STAT CON While Rules may be relaxed when the party invoking liberality adequately explains his failure

to abide therewith, the bank failed to do so.

STATUTE CONSTRUED AS A WHOLE
The explanations 49 proffered by the bank behind its failure to incorporate a notice of
hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration are unsatisfactory
NUNEZ VS GSIS
As to the claim that the government would suffer loss of substantial amount if not allowed to
FACTS recover the proceeds of the loans, this Court finds that any loss was caused by respondent's
Petitioner Leonilo obtained three loans from GSIS Family Bank own doing or undoing.
All the three loans were secured by a mortgage of certain parcel/properties of land In fine, the failure to timely perfect an appeal cannot simply be dismissed as a mere
While the 3 loans were maturing, he obtained a ‘fourth loan’ technicality, for it is jurisdictional
On the maturity of the three loans, he executed a promissory note
More than 19 years after the promissory note, the bank undertook to extrajudicially Jurisdictional issue aside, upon the ground of prescription, the bank's case would just the
foreclose the properties mortgaged same fail. An action to foreclose a real estate mortgage prescribes in ten years
A review of the records of the case shows that, as correctly claimed by petitioners, no letter
CONTENTION OF BANK: of demand, court action, or foreclosure proceeding was undertaken prior to December 11,
That Leonilo violated the terms and conditions of the loans when he failed to pay his 1997 and September 1, 1999.
principal obligations and interest
On petition, 2 of the 6 lands was extrajudicially closed STAT CON at
Clutching PART
straws, the bank argues that the applicable provision is Article 1141, 56 not
Leonilo filed a complaint against GSIS Article 1142 57 of the Civil Code.
Article 1141 of the Civil Code speaks of real actions over immovables or rights. Article 1142 of
CONTENTION OF LEONILO: the Civil Code speaks of a mortgage action which prescribes in ten years. The strategic
That he did not secure a ‘fourth loan’ location of Article 1142 immediately right after Article 1141 of the same Code, which speaks
That the three loans already matured, hence, it no longer had any right as prescription set in of real actions, indicates that it is an exception to the rule in the previous article.

RTC – for Leonilo , died and substituted by his heirs (cause of action already prescribed); the petition is GRANTED.
denied Bank’s Motion for Recon and Notice of Appeal
PNB VS CRUZ
CA – for Bank; denied Leon ilo’s Motion for Recon
FACTS
RULING: AMEX laid off 70% of its employees because of business reverses
Distinction of Rule 45 and Rule 65 of RoC
-That errors of jurisdiction are best reviewed in a special civil action for certiorari under Rule The retained 30% continued to work but were not paid and continued until AMEX ceased
65; operations and entered into an agreement with TM San Andres (latter would be leasing the
-That error of judgment can only be corrected by appeal in a petition for review under Rule equipment and machineries of AMEX)
45. The unpaid employees filed with Labor Arbiter and found t heir claim valid and meritorious
AMEX and its president did not appeal but PNB did as mortgage-creditor
Despite the distinct, the Court may treat certiorari filed under Rule 45 if the same is filed w/in
reglementary period for filing a petition for review CONTENTION of PNB
That the workers' lien covers unpaid wages only and not the termination or severance pay
The petition was filed under Rule 45 and 65 which the workers likewise claimed they were entitled to

When the bank then filed its Motion for Reconsideration on the last of the 15-day period for NLRC affirmed the appealed decision
taking an appeal and it was subsequently denied, the bank had only one (1) day from
December 9, 2002 when it received a copy of the order denying the motion or until RULING
December 10, 2002 within which to perfect its appeal The petition is devoid of merit
It filed the Notice of Appeal, however, on December 11, 2002, hence, out of time, and the PNB daw did not question the validity of the worker’s claim for unpaid wages
decision of the trial court had become final and executory. =ISTCHE In the petition, PNB a sks w/n the worker’s lien take precedence…
COURT: cannot allow petitioner to alter its stance; the petitioner failed to question the same
on appeal. Hence, it is now barred from claiming that the workers' lien applies only to the
products of their labor and not to other properties of the employer which are encumbered
by mortgage contracts or otherwise
STAT CON HERE
In Herman vs. Radio Corporation of the Philippines, 7 this Court declared that whenever two
statutes of different dates and of contrary tenor are of equal theoretical application to a
particular case, the statute of later date must prevail being a later expression of legislative
will. Applying the aforecited case in the instant petition, the Civil Code provisions cited by the
petitioner must yield to Article 110 of the Labor Code
Nevertheless, under Article 110 of the Labor Code as amended, the unpaid wages and other
monetary claims of workers should be paid in full before the claims of the Government and
other creditors. Thus not even tax claims could have preference over the workers' claim
Consistent with the ruling of this Court in Volkschel Labor Union vs. Bureau of Labor
Relations, 11 this court
of the provisions adopts
of the Laborthe doctrine
Code that
and its "(i)n the implementation
implementing and workingman's
regulations, the interpretation
welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration."12 Bearing this in mind, this
Court must reiterate the dictum laid down in A.C . Ransom that the conflict between Article
110 of the Labor Code and Article 2241 to 2245 of the Civil Code must be resolved in favor of
the former. A contrary ruling would defeat the purpose for which Article 110 was intended;
that is, for the protection of the working class, pursuant to the never-ending quest for social
justice
the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit
LOPEZ VS CSC
FACTS
Vice Mayor of MNL and Presiding Officer of City Council submitted to CSC the appointments
of 19 officers and employees in the Exec Staff of the Office of Presiding Officer (pursuant to
Sec 15 RA 409)
City Budget Officer sought recommendation from Personnel Bureau whether the newly
appointed employees be paid [on the basis of appointments by Vice Mayor]
Personnel Bureau said that City Mayor is proper appointing officer and the opinion was
transmitted to CSC
CSC opined that it is City Council is vested with the power
ISSUE: whether or not Section 15, supra, of the Charter of the City of Manila has been
repealed
No appeal from decision of CSC… parties aggriev ed proceed to Court on certiorari under Rule
65 w/in 30 days from receipt
CSC judgment are unappealable and subject only to certiorari
Still accept the petition because of important public interest (since it was filed w/in 30 days)
CONTENTION OF PET:
Sec 15 RA 409 has been repealed by RA 5185
RULING OF COURT:
RA 409 is a special law; RA 5185 and BB 337 is a general law
RULE OF STAT CON: that a special law prevails over a general law — regardless of their dates
of passage — and the special is to be considered as remaining an exception to the g eneral
ANOTHER RULE: every effort must be exerted to avoid a conflict between statutes. If
reasonable construction is possible, the laws must be reconciled in that manner
In the light of all the foregoing, we do not find any grave abuse of discretion committed by
the respondent Commission.
the petition is DISMISSED.
NPC VS HON PRESIDING JUDGE
FACTS
Province of Misamis Oriental filed a complaint with RTC Cagayan against NAPOCOR for
[collection of real property tax and special education fund tax covering from 1978-1984]
Pet NAPOCOR filed Motion to Dismiss: that court had no jurisdiction; cited PD 242 that
disputes bet gov’t agenci es is settled by SEC of JUSTICE
Court denied the Motion to Dismiss; denied the second Motion to Dismiss
NAPOCOR relied on PD 242 that …cases… settled by the SEC of JUSTICE
RESPONDENT MUNICPAL CORPORATIONS relied on PD 464: that …collection of tax may be
enforced by civil action in any COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION
RULING:
Use STAT CON:
PD 242 is general law
PD 464 is special law
Between GL and SL, the SL prevails
Where SL is inconsistent with GL, a partial repeal of
GL will be implied to the extent of the repugnancy grafted upon the GL
SL is EX to GL
In the case, conflict bet. PD 242 and 464, in favor of 464 because it is later enactment
the petition is DISMISSED.
GORDON VS JUDGE VERIDIANO
FACTS
There are two drug stores owned by PR, covered by mayor’s permi t and license to operate by
FDA
FDA conducted a test buy at one of the drug stores and was sold of a certain drug w/o
doctor’s prescription
A report was submitted to petitioner mayor and he revoke the Mayor’s Permit… Vice Mayor
caused the posting for the permanent closure [since Mayor went to Singapore]
FDA Administrator directed the closure of the drug store and payment of fine in violation of
RA 3720 + stern warning. Later, FDA lifted the closure order
PR wrote to Pet Mayor to reconsider the revoked Mayor’s Permit
After the reply, PR filed with RTC a mandamus and damages against Pet and Vice-M
PR requested from FDA to exchange the location of the drug stores and was granted.
But upon knowing this, Pet disapproved th e transfers a nd suspended the Mayor’s Permit
PR filed supplemental complaint; Respondent judge directed to maintain status quo
Pet wrote FDA requesting reconsideration and resumption of the o peration of the drug store
Thus, in the case, drug store was ordered by FDA for violation of its own condition, THUS THE
MAYOR HAD NO AUTHORITY TO interpose his own findings on the matter and substitute
them
Violation is national in scope, so under the FDA
Factual finding of administrative authorities are accorded with respect… Even courts respect
them… So petitioner must accept the decisions…
HOWEVER, the SUSPENSION IS BASED ON THE TRANSFER OF THE SITE OF THE DRUG STORE
APPROVED BY DFA W/O PERMISSION FROM PET…
Court believes final decision is with MAYOR since it is related to LOCATION
FDA have no right to disapprove… only if it would impair the health or interest of the
customer
Our holding is that the petitioner acted invalidly in revoking Mayor's Permit No. 1954 after
the FDA had authorized the resumption of operations of the San Sebastian Drug Store
following the enforcement of the penalties imposed upon it. However, it was competent for

but denied by FDA; motion for recon likewise denied the petitioner
Store to suspend
in violation Mayor's
of the permit . Permit No. 1955 for the transfer of the Olongapo City Drug
RULING
Compare the power and function of FDA and Mayor Pet was only promoting campaign against drug addiction… he acted with good faith… though
he may have overreacted
==FDA==
Board of Pharmaceutical Examiners – was tasked srcinally to inspect drug via ACT 2762 PP VS JUDGE PALMA
FDA – vested will all drug inspection function under RA 3720
DOH issued AO No. 60 – for effective exercise of function; laid down requirement for FACTS
application to be filled with FDA for authorization to operate or establish drug establishment Respondent Morada, 17 y/o was charged with vagrancy
PD 280 – promulgated because of rampant drug addiction; TO GIVE MORE TEETH TO THE Respondent judge dismissed the case that court cannot take further cognizance of the case…
POWERS OF FDA w/o prejudice to refiling in the Ju venile court
Prosecution + Cam Sur Juvenile court judge believe that jurisdiction remain with regular court
==MAYOR== Thus petition
Traces his authority to the charter of Olongapo City, R.A. No. 4645 under Section 10
RULING
STAT CON PRINCIPLE Court sustains the petition
Conflicting statutes should be reconciled instead of declaring one invalid; harmonize them
RA 6591 created the Cam Sur Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and provided a limited
Authorization to operate issued by FDA is a precedent to the grant of mayor’s permit jurisdiction over criminal cases where the accused is UNDER 16 YEARS OLD at the TIME OF
Despite the FDA permit, compliance must still be ascertained by the mayor if the LOCAL FILING THE CASE

REQUIREMENTS
refuse to give thewere observed, otherwise, in the exercise of his own authority, he may
permit PD 603 was issued and defined YOUTHFUL OFFENDER as OVER 9 but under 21 and DID NOT
The power to approve license extends also to the power to revoke it… TRANSFER JURISDICTION OVER CC WHERE ACCUSED IS UNDER 16
Thus, FDA grants the license, so FDA may revoke the license for viola tion… Same is applied to
Olongapo PD 603 is a general law
RA 6591 is a special law
Mayor may not revoke permit on the ground that the compliance was found satisfactorily by
FDA… Same also with FDA: may not revoke license on the ground laid by mayor … A GL cannot repeal a SL by implication… it must be expressed and specific
AGAIN, the definition of YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS DID NOT WITHDRAW THE REGULAR COURT
THEIR JURISDICTION TO TRY CASES WHERE ACCUSED ARE 16 but below 21 and TRANSFER it
to JUVENILE COURT (where it is limited only to under 16)
IF IT WERE THE INTENT AND PURPOSE OF PD, it would have expressly provided for repeal
ISSUANCE OF PD 798 strengthen the prosecution’s stand that REG COURT – over 16, under
21; JUV COURT – under 16
Though SG acknowledge RJ’s intent, IT WAS CLEAR IN THE LAW THAT JUV COURTS ARE
LIMITED TO UNDER 16… it cannot be expanded by judicial fiat
The Code establishes the criteria and guidelines under which all youthful offenders under 21
years are to be tried and attended to, regardless of whether the cases be filed with the
Juvenile Courts for those under 16 years or with the regular courts for the older ones
Thus, the dismissal orders of respondent judge dated March 6, 1976 and April 1, 1976 are set
aside
CITY OF MANILA VS TEOTICO
FACTS
Teotico was a practicing public accountant, a business, a professor. One night, he fell inside
an UNVCOVERED and UNLIGHTED CATCHBASIN or MANHOLE
Due to this fall, he sustained injuries and he was brought to hospital
He filed with CFI a complaint for damages against MNL because the incident: (CONTENTION)
-Prevented him from working for 20 days
-Lost daily income
-Subjected to humiliation and ridicule
-Fear and anxiety for the welfare of his minor children
MNL (CONTENTION)
-That missing iron cover of catchbasin was reported missing and was replaced the next day
-That no report that the catchbasin was not covered
-That it was always policy to repair such
-That it was immediately attended to
CFI – sustained the defendants and dismissed the complaint
CA – decision was affirmed EXCEPT in so far as MNL is concerned; was sentenced to pay
ISSUE: w the case is governed by Sec 4, RA 409 or Article 2189 of CC
CONTENTION of MNL:
RA 2189 should prevail over RA 409 because:
-Latter is special law (exclusive for City of MNL) while former is general law (applicable to
entire PH)
RULING/STAT CON:
CA correctly applied CC
Sec 4, RA 409 is not SL but General Law because it regulates the liability o f City of MNL
Art 2189 is SL because it is particular prescription making
In other word, Sec 4 RA 209 refers to liability arising from negligence in general while ART
2189 refers to liability due to defective stress in particular
Thus, present petition is based on alleged defective of condition of road as was in ART 2189
FIRST ISSUE: City admitted that such streets were under its control and supervision
Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was and is u nder its control and
supervision
Then, again, the determination of whether or not P. Burgos Avenue is under the control or
supervision of the City of Manila and whether the latter is guilty of negligence, in connection
with the maintenance of said road, which were decided by the Court of Appeals in the
affirmative,
review. is one of fact, and the findings of said Court, thereon are not subject to our
ARCENAS VS CITY OF SAN CARLOS
FACTS
Arenas was a judge of San Carlos City. He instituted a petition for mandamus against City of
San Carlos. He alleged that SC City is a 3rd class city;
CONTENTION:
THAT under RA 5967 provides that the basic salary of 2nd and 3rd class cities shall be 18k per
annum
THAT he was receiving monthly salary of 1k: 350 of nat’l govt wile 650 by the city gov’t and
that it was short of 500
THAT he was entitled to salary differential of 9,500k
THAT he requested to enact the budget but refused
THAT it is the duty of respondents to enact the budget
CONTENTION (Respondent)
Admitted and denied the allegations:
THAT city judge shall at least be 100 pesos less than that of city mayor.
CFI dismissed the petition
CONTENTION #2 (Petitioner)
THAT if the last proviso o f Sec 7, RA 5967 wo uld be interpreted as the controlling measure for
fixing the salary of the city judges, THEN THE PRINCIPAL SEC 7 of FIXING THE SALARY OF CITY
JUDGE HIGHER THAN CITY MAYOR WOULD BE USELESS
THAT since it is the intention to increase the salary of city judge, THE LAST PROVISO SHOULD
GIVE WAY TO THE PRECEDING PROVISIONS
RULING
City Mayor – 13,200
Ciy Judge – 12,000
Exactly 100 more than the salary of the city judge
STAT CON
Based on the deliberation of Senate, the intention of Congress in enacting Republic Act No.
5967 was that the salary of a city judge should not be higher than the salary of the city mayor
The saving clause "Provided, however…” qualifies the earlier provision which fixes the salary
of city judges for second and t hird class cities at P18,000.00 per annum
The primary purpose of a proviso is to limit the general language of a statute. When there is
irreconcilable repugnancy between the proviso and the body of the statute the former is
given precedence over the latter on the ground that it is the latest expression of the intent of
the legislature
DECISION: dismisssed
BAGATSING VS RAMIREZ
FACTS
Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 7522 which is regulating the operation of
public markets and prescribing fees for rentals of stalls …
Respondent Manila Market Vendors Inc., (MMVI) commenced civil case seeking the
declaration of nullity of the said ordinance
CONTENTION OF MMVI:
THAT publication requirement was not complied
THAT market committee was not given participation
THAT anti graft and corrupt practices act was violated
THAT ordinance violate PD 7
First, respondent judge denied the plea for FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES
Later, respondent judge declared the nullity of the ordinance for NON COMPLIANCE OF
PUBLICATION REQUIREMENT
Motion for recon was denied; Hence present petition
RULING
1 CONFLICT between Revised City Charter (RCC) and Local Tax Code (LTC) on the manner of
publication
RCC require publication before the enactment of th o rdinance and after the approval
LTC prescribes publication after the approval of o rdinances levying or imposing taxes, fees, or
other charges
RCC is a special act (applied only to MNL) whereas LTC is a general law (applied to all LGU)
Blackstone definition of GL and SL - universal rule affecting the entire community and
special law as one relating to particular persons or things of a class
Moreover, SL is considered as EX to GL
BUT THE RULE IS NOT APPLICABLE IF SL = GL and GL = SL or particular
In the case, it is
RCC – speaks of ordinance in general
LTC – speaks of ‘ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges’ in particular
Thus, LTC CONTROLS… a Gprovision must give way to Pprovision
2 PRINCIPLE
The principleOF EXHAUSTING
cannot be applied since the CONTROVERSY IS A PURE QUESTION OF LAW
3 Minor details but still.. important… wa ko ka g
4 non participation of Market Committee … does not affect the or dinance
The function of committee is purely recommendatory… its recommendation is wi thout
effect… MC serve as legislative aide
5 Ordinance not made for corporation but for raising revenues of city.
The right to tax depends upon the ultimate use and purpose NOT ON THE CHARACTER OR
THE PERSON
DECISION: ordinance is held valid
MAGTAJAS VS PRYCE
FACTS
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro; leased a portion of building
belonging to Pryce Properties Corp (PR), renovated and equipped it and prepared its
inauguration during Christmas season
It was met with opposition from different backgrounds: civil orgs, religious sects, women,
youth. Demonstrations led by mayor
SP of CDO enacted Ordinance 3353 (Ord 1) and adopted another Ordinance 3375-93 (Ord 2)
Pryce assailed the ordinances before CA [with PAGCOR as intervenor]
CA declared the ordinance invalid and issued writ to prohibit the enforcement;
reconsideration was denied
CONTENTION OF PETITIONERS
THAT gambling is not allowed by GL and by the Consti
THAT legislative power conferred upon LGU may be exercised over all kinds of gambling; thus
gov’t of CDO has the authority to prohibit them w/in its territory
THAT when the Code authorize the LGU to prevent and suppress gambling, it meant ALL
FORMS OF GAMBLING w/o distinction: Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemos.
Otherwise, it would have expressly excluded from the scope of their power casinos and other
forms of gambling authorized by special law, as it could have easily done. The fact that it did
not do so simply means that the local government units are permitted to prohibit all kinds of
gambling within their territories, including the operation of casinos
THAT if there is doubt on LGC, it must be in favor of LGC
THAT gambling is harmful; impugn the wisdom of PD 1869 in creating PAGCOR and authorize
the operation of casino
ADDITIONAL: two kinds of gambling: ILLEGAL AND AUTHORIZED BY LAW
COURT FINDS THAT the ordinances violated PD 1869
Ordinance should not contravene a statute. Municipal Gov’t are only agents of Nat’t Gov’t.
The delegate cannot be superior to the principal
CONCLUSION/DECISION:
PAGCOR has the power to centralize and regulate all games of chance w/in the PH.. PD 1869
remains unimpaired and not modified by LGC
Casino gambling is authorized by PD 1869. It cannot be amended o r nullified by an ordinance
Despite the good intention and motives, the ordinances are contrary to PD 1869

Basically, morality of gambling is not justiciable. Thus Court cannot question the wisdom, Petition is DENIED
morality or practicability of statutes… it is left with the legislative and executive
department… JUDGE LEYNES VS COA

More details on the paragraph: LIM VS CA

Gambling
Nothing inisthe
notConsti
illegalthat
per se
proscribe or penalize gambling FACTS
Left to Congress whether to allow it without limitation or prohibit some forms PR entered into contract of lease with Pet for 3 years
After the term expired, PR refused to vacate
ISSUE: main issue is whether the ordinances are valid Pet filed with City Court MNL an ejectment suit
The case was terminated by a judicially approved compromise agreement
RULING
Test for validity of an ordinance The lease continued and on Apr 1985, pet advised PR that he would no longer renew the
contract
Under Sec 458 of LGC, gov’t units are authorized to prevent or suppress “gambling”. But this However, on Aug 1985, PR informed pet of his intention to renew contra ct
provision excludes games of chance w/c are NOT PROHIBITED BUT ARE PERMITTED BY LAW But pet advised PR that he did not agree with the renewal

Under the rule of NOSCITUR A SOCIIS, a word or phrase should be interpreted in relation to,
or given the same meaning of, words with which it is associated.
Accordingly, we conclude that since the word "gambling" is associated with "and other
prohibited games of chance," the word should be read as referring to only illegal gambling
which, like the other prohibited games of chance, must be prevented or suppressed.
PET only read par F of the repealing clause… upon reading the entire clause, PD 1689 is not
one of them [repealed]
Because PR refused to vacate, pet filed another ejectment suit with Met Trial Court
LOWER COURT - dismissed the complain that: lease contract has not expired and that
compromise agreement constitutes res judicata
RTC - Pet appealed to RTC but RTC affirmed lower court
CA – affirmed the RTC; motion for recon denied

IMPLIED
No proofREPEAL
that PD 1869 was impliedly repealed WA NAHUMAN
PAGCOR is mentioned as source of founding of two RAs. This show that PAGCOR was not DAR VS SUTTON
repealed by LGC but improved to be responsive to the fiscal problems of the government
FACTS
STAT CON? This is about a land in Masbate
Reconcile and harmonize statute if there is conflict Respondent made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) their landholding to PET DAR to avail of
Proper action on the conflict of PD and Code is NOT TO UPHOLD ONE AND ANNUL THE certain incentives under the law [pursuant to the existing agrarian reform law at that time]
OTHER but to give EFFECT TO BOTH BY HARMONIZING THEM
So: LGU may and must prevent and suppress all kinds of gambling w/in their territories A new agrarian law took effect and included in its coverage farms used for raising livestock
EXCEPT only those allowed by statutes like PD 1869 (CARL)

A case decided by SC ruled that that lands devoted to livestock and poultry-raising are not
included in the definition of agricultural land. SC declared as unconstitutional some
provisions of CARL
In view of the case, respondents filed with PET DAR a formal request to withdraw their V OS
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer inspected the land and found that it was SOLELY for cattle-
raising and recommended to DAR Secretary that it be exempted from the coverage of CARL
Respondents reiterated the withdrawal but PET ignored their request
DAR issued AO 9 series of 1993 that only portions of private agricultural lands shall be
excluded from CARL
STAT CON: Moreover, it is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that the reenactment
of a statute by Congress without substantial change is an implied legislative approval and
adoption of the previous law
Basically, the 1988 CARL was amended by RA 7881 to amend certain provisions… Specifically
the definition of the terms ‘agricultural activity’ and ‘commercial farming’… Congress sought
to align the provisions of the agrarian law with that of the intent of the Consti
DECISION: dismissed
The AO was unconstitutional as it enlarges the coverage of the agrarian reform beyond the
scope of the Consti

Respondents wrote DAR Sec and advised him to consider their withdrawal under the Luz
Farms Doctrine
DAR partially granted the application from CARL. Pet exempted certain hectares of
respondent’s land while the other were ordered to be segregated and placed under
compulsory acquisition

Respondent moved for recon; filed a notice of appeal to Office of President; Office of the
Pres affirmed the Order of petitioner DAR but the issues of the constitutionality of the AO is
left for the courts to determine

CA favored the respondents

ISSUE: constitutionality of DAR AO 9

CONTENTION OF DAR
THAT AO 9 is to limit the area of livestock farm
THAT AO 9 seeks to remedy reports that some landowners convert their agri farms to
livestock farms to evade coverage in the CARL

Admin rules and reg are subject to judicial review because they partake the force and effect
of law
For admin rules and reg to be valid, must be issued by authority of a law AND MUST NOT
CONTRAVENE THE CONSTI

RULING
THE AO CONTRAVENE THE CONSTI

AO
It is –clear
regulate
in thelivestock farmit by
Consti that including
excluded ALLt hem in the
LANDS agrarian reform
EXCLUSIVELY DEVOTED TO LIVESTOCK
PET DAR clearly exceeded its power in issuing the AO

PET DAR argues that AO is to address the reports that landowners convert their agri lands to
livestock farms… BUT THE SCENAR IO IS NOT APPLICABE TO THE CASE
The family acquired the land as early as 1948; been in the business for a long period; NO
EVIDENCE THAT RESPONDENT CONVERTED THEIR BUSINESS OF BREEDING CATTLE AFTER THE
ENACTMENT OF CARL