - below 25 feet - of all the vessels
connected to the single relief valve is used in computing heat input from fire.
(FPM 1912, API 520, 5.2)
S.2.2.3 Thermal relief shall be provided on all piping that can be blocked in if no valve
leakage is expected. Thermal relief shall also be provided on all piping confined
by valves where leakage past the valve can be expected, but there is more than 200
feet of pipe per valve; on lines and valves that are steam or electrically traced, and
may be blocked closed; and on four inch and larger double seated (block and
bleed) valves with interference fit bonnet seals.
Comment S.2.2.3 Industry standards. The 200 feet per valve rule is a Company
guideline. High pressures from thermal expansion can occur in completely filled
lines and valve bodies. This can result in a fire hazard if piping rupture and
product spillage occurs. Thermal pressure relief should be provided
commensurate with risk.
Thermal relief valves should be installed with maintenance block valves,

particularly if the thermal relief valve piping bridges the first block valve off a
tank. The maintenance block valves should be locked or sealed in the open
position. Piping systems designed with multiple thermal relief valves must be
designed to compensate for excessive back pressure. ICM 1260; API 521.
S.2.3 Layout and Spacing
S.2.3.1 All relief systems shall vent to safe locations. Discharge points shall be located
and oriented so that flammable concentrations do not reach people or ignition
sources.

Chevron Appendix G
Process vent lines and vent stacks shall discharge vertically a minimum of seven
feet above the highest platform within a 10-foot radius of the vent outlet, or three
feet above the equipment being vented. Such vent lines shall be properly supported
and braced, with no caps, bends or obstructions in the discharge path. 3/8"
diameter drain holes should be provided at the low point of the discharge stack to
prevent liquid or ice accumulation in the relief valve discharge piping.
Comment S.2.3.1 Company requirements. There are nominal additional costs.

Atmospheric discharge systems must be designed to avoid exposing workers to
toxic substances and the radiant heat from a fire. Likewise, nearby equipment
should not be exposed to radiant heat from a relief vent fire. Dispersion modeling
can be performed if there is concern that flammable mixtures may form near
ignition sources.
Discharge from vents and vent stacks should not be directed towards personnel or
equipment. If larger than 3/8", the relief discharge piping drain hole should be
directed away from the vessel and piping being protected to prevent possible flame
impingement in case of a fire. The 3/8" drain hole prevents corrosion from
plugging the hole. FPM 1920; API 521
S.2.4 Relief Valve Piping Design
S.2.4.1 The following are acceptable isolations for relief valves:
• single relief valve with no block valve between it and the protected system if
protected equipment can be removed from service for relief system testing and
maintenance.
• single relief valve with a block valve between it and the protected system with
the block valve positively locked open.
• Dual full capacity relief valves, with individual block valves or tied into a
three-way valve, for critical or hard-to-isolate equipment.
Comment S.2.4.1 Industry standard. Block valves under relief valves allow
inspection and maintenance without taking the protected equipment out of service.
However, management must have strict control over the closure of block valves,
and maintain a program of regular inspection to ensure block valves remain open.
Relief valve isolation methods should meet the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel
Code, Paragraph UG-135, and Appendix M requirements. FPM 1913 and 1916
S.2.4.2 Relief system block valves shall be designed and installed to prevent failure in the
closed position.
Comment S.2.4.2 Industry standard. Examples of installations that will not fail
in the closed position include:

Chevron Appendix G
• A gate valve or slide (knife) gate valve installed with the stem at or below the
horizontal position.
• A slide gate with its stem above the horizontal position with a positive,
secondary, and externally visible device provided to fix the wedge in the open
position, such as a locked pin through the body and gate.
• A globe valve installed with the pressure source under the disc.
• A quarter turn valve (e.g., plug, butterfly, or ball) with a permanent position
indicator positively secured to the stem. API 521
S.2.4.3 Where LPG (and other vaporizing liquids) will be discharged into the relief system,
the piping and knockout drum materials shall be suitable for auto-refrigeration
temperatures.
Comment S.2.4.3 Industry standard. Auto-refrigeration occurs as vapor (or a

flashing liquid such as LPG) passes through a relief valve. As a consequence, the
cold vapors also cool the piping and vessels that they are exposed to. The piping
and vessels need to be designed for the auto-refrigeration temperatures to prevent
loss of ductility and possible brittle fracture. Check valves are not recommended
in cold climates because the trim can freeze in the closed position. FPM 1914;
API 521
S.2.4.4 When rupture disks are used under relief valves to shield the valves from corrosive
fluids, the rupture disk assemblies shall not interfere with the normal operation of
the valves they are protecting. Rupture disks shall be non-fragmenting.
Comment S.2.4.4 Industry standard. Some types of rupture disks are composed
of a scored plate of carbon material which fractures on overpressure. The pieces
of carbon may block the relief valve inlet and prevent it from functioning correctly.
ASME Section VIII Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, UG-127
S.2.5 Relief System and Flare Design
S.2.5.1 Relief systems shall contain at least one knockout drum, located upstream of the
flare stack. The liquid disposal system shall be designed for the knockout drum to
operate without a liquid level under normal conditions, and shall be sized so that
not more than half the usable drum volume is filled, assuming a 10 minute
maximum discharge through the drum. The knockout drum shall have a high level
alarm separate from the level control system.
Comment S.2.5.1 Industry standard. Relief streams from process plants should
be assumed to contain liquids. Flares are designed to burn vapors only. If liquids
are carried over into the flare, the flare may discharge burning liquids out the top.
It's common to locate knockout drums in relief piping near the plot limits of
individual plants in addition to the one at the flare. Also, it is often appropriate to
provide a single knockout drum for a group of plants. API 521

Chevron Appendix G
S.2.5.2 Flares shall be equipped with a flame barrier designed to prevent flashback into the
relief system (e.g., liquid seal or flame arrestor). Detonation arrestors shall be used
when the arrestor cannot be installed near (<15 feet) the end of the pipe.
Comment S.2.5.2 Industry standard. Liquid seals provide the final vapor-liquid
separation before the flare stack and prevent the entry of air into the relief system.
They also prevent flame propagation into the relief system if ignition does occur.
Both liquid and molecular seals are acceptable. The depth of liquid seal is
commonly 6" for ground flares and 2 feet for elevated flares. Ground flares
connected to an alternate elevated flare for over-capacity protection may use a
double seal design to divert excess gas to the elevated flare.
Refer to Fire Protection Manual section 1900 for selection and spacing of flame
arresting devices. Flame arrestors installed in the line greater than 15 feet from
the end of the line may pass flame unless they are designed as detonation
arrestors. API 521; ICM 1200; FPM 1940
S.3 Fire Water System and Fire Fighting Equipment
S.3.1 Fire Water System Design
Projects which involve significant changes to the fire water system (i.e. changes or additions
to the fire water main, sprinkler systems, etc.) shall review the design and material selection
with the authority having jurisdiction.
Comment S.3.1 This section provides guidance on design of fire water systems for
process plants. Remote, non-critical or low value facilities may not require a fire water
system. In many locations, the local fire department is the "authority having juris-diction"
especially if they routinely respond in the event of a fire. The insurance carriers also
require a review of projects involving major changes to the fire water system.
S.3.1.1 The capacity of the facility fire water system shall be designed to handle the largest
single fire contingency for a four hour duration. If an existing firewater system will
be used by a project, the existing system shall be flow tested at the tie-in points to
determine that there is sufficient capacity to handle the largest single fire
contingency of the project.
Comment S.3.1.1 Guideline. The largest single fire contingency is based on the
largest single process unit fire or on the largest tank fire scenario whichever is
greater. If two process units are less than 50 feet apart, then the combined area
should be considered a single fire area. See Section D for tank firewater
requirements. The flow testing is needed to determine whether adequate water is
available to handle any potential hazards resulting from the project. FPM 1620
S.3.1.2 The firewater system shall be dedicated to firewater use only.

Chevron Appendix G
Comment S.3.1.2 Company requirement. Using firewater for process

operations or cooling may lead to contamination of the firewater or reduce the
amount of firewater available in an emergency. Also, it could lead to a severe
process upset when fire water is used, causing a process water pressure drop.
Temporary connections to firewater systems shall be in accordance with Section
B.5. FPM 1620
S.3.2 Fire Water Pumps
Projects which require additional firewater pumps or pumping capacity shall be in

accordance with the Fire Protection Manual, Section 1631, and NFPA 20. New fire water
pumps shall be designed with flow meters to facilitate flow testing the pumps.
Comment S.3.2 Industry standard. Flow testing is generally not performed unless flow
meters are installed.
S.3.3 Fire Water Piping
S.3.3.1 Steel pipe shall be used above ground. Underground piping systems should be
constructed of steel, lined steel, or FM-approved high density polyethylene
(HDPE). Underground steel pipe shall be externally coated for corrosion
resistance.
Comment S.3.3.1 Guideline. Local approval authorities may require

compliance with NFPA 24 "Installation of Private Fire Service Mains and Their
Appurtenances." HDPE piping is recommended for underground service only.
Piping in salt water systems may require internal coating. FPM 1630; NFPA 20,
2-14
S.3.3.2 Fire water mains shall be arranged in loops around each process unit and major
tank field area. Shutoff valves shall be located to allow isolation of individual
segments of the system for maintenance. Each segment may include up to 6
monitor and hydrant connections. The loops shall be sized to provide a minimum
of 60 percent of the design flow rate to a process area with one segment of the loop
out of service.
Comment S.3.3.2 Industry practice and contractor standard. The looped

system is needed to allow future maintenance on parts of the system without taking
the entire system out-of-service. FPM 1630.
S.3.3.3 The fire water piping shall be designed to deliver the design flow rate at 100 psig at
the furthest hydrant.
Comment S.3.3.3 Guideline. This provision allows portable or fixed monitors to

be used without boosting. FPM 1633

Chevron Appendix G
S.3.3.4 Fire water mains and headers looping facilities shall be 8 inch minimum. Laterals
supplying single hydrants or monitors shall be 6 inch minimum. Each process area
shall be provided with a 4 inch minimum header to serve first aid hose stations.
Branch lines to hose stations shall be 2 inch minimum. The pipe diameters shall be
increased one size to allow for deposits and scale buildup in firewater systems
using salt water.
Comment S.3.3.4 Guideline. These sizes are the minimum sizes which can
provide the required flow rates and pressures. FPM 1630
S.3.3.4 When installed aboveground, firewater pipe shall be located where the risk of
damage from fire, explosions or mechanical damage from vehicles is minimized.
S.3.4 Fire Water Hydrants
S.3.4.1 In freezing climates, the dry-barrel type hydrant shall be installed.
S.3.4.2 Fire water hydrants shall have a minimum of one 4 1/2 inch outlet and two 2 1/2
inch outlets. Each 2 1/2 inch hydrant outlet shall be individually valved, so that
each hose can be controlled separately. Connections shall be compatible (without
the use of adapters) with the emergency responders' equipment.
Comment S.3.4.2 Guideline. Commercial or shop-fabricated hydrants may be

used. Consider Standard Drawing GD-99621 for design of shop fabricated fire
hydrants. Threaded connections should permit interconnection with local
emergency responders. National Hose Threads should be used in the absence of
other guidance. The 4 1/2 inch connection can be used for suction by fire trucks.
In facilities with no fire truck response, the 4 1/2 inch connection is unnecessary.
FPM 1630
S.3.4.3 Hydrants shall be spaced so that any plant area is within reach of two hydrants by
hoses of 250 feet maximum length. Hydrants shall be located at least 50 feet from
buildings or the process equipment to be protected.
Comment S.3.4.3 Guideline. Generally, this means that hydrants should be

placed on each street corner and if the distance between each hydrant is more than
300 feet, another hydrant should be placed in the middle. Hoses of greater lengths
may be difficult to handle in plant areas. Fire water equipment should be far
enough away from the hazard area to allow operation in an emergency. FPM
1630
S.3.4.4 In tank fields, hydrants shall be located as described in Section D.3.
S.3.5 Fire Water Equipment
S.3.5.1 1 1/4 inch first aid hose reels shall be located not closer than 20 feet from process
equipment or buildings they are protecting. Hose reels shall be located so that all

Chevron Appendix G
process areas, loading racks and manifolds are within 100 feet of two hoses. First
aid water hose nozzles shall be 60 gpm rated.
Comment S.3.5.1 Guideline. First aid hose reels can be operated by one person
to fight small, incipient stage fires. Lengths longer than 100 feet are difficult for
one person to handle. Hose reels are preferred due to ease of use. Responders
only need to pull out the length of hose necessary and the system is immediately
charged with water. Folded hoses require pulling out all of the hose and laying it
down before charging with water. FPM 1640; GD-S99633
S.3.5.2 Fire water monitors, where required, shall be located between 40 and 70 feet from
the hazard to be protected.
Comment S.3.5.2 Guideline. Monitors are used in high risk, high value
facilities, where personnel for fire control is limited or for the protection of a
specific risk within a plant (such as fire hazardous equipment or vessels containing
large holdups of flammable liquid). Consider the use of pilot-activated Inbal
valves to isolate monitors FPM 1640
S.3.6 Foam Systems
S.3.6.1 Foam systems shall be designed and constructed in accordance with NFPA 11
"Foam Extinguishing Systems," NFPA 11A, "High Expansion Foam Systems," and
NFPA 11B, "Synthetic Foam and Combined Agent Systems."
Comment S.3.6.1 Industry standard. Foam is used primarily for extinguishment

of liquid pool fires, sumps or trenches, tanks, and fires on offshore platforms.
Consider Section 1650 of the Fire Protection Manual for a discussion of the
different types of foam available. Consider Section D for the tank foam system
requirements.
S.3.6.2 Foam hose reels shall be installed in areas where the primary hazard is from leaks
and spill fires.
Comment S.3.6.2 Guideline. Refer to Std. Dwg. No. GD-S1093 for foam hose
reel design. FPM 1652
S.3.7 Portable Fire Extinguishers
Portable fire extinguishers shall be located between 20 and 50 feet from the risk to be
protected. Extinguishers shall be easily accessible, located near doors and exits, and shall
be conspicuously marked. Extinguishers shall be set at least 4 inches off the floor or
ground.
Comment S.3.7: Guideline. Consider Figure 1600-19 in the Fire Protection Manual for
guidance in selecting the type of fire extinguisher. NFPA 10, Life Safety Code, lists the

Chevron Appendix G
travel distance requirements for buildings. Locations shall be clearly marked to alert
personnel in the event that an extinguisher is missing. FPM 1660; NFPA 10
S.3.8 Fixed Water Spray Systems
S.3.8.1 Fixed water spray systems shall be designed and constructed per NFPA 15 and API
2510. Deluge systems shall be designed per API 2510. Sprinkler systems shall be
designed and constructed per NFPA 13.
S.3.8.2 Fixed water spray systems shall be located in the following areas:
• Uninsulated vessels containing 2,500 gallons or more of flammable liquid

where monitor streams cannot reach all exposed surfaces that are above the
normal liquid level.
• Pumps or other mechanical equipment that contain liquids that are above their
auto-ignition temperature or 600°F, or mechanical equipment containing
volatile liquid that is located under pipeways, air coolers or other high value
equipment.
Comment S.3.8.2: Guideline. The incremental costs are project-specific. Water

sprays can provide cooling, limiting the extent of damage and exposure to
overhead equipment. Other possible locations for water spray systems include:
over critical equipment located on offshore production platforms, or over critical
equipment in unattended facilities where personnel for fire fighting may not be
immediately available. Use of water sprays should be considered when sizing
drainage systems, refer to Section S.1. For insulated vessels in fire risk areas,
where the insulation is designed to handle a fire scenario, water sprays are not
needed. FPM 1670
S.3.8.3 Spray systems for pumps and other mechanical equipment shall be designed to
deliver a minimum of 0.5 gpm per square foot of area covered. Sprays shall be
designed to protect the process end of the pump assembly including shafts, packing
glands, connections, and other critical parts.
Comment S.3.8.3 Industry standard. The area covered equals the area of the
nozzle's circle of coverage at the pump centerline. Refer to Figure 1600-23 in the
Fire Protection Manual for details. Double-ended pumps require two nozzles for
adequate coverage. Sprays can be activated manually from a safe location or by
fusible plugs installed near the seal area. FPM 1670; NFPA 15
S.3.8.4 Spray systems for vertical vessels shall be designed to deliver a minimum of 0.25
gpm per square foot of exposed uninsulated surface. Spray systems for horizontal
vessels shall be designed to deliver a minimum of 0.25 gpm per square foot of
uninsulated surface area above the lowest operating level of the vessel. The design
can allow for rundown in accordance with API 2510, 8.5.4.2.

Chevron Appendix G
Comment S.3.8.4 Industry standard. Company and industry guidelines give

credit for rundown from the upper half of the vessel to the lower half although
NFPA 15, "Water Spray Fixed Systems" does not. FPM 1670; API 2510, 8.5.4.2
S.3.8.5 Water spray nozzles shall be installed in accordance with API 2510, 8.5.4.
Additionally, a drain valve shall be provided at grade and the piping shall be sloped
to provide gravity drainage. The system shall be designed without low points
which can trap water and increase scaling.
Comment S.3.8.5 Guideline. The drain valve and sloped line can prevent water
accumulation in the line and plugging of the nozzles. Refer to Figure 1600-24 in
the Fire Protection Manual for additional details. In unmanned facilities,
automatic activation of water sprays is recommended. Consider using quick-
opening valves such as the Inbal for activation of water sprays. FPM 1670; API
2510, 8.5.4
S.3.9 Halon Extinguishing Systems
Halon shall not be used unless approved by the Company.
Comment S.3.9 Company requirement. Both the Montreal Protocol and the Clean Air
Act require that the production of Halon be phased out due to its depletion of the ozone
layer. Halon should not be used in new facilities except where life safety is a factor and
after review by the CRTC Fire and Process Safety Team. FPM 1670
S.3.10 CO2 Extinguishing Systems
Fixed CO2 extinguishing systems shall be designed and constructed per NFPA 12 "Carbon
Dioxide Extinguishing Systems."
Comment S.3.10 Industry standard. CO2 will not sustain life and should not be used for
locations where personnel can be expected. CO2 may be appropriate for use on small
turbine enclosures and under floor areas. The CRTC Fire and Process Safety Team should
be consulted before using CO2 in areas accessible to people. FPM 1670

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Appendix G.

Fire Protection Guidelines for New Projects

Chevron Corporation G-1 January 1997

Fire Protection Guidelines for New Projects

1.0 SCOPE .......................................................................................................................................................... 3

2.0 USING THESE GUIDELINES ................................................................................................................. 4

C. COLUMNS AND VESSELS.................................................................................................................... 16

E. EXCHANGERS AND COOLING TOWERS....................................................................................... 26

P. ELECTRICAL AREA CLASSIFICATION ......................................................................................... 51

S. MISCELLANEOUS SERVICES ............................................................................................................ 56

Page 2 of 68 January 1997

Fire Protection Guidelines for New Projects

• decreasing the number of releases and fires

January 1997 Page 3 of 68

Fire Protection Guidelines for New Projects

2.0 USING THESE GUIDELINES

• Legal Requirements - required by OSHA or other legal entities

Page 4 of 68 January 1997

Fire Protection Guidelines for New Projects

Acronym Company Manual

CIV Civil and Structural

API American Petroleum Institute

January 1997 Page 5 of 68

Fire Protection Guidelines for New Projects

A.1 Spacing and Layout

The plant-to-plant, plant-to-property line, and plant-to-building spacing guidelines

• preventing an incipient stage fire at one piece of equipment impacting an

Page 6 of 68 January 1997

Fire Protection Guidelines for New Projects

Comment A.1.1.3 Company requirement. The incremental costs are project-

Comment A.1.1.4 Industry practice. Pumps are a primary source of liquid

• 5 feet minimum spacing between pump foundations

Comment A.1.1.5 Industry practice. "Hot" pumps are a significantly greater

January 1997 Page 7 of 68

Fire Protection Guidelines for New Projects

Comment A.1.1.6 Legal (NFPA 30) requirement. In many locations, NFPA 30

Comment A.1.2.1 Additional design information is in the Civil and Structural

A.1.2.4 Process piping shall be run on above-ground pipeways. There shall be no

Comment A.1.2.4 Industry practice. Above-ground pipeways splitting a plant

• piping in above-ground pipeways can be inspected and leaks easily detected

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Fire Protection Guidelines for New Projects

Fires on mechanical equipment located underneath pipeways can damage the

A.1.3 Roadway Layout and Restrictions

Comment A.1.3.2 Company requirement. Additional costs of this requirement

A.2 LPG Storage and Handling

• API Recommended Practice 2510, Design and Construction of Liquefied Petroleum

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Fire Protection Guidelines for New Projects

A.2.2 LPG Tanks

Comment A.2.2 Compliance with ASME Code is a legal requirement. Designing to

Comment A.2.3.1 Company requirement. The incremental costs of installing

Comment A.2.3.2 Industry standard. Automatic Tank Gauges (ATGs) are

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Fire Protection Guidelines for New Projects

Comment A.2.3.3 Guideline. The incremental cost is project-specific. Shutting

Comment A.2.3.4 Industry standard. It is preferable to vent relief valves to

Comment A.2.3.5 Double valving is an industry standard; The use of a

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Fire Protection Guidelines for New Projects

A.2.4 Spacing and Spill Containment

Comment A.2.4.2 Guideline. Incremental costs are project-specific. In low