BEING AND ONE: THE DOCTRINE OF THE CONVERTIBLE TRANSCENDENTALS IN DUNS

SCOTUS
Author(s): Jan A. Aertsen
Source: Franciscan Studies , 1998, Vol. 56, Essays in Honor of Dr. Girard Etzkorn (1998),
pp. 47-64
Published by: St. Bonaventure University - Franciscan Institute Publications

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.com/stable/41975231

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 BEING AND ONE:
THE DOCTRINE OF THE
CONVERTIBLE TRANSCENDENTĀLS
IN DUNS SCOTUS

In the prologue of his commentary on the Metaphysics , Duns S

explains the name "metaphysics" as transcendens scientia , that
science that is concerned with the transcendentia} This explana
indicative of the prominent place Scotus ascribes to the doctrine
transcendentais, which was formulated for the first time in the Su
de bono of Philip the Chancellor that is datable about 122
connection between the object of first philosophy and the
cendentais is not in itself new,2 although the identity posed by Sco
more radical than in his predecessors. Yet it is no exaggeration
that Scotus's philosophy marks a new phase in the history
doctrine of the transcendentia.

Scotus understands the concept "transcendental" differently

his predecessors did. To thinkers of the thirteenth century, t
cendental properties are communissima. "Being," "one," "tr
"good" "transcend" the Aristotelian categories because they ar
limited to one of them but are common to all things. Accordi
Scotus, however, it is not necessary that a transcendental as tr
dental be predicated of every being; it is not essential to the
transcendens that it has many inferiors. In his Ordinatio he determin
concept negatively: "what is not contained under any genus" or
remains indifferent to finite and infinite."3 This definition makes
possible a vast extension of the transcendental domain; the most import-
ant innovation is formed by the so-called disjunctive transcendentais,
which are convertible with being not separately but as pairs. The fact

1 Quaestiones subtilissimae super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis , prol. n. 18: "Et hanc
scientiam vocamus metaphysicam, quae dicitur a 'meta', quod est 'trans', et 'ycos',
'scientia', quasi transcendens scientia, quia est de transcendentibus."
See Albert the Great, Metaphysica I, tract. 1, c. 2 ( Opera omnia XVI, 1 ed. B. Geyer,
5, 13-14), who uses the phrase prima et transcendentia in his analysis of the subject matter
of metaphysics. For Thomas Aquinas's doctrine, see J.A. Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy and
the Transcendentais : The Case of Thomas Aquinas (London/New York 1966) 1 13-158.
Ordinatio I, d. 8, p. 1, q. 3, n. 113-14 (ed. Vaticana IV, 206).

47

Franciscan Studies Vol. 56 (1998)

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 48 Jan A. Aertsen

that the transcendental properties are

communissima is, I suspect, the reason
which occurs only sporadically in
Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghen
and becomes the usual term.
About Scotus's doctrine of the transc
other medieval thinkers, we are we
pioneering study, The Transcende
Metaphysics of Duns Scotus (1946). Y
that have thus far received little atten
them is Scotus's treatment of the t
"good," which as such are convertibl
want to show that with respect to t
Scotus breaks new ground and appr
thirteenth-century predecessors. Bec
the relation between being and one, I f

I.
THE QUAESTIO ABOUT BEING AND ONE

Scotus deals with being and one in his commentary (in the form of
quaestiones) on book IV of Aristotle's Metaphysics , the usual place for
medieval reflections on this theme. The second question of book IV is a
fascinating but difficult text, because it presupposes a thorough knowl-
edge of the history of thought - Aristotle, the Arabic heritage, and
thirteenth-century authors - and of the philosophical problems inherent
in the doctrine of the transcendentais. Moreover, the quaestio exhibits a
complex structure that makes it less than easy for the reader to follow
the line of argumentation.
Some parts of the second question are worked out at length while
others are scarcely more than rough sketches. There is external and
internal evidence that Scotus had the habit of later returning to a base
text to make corrections, refinements, and additions. At the end of the
present question there is a long Additio which James of Aesculo in his
tabula Scoti regarded as question 3 of book IV. Recently it has been
argued that the Questions on the Metaphysics were composed at different

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 CONVERTIBLE TRANSCENDENTĀLS 49

stages in Scotus's career and that the traditional view

tary is earlier than the theological works must be recon
The new edition of the commentary on the Metap
the Franciscan Institute is a milestone in Scotus schol
in the notes a store of information about the position
and it offers, in comparison to earlier editions, a mu
into the structure of the quaestio .5 The new edition dis
the introductory arguments pro and contra (n. 1-11), fo

A. Ad quaestionem (n. 12-65);

B. Solutio propria (n. 66-76);
C. Responsio ulterior ad quaestionem (n. 77-160);
D. Quaestio de continentia unitiva (n. 161-76).

These four parts can be reduced logically to two ma

C/D).
In reference to Aristotle's text (IV, c. 2, 1003b 22-23), the first main
part raises the question: "Do being and one signify the same nature?"
( Utrum ens et unum significant eandem naturam). Scotus discusses the
Philosopher's arguments for their identity in close connection with the
controversy in the Arabic tradition between Avicenna and Averroes
about the nature of the one. His expositions also appear to have been
influenced by logical texts. The first contra argument is that the identity
of being and one would have as its consequence that the proposition
" tantum unum est ens" would be true. uTantum unum esť is a standard
sophisma in the thirteenth century.6 The first main part is closed by
Scotus's own solution to the question.
Scotus introduces the second main part of the text with the
observation that haec quaestio de uno et ente habet tot difficultates (n. 77).
He sums up four difficulties, which reflect central problems of the
thirteenth-century discussions about the transcendental one. I briefly
indicate the difficulties and Scotus' s solutions to them.

4S. D. Dumont, "The Question on Individuation in Scotus' Quaestiones super

Metaphysicam" in L. Sileo (ed.), Via Scoti. Methodologica ad mentem Joannis Duns Scoti
(Roma 1995) 193-227.
I wish to thank the editors of Scotus's Quaestiones in Metaphysicam of the Franciscan
Institute, St. Bonaventure University, for making available to me a version of their critical
text of the commentary.
S. Ebbesen, 11 Tantum unum. est. 13th-Century Sophismatic Discussions around the
Parmenidean Thesis," in: The Modem Schoolman 72 (1995), 175-99.

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 50 Jan A. Aertsen

(i) The first difficulty is: "Does th

(An unum dicat aliquid positivům )
thinkers define the one as that whic
that goes back to Aristotle ( Metaph
through the negation of division, t
something positive. Thomas Aquinas
The one does not include the aspect of
it is said solely secundum rationem neg
"negative aspect" of existence.7 But ho
of the one reconcilable with Thomas's statement in his Summa
Theologiae that "everything guards its unity as it guards its being (esse)"?8
Why would things guard something negative? In the Franciscan
tradition, as in Bonaventure, for example, a distinction is therefore made
concerning the one between the ratio intelligendi and the res which is
understood. The ratio of the one is expressed through the privation of
division, but with respect to the thing understood, the one expresses
something positive.9 Duns joins this tradition and responds affirmatively
to the first dubium. A privation posits no perfection, but unity does.10

(ii) Scotus's second difficulty is whether the one is convertible with

being (n. 81-82). An obstacle for the convertibility is that "being" is
predicated of something of which "one" is not predicated, namely,
"multitude." The problem becomes clearly perceptible in Aquinas's
doctrine of the transcendentais. On the one hand, he expressly states the
convertibility of being and one, but, on the other, he maintains that
being is divided by the one and the many, and that multitude belongs to
the transcendentia .n How can one be convertible with being, when the
one and the many form the primary differentiations of being in general

7Thomas Aquinas, Summa theol. 1,6.3 ad 1; De veritate 21.5 ad 7. Cf. J. Owens,

"Unity and Essence in St. Thomas Aquinas," in: Mediaeval Studies 23 (1961), 240-59 (251-
52).
8 Summa theol. 1, 1 1 . 1 .

9Bonaventure, In I Sent , d. 24, a. 1, q. 1 (Opera omnia I, 420-22). Cf. Peter John

Olivi, Quaestiones in Secundum Librum Sententiarum , q. 14 (ed. B.Jansen, Quaracchi 1922-
26, I, 271). R. E. Houser, "Transcendental Unity in Petrus de Trabibus," in: Franciscan
Studies Ì9 (1979), 49-104.
°Duns Scotus, QQ. Metaph. IV, q. 2, n. 80: "Confirmatur: privatio nullam
perfectionem ponit; unitas ponit."
1 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theol. 1,30.3: "Multitudo (...) est de transcendentibus,
secundum quod ens dividitur per unum et multa."

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 CONVERTIBLE TRANSCENDENTĀLS 5 1

{ens commune )?12 Scotus's solution to the difficulty i

The reason for this could be that the question of
forms the key problem in the first main part of the
his solution he had already said what was essential.

(iii) The third difficulty is the question whethe

convertible with being is the principle of number
case too it is illuminating for the understanding of th
a comparison with Thomas Aquinas. He had made a
between the transcendental or "metaphysical" one
with being and the "mathematical" one that belongs
quantity.13 In his commentary on the Sentences ,
criticizes this dual conception of unity of Thom
mention Thomas by name, but he cites verbatim p
work.14 In this criticism, Ockham seems to have
Scotus, for Scotus's solution to the difficulty consists
that one and the same thing does not possess two
created thing the unity that is convertible with be
( realiter ) differ from the unity that belongs to the ca
However, the concept of transcendental unity is al
than that of numerical unity since it is ex se indifferen
the nonlimited, while the unity of a determinate c
denotes something limited.15

(iv) The final difficulty is whether the one when

with being expresses some other res than being
himself remarks that this dubium is common to all tr
this difficulty is central in the thirteenth-centur
communissima. When "one," "true," and "good" ar
"being," the problem is how their identity and thei
thought at the same time. If there is no difference
useless repetition of the same ( nugatio ) to say that

l2In I Sent. 24.1.3: "Et sic accepta, unum et multa sunt de prim
secundum quod ens dividitur in unum et multa, et in actum et po
multa dividunt ens commune."
13Thomas Aquinas, In IV Metaph., lect. 2, 560; X, lect. 3, 1981
ad 2.
14William of Ockham, Scriptum ini Sent., d. 24, q. 1 ( Opera Theol . IV, 73-74).
15Duns Scotus, QQ. Metaph. IV, q. 2, n. 100.

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 52 JanA. Aertsen

true, and good. If, however, one,

being, they would no longer be
transcendental character. Scotus di
extensively than he does the others
of "unitive containment" ( continenti
with a separate treatment of this not
the division of the question in the ne
Our analysis of the structure of
commentary Scotus focuses on two
of the convertibility between being a
main part) and the question of the
transcendentais. I would like to cons

II.
IS THE ONE CONVERTIBLE WITH BEING?

The point of departure of Scotus's question is Aristotle's account o

the relation between being and the one in book IV of the Metaphysic
Having established in chapter 1 that the subject matter of firs
philosophy is being-as-being and the properties that belong to being
such, Aristotle turns in ch. 2 to the per se attribute of being, "the one."
is introduced as follows (1003b 22-25): "Being and the one are the sam
and one single nature (physis ) in the sense that they follow upon eac
other (...) but not in the sense that they are determined by one conce
(logos)»
The Philosopher adduces two arguments for the convertibility of
being and the one.16 The first argument (1003b 26-32) is based on
semantic considerations. The expressions "one man," "being man," and
"man" signify the same. The addition of the terms "one" and "being"
does not express something different from the nature of "man."
Evidence for this conclusion is furnished by the processes of coming-to-
be and passing-away. When a man is generated, being man is generated,
and at the same time one man. Aristotle's second argument (1003b 32-

16Aristotle does not use the term "convertibility" in book IV, but the expression is
found in book XI, c. 3 (1061a 15-17): "Et enim si non idem sed est aliud, conuertitur
quidem; unum enim ens aliqualiter et ens unum." (Transi. Guillelmi).

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 CONVERTIBLE TRANSCENDENTĀLS 53

33) is if possible even more concise: "The substance o

and not per accidens , and similarly it is not a being acci
It is important to note that Aristotle's expositions
lie at the foundation of the medieval doctrine of the transcendentais.
The Aristotelian origin is clearly evident in the first formulation of this
doctrine in Philip the Chancellor. In the prologue of the Summa de bono ,
he states that there are four communissima : ens , unum , verum, bonům. 18 In
the first three quaestiones he investigates how the most common notions
are related to each other. Are they synonyms? Philip's solution became
decisive for the thirteenth-century doctrine. "Being," "one," "true," and
"good" are the same according to their supposita; they possess a material
identity. They differ from each other, however, according to their ratio;
the concept of "being" is not identical with the concept of "one". The
other communissima add not a reality to being, but something con-
ceptual. This solution is based on the two features whereby Aristotle in
his Metaphysics characterizes the relation between being and the one:
real identity and conceptual difference. His definition of the "one" in
terms of "indivision" becomes in Philip the model for the conceptual
difference between the transcendentais. That appears from the fact that
Philip also wants to define "the true" and "the good" in terms of
indivision. The first systematization of the transcendentais is based on
this notion.19

Aristotle's exposition is the starting point of Scotus's question, but

its actual background is the discussions in Arabic philosophy about the

17Cf. Scotus's summary of Aristotle's arguments in q. 2, n. 10: "Oppositum est

Philosophus, IV huius: 'ens homo et homo et unus homo' idem significant. Probado: 'quia
non separantur in generatione et corruptione'"; and n. 11: "Item, 'ens' et 'unum'
praedicant essentiam cuiuslibet, ergo significant idem."
18Philip the Chancellor, Summa de bono , prol. (ed. N. Wicki, Bern 1985, 4).
Philip the Chancellor, Summa de bono , q. 3 (ed. Wicki, 17,24-29): "Dico quod
verum simpliciter prius est intellectu quam bonum. Et hoc patet ex diffinitionibus. Verum
enim dicitur habens indivisionem esse et eius quod est. Non nominatur hie quod non sit
ex parte ends, scilicet ipsum esse et id quod est. In radone autem boni preter esse habetur
intendo finis et comparado ad finem cum dicitur: bonum est habens indivisionem actus a
potentia sive finis simpliciter vel quodam modo." Cf. q. 7 (ed. Wicki, 27): "Unum non
ponit super ens nisi indivisionem." Cf. H. Pouillon, "Le premier traité des propriétés
transcendentales, la Summa de bono du Chancelier Philippe," in: Revue néoscolastique de
philosophie 42 (1939), 40-77; Jan A. Aertsen, "The Beginning of the Doctrine of the
Transcendentais in Philip the Chancellor," in: Quodlibetaria , Festschrift J. M. da Cruz
Pontes, Mediaevalia. Textos e estudos 7-8 (1995), 269-86.

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54 Jan A. Aertsen

nature of the one. In the third treatise

a succinct summary of his view:
The one coincides (parificatur ) w
being, is said of each of the catego
know, are different. They agree in
substance of any thing.20

This text makes clear that Avicenn

elements. First, he recognizes the co
which is being is one. They are id
Second, there exists a conceptual dif
Avicenna illustrates this difference
"many" is not "one," but is neverthe
not have the character of a substance.
one in a positive way as a concomitant
The medieval reading of the Av
influenced by the severe criticism o
Metaphysics IV, ch. 2, he portrays A
much in holding that ťthe one' and 'b
the essence of a thing." His basic err
identification of the one that is predic
that is the principle of number. Numb
man [Avicenna] held that the one signi

20Avicenna latinus, Liber de philosophia prim

Louvain and Leiden 1977, 114): "Unum autem
unoquoque praedicamentorum, sicut ens, sed i
Conveniunt autem in hoc quod nullum eorum s
21 Cf. Ibid., Vn,l (ed. Van Riet, 349): "Scias a
in praedicatione sui de rebus, ita quod, de quo
illud potest esse unum alio respectu. Nam quicq
quia id quod intelligitur de utroque sit unum
subiecto, scilicet quia, in quocumque est hoc,
uno omnino esset id quod intelligitur per ens,
non esset ens sicut non est unum, quamvis acci
multitudo est una, sed non inquantum est m
enim [unitas] recipitur in certificatione quiddi
comitans substantiam, sicut iam nosti. Non
differentiam, sed sicut accidens."
22Averroes, In IV Metaph., comm. 3, in: Aristo
vol. VIII, Venice 1562-1574 (rpt. Frankfurt
autem peccavit multum in hoc, quod exis
dispositiones additas essentiae rei (...) Et etiam

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 CONVERTIBLE TRANSCENDENTĀLS 5 5

The carry-over of the "Commentator's" criticism

manifest in the thirteenth-century commentaries on
physics . Albert the Great, in his commentary on bo
digressio in which he disputes arguments of sophistae agai
being and the one are one and the same nature.23 Unm
is referring here to logical texts from the Faculty of
above-mentioned sophisms Tantum unum est. One of
controversy between Avicenna and Averroes. Argum
convertibility of being and the one are presented as r
their refutations are based on Averroes' criticisms.24 Alb
to Avicenna the series of arguments he adduces ag
conception of the convertibility of being and one. The
however, in Albert's view, easy to refute. At the co
excursus he tempers his criticism of Avicenna. The A
is to be excused {excusare). Closer scrutiny of his stateme
he intended to say the same as Aristotle, namely, that be
signify one and the same nature.25
Thomas Aquinas is less reserved in his critique of A
commentary on the Metaphysics , he states that Avicenn
view of the one than Aristotle had. The Arabic philosoph
one adds something real to the substance of a thing a
one that is convertible with being with the one that
number. But according to Thomas this view is incorr
is in a determinate category is consequent upon being
one that belongs to the category of quantity cann
convertible with being in general. Thomas's rejection

omnibus praedicamentis, est illud unum quod est principium n

autem est accidens. Unde opinatus fuit iste, quod hoc nomen unum
entibus."

23Albert the Great, MetaphysicaW , tract. 1, c. 5 (ed. Geyer, 166-6

declarans solutionem rationum sophistarum inductarum ad hoc q
sint natura una et eadem."
Cf. A. de Libera, "D'Avicenne à Averroès, et retour. Sur les sources arabes de la
théorie scolastique de l'un transcendental," in: Arabie Sciences and Philosophy 4 (1994), 156-
57. De Libera discusses the sophism " Tantum unum est ," contained in the Collectio secunda
of the Bibliothèque Nationale, ms. lat. 16135.
25Albert the Great, Ibid., IV, tract. 1, c. 5 (ed. Geyer, 167): "Et facile est per haec
quae hic dicta sunt, excusare dicta Avicennae, quia pro certo, si quis subtiliter dicta sua
respiciat, dicere intendit quod hic dictum est."

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 56 JanA. Aertsen

between the transcendental one and the mathematical one in fact

repeats Averroes' criticism of Avicenna.26
Against the background of this trend in the commentaries, the
newness of Scotus's approach stands out in sharp relief. His approach
can be described as a return to Avicenna. Sympathy for Avicenna's
position runs like a thread through his entire treatment of the quaestio.
Scotus presents the opinio Avicennae by means of four arguments:27

(i) According to Avicenna being and the one, although predicated

of all things, are not identical according to their nature. The
reason for this is that if the one were essentially identical with
being, then the many would be not-being, inasmuch as the
many, as many, is not one (n. 12).

(ii) It would be a useless repetition of the same (nugatio) to say that

"being" is "one" if there were an essential identity between the
two (n. 13). The expression nugatio does not occur in the
Avicenna latinus but is borrowed from Averroes.28

(iii) If the one signifies the same as being, then it would be

predicated in quid of being. That, however, is not the case: the
one is said denominatively of being (n. 18). The third argument
is formulated in the terminology of Scotus's doctrine of
predication. To predicate in quid means to predicate the
essence or at least the determinable part of the essence (genus)
of a subject. What is predicated per modum denominantis is
always predicated in quale. In this way a further modification or
qualification of the essence of the subject is predicable.29 The
thrust of the third argument is therefore that the one and being
are not convertible. That the one is not predicated in quid of
being Scotus demonstrates in the following way. When the one
and being are taken abstractly, that is, abstracted from the

26Thomas Aquinas, In IV Metaph., lect. 2, 556-60.

27These arguments display a striking agreement with the four rationes Avicennae in
the sophism Tantum unum est , that is discussed by A. de Libera (o.e., nt. 24).
¿8Averroes, Ibid. (ed. Venice Vili, f. 67ra): "Et iste homo [Avicenna] ratiocinatur ad
suam opinionem, dicendo quod, si unum et ens significant idem, tunc dicere ens est unum
esset nugatio, quasi dicere unum est unum, aut ens est ens. "
Cf. A. B. Wolter, The Transcendentais and Their Function, 79-81.

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 CONVERTIBLE TRANSCENDENTĀLS 57

subject, then the proposition unitas est entitas (

appears to be false, for "indivision" belongs to t
unity, but not to the concept of entity. They are t
identical (n. 20).

(iv) Every unity belongs to the category of quantity.

one is not convertible with being (n. 21).

Scotus's further procedure in the quaestio is th

Aristotle's arguments for the convertibility from Avice
(sustinendo opinionem Avicennae ); adduces objections to
ments; formulates answers to these objections; and fi
own solution. For clarity's sake I summarize the
moments of this discussion in five points.

(1) Scotus concludes in his solution that being and

simply convertible. He explains this conclusion
Avicenna' s first argument.30 If the one were accord
identical with being, the many, as many, would be no
since what is many is not "one" in the sense of an essent

(2) As an objection against Avicenna's argument,

forward that its consequence would be the denial of
between being and the one, which conflicts, however
statement that "being and the one coincide (p
predication."31 In his reply Scotus stresses that the A
does recognize a convertibility, but not an "essentia
Avicenna's point is that the one and being are n
(essentialiter) identical, since otherwise it would be a nug
being is one (his second argument), and one would b
being in quid and not denominatively (his third a
interpretation of Avicenna, Scotus distinguishes two
bility. The type that Avicenna recognizes with respec

™QQ. Metaph. IV, q. 2, n. 66: "Dicendum est ad quaesti

convertuntur propter rationem tactam, quae (...) fuit prima pro opin
ilIbid. IV, q. 2, n. 41: "Contra primam rationem: sequitur ex il
non convertuntur. Hoc haberi potest ex prima ratione pro op
praedicantur de eisdem. Contradicit sibi ipsi, quia dicit in VII Metap
parificantur in praedicatione.'"

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 58 Jan A. Aertsen

one presupposes not an essential iden

subject.32 This type of convertibility
related to each other as subiectum and

(3) In his elaboration of the con

further than Avicenna. Scotus's thesis is that the one is convertible with
being insofar as the one is understood to be the unum simpliciter or
secundum quid. This disjunction, like the disjunction "act or potency," is
convertible with being, not, however, one of the members of the
disjunction separately.33 Scotus's answer to the quaestio aims to reinter-
pret the traditional view of the convertibility of being and the one in the
direction of his doctrine of the disjunctive transcendentais. It is not the
one as such that is convertible with being but the disjunction "the one
or the many."34

(4) This tendency is also present in Scotus's attitude towards the

authority of Aristotle. Scotus inquires after the intentio Philosophi and
thinks that this agrees with his own interpretation of the convertibility.
In book IV of the Metaphysics , Aristotle wants to show that, in keeping
with the principle that one and the same science considers both the
subject and its disjunctive properties, first philosophy deals both with
being and with the one and the many - and with each of the last two
separately. In ch. 2 Aristotle intends to demonstrate that the consider-
ation of being and the one belongs to the same science. This demon-
stration does not require as antecedent either that the one is essentially
identical with being or that the one is convertible with being. For the

i2Ibid. IV, q. 2, n. 56: "Ad radones contra opinionem Avicennae, dicendum quod
concedit convertibilitatem, non essentialem, sed quod idem sunt subiecto, non secundum
essentiam."

ì3Ibid. IV, q. 2, n. 66: "Dicendum est ad quaestionem, quod non convertuntur (...),
nisi sit unum simpliciter vel secundum quid. Hoc disiunctum convertitur - sicut potentia
vel actus - cum ente, non alterum per se."
34This point has thus far been neglected in studies on Scotus's doctrine of the
transcendentais. A. B. Wolter, The Transcendental* and Their Function, deals with "unity" in
the chapter on the coextensive transcendental attributes (101-110), but also lists "one-
many" among the disjunctive transcendentais (138). He does not go into the relation
between the two viewpoints.

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 CONVERTIBLE TRANSCENDENTĀLS 59

conclusion intended by Aristotle, the premise s

disjunction "the one and its opposite" is convertible with

(5) But how is the transcendentality of the one to be

Avicenna's (fourth) argument that the one belongs
category"? Scotus subscribes to this argument. Bein
related to each other as subiectum and passio. No sub
passio of another substance or of itself. The propert
accident. "I concede {concedo) that the one belongs t
category, namely, to that of quantity." For all that,
that the transcendental character of the one is not t
He endeavors to clarify this by making a comparison wi
creatio. "Creation" in the passive sense signifies t
things, which belongs to everything that is not God. Cr
a property of being, but it still belongs to a determinat
relation. In the same way, the one can belong to a det
and still ( simpliciter or secundum quid) to the whole of b
One may wonder whether Scotus's reasoning is rea
According to his own definition, "transcendent" is th
fall under a category. Strikingly, Scotus elsewhere ad
conception of the relation of creation. Everything that
before it is divided into the categories, he argues, is
relation of creation is of this sort, for it belongs to eve
descends into the categories. The relation of creation
a particular category but is a relatio transcendens - Scot
use this expression.37 This conception would also ha

35QQ. Metaph. IV, q. 2, n. 67: "Ad rationes pro intentione Phi

eamdem scientiam pertinet considerare de subiecto et de passione
de uno vel multo, et de utraque parte seorsum. Unde ibi inte
eamdem scientiam pertinet considerare de ente et uno. Ad hoc prob
pro antecedente quod unum sit essentialiter idem enti, nec etiam
ente, sed sufficit quod ipsum 'disiunctum contra oppositum' conver
hoc sequitur conclusio Philosophi. "
* Ibid. IV, q. 2, n. 70: "Concedo tunc quod omne unum est d
scilicet quantitatis. Sicut enim omne aliud a Deo dicitur creatum,
est proprietas entis, et tamen creatio est unius generis, ut relationis,
in ilio genere, sic unum potest esse determinati generis, et tame
simpliciter vel secundum quid. (...) Unde hoc nihil concludit contra A
37 Ordinano II, d. 1, n. 277 (ed. Vat. VII, 137-38); Rep. Paris. II,
Vivès XXII, 555b); Lectura II, d. 1, n. 261 (ed. Vat. XVÏÏI, 89).

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 60 Jan A. Aertsen

quences for Scotus's discussion of

relation of creation into the presen
elucidate the status of the one.
Concluding our analysis of the first
can observe that his discussion of th
contains two important new eleme
thirteenth-century views. The fi
Avicenna's view of the nature of the
between the one and being. The seco
ment of the one within the scope of th
one is not simply convertible with b
many.38

III.
IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
BEING AND THE CONVERTIBLE TRANSCENDENTĀLS

The second theme of our investigation concerns the (fourth

difficulty raised by Scotus in the second main part of his quaestio
namely: "Does the transcendental one express some other res th
being?" Arguments pro are of course drawn from Avicenna, argume
contra from Aristotle and the "Commentator." Now, in the first ma
part of the question, Scotus had concurred with Avicenna's view tha
being and the one are not essentially convertible, but that they ar
related to each other as subject and property. The one has the charac
of an accident, which signifies a disposition added to being. For Sco
it therefore seems to hold that the one expresses some other res th
being.
But what is meant by some other "reality"? With respect to this
point Scotus makes two striking statements. First, he defends Avicenna
against the criticism of Averroes. One must not attribute the view of a

38There is a certain discrepancy between Scotus's answer to the quaestio and his
answer to the second difficulty in the second main part ("Whether the one is convertible
with being?"). This last reply does not rise above the level of a rudimentary note. Scotus
answers the question positively only by pointing to two texts of Avicenna's. He adds to
this that the counter-argument based on the division of being by one and many is not valid
{non valet), for this division is not by opposites (n. 81). The precise relation between the
two solutions is difficult to determine. Because the first solution is, however, the one that
is elaborated by Scotus, I regard it as representative for his view.

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 CONVERTIBLE TRANSCENDENTĀLS 61

"real diversity" between being and the one to Avic

appears to do. Avicenna' s statements about the one m
in the light of his definition of "accident": "all that is
concept of the essence." Avicenna means to say that
not actually included in the quiddity, but rather
quiddity. Scotus subsequently adds a remark to this
expresses a cautious distance from Avicenna: "This m
mean that these properties are accidents, but that
contained {unitiva contenta )."39 He thereby introdu
will serve as the model for his solution to the probl
and difference.

In another place in his commentary on the Meta

makes a distinction between esse de essentia and esse ide
realiter , which is helpful for understanding his last re
essence of A" is precisely that which is included in
concept of A. "To be really identical with A" can occur
outside the concept of A. Scotus illustrates the latter no
the transcendental perfections unity and truth, "wh
concept of being that is, as Avicenna states, prior to
not mean another res than being."40
In our present text Scotus expresses the denial of
through the notion of continentia unitiva and he next
identity" (¡ identitas realis) which is implicit in this
divine essence contains infinite perfections, and co
unitively so that they are not other things (res), in like
essence can contain unitively some perfections. The
fundamental difference between the unitive containm
essence and in created essence. Every perfection in G
cannot therefore be said to be a part of one tot
creatures, every contained perfection is limited, and
containing essence considered according to its to

3 9QQ . Metaph. IV, q. 2, n. 142: "nota etiam quod opini onem ista
non oportet imponere Avicennae, licet Averroes videatur ei impo
dicit Avicenna III Metaphysicae suae vel VII de hac materia, e
accidens est quidquid est extra per se intellectum quiditatis, sicut
'Quiditas est tantum quiditas, nec universalis, nec parti cularis
istorum actu includitur in intellectu quiditatis, sed quasi prius n
quiditatem. Sed hoc non necessario forte ponit quod sint accidentia
^lbid. VII, q. 1, n. 11.

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 62 JanA. Aertsen

perfection can be said to be a part

distinct {realiter differens ), so t
another perfection, by an othern
This difference is not as great as
of "diverse things" but is a minor r
if we call every difference no
difference."41
The notion of "unitive containment" expresses a real identity and a
real difference of a specific nature that deserves further attention. Scotus
traces the origin of the notion to Dionysius the Areopagite's work De
divinis nominibus 42 The passage he has in mind is ch. 5, where it is said
that "in the divine goodness are being itself, the principles of beings, all
beings and whatever contains being (esse continentia)' and they are in it in
an irrepressible, comprehensive and unitive way ( unitive )."43 Dionysius
wants to make clear that all beings are in God, not, however, as they are
in created things, where they possess diversity and plurality, but
unitively. From the Dionysian idea Scotus framed the notion of "unitive
containment." He employs it in the discussion of the question
concerning the relation between God and his many attributes, but also
applies it to other problems. One of these is the relation between being
and the convertible transcendentais.44
Scotus elaborates the concept of "unitive containment" in several
passages of his work.45 What is unitively contained are not perfections

41 Ibid . IV, q. 2, n. 143: "Sicut essentia divina infinitas perfectiones continet et omnes
unitive, sic quod non sunt alia res, sic essentia creata potest alias perfectiones unitive
continere. Tamen in Deo quaelibet est infinita; et ideo proprie non potest dici pars unius
totalis perfectionis. (...) In creatura quaelibet perfectio contenta limitata est, et limitador
essentia continente secundum totalitatem considerata. Ideo quaelibet potest dici pars
perfectionis, non tamen realiter differens quod sit alia natura, sed alia perfectio realis, -
alietate, inquam, non causata ab intellectu, nec tamen tanta quantam intelligimus cum
dicimus 'diversae res'; sed differentia reali minori, si vocetur differentia realis omnis non
causata ab intellectu."
42 Ordinatio II, d. 16, q. un., n. 17 (ed. Vivès XIII, 43 a.).
De divinibus nominibus c. 5,6 (PG 3, 820C-D) in the translation of Robert
Grosseteste ( Dionysiaca I, 343): "Et est ex ipsa, et in ipsa, et ipsum esse, et entium principia
et entia omnia, et qualitercumque esse continentia, et haec irretentive et convolute et
unitive."
^See M. J. Grajewski, The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus , Washington, D. C.
1944, 124-37.
Concerning continentia unitiva there are three important texts: Ordinatio II, d. 16, q.
un., nn. 17-18 (ed. Vivès XIII, 43-44); IV, d. 43, q. 3, n. 5 (ed. Vivès XX, 448a-b); Rep.
Paris. II, d. 1, q. 6, n. 14 (ed. Vivès XXII, 554a-b).

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 CONVERTIBLE TRANSCENDENTĀLS 63

that are altogether identical, for those are not united b

presupposes some distinction. Neither are perfectio
tained that are really distinct in the sense that they
because those are contained multipliciter or dispersí
presupposed by unitive containment is, as we have s
difference," that is, a difference not constituted by
where Scotus calls this difference a "formal" distinction
between different formalitates or realitates , which
quiddities independent of the intellect.46 Thus the
containment" connects a real identity with a formal no
two features hold for the relation between being an
transcendentais. Scotus's answer to the question whet
dental one expresses some other res than being is t
provided that "thing" is understood in the sense
formalitas.
Scotus develops a new model for the relation between being and the
convertible transcendentais. Thirteenth-century thought followed the
solution of Philip the Chancellor: there exists between them a real
identity (they are the same in subiecto or supposito ), but a conceptual non-
identity (they differ ratione). For Scotus there exists between being and
the convertible transcendentais not only a real identity, but also a real
non-identity in the sense of a formal distinction. What philosophical
grounds lead Scotus to reject the traditional conception of a purely
conceptual difference?
This question can best be elucidated by referring to a view of the
transcendentais given by Etienne Gilson in a posthumously published
work. According to Gilson the transcendentais are superfluous for being
as being. Being contains them, so they add nothing to being. The trans-
cendentais are not concerned with being as such, but with being as
known. "The transcendental is only given in knowledge."*7 Gilson
employs the same expression Scotus uses; being "contains" the transcen-

^See M. J. Grajewski, The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus (important for the
connection with "unitive containment"); A. B. Wolter, "The Formal Distinction," in : J.
K. Ryan and B. M. Bonansea (eds.), John Duns Scotus , 1265-1965 , Washington, D. C.
1965, 45-60; M. McCord Adams, "Ockham on Identity and Distinction," in: Franciscan
Studies 36 (1976), 5-74 (on Scotus, 25-43); L. Honnefelder, Ens inquantum ens. Der Begriff
des Seienden als solchen als Gegenstand der Metaphysik nach der Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus,
Münster 1979, 367-80.
E. Gilson, Constantes philosophiques de Vetre, Paris 1983, 117.

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 64 Jan A. Aertsen

dentals. The renowned French scholar draws from this the conclusion
that the transcendentais are therefore superfluous for being as such and
manifest themselves only in relation to a knowing subject. Scotus would
have rejected this conclusion, since in that case our distinct knowledge
of the transcendentais would possess no real foundation.
Scotus introduces a new model for the relation between being and
the convertible transcendentais in order to safeguard the possibility of
metaphysics. If the transcendentais are not distinguished from being by
a real formality, he argues, then metaphysics, which considers these
properties, would no longer be a real science.48 The scientia transcendens
can only remain a scientia realis when the transcendentais are more than
mental constructions.

Thomas Institute, Cologne Jan A . Aertsen

48 Or dinatio II, d. 16, q. un., n. 17 (ed. Vivès XIII, 43 a-b): "Aliter Metaphysica
concludens tales passiones de ente, et illas considerans, non esset scientia realis."

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