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CREW v. DHS: Regarding Border Fence: 1/29/10 - CREW's Motion For An Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs (Document 50)
CREW v. DHS: Regarding Border Fence: 1/29/10 - CREW's Motion For An Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs (Document 50)
CREW v. DHS: Regarding Border Fence: 1/29/10 - CREW's Motion For An Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs (Document 50)
for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (“CREW”) respectfully moves for an award
of attorneys’ fees and costs reasonably concurred in its pursuit of this action. CREW
Respectfully submitted,
respectfully submits this memorandum of points and authorities in support of its motion
for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs against defendant Department of Homeland
Security (“DHS”). Pursuant to the Court’s Orders dated December 7, 2009 (Docket No.
47), and December 18, 2009 (Docket No. 48), the parties conferred and attempted to
reach agreement on attorney’s fee issues. Although defendant DHS “will not contest
plaintiff’s eligibility or entitlement to attorney’s fees,” the parties have been unable to
reach an agreement because the agency contests “the reasonableness of the amount of
Background
In this action under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552,
CREW sought the disclosure of records concerning allegations that defendant DHS and
its component, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”), engaged in improper
political favoritism when CBP made decisions concerning the location of the U.S.-
Case 1:08-cv-01046-JDB Document 50-1 Filed 01/29/10 Page 2 of 8
Mexico border fence and the property owners who would be adversely impacted by the
construction project. Following briefing and the Court’s in camera inspection of the
disputed records, by memorandum opinion and order dated September 1, 2009, the Court
granted in part and denied in part the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. See
Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 648 F. Supp. 2d 152
(D.D.C. 2009). Specifically, the Court ordered defendant DHS to release to CREW
certain information previously withheld by CBP, and “with respect to the Exemption 5
claims in Document Nos. 1, 9 and 27 and relevant attachments within Document Nos. 22
and 24,” the Court directed that “defendant must file a supplemental Vaughn submission,
along with a memorandum in support of its exemption claims, by not later than October
2, 2009 or the Court will treat these remaining exemption claims as conceded and order
that the withheld material be released.” Order of September 1, 2009 (Docket No. 36) at
2.
the Court’s Order of September 1, 2009 (Docket No. 37). By minute order dated October
5, 2009, the Court granted defendant’s motion and stayed defendant’s deadline for filing
September 1 Order (Docket No. 38) and moved to stay the Order pending appeal (Docket
No. 39). CREW opposed the motion to the extent that defendant sought to delay the
(Docket No. 42), the Court granted in part and denied in part defendant’s stay motion and
2
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ordered the agency to “file its supplemental Vaughn index and supporting memorandum
by not later than November 27, 2009,” and to “file a report on the status of its appeal” by
On November 25, 2009, defendant DHS released to CREW the records ordered
disclosed by the Court’s September 1 Order, as well as the records for which the Court
Compliance with Court’s September 1, 2009 Disclosure Order (Docket No. 44). On
November 27, 2009, the agency represented to the Court that it “expects to file a motion
to dismiss [its pending] appeal on or before . . . December 4, 2009.” Id. at 3. The court
of appeals did, in fact, dismiss the agency’s appeal on that date (Docket No. 45).
Argument
The FOIA provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he court may assess against the
United States reasonable attorney’s fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred in
any case under [the Act] in which the complainant has substantially prevailed.” 5 U.S.C.
over disputed documents is deemed to be “eligible” for an award of fees and costs, and is
deemed to be “entitled” to an award if, inter alia, the public interest in disclosure of the
released information outweighs any “private commercial interests” the requester might
have in disclosure. Davy v. CIA, 550 F.3d 1155, 1158 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Thus, for
instance, a fee award would generally be appropriate for a “public interest group seeking
information to further a project benefitting the general public.” Id. (citation omitted).
3
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attorney’s fees,” Defendant’s Status Report (Docket No. 49) at 1, so the Court need not
adjudicate those issues. “Once a plaintiff is deemed eligible and entitled, the court
focuses on the proper amount of the fee award.” Summers v. Dep’t of Justice, 477 F.
employing the “usual method of calculating reasonable attorney’s fees [by] multiply[ing]
the hours reasonably expended in the litigation by a reasonable hourly fee, producing the
lodestar amount.” Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 562 F. Supp. 2d 159,
In Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984), the Supreme Court held that public
interest attorneys may be awarded fees according to the prevailing market rates in the
community. To ascertain appropriate rates in this jurisdiction, “use of the broad Laffey
matrix may be by default the most accurate evidence of a reasonable hourly rate.”
Northwest Coalition for Alternatives to Pesticides v. EPA, 421 F. Supp. 2d 123, 129
(D.D.C. 2006).1 The Laffey matrix designation of appropriate hourly fees is periodically
updated by the Office of the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia; the most current
While a fee applicant “has the burden of establishing the reasonableness of its fee
request,” that burden is met when supporting documentation is “of sufficient detail and
probative value to enable the court to determine with a high degree of certainty that such
hours were actually and reasonably expended,” Role Models America, Inc. v. Brownlee,
1
“The Laffey matrix is ‘a schedule of charges based on [particular attorneys’] years of
experience’ developed in Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 572 F.Supp. 354 (D.D.C.
1983).” Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 562 F. Supp. 2d at 175.
4
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353 F.3d 962, 970 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see
also American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 72 F.3d 907, 915 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“petitioner
must submit ‘sufficiently detailed information about the hours logged and the work
number of hours counsel devoted to discrete tasks performed at specific stages of the
and Declaration of Melanie Sloan (“Sloan Decl.”) (filed herewith) While broken down
into eleven categories, these tasks fall within three broad phases of the case:
1. Case initiation and early tasks. Included in this phase are hours devoted to
drafting and filing the complaint. CREW notes that while the case eventually was
bifurcated by agreement of the parties in order to separately litigate the two distinct parts
of CREW’s FOIA request, see Docket No. 8, the work performed to initiate the case
clearly was reasonable and necessary in order to “substantially prevail” on the claims
CREW advanced in Part I of the case.2 The early tasks also include negotiation with
opposing counsel in order to refine the scope of Part I of CREW’s FOIA request, and to
reach an agreement with respect to the bifurcation of the litigation. These tasks expedited
the ultimate release of the information CREW sought through Part I of its request. See,
2
Should CREW prevail in subsequent litigation of Part II of the case, it acknowledges
that it would not be entitled to “double” compensation for any work (such as preparation
of the complaint) for which it is compensated through this petition.
5
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e.g., Edmonds v. FBI, 417 F.3d 1319, 1324 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“Plainly, there is value to
obtaining something earlier than one otherwise would.”) (FOIA fee case).3
counsel reviewing the agency’s Vaughn submission and partially redacted responsive
CREW’s cross-motion; reviewing the agency’s reply memorandum; and researching and
Court’s memorandum opinion and order of September 1, 2009; consultation, research and
drafting related to defendant’s motions for stays of the Court’s disclosure order; and
review of the records eventually disclosed by defendant to ensure compliance with the
Court’s order. CREW notes that defendant’s motion for a stay pending appeal (Docket
No. 39) sought an open-ended delay of the agency’s obligation to “file a supplemental
Vaughn submission, along with a memorandum in support of its exemption claims” with
respect to several withheld records. Upon CREW’s opposition, the Court denied that
requested relief, noting that it was “not persuaded that it should indefinitely delay
November 5, 2009 (Docket No. 42), at 2. Defendant DHS subsequently released the
disputed records. Again, this work contributed to a more timely disclosure of contested
material than might otherwise have occurred. See Edmonds, 417 F.3d at 1324.
3
It is beyond dispute that the bifurcation of the case resulted in the disclosure of
previously withheld information “earlier” than if CREW had to await litigation of both
parts of its request. Defendant DHS will not even complete processing of material
responsive to Part II of the request until June 20, 2010. See Docket No. 48.
6
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A. Rates and Hours that Form the Basis for CREW’s Request
As is set forth in the accompanying declarations of counsel, both Mr. Sobel and
Ms. Weismann have been practicing law for more than 25 years, Sobel Decl., ¶ 2;
Weismann Decl., ¶ 2, and Ms. Sloan has been practicing law for more than 18 years,
Sloan Decl., ¶ 2. As such, under rates established in the Laffey matrix, Mr. Sobel and
Ms. Weismann are entitled to compensation at an hourly rate of $465, and Ms. Sloan is
entitled to a rate of $410. Exhibit A. Applying those rates to the hours detailed in the
In addition, CREW seeks compensation for time devoted to the preparation of this
motion, see Sobel Decl., ¶ 7; Weismann Decl., ¶ 7; Sloan Decl., ¶ 4, in the amount of
$5,087, as follows:
7
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As detailed above, CREW seeks a total award of attorneys’ fees in the amount of
$45,964 for time reasonably expended by counsel in litigating the merits of Part I of this
case and in the preparation of this motion.4 In addition, CREW seeks reimbursement of
costs reasonably incurred in the amount of $350, which is limited to the filing fee CREW
paid to the Court upon the initiation of this action, Sobel Decl., ¶ 8.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant this motion and order defendant
DHS to pay CREW attorneys’ fees in the amount of $45,964 and costs in the amount of
$350.
Respectfully submitted,
4
CREW intends to supplement its request for attorney’s fees to account for additional
time spent in the preparation of its reply in support of this motion.
8
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EXHIBIT A
Years (Rate for June 1 - May 31, based on prior year's CPI-U)
Years
Explanatory Notes
1. This matrix of hourly rates for attorneys of varying experience levels and paralegals/law clerks has
been prepared by the Civil Division of the United States Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia.
The matrix is intended to be used in cases in which a "fee-shifting" statute permits the prevailing party
to recover "reasonable" attorney's fees. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act); 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (Freedom of Information Act); 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (b) (Equal
Access to Justice Act). The matrix does not apply in cases in which the hourly rate is limited by
statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d).
2. This matrix is based on the hourly rates allowed by the District Court in Laffey v. Northwest Airlines,
Inc., 572 F. Supp. 354 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 746 F.2d 4 (D.C.
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1021 (1985). It is commonly referred to by attorneys and federal
judges in the District of Columbia as the "Laffey Matrix" or the "United States Attorney's Office Matrix."
The column headed "Experience" refers to the years following the attorney's graduation from law
school. The various "brackets" are intended to correspond to "junior associates" (1-3 years after law
school graduation), "senior associates" (4-7 years), "experienced federal court litigators" (8-10 and 11-
19 years), and "very experienced federal court litigators" (20 years or more). See Laffey, 572 F. Supp.
at 371.
3. The hourly rates approved by the District Court in Laffey were for work done principally in 1981-82.
The Matrix begins with those rates. See Laffey, 572 F. Supp. at 371 (attorney rates) & 386 n.74
(paralegal and law clerk rate). The rates for subsequent yearly periods were determined by adding the
change in the cost of living for the Washington, D.C. area to the applicable rate for the prior year, and
then rounding to the nearest multiple of $5 (up if within $3 of the next multiple of $5). The result is
subject to adjustment if appropriate to ensure that the relationship between the highest rate and the
lower rates remains reasonably constant. Changes in the cost of living are measured by the
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) for Washington-Baltimore, DC-MD-VA-WV,
as announced by the Bureau of Labor Statistics for May of each year.
4. Use of an updated Laffey Matrix was implicitly endorsed by the Court of Appeals in Save Our
Cumberland Mountains v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1516, 1525 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc). The Court of
Appeals subsequently stated that parties may rely on the updated Laffey Matrix prepared by the
United States Attorney's Office as evidence of prevailing market rates for litigation counsel in the
Washington, D.C. area. See Covington v. District of Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101, 1105 & n. 14, 1109
(D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1115 (1996). Lower federal courts in the District of Columbia
have used this updated Laffey Matrix when determining whether fee awards under fee-shifting statutes
are reasonable. See, e.g., Blackman v. District of Columbia, 59 F. Supp. 2d 37, 43 (D.D.C. 1999);
Jefferson v. Milvets System Technology, Inc., 986 F. Supp. 6, 11 (D.D.C. 1997); Ralph Hoar &
Associates v. Nat'l Highway Transportation Safety Admin., 985 F. Supp. 1, 9-10 n.3 (D.D.C. 1997);
Martini v. Fed. Nat'l Mtg Ass'n, 977 F. Supp. 482, 485 n.2 (D.D.C. 1997); Park v. Howard University,
881 F. Supp. 653, 654 (D.D.C. 1995).
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(“CREW”) in the above-captioned action and submit this declaration in support of CREW’s
2. I have been an active member of the bar and practicing law since May 1980. For the
past 25 years, I have represented a wide variety of non-profit, public interest organizations in
litigation under the Freedom of Information Act in this and other federal courts.
3. I represented CREW in this matter on a partially contingent, flat fee basis. As such, I
did not prepare bills or invoices for CREW reflecting the hours I devoted to the case on a
monthly (or other periodic) basis. Rather, CREW agreed to pay me flat fees for specific stages
of the litigation (e.g., drafting and filing the complaint, briefing dispositive motions, etc.), and it
was understood that those fees were “below market” and did not reflect the market rates for my
work to which I would be entitled if CREW prevailed in this matter and petitioned the Court for
4. While I did not submit periodic bills or invoices to CREW based upon an itemization
of my time devoted to specific tasks, I did maintain a running tally of time devoted to each
discrete stage of the litigation. This tally was compiled on a computer file which I updated as
additional time was devoted to the case. Thus, for example, when I began work on a specific
task, I would create an entry describing the work (e.g., “drafting complaint”) and then enter the
time devoted to that task (e.g., “2.5 hours”). When I completed the next segment of time devoted
to the task, I updated the tally accordingly (e.g., an additional two hours of work would raise the
tally to “4.5 hours”). In compiling my hours, I endeavored to be conservative and to ensure that
unproductive time was not included in the tally. In furtherance of that objective, my practice was
to record my time in 30 minute increments and to “round down” to the lower increment. For
instance, if I worked for two hours and twenty minutes on a particular task, I would “round
eleven discrete litigation activities, and my case file of pleadings and research materials. As a
result of that review, and in an exercise of billing judgment, I have adjusted downward the time
for which I seek compensation, which is reflected in the attached Exhibit A. I am confident that
the time reflected in Exhibit A was reasonably expended in order to achieve success in this
matter, and that there are no excessive, redundant or unnecessary hours included in this request.
6. In light of the fact that litigation of this case was bifurcated, I note that all of the time
reflected in Exhibit A was devoted to “Part I” of the case, and none to “Part II.”
7. In addition to the time recorded in Exhibit A, I devoted 8.5 hours of time to the
preparation of CREW’s motion for an award of attorney’s fees and costs, and I intend to submit a
2
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supplemental declaration to account for additional time devoted to the preparation of CREW’s
8. CREW seeks reimbursement of costs reasonabled incurred in this case in the amount
of $350, which is limited to the filing fee CREW paid to the Court upon the initiation of this
action.
Under penalty of perjury, I hereby affirm that the foregoing is true and correct to the best
3
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Exhibit A
Breakdown of Hours for David L. Sobel – CREW v. DHS, C.A. No. 08-1046
Work Hours
TOTAL 73.0
4
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(“CREW”) in the above-captioned action and submit this declaration in support of CREW’s
2. Currently I serve as chief counsel for CREW, a position I have held since March
2005. Prior to that, I was Deputy Chief of the Enforcement Bureau at the Federal
Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice; and a staff attorney at the U.S. Department of Labor.
I have been an active member of the bar and practicing law since November 1979.
3. Like all other employees of CREW, I maintain daily time sheets. These records
indicate the number of hours (and in some cases half-hour increments) I have spent on specific
cases, but do not itemize the specific tasks I performed for each of those cases.
4. In order to determine my time for purposes of recovering our fees in this matter, I
reviewed the hours I had spent on the case in coordination with the docket sheet and my case
files, which informed me as to the specific matter pending on a date on which I had expended
Case 1:08-cv-01046-JDB Document 50-4 Filed 01/29/10 Page 2 of 4
time. For example, knowing the plaintiff filed its opposition to defendant’s motion for a stay on
November 5, 2009, allowed me to attribute the time I spent on this case in the days preceding
example, I am claiming reimbursement of only two hours spent on the complaint, while the total
amount of time, including pre-filing consultations with lead counsel David Sobel, was well in
discrete litigation activities. Those activities correspond to the activities enumerated in my co-
counsel David Sobel’s declaration. After reviewing my time sheets and the entire record in this
matter I am confident the time reflected in Exhibit A was reasonably expended in order to
achieve success in this matter, and that there are no excessive, redundant, or unnecessary hours
7. In addition to the time recorded in Exhibit A, I have to date devoted two hours of time
to the preparation of CREW’s motion for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. I intend to
submit a supplemental declaration to account for any additional time devoted to the preparation
8. I also note that because this litigation was bifurcated, I am claiming reimbursement
only for time devoted to Part I of this case, on which CREW prevailed, and not Part II, which has
yet to be resolved.
2
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3
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EXHIBIT A
Breakdown of Hours for Anne L. Weismann in CREW v. DHS, C.A. No. 08-1046
Work Hours
TOTAL 10.5
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(“CREW”). I submit this declaration in support of CREW’s motion for an award of attorneys’
2. I have served as CREW’s executive director since February 2003. Prior to that, I
served as an Assistant United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, and before that spent
five years on Capitol Hill working for first, the Senate Judiciary Committee, and later the House
Judiciary Committee. I have been an active member of the bar and have practiced law since
December 1991.
3. In order to determine my time for purposes of recovering our fees in this matter, I
hours on 10 discrete litigation activities. Those activities correspond to the activities enumerated
in David Sobel’s declaration. After reviewing my time sheets and the entire record in this matter
I am confident the time reflected in Exhibit A was reasonably expended in order to achieve
success in this matter, and that there are no excessive, redundant, or unnecessary hours included
Case 1:08-cv-01046-JDB Document 50-5 Filed 01/29/10 Page 2 of 3
in this request.
4. In addition to the time recorded in Exhibit A, I have to date spent one-half hour on the
preparation of CREW’s motion for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. I intend to submit a
supplemental declaration to account for any additional time devoted to the preparation of
5. I also note that because this litigation was bifurcated, I am claiming reimbursement
only for time devoted to Part I of this case, on which CREW prevailed, and not Part II, which has
yet to be resolved.
2
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EXHIBIT A
Breakdown of Hours for Melanie Sloan in CREW v. DHS, C.A. No. 08-1046
Work Hours
TOTAL 5