CRIMLAWaaa

G.R. No.
183563 December 14, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
HENRY ARPON y JUNTILLA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Assailed before Us is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated February 8, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00560,
which affirmed with modification the Decision2 dated September 9, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban
City, Branch 7, in Criminal Case Nos. 2001-01-46 to 2001-01-53, finding the accused-appellant Henry Arpon y Juntilla
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one (1) count of statutory rape and seven (7) counts of rape against the private
complainant AAA.3
On December 29, 1999, the accused-appellant was charged4 with eight (8) counts of rape in separate informations, the
accusatory portions of which state:
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-46
That sometime in the year 1995 in the municipality of [XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said [AAA], who was then
only eight (8) years old, without her consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is
a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree.5
That sometime in the month of July, 1999 in the municipality of [XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the twelve-year-old offended party,
actuated by lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with the use of force and violence succeed
in having carnal knowledge of the said [AAA], without her consent and against her will.
That sometime in the month July 1999 in the municipality of [XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the
That sometime in the month of August, 1999 in the municipality of [XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the
That sometime in the month of August, 1999 in the municipality of [XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the
a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree.12 (Emphases ours.)
During the arraignment of the accused-appellant on November 28, 2000, he entered a plea of not guilty.13 On March 13,
2001, the pre-trial conference of the cases was conducted and the parties stipulated on the identity of the accused-
appellant in all the cases, the minority of the victim and the fact that the accused appellant is the uncle of the victim.14
The pre-trial order containing the foregoing stipulations was signed by the accused and his counsel. The cases were
then heard on consolidated trial.
The prosecution presented the lone testimony of AAA to prove the charges against the accused-appellant. AAA testified
that she was born on November 1, 1987.15 In one afternoon when she was only eight years old, she stated that the
accused-appellant raped her inside their house. She could not remember, though, the exact month and date of the
incident. The accused-appellant stripped off her shorts, panties and shirt and went on top of her. He had his clothes on
and only pulled down his zipper. He then pulled out his organ, put it in her vagina and did the pumping motion. AAA felt
pain but she did not know if his organ penetrated her vagina. When he pulled out his organ, she did not see any blood.
She did so only when she urinated.16
AAA also testified that the accused-appellant raped her again in July 1999 for five times on different nights. The
accused-appellant was then drinking alcohol with BBB, the stepfather of AAA, in the house of AAA’s neighbor. He came
to AAA’s house, took off her panty and went on top of her. She could not see what he was wearing as it was nighttime.
He made her hold his penis then he left. When asked again how the accused-appellant raped her for five nights in July
of the said year, AAA narrated that he pulled down her panty, went on top of her and pumped. She felt pain as he put
his penis into her vagina. Every time she urinated, thereafter, she felt pain. AAA said that she recognized the accused-
appellant as her assailant since it was a moonlit night and their window was only covered by cloth. He entered through
the kitchen as the door therein was detached.17
AAA further related that the accused-appellant raped her again twice in August 1999 at nighttime. He kissed her and
then he took off his shirt, went on top of her and pumped. She felt pain in her vagina and in her chest because he was
heavy. She did not know if his penis penetrated her vagina. She related that the accused-appellant was her uncle as he
was the brother of her mother. AAA said that she did not tell anybody about the rapes because the accused-appellant
threatened to kill her mother if she did. She only filed a complaint when he proceeded to also rape her younger sister,
DDD.18
After the testimony of AAA, the prosecution formally offered its documentary evidence, consisting of: (1) Exhibit A - the
Medico-Legal Report,19 which contained the results of the medical examination conducted on AAA by Dr. Rommel
Capungcol and Dr. Melissa Adel Gagala on October 26, 1999; and (2) Exhibit B - the Social Case Study
Report20 pertaining to AAA’s case, which was issued by the Municipal Social Welfare and Development Office of the
Province of Leyte.
The Medico-Legal Report stated the following findings:
P. E. Findings: Surg. Findings:
- (-) Physical injuries.
OB- NOTES:
- Patient came in with history of rape since 8 year old for so many times. last act was March 1999.
O: Pelvic Exam:
Ext. Genetalia – grossly normal.
Introitus: Old, healed incomplete laceration at 3 & 9 o’clock position
Speculum Exam: not done due to resistance.
Internal Exam:
Vaginal smear for presence of spermatozoa: = NEGATIVE21
Upon the other hand, the defense called the accused-appellant to the witness stand to deny the informations filed
against him and to refute the testimony of AAA. He testified that when the first incident of rape allegedly happened in
1995, he was only 13 years old as he was born on February 23, 1982. In 1995, he worked in Sagkahan, Tacloban City
as a houseboy for a certain Gloria Salazar and he stayed there up to 1996. He stated that he was working in Tacloban
City when the alleged rapes happened in the municipality of XXX. When he would go home from Tacloban, he would
stay at the house of a certain Fred Antoni. He did not go to the house of AAA as the latter’s parents were his enemies.
He said that he had a quarrel with AAA’s parents because he did not work with them in the ricefields. He further
recounted that in July 1999, he was also living in Tacloban City and worked there as a dishwasher at a restaurant. He
worked there from 1998 up to September 1999. The accused-appellant likewise stated that in August 1999, he was still
working at the same restaurant in Tacloban City. While working there, he did not go home to XXX as he was busy with
work. He denied that he would have drinking sprees with AAA’s stepfather, BBB, because they were enemies.22
On cross-examination, the accused-appellant admitted that the mother of AAA was his sister and they were close to
each other. He said that his parents were still alive in 1995 up to October 1999 and the latter then resided at Calaasan,
Alangalang, Leyte. He indicated that his parents’ house was about two kilometers away from the house of AAA. While
he was working at the restaurant in Tacloban City, he would visit his parents once every month, mainly on Sundays.23
The Judgment of the RTC

On September 9, 2002, the RTC of Tacloban City, Branch 7, rendered a Decision convicting the accused-appellant as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, pursuant to Art. 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code as amended, and
further amended by R.A. 8353 (Rape Law of 1997) and R.A. 7659 (Death Penalty Law) the Court found
accused HENRY ARPON, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of ONE COUNT OF STATUTORY RAPE and SEVEN
COUNTS OF RAPE charged under the informations and sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of DEATH, and to
indemnify the victim, [AAA] the amount of Fifty Thousand (₱50,000.00) Pesos for each count of Rape and pay moral
damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand (₱50,000.00) Pesos and pay the cost.24 (Emphases in the original.)
The court a quo found more credible the testimony of AAA. The fact that AAA was in tears when she testified convinced
the trial court of the truthfulness of her rape charges against the accused-appellant. If there were inconsistencies in
AAA’s testimony, the trial court deemed the same understandable considering that AAA was pitted against a learned
opposing counsel. The delay in the reporting of the rape incidents was not also an indication that the charges were
fabricated. Moreover, the trial court ruled that the findings of the medico-legal officer confirmed that she was indeed
raped. The accused-appellant’s defense of alibi was likewise disregarded by the trial court, declaring that it was not
physically impossible for him to be present in XXX at any time of the day after working hours while he was working in
Tacloban City. The trial court stated that the accused-appellant was positively identified by AAA as the person who
sexually abused her and she held no grudge against him. The trial court imposed the penalty of death as it found that
AAA was less than 18 years old at the time of the commission of the rape incidents and the accused-appellant was her
uncle, a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree. The trial court also appreciated against the accused-
appellant the aggravating circumstances of abuse of confidence and nighttime.
The accused-appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration25 of the RTC Decision, asserting that the trial court failed to
consider his minority as a privileged mitigating circumstance. As stated in his direct examination, the accused-appellant
claimed that he was born on February 23, 1982, such that he was only 13 and 17 years old when the incidents of rape
allegedly occurred in 1995 and 1999, respectively. In a Resolution26 dated November 6, 2002, the trial court denied the
accused-appellant’s motion, holding that the latter failed to substantiate with clear and convincing evidence his
allegation of minority.
The cases were elevated to the Court on automatic review and were docketed as G.R. Nos. 165201-08.27 The parties
then filed their respective briefs.28 On February 7, 2006, we resolved29 to transfer the cases to the Court of Appeals
pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo.30 The cases were docketed in the appellate court as CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
00560.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
On February 8, 2008, the Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed decision, decreeing thus:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated September 9, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City in Criminal
Case Nos. 2001-01-46 to 2001-01-53 is AFFIRMED with modification awarding exemplary damages to [AAA] in the
amount of Twenty[-]Five Thousand (₱25,000.00) Pesos for each count of rape and clarification that the separate award
of Fifty Thousand (₱50,000.00) Pesos as moral damages likewise pertains to each count of rape. The death penalty
imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua in accord with Rep. Act No. 9346.31
The Court of Appeals adjudged that the inconsistencies pointed out by the accused-appellant in the testimony of AAA
were not sufficient to discredit her. The appellate court held that the exact age of AAA when the incidents of rape
occurred no longer mattered, as she was still a minor at the time. More significant was her "straightforward, categorical
and candid testimony" that she was raped eight times by the accused-appellant. The Court of Appeals also agreed with
the ruling of the RTC that AAA’s charges of rape conformed with the physical evidence and the accused-appellant’s
uncorroborated defense of alibi could not stand against the positive identification made by AAA.
As regards the attendant circumstances, the Court of Appeals ruled that the relationship of the accused-appellant to
AAA was both alleged in the informations and admitted by the accused-appellant. The appellate court, however, differed
in appreciating against the accused-appellant the qualifying circumstance of AAA’s minority. The lone testimony of AAA
on the said circumstance was held to be an insufficient proof therefor. The aggravating circumstance of nighttime was
also ruled to be inapplicable as it was not shown that the same was purposely sought by the accused-appellant or that it
facilitated the commission of the crimes of rape. In view of the presence of the qualifying circumstance of relationship,
the Court of Appeals awarded exemplary damages in favor of AAA.
The accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal32 of the above decision and the same was given due course by the Court
of Appeals in a Resolution33 dated May 27, 2008.
On November 17, 2008, the Court resolved to accept the appeal and required the parties to file their respective
supplemental briefs, if they so desire, within 30 days from notice.34 Thereafter, in a Manifestation and Motion35 filed on
December 24, 2008, the plaintiff-appellee, through the Office of the Solicitor General, prayed that it be excused from
filing a supplemental brief. On February 3, 2009, the accused-appellant submitted a Supplemental Brief.36
The Issues
In the accused-appellant’s brief, the following issues were invoked:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED
DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE AND
INCONSISTENT TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH.37
The accused-appellant insists that it was error on the part of the RTC to give weight to the incredible testimony of AAA.
He alleges that AAA could not state with consistency the exact date when she was first supposedly raped, as well as
her age at that time. The accused-appellant also avers that AAA could not remember the dates of the other incidents of
rape charged, all of which were allegedly described in a uniform manner. Contrary to the judgment of the Court of
Appeals, the accused-appellant posits that the above inconsistencies cannot merely be discounted as insignificant. He
further insists that the qualifying circumstances of AAA’s minority and her relationship to the accused-appellant were not
duly proven by the prosecution. The accused-appellant, thus, prays for a judgment of acquittal.
The Ruling of the Court
After a careful examination of the records of this case, the Court resolves to deny the appeal, but with a modification of
the penalties and the amount of indemnities awarded.
To recall, the RTC and the Court of Appeals found the accused-appellant guilty of one (1) count of statutory rape and
seven (7) counts of qualified rape.
Under the information in Criminal Case No. 2000-01-46, the first incident of rape was alleged to have occurred in 1995
when AAA was only eight years old. However, the accused-appellant points out that the prosecution failed to
substantiate the said fact as AAA’s testimony thereon was too inconsistent and incredible to be worthy of any belief. He
explains that AAA initially claimed that she was raped for the first time when she was eight years old. Nonetheless,
during her testimony regarding the incidents of rape that occurred in July 1999, she said that the accused did the same
thing that he did to her when she was only seven years old. On her redirect examination, AAA then stated that she was
first raped in 1998 when she was eleven (11) years old.
Presently, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code defines the crime of rape by sexual intercourse as follows:
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.
In particular, "Article 266-A(1)(d) spells out the definition of the crime of statutory rape, the elements of which are: (1)
that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such a woman is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented."38
The above provision came into existence by virtue of Republic Act No. 8353,39 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, which took
effect on October 22, 1997.40 Prior to this date, the crime of rape was penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code,41 which provides:
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any
of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
In People v. Macafe,42 we explained the concept of statutory rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in this
wise:
Rape under paragraph 3 of [Article 335] is termed statutory rape as it departs from the usual modes of committing
rape. What the law punishes in statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve years old. Hence,
force and intimidation are immaterial; the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and whether carnal
knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a will of her own on account of her
tender years; the child's consent is immaterial because of her presumed incapacity to discern evil from
good.43 (Emphasis ours.)
Manifestly, the elements of statutory rape in the above-mentioned provisions of law are essentially the same. Thus,
whether the first incident of rape charged in this case did occur in 1995, i.e., before the amendment of Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, or in 1998, after the effectivity of the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, the prosecution has the burden to
establish the fact of carnal knowledge and the age of AAA at the time of the commission of the rape.
Contrary to the posturing of the accused-appellant, "the date of the commission of the rape is not an essential element
of the crime of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman."44 "Inconsistencies and
discrepancies in details which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime are not grounds for acquittal."45
As regards the first incident of rape, the RTC credited with veracity the substance of AAA’s testimony. On this matter,
we reiterate our ruling in People v. Condes46 that:
Time and again, the Court has held that when the decision hinges on the credibility of witnesses and their respective
testimonies, the trial court's observations and conclusions deserve great respect and are often accorded finality. The
trial judge has the advantage of observing the witness' deportment and manner of testifying. Her "furtive glance, blush
of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath" are
all useful aids for an accurate determination of a witness' honesty and sincerity. The trial judge, therefore, can better
determine if witnesses are telling the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies. Unless certain
facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, its assessment
must be respected for it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying and
detect if they were lying. The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the
[Court of Appeals].47
In the instant case, we have thoroughly scrutinized the testimony of AAA and we found no cogent reason to disturb the
finding of the RTC that the accused-appellant indeed committed the first incident of rape charged. AAA positively
identified the accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the dastardly crimes. With tears in her eyes, she clearly and
straightforwardly narrated the said incident of rape as follows:
[PROSECUTOR EDGAR SABARRE]
Q: Do you recall of any unusual incident that happened when you were still 8 years old?
[AAA]
A: There was but I cannot anymore remember the exact month and date.
Q: Just tell what happened to you when you were still 8 years old?
A: I was raped by Tiyo Henry.
Q: How did he rape you?
A: He stripped me of my panty, shorts and shirts.
Q: Do you remember what place did he rape you?
A: Yes, sir in our house.
Q: Who were the persons present then at that time?
A: My younger brother and I.
Q: About your mother and step father where were they?
A: In the ricefield.
PROS. SABARRE:
May we make it of record that the witness is crying.
COURT:
Have it on record.
PROS. SABARRE:
Q: Do you still recall was it in the morning, in the afternoon or evening?
A: In the afternoon.
xxxx
Q: After your clothes and [panty] were taken off by accused what did he do to you next if any?
A: He went on top of me.
Q: Was he still with his clothes on or already naked?
A: He has still clothes on, he did not take off his pants, he only pulled down the zipper.
Q: And when he pulled down the zipper and went on top of you what did he do next if any?
A: He was pumping on me.
Q: Did he pull out his organ?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And where did he place his organ?
A: In my vagina.
Q: When he kept on pumping what did you feel?
A: Pain.48
The above testimony of AAA was also corroborated by the Medico-Legal Report of Dr. Capungcol and Dr. Gagala, who
found "old, healed, incomplete" hymenal lacerations on the private part of AAA. "[W]hen the testimony of a rape victim is
consistent with the medical findings, there is sufficient basis to conclude that there has been carnal knowledge."49
Anent the five incidents of rape that were alleged to have been committed in July 1999, the Court disagrees with the
ruling of the trial court that all five counts were proven with moral certainty. The testimony of AAA on the said incidents
is as follows:
Q: How many times did [the accused-appellant] rape you in July 1999?
A: Five times.
Q: Was it in the daytime or night time?
A: Night time.
Q: Was it in different nights or on the same night?
A: Different nights.
Q: Who were present then at that time when he raped you five times?
A: My Kuya and other siblings.
Q: You have companions why were you raped?
A: Because they were sleeping.
Q: How did he rape you on that July night for five times, will you please narrate to the court?
A: Because they have been drinking, he came to our house, pulled out my panty and went on top of me.
Q: With whom was he drinking?
A: With my step father.
Q: Where did they drink?
A: In our neighbor.
Q: When he took off your shorts and panty what was the accused wearing at that time?
A: I do not know because I could not see since it was night time.
Q: When he was on top of [you] was he still wearing something?
A: No, sir.
Q: What did he do with his penis?
A: He made me hold it.
Q: Then after he made you hold it what did he do with it?
A: He left.
xxxx
ATTY. SABARRE:
Q: You said you were raped on that July evening for five nights how did he rape you?
A: (witness did not answer)
PROS. SABARRE:
Make it of record that the witness is crying again.
Q: Why are you crying?
A: I am angry and hurt.
PROS. SABARRE:
Your honor please may I be allowed to suspend the proceeding considering that the witness is psychologically
incapable of further proceeding.
xxxx
Q: I have asked you how did the accused rape you will you please narrate the whole incident to this honorable court?
A: The same that he did when I was 8 years old, he went on top of me.
Q: What was the same thing you are talking about?
A: He pulled down my panty and went on top of me and pump.
Q: When he pump what did you feel?
A: Pain.
COURT:
Why did you feel pain?
A: He placed his penis inside my vagina, everytime I urinate I feel pain.
ATTY. SABARRE;
How did you recognize that it was Henry Arpon when it was night time?
A: It was a moonlight night and our window was only covered by cloth as cover.50
From the above testimony, AAA merely described a single incident of rape. She made no reference whatsoever to the
other four instances of rape that were likewise supposedly committed in the month of July 1999.
The same is also true for the two (2) counts of rape allegedly committed in August 1999. AAA narrated only one incident
of rape in this manner:
Q: How many times did [the accused-appellant] rape you in the month of August 1999?
A: Two times.
Q: Was it during day time or night time?
A: Nighttime.
Q: How did he rape you again that August 1999?
A: He kissed me.
Q: After kissing you what did he do next?
A: He took off his shirts.
Q: After he took off his shirts what happened?
A: He went on top of me and pump.
Q: When he made a pumping motion on top of you what did you feel?
A: My vagina was painful and also my chest because he was heavy.
Q: Why did you feel pain in your vagina?
A: Because he was raping me.
Q: Did his penis penetrate your vagina?
A: I do not know.
Q: If this Henry Arpon is present now in court could you recognize him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where is he?
A: That man (witness pointing a detention prisoner when asked his name answered Henry Arpon).51
"It is settled that each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime that the law requires to be proven
beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution's evidence must pass the exacting test of moral certainty that the law
demands to satisfy the burden of overcoming the appellant's presumption of innocence."52 Thus, including the first
incident of rape, the testimony of AAA was only able to establish three instances when the accused-appellant had
carnal knowledge of her.
The allegation of the accused-appellant that the testimony of AAA described the incidents of rape in a uniform manner
does not convince this Court. To our mind, AAA’s narration of the sexual abuses committed by the accused-appellant
contained an adequate recital of the evidentiary facts constituting the crime of rape, i.e., that he placed his organ in her
private part.53 "Etched in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that a victim of a savage crime cannot be expected to
mechanically retain and then give an accurate account of every lurid detail of a frightening experience — a verity born[e]
out of human nature and experience."54
We uphold the ruling of the RTC that the accused-appellant’s defense of alibi deserves scant consideration. "Alibi is an
inherently weak defense because it is easy to fabricate and highly unreliable. To merit approbation, the accused must
adduce clear and convincing evidence that he was in a place other than the situs criminis at the time the crime was
committed, such that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime when it was
committed."55 "[S]ince alibi is a weak defense for being easily fabricated, it cannot prevail over and is worthless in the
face of the positive identification by a credible witness that an accused perpetrated the crime."56
In the instant case, we quote with approval the findings of fact of the trial court that:
The distance of [XXX] to Tacloban City is just a few kilometers and can be negotiated by passenger bus in less than
one (1) hour, hence, it is not impossible for the accused to be present in [XXX] at any time of the day after working
hours while working in Tacloban. Besides, the accused has his day off every Sunday, which according to him he spent
in [XXX], Leyte.
The accused was positively identified by the victim as the person who sexually molested her beginning that afternoon of
1995, and subsequently thereafter in the coming years up to August 1999. She can not be mistaken on the identity of
the accused, because the first sexual molestation happened during the daytime, besides, she is familiar with him being
her uncle, the brother of her mother.57
Furthermore, the Court rejects the contention of the accused-appellant that AAA may have been prompted to falsely
testify against him (accused-appellant) in view of the latter’s quarrel with AAA’s parents when he refused to work with
them in the rice fields.58 Aside from being uncorroborated, we find the same specious and implausible. "Where the
charges against the appellant involve a heinous offense, a minor disagreement, even if true, does not amount to a
sufficient justification for dragging a young girl's honor to a merciless public scrutiny that a rape trial brings in its
wake."591avvphi1
As to the accused-appellant’s objection that there was no proof of the age of the victim, we affirm the trial court’s finding
that the prosecution sufficiently established the age of AAA when the incidents of rape were committed. The testimony
of AAA that she was born on November 1, 1987,60 the voluntary stipulation of the accused, with assistance of counsel,
regarding the minority of the victim during pre-trial and his testimony regarding his recollection of the age of the
victim,61 his own niece, all militate against accused-appellant’s theory. In People v. Pruna,62 the Court established the
guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance, as follows:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate
of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and
school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise
unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's mother or a member of the family either by affinity
or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth
of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the
following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less
than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less
than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less
than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim's mother or
relatives concerning the victim's age, the complainant's testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly
and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to
object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him. (Emphases ours.)
Notably, in its Decision, the trial court observed that at the time she took the witness stand (when she was 14 years old),
the victim, as to her body and facial features, was indeed a minor.63
That the carnal knowledge in this case was committed through force, threat or intimidation need no longer be belabored
upon. "[I]n rape committed by close kin, such as the victim’s father, step-father, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her
mother, it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed. Moral influence or ascendancy takes the place
of violence and intimidation."64
Penalties
On the penalties imposable in the instant case, the former Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
punishes the crime of rape with reclusion perpetua. The sixth paragraph thereof also provides that:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law-spouse of the parent
of the victim. (Emphases ours.)
Similarly, the present Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code relevantly recites:
ART. 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua.
xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent
of the victim. (Emphases ours.)
The Court finds that the circumstances of minority and relationship qualify the three (3) counts of rape committed by the
accused-appellant. "As a special qualifying circumstance of the crime of rape, the concurrence of the victim’s minority
and her relationship to the accused must be both alleged and proven beyond reasonable doubt."65 In the instant case,
the informations alleged that AAA was less than eighteen (18) years of age when the incidents of rape occurred and the
accused-appellant is her uncle, a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree. The said circumstances were
also admitted by the accused-appellant during the pre-trial conference of the case and again admitted by him during his
testimony.66
In People v. Pepito,67 the Court explained that "[t]he purpose of entering into a stipulation or admission of facts is to
expedite trial and to relieve the parties and the court, as well, of the costs of proving facts which will not be disputed on
trial and the truth of which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry. These admissions during the pre-trial conference
are worthy of credit. Being mandatory in nature, the admissions made by appellant therein must be given weight."
Consequently, for the first incident of rape, regardless of whether the same occurred in 1995 or in 1998, the imposition
of the death penalty is warranted. For the second and third counts of rape, the imposable penalty is also death.
Nonetheless, a reduction of the above penalty is in order.

The RTC and the Court of Appeals failed to consider in favor of the accused-appellant the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority. Although this matter was not among the issues raised before the Court, we still take
cognizance of the same in accordance with the settled rule that "[i]n a criminal case, an appeal throws open the entire
case wide open for review, and the appellate court can correct errors, though unassigned, that may be found in the
appealed judgment."68
Pertinently, the first paragraph of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as the "Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Act of 2006," provides for the rule on how to determine the age of a child in conflict with the law,69 viz:
SEC. 7. Determination of Age. — The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the presumption of minority. He/She shall
enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with the law until he/she is proven to be eighteen (18) years of age or older. The
age of a child may be determined from the child's birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any other pertinent
documents. In the absence of these documents, age may be based on information from the child himself/herself,
testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. In case of doubt as to
the age of the child, it shall be resolved in his/her favor.
Furthermore, in Sierra v. People,70 we clarified that, in the past, the Court deemed sufficient the testimonial evidence
regarding the minority and age of the accused provided the following conditions concur, namely: "(1) the absence of any
other satisfactory evidence such as the birth certificate, baptismal certificate, or similar documents that would prove the
date of birth of the accused; (2) the presence of testimony from accused and/or a relative on the age and minority of the
accused at the time of the complained incident without any objection on the part of the prosecution; and (3) lack of any
contrary evidence showing that the accused's and/or his relatives' testimonies are untrue."71
In the instant case, the accused-appellant testified that he was born on February 23, 1982 and that he was only 13
years old when the first incident of rape allegedly happened in 1995.72 Other than his testimony, no other evidence was
presented to prove the date of his birth. However, the records of this case show neither any objection to the said
testimony on the part of the prosecution, nor any contrary evidence to dispute the same. Thus, the RTC and the Court
of Appeals should have appreciated the accused-appellant’s minority in ascertaining the appropriate penalty.
Although the acts of rape in this case were committed before Republic Act No. 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, the
said law is still applicable given that Section 68 thereof expressly states:
SEC. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentences. — Persons who have been convicted and
are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the
time of the commission of the offense for which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit
from the retroactive application of this Act. They shall be entitled to appropriate dispositions provided under this Act and
their sentences shall be adjusted accordingly. They shall be immediately released if they are so qualified under this Act
or other applicable law.
People v. Sarcia73 further stressed that "[w]ith more reason, the Act should apply to [a] case wherein the conviction by
the lower court is still under review."
Thus, in the matter of assigning criminal responsibility, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 is explicit in providing that:
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. — A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the
commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an
intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of the Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and
be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be
subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be
enforced in accordance with existing laws. (Emphases ours.)
As held in Sierra, the above provision effectively modified the minimum age limit of criminal irresponsibility in
paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,74 "i.e., from ‘under nine years of age’ and ‘above nine
years of age and under fifteen’ (who acted without discernment) - to ‘fifteen years old or under’ and ‘above fifteen but
below 18’ (who acted without discernment) in determining exemption from criminal liability."75
Accordingly, for the first count of rape, which in the information in Criminal Case No. 2000-01-46 was allegedly
committed in 1995, the testimony of the accused-appellant sufficiently established that he was only 13 years old at that
time. In view of the failure of the prosecution to prove the exact date and year of the first incident of rape, i.e., whether
the same occurred in 1995 or in 1998 as previously discussed, any doubt therein "should be resolved in favor of the
accused, it being more beneficial to the latter."76 The Court, thus, exempts the accused-appellant from criminal liability
for the first count of rape pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9344. The accused-appellant,
nevertheless, remains civilly liable therefor.
For the second and third counts of rape that were committed in the year 1999, the accused-appellant was already 17
years old. We likewise find that in the said instances, the accused-appellant acted with discernment. In Madali v.
People,77 the Court had the occasion to reiterate that "[d]iscernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate
the consequences of his unlawful act. Such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into
consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case." In this case, the fact that the
accused-appellant acted with discernment was satisfactorily established by the testimony of AAA, which we had already
found to be credible. Verily, AAA testified that she at first did not tell anybody about the sexual assault she suffered at
the hands of the accused-appellant because the latter told her that he would kill her mother if she did so. That the
accused-appellant had to threaten AAA in an effort to conceal his dastardly acts only proved that he knew full well that
what he did was wrong and that he was aware of the consequences thereof.
Accordant with the second paragraph of Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and in conformity with our
ruling in Sarcia, when the offender is a minor under eighteen (18) years of age, "the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period. However, for purposes of determining the proper
penalty because of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be
reckoned with." Thus, for the second and third counts of rape, the proper penalty imposable upon the accused-appellant
is reclusion perpetua for each count.
Had the trial court correctly appreciated in favor of the accused-appellant the circumstance of his minority, the latter
would have been entitled to a suspension of sentence for the second and third counts of rape under Section 38 of
Republic Act No. 9344, which reads:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. — Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of
the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil
liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of
conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application.
Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be supplied even if the juvenile is already eighteen years (18)
of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the
appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on Juvenile in Conflict with the Law. 1awphi1
Be that as it may, the suspension of sentence may no longer be applied in the instant case given that the accused-
appellant is now about 29 years of age and Section 40 of Republic Act No. 9344 puts a limit to the application of a
suspended sentence, namely, when the child reaches a maximum age of 21. The said provision states:
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. — If the court finds that the objective of the disposition
measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has
willfully failed to comply with the conditions of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the
law shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the court
shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend
the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21)
years. (Emphasis ours.)
Nonetheless, the disposition set forth under Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344 is warranted in the instant case, to wit:
SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities. — A child in conflict
with the law may after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement
in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained,
supervised and controlled by the [Bureau of Corrections], in coordination with the [Department of Social Welfare and
Development].
Additionally, the civil liability of the accused-appellant for the second and third incidents of rape shall not be affected by
the above disposition and the same shall be enforced in accordance with law and the pronouncements in the prevailing
jurisprudence.
Civil Liability
The Court recently ruled in People v. Masagca, Jr.78 that "[c]ivil indemnity is mandatory when rape is found to have been
committed. Based on prevailing jurisprudence, we affirm the award of ₱75,000.00 to the rape victim as civil indemnity
for each count." We also explained in Sarcia that "[t]he litmus test x x x in the determination of the civil indemnity is the
heinous character of the crime committed, which would have warranted the imposition of the death penalty, regardless
of whether the penalty actually imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua."79 The trial court’s award of civil indemnity of
₱50,000.00 for each count of rape is therefore increased to ₱75,000.00 for each of the three (3) counts of rape
committed in the instant case.
Anent the award of moral damages, the same is justified "without need of proof other than the fact of rape because it is
assumed that the victim has suffered moral injuries [from the experience she underwent]."80 We also increase the trial
court’s award of ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00 for each of the three (3) counts of rape herein established in keeping with
the recent case law.81
Lastly, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ award of exemplary damages. As held in People v. Llanas, Jr.,82 "[t]he award of
exemplary damages is also proper not only to deter outrageous conduct, but also in view of the aggravating
circumstances of minority and relationship surrounding the commission of the offense, both of which were alleged in the
information and proved during the trial." The appellate court’s award of ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages is raised to
₱30,000.00 for each of the three (3) counts of rape in keeping with the current jurisprudence on the matter.83
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated February 8, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00560 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) For the first count of rape herein established, the accused-appellant Henry Arpon y Juntilla is hereby
EXEMPTED from criminal liability.
(2) For the second and third counts of rape, the accused-appellant is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
two (2) counts of QUALIFIED RAPE and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each
count.
(3) As to the civil liability, the accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay AAA for each of the three (3) counts of
rape ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages,
plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% from the date of finality of this Decision.
(4) The case is hereby REMANDED to the court of origin for its appropriate action in accordance with Section
51 of Republic Act No. 9344.
No costs.
G.R. No. 167179 January 28, 2008
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ELMER CEREDON y PAGARAN, accused-appellant.
DECISION
REYES R.T., J.:
Sa mga karumal-dumal na krimen, walang higit na nagpapasiklab ng galit, pagkarimarim at pagkapoot kaysa sa
panghahalay sa sariling laman. Ito ay kasuklam-suklam at nakapandidiri na marapat lamang na maramdaman ng
nagkasala ang ngalit at pagtatakwil sa kanya ng lipunan. Sa pagkaka-repeal ng Death Penalty Law noong June 24,
2006 sa pamamagitan ng Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346, ang akusadong umaapela ay sampung ulit na hinahatulan ng
reclusion perpetua. Sa piitan na lilipas ang kanyang mga araw kasama ang umuusig na gunita ng pagkakasala sa
kanyang batang-batang kapatid.
AMONG the heinous crimes, none stirs up so much public outrage, repulsion and hatred than incestuous rape. It is so
odious and disgusting that the perpetrator rightfully must feel the anger and spurn of society.1 With the repeal of the
Death Penalty Law2 on June 24, 2006 through the passage of R.A. No. 9347,3 accused-appellant is sentenced ten times
to reclusion perpetua. He is to live out his days under incarceration with thoughts of his crimes against his sister of
tender age to haunt his conscience.
The Case
Appellant Elmer Ceredon y Pagaran was indicted for ten (10) counts of rape, defined and penalized under Article 266(A)
and (B) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353 and R.A. No. 7659, allegedly committed as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 08-1296:
That sometime in 1995, in the Municipality of Gattaran, Province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused armed with a knife, with lewd design, by use of force or
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the herein
offended party, AAA,4 his youngest sister, a minor, ten (10) years of age, all against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
offended party, AAA, his youngest sister, a minor, ten (10) years of age, all against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
CONTRARY TO LAW.7

CONTRARY TO LAW.8
CONTRARY TO LAW.9
offended party, AAA, his youngest sister, a minor, eleven (11) years of age, all against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.10
offended party, AAA, his youngest sister, a minor, eleven (11) years of age, all against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.11
offended party, AAA, his youngest sister, a minor, thirteen (13) years of age, all against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.12
offended party, AAA, his youngest sister, a minor, thirteen (13) years of age, all against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.13
offended party, AAA, his youngest sister, a minor, fifteen (15) years of age, all against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.14
On August 13, 2001, at his arraignment before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Aparri, Cagayan, appellant
pleaded "not guilty" to all ten (10) charges. However, on September 3, 2001, during the pre-trial conference, his counsel
manifested before the trial court the desire of appellant to change his plea to "guilty" on all ten (10) counts. Said
manifestation was granted and appellant was re-arraigned.14-a
Thereafter, joint trial on the merits ensued. Teresa Andres-Teresa, Grade IV teacher of private complainant AAA, and
AAA herself took the witness stand for the prosecution.
No evidence was presented for the defense.
The Facts
Criminal Case No. 08-1296
The corruption of AAA's childhood innocence commenced sometime in 1995 when she was merely ten (10) years of
age. It occurred at mid-day in her own home at Baraoidan, Gattaran, Cagayan.15 She was playing with her brothers BBB
and CCC when appellant beckoned to her. She ignored him for fear of getting whipped. His calls unheeded, appellant
came out of the house and ordered their two brothers to go down to the river. BBB and CCC did as they were told.16
Holding AAA by the arms, appellant then brought her into the house. She cried but appellant told her in Ilocano "Uki ni
nam, ta bedbedak ta ngiwat mo" which roughly translates to "Vulva of your mother, I will gag your mouth." Appellant
proceeded to search for a handkerchief.17
AAA ran towards her youngest brother's cradle but appellant pulled her away to another room where he gagged her and
whipped her with a belt.18 After that, appellant tied her hands together behind her back with a rope, pulled her dress
down, laid her on a bed and, with more rope, tied each of her legs to separate corners of the bed.19 Appellant then left
the room.20
When he returned, he was wielding a pair of scissors. He snipped off AAA's shorts and underwear then shed his own
clothes. Appellant then mounted her and inserted his penis into her vagina. The penetration caused her great
pain.21 Afterwards, appellant wiped her genital region with a handkerchief and showed it to her. It was covered with
blood.22
Moments later, appellant heard their sister DDD's voice prompting him to procure a towel with which to cover AAA.
Having concealed her nudity in this manner, appellant hastily donned his garments and left laughing.23
When DDD and their brothers BBB and CCC entered the room, they found AAA still tied to the bed. One of her brothers
pulled off the towel and untied her.24 AAA did not tell them that appellant had raped her because of her fear of appellant
and his threats that he would kill them all.25
Criminal Case No. 1297
The second incident of rape also occurred in 1995.26 AAA was tending to their youngest brother when appellant
summoned her to extract his armpit hairs. She turned a deaf ear. Appellant then instructed their brother BBB to take
their youngest sibling to the river to bathe him. BBB complied.27 Left alone now with AAA, appellant dragged her inside a
room and ordered her to remove her clothes.28 When she refused, he forcibly undressed her at knife-point.29
Stripped naked, AAA was then brought to the bed - the same bed on which appellant had previously committed the
dastardly deed. While lying on the bed, appellant disrobed and, while poking her with his knife, mounted her. He then
penetrated her vagina with his penis. After satisfying himself, he again threatened to kill all of them should she report
the matter to anyone.30
Later that same year, appellant raped AAA for the third time.31 At the time of the incident, their parents were out of the
house.32 While sleeping on top of their trunk, AAA was awakened when appellant started undressing her. She cried and
begged him to stop, but he disregarded her pleas and proceeded to sexually abuse her.33 Despite her protestations,
appellant proceeded to insert his penis into the young girl's vagina.34 After his lust had been sated, he reiterated his
threat to kill them all should she reveal the incident to anyone.35
A few days after the third rape, AAA was again sexually abused by appellant inside their house, in the same room and
upon the same bed. As in the previous incidents, appellant poked a knife at her to compel her to submit to his bestial
urges.36 Out of fear, she did not struggle or resist. Thereafter, appellant, had carnal knowledge of her.37
The fifth rape happened in the same year.38 By this time, appellant was already married.39 His bestial acts towards his
own sister nonetheless continued. It was noontime and AAA had just come home from visiting their grandfather.40 When
she entered the bedroom, appellant quickly followed her in, closed the door behind him and locked it.41
Poking his knife at her, he told her to strip. When she refused, appellant forcibly undressed her. He then removed his
own clothes and laid her on the bed.42 While pointing a knife at her, he mounted her and inserted his penis into her
vagina.43
She pleaded with appellant to stop doing it to her by saying, "Manong kaasiandak kadin, husto na kadin," which means
"Brother, have pity on me, please stop it." Appellant, however, just slapped her mouth and proceeded to rape her.
Afterwards, he issued his threat not to divulge the matter to anyone lest he would kill them all.44
In 1996, appellant, for the sixth time, raped AAA45 who had turned eleven (11) years old. She was playing alone in front
of their house when she saw appellant approaching her. As she was afraid of him, she tried to run away. She stumbled,
however, and he was able to catch up with her. Appellant then dragged her inside where he laid her on the living room
floor. They were alone at home as the rest of the family had gone to harvest rice at their kaingin.46
Appellant proceeded to remove AAA's dress and underwear. Then, he removed his own clothes. Subsequently, he
mounted her and inserted his penis into her vagina against her will.47 Afterwards, he uttered the same threats to kill
everyone should she expose her defloration to anyone.48
The seventh occurrence of rape was also in 1996. The family had just transferred to a new house situated at the foot of
a mountain in Baraoidan, Gattaran, Cagayan. They were forced to relocate to a new house after their old home was
swept away in a flood.49
When probed by the prosecutor as to the details of the seventh incident of rape, AAA disclosed that she could no longer
remember the exact manner how appellant perpetrated the rape. She was, however, certain that she was twice raped in
1996 by the same.50
The eighth incident of rape took place in 199851 when AAA was thirteen (13) years of age. She was then lying alone
inside their house. Her parents, along with her other siblings, were out working in their kaingin.52
Suddenly, appellant appeared and moved closer to her. She tried to rise but he pushed her back down. Appellant then
forcibly removed the young girl's clothes, her shorts and panty. He then proceeded to unbutton his pants. 53
According to her, she could not have escaped while appellant was undressing because she feared what he might do to
her. After removing his own clothes, appellant went on top of her and commenced raping her.54
Just as she did countless times before, AAA pleaded with appellant "Manong, kuston kaasiannak kadin" ("Brother,
enough, have pity on me"). Instead of desisting, appellant slapped her in the mouth. After the sexual abuse, he issued
the same threatening statements to her.55
Also in 1998, the ninth rape happened. It occurred under similar circumstances. The rest of their family had gone to
their kaingin and private complainant AAA was left alone in their house at the foot of the mountain.56
Seeing that she was left alone to tend the house, appellant again pounced on the opportunity to impose his bestial
urges on his young sister. At that time, AAA was still thirteen (13) years old.
As in the previous offenses, appellant forced AAA to undress. After ridding himself of his clothing, appellant mounted
her fragile frame and penetrated the young girl's vagina.57
was then fifteen (15) years old. It was committed in a new house, also in Baraoidan, Gattaran, Cagayan, where they
transferred.59 Appellant had his own house by then situated about five hundred (500) meters away.60 Their father was
lying in state at appellant's house.61
On said date at noontime, their mother sent AAA home to feed the chickens.62 She obeyed and went inside their house
to fetch rice with which to feed them when appellant followed and grabbed her. She resisted and kicked him in the
abdomen. He fell down and she tried to run but he was able to grab her foot causing her to stumble and fall.63
Thereafter, appellant removed all her clothes. He kissed her lips and breasts several times, mounted her, then sexually
violated her.64 All the while, he was flaunting his perversion by telling his sister, "Nagimas gayam ti kabagis ko" ("I
derived so much satisfaction from my sister"). Afterwards, he issued the same previous threats to her.65
Subsequent Events
However, on September 18, 2000, AAA reached the end of her rope. Notwithstanding appellant's threats, she revealed
to her sister DDD, friend Giselle and teacher Teresa that she was raped by appellant, her brother.66Teresa, upon
hearing AAA's revelation, accompanied her to their head teacher Felix Salvador. Then, together, they went to the
barangay captain who told them to report the matter to the police. This they did.67
On September 20, 2000, policemen were dispatched to bring appellant to the police station. There, a confrontation
arose between AAA and appellant. Upon seeing appellant, AAA punched him and said "Hayop ka, baboy, nirape mo
ako" ("You animal, pig, you raped me").68
On September 21, 2000, there was a second confrontation.69 Present were their mother, their sister DDD, their uncle
Raymundo Bumanglag, appellant's wife Josephine, and AAA's teachers Charito Elesterio, Jerry Roque and Elpidio
Salvatierra. In said confrontation, AAA accused her brother, appellant, of raping her ten (10) times, while he admitted to
having raped her thrice only. Josephine, appellant's wife, told him to admit so that AAA could forgive him.70 He then
admitted that he had raped her ten (10) times and asked for forgiveness, beseeching her to take pity on his family. AAA
replied that she could no longer forgive him because her heart had "already hardened like stone." Appellant cried.71
RTC and CA Dispositions
On January 8, 2002, the trial court rendered its decision72 convicting appellant on all ten counts of rape, with the
following disposition:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Elmer Ceredon y Pagaran "GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt in all the
ten (10) Criminal Informations for "RAPE" and is hereby sentence (sic) to suffer the supreme penalty of
"DEATH" in each of the ten (10) criminal informations.
SO ORDERED.73 (Underscoring supplied)
Hence, the automatic appeal to the Supreme Court. However, on the strength of People v. Mateo,74 the case was
forwarded to the Court of Appeals (CA) for intermediate review.
In its Decision75 dated January 28, 2005, the CA affirmed the judgment of the trial court but with modification providing
for damages, thus:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that for each count of rapethe
accused should pay private complainant the amount of (1) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) P50,000.00 as
moral damages; and (3) P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Let the entire records of this case be elevated to the Supreme Court for review pursuant to A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC
(Amendments to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to Govern Death Penalty Cases), which took effect
on October 15, 2004.
SO ORDERED.76 (Underscoring supplied)
Issues
Since the Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of the People, and the Public Attorney's Office, as defense counsel to
appellant, had both submitted Manifestations in lieu of Supplemental Briefs, the Court is now faced in this review with
the same assignment of errors appellant presented before the CA, to wit:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND

REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED BASED ON AN IMPROVIDENT PLEA OF GUILTY.
II
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THERE WAS NO IMPROVIDENT PLEA OF GUILTY, THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT IN CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 08-1296; 08-1297; 08-
1298; 08-1299; 08-1300; 08-1301; 08-1302; 08-1303 AND 08-1304; CONSIDERING THAT THE
SAID INFORMATIONS FAILED TO SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISH WITH PARTICULARITY THE DATES OF
THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE.
III
ASSUMING AGAIN THAT THERE WAS NO IMPROVIDENT PLEA OF GUILTY, THE TRIAL COURT
GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY UPON THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IN CRIMINAL
CASE NO. 08-1305.
IV
ASSUMING FURTHER THAT THE PROSECUTION HAS SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISH (SIC) WITH
PARTICULARITY THE DATE OF THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE, THE TRIAL COURT
GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY ON THE ACCUSED AS THE QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE THAT THE ACCUSED IS THE BROTHER OF THE VICTIM AND, HENCE, A RELATIVE
WITHIN THE SECOND DEGREE OF CONSANGUINITY WAS NOT PROPERLY ALLEGED.77 (Underscoring
supplied)
Our Ruling
No Improvident Plea of Guilt
Appellant claims that the trial court based its ruling of conviction on his "improvident plea of guilt," relying on Section 3,
Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. - When the accused pleads guilty to a capital
offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of
culpability. The accused may present evidence in his behalf.78
He argues that when he was re-arraigned and he pleaded "guilty" to all ten charges of rape levelled against him, he was
not fully apprised of the consequences of his change of plea from "not guilty" to "guilty." According to him, the trial court
did not inquire as to the voluntariness of his plea and that it failed to explain fully to him that once convicted, he would
be meted the death penalty under R.A. No. 7659. Hence, he contends, his conviction should be set aside.
We cannot agree.
The rule is where the accused desires to plead guilty to a capital offense, the court is enjoined to observe the following:
1. It must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his
plea;
2. The court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise
degree of his culpability; and
3. The court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he
desires.79
There is no definite and concrete rule on how a trial judge may go about the matter of a proper "searching inquiry" as
required by the aforecited rule. It is incumbent upon a trial judge to ascertain and be fully convinced that the plea of
guilty was voluntarily made and its consequences fully comprehended by the accused.80
Records reveal that appellant was duly assisted by his counsel, both in his first arraignment and re-arraignment. In fact,
it was his counsel who manifested before the trial court that appellant desired to change his plea from "not guilty" to
"guilty" on all ten charges of rape filed against him by his younger sister.
Besides being assisted by counsel all throughout the proceedings, when appellant was re-arraigned, the charges were
read and explained to him in Ilocano, his native tongue.81 He cannot now claim that he was unaware of the
consequences of his change of plea.
More than that, appellant admitted raping private complainant AAA. When confronted by AAA, their mother, sister DDD,
and their uncle Raymundo Bumanglag, appellant readily admitted to violating his sister AAA on at least three occasions.
Sensing that AAA was only angered by his fractional admission, and through the prodding of his wife Josephine for him
to admit the whole truth, appellant confessed to the ten counts of rape.
At any rate, contrary to appellant's assertion, he was convicted by the trial court, not on the basis of his plea of guilty,
but on the strength of the evidence adduced by the prosecution. As consistently held by the Court,82 while convictions
based on pleas of guilt to capital offenses have been set aside because of the improvidence of the plea, the same holds
true only when such plea is the sole basis of the judgment.
When, as in this case, the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, the same must be sustained for the simple reason that the conviction is predicated not on the guilty
plea of accused but on the convincing evidence proving his commission of the offenses charged.
Indeed, there were instances, such as in People v. Lakindanum,83 where even when the court found that the judge was
remiss in his duty to conduct a searching inquiry, the conviction was sustained in the interest of justice:
The Court observes that, indeed, the manner by which the trial court judge conducted the inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the accused-appellant's plea of guilty leaves much to be desired.
xxxx
From the records of the proceedings in the court below, it can be gleaned that the trial judge's manner of
apprising Lakindanum of the consequences of his plea was at best, cursory, to wit:
xxxx
From the foregoing, it is clear that the judge can hardly be said to have satisfied the requirement of conducting a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension by the accused of entering a guilty plea. Worse,
the judge erroneously informed Lakindanum that by pleading guilty, the latter forfeited his right to
testify and to adduce evidence in his defense. x x x.
xxxx
From the foregoing positive identification by the child victim of her rapist and her candid narration of the
circumstances surrounding the rape, it is clear that accused-appellant was properly convicted for robbing
Catherine of her innocence and childhood. This Court cannot, on mere procedural grounds, allow the
revolting perversion of the accused-appellant to go unpunished.84 (Emphasis supplied)
Appellant's conviction must be upheld as there was no such error of accepting an improvident plea committed by the
trial court.
There can only be an improvident plea of guilt under Section 3, Rule 116 where there is a possibility of an accused
being meted out the supreme penalty of death. In the words of said section, "When accused pleads guilty to a capital
offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry x x x, etc." The obvious rationale for this is to ascertain that accused
truly understands the dire consequences of his plea. Considering that R.A. No. 9346 has prohibited the imposition of the
death penalty, the raison d'etre behind said rule is absent in the case at bar.
Exact dates of commission

need not be alleged.
Appellant next contends that the Informations filed against him do not sufficiently charge the offenses committed
because the exact dates of commission are not alleged. Hence, his conviction is not warranted.
The contention is without merit.
The date or time of the commission of the rape need not be alleged with precision. It is enough for the information or
complaint to state that the crime has been committed at a time as near as possible to the date of its actual commission.
Failure to allege the exact date when the crime happened does not render the information defective, much less void.85
An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the elements of the offense and the constitutive acts or omissions.
The exact date of the commission of a crime is not an essential element of it.86 Thus, in a prosecution for rape, the
material fact or circumstance to be considered is the occurrence of the rape, not the time of its commission.87 The failure
to specify the exact date or time when it was committed does not ipso facto make the information defective on its face.88
The date or time of the commission of rape is not a material ingredient of the said crime because the gravamen of rape
is carnal knowledge of a woman through force and intimidation. In fact, the precise time when the rape takes place has
no substantial bearing on its commission. As such, the date or time need not be stated with absolute accuracy. It is
sufficient that the complaint or information states that the crime has been committed at any time as near as possible to
the date of its actual commission.89
Besides, as succinctly explained by the trial court:
[Private-complainant] was only ten (10) years old in 1995 and about eleven (11) years old in 1996 she being
born on February 18, 1985. It is but natural for her not to remember the dates. More so when it has a very
negative, horrifying and traumatic effect and impact on her life.90
Further, it is already too late in the day for appellant to question the sufficiency of the information. He had all the time to
raise this issue during the course of the trial, particularly during his arraignment. He could have filed for a bill of
particulars in order to be properly informed of the dates of the alleged rapes. However, appellant chose to be silent and
never lifted a finger to question the information. As a result, he is deemed to have waived whatever objections he had;
he cannot now be heard to seek affirmative relief. Furthermore, objections as to matters of form in the information
cannot be made for the first time on appeal.91
Relationship as qualifying circumstance

may be alleged in layman's terms.
Nor was there any defect in the Informations when they merely averred that the victim was the youngest sister of
appellant. We do not agree with the defense that in order for relationship to qualify in this case, it must be mentioned
that the victim is a "relative within the second degree of consanguinity."
This is not a novel question. The same issue was addressed by the Court in People v. Sanchez.92 In the said case,
appellant argued that he could not be meted the death penalty for raping his sister for failure of the information to allege
that said private complainant was a "relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity."
The Court struck down appellant's argument in the following tenor:
We have held in People v. Ferolino, that:
"If the offender is merely a relation - not a parent, ascendant, stepparent, or guardian or common law
spouse of the mother of the victim - it must be alleged in the information that he is a relative by
consanguinity or affinity (as the case may be) within the civil degree. That relationship by consanguinity
or affinity was not alleged in the informations in these cases. Even if it was, it was still necessary to
further allege that such relationship was within the third civil degree."
The present case is not within the contemplation of said ruling considering that in the Ferolino case, the victim is
a niece of the offender while in the present case the victim is a sister of the offender. It was deemed necessary
in the Ferolino case to require that it must be specifically alleged in the Information that the offender is "a relative
by consanguinity or affinity (as the case may be) within the third civil degree" because we acknowledge the fact
that there are niece-uncle relationships which are beyond the third civil degree, in which case, death penalty
cannot be imposed on an accused found guilty of rape. However, a sister-brother relationship is obviously in the
second civil degree and no other sister-brother relationship exists in civil law that falls beyond the third civil
degree. Consequently, it is not necessary in this case that the Information should specifically state that the
appellant is a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree of the victim. This is an exception to the
requirement enunciated in the Ferolino case.93
Further, what is required by the Rules is that "the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the
language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense
is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce
judgment."94 Perusing the ten (10) Informations for rape, private complainant AAA was categorically identified as
appellant's younger sister. Verily, the requirement of allegation as to relationship was more than satisfied.
Testimony of AAA as to her own

age is sufficient evidence.
Appellant argues that in Criminal Case No. 08-1305, no evidence was presented as to the age of the victim, AAA. This
is false. On the issue of age of the victim, it is enough that the victim testified on her age vis-a-vis the time she was
raped by appellant.
In People v. Pruna,95 the Court set out guidelines as to the appreciation of age, either as an element of the crime or as a
qualifying circumstance. In that case, the rule was laid out, once and for all, that although the best evidence to prove the
age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party, its presentation
into evidence is not a sine qua non requirement to prove her age for the appreciation of minority, either as an element of
the crime or as a qualifying circumstance. The decision goes on to state that in the absence of (a) certificate of live birth,
(b) authentic document, or (c) testimony of the victim's mother or relatives concerning the victim's age, complainant's
testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
In the case at bar, private complainant categorically disclosed that she was only ten (10) years old at the time of the first
rape in 199596 and fifteen (15) years of age when she was last raped by appellant.97 Appellant Ceredon admitted these
in a confrontation between him and private complainant, witnessed by their mother and other relatives.98
More than that, not only did the defense fail to object to complainant's claim to minority when it was consistently bared
during the trial; the accused, through his plea of guilt, admitted to the victim's age as alleged in the informations against
him.99 Furthermore, appellant cannot claim ignorance of the age of the victim as she is his own sister.100
Anent the Pruna requirement that the court make a categorical finding as to age, the RTC had this to say:101
True, AAA was not able to tell the exact month and date of the first nine incidents but this is not fatal to her
credibility. She is only about ten (10) years old in 1995 and about eleven (11) years old in 1996, she being born
on February 18, 1985 and therefore it is but natural for her not to remember the dates more so when it has a
very negative, horrifying and traumatic effect and impact on her life. (Underscoring supplied)
Death penalty repeal and damages
In order that the rape be qualified, there need only be one qualifying circumstance present. Here, We have two -
relationship and age. Even assuming that the circumstance of age had not been duly proven, it makes no
difference as to the final outcome of this case as the circumstance of relationship of appellant to the victim
cannot be denied.
As the death penalty has been repealed through R.A. No. 9346,102 entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death
Penalty in the Philippines," appellant's sentence should be downgraded from death to reclusion perpetua. Section 2 of
the said law pertinently provides:
Section 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of
the Revised Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the
penalties of the Revised Penal Code.
Notwithstanding the reduction of the penalty imposed on appellant, he is not eligible for parole following Section 3 of the
law, which reads:
Section 3. Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced
to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known
as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
Anent the CA award of damages, civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00 is correct as each count of rape is
qualified by circumstances which warrant the imposition of the death penalty.103 With respect to moral damages, the
awarded amount of P50,000.00 must be increased to P75,000.00, without need of pleading or proof of basis.104The
additional amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages to AAA is likewise justified due to the presence of the
qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship.105
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty
imposed in each case is hereby changed from death to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole. Further, the
award of moral damages to AAA in the amount of P50,000.00 is increased to P75,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 130602 March 15, 2000

vs.
MICHAEL FRONDA y QUINDARA, ANTONINO FLORA y SABADO, JR., LAURO MILLAMINA y CINENSE, JR.,
accused, MICHAEL FRONDA y QUINDARA, accused-appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Accused Michael Fronda (hereafter FRONDA); Antonino Flora, Jr.; and Lauro Millamina, Jr., were charged with and
tried for violation of Section 4, Article II of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City,
1
Branch 6, in Criminal Case No. 14570-R under an information whose accusatory portion reads as follows:
That on or about the 8th day of October, 1996, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to PO3 June Corpuz and PO2 Ceasary Harry
Bedey, members of the Philippine National Police, Baguio City, one (1) kilo marijuana leaves wrapped with
newspaper, a prohibited drug, well knowing that the sale and delivery of such drug is prohibited without authority
of law to do so, in violation of the aforementioned provisions of law.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 2
Accused entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment.
At the trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses PO2 Ceasary Harry Bedey and PO3 June Corpuz, who arrested the
accused, and Police Senior Inspector Alma Margarita Villaseñor, the forensic chemist.
After its Demurrer to Evidence was denied, the defense presented as witnesses the three accused and their landlady,
Mrs. Lolita Flora.
The prosecution's evidence was faithfully summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in its Manifestation
and Motion in Lieu of Appellee's Brief as follows:
On October 8, 1998, around 12:00 high noon, Police Officer Cesary Harry Bedey, Desk Officer at the Baguio
City Police Office, was informed by a "concerned citizen" thru telephone that somebody was engaged in selling
marijuana at No. 341 A. Bonifacio Street, Baguio City (TSN, December 11, 1996, p. 3). The caller mentioned the
names of Michael Fronda, Antonino Flora, Jr. and Lauro Millamina, Jr., as the marijuana dealers (TSN, ibid., p.
6).
After referring the matter to his superior, Officer Bedey was advised to look for Police Officer June Corpuz who
was also a resident of No. 341 A. Bonifacio Street (TSN, ibid., p. 4).
When Officer June Corpuz arrived at the police station around 8:30 in the evening, Bedey immediately relayed
to him the information about the drug dealing activities at the given address (TSN, ibid., pp. 4-5). Both of them
then agreed to verify "the information" and proceeded to 341 Bonifacio Street, which was also Corpuz' residence
(TSN, ibid., p. 5).
There were actually two (2) houses at 341 A. Bonifacio Street. The first house was the residence of the land
lady, Lolita Flora, while the second house was a two-storey building leased to bedspacers. There were 2 rooms
at the first floor and also two rooms at the second floor. One room at the first floor was occupied by Fronda,
Flora and Millamina and beside it was another room occupied by one Gilbert Mugot. At the second floor, Officer
Corpuz occupied the room directly above that of the accused (TSN, December 3, 1996, pp. 8-9).
To avoid detection, Corpuz then went ahead of Bedey and a woman companion. Upon reaching the place, he
joined the drinking session held at the room of Gilbert Mugot (TSN, December 3, 1996, pp. 4-5, 10).
Meanwhile, Bedey and his woman companion following Corpuz, proceeded to the house of the landlady and
inquired where the appellant and his co-accused resided (TSN, December 3, 1996, pp. 5-6; TSN, December 11,
1996, p. 5). After Lolita Flora had pointed to one of the rooms at the first floor, Bedey proceeded there and
knocked at the door (TSN, December 11, 1996, p. 7). Somebody from inside then pulled the door open half-way
and asked, "What do you want?" (TSN, ibid., pp. 8-9,11,13).
As soon as the door was opened, Bedey stepped backwards, about 3 to 4 meters (TSN, December 11, 1996, p.
9), and then asked if he could buy marijuana (TSN, ibid., pp. 9,13).
Someone answered, "there is," and a square package wrapped in newspaper about 1 to 2 inches thick, 8 1/2
inches in width and 11 inches long was then handed to Bedey (TSN, ibid., pp. 9, 15, 16).
Bedey immediately opened the package a little, smelled it and determined that the contents were marijuana
(TSN, ibid., p. 20). At the same time, he asked, "How much?" (TSN, ibid., pp. 13-18).
When somebody answered "P1,000.00," Bedey immediately shouted "positive" (TSN, ibid., pp. 19-20).
Upon hearing Bedey, officer June Corpuz immediately rushed towards him from the next room (TSN, December
3, 1996, p. 11). He and Bedey then advised/invited the occupants of the room to come out (TSN, December 3,
1996, ibid; December 11, 1996, p. 20) Michael Fronda, Lauro Millamina., Jr., and Antonino Flora, Jr. came out of
the room (TSN, December 11, 1996, p. 22; December 3, 1996, pp. 11,14, 16-17).
The three were immediately brought to the police station and charged with selling marijuana (TSN, December 3,
1996, p. 18; December 11, 1996, p. 32). Meanwhile, the brick of marijuana was turned over to the PNP Crime
Laboratory where Alma Margarita Villaseñor, Forensic Chemist, subjected it to physical, chemical and
confirmatory tests (TSN, December 3, 1996, p. 38). The package, weighing 1.1 kilograms, was confirmed to be
marijuana, a prohibited drug (TSN, ibid., pp. 38-40, Exhibit "D").
The accused's defense is denial. Their version of the incident was also succinctly summarized by the OSG in its
Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Appellee's Brief, thus:
[The accused] claimed that they hailed from Talogtog, Nueva Ecija and were freshmen students at the
University of Baguio (TSN, February 4, 1997, pp. 13-14; February 6, 1997, p. 2). Since June 1996, they stayed
as bedspacers at the boarding house/apartment of Mrs. Lolita Flora at No. 341 A. Bonifacio Street, Baguio City
(TSN, February 4, 1997, p. 3; February 6, 1997, ibid).
From June 16 to September 30, 1996, only the three of them occupied a room located at the first floor of the
apartment. However, on October 1, 1996, one Ramil (Rommel) Oroy from Kapangan, Benguet, was taken in by
Mrs. Lolita Flora as another bedspacer and stayed with them in their room (TSN, February 4, 1997, pp. 3-4;
February 5, 1997, p. 2; February 6, 1997, p. 8).
Around 7:00 o'clock in the evening of October 8, 1996, Fronda, Flora and Millamina came home one after the
other from their respective classes at the University of Baguio. At the time, Oroy was inside, talking with two (2)
unidentified visitors. They did not mind Oroy and his visitors and proceeded to eat their supper. Thereafter, the
three of them went to sleep (TSN, February 4, 1997, pp. 6-7, 19 24; February 5, 1997, pp. 9-10; February 6,
1997, pp. 4-6).
They were suddenly awakened when they heard someone calling their names and ordering them to go out of
their room (TSN, February 4, 1997, pp. 8-9; February 5, 1997, p. 4.). As soon as they went out, they were
surprised when they were handcuffed and brought to the police station for allegedly dealing in marijuana (TSN,
February 4, 1997, pp. 9-12; February 5, 1997, pp. 6-8; February 6, 1997, pp. 6-7).
Mrs. Lolita Flora confirmed on the stand that, indeed, on October 8, 1996, appellant Fronda, Flora and Millamina
were sharing their room with a new boarder, Rommel/Ramil Oroy.
All the accused vigorously denied having anything to do with the brick of marijuana recovered on the night of 8 October
1996, which they allegedly saw for the first time only during the trial. FRONDA claimed that he did not even know what a
3
marijuana was. Millamina denied that he was engaged in selling marijuana, and that any one of them handed the
4
marijuana to PO2 Bedey. 5
In its Decision of 6 March 1997, the trial court found the prosecution's evidence sufficient to prove that the accused
6
conspired in delivering or dealing in marijuana. It reasoned that (1) the accused were literally caught flagrante delicto,
delivering or dealing a brick of marijuana to PO2 Bedey; (2) only the accused came out of the room where the brick of
marijuana was obtained; (3) the marijuana was sold and delivered by the three of them, if not by one of them; (4) since
the accused chose to cover up for each other, they must have acted together in dealing in the marijuana; and (5)
notwithstanding the fact that no money was exchanged, there was a transaction of the delivery of the marijuana and the
"twin elements of the selling transaction and the corpus delicti were present to uphold a conviction under Section 4,
Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended."
The trial court did not find credible accused's claim that they were mere students, since their classcards, enrollment or
registration papers, or even their teachers and classmates were not presented. It dismissed as concocted and
fabricated the defense's story that a fourth bedspacer named Rommel Oroy/Ramil Uroy was inside the room of the
accused with two unidentified visitors in the night of 8 October 1996 when the marijuana was obtained by PO2 Bedey,
considering that PO3 Corpuz testified categorically that only the three accused came out of the room as occupants. If
indeed Ramil Oroy and his two unidentified visitors were inside the room on that occasion, they could not have escaped
the attention of the policemen, there being only one door to the room and the two policemen were outside that door
when they asked the occupants to come out. Besides, when caught, the accused did not tell the police that there were
other occupants in the room. The Court disbelieved Lolita Flora's corroborative testimony that a certain Ramil Oroy was
also a bedspacer in that room and considered it as a last minute attempt on her part to help out the three accused to
create a doubt on who were inside the room at the time.
The trial court thus convicted all the accused of violation of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentenced them to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000, plus costs.
On 11 March 1997, all the three accused filed a Notice of Appeal. However, two days later, Flora and Millamina filed a
7
Motion for Suspension of Sentence under the provision of P.D. No. 603, as amended. Pending its resolution, the trial
8 9
court issued an Order holding in abeyance Flora and Millamina's Notice of Appeal until their motion was resolved. It
10
also stated that FRONDA's appeal would be forwarded to us only after the resolution of his co-accused's motion for
suspension of sentence.
During the hearing of the motion, the trial court informed Atty. Jaime Ulep, Flora and Millamina's new counsel, that
should the Supreme Court ultimately rule that the movants were not entitled to a suspended sentence, they might lose
their right to appeal because by their move to avail themselves of the benefit of the suspended sentence, they could be
deemed to have withdrawn their appeal and not to have disputed the trial court's finding of guilt. Thus, Flora and
Millamina were required to manifest to the court whether
(1) they are pursuing only the appeal of the decision in this case and therefore their appeal should be forwarded
immediately to the Supreme Court and that they are withdrawing their Motion for Suspension of Sentence which
shall no longer be resolved by the court; or
(2) they are pursuing only the motion to suspend sentence and therefore withdrawing their notice of appeal in
which case the court will resolve the Motion to Suspend Sentence immediately; or
(3) they are pursuing their motion for a suspension of sentence which should therefore be resolved by the court
and in the event the accused minors do not qualify, their appeal of the decision of the court convicting them
should nevertheless be forwarded to the Supreme Court as they are also pursuing the appeal. 11
In his Manifestation of 26 May 1997 Atty. Ulep stated that accused Flora and Millamina were "pursuing their motion for a
suspension of sentence and/or for the suspension of further proceedings under Article 192 of P.D. 603, as amended";
and in the possibility that they would not qualify, they would file a petition to be admitted to bail and to avail themselves
of their right to appeal the decision.
12
On 4 June 1997, the trial court granted Flora and Millamina's motion for suspension of sentence and amended its
13
decision by (1) reducing their penalty to an indeterminate penalty ranging from 6 years and 1 day of prision mayoras
minimum to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum on ground of the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority, both being below 18 years of age at the time the offense was committed; (2) suspending their
sentence for two years from 4 June 1997; (3) releasing Flora and Millamina and committing them to the custody of their
parents and grandparents, respectively, with the supervision of the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD) in Nueva Ecija; and (4) stating that should they behave properly, they would be discharged and their case
would be dismissed; otherwise, they would be returned to the court for pronouncement of their penalty.
In its Order of 9 June 1997, the trial court forwarded to us the records of the case "for purposes of the appeal of Michael
Fronda only," and ordered FRONDA's commitment to the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City for preventive
14
imprisonment pending appeal. 15
In our Resolution of 19 January 1998 we accepted not only the appeal of FRONDA, but also those of Flora and
Millamina. The acceptance of the appeals of Flora and Millamina was erroneous because they did not appeal from the
Amended Decision. Consequently, we shall deal only with FRONDA's appeal.
FRONDA alleges that (a) the trial court erred in convicting him solely on the basis of circumstantial evidence, and in
totally disregarding the evidence for the defense; (b) the prosecution's evidence is insufficient to warrant a conviction;
and (c) there being no factual or legal basis, the decision is a complete nullity.
For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Appellee's Brief,
submitting that the prosecution's evidence fails to meet the quantum of evidence required to overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence; and thus, regardless of the supposed weakness of their defense, all the accused are entitled
to acquittal. It therefore recommends the acquittal not only of appellant FRONDA, but also of his co-accused, Flora and
Millamina.
In every criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender or offenders, like the crime itself, must be established by proof
beyond reasonable doubt. Identification which does not preclude a reasonable possibility of mistake cannot be accorded
any evidentiary force. Thus, where eyewitnesses contradict themselves on the identity of the malefactor, the element
16
of reasonable doubt is injected and cannot be lightly disregarded. In the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt as
17
to the identity of the culprit, the accused's constitutional right of presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved is
not overcome, and he is entitled to an acquittal even though his innocence may be doubted. The constitutional
18 19
presumption of innocence guaranteed to every individual is of primary importance, and the conviction of the accused
must rest not on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of the evidence for the prosecution. 20
In the instant case, as correctly pointed out by both FRONDA and the OSG, the trial court's finding that FRONDA and
the other accused were "literally caught flagrante delicto, delivering or dealing in a brick of marijuana to Police Officer
Bedey" is not supported by the evidence adduced by the prosecution. Flagrante delicto means "[i]n the very act of
committing the crime." To be caught flagrante delicto, therefore, necessarily implies positive identification by the
21
eyewitness or eyewitnesses. Such is a "direct evidence" of culpability, which is "that which proves the fact in dispute
without the aid of any inference or presumption" in contrast to circumstantial evidence which is "the proof of facts from
22
which, taken collectively, the existence of the particular fact in dispute may be inferred as a necessary or probable
consequence." Circumstantial evidence, however, is not a weaker form of evidence vis-á-vis direct evidence, for our
23
rules make no distinction between direct evidence of fact and evidence of circumstances from which the existence of a
fact may be inferred. No greater degree of certainty is required when the evidence is circumstantial than when it is
24
direct; for in either case, the trier of fact must be convinced beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. 25
In this case, as pointed out by the parties, neither PO2 Bedey, who transacted with and obtained the brick of marijuana
from "somebody" in the room at 341 A. Bonifacio St., Baguio City, nor PO3 Corpuz, who rushed to the scene upon
hearing Bedey shout "Positive," could identify the person or persons Bedey was talking to and dealing with prior to and
at the time the brick of marijuana was obtained. Thus, the trial court had to resort to inference that since Bedey obtained
the brick of marijuana from "somebody" from the same room occupied by FRONDA and the other accused who, when
their names were called, "volunteered" as occupants of the room, then one or some of them must be responsible for
selling and delivering to Bedey the marijuana.
From the testimony of PO2 Bedey on the circumstances resulting in the delivery of a brick of marijuana, it is clear that
none of the accused was caught flagrante delicto selling or delivering marijuana. Due to the darkness and lack of
illumination inside and outside the door where the transaction took place, Bedey could not identify the person he was
dealing with. He was not even sure how many person or persons he was talking to that night in question. Significantly,
he admitted that there were several persons who came out of the room other than the accused. Like PO3 Corpuz, he
did not even bother to enter the room to check whether there were persons other than the accused. When Bedey was
given the final chance to identify who among the three accused talked to him and handed him the marijuana, he could
not do so. 26
PO3 Corpuz, who was in another room when Bedey obtained the marijuana, neither witnessed the transaction leading
to the delivery of marijuana. His testimony that only the accused came out of the room was materially contradicted by
Bedey's testimony that besides the accused, there were other persons who came out of the room. Moreover, Corpuz
also admitted during cross examination that, like Bedey, he did not enter the room of the accused and thus could not
definitely rule out the possibility that there were other persons in the room aside from the three. 27
In view of the admissions by the police officers who conducted the "operation" that they could not identify the person or
persons who transacted with Bedey and delivered the brick of marijuana, and that they did not bother to enter the room
where the marijuana was obtained, there is no moral certainty that FRONDA and the other accused were responsible
for the delivery of marijuana to Bedey. 1âwphi1
Indeed, far from having been caught flagrante delicto, the evidence against FRONDA and his co-accused is, at most,
only circumstantial in nature. Where the evidence is purely circumstantial, there should be an even greater need than
usual to apply with vigor the rule that the prosecution cannot depend on the weakness of the defense and that any
conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of guilt of the accused. Under the Rules of Court,
28
circumstantial evidence would be sufficient for conviction if the following concur: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proved; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Or, as jurisprudentially formulated, a
judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proven constitute an
unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others,
as the guilty person; i.e., the circumstances proven must be consistent with each other and consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty. 29
The only circumstantial evidence clearly established by the prosecution against the accused are the following: (1) the
fact that a brick of marijuana was obtained by Bedey from "somebody" inside the room which the appellants were also
occupying; and (2) when called out, the accused "volunteered" to come out of the room. The concordant combination
and cumulative effect of these circumstances do not satisfy the requirements of Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of
Court. They do not conclusively establish the guilt of the accused beyond any reasonable doubt. They do not exclude
the possibility that other persons might have been the ones who transacted with Bedey and handed him the marijuana
principally because the police officers failed to seal off the area from other curious boarders and to enter the room to
ensure that no other persons were still inside that room. Notably, Bedey testified that there were other persons besides
the accused who came out of the room.
The foregoing disquisitions render unnecessary a discussion on the trial court's finding of conspiracy.
A final word on the fate of Flora and Millamina is in order. We disagree with the view of the trial court that the application
and grant of Flora and Millamina's suspension of sentence presupposed their acceptance of the finding of guilt against
them and constituted a waiver of the right to appeal. It must be emphasized that an application for suspension of
sentence under the provisions of Article 192 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code is not the same as an application for
probation, which is deemed a waiver of their right to appeal. There is nothing in the said Code which prohibits a
30
youthful offender from appealing his conviction after he proves to be incorrigible and the trial court proceeds to
pronounce its judgment of guilty and sentence against him. In fact, as amended by P.D. No. 1179, Article 197 of the
31
Code expressly provides that the convicted offender may still apply for probation under the provisions of P. D. No. 968.
Conversely, the accused may pursue his appeal if he chooses not to avail himself of the benefits of probation. Although
the right to appeal is a statutory right, it is an essential part of the judicial system. Courts should proceed with caution so
as not to deprive a party of this right; they should, instead, afford every party-litigant the amplest opportunity for the
proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.
32
At any rate, even if Flora and Millamina did not pursue their appeal, the acquittal of FRONDA and our finding that the
prosecution has not established the guilt of all the accused beyond reasonable doubt must, perforce, benefit Flora and
Millamina. First, neither the charge of conspiracy nor their individual liability was proved beyond reasonable doubt.
33
Second, under Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, an "[a]ppeal taken by one or more of
several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except in so far as the judgment of the appellate court is
favorable and applicable to the latter." After all, the grant of suspended sentence to accused Flora and Millamina does
not mean that they are already exonerated from the crime charged; only that the pronouncement of judgment and the
service of sentence are suspended until their return to court for final disposition depending on their conduct and the
34
progress of rehabilitation. Should the criminal case against them be dismissed based on their observance of good
35
conduct, it would only mean that they would suffer no penalty. 36
WHEREFORE, the Amended Decision of the RTC, Baguio City, Branch 6, in Criminal Case No. 14570-R is hereby
REVERSED. A new judgment is hereby rendered ACQUITTING MICHAEL FRONDA y QUINDARA and his co-accused
ANTONINO FLORA y SABADO, JR., and LAURO MILLAMINA y CINENSE, JR. The Director of the Bureau of
Corrections is directed to immediately release from confinement MICHAEL FRONDA unless his further detention is
warranted by virtue of any lawful cause, and to make a report of such release within five (5) days from notice hereof.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED. 1âwphi1.nêt
G.R. No. 168546 July 23, 2008
MICHAEL PADUA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review assails the Decision1 dated April 19, 2005 and Resolution2 dated June 14, 2005, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86977 which had respectively dismissed Michael Padua’s petition for certiorari and denied
his motion for reconsideration. Padua’s petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailed the Orders dated May
11, 20043 and July 28, 20044 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 168, Pasig City, which had denied his petition
for probation.
The facts, culled from the records, are as follows:
On June 16, 2003, petitioner Michael Padua and Edgar Allan Ubalde were charged before the RTC, Branch 168, Pasig
City of violating Section 5,5 Article II of Republic Act No. 9165,6 otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002," for selling dangerous drugs.7 The Information reads:
The Prosecution, through the undersigned Public Prosecutor, charges Edgar Allan Ubalde y Velchez a.k.a.
"Allan" and Michael Padua y Tordel a.k.a. "Mike", with the crime of violation of Sec. 5, Art. II, Republic Act No. 9165
in relation to R.A. [No.] 8369, Sec. 5 par. (a) and (i), committed as follows:
On or about June 6, 2003, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, Edgar Allan
Ubalde y Velchez and Michael Padua y Tordel, a minor, seventeen (17) years old, conspiring and confederating
together and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another, not being lawfully authorized to sell any dangerous
drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to PO1 Roland A. Panis, a police
poseur-buyer, one (1) folded newsprint containing 4.86 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops, which was found positive
to the tests for marijuana, a dangerous drug, in violation of the said law.
Contrary to law.8
When arraigned on October 13, 2003, Padua, assisted by his counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty.9
During the pre-trial conference on February 2, 2004, however, Padua’s counsel manifested that his client was willing to
withdraw his plea of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty to avail of the benefits granted to first-time offenders under
Section 7010 of Rep. Act No. 9165. The prosecutor interposed no objection.11 Thus, the RTC on the same date issued an
Order12 stating that the former plea of Padua of not guilty was considered withdrawn. Padua was re-arraigned and
pleaded guilty. Hence, in a Decision13 dated February 6, 2004, the RTC found Padua guilty of the crime charged:
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Michael Padua y Tordel guilty of [v]iolation of Sec. 5 Art. II of R.A. No.
9165 in relation to R.A. No. 8369 Sec. 5 par. (a) and (i) thereof, and therefore, sentences him to suffer an indeterminate
sentence of six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of
reclusion temporal as maximum and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00).
No subsidiary imprisonment, however, shall be imposed should [the] accused fail to pay the fine pursuant to Art. 39 par.
3 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.14
Padua subsequently filed a Petition for Probation15 dated February 10, 2004 alleging that he is a minor and a first-time
offender who desires to avail of the benefits of probation under Presidential Decree No. 96816 (P.D. No. 968), otherwise
known as "The Probation Law of 1976" and Section 70 of Rep. Act No. 9165. He further alleged that he possesses all
the qualifications and none of the disqualifications under the said laws.
The RTC in an Order17 dated February 10, 2004 directed the Probation Officer of Pasig City to conduct a Post-Sentence
Investigation and submit a report and recommendation within 60 days from receipt of the order. The City Prosecutor
was also directed to submit his comment on the said petition within five days from receipt of the order.
On April 6, 2004, Chief Probation and Parole Officer Josefina J. Pasana submitted a Post-Sentence Investigation
Report to the RTC recommending that Padua be placed on probation.18
However, on May 11, 2004, public respondent Pairing Judge Agnes Reyes-Carpio issued an Order denying the Petition
for Probation on the ground that under Section 2419 of Rep. Act No. 9165, any person convicted of drug trafficking
cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law. The court ruled thus:
Before this Court now is the Post-Sentence Investigation Report (PSIR) on minor Michael Padua y Tordel prepared by
Senior Parole and Probation Officer Teodoro Villaverde and submitted by the Chief of the Pasig City Parole and
Probation Office, Josefina J. Pasana.
In the aforesaid PSIR, Senior PPO Teodoro Villaverde recommended that minor Michael Padua y Tordel be placed on
probation, anchoring his recommendation on Articles 189 and 192 of P.D. 603, otherwise known as the Child and
Welfare Code, as amended, which deal with the suspension of sentence and commitment of youthful offender. Such
articles, therefore, do not find application in this case, the matter before the Court being an application for probation by
minor Michael Padua y Tordel and not the suspension of his sentence.
On the other hand, Section 70 is under Article VIII of R.A. 9165 which deals with the Program for Treatment and
Rehabilitation of Drug Dependents. Sections 54 to 76, all under Article VIII of R.A. 9165 specifically refer to violations of
either Section 15 or Section 11. Nowhere in Article VIII was [v]iolation of Section 5 ever mentioned.
More importantly, while the provisions of R.A. 9165, particularly Section 70 thereof deals with Probation or Community
Service for First- Time Minor Offender in Lieu of Imprisonment, the Court is of the view and so holds that minor Michael
Padua y Tordel who was charged and convicted of violating Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165, cannot avail of probation
under said section in view of the provision of Section 24 which is hereunder quoted:
"Sec. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and Pushers. – Any person convicted for drug
trafficking or pushing under this Act, regardless of the penalty imposed by the Court, cannot avail of the privilege
granted by the Probation Law or Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended." (underlining supplied)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Probation filed by Michael Padua y Tord[e]l should be, as it is
hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.20
Padua filed a motion for reconsideration of the order but the same was denied on July 28, 2004. He filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals assailing the order, but the Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated April
19, 2005, dismissed his petition. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.21
Padua filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision but it was denied. Hence, this petition where
he raises the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DENIAL OF THE PETITION
FOR PROBATION WHICH DEPRIVED PETITIONER’S RIGHT AS A MINOR UNDER ADMINISTRATIVE
ORDER NO. [02-1-18-SC] OTHERWISE KNOWN AS [THE] RULE ON JUVENILES IN CONFLICT WITH THE
LAW.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT [THE] ACCUSED[’S] RIGHT [TO BE RELEASED UNDER RECOGNIZANCE] HAS BEEN
VIOLATED OR DEPRIVED IN THE LIGHT OF R.A. 9344 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS AN ACT ESTABLISHING
A COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE SYSTEM, CREATING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE
AND WELFARE COUNCIL UNDER DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND
OTHER PURPOSES.22
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing public respondent, opted to adopt its Comment23 as its
Memorandum. In its Comment, the OSG countered that
I.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals have legal basis in applying Section 24, Article II of R.A. 9165 instead of
Section 70, Article VIII of the same law.
II.
Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as the "Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law" has no
application to the instant case.24
Simply, the issues are: (1) Did the Court of Appeals err in dismissing Padua’s petition for certiorari assailing the trial
court’s order denying his petition for probation? (2) Was Padua’s right under Rep. Act No. 9344,25 the "Juvenile Justice
and Welfare Act of 2006," violated? and (3) Does Section 3226 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as the "Rule on
Juveniles in Conflict with the Law" have application in this case?
As to the first issue, we rule that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing Padua’s petition for certiorari.
For certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.27
"Without jurisdiction" means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority. There is "excess of jurisdiction" when
the court transcends its power or acts without any statutory authority. "Grave abuse of discretion" implies such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In other words,
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and such
exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the
duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.28
A review of the orders of the RTC denying Padua’s petition for probation shows that the RTC neither acted without
jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion because it merely applied the law and adhered to principles of statutory
construction in denying Padua’s petition for probation.
Padua was charged and convicted for violation of Section 5, Article II of Rep. Act No. 9165 for selling dangerous drugs.
It is clear under Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165 that any person convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the
privilege of probation, to wit:
SEC. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and Pushers. – Any person convicted for drug
trafficking or pushing under this Act, regardless of the penalty imposed by the Court, cannot avail of the
privilege granted by the Probation Law or Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended. (Emphasis supplied.)
The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing, regardless
of the penalty imposed, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or P.D. No. 968. The elementary rule
in statutory construction is that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning
must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says.29 If a
statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi
sermo, or speech is the index of intention.30 Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or from
the words of a statute there should be no departure.31
Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that the intention of the legislators in Section 24 of Rep. Act No.
9165 is to provide stiffer and harsher punishment for those persons convicted of drug trafficking or pushing while
extending a sympathetic and magnanimous hand in Section 70 to drug dependents who are found guilty of violation of
Sections 1132 and 1533 of the Act. The law considers the users and possessors of illegal drugs as victims while the drug
traffickers and pushers as predators. Hence, while drug traffickers and pushers, like Padua, are categorically
disqualified from availing the law on probation, youthful drug dependents, users and possessors alike, are given the
chance to mend their ways.34 The Court of Appeals also correctly stated that had it been the intention of the legislators
to exempt from the application of Section 24 the drug traffickers and pushers who are minors and first time offenders,
the law could have easily declared so.35
The law indeed appears strict and harsh against drug traffickers and drug pushers while protective of drug users. To
illustrate, a person arrested for using illegal or dangerous drugs is meted only a penalty of six months rehabilitation in a
government center, as minimum, for the first offense under Section 15 of Rep. Act No. 9165, while a person charged
and convicted of selling dangerous drugs shall suffer life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (₱10,000,000.00) under Section 5, Rep. Act No. 9165.
As for the second and third issues, Padua cannot argue that his right under Rep. Act No. 9344, the "Juvenile Justice
and Welfare Act of 2006" was violated. Nor can he argue that Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as
the "Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law" has application in this case. Section 6836 of Rep. Act No. 9344 and
Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC both pertain to suspension of sentence and not probation.
Furthermore, suspension of sentence under Section 3837 of Rep. Act No. 9344 could no longer be retroactively applied
for petitioner’s benefit. Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344 provides that once a child under 18 years of age is found guilty
of the offense charged, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with
the law under suspended sentence. Section 4038 of Rep. Act No. 9344, however, provides that once the child reaches
18 years of age, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child, order execution of sentence, or extend the
suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of 21 years.
Petitioner has already reached 21 years of age or over and thus, could no longer be considered a child39 for purposes of
applying Rep. Act 9344. Thus, the application of Sections 38 and 40 appears moot and academic as far as his case is
concerned.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated April 19, 2005 and the Resolution dated June 14,
2005 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 193507 January 30, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
REY MONTICALVO y MAGNO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00457 dated 3 December 2009
affirming in toto the Decision2 of Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Catarman, Northern Samar, in Criminal
Case No. C-3460 dated 18 October 2005 finding herein appellant Rey Monticalvo y Magno guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape of a demented person committed against AAA,3 thereby imposing upon him the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Appellant Rey Monticalvo y Magno was charged with raping AAA in an Information4 dated 30 April 2003, the accusatory
portion of which reads:
That on or about the 9th day of December 2002 at about 7:00 o’clock in the evening in Bgy. XXX, Municipality of XXX,
Province of XXX, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named appellant, actuated by
lust and with lewd design, with force and intimidation, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge with AAA, 12 years old and is suffering from mental disorder or is demented or has mental disability,
without the consent and against the will of said victim.5 [Emphasis supplied].
On arraignment, appellant, with the assistance of counsel de oficio, pleaded NOT GUILTY6 to the crime charged.
At the pre-trial conference, the prosecution and the defense failed to make any stipulation of facts.7 The pre-trial
conference was then terminated and trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) AAA, the private offended party; (2) BBB, mother of AAA; (3)
Analiza Pait (Analiza), neighbor and friend of AAA; (4) Dr. Jesus Emmanuel Nochete (Dr. Nochete), Medical Officer IV,
Northern Samar Provincial Hospital; and (5) Dr. Vincent Anthony M. Belicena (Dr. Belicena), Medical Specialist II,
Northern SamarProvincial Hospital. Their testimonies established the following facts:
AAA is a mental retardate and was 12 years and 11 months old at the time of the rape incident.8 She and appellant, who
was then 17 years old,9 are neighbors − their respective houses are adjoining each other.10
In the afternoon of 9 December 2002, AAA and her friend, Analiza, were in front of the sari-sari store of AAA’s mother,
BBB, while appellant was inside the fence of their house adjacent to the said sari-sari store. Shortly, thereafter,
appellant invited AAA to go with him to the kiln at the back of their house. AAA acceded and went ahead.11
Upon seeing appellant and AAA going to the kiln, Analiza, pretending to look for her one peso coin, followed them until
she reached a papaya tree located three and a half meters away from the place. Analiza hid under the papaya tree and
from there she saw appellant undress AAA by removing the latter’s shorts and panty. Appellant, however, glanced and
saw Analiza. Frightened, Analiza ran away and went back to the sari-sari store of BBB without telling BBB what she
saw.12
Appellant proceeded to satisfy his bestial desire. After undressing AAA, appellant made her lie down. He then placed
himself on top of AAA and made push and pull movements. Afterwards, appellant stopped, allowed AAA to sit down for
a while and then sent her home.13
When AAA arrived at their house around 7:30 p.m., she was asked by her mother, BBB, where she came from and why
she came home late. AAA replied that she was at the back of their house as appellant brought her there and had sexual
intercourse with her.14
The following day, BBB brought AAA to the police station and then to the Northern Samar Provincial Hospital where
AAA was examined by Dr. Nochete.15 The medical examination yielded the following:
The findings are:
= Confluent abrasion 1 x 1 inches, 2 inches below the umbilicus.
Genitalia Exam:
= Admits 1 finger with ease.
= (-) vulvar swelling, (-) erythema.
= (+) complete healed hymenal laceration at 5 o’clock, 7 o’clock & 10 o’clock position.
Gram Stain Result: Negative for spermatozoa.16
Dr. Nochete explained that AAA could have possibly sustained those complete healed hymenal lacerations more than a
month prior to the date of the examination. He also clarified that even though AAA has no fresh hymenal laceration it
does not necessarily mean that no sexual intercourse was committed on her on 9 December 2002. It is possible that
AAA did not sustain any fresh hymenal laceration because the vaginal canal has become loose. He did not also find any
trace of spermatozoa on AAA’s vagina, its presence being dependent on whether the appellant did ejaculate or not.17
AAA was also examined by Dr. Belicena, a Psychiatrist at the Northern Samar Provincial Hospital, who found that AAA
is suffering from moderate to severe mental retardation, meaning, AAA is suffering from the specific form of below
average intelligence that has a low reproduction functioning resulting in impaired functioning. This finding was obtained
through mental examination and actual interview of AAA. Dr. Belicena, however, recommended a full battery of
psychological testing to determine AAA’s exact mental age.18 Dr. Belicena’s finding was reduced into writing as
evidenced by a Medical Certificate19 dated 18 May 2004.
For its part, the defense offered the testimonies of (1) Pio Campos (Pio), neighbor and friend of appellant; (2) Cesar
Monticalvo (Cesar), appellant’s father; (3) Alexander Sanico (Alexander), Local Civil Registrar of Bobon, Northern
Samar; and (4) appellant, who invoked the defense of denial and alibi to exonerate himself from the crime charged.
Appellant denied having raped AAA. He claimed that on 9 December 2002, at around 1:00 p.m., he, together with Pio
and a certain Dinnes Samson, was having a drinking spree in the house of one Adolfo Congayao (Adolfo). They finished
drinking at around 6:00 p.m. As he was too drunk, Pio assisted him in going home. He went to sleep and woke up only
at 12:00 midnight as he needed to urinate. He went back to sleep and woke up at 6:00 a.m. of the following day, i.e., 10
December 2002. He was surprised that AAA charged him with rape. He was then arrested at around 3:00 p.m. of 10
December 2002.20
Appellant disclosed, however, that the house of Adolfo, where they had their drinking spree, is more or less six (6)
meters away from the house of AAA. In fact, he could still see the house of AAA even when he was in the house of
Adolfo. He similarly admitted that he knew very well that AAA is suffering from mental abnormalities. He also divulged
that he asked Pio to testify on his behalf.21
Appellant’s testimony was corroborated on all material points by Pio and his father, Cesar, who also admitted that he
personally knew AAA as she is their neighbor. Cesar also knew that AAA is suffering from mental disorder.22 Both Pio
and Cesar confirmed that on 9 December 2002, they brought appellant to his bedroom and let him sleep there because
he was too drunk. Thereafter, Pio and Cesar engaged in a drinking spree inside the latter’s house, particularly at the
kitchen that is more than two (2) meters away from appellant’s bedroom, which lasted until 11:00 p.m. Pio and Cesar
likewise stated that there was no moment that appellant went out of his bedroom since the time they brought him
there.23
Alexander, another defense witness, presented appellant’s Certificate of Live Birth24 to prove that the latter was only 17
years old during the commission of the crime, i.e., 9 December 2002.25
The trial court, convinced about the merits of the prosecution’s case rendered a Decision on 18 October 2005, finding
the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape of a demented person and sentenced him to an
imprisonment term of reclusion perpetua and ordered him to indemnify AAA in the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
On appeal, the following errors were assigned:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME OF RAPE OF A
DEMENTED PERSON DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE APPELLANT’S AGE, BEING A MINOR, ATTHE TIME OF THE
COMMISSION OF THE CRIME.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO IMPOSE THE PROPER PENALTY.26
The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision on 3 December 2009 affirming in toto the trial court’s Decision
dated 18 October 2005.
Hence, this appeal.
Appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt as the testimonies of AAA,
BBB, Analiza and Dr. Nochete were replete with inconsistencies and improbabilities. Firstly, while the Information stated
that appellant raped AAA on or about the 9th day of December 2002 at around 7:00 p.m., Analiza testified that it was in
the afternoon of the same day when she saw and heard appellant calling AAA to go to the kiln at the back of their
house, and while she saw appellant undress AAA, she did not actually see the sexual intercourse because the appellant
saw her watching them, so she ran away. Secondly, BBB’s testimony that on 9 December 2002, AAA confided to her
that she was raped by appellant early that night was inconsistent with the testimony of Analiza that it was in the
afternoon of the same day when she saw appellant and AAA going to the kiln, where the former undressed the latter.
Thirdly, Dr. Nochete’s testimony clearly stated that the hymenal lacerations on AAA’s vagina could have possibly been
sustained by her a month ago, which does not support AAA’s claim of rape on 9 December 2002. Even granting that
appellant, indeed, raped AAA on 9 December 2002, it is highly implausible that the hymenal lacerations on her vagina
were already completely healed when she was examined by Dr. Nochete on 10 December 2002, which was only after
less than 24-hours from the date the alleged rape was committed.
Appellant also questions the credibility of AAA as a witness given her condition as a mental retardate. Appellant opines
that AAA, could not perceive and is not capable of making known her perception to others. As such, she can be easily
coached on what to say or do.
Appellant finally avers that granting arguendo that he is guilty of the crime charged, he was only 17 years old at the time
of its commission as evidenced by his Certificate of Live Birth. This fact was even attested to by the Local Civil Registrar
of Bobon, Northern Samar. Given his minority at the time of the commission of the crime charged, the court should have
considered the same as privileged mitigating circumstance in imposing the penalty against him.
This Court affirms appellant’s conviction.
At the outset, paragraph 1, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353,27provides
for two (2) circumstances when carnal knowledge of a woman with mental disability is considered rape. Subparagraph
(b) thereof refers to rape of a person "deprived of reason" while subparagraph (d) refers to rape of a "demented
person."28 The term "deprived of reason" has been construed to encompass those suffering from mental abnormality,
deficiency or retardation.29 The term "demented," on the other hand, means having dementia, which Webster defines as
mental deterioration; also madness, insanity.30 Dementia has also been defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as a "form of
mental disorder in which cognitive and intellectual functions of the mind are prominently affected; x x x total recovery not
possible since cerebral disease is involved."31 Thus, a mental retardate can be classified as a person "deprived of
reason," not one who is "demented" and carnal knowledge of a mental retardate is considered rape under subparagraph
(b), not subparagraph (d) of Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.32
In this case, both the trial court and the appellate court incorrectly used the word demented to characterize AAA’s
mental condition and mistakenly categorized the rape committed by appellant under subparagraph (d), Article 266-A(1)
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, instead of under subparagraph (b) thereof. Nonetheless, the mistake would
not exonerate appellant. Otherwise stated, his conviction or criminal liability for rape stands though not under
subparagraph (d) of Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, but under subparagraph (b) thereof.
Neither can it be said that appellant’s right to be properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him was violated. This Court is not unaware that the Information was worded, as follows: "AAA is suffering from mental
disorder or is demented or has mental disability." This fact, however, will not render the Information defective and will
not bar this Court from convicting appellant under subparagraph (b) of Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended.
In Olivarez v. Court of Appeals,33 this Court pronounced that:
x x x In People v. Rosare,34 the information did not allege that the victim was a mental retardate which is an essential
element of the crime of statutory rape. This Court however sustained the trial court’s judgment of conviction holding that
the resolution of the investigating prosecutor which formed the basis of the information, a copy of which is attached
thereto, stated that the offended party is suffering from mental retardation. It ruled that there was substantial compliance
with the mandate that an accused be informed of the nature of the charge against him. Thus:
Appellant contends that he cannot be convicted of statutory rape because the fact that the victim was a mental retardate
was never alleged in the information and, absent this element, the acts charged negate the commission of the offense
for which he was convicted by the lower court.
Pursuant to Section 8, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, we have decided to motu proprio take cognizance of the
resolution issued by the investigating prosecutor in I.S. No. 92-0197 dated June 2, 1992, which formed the basis of and
a copy of which was attached to the information for rape filed against herein appellant. Therein, it is clearly stated that
the offended party is suffering from mental retardation. We hold, therefore, that this should be deemed a substantial
compliance with the constitutional mandate that an accused be informed of the nature of the charge against him x x x
(citation omitted).35 [Emphasis supplied].
In this case, both the Complaint36 and the Resolution37 of the Municipal Trial Court of Northern Samar, which formed
the basis of the Information and copies of which were attached in the records, stated that AAA is suffering from mental
abnormalities – she looked like a retardate and her focus is not normal. Even, the Resolution38 of the Acting Provincial
Prosecutor concurred with the aforesaid findings. From the aforesaid, it can be gleaned that AAA’s mental disorder or
mental disability is that of being a mentally retarded and not demented. Thus, there was substantial compliance with the
mandate to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation.39 More so, as discussed hereunder, the prosecution was
able to prove that AAA is, indeed, a mental retardate. Even the appellant affirmed the said mental condition of the
victim.
To repeat, the term "deprived of reason" has been construed to encompass those suffering from mental abnormality,
deficiency or retardation.40 Hence, carnal knowledge of a mental retardate is rape under subparagraph (b) not
subparagraph (d) of Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.41
The gravamen of the crime of rape under Art. 266-A(1) is sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or without
her consent.42 Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, specifically states that:
ART. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. — Rape is committed.
1) By a man who have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.[Emphasis supplied].
From the foregoing, for the charge of rape to prosper, the prosecution must prove that the offender had carnal
knowledge of a woman through any of the four enumerated circumstances. Without doubt, carnal knowledge of a
woman who is a mental retardate is rape under the aforesaid provisions of law. Proof of force or intimidation is not
necessary, as a mental retardate is not capable of giving consent to a sexual act. What needs to be proven are the facts
of sexual congress between the accused and the victim, and the mental retardation of the latter.43
In People v. Dalandas,44 citing People v. Dumanon,45 this Court held that mental retardation can be proven by evidence
other than medical/clinical evidence, such as the testimony of witnesses and even the observation by the trial court.46
In the present case, the prosecution was able to establish that AAA is, indeed, a mental retardate through, (1) the
testimony of her mother; (2) the trial court’s observation; and (3) the mental examination and actual interview of AAA
conducted by Dr. Belicena, a Psychiatrist at the Northern Samar Provincial Hospital, who found AAA to be suffering
from moderate to severe mental retardation, meaning, AAA is suffering from the "specific form of below average
intelligence which has a low reproduction functioning which result to impairment functioning."47 It is also worthy to note
that the defense did not dispute, even admitted the fact that AAA is suffering from mental retardation. The findings of the
lower courts about AAA’s mental condition must be upheld.
The prosecution was also able to establish the fact of sexual congress between appellant and AAA. Despite the latter’s
mental condition, she narrated before the court in the best way she could her ordeal in the hands of appellant. As stated
by the appellate court, AAA conveyed her ideas by words and demonstrations.48 AAA recounted how the appellant
sexually abused her on 9 December 2002 by inviting her to go to the kiln at the back of their house. Thereupon,
appellant suddenly undressed her by removing her shorts and panty. This fact was attested to by Analiza, one of the
prosecution witnesses, who actually witnessed appellant undressing AAA by removing the latter’s shorts and panty.
AAA further testified that after undressing her, appellant made her lie down, placed himself on top of her and made push
and pull movements. Thereafter, appellant stopped, made her sit down and sent her home.49 This testimony of AAA was
correctly found by the trial court and the appellate court as coherent and given in a detailed manner.50
Emphasis must be given to the fact that the competence and credibility of mentally deficient rape victims as witnesses
have been upheld by this Court where it is shown that they can communicate their ordeal capably and consistently.
Rather than undermine the gravity of the complainant’s accusations, it even lends greater credence to her testimony,
that, someone as feeble-minded and guileless could speak so tenaciously and explicitly on the details of the rape if she
has not in fact suffered such crime at the hands of the accused. Moreover, it has been jurisprudentially settled that when
a woman says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that she has been raped and her
testimony alone is sufficient if it satisfies the exacting standard of credibility needed to convict the accused.51
Worth stressing also is the fact that during AAA’s testimony, she positively identified the appellant as the person who
raped her.52 Thus, the straightforward narration of AAA of what transpired, accompanied by her categorical identification
of appellant as the malefactor, sealed the case for the prosecution.53
The allegation of inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA, BBB, Analiza and Dr. Nochete as regards the exact date
and time the alleged rape incident happened, as well as the absence of fresh hymenal lacerations on AAA’s vagina,
pointed to by appellant cannot work in his favor.
Evidently, these inconsistencies refer only to trivial and inconsequential matters that do not alter the essential fact of the
commission of rape.54 A witness is not expected to remember with perfect recollection every minute detail of her
harrowing experience. A minor mistake as to the exact time of the commission of the rape is immaterial and cannot
discredit the testimony of a witness. This Court has repeatedly held that the exact date of the commission of the rape is
not an essential element of the crime.55 Indeed, the precise time of the crime has no substantial bearing on its
commission.56 What is decisive in a rape charge is that the commission of the rape by the accused against the
complainant has been sufficiently proven. Inconsistencies and discrepancies as to minor matters which are irrelevant to
the elements of the crime cannot be considered grounds for acquittal.57
In the same way, the absence of fresh hymenal lacerations and spermatozoa on AAA’s vagina do not negate the fact of
rape. A freshly broken hymen, as well as the presence or absence of spermatozoa, is not also an essential element of
rape.58 As clarified by Dr. Nochete, the absence of fresh hymenal laceration on AAA’s vagina does not necessarily mean
that she did not engage in sexual intercourse on 9 December 2002. Possibly, AAA did not sustain any fresh hymenal
laceration as her vaginal canal had become loose. And, he did not find any trace of spermatozoa because its presence
depends on whether or not the appellant ejaculated.
Indeed, a mental retardate is not, by reason of such handicap alone, be disqualified from testifying in court.59 Mental
retardation per se does not affect credibility. A mentally retarded may be a credible witness. The acceptance of her
testimony depends on the quality of her perceptions and the manner she can make them known to the court.60 If the
testimony of a mental retardate is coherent, the same is admissible in court.61
Neither can it be said that AAA was merely coached as a witness by her mother. It is highly unthinkable that a mother
would draw her daughter, a mental retardate at that, into a rape story with all its attendant scandal and humiliation if the
rape did not really happen. No mother in her right mind would possibly wish to stamp her child with the stigma that
follows the despicable crime of rape.62 Moreover, appellant failed to show any ill-motive on the part of AAA and her
mother to falsely testify against him.
In light of the straightforward and credible testimony of AAA, her positive identification of appellant as her assailant and
the lack of ill-motive on her part to falsely testify against appellant, the latter’s defense of denial and alibi must
necessarily fail.
Denial is an inherently weak defense and has always been viewed upon with disfavor by the courts due to the ease with
which it can be concocted. Denial as a defense crumbles in the light of positive identification of the accused, as in this
case. The defense of denial assumes significance only when the prosecution’s evidence is such that it does not prove
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Verily, mere denial, unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative self-
serving evidence which cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the testimony of the complaining witness who
testified on affirmative matters.63
Like denial, alibi is not looked upon with favor by the trial court. It also cannot prevail over witnesses’ positive
identification of appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. In any event, for the defense of alibi to prosper, it is not
enough that the accused can prove his presence at another place at the time of its commission, it is likewise essential
that he show physical impossibility for him to be at the locus delicti,64 which the appellant in this case failed to do.
As aptly observed by the trial court:
The houses of the offended party and the appellant are only divided by a fence and the place of the incident is only at
the back of the house of the appellant. The defense of alibi must fail. In addition to the positive identification made by
AAA and the place of the incident is adjacent to the houses of the victim and the appellant, being neighbors, the fact
that the appellant alleged that he was having drinking spree at that time and that he was dead drunk at around 6:00
p.m. of that date, there is no impossibility for the appellant to be physically present at the scene of the incident, because
of its proximity.
Corroborative testimony is not credible if tainted with bias particularly in cases where the witnesses are closely
associated to the appellant as to be interested in the appellant’s acquittal. In this case, the appellant’s witnesses are his
alleged drinking buddy and his father. Considering that they are bound by friendship and affiliation, it is conceivable that
they would be inclined to make excuses for him appellant from culpability.65
All told, appellant’s guilt has been proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, thus, his conviction stands.
As to penalty. Under Article 266-B66 in relation to Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, simple rape
is punishable by reclusion perpetua. However, when rape is committed by an assailant who has knowledge of the
victim’s mental retardation, the penalty is increased to death. But this circumstance must be alleged in the information
being a qualifying circumstance which increases the penalty to death and changes the nature of the offense from simple
to qualified rape.67 In the case at bench, while appellant categorically admitted that he knew AAA to be suffering from
mental abnormalities, the prosecution failed to allege this fact in the information. As such, even if it was proved, it
cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance. Thus, appellant’s conviction is only for simple rape for which he
should be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Nonetheless, a reasonable ground exists in this case that calls for the modification of the penaltyof reclusion perpetua
imposed by both lower courts upon the appellant.
This Court finds merit in appellant’s assertion that he was a minor during the commission of the crime charged. During
trial, upon order of the trial court, the Local Civil Registrar of Bobon, Northern Samar, brought before it their office
records, particularly appellant’s Certificate of Live
Birth containing the fact of birth of the latter. Appellant’s Certificate of Live Birth shows that he was born on 23 February
1985. Indeed, at the time of the commission of the crime charged on 9 December 2002, appellant was only 17 years
old, a minor. Thus, he is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority pursuant to Article 68(2) of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended,68 which specifically states that:
ART. 68. – Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age. – When the offender is a minor under
eighteen years and his case is one coming under the provisions of the paragraph next to the last of article 80 of this
Code, the following rules shall be observed:
xxxx
2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the law
shall be imposed, but always in the proper period.69 [Emphasis supplied].
Applying the privileged mitigating circumstance, the proper imposable penalty upon appellant is reclusion temporal,
being the penalty next lower to reclusion perpetua - the penalty prescribed by law for simple rape. Being a divisible
penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable.70
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, appellant can be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty the minimum of
which shall be within the range of prision mayor (the penalty next lower in degree to reclusion temporal), that is 6 years
and 1 day to 12 years, and maximum of which shall be within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium period
(there being no other modifying circumstances attendant to the crime), that is 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years
and 4 months.71 With that, the indeterminate penalty of 10 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years and 4
months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, should be imposed upon the appellant. However, the case of appellant
does not, as it normally should, end at this point. On 20 May 2006, Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as the
"Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006," took effect. Section 68 thereof specifically provides for its retroactive
application, thus:72
SEC. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence. – Persons who have been convicted and are
serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time
of the commission of the offense for which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the
retroactive application of this Act. They shall be entitled to appropriate dispositions provided under this Act and their
sentences shall be adjusted accordingly. They shall be immediately released if they are so qualified under this Act or
other applicable law. [Emphasis supplied].
Clearly, Republic Act No. 9344 is applicable in this case even though the crime was committed four (4) years prior to its
enactment and effectivity. Parenthetically, with more reason should Republic Act No. 9344 apply to this case as the
2005 conviction by the lower courts was still under review when the law took effect in 2006.73
Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344 warrants the suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law
notwithstanding that he/she has reached the age of majority at the time the judgment of conviction is pronounced.74It
reads, thus:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. – Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of
the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil
liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of
conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application:
Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) of age
or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the
appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
[Emphasis supplied].
However, while Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344 provides that suspension of sentence can still be applied even if
the child in conflict with the law is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of
his/her guilt, Section 40 of the same law limits the said suspension of sentence until the said child reaches the
maximum age of 21, thus:75
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. – If the court finds that the objective of the disposition
measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has
willfully failed to comply with the conditions of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the
law shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the court
shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend
the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21)
years. [Emphasis supplied].
At present, appellant is already 27 years of age, and the judgment of the trial court was promulgated prior to the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 9344. Therefore, the application of Sections 38 and 40 of the said law is already moot and
academic.
Be that as it may, to give meaning to the legislative intent of Republic Act No. 9344, the promotion of the welfare of a
child in conflict with the law should extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit of 21 years, so long as he/she
committed the crime when he/she was still a child. The offender shall be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation
and reintegration in accordance with Republic Act No. 9344 in order that he/she is given the chance to live a normal life
and become a productive member of the community. The age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the
promulgation of the judgment of conviction is not material. What matters is that the offender committed the offense
when he/she was still of tender age.76 The appellant, therefore, shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Section
51 of Republic Act No. 9344, which provides for the confinement of convicted children as follows:77
SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities. – A child in conflict
with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement
in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained,
supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
To conform to this Court’s ruling in People v.Sarcia,78 the case shall be remanded to the court of origin to effect
appellant’s confinement in an agricultrual camp or other training facility.79
As to damages. The civil liability resulting from the commission of the offense is not affected by the appropriate
disposition measures and shall be enforced in accordance with law.80 This Court affirms both the civil indemnity of
P50,000.00 and moral damages of P50,000.00 awarded by the lower courts in favor of AAA. Civil indemnity, which is
actually in the nature of actual or compensatory damages, is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape. Case law
also requires automatic award of moral damages to a rape victim without need of proof because from the nature of the
crime, it can be assumed that she has suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award. Such award is separate and
distinct from civil indemnity.81
In consonance with prevailing jurisprudence on simple rape wherein exemplary damages are awarded to set a public
example and to protect hapless individuals from sexual molestation, this Court likewise affirms the lower courts award of
exemplary damages but increased the same from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00 to conform to recent jurisprudence.82
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00457 dated 3
December 2009 is hereby MODIFIED as follows: (I) appellant is found guilty of rape under subparagraph (b) of Article
266-A( I) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and not under subparagraph (d) thereof; (2) in view of the privileged
mitigating circumstance appreciated in favor of appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua is reduced to reclusion
temporal and being a divisible penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law applies and the indeterminate penalty of I 0
years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, is imposed upon the
appellant; and (3) the amount of exemplary damages awarded by the lower courts is increased from P25,000.00 to
P30,000.00. The award of civil indemnity and moral damages both in the amount of P50,000.00 are maintained. This
case, however, shall be REMANDED to the court a quo for appropriate disposition in accordance with Section 51 of
Republic Act No. 9344.
SO ORDERED.
EDNA A. RAYNERA, for herself and on behalf of the minors RIANNA and REIANNE RAYNERA, petitioners,
vs. FREDDIE HICETA and JIMMY ORPILLA, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals, [1] reversing that of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 45, Manila.[2]
The rule is well-settled that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are generally considered final and may not be
reviewed on appeal. However, this principle admits of certain exceptions, among which is when the findings of the
appellate court are contrary to those of the trial court, a re-examination of the facts and evidence may be undertaken.
[3]
This case falls under the cited exception.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Edna A. Raynera was the widow of Reynaldo Raynera and the mother and legal guardian of the minors
Rianna and Reianne, both surnamed Raynera. Respondents Freddie Hiceta and Jimmy Orpilla were the owner and
driver, respectively, of an Isuzu truck-trailer, with plate No. NXC 848, involved in the accident.
On March 23, 1989, at about 2:00 in the morning, Reynaldo Raynera was on his way home. He was riding a
motorcycle traveling on the southbound lane of East Service Road, Cupang, Muntinlupa. The Isuzu truck was travelling
ahead of him at 20 to 30 kilometers per hour.[4] The truck was loaded with two (2) metal sheets extended on both sides,
two (2) feet on the left and three (3) feet on the right. There were two (2) pairs of red lights, about 35 watts each, on
both sides of the metal plates.[5] The asphalt road was not well lighted.
At some point on the road, Reynaldo Raynera crashed his motorcycle into the left rear portion of the truck trailer,
which was without tail lights. Due to the collision, Reynaldo sustained head injuries and truck helper Geraldino D.
Lucelo[6] rushed him to the Paraaque Medical Center. Upon arrival at the hospital, the attending physician, Dr. Marivic
Aguirre,[7] pronounced Reynaldo Raynera dead on arrival.
At the time of his death, Reynaldo was manager of the Engineering Department, Kawasaki Motors (Phils.)
Corporation. He was 32 years old, had a life expectancy of sixty five (65) years, and an annual net earnings of not less
than seventy three thousand five hundred (P73,500.00) pesos,[8] with a potential increase in annual net earnings of not
less than ten percent (10%) of his salary.[9]
On May 12, 1989, the heirs of the deceased demanded [10] from respondents payment of damages arising from the
death of Reynaldo Raynera as a result of the vehicular accident. The respondents refused to pay the claims.
On September 13, 1989, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, Manila[11] a complaint[12] for damages against
respondents owner and driver of the Isuzu truck.
In their complaint against respondents, petitioners sought recovery of damages for the death of Reynaldo Raynera
caused by the negligent operation of the truck-trailer at nighttime on the highway, without tail lights.
In their answer filed on April 4, 1990, respondents alleged that the truck was travelling slowly on the service road,
not parked improperly at a dark portion of the road, with no tail lights, license plate and early warning device.
At the trial, petitioners presented Virgilio Santos. He testified that at about 1:00 and 2:00 in the morning of March
23, 1989, he and his wife went to Alabang market, on board a tricycle.They passed by the service road going south, and
saw a parked truck trailer, with its hood open and without tail lights. They would have bumped the truck but the tricycle
driver was quick in avoiding a collision. The place was dark, and the truck had no early warning device to alert passing
motorists.[13]
On the other hand, respondents presented truck helper Geraldino Lucelo.[14] He testified that at the time the incident
happened, the truck was slowly traveling at approximately 20 to 30 kilometers per hour. Another employee of
respondents, auto-mechanic Rogoberto Reyes,[15] testified that at about 3:00 in the afternoon of March 22, 1989, with
the help of Lucelo, he installed two (2) pairs of red lights, about 30 to 40 watts each, on both sides of the steel plates.
[16]
On his part, traffic investigation officer Cpl. Virgilio del Monte [17] admitted that these lights were visible at a distance of
100 meters.
On December 19, 1991, the trial court rendered decision in favor of petitioners. It found respondents Freddie Hiceta
and Jimmy Orpilla negligent in view of these circumstances: (1) the truck trailer had no license plate and tail lights; (2)
there were only two pairs of red lights, 50 watts[18] each, on both sides of the steel plates; and (3) the truck trailer was
improperly parked in a dark area.
The trial court held that respondents negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of Reynaldo Rayneras
death, for which they are jointly and severally liable to pay damages to petitioners. The trial court also held that the
victim was himself negligent, although this was insufficient to overcome respondents negligence. The trial court applied
the doctrine of contributory negligence[19] and reduced the responsibility of respondents by 20% on account of the
victims own negligence.
The dispositive portion of the lower courts decision reads as follows:
All things considered, the Court is of the opinion that it is fair and reasonable to fix the living and other expenses of the
deceased the sum of P54,000.00 a year or about P4,500.00 a month (P150.00 p/d) and that, consequently, the loss or
damage sustained by the plaintiffs may be estimated at P1,674,000.00 for the 31 years of Reynaldo Rayneras life
expectancy.
Taking into account the cooperative negligence of the deceased Reynaldo Raynera, the Court believes that the demand
of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating the damages on 80-20 ratio. Thus, P1,337,200.00 shall be paid by the
defendants with interest thereon, at the legal rate, from date of decision, as damages for the loss of earnings. To this
sum, the following shall be added:
(a) P33,412.00, actually spent for funeral services, interment and memorial lot;
(b) P20,000.00 as attorneys fees;
(c) cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.[20]
On January 10, 1992, respondents Hiceta and Orpilla appealed to the Court of Appeals.[21]
After due proceedings, on April 28, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered decision setting aside the appealed
decision. The appellate court held that Reynaldo Rayneras bumping into the left rear portion of the truck was the
proximate cause of his death,[22] and consequently, absolved respondents from liability.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
In this petition, the heirs of Reynaldo Raynera contend that the appellate court erred in: (1) overturning the trial
courts finding that respondents negligent operation of the Isuzu truck was the proximate cause of the victims death; (2)
applying the doctrine of last clear chance; (3) setting aside the trial courts award of actual and compensatory damages.
The issues presented are (a) whether respondents were negligent, and if so, (b) whether such negligence was the
proximate cause of the death of Reynaldo Raynera.
Petitioners maintain that the proximate cause of Reynaldo Rayneras death was respondents negligence in
operating the truck trailer on the highway without tail lights and license plate.
The Court finds no reason to disturb the factual findings of the Court of Appeals.
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something, which a prudent and reasonable
man would not do.[23]
Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.[24]
During the trial, it was established that the truck had no tail lights. The photographs taken of the scene of the
accident showed that there were no tail lights or license plates installed on the Isuzu truck. Instead, what were installed
were two (2) pairs of lights on top of the steel plates, and one (1) pair of lights in front of the truck. With regard to the
rear of the truck, the photos taken and the sketch in the spot report proved that there were no tail lights.
Despite the absence of tail lights and license plate, respondents truck was visible in the highway. It was traveling at
a moderate speed, approximately 20 to 30 kilometers per hour. It used the service road, instead of the highway,
because the cargo they were hauling posed a danger to passing motorists. In compliance with the Land Transportation
Traffic Code (Republic Act No. 4136)[25] respondents installed 2 pairs of lights on top of the steel plates, as the vehicles
cargo load extended beyond the bed or body thereof.
We find that the direct cause of the accident was the negligence of the victim. Traveling behind the truck, he had
the responsibility of avoiding bumping the vehicle in front of him. He was in control of the situation. His motorcycle was
equipped with headlights to enable him to see what was in front of him. He was traversing the service road where the
prescribed speed limit was less than that in the highway.
Traffic investigator Cpl. Virgilio del Monte testified that two pairs of 50-watts bulbs were on top of the steel plates,
[26]
which were visible from a distance of 100 meters. [27] Virgilio Santos admitted that from the tricycle where he was on
board, he saw the truck and its cargo of iron plates from a distance of ten (10) meters.[28] In light of these circumstances,
an accident could have been easily avoided, unless the victim had been driving too fast and did not exercise due care
and prudence demanded of him under the circumstances.
Virgilio Santos testimony strengthened respondents defense that it was the victim who was reckless and negligent
in driving his motorcycle at high speed. The tricycle where Santos was on board was not much different from the victims
motorcycle that figured in the accident. Although Santos claimed the tricycle almost bumped into the improperly parked
truck, the tricycle driver was able to avoid hitting the truck.
It has been said that drivers of vehicles who bump the rear of another vehicle are presumed to be the cause of the
accident, unless contradicted by other evidence.[29] The rationale behind the presumption is that the driver of the rear
vehicle has full control of the situation as he is in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the responsibility to avoid the collision with the front vehicle lies with the
driver of the rear vehicle.
Consequently, no other person was to blame but the victim himself since he was the one who bumped his
motorcycle into the rear of the Isuzu truck. He had the last clear chance of avoiding the accident.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari and AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G. R. CV No. 35895, dismissing the amended complaint in Civil Case No. 89-50355, Regional Trial Court, Branch
45, Manila.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 103613 February 23, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ELADIO C. TANGAN, respondents.
x------------------x
G.R. No. 105830 February 23, 2001
ELADIO C. TANGAN, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
At around 11:30 p.m. of December 1, 1984, Navy Captain Eladio C. Tangan was driving alone on Roxas Boulevard
heading south. He had just come from Buendia Avenue on an intelligence operation. At the same time, Generoso
Miranda, a 29-year old optometrist, was driving his car in the same direction along Roxas Boulevard with his uncle,
Manuel Miranda, after coming from the Ramada Hotel. Generoso was moving ahead of Tangan. Suddenly, firecrackers
were thrown in Generoso's way, causing him to swerve to the right and cut Tangan's path. Tangan blew his horn
several times. Generoso, slowed down to let Tangan pass. Tangan accelerated and overtook Generoso, but when he
got in front, Tangan reduced speed. Generoso tried four or five times to overtake on the right lane but Tangan kept
blocking his lane. As he approached Airport Road, Tangan slowed down to make a U-tum. Generoso passed him,
pulled over and got out of the car with his uncle. Tangan also stopped his car and got out. As the Mirandas got near
Tangan's car, Generoso loudly retorted, " Putang ina mo, bakit mo ginigitgit ang sasakyan ko?" Generoso and Tangan
then exchanged expletives. Tangari pointed his hand to Generoso and the latter slapped it, saying, "Huwag mo akong
dinuduro! Sino ka ba, ano ba ang pinagmamalaki mo?" Tangan countered, "Ikaw, ano ang gusto mo?" With this,
Tangan went to his car and got his .38 caliber handgun on the front seat. The subsequent events per account of the
parties' respective witnesses were conflicting:
According to the prosecution witnesses, particularly, Mary Ann Borromeo, Rosalia Cruz and Manuel Miranda,
the accused pointed his gun at Generoso Miranda and when Manuel Miranda tried to intervene, the accused
pointed his gun at Manuel Miranda, and after that the accused pointed again the gun to Generoso Miranda, the
accused shot Generoso Miranda at a distance of about a meter but because the arm of the accused was
extended, the muzzle of the gun reached to about more or less one foot away from the body of Generoso
Miranda. The shot hit the stomach of Generoso Miranda causing the latter to fall and while still conscious,
Generoso Miranda told Manuel Miranda, his uncle, to get the gun. Manuel Miranda grappled for the possession
of the gun and during their grappling, Rosalia Cruz intervened and took hold of the gun and after Rosalia Cruz
has taken hold of the gun, a man wearing a red T-shirt took the gun from her. The man in T-shirt was chased by
Manuel Miranda who was able to get the gun where the man in red T-shirt placed it.
On the other hand, the defense, particularly the accused and his witness by the name of Nelson Pante claimed
that after the gun was taken by the accused from inside his car, the Mirandas started to grapple for possession
of the gun and during the grappling, and while the two Mirandas were trying to wrest away the gun from the
accused, they fell down at the back of the car of the accused. According to the accused, he lost the possession
of the gun after falling at the back of his car and as soon as they hit the ground, the gun fell, and it exploded
hitting Generoso Miranda.1
After the gun went off, Tangan ran away. Meanwhile, Generoso lay on the ground bloodied. His uncle, Manuel, looked
for the gun and ran after Tangan, joining the mob that had already pursued him. Tangan found a policeman who
allowed him to enter his patrol car. Manuel arrived and told the policeman that Tangan had just shot his nephew. Then
he went back to where Generoso lay and there found two ladies, later identified as Mary Ann Borromeo and Rosalina
Cruz, helping his nephew board a taxi. Manuel suggested that Generoso be brought to the hospital in his car. He was
rushed to the Philippine General Hospital but he expired on the way.1âwphi1.nêt
Tangan was charged with the crime of murder with the use of an unlicensed firearm.2 After a reinvestigation, however,
the information was amended to homicide with the use of a licensed firearm,3 and he was separately charged with illegal
possession of unlicensed firearm.4 On arraignment, Tangan entered a plea of not guilty in the homicide case, but moved
to quash the information for illegal possession of unlicensed firearm on various grounds. The motion to quash was
denied, whereupon he filed a petition for certiorari with this Court.5 On November 5, 1987, said petition was dismissed
and the joint trial of the two cases was ordered.6
During the trial, the prosecution and the defense stipulated on the following: that the amount of P126,000.00 was
incurred for the funeral and burial expenses of the victim;7 that P74,625.00 was incurred for attorneys fees; and that the
heirs of Generoso suffered moral damages, the amount of which is left for the courts to determine. After trial, the lower
court acquitted Tangan of illegal possession of firearm, but convicted him of homicide. The privileged mitigating
circumstance of incomplete self-defense and the ordinary mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation on the part
of the offended party and of passion and obfuscation were appreciated in his favor; consequently, the trial court ordered
him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years and four (4)
months of prision correccional, as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of the victim.8 Tangan was released from
detention after the promulgation of judgment and was allowed bail in the homicide case.
Private complainants, the heirs of Generoso Miranda, filed a petition for review with this Court, docketed as G.R. No.
102677, challenging the civil aspect of the court a quo's decision, but the same was dismissed for being premature. On
the other hand, Tangan appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the judgment of the trial court but increased
the award of civil indemnity to P50,000.00.10 His subsequent motion for reconsideration and a motion to cite the Solicitor
General in contempt were denied by the Court of Appeals.11
The office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of the prosecution, alleging grave abuse of discretion, filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65, docketed as G.R. No.103613, naming as respondents the Court of Appeals and Tangan,
where it prayed that the appellate court's judgment be modified by convicting accused-appellant of homicide without
appreciating in his favor any mitigating circumstance.12 Subsequently, the Office of the Solicitor General, this time acting
for public respondent Court of Appeals, filed a motion for extension to file comment to its own petition for
certiorari.13 Discovering its glaring error, the Office of the Solicitor General later withdrew its motion for extension of
time.14 Tangan filed a Reply asking that the case be submitted for decision.15
Meanwhile, Tangan filed a separate petition for review under Rule 45, docketed as G.R. No. 105830.16 Since the petition
for certiorari filed by the Solicitor General remained unresolved, the two cases were consolidated.17 The Office of the
Solicitor General filed a manifestation in G.R. No. 105830, asking that it be ex6used from filing a comment to Tangan's
petition for review, in order to avoid taking contradictory positions.18
In the recent case of People v. Velasco and Galvez,19 we held that the prosecution cannot avail of the remedies of
special civil action on certiorari, petition for review on certiorari, or appeal in criminal cases. Previous to that, we
categorically ruled that the writ of certiorari cannot be used by the State in a criminal case to correct a lower court's
factual findings or evaluation of the evidence.20
Rule 117, Section 7, of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, is clear:
Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. - When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the
case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other fom1al charge sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused
or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to
commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included
in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which,
necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information under any of the following
instances:
(a) the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or omission constituting the
former charge;
(b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only after a pleas was entered in
the former complaint or information; or
(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the fiscal and of the offended party,
except as provided in section 1(f) of Rule 116.
In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused satisfies or serves in whole or in part the judgment, he shall be
credited with the same in the event of conviction for the graver offense.
Based on the foregoing, the Solicitor General's petition for certiorari under Rule 65, praying that no mitigating
circumstance be appreciated in favor of accused-appellant and that the penalty imposed on him be correspondingly
increased, constitutes a violation of Tangan's right against double jeopardy and should be dismissed.
We now come to the petition for review filed by Tangan. It is noteworthy that during the trial, petitioner Tangan did not
invoke self-defense but claimed that Generoso was accidentally shot. As such, the burden of proving self-
defense,21 which normally would have belonged to Tangan, did not come into play. Although Tangan must prove his
defense of accidental firing by clear and convincing evidence,22 the burden of proving the commission of the crime
remained in the prosecution.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals appreciated in favor of Tangan the privileged mitigating circumstance of
incomplete self-defense under Article 13 (1), in relation to Article 11 (1), of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
ARTICLE 11. Justifying circumstances. - The following do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur:
First. Unlawful aggression.
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
xxx xxx xxx
ARTICLE 13. Mitigating Circumstances. - The following are mitigating circumstances:
1. Those mentioned in the preceding Chapter, when all the requisites necessary to justify the act or to exempt
from criminal liability in the respective cases are not attendant.
Incomplete self-defense is not considered as a justifying act, but merely a mitigating circumstance; hence, the burden of
proving the crime charged in the information is not shifted to the accused.23 In order that it may be successfully
appreciated, however, it is necessary that a majority of the requirements of self-defense be present, particularly the
requisite of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.24 Unlawful aggression by itself or in combination with either of
the other two requisite suffices to establish incomplete self-defense. Absent the unlawful aggression, there can never be
self-defense, complete or incomplete,25 because if there is nothing to prevent or repel, the other two requisites of
defense will have no basis.26
There is no question that the bullet which hit the victim was fired from the caliber. 38, which was issued to Tangan by
the Philippine Navy. The cause of death was severe hemorrhage secondary to gunshot wound of the abdomen, caused
by the bullet fired from a gun of the said caliber. The prosecution claimed that Tangan shot the victim point-blank in the
stomach at a distance of about one foot. On the other hand, Tangan alleged that when he grappled with Generoso and
Manuel Miranda for possession of the gun, it fell to the ground and accidentally fired, hitting the victim.
When the testimonies of witnesses in open court are conflicting in substantial points, the calibration of the records on
appeal becomes difficult. It is the word of one party against the word of the other. The reviewing tribunal relies on the
cold and mute pages of the records, unlike the trial court which had the unique opportunity of observing first-hand that
elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witness' deportment on the stand while testifying.27 The trial court's
assessments of the credibility of witnesses is accorded great weight and respect on appeal and is binding on this
Court,28 particularly when it has not been adequately demonstrated that significant facts and circumstances were shown
to have been overlooked or disregarded by the court below which, if considered, might affect the outcome hereof.29 The
rationale for this has been adequately explained in that,
The trial court has the advantage of observing the witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or
falsehood, such as the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the
tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply; or the furtive glance, the blush of
conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere or the flippant or sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn,
the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, and carriage and mien.30
Equally, when a person fabricates a story, he usually adopts a simple account because a complex one might lead to
entanglement from which he may find it hard to extricate himself. Along the same line, the experience of the courts and
the general observations of humanity teach us that the natural limitations of our inventive faculties are such that if a
witness delivers in court a false narrative containing numerous details, he is almost certain to fall into fatal
inconsistencies to make statements which can be readily refuted, or to expose in his demeanor the falsity of his
message.31 Aside from this, it is not also unusual that the witness may have been coached before he is called to the
stand to testify.
Somewhere along the painstaking review of the evidence on record, one version rings the semblance of truth, not
necessarily because it is the absolute truth, but simply because it is the best approximation of the truth based on the
declarations of witnesses as corroborated by material evidence. Perforce, the other version must be rejected. Truth and
falsehood, it has been well said, are not always opposed to each other like black and white, but oftentimes, and by
design, are made to resemble each other so as to be hardly distinguishable.32 Thus, after analyzing the conflicting
testimonies of the witnesses, the trial court found that:
When the accused took the gun from his car and when he tried to get out of the car and the two Mirandas saw
the accused already holding the gun, they started to grapple for the possession of the gun that it went off hitting
Generoso Miranda at the stomach. The court believes that contrary to the testimony of the accused, he never
lost possession of the gun for if he did and when the gun fell to the ground, it will not first explode or if it did,
somebody is not holding the same, the trajectory of the bullet would not be perpendicular or horizontal.33
The Court of Appeals agreed -
The finding of the lower court that Generoso Miranda III was shot while the accused and the Mirandas were
grappling for the possession of the gun immediately after the accused had taken his gun from inside his car and
before the three allegedly fell to the ground behind the car of the accused is borne out by the record. The court
also agrees with the court below that it was the accused-appellant who shot and killed Generoso Miranda III. If
the accused-appellant did not shoot Generoso III during the scuffle, he would have claimed accidental killing by
alleging that his gun exploded during the scuffle instead of falsely testifying that he and the Mirandas fell to the
ground behind his car and the gun exploded in the possession of Manuel Miranda. The theory of the prosecution
that the shooting took place while the three were grappling for the possession of the gun beside the car of
appellant is completely in harmony with the findings and testimony of Dr. Ibarrola regarding the relative position
of the three and the precarious nearness of the victim when accused-appellant pulled the trigger of his gun. Dr.
Ibarrola explained that the gun was about two (2) inches from the entrance wound and that its position was
almost perpendicular when it was fired. It was in fact the closeness of the Mirandas vis-à-vis appellant during the
scuffle for the gun that the accused-appellant was compelled to pull the trigger in answer to the instinct of self-
preservation.34
No convincing reason appears for the Court to depart from these factual findings, the same being ably supported by the
evidence on record. In violent deaths caused by gunshot wounds, the medical report or the autopsy on the cadaver of
the victim must as much as possible narrate the observations on the wounds examined. It is material in determining the
truthfulness of the events narrated by the witnesses presented. It is not enough that the witness looks credible and
assumes that he indeed witnessed the criminal act. His narration must be substantiated by the physical evidence
available to the court.
The medical examiner testified that the distance between the muzzle of the gun and the target was about 2 inches but
definitely not more than 3 inches. Based on the point of exit and the trajectory transit of the wound, the victim and the
alleged assailant were facing each other when the shot was made and the position of the gun was almost perpendicular
when fired.35 These findings disprove Tangan's claim of accidental shooting. A revolver is not prone to accidental firing
because of the nature of its mechanism, unless it was already first cocked and pressure was exerted on the trigger. If it
were uncocked, then considerable pressure had to be applied on the trigger to fire the revolver.36
Having established that the shooting was not accidental, the next issue to be resolved is whether Tangan acted in
incomplete self-defense. The element of unlawful aggression in self-defense must not come from the person defending
himself but from the victim.
A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not sufficient.37 Likewise, the exchange of insulting words and invectives
between Tangan and Generoso Miranda, no matter how objectionable, could not be considered as unlawful aggression,
except when coupled with physical assault.38 There being no lawful aggression on the part of either antagonists, the
claim of incomplete self-defense falls. Tangan undoubtedly had possession of the gun, but the Mirandas tried to wrestle
the gun from him. It may be said that the former had no intention of killing the victim but simply to retain possession of
his gun. However, the fact that the victim subsequently died as a result of the gunshot wound, though the shooter may
not have the intention to kill, does not absolve him from culpability. Having caused the fatal wound, Tangan is
responsible for all the consequences of his felonious act. He brought out the gun, wrestled with the Mirandas but
anticipating that the gun may be taken from him, he fired and fled.
The third requisite of lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself is not supported by
evidence. By repeatedly blocking the path of the Mirandas for almost five times, Tangan was in effect the one who
provoked the former. The repeated blowing of horns, assuming it was done by Generoso, may be irritating to an
impatient driver but it certainly could not be considered as creating so powerful an inducement as to incite provocation
for the other party to act violently.
The appreciation of the ordinary mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation and passion and obfuscation under
Article 13, paragraphs 4 and 6,39 have no factual basis. Sufficient provocation as a requisite of incomplete self-defense
is different from sufficient provocation as a mitigating circumstance. As an element of self-defense, it pertains to its
absence on the part of the person defending himself; while as a mitigating circumstance, it pertains to its presence on
the part of the offended party. Besides, only one mitigating circumstance can arise out of one and the same
act.40 Assuming for the sake of argument that the blowing of horns, cutting of lanes or overtaking can be considered as
acts of provocation, the same were not sufficient. The word "sufficient" means adequate to excite a person to commit a
wrong and must accordingly be proportionate to its gravity.41 Moreover, Generoso's act of asking for an explanation from
Tangan was not sufficient provocation for him to claim that he was provoked to kill or injure Generoso.42
For the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation to be appreciated, it is required that (1) there be an act,
both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) said act which produced the obfuscation was
not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might
recover his normal equanimity.43
In the case at bar, Tangan could not have possibly acted upon an impulse for there was no sudden and unexpected
occurrence which wuld have created such condition in his mind to shoot the victim. Assuming that his path was
suddenly blocked by Generoso Miranda due to the firecrackers, it can no longer be treated as a startling occurrence,
precisely because he had already passed them and was already the one blocking their path. Tangan's acts were done
in the spirit of revenge and lawlessness, for which no mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation can arise.
With respect to the penalty, under the laws then existing, homicide was penalized with reclusion temporal,44 but if the
homicide was committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty shall be death.45 The death penalty,
however, cannot be imposed on Tangan because in the meantime, the 1987 Constitution proscribed the imposition of
death penalty; and although it was later restored in 1994, the retroactive application of the death penalty is unfavorable
to him. Previously the accused may be prosecuted for two crimes: (1) homicide or murder under the Revised Penal
Code and (2) illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form under P.D. 1866.46
P.D. 1866 was amended by R.A. No. 8294,47 which provides that if an unlicensed firearm is used in murder or homicide,
such use of unlicensed firearm shall be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance and no longer considered as a
separate offense,48 which means that only one offense shall be punished - murder or homicide. However, this law
cannot apply retroactively because it will result in the imposition on Tangan of the maximum period of the penalty.
Moreover, under Rule 110, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,49 the aggravating circumstance must
be alleged in the information. Being favorable, this new rule can be given retroactive effect as they are applicable to
pending cases.50 In any case, Tangan was acquitted of the illegal possession case.
Consequently, Tangan should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal. Pursuant to Article 64 of the
Revised Penal Code, if the prescribed penalty is composed of three periods, and there is neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstance, the medium period shall be applied. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence law, the maximum
of the indeterminate penalty shall be that which, in view of the attendant circumstances, may be properly imposed,
which in this case is reclusion temporal medium with an imprisonment range of from fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. The minimum of the indeterminate sentence shall
be the next lower degree which is prision mayor with a range of from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years.51 Hence, petitioner Tangan is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum; to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
The death indemnity of P30,000.00 was correctly increased by the appellate court to P50,000.00 in line with
jurisprudence.52 Moral damages are awarded in criminal cases involving injuries if supported by evidence on
record,53 but the stipulation of the parties in this case substitutes for the necessity of evidence in support thereof.
Though not awarded below, the victim's heirs are entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 which is
considered reasonable considering the pain and anguish brought by his death.54
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 103613 is DISMISSED. The appealed decision subject of G.R. No. 105830
is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) Tangan is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with all
the accessory penalties.
(2) Tangan is ordered to pay the victim's heirs P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P42,000.00 as funeral and burial
expenses, P5,000.00 as attorney's fees, and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-45373 March 31, 1937
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PRIMO PARANA, defendant-appellant.
Lorenzo Sumulong for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for appellee.
AVANCEÑA, C.J.:
The accused Primo Parana appeals from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros sentencing
him, for the crime of murder committed on the person of Manuel Montinola, to the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, with the costs.
On the morning of May 19, 1936, in the municipality of Silay, Occidental Negros, the deceased, who was taking part in a
game of monte in the house of Jose Lapuos, was informed by the chauffeur Valentin Poblacion that his brother Glicerio
Montinola's car, which he had ordered for his trip to the municipality of Cadiz, was ready to start. Five minutes later the
deceased came downstairs and upon reaching the street, he turned towards the car which was waiting or him. As the
moment the chauffeur Poblacion, who saw the appellant behind the deceased in the attitude of stabbing him with a
dagger, shouted to warn him of the danger, and the deceased, looking behind, really saw the appellant about to stab
him. The deceased, really saw the appellant about to stab him. The deceased, defending himself, retreated until he fell
on his back into a ditch two meters wide and 1.7 meter deep. Without lessening the aggression the appellant mounted
astride of the deceased and continued to stab him with the dagger. As the chauffeur Poblacion had been making on
alarm from the beginning, Liboro Montelibano, who was in nearby drug store, about fifty meters away, went to said
place and found the appellant astride of the deceased who was defending himself with his hands and feet from the
blows the appellant gave him with the dagger. Montelibano wrested the dagger from the hands of the appellant who,
finding himself disarmed, seized the revolver which the deceased carried in his belt and tried to fire at the latter without
succeeding in his attempt because Montelibano likewise wrested said weapon from him. After the appellant and the
deceased had been separated, the former still asked Montelibano for the weapon taken from him, but at that moment a
policeman arrived and the appellant was placed under arrest. When the deceased was later removed from the ditch into
which he had fallen, he was found wounded and was taken to the municipal building. He was later transferred to the
provincial hospital where he was treated by Dr. Ochoa, expiring six days later, as a result of general peritonitis produced
by one of his wounds.
Then preceding night, at about 11 o'clock, monte had also been played in the house of Glicerio Montinola, brother of the
deceased. The deceased took part in said game where the appellant was designated to attend to the players. One
Lamay, who was also taking part in the game, gave the appellant the sum of P2 to buy beer. For failure of the appellant
to immediately comply with this request, a discussion ensued between him and Lamay and, as both raised their voices,
they were admonished by the deceased. As the appellant left and went to Lapuos' house where he lived, where the
deceased took part in another game on the following day, and where said deceased came from when he was attacked.
At about 7 o'clock in the morning of the crime, the appellant purchased from the store of the Japanese Matzu Akisama a
hunting knife (Exhibit F), which is the same knife used by him in attacking the deceased.
On the same morning, at about seven thirty, the appellant went to the house of Crispin Espacio for whom he used to
work, to ask to be excused from work that day as he intended to wreak vengeance on somebody. Espacio advised him
against it as he might again go to Bilibid prison, inasmuch as he had already served a term for the crime of homicide.
These are the facts found by this court to have been established in this case, proving beyond all doubt that it was the
intention of the appellant to kill the deceased, judging not only from the condition of the weapon with which he provided
himself but also by the manner and circumstances under which he committed the aggression.
The appellant's testimony is the only evidence in his defense. According to him, on the morning of the crime he saw the
deceased taking part in the game in Lapuos' house where he lived. The deceased then uttered threatening words to
him, which he disregarded, leaving the house and going to a nearby Chinese store. Sometime, later, as he was on his
way to Lapuos' house, he saw the deceased coming down and, approaching the latter, he spoke to him about the
incident of the previous night and of their meeting a few minutes before, asking said deceased to forgive and not wreak
vengeance on him. The deceased, by way of an answer, drew the revolver which he carried in his belt, and the
appellant, in their face of such attitude, attempted to wrest the weapon from him. In the struggle the deceased fell on his
back into a ditch and the appellant mounted astride of him, tried to wrest the revolver from him, attacking the deceased
therewith. When the appellant had succeeded in taking possession of the revolver the deceased got up and walked
towards the car. At that moment Liboro Montelibano appeared and the appellant turned over the knife and the revolver
to him.
This version of the incident given by the appellant in his testimony, without any corroboration, is contradicted by the
testimony of the chauffer Poblacion and of Liboro Montelibano. Furthermore it is improbable, taking into consideration
the fact that he was the offended party, suffering from the justice of the offense received, provided himself with a lethal
weapon and approached the deceased, which circumstances do not agree with his attitude according to his testimony.
The court correctly found that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was present in the commission of the crime.
The appellant, in inspite of having seen the deceased in the upper story of Lapuos' house, did not wish to attack the
latter there undoubtedly to avoid his being defended by the many players who were with him. Instead, he waited for the
deceased at a merely store until the latter came down, and attacked him while he had his back turned and could not see
the appellant. All these, which were the beginning of the execution of the appellant's design to kill the deceased,
constitute treachery inasmuch as they tended to avoid every risk to himself arising from the defense which the
deceased might make (U. S. vs. MacMann, 4 Phil., 561; U. S. vs. Pendleton, 7 Phil., 457; U. S. vs. Mercoleta, 17 Phil.,
317; U. S. vs. Cabanog, 34 Phil., 620). It matters not that the deceased accidentally turned around upon hearing
Poblacion's warning and was able to defend himself from the elbow which, at that moment, the appellant was about to
give with a dagger, because the treacherous character of a means employed in the aggression does not defend upon
the result thereof but upon the means itself, in connection with the aggressor's purpose in employing it. Otherwise this
reason the law does not require that the treacherous risk to the person of the aggressor arising from the defense which
the offended party might make, it being sufficient that it tend to this end.
However, even considering at the moment the deceased turned around and saw the appellant in the attitude of stabbing
him, this court also finds therein the elements of treachery inasmuch as the aggression, under the circumstances, was
so sudden that the deceased, who carried a revolver in his belt, had no chance to defend himself with it.
Considering the incident at the moment the appellant mounted astride of the deceased, who defend himself only with
his feet and hands without having been able to use the revolver carried by him in his belt, when said appellant, in such
situation, inflicted the wound which caused the death of the deceased, he likewise acted with treachery on the ground
that, under the circumstances, he was not running, as in fact he did not run, any risk arising from the defense which the
deceased might make.
And so, whether the beginning and the end of the aggression be considered singly, or the development thereof be
considered as a whole, it is evident that the aggravating circumstance of treachery was present.
The aggravating circumstance that the appellant is a recidivist must be taken into consideration. The mitigating
circumstance that he had acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense committed against him a few hours
before, when he was slapped by the deceased in the presence of many persons, must likewise be taken into
consideration. Although this offense, which engenders perturbation of mind, was not so immediate, this court is of the
opinion that the influence thereof, by reason of its gravity and the circumstances under which it was inflicted, lasted until
the moment the crime was committed. Lastly, the other mitigating circumstance that the appellant had voluntarily
surrendered himself to the agents of the authorities must be considered.
For the foregoing considerations, this court finds the appellant guilty of the crime of murder qualified by treachery, and,
taking into consideration the presence of one aggravating and two mitigating circumstances in the commission of the
crime, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Act No. 4103, he is sentenced to the penalty of from ten years
of prision mayor, as the minimum, to seventeen years, four months and one day of reclusion temporal, as the maximum,
affirming the appealed sentence in all other respects, with the costs. So ordered.
Abad Santos, Imperial and Diaz, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
VILLA-REAL, J., dissenting:
I regret to have to dissent from the worthy opinion of the majority in so far as it finds the circumstance of treachery
established and takes it into consideration in order to qualify as murder the crime committed by the herein accused-
appellant Primo Parana.
The accused-appellant, testifying on the aggression said: "And when I went home, it was the precise moment
when Manuel Montinola was coming down and we met on the way. I then called him saying: Please, I have to
tell you something. I approached him and said: Maning, last night you slapped me and you still continue to talk
against me; you do not pity me. It was you who took me to serve in that gambling house; if you take revenge
upon me I shall lose the job and there is not other person to whom I can apply for help. I would die of hunger.
Have compassion wrong against you and if I have committed an offense please forgive me. You used to give
me something when you won in the game. By way of an answer he said to me: Go away, you are a fool, and
immediately drew his revolver from his pocket. When I saw him take his revolver from his pocket, I held him by
wrist and he persisted in his effort. I then jerked his hand and in the struggle he retreated until he fell into the
ditch. I released him because he slipped from my grasp. He then pulled his revolver out of his pocket and I
jumped into the ditch and seized his hand holding the revolver pressing it against his breast. With my left hand I
took the revolver and with my right I unsheated the hunting knife, which I carried in my belt. I warned him saying:
Do not fire your revolver seizing the barrel of the revolver with my left hand, twisting it with my right hand which
carried the hunting knife. We struggled for the possession of the revolver and I succeeded in taking it away. I
then left him and withdrew to a distance of about one braza from him while he got up and ran towards the car.
Then Benito Abellar arrived and said to me: Give me your hunting knife and the revolver. Liboro Montelibano
later arrived and said to me: Primo, do you know me? I answered: Yes, I know you. You are one of my friends.
He told me: Turn over to me the revolver and the hunting knife.
Valentin Poblacion, a witness for the prosecution, testifying on the aggression stated briefly as follows:
As the deceased Manuel Montinola had borrowed his brother Glicerio Montinola's car, which was being driven by the
witness as Glicerio Montinola's chauffeur, he (Poblacio) brought it at 10 o'clock in the morning of the day of the crime to
the house of Jose Lapous, where said Manuel Montinola was playing monte. The accused-appellant Primo Parana was
also in said house playing monte. The witness left the car parked in front of Jose Lapuos' house and went up to notify
Manuel Montinola. As Manuel Montinola told him to wait, the witness left the house and went to the car to do as he was
told. About five minutes after he had left, he saw the deceased Manuel Montinola also coming downstairs. The latter
told him to wait because he had yet to go to his house. The witness then called out to Manuel Montinola, saying:
"Maning, Maning, Primo is going to stab you." Upon a hearing this, Manuel Montinola turned around and, seeing the
accused in the attitude of stabbing him, retreated defending himself. He fell on his back in the street near a ditch and in
his position he continued to defend himself with his feet and hands until he finally fell into the ditch, which was
a braza wide and three-fourths of a meter deep, without ceasing to defend himself. This struggle lasted only about two
minutes, in the course of which, the accused succeeded in inflicting a slight wound in the left side of Manuel Montinola's
breast. Liboro Montelibano then came and, seizing the accused by his left side, wrested from him the dagger, Exhibit F,
with which he stabbed the deceased, and took the accused to the municipal building. The witness saw no revolver on
the person of the deceased.
It will be noted that between the testimony of the accused-appellant and that of Valentin Poblacion, there is a
discrepancy as to the commencement of the aggression. While the accused-appellant states that he had a conversation
with the deceased during which the latter called him a "fool" and drew his revolver from his pocket, which said accused-
appellant tried to wrest from him, Valentin Poblacion stated that after he had informed Manuel Montinola that his brother
Glicerio's car was at his disposal and Manuel told him to wait because he would first go home, he (Poblacion) went to
his car, and, upon turning around, he saw the accused-appellant behind the deceased in the attitude of stabbing him.
The testimony of the accused-appellant relative to the conversation had between him and Manuel Montinola is very
probable inasmuch as on the morning in question both were at the house of Jose Lapuos from which they came down.
This conversation was not contradicted by anybody.
Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make."
If, as the defense claims, before the fight a conversation was had between the deceased and the accused, during which
the deceased called the accused a "fool" and drew his revolver, it cannot be stated that the accused employed means,
methods and forms in the fight which tended directly and specially to insure the infliction of the wound, without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might have made, on the ground that the deceased was not
only the provoker but also the aggressor.
But even granting, for the sake of argument that the latter's back was turned, but he did not succeed in his attempt due
to Valentin Poblacion's shouts of warning, it can not be said that he acted with treachery in wounding the deceased
while the latter lay upon his back in the ditch, inasmuch as he had been defending himself with his feet and hands and
his defense was so effective that the accused succeeded in wounding him only slightly. The attempted treachery
disappeared from the moment Manuel Montinola became aware of the danger from the knife of the accused, to which
his person was exposed, and was able to evade it by retreating until he fell into a ditch from which, as a cat upon its
back, he defended himself with his feet and hands. In order that treachery may exist, it is necessary that the means,
methods, or forms employed in the commission of any of the crimes against persons be made use of simultaneously or
in such a combination as to afford the offended party no defense that may endanger the person of the aggressor. If in
the development of a fight commenced treacherously by the aggressor, the offended party comes upon a chance to
defend himself and is wounded, it cannot be juridically stated that he was wounded treacherously.
In view of the foregoing considerations, we are, therefore, of the opinion that treachery, as a circumstance qualifying the
crime of murder, was not present in this case. The crime resulting from the facts established during the trial should be
considered as a simple homicide and punished with the penalties prescribed therefor by the law.
Concepcion, J., concurs.
LAUREL, J., concurring and dissenting:
I yield to the next conclusion of guilt of the appellant. I also accept the concurrence of the mitigating circumstance of
vindication of a grave offense in favor of the appellant (par. 5, art. 13, Rev. Penal Code). I however join in the dissent
from the opinion of the majority that treachery was present in the commission of the offense. I really do not think that the
appellant had adopted a method or form of execution which tended directly and especially to insure the accomplishment
of his purpose without risk to himself arising from any defense which Manuel Montinola could have made. The evidence
for the prosecution is to the effect that the appellant was seen by the chauffeur Poblacion behind the deceased in the
attitude of stabbing the latter. Poblacion called out to Manuel warning him and the latter turned around and, seeing the
attitude of the appellant, retreated and in so doing fell on his back into a ditch (pp. 24, 26, 30, t. s. n., Set II). Seeing this
the chauffeur cried out for help and brought to the scene Liboro Montelibano who was at the time at a drug store.
Montelibano wrested from the defendant the knife, Exhibit F, and the revolver which the defendant had taken from the
deceased. Whatever may be the rule as to the continuity of an attack, whether treachery must precede it (U. S. vs.
Balagtas and Jaime, 19 Phil., 164) or may be considered if present at any time thereafter in the interval before the
termination (U. S. vs. Baluyot, 40 Phil., 385), I express the opinion that upon the facts of this case there was no
treachery. Although the defendant was in the attitude of stabbing the deceased from behind, that was at most a mere
attempt, ineffectual, and the wound was actually inflicted while the appellant and the deceased were struggling in the
ditch and in the course of which the deceased made quite an effective defense.
I believe that the appellant should be convicted of simple homicide with the aggravating circumstance of recidivism, he
having been previously convicted by final judgment of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga in criminal case 2143
for the crime of homicide on July 20, 1921, which circumstance is compensated by the mitigating circumstance of
immediate vindication of a grave offense. Considering the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in his favor, he
should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six years and one day, prision mayor to twelve years and
one day, reclusion temporal, with the accessory penalties provided, the indemnity, and the costs.
[G.R. Nos. 140514-15. September 30, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUNE IGNAS y SANGGINO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
In the amended decision[1] dated June 2, 1999, in Criminal Case No. 96-CR-2522, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 8, found appellant June Ignas y Sanggino guilty of murder aggravated especially by the
use of an unlicensed firearm. Appellant was initially sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,[2] but on
motion for reconsideration by the prosecution, the penalty was upgraded to death by lethal injection. [3] Hence, the case
is now before us for automatic review.
Appellant is an elementary school graduate. He resided at Cruz, La Trinidad, Benguet, where he operated a
bakery.[4] He is married to Wilma Grace Ignas, by whom he has a son of minor age. [5] Wilma Grace used to be the
cashier of Windfield Enterprise, which is owned by Pauline Gumpic. [6] Pauline had a brother, Nemesio Lopate. It was he
whom appellant fatally shot.
In the amended Information,[7] pursuant to Section 14, Rule 110[8] of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
Provincial Prosecutor of Benguet charged appellant as follows:
That on or about the 10th day of March 1996 at Trading Post, Km. 5, Municipality of La Trinidad, Province of Benguet, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, without any authority of law or without any lawful permit did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession, control and custody a Cal. .38 hand gun and two (2) ammunitions, (sic)
which firearm and ammunitions were used by the accused in unlawfully killing NEMESIO LOPATE at the above-mentioned place
and date in violation of the said law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[9]
Appellant was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the foregoing amended information. The case then proceeded to
be heard on the merits.
Gleaned from the records, the facts of this case are as follows:
Sometime in September 1995, appellants wife, Wilma Grace Ignas, confided to her close friend,
Romenda[10] Foyagao, that she was having an affair with Nemesio Lopate.[11]
On the evening of October 16, 1995, Wilma Grace, Romenda, and Nemesio went to Manila. Romenda and
Nemesio were sending off Wilma Grace at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport as she was leaving for Taiwan to work
as a domestic helper. Upon arrival in Manila, the trio checked at Dangwa Inn, with Nemesio and Wilma Grace sharing a
room.[12] All three of them stayed at the inn until October 18, 1995, when Wilma Grace left for Taiwan.[13]
Thereafter, Romenda received from Taiwan four letters written by Wilma Grace on various dates. Although all the
letters were addressed to Romenda, two of them were meant by Wilma Grace to be read by her paramour, Nemesio.
[14]
In the other two letters, Wilma Grace instructed Romenda to reveal to appellant her affair with Nemesio.
It was only sometime late in February 1996 that Romenda, following her bosom friends written instructions,
informed appellant about the extramarital affair between Wilma Grace and Nemesio. Romenda informed him that the
two had spent a day and a night together in a room at Dangwa Inn in Manila. [15] Appellant became furious. He
declared Addan to aldaw na dayta nga Nemesio, patayek dayta nga Nemesio (There will be a day for that Nemesio. I
will kill that Nemesio).[16] Appellant then got all the letters of Wilma Grace from Romenda.[17]
That same week Alfred Mayamnes, appellants neighbor who was presented at the trial as a prosecution witness,
had a talk with appellant. Mayamnes was an elder of the Kankanaey tribe to which appellant belonged. He wanted to
confirm whether Nemesio Lopate, who was likewise from the same tribe, [18] was having an affair with appellants spouse.
Talk apparently had reached the tribal elders and they wanted the problem resolved as soon as possible.[19] A visibly
angry appellant confirmed the gossip.[20] Mayamnes also testified that he advised Nemesio to stay at the Mountain Trail
Kankanaey community until things had cooled down.[21]
Shortly after their talk, appellant closed down his bakeshop and offered his equipment for sale. Among the potential
buyers he approached was Mayamnes, but the latter declined the offer.[22]
Sometime during the first week of March, Mayamnes saw appellant load his bakery equipment on board a hired
truck and depart for Nueva Vizcaya.[23]
At around 10:00 p.m. of March 10, 1996, according to another prosecution witness, Annie Bayanes, a trader in
vegetables, she was at the Trading Post, La Trinidad, Benguet. [24] The Trading Post is a popular depot where vegetable
growers in the Cordilleras bring their produce late in the evenings for sale to wholesalers and retailers. Witness
Bayanes said she was at the unloading area (bagsakan), conversing with another dealer at the latters booth, when
suddenly two gunshots shattered the quiet evening.[25]
Bayanes turned towards the place where the sound of the gunshots came from. She testified that she saw a person
falling to the ground.[26] Standing behind the fallen individual, some 16 inches away,[27] was another person who tucked a
handgun into his waistband and casually walked away.[28]
Initially, she only saw the gunmans profile, but when he turned, she caught a glimpse of his face.[29] She
immediately recognized him as the appellant June Ignas. She said she was familiar with him as he was her townmate
and had known him for several years. Witness Bayanes was five or six meters away from the scene, and the taillight of
a parked jeepney, which was being loaded with vegetables, plus the lights from the roof of the bagsakan, aided her
recognition of appellant.[30]
Also at the bagsakan area that night was prosecution witness Marlon Manis. He testified that on hearing gunshots
from the Trading Post entrance, he immediately looked at the place where the gunfire came from. He saw people
converging on a spot where a bloodied figure was lying on the ground.[31] Witness Manis saw that the fallen victim was
Nemesio Lopate, whom he said he had known since Grade 2 in elementary school. [32] Manis then saw another person,
some 25 meters away, hastily walking away from the scene. He could not see the persons face very well, but from his
gait and build, he identified the latter as his close friend and neighbor, June Ignas. [33] Manis said that the scene was very
dimly lit and the only illumination was from the lights of passing vehicles, but he was familiar with appellants build,
hairstyle, and manner of walking.[34]
Prosecution witness Mona Barredo, a bakery worker, testified that she knew appellant. She said they were co-
workers formerly at the Annaliza Bakery at Km. 10, Shilan, La Trinidad, Benguet. [35] Barredo declared that at around
10:30 p.m. of March 10, 1996, appellant came to her residence at Pico, La Trinidad. After being served refreshments,
appellant took out a handgun from his jacket and removed the empty shells from the chamber.[36] Appellant then told her
to throw the empty cartridges out of the window. Because of nervousness she complied.[37] Barredo also said that
appellant disclosed to her that he had just shot his wifes paramour. [38] Appellant then stayed at her house for 8 or 9
hours; he left only in the morning of March 11, 1996, [39] according to her. Police investigators later recovered the spent
gun shells from witness Barredos sweet potato garden.[40]
According to witness on the scene, responding policemen immediately brought the victim, Nemesio Lopate, to the
Benguet General Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival.[41]
Dr. Doris C. Jovellanos, Municipal Health Officer of La Trinidad, Benguet, testified during that trial that she
conducted the post-mortem examination of the victims cadaver. Among her findings were:
1. Ovaloid hole, 2.0 x 5.0 cm. dms., with blackened edges (1.8 x 1.3 cms. span), on the right side of the mouth, above the edge of
the upper lip
xxx
3. Exit hole on the left side of the mouth, 5.0 x 1.3 cm. dms., with avulsion of the upper lip on the left side
xxx
9. Circular hole, penetrating, on the back, right side, 0.7 cm. x 0.7 cm. diam., with blackened edges (0.9 x 0.9 cm. span), at the level
of the fifth intercostal space, subscapular area, 13 cm. from the midline, directed to the left side of the chest, 38.0 cm. from the
embedded bullet slug of the left shoulder.[42]
Dr. Jovellanos determined the cause of death to be Hypovolemia due to gunshot wound, back, right, (Point of Entry
fifth intercostal space subscapular area).[43] She further stated on the witness stand that she recovered a bullet from the
victims left shoulder, which she turned over to the police investigators.[44] According to her, given the blackened edges of
the gunshot wound at the victims back, Nemesio was shot from a distance of less than three (3) feet.[45]
On March 14, 1996, police investigators accompanied by one of appellants brother as well as prosecution witness
Julio Bayacsan, a friend of appellant, went to Kayapa, Nueva Vizcaya, to invite appellant to shed light on the slaying of
Nemesio. The law enforcers found appellant selling bread at Kayapa and brought him back to La Trinidad, Benguet.[46]
Witness Bayacsan testified that shortly after they arrived from Kayapa, he had an opportunity to talk with appellant
at the La Trinidad Police Station. There, appellant disclosed to this witness that he shot and killed Nemesio.
[47]
Bayacsan, however, did not inform the police about appellants revelation as he considered appellant his good friend.
[48]
Prosecution witness Pauline Gumpic, the victims sister, testified that she and appellant had a private talk, while the
latter was in police custody, and appellant admitted to her that he killed her brother. [49] Gumpic declared that appellant
revealed to her that he shot Nemesio for having illicit relations with appellants wife and failing to ask for his forgiveness.
[50]
SPO4 Arthur Bomagao[51] of the La Trinidad police, who headed the team that investigated the fatal shooting of
Nemesio, declared on the stand that appellant voluntarily admitted to him that he shot the victim with a .38 caliber
handgun.[52] Bomagao further testified that appellant surrendered to him the letters of Wilma Grace, wherein the latter
admitted her affair with Nemesio.[53]
Appellant interposed the defense of alibi. Sometime during the last week of February 1996, he said, he entered into
a partnership with a friend and fellow baker, Ben Anoma, to operate a bakery in Kayapa, Nueva Vizcaya.[54] Appellant
claimed that he was having a hard time operating his bakeshop in La Trinidad as he had no helpers. When Anoma
proposed a business arrangement, he added, he immediately seized the opportunity. [55] On March 8, 1996, he and
Anoma then transferred his equipment to Anomas bakery in Kayapa, [56] which is some four (4) to five (5) hours away
from La Trinidad, according to appellant. He averred that he was baking bread with Anoma in Kayapa on the night
Nemesio was killed.[57] Under oath, appellant said that he never left Kayapa since his arrival on March 8, 1996. He and
Anoma were engrossed in baking and marketing their produce, he testified, until the policemen from La Trinidad brought
him back to Benguet for questioning on March 14, 1996.[58]
Defense witness Ben Anoma corroborated appellants alibi. Anoma declared that during the last week of February
1996, he met with appellant in La Trinidad. There, the witness said, he proposed a partnership with appellant in the
baking business to be based in Kayapa.[59] Appellant agreed and on March 8, 1996, they transferred appellants
equipment to Kayapa.[60] They immediately commenced their operations and on the evening of March 10, 1996, he and
appellant baked bread at his bakery in Kayapa until 11:00 p.m., when they rested for the night.[61]
The trial court disbelieved appellants defense and sustained the prosecutions version. Its initial judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused June Ignas is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
MURDER as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and considering the aggravating circumstances of
treachery, nighttime and the special aggravating circumstance of the use of an unlicensed firearm, without any mitigating
circumstance, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. He is further sentenced to pay the heirs of the
VICTIM the following sums:
1. P150,000.00 for funeral expenses and those incurred for and during the wake;
2. P1,800,000.00 for unearned income;
3. P50,000.00 as death compensation established by jurisprudence; and
4. P50,000.00 as and for moral damages; and
5. P20,000.00 as attorneys fees.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED in Chambers this 18th day of February 1999 at La Trinidad, Benguet, Philippines.[62]
Both the prosecution and the defense filed their respective motions for reconsideration. The prosecution sought the
imposition of the death penalty.[63] The defense prayed for acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt.
On June 2, 1999, the trial court granted the prosecutions motion. It amended its judgment to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused June Ignas is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
MURDER as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and considering the aggravating circumstances of
treachery, nighttime and the special aggravating circumstance of the use of an unlicensed firearm, without any mitigating
circumstance, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection. He is further sentenced to pay the heirs of the
victim the following sums:
1. P150,000.00 for funeral expenses and those incurred for and during the wake;
2. P2,040,000.00 for unearned income;
3. P50,000.00 as death compensation established by jurisprudence; and
4. P50,000.00 as and for moral damages; and
5. P20,000.00 as attorneys fees.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED in Chambers.[64]
Hence, this automatic review, with appellant imputing the following errors to the court a quo:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER DESPITE THE WEAKNESS OF THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF THE
PROSECUTION.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT TO THE ALLEGED EXTRA-JUDICIAL
ADMISSIONS MADE BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE ITS BEING HEARSAY IN NATURE AND IN VIOLATION OF
HIS RIGHTS UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING PROBATIVE VALUE TO THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI
INTERPOSED BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
IV
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED

WHEN IT RULED THAT THE KILLING OF THE DECEASED WAS ATTENDED BY EVIDENT PREMEDITATION,
TREACHERY AND NIGHTTIME.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT APPRECIATED THE ALLEGED USE OF AN
UNLICENSED .38 CALIBER FIREARM AS AN AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE IN THE COMMISSION OF THE
CRIME OF MURDER WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS.
VI
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DID NOT APPRECIATE IN FAVOR OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF IMMEDIATE VINDICATION OF A GRAVE
OFFENSE, PASSION AND OBFUSCATION AND VOLUNTARY SURRENDER.
VII
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT AWARDED EXCESSIVE DAMAGES IN THE FORM
OF FUNERAL EXPENSES AND UNEARNED INCOME OF THE DECEASED WHICH WERE NOT SUFFICIENTLY
PROVEN.[65]
Appellants assigned errors may be reduced to the following pertinent issues: (1) the nature of the crime committed,
if any; (2) the sufficiency of the prosecutions evidence to prove appellants guilt; (3) the correctness of the penalty; and
(4) the propriety of the damages awarded.
1. Murder or Homicide
Assuming arguendo that the evidence on record suffices to sustain the appellants conviction for the unlawful killing
of Nemesio Lopate, the question arises: Was the killing murder as found by the trial court or mere homicide? Note that
the amended information under which the appellant stands charged does not, unlike the original information, charge
appellant with murder but with mere unlawful killing albeit through the use of an unlicensed firearm. Note further that the
amended information does not definitely and categorically state that the unlawful killing was attended by the aggravating
or qualifying circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, and nocturnity.
The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be
specifically alleged in the information. [66] Although the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure took effect only on
December 1, 2000 or long after the fatal shooting of Nemesio Lopate, as a procedural rule favorable to the accused, it
should be given retrospective application. Hence, absent specific allegations of the attendant circumstances of
treachery, evident premeditation, and nocturnity in the amended information, it was error for the trial court to consider
the same in adjudging appellant guilty of murder. As worded, we find that the amended information under which
appellant was charged and arraigned, at best indicts him only for the crime of homicide. Any conviction should, thus, fall
under the scope and coverage of Article 249[67] of the Revised Penal Code.
As for the separate case for illegal possession of firearm, we agree with the trial courts order to dismiss the
information for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in Criminal Case No. 97-CR-2753. [68] Under R.A. No. 8294,
[69]
which took effect on July 8, 1997, where murder or homicide is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the
separate penalty for illegal possession of firearm shall no longer be imposed since it becomes merely a special
aggravating circumstance.[70] This Court has held in a number of cases[71] that there can be no separate conviction of the
crime of illegal possession of firearm where another crime, as indicated by R.A. No. 8294, is committed. Although R.A.
No. 8294 took effect over a year after the alleged offense was committed, it is advantageous to the appellant insofar as
it spares him from a separate conviction for illegal possession of firearms and thus should be given retroactive
application.[72]
2. Sufficiency of the Prosecutions Evidence
But is the prosecutions evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction for homicide?

Appellant primarily contests the accuracy of the identification made by the prosecution witnesses who testified that
they saw him at the locus criminis, tucking a gun in his pants and casually walking away. For one, he contends that the
prosecution witnesses who were present at the scene did not in fact see appellant as the person who allegedly shot the
victim. Witness Marlon Manis was not certain that the person he saw walking away from the fallen victim was appellant.
As per Manis own admission, he merely presumed that it was appellant. As to witness Annie Bayanes, her identification
of appellant as the assailant was equally doubtful. The fact is she did not see the alleged gunmans face, considering
that the only illumination on the scene was a vehicles taillight. Appellant stresses that both Bayanes and Manis were in
a state of excitement and nervousness as a result of the incident, hence the resultant commotion and fear distracted
their powers of observation. Appellant insists that given these considerations, the testimonies of Bayanes and Manis
failed to show that he was at the scene of the crime, much less prove that he was the gunman.
For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the failure of Manis to see the actual
shooting is irrelevant, as such was not the purpose for which his testimony was offered in evidence. Rather, Manis
testimony was meant to provide circumstantial evidence tending to show the physical description of Nemesios attacker,
and not as an eyewitness testimony to positively identify said assailant. Neither was Bayanes presented to testify as an
eyewitness to the shooting, but to declare that she got a clear look at the face of the suspected gunman.
We note that at the heart of the prosecutions case is the familiarity of Annie Bayanes and Marlon Manis with
appellant. Absent this familiarity, the prosecutions theory that circumstantial evidence shows that appellant killed
Nemesio would collapse like a house of cards. It was precisely this familiarity with appellant, which enabled said
witnesses to recognize him as the person tucking a gun in his waistband and walking away from the fallen victim.
Bayanes had known appellant for some ten (10) years before the incident and even described him as a good man.
[73]
She was only five or six meters away from the scene of the crime and was able to fully look at the face of the person
tucking a gun in his pants and walking away. Familiarity with the physical features, particularly those of the face, is
actually the best way to identify the person.[74] That the only illumination in the area came from the taillight of a parked
vehicle and the lights on the roof of the bagsakan does not discredit her account. We have held that moonlight,
[75]
starlight,[76] kerosene lamps,[77] a flashlight,[78] and lights of passing vehicles[79] may be adequate to provide illumination
sufficient for purposes of recognition and identification. Under the circumstances of these cases, this Court believes that
Bayanes was in the position and had a fair opportunity to identify appellant as the person leaving the crime scene with a
gun tucked in his waist.
Her testimony was buttressed by that of witness Marlon Manis. A former neighbor of appellant, he had known
appellant since 1993. He was a frequent customer at appellants bakery. In the rural areas, people tend to be more
familiar with their neighbors. This familiarity may extend to body movements, which cannot easily be effaced from
memory. Hence, Manis testimony that he could recognize appellant even just from his build and manner of walking is
not improbable. His declaration that he was some twenty-five (25) meters away from the person walking away from the
victim does not make recognition far-fetched. Once a person has gained familiarity with another, identification is an easy
task, even from that distance.[80]
Evidence should only be considered for the purpose it was formally offered.[81] As the Solicitor General points out,
the statements of Bayanes and Manis were not offered to positively identify appellant as the assailant, but to provide
circumstantial evidence concerning Nemesios assailant, tending to prove that appellant did shoot the victim. Thus, the
court a quocommitted no reversible error in giving weight and credence to the testimonies of Bayanes and Manis for the
stated purposes therefor.
Appellant next assails the testimonies of the following prosecution witnesses: (1) Pauline Gumpic for being
inconsistent and flawed with contradictions; (2) Annie Bayanes and Julio Bayacsan for their unexplained delay in giving
their respective sworn statements to the police; and (3) Mona Barredo for flip-flopping with respect to the alleged
admission to her by appellant and how the police investigators knew about said admission, after she claimed that she
did not tell anyone about his revelation. Appellant submits that the trial court erred in giving weight to the
aforementioned testimonies.
For appellee, the OSG argues that with respect to Gumpics alleged contradictions, they refer only to unimportant
and collateral matters; they do not affect her credibility. With respect to the delay or vacillation by Bayacsan and
Bayanes in giving their statements to the authorities, the OSG points out that a reading of their declarations in court will
show that the alleged delay was adequately explained. As to Barredos testimony, a closer reading of her supposed flip-
flopping shows that the alleged contradictions were due to an honest misapprehension of fact on her part.
When the issue boils down to the credibility of witnesses, the appellate court will not generally disturb the findings
of the trial court because the latter is in the vantage position of observing witnesses through the various indicia of
truthfulness or falsehood.[82] However, this rule is not absolute. One exception is where the judge who wrote the decision
did not personally hear the prosecutions evidence.[83] In this case, the records show that Judge Angel V. Colet, who
authored the assailed decision, took over from Judge Benigno M. Galacgac only on April 29, 1997 or after the witnesses
for the prosecution had testified. It does not follow, however, that a judge who was not present at the trial cannot render
a just and valid judgment. The records and the transcripts of stenographic notes are available to him as basis for his
decision.
After going over the transcripts of the witnesses testimonies, we find no reason to disturb the findings of the trial
court. With respect to the statements of Gumpic, we agree with the Solicitor General that alleged inconsistencies refer
only to irrelevant and collateral matters, which have nothing to do with the elements of the crime. It is axiomatic that
slight variations in the testimony of a witness as to minor details or collateral matters do not affect his or her credibility
as these variations are in fact indicative of truth and show that the witness was not coached to fabricate or dissemble.
[84]
An inconsistency, which has nothing to do with the elements of a crime, is not a ground to reverse a conviction.[85]
We likewise find no basis for appellants contention that Bayanes and Bayacsan failed to give a satisfactory
explanation for the delay or vacillation in disclosing to the authorities what they knew. Bayanes gave a satisfactory
reason for her delay in reporting to the authorities what she knew. She had simply gone about her normal business
activities for some months, unaware that a case had been filed concerning the killing of Nemesio. It was only nine (9)
months after the incident that she read a notice for help posted by the victims relatives at the Trading Post, appealing to
possible witnesses to the killing to come forth and assist them in their quest for justice. It was only then that she decided
to reveal to the authorities what she knew.
As to Bayacsan, he candidly admitted in court that he considered appellant his friend and he wanted to protect him
and hence, he only disclosed appellants admission to him when the police started questioning him. There is no rule that
the suspect in a crime should immediately be named by a witness. [86] Different people react differently to a given
situation and there is no standard form of human behavior when one is confronted with a strange, startling, or frightful
experience.[87] The Court understands the natural reluctance or aversion of some people to get involved in a criminal
case.[88] More so where, as in these cases, a townmate of Bayanes and Bayacsan is involved. We have taken notice
that when their townmates are involved in a criminal case, most people turn reticent. [89] Hence, the failure of Bayanes
and Bayacsan to immediately volunteer information to the police investigators will not lessen the probative value of their
respective testimonies. The delay, having been satisfactorily explained, has no effect on their credibility.[90]
We have likewise closely scrutinized the testimony of Mona Barredo regarding the alleged admission by appellant
to her that he killed the victim. We find nothing flip-flopping about her testimony. Instead, we find a witness who
admitted she was nervous that she might not be able to answer all the questions. [91] Said nervousness was engendered
by her erroneous belief that to be a credible witness, she must have personal knowledge of the crime. [92] Even the most
candid witnesses make mistakes and may give some contradictory or inconsistent statements, but such honest lapses
need not necessarily affect their credibility. Ample margin should be accorded a witness who is tension-filled with the
novelty of testifying before a court.[93]
Appellant further contends that the trial court erred in giving credence to the verbal admissions of guilt he made to
Gumpic and SPO4 Bomagao inside the police station since said admissions are inadmissible in evidence as
uncounseled confessions.
The OSG submits that said verbal admissions of complicity, as well as those made to appellant to Bayacsan and
Barredo, are admissible as statements forming part of the res gestae. We agree on this point with the OSG.
The requisites of res gestae are: (1) the principal act or res gestae must be a startling occurrence; (2) the statement
is spontaneous or was made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise a false statement, and the statement
was made during the occurrence or immediately prior or subsequent to thereto; and (3) the statement made must
concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. [94] All these elements are present in
appellants verbal admission to Barredo that he killed the victim when he went to the latters house half an hour after the
fatal shooting of Nemesio.
The verbal admission by appellant to Barredo was made before appellant had the time and opportunity to contrive
a falsehood. Similar statements have been held to be part of the res gestae: (1) a childs declaration made an hour after
an alleged assault;[95] (2) the testimony of a police officer as to what the victim revealed to him some 30 minutes after
the commission of an alleged crime;[96] and (3) a victims declaration made some 5 to 10 minutes after an alleged felony
took place.[97] Note that since appellants admission was not solicited by police officers in the course of a custodial
investigation, but was made to a private person, the provisions of the Bill of Rights on custodial investigation do not
apply. The Rules of Court[98] provides that an admission made to a private person is admissible in evidence against the
declarant.[99]
Prosecutions evidence here is admittedly circumstantial. But in the absence of an eyewitness, reliance on
circumstantial evidence is inevitable.[100] Resort thereto is essential when the lack of direct evidence would result in
setting a felon free.[101]
Circumstantial evidence suffices to convict if the following requisites are met: (1) there is more than one
circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. [102] In our mind, the following pieces of
circumstantial evidence show with moral certainty that appellant was responsible for the death of Nemesio:
1. Appellant had the motive to kill Nemesio Lopate for having an affair with his wife, and appellant had openly expressed his desire
and intention to do so;
2. At around 10:00 p.m. of March 10, 1996, Annie Bayanes and Marlon Manis heard two gun shots at the Trading Post, La Trinidad,
Benguet and saw Nemesio Lopate fall to the ground;
3. Bayanes saw appellant behind the victim, tucking a gun into his waistband, and walking away;
4. From another angle, Manis also saw a person whose gait and built resembled that of appellant walking away from the crime
scene;
5. At around 10:30 p.m. of March 10, 1996, appellant went to the house of Mona Barredo, brought out a handgun, emptied it of two
spent .38 caliber shells and instructed Barredo to throw the shells out of the window, which she did;
6. Appellant then told Barredo that he had shot and killed his wifes paramour, after which he stayed at Barredos house for the night;
7. On March 11, 1996, Dr. Doris C. Jovellanos, Municipal Health Officer of La Trinidad, Benguet recovered a .38 caliber slug from
Nemesios corpse and found two (2) bullet entry wounds on the said cadaver;
8. On March 18, 1996, police investigators, assisted by Barredo, recovered two (2) spent .38 caliber shells from Barredos sweet
potato patch, immediately outside her residence wherein appellant had slept a week before.
The foregoing circumstances clearly show that appellant had the motive, the opportunity, and the means to commit
the crime at the place and time in question. Simply put, the circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution has
successfully overcome the claim of innocence by appellant. Under the proved circumstances, appellants defense of alibi
is untenable. More so, in this situation where prosecution witness Bayanes unflinchingly declared that she saw appellant
standing behind the victim, tucking a gun in his pants, moments after the latter was shot. As we held in People v.
Salveron,[103] and reiterated in People v. Sesbreo,[104] where an eyewitness saw the accused with a gun, seconds after
the gunshot and after the victim fell to the ground, the reasonable conclusion is that said accused killed the victim.
Appellants alibi cannot prevail over the positive testimony of Bayanes concerning appellants identification and
presence at the crime scene. Basic is the rule that for alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that he was somewhere
else when the crime was committed and that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime.
[105]
Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where the appellant was when the crime transpired
and the place where it was committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places. [106] In these cases, the
defense admitted that the distance between La Trinidad, Benguet and Kayapa, Nueva Vizcaya is 79 kilometers, which
can be negotiated in 4 or 5 hours. [107] Clearly, it was not physically impossible for appellant to be at the locus criminis at
the time of the killing. Hence, the defense of alibi must fail.
In sum, we find that the prosecutions evidence suffices to sustain the appellants conviction for homicide.
3. Crime and its Punishment
As appellant can only be convicted of homicide, it follows that he cannot, under the provisions of RA No. 7659, be
sentenced to suffer the death penalty. The penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code
is reclusion temporal. Our task now is to determine whether there are aggravating or mitigating circumstances which
could modify the penalty.
More specifically, may the special aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm be taken against the
appellant?
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in appreciating the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed
firearm in the present case. Like the killing, said aggravating circumstance must likewise be proved beyond reasonable
doubt, says the appellant. On this point, he adds, the prosecution failed to adduce the necessary quantum of proof.
We find merit in the appellants contentions. It is not enough that the special aggravating circumstance of use of
unlicensed firearm be alleged in the information, the matter must be proven with the same quantum of proof as the
killing itself. Thus, the prosecution must prove: (1) the existence of the subject firearm; and (2) the fact that the accused
who owned or possessed it does not have the corresponding license or permit to own or possess the same.[108] The
records do not show that the prosecution presented any evidence to prove that appellant is not a duly licensed holder of
a caliber .38 firearm. The prosecution failed to offer in evidence a certification from the Philippine National Police
Firearms and Explosives Division to show that appellant had no permit or license to own or possess a .38 caliber
handgun. Nor did it present the responsible police officer on the matter of licensing as a prosecution witness.Absent the
proper evidentiary proof, this Court cannot validly declare that the special aggravating circumstance of use of
unlicensed firearm was satisfactorily established by the prosecution. Hence such special circumstance cannot be
considered for purposes of imposing the penalty in its maximum period.
Coming now to the obverse side of the case, is the appellant entitled to benefit from any mitigating circumstance?
Appellant, firstly contends that assuming without admitting that he is guilty, the lower court should have considered
at least the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense as well as that of passion and
obfuscation. Appellant points out that the victims act of maintaining an adulterous relationship with appellants wife
constituted a grave offense to his honor, not to mention the shame, anguish, and anxiety he was subjected to. Even the
mere sight of the victim must have triggered an uncontrollable emotional outburst on appellants part, so that even a
chance meeting caused in him an irresistible impulse powerful enough to overcome all reason and restraint. Secondly,
appellant points out that the trial court failed to consider his voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance.
The Solicitor General counters that there was literally no immediate vindication to speak of in this case. Appellant
had sufficient time to recover his serenity following the discovery of his wifes infidelity. Nor could passion and
obfuscation be appreciated in appellants favor because the killing was not proximate to the time of the
offense. Appellant became aware of the treatment offensive to his dignity as a husband and to the peace and tranquility
of his home two weeks earlier. This interval between the revelation of his wifes adultery and the fatal shooting was
ample and sufficient for reason and self-control to reassert themselves in appellants mind. As to the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender, the OSG stresses that his supposed surrender at Kayapa, Nueva Vizcaya was
actually due to the efforts of law enforcers who came looking for him. There he did not resist, but lack of resistance
alone is not tantamount to voluntary surrender, which denotes a positive act and not merely passive conduct.
According to the OSG, for the mitigating circumstance of vindication of a grave offense to apply, the vindication
must be immediate. This view is not entirely accurate. The word immediate in the English text is not the correct
translation of the controlling Spanish text of the Revised Penal Code, which uses the word proxima.[109] The Spanish
text, on this point, allows a lapse of time between the grave offense and the actual vindication. [110] Thus, in an earlier
case involving the infidelity of a wife, the killing of her paramour prompted proximately though not immediately by the
desire to avenge the wrong done, was considered an extenuating circumstance in favor of the accused.[111] The time
elapsed between the offense and the suspected cause for vindication, however, involved only hours and minutes, not
days. Hence, we agree with the Solicitor General that the lapse of two (2) weeks between his discovery of his wifes
infidelity and the killing of her supposed paramour could no longer be considered proximate. The passage of a fortnight
is more than sufficient time for appellant to have recovered his composure and assuaged the unease in his mind. The
established rule is that there can be no immediate vindication of a grave offense when the accused had sufficient time
to recover his serenity.[112] Thus, in this case, we hold that the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a
grave offense cannot be considered in appellants favor.
We likewise find the alleged mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation inexistent. The rule is that the
mitigating circumstances of vindication of a grave offense and passion and obfuscation cannot be claimed at the same
time, if they arise from the same facts or motive.[113] In other words, if appellant attacked his victim in proximate
vindication of a grave offense, he could no longer claim in the same breath that passion and obfuscation also blinded
him. Moreover, for passion and obfuscation to be well founded, the following requisites must concur: (1) there should be
an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind; and (2) the act which produced the obfuscation
was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator
might recover his moral equanimity.[114] To repeat, the period of two (2) weeks which spanned the discovery of his wifes
extramarital dalliance and the killing of her lover was sufficient time for appellant to reflect and cool off.
Appellant further argues that the lower court erred in failing to consider voluntary surrender as a mitigating
circumstance. On this point, the following requirements must be satisfied: (1) the offender has not actually been
arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (3) the surrender was voluntary. [115] Records
show, however, that leaflets and posters were circulated for information to bring the killer of Nemesio to justice. A team
of police investigators from La Trinidad, Benguet then went to Kayapa, Nueva Vizcaya to invite appellant for
questioning. Only then did he return to Benguet. But he denied the charge of killing the victim. Clearly, appellants
claimed surrender was neither spontaneous nor voluntary.
Absent any aggravating or mitigating circumstance for the offense of homicide the penalty imposable under Art. 64
of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
penalty which could actually be imposed on appellant is an indeterminate prison term consisting of eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum.
4. Proper Award of Damages
Appellant and the Solicitor General are one in contending that the trial court awarded excessive actual damages
without adequate legal basis. Thus, the amount of P150,000.00 was awarded for funeral and burial expenses without
any supporting evidence on record.[116] This cannot be sustained in this review. In order for actual damages to be
recovered, the amount of loss must not only be capable of proof but must actually be proven with reasonable degree of
certainty, premised upon competent proof or best evidence obtainable of the actual amount thereof, such as receipts or
other documents to support the claim.[117] The records clearly show in this case that only the amount of P7,000 as
funeral expenses was duly supported by a receipt.[118] Hence, the award of actual damages should be limited to P7,000
only.
Appellant further contests the award of P2,040,000 for loss of earning capacity as unconscionable. Since the
victims widow could not present any income tax return of her husband to substantiate her claim that his net income
was P60,000 annually, then according to appellant, there is no basis for this award at all. At best, appellant says, only
temperate or nominal damages may be awarded.
The OSG responds that the award for loss of earning capacity has adequate basis as the prosecution presented
sufficient evidence on the productivity of the landholdings being tilled by the deceased and the investments made by the
Lopate family from their income. Hence, said the OSG, it was not a product of sheer conjecture or speculation.
Nonetheless, the OSG submits that the original amount of P1,800,000 for loss of earning capacity should be restored as
it is this amount which takes into account only a reasonable portion of annual net income which would have been
received as support by the heirs.
In setting said award at P2,040,000, amended from P1,800,000, for lost earnings, the trial court took note of the
following factors in its computations:
The Death Certificate of Nemesio Lopate shows that he died at the age of 29. [119] His widows detailed testimony
shows that their average annual net income from vegetable farming was P60,000.[120] The victims share of the annual
net income from the couples farm is half thereof, or P30,000. Using the American Expectancy Table of Mortality, the life
expectancy of the victim at age 29 is set at 34 years.
Therefore, total loss of Earning Capacity (X) should be computed as follows:
X = 2/3 (80-29) x P30,000
X = 2/3 (51) x P30,000
X = 34 x P30,000
X = P1,020,000
This amount should form part of the damages awarded to the heirs.
We sustain the award of P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto. But there being no testimony or other proof thereon, the
award of P50,000 as moral damages cannot now be sustained.Instead, temperate damages in the amount of P25,000
should be awarded.
The award of P20,000 in attorneys fees should be maintained. Records show that the victims widow had to hire the
services of a private prosecutor to actively prosecute the civil aspect of this case,[121] and in line with Article 2208 of the
Civil Code,[122] reasonable attorney fees may be duly recovered.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 8, in Criminal Case No.
96-CR-2522 is MODIFIED as follows:
Appellant June Ignas y Sanggino is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE as defined
and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. There being neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstance, he is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
Appellant June Ignas y Sanggino is ORDERED TO PAY the heirs of the victim, Nemesio Lopate, the following
sums: a) P7,000 as actual damages; b) P1,020,000 for loss of earning capacity; c) P50,000 as civil indemnity;
d) P25,000 as temperate damages; and e) P20,000 as attorneys fees. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 135551 October 27, 2000

vs.
AMPIE TARAYA y CANTUBA @ "Boyet," ARLY CANTUBA y DAIGO @ "Beget" and JONAR ESTRADA y
CANTUBA, accused-appellants.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Accused-appellants appeal from the decision in Criminal Case No. S-1898 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of
1
Siniloan, Laguna, which found them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentenced each of them
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and pay ₱50,000 to the heirs of the victim, as well as the costs.
Accused-appellants are relatives. Ampie Taraya (hereafter AMPIE) and Jonar Estrada (hereafter JONAR) are cousins
and the nephew of Arly Cantuba (hereafter ARLY). ARLY is the brother of the respective mothers of AMPIE and
JONAR.
The accusatory portion of the information which charged them with murder reads as follows:
2
That on or about 11:20 o’clock [sic] in the evening of September 24, 1995 at Sitio Bagong Silang, Barangay Batuhan,
Municipality of Famy, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
while conveniently armed with deadly weapon (itakan), with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery and
with abuse of superior strength conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hack and slash the throat of one Salvador Reyes by [sic] the said weapon
thereby inflicting upon him hacking/slashing wound anterior neck, proximal end and directing backward and superiorly at
the base of the mandible cutting half the circumference of the neck cutting the trachea, esophagus, neck vessels
including jugular veins and caroted arteries on both sides sparing the cervical vertebrae and cord which directly caused
his death to the damage and prejudice of the surviving heirs of the victim.
That the qualifying and aggravating circumstances of treachery, abuse of superior strength and evident premeditation
attended the commission of the crime.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Accused-appellants pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented Mariano Adillo, David Angeles, Jr., Gregorio Reyes and Dr. Gloria Jamolin. The evidence for
the prosecution established the following facts:
Mariano Adillo a co-worker of the victim Salvador Reyes in a sash factory, testified that he had known Salvador for two
months. At about 10:00 p.m. of 24 September 1995, he, Salvador and three other companions were in a beer house in
Famy, Laguna. Salvador drank his beer outside the pub and was in a conversation with a girl. Both were within the view
of Mariano. Later, Salvador was approached and surrounded by three men, one of them faced him while the two others
positioned themselves behind him. Mariano hollered at the men, who immediately left.
Half an hour later Mariano went out, but Salvador was nowhere in sight. At about 11:00 p.m., Mariano and a boy
searched for him up to a billiard hall which was about 200 meters away. They returned to the beer house and he
instructed the boy to hail a tricycle for his ride home. When no tricycle could be found he and a companion walked
home. The following day he learned of Salvador’s death.
3 4
When asked in open court if he could identify the three persons who approached Salvador, Mariano pointed to AMPIE,
JONAR and ARLY.
David Angeles, Jr. testified that accused-appellants were his neighbors in Famy, Laguna. ARLY, with whom AMPIE
lived, was an adjacent neighbor, while JONAR lived some thirty feet away from his house. He had known JONAR for
some ten years, ARLY for about five years and AMPIE for three years. He never had any misunderstanding with anyone
of them. 5
According to David, in the late evening of 24 September 1995, he was at home and could hardly sleep as he was
suffering from a backache. He went out of the house to relieve himself. On the street he saw AMPIE brandishing a one-
foot long bolo. Behind AMPIE were ARLY and JONAR. They were about five meters away from where David stood.
AMPIE approached a man who seemed to be urinating. AMPIE then held up the head of the man and slashed his neck
once while his companions ARLY and JONAR stood nearby ready to assist AMPIE. The victim was able to free himself
and ran towards David until he dropped a few meters from the house. Immediately AMPIE, ARLY and JONAR ran to
their respective homes. David later learned that the victim was Salvador Reyes. 6
David was certain of whom he saw because the place was illuminated. He went back to the house and ten minutes later
he saw people lurking outside with flashlights. He went out when he heard somebody ask why there were bloodstains
around. He kept quiet as he was reluctant to divulge what he saw, and he feared the consequences should he be
involved. A few days passed and since his conscience still bothered him, he decided to reveal what he had witnessed.
He gave a sworn statement to the police.
7
According to Gregorio Reyes, his son Salvador Reyes died on 24 September 1995. At the time of his death Salvador
was thirty-nine years old, separated from his wife and was earning an average of ₱200 a day. Salvador had confided to
him that he had an altercation with ARLY. He mentioned this fact in his sworn statement. The funeral expenses he
8
incurred amounted to ₱18,000; however, he could not produce any receipt because some of the expenses were paid by
his friends.
9
Dr. Gloria Jamolin performed an autopsy on Salvador Reyes. She noted the presence of abrasions in the right temporal
area and below the eyes and a hack wound at the neck which could have been caused by a sharp instrument such as a
bolo. Judging from the nature and the location of the wound, the assailant was in front of the victim during the attack.
The cause of death was cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to shock and hemorrhage due to the hack wound
penetrating the esophagus. She prepared a post mortem report.
10 11
The defense had another version of the incident. The witnesses it presented were Armando Bilara, Domingo Decena,
SPO2 Emmanuel Martinez, ARLY, JONAR and AMPIE.
Armando Bilara, a barangay tanod, claimed that he has known all accused-appellants for about three years. On 13
September 1995 he was on his way home for lunch when a commotion took place near his house. JONAR had a
fistfight with Danilo Angeles, brother of prosecution witness David Angeles, Jr. Danilo was atop of and giving blows to
JONAR. Armando intervened and pacified both of them. He had no idea what caused the scuffle. David was among the
spectators of the fight but he did not interfere.
12
Domingo Decena was at home and watching a television show on the night of 24 September 1995 and until 2:00 a.m. of
the following day. Thereafter, he left the house to go to his brother’s place to sleep. While he was walking along the
street, he saw another person who was also walking and holding an iron pipe about one and a half feet long. He later
learned that the man was Salvador Reyes. He also saw AMPIE. When AMPIE came face to face with Salvador, the
latter tried to hit AMPIE once with the pipe, but AMPIE was able to duck and avoid being hit by the pipe. AMPIE
retaliated by hacking Salvador with a bolo. Salvador ran away, followed behind by AMPIE. Frightened with what he saw,
Domingo rushed back to his house. Twenty-five minutes later he saw a commotion outside and learned that Salvador
was found dead twenty meters away from AMPIE’s house. 13
On cross-examination Domingo admitted that he did not tell anyone in the house of what he had just witnessed. Neither
did he inform the police because of fear. He also denied seeing David Angeles, Jr. that night. He was unable to reveal
what he saw for one and a half years because he was busy with work and he had just learned that AMPIE was
languishing in jail. It was AMPIE’s wife who requested him to testify.14
SPO2 Emmanuel Martinez was among the policemen who arrived at the scene of the crime. The body of Salvador
Reyes was found some ten yards from the house of David Angeles, Jr. Accused-appellants were implicated by an
eyewitness to the death of Salvador. ARLY and JONAR were immediately incarcerated while AMPIE, accompanied by
his sister, surrendered at the police station on 9 October 1997. He recorded in the police blotter the date and time of
AMPIE’s surrender. AMPIE admitted that he killed Salvador, but alleged that he did so in self-defense. Martinez then
discontinued the investigation and advised AMPIE to avail of the services of a lawyer from the Public Attorney’s Office. 15
ARLY raised the defense of alibi. According to him, on 24 September 1995, he was at his place of work, a coprasan. He
stayed there until 8:00 p.m. and he immediately proceeded home. He slept an hour later. At around 1:00 a.m. of the
following day he was awakened by his wife, informing him that there were several people milling outside. He went out
and he saw the dead body of Salvador Reyes, whom he knew by face. He returned home to sleep. He had not gone out
of his house between the hours he slept and woke up. In the morning of 25 September 1995, the police came to
question him. He was allowed to go home after the investigation. 16
ARLY surmised that David Angeles, Jr. linked him to the crime because of the squabble he had with him on 13
September 1995, when his nephew JONAR was mauled by David and Bobby Angeles. He explained that Armando
Bilara arrived late during the encounter, for which reason Armando failed to see that David was actually injured by
JONAR.
ARLY further declared that he did not go to the beer house at any time on 24 September 1995. 17
JONAR also offered the defense of alibi. He had known Salvador Reyes for about fifteen years and during that period
he never had any misunderstanding with Salvador. He was at home in the evening of 24 September 1995. He slept at
8:00 p.m. and woke up at 5:00 a.m. the following day. He learned that Salvador was killed that morning and the police
came to arrest him two weeks after. He had no involvement in Salvador’s death, since he was asleep the whole night.
He was not in the beer house as alleged by Mariano Adillo. He asserted that David Angeles, Jr. implicated him in the
murder of Salvador because David is the brother of Danilo Angeles and he had a misunderstanding with Danilo’s wife.
The incident happened on 13 September 1995, when Danilo punched him and David joined in the fracas. 18
AMPIE claimed self-defense. According to him in the early evening of 24 September 1995 he was in a beer house.
Then he proceeded to the nearby house of his friend Bebet, and stayed at the balcony. He was just a meter away from
the beer house when Lorna, a waitress from the beer house, approached him and talked with him. During their
conversation he noticed a man and his companions enter the beer house. Later the man approached him and Bebet.
The man asked him what he was doing, and he replied that he was just listening to the music. The man also asked him
if he had a relationship with Lorna and he answered "not yet." Not satisfied with his response, the man punched him and
Lorna parted them away. The man left after warning him to wait as they would settle the matter. Lorna explained that
the man was a former boyfriend. After the threat he went home to JONAR’s house to sleep. 19
However, AMPIE awoke at midnight and went outside the house to answer the call of nature. He armed himself with a
bolo as he was suspicious and frightful that night. He then saw a man opposite the house of his neighbor Domeng, and
the man, who was Salvador Reyes, attempted to hit him twice with an iron pipe. He was able to avoid the first blow but
the second blow hit him. In retaliation AMPIE swung his bolo, dropped it and immediately went back to the house. The
following morning he heard of the death of Salvador. He did not tell anyone of what transpired that night. Instead, he
reported to work at the coprasan in Sta. Maria, Laguna and stayed there for three days. On the third day, he was
fetched by his employer to buy duck eggs in Pateros. He was able to return briefly to Famy, Laguna, on 2 October but
that same afternoon he left for Pasig City.
20
On 8 October AMPIE asked from his employer permission to leave for Pagsanjan, Laguna. In Pagsanjan he was
informed by his sister that the police was looking for him in connection with the death of Salvador Reyes. Thus, the
following day he and his sister went to the police station, where he identified himself. He learned that his uncle ARLY
and cousin JONAR were both in jail as they too were implicated in the death of Salvador. AMPIE denied the
participation of ARLY and JONAR, and insisted that it was only he and Salvador who had an altercation. AMPIE was
thereafter detained at the police station. He requested that he be allowed to contact his employer and consult with the
lawyer provided by the latter.
21
On cross-examination AMPIE claimed that he swung his bolo to parry the second attempt of Salvador to hit him with the
pipe. He was unaware that he actually hit Salvador which result in the death of the latter.
22
The trial court limited itself to the resolution of the following issues: (1) whether AMPIE acted in self-defense, (2)
whether ARLY and JONAR participated in the killing of Salvador Reyes, and (3) whether AMPIE voluntarily surrendered
to the police.
In its decision of 6 February 1998, the trial court convicted accused-appellants and decreed, thus:
23
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding all the accused AMPIE TARAYA y
CANTUBA, ARLY CANTUBA y DAIGO and JONAR ESTRADA y CANTUBA, guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime of "MURDER", qualified by treachery, absent of any other mitigating or aggravating circumstances, hereby
sentences them to Reclusion Perpetua. To pay the heirs of the victim for his death the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay
the cost.
Accused Ampie Taraya y Cantuba, Arly Cantuba y Daigo and Jonar Estrada y Cantuba being detention prisoners, it is
hereby ordered that they be credited with the full [length] of their preventive imprisonment if they agree voluntarily in
writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoner, otherwise, they shall be credited with
4/5 of the period they had undergone preventive imprisonment, in accordance with Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended.
The trial court gave credence to the witnesses of the prosecution, particularly to its eyewitness who positively identified
accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the crime. It rejected ARLY and JONAR’s defense of alibi because of its
weakness considering their positive identification and that their respective residences were only some meters away
from where the dead body of Salvador Reyes was found.
In repudiating AMPIE’s claim of self-defense, the trial court noted the weak evidence proffered by him. He failed to show
any physical injury he could have sustained when Salvador allegedly hit him with the iron pipe. The pipe was not
presented, and none was found at the scene of the crime; and even assuming there was indeed a pipe, AMPIE failed to
establish the reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent the alleged unlawful aggression on the part of
Salvador Reyes. It ruled that all the elements of self-defense were not present. Hence, the killing of Salvador was not at
all justified.
The trial court ruled that the killing of Salvador Reyes was attended with treachery. The attack was sudden and
accused-appellants deliberately employed means to ensure the success of their plan without risk to themselves.
Besides, their victim was without means to defend himself. Although it found the presence of the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength, it declared that the same was absorbed in the qualifying circumstance of
treachery. It found no factual basis for the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation.
The trial court ruled that AMPIE could not benefit from the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Salvador
Reyes was killed on 24 September 1995. The complaint for murder was filed on the third day of the following month,
October, and a warrant of arrest was issued the day after. He admitted the killing under claim of self-defense, it cannot
be believed that he was unaware of the filing of the case. The trial court concluded that the purpose of AMPIE’s visit to
the police station on 9 October 1995, accompanied by his sister, was not to surrender but to verify the charge filed
against him.
Finally, the trial court considered AMPIE’s flight as an indication of guilt. He fled after the incident under the pretext that
his work required him to be away for several days.
Undaunted, accused-appellants AMPIE, ARLY and JONAR appealed to us from the judgment of conviction. They
anchor their appeal on the following alleged errors of the trial court:
1. … IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY TO KILL AMONG THE THREE ACCUSED;
2. … IN FINDING THAT CO-ACCUSED ARLY AND JONAR PARTICIPATED IN THE KILLING OF THE
VICTIM; AND
3. … IN FINDING THAT THE CRIME OF MURDER WAS COMMITTED BY ACCUSED AMPIE WHEN THE
CRIME WAS ONLY HOMICIDE.
On the first and second assigned errors, they assert that ARLY and JONAR were not co-conspirators in the killing of
Salvador Reyes. They were implicated by David Angeles, Jr. who claimed to have seen them behind AMPIE, allegedly
ready to render assistance to AMPIE when the latter hacked the neck of Salvador. They emphasize, however, that there
is no evidence that they actually helped AMPIE, and no overt act of killing could be attributed to them. Thus, they
deserve an acquittal.
Anent the third assigned error, accused-appellants assail the finding of treachery and contend that AMPIE could only be
guilty of homicide and not murder. AMPIE hacked the victim only once and he immediately fled thereafter. He did not
even seek the help of ARLY and JONAR in killing the victim. He was the lone assailant. For treachery to be appreciated,
it must be proved by strong and convincing evidence. The prosecution failed to do so.
Accused-appellants pray that ARLY and JONAR be acquitted of the crime charged because of reasonable doubt, and
that AMPIE be found guilty of homicide only, not murder.
The Office of the Solicitor General refutes the arguments raised in the Appellants’ Brief. On the first and second
grounds, it counters that conspiracy can be inferred from the conduct of ARLY and JONAR. David Angeles, Jr.
unequivocally testified that both ARLY and JONAR were behind AMPIE, who was armed with a bolo and with it
approached Salvador Reyes, held his head up and hacked his neck. At that time ARLY and JONAR’s actions were
described as "nakaalalay" and "anyong tutulong." Said actions establish a common design to attack Salvador. In a
24
conspiracy to commit murder it is not necessary that all the conspirators actually kill the victim. Besides, their action
after the killing, that is scampering away instead of rendering assistance to the victim, affirmed their criminal intent.
Anent the last argument, the Office of the Solicitor General maintains that the trial court properly appreciated the
qualifying circumstance of treachery. The means used directly and specifically insured the death of Salvador without risk
to accused-appellants. Salvador was alone and unarmed, unsuspecting of what was to befall him. He had no
opportunity to defend himself.
In their Reply Brief, accused-appellants insist on the exculpation of ARLY and JONAR, arguing that their mere presence
in the scene of the crime cannot constitute conspiracy. They assert that David Angeles, Jr. had a wrong impression of
what actually transpired. Moreover, there can be no treachery since AMPIE was the lone perpetrator.
We affirm the conviction of accused-appellant AMPIE but only for homicide; and because of reasonable doubt as to
their guilt, we ACQUIT accused-appellants ARLY and JONAR.
The first and second issues shall be jointly discussed since they question the trial court’s finding of conspiracy, which
resulted in the complicity of ARLY and JONAR.
The trial court relied heavily on the testimonies of Mariano Adillo and David Angeles, Jr. Mariano Adillo testified that
Salvador, prior to his death, was accosted by accused-appellants outside the beerhouse where he was engaged in a
conversation with a woman when accused-appellants arrived. One of the accused-appellants directly faced Salvador,
while the two others positioned themselves just behind the first. Sensing danger, Mariano immediately bellowed at
accused-appellants who immediately left together. David Angeles, Jr., declared that he saw accused-appellants
together at the time Salvador was assaulted. ARLY and JONAR appeared to him to be ready to give assistance to
AMPIE. Pertinent portion of his testimony reads as follows:
xxx
Q What else did you notice when if any when according to you saw B Taraya?
A I saw B Taraya approaching a man who when I looked on that man as if urinating.
Q Where were Jonar Estrada and Arly Cantuba at the time according to you B Taraya slashed the neck of the victim?
A They were near each other. In fact, Arly Cantuba and Jonar Estrada were ready to help B Taraya.
xxx
Q How about these three accused, what did they do if they did anything after the victim Salvador Reyes was able to free
himself and able to run away from them?
A B Taraya and Arly Cantuba slowly entered their house and Jonar Estrada run [sic] towards his house.
xxx
Q And you stated that the two (2) other accused in this case Arly Cantuba and Jonar Estrada were also in the scene of
the crime?
A Yes, sir. "Nandoon din po sila nakaalalay."
Q How far were the two other accused from the victim Salvador Reyes?
A They were side by side, sir.

Q How far?
A Maybe this distance.
Interpreter:
Witness demonstrated by his two hands the distance of about 1 & ½ feet.
Q I would like to direct your attention to your Sworn Statement which was already marked in evidence as Exh. "B"
particularly question 10 and your answer in said question and I will quote: "[A]no naman ang palagay mo na naging
partisipasyon nitong si Arly Cantuba and Jonar Estrada? Answer: "Sa tingin ko po ay pagtutulung-tulungan itong
namatay na si Salvador Reyes dahil nakaalalay silang dalawa kay Boyet Taraya." Do you remember having given those
[sic] answer when asked by the Police Officer during the investigation?
A Yes, sir.
xxx
Q Why did you say that these two (2) accused Arly Cantuba and Jonar Estrada were "nakaalalay"?
A Because when Ampie Taraya slashed the neck of Salvador Reyes, the two (2) Jonar Estrada and Arly Cantuba, were
beside them and appears [sic] to be about [sic] to help, "anyang tutulong".
Q Why did you say that Mr. Witness? What did you conclude in the actuation of Arly Cantuba and Jonar Estrada that
you conclude that they were about to help?
A Because while Ampie Taraya was on the act of slashing the neck of Salvador Reyes, Jonar Estrada and Arly Cantuba
were approaching them ("papalapit sila").
Q So you are basing your conclusion that the other two (2) accused Arly Cantuba and Jonar Estrada were about to help
because you said while Boyet Taraya was approaching the victim Salvador Reyes, the two other accused, I am referring
to Arly Cantuba and Jonar Estrada, were also approaching, that is why you said that they were "nakaalalay"?
A Yes, sir.
Q And aside from that Mr. [W]itness, you claimed that Arly Cantuba and Jonar Estrada were also approaching, there
was no other actuation or assistance made by these two (2) aside from the fact that they were also there and
approaching the victim while Boyet Taraya whom you said slashed the neck of Salvador Reyes?
A That is only what I saw, that they were on the act of helping, "anyang tutulong".
xxx
Their reaction was just about to help Boyet Taraya, they did not do anything against Salvador Reyes. 25
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and
decide to commit it. It does not require that such agreement occurred for an appreciable period prior to the commission
26
of the crime; it is sufficient that at the time of the execution thereof, all accused had the same purpose and were united
therein. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the crime was committed, or inferred from the
acts of all accused which denote a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest. In 27
establishing conspiracy direct proof of a previous agreement is unnecessary. And, when it is proven, the act of one is
the act of all.28
Our meticulous evaluation of the prosecution’s evidence fails to convince us of its sufficiency to prove with moral
certainty that there was conspiracy among accused-appellants to kill Salvador so as to hold ARLY and JONAR equally
liable as AMPIE for the death of Salvador.
There is at all no intimation that there was bad blood between Salvador and AMPIE or ARLY or JONAR before the
beerhouse incident. The accused-appellants may have come to the beerhouse to enjoy together but not to look for
Salvador. Neither is there evidence that the girl with whom Salvador was conversing was AMPIE’s girlfriend or was
being courted by him and he felt jealous when he saw Salvador conversing with her.
The testimony of David Angeles, Jr. is not persuasive as to their participation in the crime. ARLY and JONAR were both
unarmed and they remained behind AMPIE. The only overt act attributed to them was that they appeared ready to
assist. There was no certainty as to their action to show a deliberate and concerted cooperation on their part as to
likewise render them liable for the killing of Salvador.
We even have doubts on the testimony of David Angeles, Jr. If indeed Salvador was in the act of urinating when AMPIE
suddenly came up from behind him, held the head and slashed the neck of Salvador, then there must have been no
prior physical confrontation between the two. Yet, the post-mortem report (Exh. "A") of Dr. Jamolin records that the latter
found the following injuries on the body of Salvador:
1. Abrasions, circular, 1 inch, right temporal area.
2. Abrasions, circular, 1 inch, lateral portion, infra-ocular area, right eye. 29
These injuries prove that Salvador and AMPIE must have had a fight. The incident at the beerhouse could be the
proximate cause thereof.
Then, too, David could not be an absolutely impartial witness. He had an axe to grind against JONAR who, only a few
1âwphi1
days earlier, or specifically on 13 September 1995, had a fight with Danilo Angeles, a brother of David. The latter was
present during that incident.
It follows then that no credible third party witnessed how AMPIE attacked and slashed Salvador’s neck with a bolo.
There being no positive and direct evidence to show that the attack was sudden and unexpected, treachery as a
circumstance to qualify the killing to murder cannot be appreciated against AMPIE.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make. Treachery as a qualifying circumstance requires that the
30
offender deliberately employs means of execution which deprives the person attacked no opportunity to defend or
retaliate. It must be proved by clear and convincing evidence or as conclusively as the killing itself. The particulars as
31 32
to how the aggression was made, or how the act which resulted in the death of the victim began and developed must be
established. 33
AMPIE then could only be liable for homicide.
An issue to be resolved, too, is whether AMPIE is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The
following are the requisites of voluntary surrender: (1) the offender had not been actually arrested; (2) the offender
surrendered himself to a person in authority or to the latter's agent; (3) the surrender was voluntary; and (4) there is no
pending warrant of arrest or information filed. For a surrender to be voluntary, it must be spontaneous and must also
34
show the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his
guilt or he wishes to save them the trouble and expense incidental to his search and capture. 35
It cannot be denied that when AMPIE learned that the police authorities were looking for him in connection with the
death of Salvador Reyes, he immediately went to the police station on 9 October 1995. It was there where he confessed
to killing Salvador in self-defense. This is bolstered by the testimony of the investigating officer SPO2 Emmanuel
Martinez, who even entered in the police blotter that AMPIE voluntarily surrendered to the police. However, the said
surrender does not constitute one which would classify as a mitigating circumstance. It must be emphasized that at the
time of his surrender, AMPIE already had a pending warrant of arrest which was issued on 4 October 1995, or five days
36
before his surrender. His arrest by that time was imminent. We cannot then appreciate in favor of AMPIE the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender.
The penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. AMPIE, however, is
entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. He can then be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
whose minimum shall be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision mayor, and whose
maximum shall be that prescribed by law taking into account the modifying circumstances. Since no modifying
circumstances has been proven in this case, the maximum of the penalty shall be the medium period of reclusion
temporal. Thus, AMPIE can be sentenced to an indeterminate imprisonment penalty ranging from ten (10) years of
prision mayor medium as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal medium
as maximum.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered (1) AFFIRMING, insofar as accused-appellant Ampie Taraya is concerned,
the decision of 6 February 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Siniloan, Laguna, Branch 33, in Criminal Case No. 4324,
with the modification that he is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of homicide only and is
hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from Ten (10) years and One (1) day of
prison mayor medium as minimum to Seventeen (17) years and Four (4) months of reclusion temporal medium
as maximum, with all the accessory penalties thereof, and to indemnify the heirs of Salvador Reyes in the sum of
₱50,000 as civil indemnity for his death; (2) ACQUITTING on ground of reasonable doubt accused-appellants ARLY
CANTUBA and JONAR ESTRADA and ordering their immediate release from confinement, unless their further
detention is justified for any other lawful cause. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections shall submit a report of their
release within five (5) days from receipt of notice of this decision.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 117954 April 27, 2000

vs.
ORLANDO ACURAM, accused-appellant.
QUISUMBING, J.
On appeal is the decision rendered on August 24, 1994, by the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 22,
in Criminal Case No. 91-1161, finding accused-appellant Orlando Acuram guilty of murder.
On September 30, 1991, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Benber Apepe charged appellant with the crime of murder,
allegedly committed as follows:
On June 29, 1991, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, at Poblacion, El Salvador; Misamis Oriental, which is
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and treachery did,
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with the use of his armalite rifle, shoot at one
Orlando Manabat who was just standing on the highway waiting for a ride towards home, thus, hitting and
1
wounding the latter on the right leg or thigh, which caused his death the following day.
CONTRARY TO and in violation of Article 248, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code. 2
Upon arraignment appellant, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty to the charge. Thereafter, trial on the
3
merits ensued. Subsequently, the trial court rendered judgment, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing facts, convincingly proved by the prosecution, the accused,
ORLANDO ACURAM, is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of MURDER, qualified by
treachery, and is meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased ROLANDO
MANABAT the jurisprudential sum of fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to pay the cost of the suit.
SO ORDERED. 4
The records disclose that on June 29, 1991, at around seven o'clock in the evening, Rolando Manabat, Oscar Manabat,
Bartolome Nabe, and Peterson Valendres, after the day's work, proceeded to the market in El Salvador, Misamis
Oriental, to buy fish. Since no fish was available at that time, they decided to head for home instead. They went to the
national highway, stood at the right side facing east towards the direction of Cagayan de Oro City and waited for a ride
there. They flagged down an approaching passenger jeepney which, however, swerved dangerously towards them. At
this juncture, Rolando Manabat shouted at the jeep "Pesteng yawa-a kamo, Manligis man kamo" (You devils, why did
you try to run over us?). A passenger inside the jeepney shouted back "Noano man diay, isog mo?" (Why? Are you
brave?). Immediately thereafter, two gunshots rang out in the air, accompanied by sparks coming from the front right
side of the jeepney. Then Rolando shouted, "Agay. I was shot." The vehicle did not stop but instead speeded towards
the direction of Cagayan de Oro City. Wounded on the right knee, Rolando was brought by his companions to the
Cagayan de Oro Medical Center. Later on, they were informed that Rolando needed blood transfusion and so they
transferred him at around 11:25 P.M. to the Northern Mindanao Regional Hospital in the same city.
Upon arrival at the hospital, Rolando was examined by Dr. Ismael Naypa, Jr. The doctor found the victim's blood
pressure to be just forty over zero (40/0) and the victim's right leg was heavily bandaged. He decided to operate on the
victim when the latter's blood pressure stabilized. At about 5:00 A.M. the following day, the victim underwent surgery.
Unfortunately, the victim died at around 11:00 A.M. Dr. Naypa later testified that the cause of Rolando's death was
"secondary to huddle respiratory syndrome secondary to blood loss, secondary to gunshot wounds", or briefly, massive
loss of blood due to gunshot wound. He stated that under normal circumstances, the wound would not necessarily
cause death but in this case where the wound transected the major part of the leg, the wound was fatal. He clarified that
the victim sustained only one gunshot wound which entered at the front portion of the right knee and exited at the back
of the right knee, causing two wounds. 5
The El Salvador police conducted investigation on the incident. It was discovered that appellant Orlando Acuram, a
policeman assigned with the 421st PNP Company based at San Martin, Villanueva, Misamis Oriental, was among the
passengers of the errant jeepney. He was seated at the front, right side of the jeepney and was the only one among its
passengers who was carrying a firearm. Pending investigation, he was restricted to the camp effective July 1, 1991,
upon orders of his commanding officer, Major Rodolfo De La Piedra. Appellant was later surrendered by his
6
commanding officer to the custody of the court on the basis of the warrant of arrest issued by MCTC Judge Evelyn
Nery. On motion by the prosecution and without objection from the defense, the trial court suspended appellant from the
7
service and ordered his detention at the provincial jail. 8
During the trial, appellant admitted that he was on board the mentioned jeepney and had a gun at that time but denied
firing it. He claimed that it was impossible for him to fire his rifle during that time since he was sitting at the front seat of
the jeepney, sandwiched between the driver and the latter's father-in-law. Moreover, he said that the rifle was locked
and wrapped by his jacket and its barrel was even pointed towards the driver. 9
The trial court found the version of the defense weak, self-serving and unreliable. On the basis of the evidence
presented by the prosecution, the court found appellant guilty as charged. Insisting on his innocence, appellant readily
filed his notice of appeal. In his brief, appellant raises the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court:
10
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT ACCUSED APPELLANT TOOK FLIGHT OR
ESCAPED AFTER THE NIGHT OF THE INCIDENT OR IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE KILLING WAS ATTENDED BY THE QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY, GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED APPELLANT IS
GUILTY.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS THE PERPETRATOR OF THE
CRIME CHARGED, DESPITE THE FACT THAT ACCUSED WAS NOT PROPERLY AND CONCLUSIVELY
IDENTIFIED, AND THE ALLEGED WEAPON NOT POSITIVELY TESTED.
IV
THAT THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING EVIDENCE POINTING TO THE
INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, THAT IS, THE EXISTENCE OF EFFICIENT INTERVENING
CAUSE, WHICH IS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM. 11
We shall take up in seriatim the challenges posed by appellant to the credibility and sufficiency of the evidence for the
prosecution. We shall also consider the weight and credibility of his defense.
To begin with, while appellant denies that he fled and hid after the shooting incident, we find that his behavior proves
otherwise. Appellant admits that he was at the scene of the crime at the time the shooting happened. Considering that
he is a law enforcement officer, the unusual incident should have at least elicited his curiosity and he should have
inquired about it. However, he chose to ignore the incident and go his way. That a policeman could display such
12
indifference to a crime committed in his presence is highly incredible. While it was true that he reported for duty the day
after the incident, the following day, he was ordered by his commanding officer restricted within the camp pending
investigation of the case. By this time, appellant must have learned that his commanding officer had received a radio
message and that he was already a suspect. As the trial court noted, no superior officer will hold back from any of his
men involved, such a grave charge. Despite these, appellant did not present himself before the police in El Salvador,
Misamis Oriental. Instead, he was conveniently nowhere to be found.
Thus, appellant's first contention that he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, in our view, is
quite untenable. The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up and
submit himself unconditionally to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save them the
trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture. In this case, it was appellant's commanding officer
13
who surrendered him to the custody of the court. Being restrained by one's superiors to stay within the camp without
submitting to the investigating authorities concerned, is not tantamount to voluntary surrender as contemplated by law.
The trial court is correct in not appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in appellant's favor.
On his second assignment of error, however, we find convincing merit. Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in
1âwphi1
concluding that the killing was qualified by treachery. On this point, we agree. For treachery to be considered an
aggravating circumstance, there must be proof that the accused consciously adopted a mode of attack to facilitate the
perpetration of the killing without risk to himself. In this case, the shooting was done at the spur of the moment. As
14
observed by the trial court, the victim had shouted damning curses at the driver and the passengers of the jeepney. The
shooting was on instantaneous response to the cursing, as appellant correctly claimed. Treachery cannot be
15
appreciated where the accused shot the victim as a result of a rash and impetuous impulse rather than from a deliberate
act of the will.
16
Thirdly, appellant contends that the trial court erred in ruling that he was the perpetrator of the crime. He claims he was
not conclusively identified and the alleged fatal weapon was not positively tested. True, prosecution witnesses did not
positively identify appellant as the one who fired the gun at the victim. Nevertheless, direct evidence of the commission
of the crime is not the only matrix where the trial court may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt. It is settled that
17
conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence provided that the following requisites must concur: (a) there is
more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of
all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Circumstantial evidence could be of
18
similar weight and probative value as direct evidence. From direct evidence of a minor fact or facts, by a chain of
circumstances the mind is led intuitively, or by a conscious process of reasoning, towards a conviction that from said
fact or facts some other facts may be validly inferred. No greater degree of certainty is required when the evidence is
19
circumstantial than when it is direct. In either case, what is required is that there be proof beyond reasonable doubt that
the crime was committed and that the accused committed the crime. 20
As noted by the trial court and the Solicitor General, the evidence for the prosecution is replete with details, duly proven
by the prosecution and to some extent by admissions of the defense, enough to sustain the guilt of appellant. These
are: (1) The appellant was a former member of the Philippine Constabulary and, during the incident, was a member of
the Philippine National Police. He was skilled in handling firearms. (2) The appellant was issued a firearm (armalite rifle)
by his command, which he was then carrying with him before, during and after the incident; (3) At the particular date,
time and place of the incident, appellant was carrying his duly issued armalite rifle inside the jeepney from where the
gunfire came from. (4) The appellant was sitting on the extreme front-right-side of the jeepney where the sparks of the
gunbursts were seen and heard by the witnesses. (5) There were no other persons with a rifle inside the jeepney except
the appellant. (6) The empty shells of an armalite rifle were recovered at the place where the fatal shooting occurred. (7)
The appellant did not go forward to the authorities to present himself until after a warrant of arrest was issued and, in
fact, until his actual arrest.
21
The aforecited circumstances taken together constitute an unbroken chain leading to a reasonable conclusion that
appellant, to the exclusion of others, was responsible for the victim's death. They constitute proof beyond reasonable
doubt that appellant was the perpetrator of the offense. It is the height of desperation on appellant's part to insist that
there should be an eyewitness to the precise moment the shot was fired considering the sudden and completely
unexpected shooting of the victim. Here, circumstantial evidence suffices.
22
Appellant's insistence on his innocence in view of the absence of paraffin and ballistic tests, in our view, is far from
convincing. Suffice it to state that even negative findings of the paraffin test do not conclusively show that a person did
not fire a gun. The absence of nitrates could be explained if a person discharged a firearm with gloves on, or if he
thoroughly washed his hands thereafter. 23
Lastly, in his attempt to exculpate himself, appellant blames the death of the victim on the lack of prompt and proper
medical attention given. He insists that the delay in giving proper medical attendance to the victim constitutes an
efficient intervening cause which exempts him from criminal responsibility. This assertion is disingenuous, to say the
least. Appellant never introduced proof to support his allegation that the attending doctors in this case were negligent in
treating the victim. On the contrary, Dr. Ismael Naypa, Jr., testified that the attending doctor at the Cagayan de Oro
Medical Center tried his best in treating the victim by applying bandage on the injured leg to prevent hemorrhage. He
added that the victim was immediately given blood transfusion at the Northern Mindanao Regional Hospital when the
doctor found out that the victim had a very low blood pressure. Thereafter, the victim's blood pressure stabilized. Then,
the doctor operated the victim as the main blood vessel of the victim's right leg was cut, thereby causing massive loss of
blood. The surgery was finished in three hours. Unfortunately, the victim died hours later. We cannot hold the attending
doctors liable for the death of the victim. The perceived delay in giving medical treatment to the victim does not break at
all the causal connection between the wrongful act of the appellant and the injuries sustained by the victim. It does not
constitute efficient intervening cause. The proximate cause of the death of the deceased is the shooting by the
appellant. It is settled that anyone inflicting injuries is responsible for all the consequences of his criminal act such as
death that supervenes in consequence of the injuries. The fact that the injured did not receive proper medical
attendance would not affect appellant's criminal responsibility. The rule is founded on the practical policy of closing to
the wrongdoer a convenient avenue of escape from the just consequences of his wrongful act. If the rule were
otherwise, many criminals could avoid just accounting for their acts by merely establishing a doubt as to the immediate
cause of death. 24
To conclude, since the qualifying circumstance was not proved in this case, the crime committed is only homicide, not
murder. Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the applicable penalty for homicide is only reclusion temporal. As
there is neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance found by the trial court or shown after a review of the records,
the penalty in this case shall be fixed in its medium period of reclusion temporal, which ranges from a minimum of 14
years, 8 months and 1 day to a maximum of 17 years and 4 months. Further applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the imposable penalty shall be within the range of prision mayor as a minimum to reclusion temporal in its medium
period as the maximum. The range of prision mayor is from 6 years and 1 day to 12 years. The span of reclusion
temporal, medium, is from 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months.
WHEREFORE, the assailed DECISION of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 22, in Criminal
Case No. 91-1161, is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant Orlando Acuram is hereby found GUILTY of HOMICIDE and
sentenced to suffer a prison term of 10 years of the medium period of prision mayor, as minimum, to 15 years and 10
months and 1 day of the medium period of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with accessory penalties provided by law,
to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Rolando Manabat in the amount of P50,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 130026 May 31, 2000

vs.
ANTONIO MAGAT y LONDONIO, accused-appellant.
PER CURIAM:
Before this court for automatic review is the joint decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103, in
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-96-68119 and Q-96-68120, finding accused-appellant Antonio Magat y Londonio guilty of raping
his daughter, Ann Fideli L. Magat, on two occasions and sentencing him to suffer the extreme penalty of death for each
case, and to pay the sum of P750,000.00 as compensatory, moral and exemplary damages.
The two (2) Informations, charging accused-appellant with rape reads:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. Q-96-68119
The undersigned, upon sworn complaint of the offended party, nineteen year old (19) ANN FIDELI
LIMPOCO MAGAT, accuses ANTONIO MAGAT y LONDONIO, her father, of the crime of rape defined
and penalized under Article 335, Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, committed as follows:
That on or about the 14th day of August 1994, during the 17th birthday of Ann Fideli L. Magat in
Kasunduan, Quezon City and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, accused ANTONIO MAGAT
Y LONDONIO, with lewd designs, and by means of threat and violence, did then and there, unlawfully
and feloniously, lie and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with Ann Fideli Limpoco Magat. 1
CRIMINAL CASE NO. Q-96-68120
The undersigned, upon sworn complaint of the offended party, nineteen year old (19) ANN FIDELI
LIMPOCO MAGAT, accuses ANTONIO MAGAT y LONDONIO, her father, of the crime of rape defined
and penalized under Article 335, Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, committed as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of September 1996, in Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused ANTONIO MAGAT Y LONDONIO, with lewd designs and
by means of threat and violence, did then and there, unlawfully and feloniously, lie and succeeded in
having sexual intercourse with Ann Fideli Limpoco Magat. 2
Upon arraignment on January 10, 1997, accused-appellant pleaded guilty but bargained for a lesser penalty for each
case. Complainant's mother, Ofelia Limpoco Magat, and the public prosecutor, Rio Espiritu agreed with the plea
bargain. Consequently, the trial court issued, on that same day, an Order, the fallo of which reads:
On arraignment, accused with the assistance of his counsel Atty. Diosdado Savellano and upon the
request of the accused, the information was read and explained to him in tagalog, a dialect known to him
and after which accused entered a plea of "GUILTY" to the crime charged against him, and further
pleads for a lower penalty to which the Hon. Public Prosecutor interpose no objection.
ACCORDINGLY, the court hereby finds the accused ANTONIO LONDONIO MAGAT, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Article 335, RPC in relation to RA 7659 and he is hereby
sentenced to suffer a jail term of ten (10) years imprisonment for each
case.3
After three months, the cases were revived at the instance of the complainant on the ground that the penalty imposed
was "too light." As a consequence, accused-appellant was re-arraigned on both Informations on April 15, 1997 where
4
he entered a plea of not guilty.

5
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued with the prosecution presenting Dr. Ida Daniel, medico-legal officer of the National
Bureau of Investigation and complainant's mother.
On July 3, 1997 accused-appellant entered anew a plea of guilty. The court read to him the Informations in English and
6
Tagalog and repeatedly asked whether he understood his change of plea and propounded questions as to his
understanding of the consequences of his plea. 7
Convinced of accused-appellant's voluntariness of his plea of guilty, the court required the taking of complainant's
testimony. The accused-appellant did not present any evidence.
On July 15, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment, the decretal portion of which reads:
CONSEQUENTLY, the court renders judgment finding the accused ANTONIO MAGAT y LONDONIO,
GUILTY of the crime of Rape in violation of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, beyond
reasonable doubt and accordingly, sentences him as follows:
1. In Crim. Case No. Q-96-68119, the accused Antonio Magat y Londonio is

sentenced to DEATH by lethal injection; and
2. In Crim. Case No. Q-96-68120, the accused Antonio Magat y Londonio is

sentenced to DEATH by lethal injection.
On the civil aspect, the accused Antonio Magat y Londonio is hereby ordered to pay Ann Fideli Limpoco
Magat the sum of P50,000.00 as compensatory damages; further sum of P200,000.00 as moral
damages and another sum of P500,000.00 as exemplary and corrective damages.
SO ORDERED. 8
Hence, this automatic review.
Accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in re-arraigning and proceeding into trial despite the fact that he
was already convicted per Order of the trial court dated January 10, 1997 based on his plea of guilt. He also argues that
when the court rendered judgment convicting him, the prosecution did not appeal nor move for reconsideration or took
steps to set aside the order. Consequently, the conviction having attained finality can no longer be set aside or modified
even if the prosecution later realizes that the penalty imposed was too light. Accused-appellant likewise posit that the re-
arraignment and trial on the same information violated his right against double jeopardy.
The January 10, 1997 order of the trial court convicting the accused-appellant on his own plea of guilt is void ab initio on
the ground that accused-appellant's plea is not the plea bargaining contemplated and allowed by law and the rules of
procedure. The only instance where a plea bargaining is allowed under the Rules is when an accused pleads guilty to a
lesser offense. Thus, Section 2, Rule 116 of Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — The accused, with the consent of the offended party and the
fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it
is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the
trial court. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary.
A conviction under this plea shall be equivalent to a conviction of the offense charged for purposes of
double jeopardy.
Here, the reduction of the penalty is only a consequence of the plea of guilt to a lesser penalty.
It must be emphasized that accused-appellant did not plead to a lesser offense but pleaded guilty to the rape charges
and only bargained for a lesser penalty. In short, as aptly observed by the Solicitor General, he did not plea bargain but
made conditions on the penalty to be imposed. This is erroneous because by pleading guilty to the offense charged,
accused-appellant should be sentenced to the penalty to which he pleaded.
It is the essence of a plea of guilty that the accused admits absolutely and unconditionally his guilt and responsibility for
the offense imputed to him. Hence, an accused may not foist a conditional plea of guilty on the court by admitting his
9
guilt provided that a certain penalty will be meted unto him. 10
Accused-appellant's plea of guilty is undoubtedly a conditional plea. Hence, the trial court should have vacated such a
plea and entered a plea of not guilty for a conditional plea of guilty, or one subject to the proviso that a certain penalty
be imposed upon him, is equivalent to a plea of not guilty and would, therefore, require a full-blown trial before judgment
may be rendered. 11
In effect, the judgment rendered by the trial court which was based on a void plea bargaining is also void ab initioand
can not be considered to have attained finality for the simple reason that a void judgment has no legality from its
inception. Thus, since the judgment of conviction rendered against accused-appellant is void, double jeopardy will not
12
lie.
Nonetheless, whatever procedural infirmity in the arraignment of the accused-appellant was rectified when he was re-
arraigned and entered a new plea. Accused-appellant did not question the procedural errors in the first arraignment and
having failed to do so, he is deemed to have abandoned his right to question the same 1 and waived the errors in
procedure. 14
Accused-appellant also maintains that assuming that there was proper basis for setting aside the Order of January 10,
1997, the trial court erred in not finding that he made an improvident plea of guilty. He faults the trial court in not
complying with the procedure laid down in the Section 3, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Court. He claims that the
15
record of the case fails to support the trial court's assertion that it conducted a searching inquiry to determine that the
accused-appellant voluntarily entered his plea of guilty with full understanding of the consequences of his plea. He
claims that there is no evidence that the trial court conducted searching inquiry in accordance with the rules.
Under the present rule, if the accused pleads guilty to capital offense, trial courts are now enjoined: (a) to conduct
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea; (b) to require the
prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and (c) to ask
the accused if he so desires to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires. 16
This Court, in a long line of decisions imposed upon trial judges to comply with the procedure laid down in the rules of
arraignment, particularly the rules governing a plea of guilty to a capital offense in order to preclude any room for
reasonable doubt in the mind of either the trial court or of this Court, on review, as to the possibility that there might
have been some misunderstanding on the part of the accused as to the nature of the charges to which he pleaded guilty
and to ascertain the circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime which justify or require the exercise of a
greater or lesser degree of severity in the imposition of the prescribed penalties. Apart from the circumstances that
17
such procedure may remove any doubt that the accused fully understood the consequences of his plea is the fact that
the evidence taken thereon is essential to the fulfillment by this Court of its duty of review of automatic appeals from
death sentences. 18
We have carefully reviewed the record of this case and are convinced that the trial judge has faithfully discharged his
bounden duty as minister of the law to determine the voluntariness and full understanding of accused-appellants' plea of
guilty. The absence of the transcript of stenographic notes of the proceedings during the arraignment do not make the
procedure flawed. The minutes of the proceedings indubitably show that the judge read the Informations to the
19
accused-appellant both in English and Tagalog, asked him questions as to his understanding of the consequences of
his plea, his educational attainment and occupation. Accused-appellant could have known of the consequence of his
plea having pleaded twice to the charges against him. In fact, in the two (2) letters sent to the trial court judge, accused-
appellant not only admitted his "sins" but also asked for forgiveness and prayed for a chance to reform. 20
Moreover, the prosecution has already presented its evidence. Thus, even assuming that there was an improvident plea
of guilt, the evidence on record can sustain the conviction of the accused-appellant.
The testimony of the complainant, as summarized by the Solicitor General, reveal:
Complainant's . . . parents separated when she was only seven (7) years old and she and her younger
brother David were left with her father, accused-appellant, while another brother, Jonathan, and sister,
Abigail, stayed with their mother (TSN, July 15, 1997, p. 46; May 22, 1997, pp. 38-41; 49-51).
On her 9th birthday, her father first raped her and she was beaten when she resisted, thus, she found it
futile to resist every time her father touched her after that (TSN, supra, pp. 24-25).
August 14, 1994, was complainant's 17th birthday. That evening, while sleeping together with accused-
appellant and her brother in their rented house at Kasunduan, Quezon City, she was awakened by the
kisses of her father. He then removed her clothes and after removing his own clothes, went on top of her
and inserted his penis inside her vagina as he had done to her many times before this incident. After he
had finished, he told her to wash her vagina which she did (TSN, supra, pp. 12-17).
On September 1, 1996, complainant who was already 19 years old, was at home with accused-appellant
and her brother after "selling" when her father ordered her and her brother to go to sleep. Her brother fell
asleep but complainant could not sleep and was restless that night. Again, accused-appellant raped her
on the same bed where her brother was also sleeping. She did not resist him anymore because nothing
would happen anyway and he would just beat her if she did (TSN, supra, 21-25).
. . . complainant further revealed that she was not only sexually abused but also physically abused by
accused-appellant who even beat her with a whip while being tied and struck her with a bag containing
tin cans causing head injuries necessitating her hospitalization. She also confirmed that her father
started raping her on her 9th birthday which was repeated several times after that. She likewise revealed
that she felt some fluid ('katas') coming out of her father's penis every time he raped her but she did not
become pregnant because her father made her drink the water from boiled guava leaves and a medicine
she identified as "Gextex" (should be Gestex) if her menstruation was delayed. In fact, when her
menstrual period was delayed for three (3) months, her father even boxed her stomach after making her
drink the water boiled from guava leaves and Gextex thereby causing her to bleed profusely. She was
not able to report or reveal what her father did to her because she was warned by him that he would kill
her, her brother, her mother and her relatives if ever she would escape and reveal the rape. Besides,
she had nowhere else to go and was further made to believe by her father that there was nothing wrong
with what he was doing to her because it was not forbidden by the Bible.
The medical examination confirmed complainant's testimony. Dr. Ida P. Daniel of the NBI testified that complainant had
"lax fourchette" and "distensible hymen" which may be caused by sexual intercourse or penetration of a hard blunt
object such as a penis. She also concluded that the "shallow rugosities" inside her vagina lead to the conclusion that
there was more than one or even more than ten (10) times of sexual intercourse or penetration of a hard blunt object
that passed through her vaginal canal. Moreover, her hymen orifice can allow complete penetration of an average-sized
Filipino adult penis in its erect stage which is from 2.5 to 3.0 cms. in diameter. 21
Surprisingly, accused-appellant did not present any evidence to rebut the prosecution's evidence nor testified in his
behalf to deny the in culpatory testimony of the complainant, giving us the impression that he acknowledges the charges
against him.
While we have in a catena of cases set aside convictions based on pleas of guilty in capital offenses because of the
improvidence of the plea, we did so only when such plea is the sole basis of the judgment of the condemnatory
judgment. Thus, when the trial court in obedience to this Court's injunction, receives evidence to determine precisely
whether or not the accused has erred in admitting guilt, the manner in which the plea of guilty is made loses legal
significance, for the simple reason that the conviction is predicated not on the plea but on the evidence proving the
commission by the accused of the offense charged. In such case, it cannot be claimed that defendant was sentenced
22
to death without having been previously informed of the nature of the charges against him and of the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances recited in the information, as he is fully apprised not only of the allegations in the information
but of the entire evidence of the prosecution. 2
Additionally, accused-appellant's second plea of guilty validated his first plea of guilt. It removed any reasonable doubt
as to his guilt.
24
Accused-appellant further impugns the trial court's imposition of the death penalty in Criminal Case No. Q-96-68120
contending that the complainant was already nineteen (19) years old when the alleged rape occurred.
Republic Act No. 7659 which amended Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is
a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim. (Emphasis supplied)
Complainant was born on August 14, 1977. On September 1, 1996, when the rape was committed (Criminal
25
Case No. Q-96-68120), complainant was already nineteen (19) years of age. Therefore, the same does not fall
under the last paragraph of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA No. 7659. The proper
penalty should be reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.
However, the extreme penalty of death should be imposed in Criminal Case No. Q-96-68119, complainant being only 17
years of age when accused-appellant, his father, raped her.
Finally, accused-appellant likewise assails the award of P750,000.00 damages claiming that the same is excessive.
With regard to the award of compensatory damages, we have ruled in People vs. Victor, which was later reaffirmed
26
in People vs. Prades, that "if the crime of rape is committed or effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under
27
which the death penalty is authorized by the present amended law, the indemnity of the victim shall be in the increased
amount of not less than P75,000.00." Accordingly, in Criminal Case NO. Q-96-68119, the award of compensatory
28
damages should be increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00. In Criminal Case No. Q-96-68120 however, while
appellant was sentenced to reclusion perpetua, the compensatory damage should be the same (P75,000.00). As rightly
argued by the Solicitor General, the trauma, ignominy, pain and shame suffered by the complainant can not be treated
or regarded any lesser.
The award of civil indemnity "is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial
fluctuations overtime, but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes
against chastity." More so, if the crime is committed by the father against his own flesh and blood.
29
With respect to the award of moral damages, we have in People vs.

Prades held:
30
. . . The Court has also resolved that in crimes of rape, such as that under consideration, moral damages
may additionally be awarded to the victim in the criminal proceeding, in such amount as the Court
deems just, without the need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof as has heretofore been the
practice. Indeed, the conventional requirement of allegata et probata in civil procedure and for
essentially civil cases should be dispensed with in criminal prosecution for rape with the civil aspect
included therein, since no appropriate pleadings are filed wherein such allegations can be made.
Corollarily, the fact that complainant has suffered the trauma of mental, physical and psychological
sufferings which constitute the bases for moral damages are too obvious to still require the recital
thereof at the trial by the victim, since the Court itself even assumes and acknowledges such agony on
her part as a gauge of her credibility. What exists by necessary implication as being ineludibly present in
the case need not go through the superfluity of still being proved through a testimonial charade.
Nevertheless, we find the award of P200,000.00 moral damages excessive. An award of P50,000.00 for each count of
rape is to our mind more reasonable. However, we are deleting the award of exemplary or corrective damages, in the
absence of any legal basis therefor.
Four members of the Court maintain their position that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death penalty,
is unconstitutional; nevertheless they submit to the ruling of the Court, by majority vote, that the law is constitutional and
the death penalty should be imposed accordingly.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. Q-96-68119, the decision of the Regional Trial Court convicting
accused-appellant Antonio Magat y Londonio of rape and sentencing him to the
Supreme Penalty of DEATH is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the award of
compensatory damages be increased to Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (75,000.00),
moral damages is reduced to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and exemplary
damages deleted.
2. In Criminal Case No. Q-96-68120, the decision of the Regional Trial Court convicting
accused-appellant of rape and sentencing him to the Supreme Penalty of DEATH is
hereby reduced to RECLUSION PERPETUA. The award of compensatory damages is
increased to Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00), moral damages is reduced to
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and exemplary damages is deleted.
In accordance with Section 25 of the RA 7659, amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon the finality of this
Decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for the possible exercise of
executive clemency or pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 102772 October 30, 1996

vs.
ROGELIO DEOPANTE y CARILLO, accused-appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:p
In deciding this appeal, the Court finds occasion to reiterate some well-settled doctrines in appreciating evident
premeditation as a qualifying circumstance in the crime of murder, and in evaluating claims of self-defense,
voluntary surrender and physical defect.
This is an appeal from the decision dated September 6, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila,
1
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 164, in Criminal Case No. 85155, convicting accused Rogelio
2
Deopante y Carillo of the crime of murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.
On January 11, 1991, an Information was filed against the appellant charging him as follows:
3
That on or about the 10th day of January, 1991, in the Municipality of Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a fan knife
(balisong), with intent to kill and with evident premeditation and treachery did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously stab with a fan knife one Dante Deopante on the different parts of his body,
thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which directly caused his death.
Contrary to law.
Arraigned on March 8, 1991, the accused, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the charge. 4
The Facts
According to the Prosecution
The facts as summarized by the Solicitor General, who added the page references to the transcript of
stenographic notes, are as follows:5
At around nine o'clock in the evening (9:00 p.m.) of January 10, 1991 at Alkalde Jose Street, Barrio
Kapasigan, Pasig, Metro Manila, Dante Deopante was having a conversation with his friend Renato
Molina when they saw appellant Rogelio Deopante coming towards their direction. Renato noticed that
as appellant was fast approaching, the latter was drawing out an open fan knife (balisong) from his right
back pants pocket. Sensing danger, Renato immediately called out to Dante and told the latter to flee
the place. As Dante took flight, so did Renato in another direction. (pp. 3-4, 6, 8, t.s.n. June 3, 1991)
Appellant ran after Dante and overpowered the latter at a basketball court located in a lot between
Alkalde Jose and Pariancillo Streets. Appellant and victim grappled with each other and both fell on the
ground. Appellant was able to assume the dominant position and as Dante lay flat on his back the
former proceeded to stab the latter twice with his fan knife. Immediately thereafter, appellant stood up
and fled the scene leaving Dante mortally wounded. Bystanders milling around Pariancillo Street then
rushed victim to the Rizal Medical Pariancillo Street then rushed victim to the Rizal Medical Center. (pp.
3-5, t.s.n., April 25, 1991; pp. 8, 9, 11, t.s.n. June 3, 1991)
At about the same time on the aforesaid date, the Pasig Police Station received a telephone call from
the Rizal Medical Center informing them that a stabbing victim has been brought to said hospital for
treatment. Patrolman Crispin Pio proceeded to the hospital and there received the information that
appellant was the one who stabbed Dante. Said policeman later obtained the sworn statement of Nestor
Deopante indicating that appellant stabbed the victim. Renato refused to give his sworn statement to the
police, but insisted that indeed it was appellant who stabbed Dante. (pp. 5-7, t.s.n., May 15, 1991)
At around eleven o'clock (11:00 p.m.) of the same evening, Patrolman Crispin Pio and two (2) other
police officers went to the house of appellant located at No. 12 Alkalde Jose Street, Barrio Kapasigan,
Pasig, Metro Manila. After informing appellant of the allegation against him, they invited the former to the
police station for investigation. Appellant went with the police officers and maintained his innocence
throughout the investigation. Patrolman Crispin Pio recovered a fan knife from appellant measuring
around ten (10") inches when opened. He sent the fan knife to the P.N.P. Crime Laboratory Service for
examination. (pp. 8-9, t.s.n., May 15, 1991)
The autopsy report shows a total of seven (7) wounds all over victim's body. Of these wounds, two (2)
were stab wounds (Wound Nos. 2 & 3) and the rest mere abrasions. Dr. Emmanuel Aranas, the medico-
legal officer of the P.N.P. Crime Laboratory Service who conducted the autopsy testified that the stab
wounds were caused by a sharp pointed object like a balisong or fan knife. He further declared that
Wound No. 2, a stab wound located at the left side of the chest, lacerated the diaphragm, liver (left lobe)
and stomach of the victim causing the latter's instantaneous death. Moreover, he concluded that the fan
knife sent to him for examination could have been used in stabbing a person since it showed minute
traces of human blood. (pp. 7-8, t.s.n., April 19, 1991; p. 17. t.s.n., May 30, 1991)
The prosecution presented six witnesses. Aside from Dr. Emmanuel L. Aranas, who testified on the results of
the autopsy, the other witnesses included Manolo Angeles and Renato Molina, who gave eyewitness accounts
of the stabbing. Patrolman Crispin Pio of the Pasig Police Station testified that he invited the accused for
investigation after receiving a report on the killing, and that upon frisking the accused, he found and recovered
from him a 10-inch fan knife which he submitted to the crime lab for examination. Alfonso Reyes, barangay
captain of Barangay Kapasigan, Pasig, Metro Manila, testified that on August 19, 1989, Dante Deopante made a
personal complaint to him as barangay captain, that Rogelio Deopante had threatened to kill him (Dante). He
testified that his office kept a logbook of all the incidents that happened in the barangay and that the same
contained a record of the said complaint of Dante Deopante. However, on cross-examination, he admitted that
6
he was not the one who personally made the entry.
Version of the Defense
In contrast to the prosecution's theory that the victim was killed with evident premeditation, the defense claimed
that the fatal injuries inflicted by accused-appellant upon the victim were done in self-defense. The defense
7
presented three witnesses, viz.: the accused himself, his longtime friend Benito Carrasco, and the son of the
accused, Vladimir Deopante. Their version of the event was as follows:
On January 10, 1991, at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening, in Alcalde Jose Street, Pasig, Metro Manila,
while the appellant was allegedly on his way home he was seen by his nephew, the victim (Dante
Deopante) and the witness for the prosecution, Renato Molina, who at that time were allegedly both
drunk. (TSN June 6, 1991, page 3). The victim (Dante Deopante) suddenly boxed him and the said
appellant ran away and (was) pursued by the victim and Renato Molina. The appellant was overtaken by
the victim by holding the back portion of his shirt. Both
of them fell. The victim pulled-out a knife which appellant allegedly wrested . . . away from Dante
Deopante. After he (appellant) wrested the knife from the victim, they continued rolling over and over the
ground and he does not know whether he stab (sic) the victim or not. (TSN June 6, 1991, page 4). Said
appellant sustained also injuries on (the) little finger of his right hand and abrasion on his right leg, left
knee and left hand (sic). The said appellant was treated by one Dr. Leonides Pappa on January 11,
1991, and issued medical certificate, marked as Exhibits "1, 1-A, 1-B and 1-C" for the defense. (TSN
June 6, 1991, pages 5-6); Appellant claimed that he placed behind bars (incarcerated) the victim for
being a drug addict when he was still a policeman and member of the Police Department of Pasig.
Renato Molina eluded arrest by him, for being a drug addict too. (TSN June 6, 1991, page 6). 8
On cross-examination, accused Rogelio Deopante testified that he was a former member of the Pasig Police
Department but was discharged for having been absent without leave, by reason of a complaint filed against him
by Manolo Angeles before the National Police Commission, and in which case the victim, Dante Deopante, was
presented as witness for complainant Angeles. He further testified that his left hand was completely severed at
the wrist when it was hacked off by his brother Nestor Deopante.
The Trial Court's Ruling
On September 6, 1991, the trial court rendered a decision convicting the appellant of murder, the decretal
portion of which reads as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds the accused Rogelio Deopante y Carillo GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder as charged; and therefore hereby imposes upon him the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, there being no other generic aggravating or mitigating circumstance adduced; and
to indemnify the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as well as to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
The Issues
In his brief, the appellant charges that the trial court erred:
I. In considering the entry in the (barangay) peace and order chairman's blotter under entry no. 0097,
page 58 (logbook) as a basis in holding the commission of the offense with evident premeditation.
II. In not affording the accused-appellant the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and his
physical condition.
III. In not considering appellant's claim of self-defense.
IV. In not considering the flaws and inconsistencies of the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses and
its biased character and wanting of credibility (sic).
V. In not considering the provision of Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code in the imposition of penalty.
The Court's Ruling
First Issue: Evident Premeditation
Very familiar by now to members of the legal profession are the elements which need to be proven before
evident premeditation can be appreciated. These are: (1) the time when the accused decided to commit the
crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that the accused had clung to his determination to commit the crime;
and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the decision to commit the crime and the execution thereof, to allow
the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his act. Mere lapse of time is not enough, however, because
premeditation is not presumed from the mere lapse of time. It must be "evident" from his overt act.
9
Considering the evidence on record, and the events leading up to the killing, we cannot agree with appellant's
contention that the lower court based its finding of evident premeditation on the victim's report to the barangay
captain that the accused-appellant had threatened to kill him. We hold that the record contains sufficient basis
for the finding of evident premeditation. The first and third elements were proven by the testimony of the
barangay captain, Alfonso Reyes, as to the report made by the deceased about the threat on his life, taken
together with the record of the report in the barangay logbook, all of which established the time when appellant
10
decided to commit the crime. The period of time between the said report and the killing (January 10, 1991)
constituted a sufficient lapse of time between the determination to commit the crime and the execution of the
same, the enable the accused to coolly consider and reflect upon his resolution to do away with the victim.
Finally, the second element was proven by the eyewitness testimony of Renato Molina, friend of the victim since
childhood, who was present from the inception to the culmination of the assault launched by appellant against
the victim. We quote with approval the trial court's ratiocination, to wit:
That at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of January 10, 1991, he (Renato Molina) and Dante Deopante
were conversing at Alkalde Jose St., Pasig, Metro Manila when the accused Rogelio Deopante arrived.
He told Dante Deopante to run away. Both of them ran but in different directions.
That he told Dante Deopante to run away because the latter and the accused had a previous (sic)
misunderstanding and the accused always threatened Dante Deopante after the latter testified against
the accused for shooting a certain Maning Angeles.
That he also told Dante Deopante to run away because he saw the accused carrying a fan knife in his
back pocket. He saw it because the place was lighted as there as a lamp post.
xxx xxx xxx
This witness (Molina) testified that when he saw the accused more than six feet away and was
approaching them, he immediately warned his childhood friend and victim Dante Deopante to run away
which the latter did. At the time, the accused was seen by this witness about to draw a knife from his
back pant's pocket; and that he, too, ran away but took the opposite direction. Having traversed a short
distance, he stopped and looked back and saw the accused chasing his victim and nephew until the
former caught up with the latter, took hold of him and they both fell to the ground.
The accused could have desisted from carrying his plan to kill into effect had he stopped when his
nephew took off and ran away from him. The latter did so because he knew in his heart that his uncle
was about to kill him and this was also felt by eyewitness Molina because of the immediate warning
given by him to his friend.
But then, although he saw his nephew sprinting away, he nevertheless did chase him for a distance and
all the while he could have stopped and go home to his residence situated only a few meters away.
Again he could have let go the victim when he caught up and took hold of him. He did not, but on the
contrary, when they both fell and rolled on the ground, he grappled with his victim and at the very first
opportune moment, mercilessly stabbed his nephew, not only once but twice, inflicting very serious
blows, one of which was most fatal and could have caused instantaneous death of his prey.
So it is that from this very actuation of the accused at the time, it is obviously clear that he clung to this
determination to kill Dante Deopante when he could have stopped at anytime between the moment that
his nephew ran away until the time that he dealt the fatal blows that ultimately caused the death of Dante
Deopante. (emphasis ours)
11
The three elements having been duly proven, the presence of evident premeditation in the case at bar is
therefore conclusive.
Second Issue: Voluntary Surrender and Physical Defect

as Mitigating Circumstances?
Contrary to appellant's protestations, the trial court was correct in finding no voluntary surrender in this case. In
order to appreciate voluntary surrender by an accused, the same must be shown to have been "spontaneous
and made in such a manner that it shows the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally to the
authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save them the trouble and expense
necessarily incurred in his search and capture. In the absence of any of these reasons, and in the event that the
only reason for an accused's supposed surrender is to ensure his safety, his arrest being inevitable, the
surrender is not spontaneous and, hence, not voluntary. It will be observed in this case that there was no
12
conscious effort on the part of the accused — who was fetched from his house by police officers to go to police
headquarters for investigation — to voluntarily surrender and/or acknowledge his guilt. He went with them for the
purpose of clearing his name as he in fact tried to do during the investigation where he professed his innocence.
The fact alone that he did not resist but went peacefully with the lawmen does not mean that he voluntarily
surrendered. On this point, it is apt to quote the decision of this Court in People vs. Flores where we stated
13 14
that:
Neither can we accept accused-appellant's plea of voluntary surrender. He did not surrender to the
police. In fact, the evidence adduced shows that it was the police authorities who came to the factory
looking for him. It was there that accused-appellant was pointed to them. With the police closing in,
accused-appellant actually had no choice but to go with them. Seeing that the police were already
approaching him, accused-appellant did not offer any resistance and peacefully went with them. To be
sure, no surrender was made by accused-appellant.
The fact that appellant suffers from a physical defect, a severed left hand, does not mean that he should
automatically be credited with the mitigating circumstance contained in paragraph 8, Article 13 of the Revised
Penal Code. In order for this condition to be appreciated, it must be shown that such physical defect limited his
means to act, defend himself or communicate with his fellow beings to such an extent that he did not have
complete freedom of action, consequently resulting in diminution of the element of voluntariness. Such cannot
15
be appreciated in the case at bar where the appellant's physical condition clearly did not limit his means of
action, defense or communication, nor affect his free will. In fact, despite his handicap, appellant nevertheless
managed to attack, overcome and fatally stab his victim.
At this point, one might wonder how a one-handed attacker can open a fan knife and grapple with and overcome
his two-handed prey. This was answered by the testimony of Renato Molina who revealed that at the time the
accused closed in for the kill, his balisong was already open and ready for use in his back pocket, and that he
had already drawn the same even during the chase. Molina's testimony is as follows:
16
Q You said that this Rogelio Deopante arrived while you were conversing with Dante
Deopante and you ask (asked) Dante Deopante to run away, why did you ask Dante
Deopante to run away?
A Because, Sir I saw the open fan knife on his pocket, Sir at his back.
Q When you said that you have seen an open fan knife at his pocket, to whom are you
referring to?
A Rogelio Deopante's, Sir.
x x x x x x x x x
Q How did you notice the fan knife which is placed at the back if (sic) his pocket?
A Because at the time, Sir he was drawing it out.
Hence, at the time the accused-appellant chased the victim, the former already had the balisong in hand.
Clearly, the fact that he had only one hand in no way limited his freedom of action to commit the crime.
Third Issue: Self-defense
Equally well-known and well-understood by now are the requirements in order for self-defense to be
appreciated. The accused must prove that there was unlawful aggression by the victim, that the means
employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression were reasonable, and that there was lack of sufficient
provocation on his part. 7 And having admitted that he killed his nephew Dante Deopante, "the burden of the
1
evidence that he acted in self-defense was shifted to the accused-appellant. It is hornbook doctrine that when
self-defense is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to the appellant to show that the killing was justified and
that he incurred no criminal liability therefor. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of the prosecution's evidence, for, even if the latter were weak, it could not be disbelieved after his
open admission of responsibility for the killing. Hence, he must prove the essential requisites of self-defense
18
aforementioned.
In the case at bar, appellant failed to prove unlawful aggression by the victim, hence, his claim of self-defense
cannot be sustained. The self-serving and unsupported allegation of appellant that he wrested the knife away
from the victim while they were struggling and rolling around on the ground (in the process sustaining only a
minor scratch on his little finger and abrasion on the right knee) does not inspire belief, when contrasted with the
positive and categorical eyewitness accounts of Renato Molina and Manolo Angeles that appellant ran after and
stabbed the victim. The latter's testimonies are corroborated by the number and extent of the stab wounds
sustained by the victim.
(Testimony of Manolo Angeles)

Q While you were urinating at a post in Pariancillo, can you remember if there was an
unusual incident that happened at that time?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was that unusual incident?
A Nakita ko po si Rogelio Deopante na tikad-tikad ng saksak si Dante Deopante (I saw

Rogelio Deopante chasing Dante Deopante with intention of stabbing).
COURT:
Q You mean by "tikad-tikad", habol?
A Yes, your Honor.
ATTY. VALERIO:
Q How far were you when you were urinating from the place where the victim was
chased by the accused?
A More or less twenty (20) meters, sir.
Q What happened after that?
A He overtook him and stabbed him.
Q Can you remember how many stabs that the deceased received from the accused?
A Two (2), Sir.
Q Did you see the position of the deceased while he was being stabbed?
A At that time Dante Deopante was lying on his back and this Rogelio Deopante stabbed
him. 19
(Testimony of Renato Molina)
Q If you know, what did Rogelio Deopante do with the knife that he was then carrying?
x x x x x x x x x
COURT:
Witness may answer.
A He used (it) in stabbing Dante Deopante.
Q How did he (use) it?
A They were both lying on the ground when this Rogelio Deopante used that Balisong or
fan knife in stabbing the victim, only I did not know how many stabs he made on the
victim (but witness demonstrating as if he is stabbing somebody from his right hand
going downward). 20
Due to appellant's failure to prove unlawful aggression by the victim, and in view of the prosecution's evidence
conclusively showing that it was appellant who was the unlawful aggressor, appellant's claims of self-defense
must be completely discounted, since even incomplete self-defense "by its very nature and essence, always
would require the attendance of unlawful aggression initiated by the victim which must clearly be shown." We 21
agree with the finding of the trial court that:
There is no gainsaying the fact that the accused herein was responsible for slaying his nephew and
victim Dante Deopante. Only, by way of avoidance, the accused stated that while he and his nephew
were rolling and grappling on the ground, the latter took a knife out of nowhere but he managed to wrest
it away from his nephew and he stabbed him (Dante Deopante) with it.
Such a posture adopted by the accused deserves scant consideration from the Court.
For one, the victim would not have time to draw a knife from his person and then opened it while at the
same time grappling with his uncle while both were rolling on the ground.
For another, such declaration was self-serving on the part of the accused and remains unsupported by
the evidence. Even the accused's own witness and friend for a long time Benito Carrasco who professed
that he was only about five to seven meters away from the accused and who witnessed the latter
grappling with the victim on the ground, did not see Dante took out a knife and that the accused manage
to wrest it away or else the defense would certainly underscore such an event and made much of it
during his testimony in court. The fact that he did not state such a circumstance gave the lie to such
posture taken by the accused. 22
Furthermore, based on the number of stab wounds sustained by the victim, we are convinced that the accused
did not act in self-defense in killing the former. "It is an oft-repeated rule that the presence of a large number of
wounds on the part of the victim negates self-defense; instead it indicates a determined effort to kill the
victim. Accused, after struggling with the victim, had the latter on his back and in an obviously helpless and
23
vulnerable position. Even assuming arguendo that it was the deceased who had initiated the attack and accused
was merely defending himself, clearly there could not have been any need for him to stab the victim twice if the
purpose was simply to disable the victim or make him desist from his unlawful assault.
Forth Issue: Credibility of Witnesses
We see no reason to disturb the trial court's evaluation and assessment of the credibility of witnesses, the same
not being tainted by any arbitrariness or palpable error. "Jurisprudence teaches us that the findings of the trial
court judge who tried the case and heard the witnesses are not to be disturbed on appeal unless there are
substantial facts and circumstances which have been overlooked and which, if properly considered, might affect
the result of the case. The trial judge's evaluation of the witness' credibility deserves utmost respect in the
absence of arbitrariness. Furthermore, "conclusions and findings of the trial court are entitled to great weight on
24
appeal and should not be disturbed unless for strong and valid reasons because the trial court is in a better
position to examine the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying on the case. 25
We reviewed the entire record of the case, and found that the trial court correctly gave credence to the
testimonies of Manolo Angeles and Renato Molina. As aptly stated by it:
So it is that the Court gave full credence to the eyewitnesses accounts of prosecution witnesses Manolo
Angeles and Renato Molina.
Both are disinterested eyewitnesses.
Manolo Angeles would not testify falsely against accused because the latter is the uncle of the full blood
of his wife, being the daughter of the sister of the accused. He would not dare incur the wrath of his wife
and her family, specially of the accused whose temperament he well knew.
The same is true with Renato Molina. He resides nearby and in the same locality as the accused and the
victim, the latter being his childhood friend.
Knowing the accused very well and his reputation, he dare not trifle with the truth and testify falsely
against him. In fact, he was very reluctant to testify and it look coercive process of the Court to bring him
to the witness stand.
Besides his presence at the scene of the stabbing incident was even acknowledged by the accused
himself during the trial so that this witness' testimony is well worth considering.
26
Furthermore, we note and concur in the court a quo's assessment of the testimony of the son of the accused,
which definitely tends to negate the theory of self-defense.
Again, another defense witness presented was Vladimir Deopante, son of the accused who mentioned
in passing during the course of his testimony that when informed of an on-going quarrel involving his
father, he immediately proceeded to the place where the incident was going on and there and then saw
his father grappling on the ground with his cousin Dante and the latter was holding a weapon with his left
hand so much so that he went back home and informed his mother about the matter and he was
instructed to go back and pacify the protagonists.
This portion of the testimony of Vladimir Deopante sounded incredulous and unbelievable.
Confronted with a like situation, a son, seeing that his father being (beleaguered) and in immediate
danger of being stabbed and possibly killed, would instinctively and intuitively rush in, come (to) succor
and render immediate assistance to his endangered parent and would not turn his back on his father
and go back home to await instructions on what to do under the premises.
It may be that this witness was actually at the scene when he saw his father and cousin were grappling
on the ground and seeing that his father had a knife in his hand and had the upper hand as well as in
control of the situation, he did not interfere but turned back and went home and informed his mother.
This would be more in keeping with the natural course of events. 7 2
Fifth Issue: Incomplete Self-defense
Appellant argues that the trial court should have applied Art. 69 of the Revised Penal Code which provides for
imposition of a penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law where the killing "is not wholly
excusable", as in the case at bar, given the absence of some of the requisites to justify the killing. Appellant is in
error. Said provision of law applies only where a majority of the conditions required to justify a criminal act or
exempt from liability are present. Such is not the situation in the case at bar. Unlawful aggression is
indispensable in self-defense, complete or otherwise. When unlawful aggression (by the victim) alone is proved,
such incomplete self-defense is to be appreciated as an ordinary mitigating circumstance under Article 13,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. When it is combined with another element of self-defense, such
incomplete self-defense becomes a privileged mitigating circumstance under Article 69 of the same Code. But 28
in the instant case, as already mentioned above, it was conclusively shown that appellant was the aggressor.
WHEREFORE, the herein appealed Decision convicting appellant Rogelio Deopante y Carillo of the crime of
murder and imposing on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the payment to the victim's heirs of civil
indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 107383 December 7, 1994
FELIX NIZURTADO, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Melquiades P. De Leon for petitioner.
Eugene C. Paras collaborating counsel for the petitioner.
VITUG, J.:
An information, accusing Felix Nizurtado of having committed the complex crime of malversation of public funds through
falsification of public document, reads:
That on or about August 25, 1983, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of
Caloocan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, a
public officer, being then the Barangay Captain of Panghulo, Malabon, Metro Manila, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify and attest Resolution No. 17 Series of 1983 by making it
appear that on August 25, 1983 the Barangay council of Panghulo met and identified T-shirt
manufacturing as its livelihood project, when in truth and in fact, as the accused fully well knew, no such
meeting was held, where T-shirt manufacturing was identified and approved by the Barangay Council as
its livelihood project, and thereafter, accused submitted the falsified resolution to the MHS-MMC-KKK
Secretariat which endorsed the same to the Land Bank of the Philippines, which on the basis of said
endorsement and the falsified resolution, encashed LBP check No. 184792 in the amount of TEN
THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00), which check was earlier received by him as Barangay Captain of
Panghulo in trust for the Barangay for its livelihood project and for which fund accused became
accountable, and upon receipt thereof herein accused, with deliberate intent and grave abuse of
confidence did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert
to his own personal use and benefit the amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) out of the
funds for which he was accountable, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the said amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
When arraigned by the Sandiganbayan, Nizurtado pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. During the pre-trial, held on 17
July 1989, the prosecution and the defense stipulated thusly:
1. That sometime in 1983 and 1984, accused Felix Nizurtado was the Barangay Captain of Barangay
Panghulo of Malabon, Metro Manila and discharged his functions as such;
2. That sometime in 1983, the Ministry of Human Settlements, the Metro Manila Commission and
Kilusang Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran (KKK) undertook a Livelihood Program for Barangays in Metro Manila
consisting of loans in the amount of P10, 000.00 per barangay.
3. That as Barangay Captain of Barangay Panghulo, accused received a check in the amount of
P10,000.00 for said barangay's livelihood program;
4. That the check, to be encashed, had to be supported by a project proposal to be approved by the
KKK;
5. That the accused encashed the check received by him in the amount of P10,000.00 with the Land
Bank of the Philippines; and
6. That the accused distributed the amount of P10,000.00 in the form of loans of P1,000.00 each to
members of the barangay council. 2
After evaluating the evidence adduced, the Sandiganbayan came out with its factual findings and conclusions,
hereunder detailed:
It appears from the evidence, testimonial and documentary, as well as from the stipulations of the parties
that accused Felix V. Nizurtado was the Barangay Captain of Barangay Panghulo, Malabon, Metro
Manila from 1983 to 1988.
In April or May 1983, Nizurtado and Manuel P. Romero, Barangay Treasurer of Panghulo, attended a
seminar at the University of Life, Pasig, Metro Manila. The seminar was about the Barangay Livelihood
Program of the Ministry of Human Settlements (MHS), the Metro Manila Commission (MMC), and the
Kilusang Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran (KKK). Under the program, the barangays in Metro Manila could avail
of loans of P10,000.00 per barangay to finance viable livelihood projects which the Barangay Councils
would identify from the modules developed by the KKK Secretariat or which, in the absence of such
modules, the Councils would choose subject to the evaluation/validation of the Secretariat.
After the seminar, Nizurtado received a check for P10,000.00 intended for Barangay Panghulo and
issued in his name. The check, however, could be encashed only upon submission to the Secretariat of
a resolution approved by the Barangay Council identifying the livelihood project in which the loan would
be invested. He entrusted the check to Romero for safekeeping.
In one of its regular sessions, which was on the second Saturday of each month, the Barangay Council
of Panghulo discussed the project in which to invest the P10,000.00. Among the proposals was that of
Romero that a barangay service center be established. But the meeting ended without the Councilmen
agreeing on any livelihood project.
A few days after the meeting, Nizurtado got back the check from Romero, saying that he would return it
because, as admitted by Nizurtado during the trial, the Councilmen could not agree on any livelihood
project. Nizurtado signed a receipt dated August 4, 1983, for the check "to be returned to the Metro
Manila Commission."
After a few more days, Nizurtado asked Romero to sign an unaccomplished resolution in mimeograph
form. All the blank spaces in the form were unfilled-up, except those at the bottom which were intended
for the names of the Barangay Councilmen, Secretary, and Captain, which were already filled-up and
signed by Councilmen Marcelo Sandel, Jose Bautista, Alfredo Aguilar, Alfredo Dalmacio, F.A. Manalang
(the alleged Barangay Secretary), and Nizurtado. In asking Romero to sign, Nizurtado said that the
MMC was hurrying up the matter and that the livelihood project to be stated in the resolution was that
proposed by Romero — barangay service center. Trusting Nizurtado, Romero affixed his signature
above his typewritten name. When he did so, the blank resolution did not yet bear the signatures of
Councilmen Santos Gomez and Ceferino Roldan.
The blank resolution having already been signed by Romero, Nizurtado asked him to talk with Gomez
and secure the latter's signature. Romero obliged and upon his pleading that his proposed barangay
service center would be the one written in the blank resolution, Gomez signed. But before he returned
the resolution, he had it machine copied. The machine copy is now marked Exhibit J.
Unknown to Romero and Gomez, the blank but signed resolution was later on accomplished by writing
in the blank space below the paragraph reading:
WHEREAS, the Barangay Council now in this session had already identified one
livelihood project with the following title and description:
the following:
Title : T-shirt Manufacturing

Description : Manufacture of round neck T-shirts of
various sizes and colors.
The other blank spaces in the resolution were also filled-up. Thus "Panghulo," "Brgy. Hall," and "August
25, 1983" were typewritten in the spaces for the name of the Barangay, the place where and the date
when the council meeting took place, respectively. In the blank spaces for the names of the members of
the Council who attended the meeting were typewritten the names of
Felix Nizurtado Barangay Captain

Marcelo Sandel Barangay Councilman
Alfredo Aguilar Barangay Councilman
Santos Gomez Barangay Councilman
Jose Bautista Barangay Councilman
Alfredo Dalmacio Barangay Councilman
Ceferino Roldan Barangay Councilman
The word "none" was inserted in the space intended for the names of the Councilmen who did not
attend. The resolution was given the number "17" series of "1983." Finally, the last line before the names
and signatures of the Councilmen was completed by typewriting the date so that it now reads:
UNANIMOUSLY APPROVED this 25th day of August, 1983.
The resolution as fully accomplished is now marked Exhibit D.
Other supporting documents for the encashment of the check of P10,000.00 were also prepared, signed,
and filed by Nizurtado. They were: Project Identification (Exhibit B), Project Application in which the
borrower was stated to be Samahang Kabuhayan ng Panghulo (Exhibit C and C-1), Project Location
Map (Exhibit E), and Promissory Note
(Exhibit F).
The application for loan having been approved, the Promissory Note (Exhibit F) was re-dated from
August to October 18, 1983, placed in the name of the Samahang Kabuhayan ng Panghulo represented
by Nizurtado, and made payable in two equal yearly amortizations of P5,000.00 each from its date. The
purpose of the loan was stated to be
T-Shirt Manufacturing of round neck shirts of various sizes and colors.
Nizurtado encashed the check on the same day, October 18, 1983, and re-lent the cash proceeds to
himself, Sandel, Aguilar, Bautista, Dalmacio, and Roldan at P1,000.00, and to Manalang and Oro
Soledad, Barangay Court Secretary and Barangay Secretary, respectively, at P500.00 each.
On April 25, 1984, Nizurtado who was then on leave wrote Sandel, then acting Barangay Captain,
informing him that per record, he, Romero, and Gomez had not made any remittance for the account of
their P1,000.00 loans from the barangay livelihood fund of P10,000.00 and advising him to collect,
through the Secretary or Treasurer.
Since Romero and Gomez had not borrowed any amount from the said fund, they told Sandel to ask
Nizurtado if he had any proof of their alleged loans. So Sandel wrote Nizurtado on May 2, 1984, but the
latter did not answer.
This attempt to collect from Romero and Gomez prompted them to make inquiries. They learned that the
check for P10,000.00 was indeed encashed by Nizurtado and that the blank resolution which they had
signed was filled-up to make it appear that in a Council meeting where all councilmen were present on
August 25, 1983, T-shirt manufacturing was adopted as the livelihood project of Panghulo. But no such
meeting occurred on that day or on any other day. Neither was Nizurtado authorized by the Council to
submit T-shirt Manufacturing as the livelihood project of Panghulo.
On August 9, 1984, Romero and Gomez lodged their complaint against Nizurtado with the Office of the
Tanodbayan. After due preliminary investigation, this case was filed.
As of September 7, 1984, the members of the Council who had received P1,000.00 each, as well as
Bacani (also referred to as Manalang) and Soledad who had received P500.00 each had paid their
respective loans to Nizurtado who, in turn, remitted the payments to the MMC on these dates:
April 16, 1984 P1,450.00
August 14, 1984 3,550.00
September 7, 1984 3,000.00
————
Total P8,000.00
In June 1987, after demands for payment, Dalmacio remitted the balance of P2,000.00 from his pocket
because, as acting Barangay Captain, he did not want to leave the Barangay with an indebtedness. 3
On the basis of its above findings, the Sandiganbayan convicted the accused of the offense charged. The dispositive
portions of its decision, promulgated on 18 September 1992, read:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Felix Nizurtado y Victa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex
crime of malversation of public funds committed through falsification of public document and,
appreciating in his favor . . . two mitigating circumstances and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
imposes upon him the penalties of imprisonment ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS, NINE (9) MONTHS,
and ELEVEN (11) DAYS of prision correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS, EIGHT (8)
MONTHS, and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as maximum; perpetual special disqualification; and a fine
of P10,000.00.
No pronouncement is made as to civil liability, there having been complete restitution of the amount
malversed.
With costs.
SO ORDERED. 4
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, Nizurtado has filed the instant petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan in that —
1. It has committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that Resolution No. 17, dated August 25, 1983,
of the Barangay Council of Panghulo, Malabon, Metro Manila (Exh. "D") is a falsified document and that
the petitioner is the forger thereof; and
2. It has committed serious error of law and gravely abused its discretion in finding petitioner guilty of
malversation of the amount of P10,000.00 which he had received as a loan from the then Metro Manila
Commission in his capacity as representative of the Samahang Kabuhayan ng Barangay Panghulo,
Malabon, Metro Manila. 5
The Solicitor General Agrees in all respects with the Sandiganbayan in its findings and judgment except insofar as it has
found petitioner to have likewise committed the crime of falsification of a public document.
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property. — Presumption of malversation. — Any public officer
who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate
the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence, shall
permit any other person to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be
guilty the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved in the
misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two hundreds pesos.
2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount involved is more than
two hundred pesos but does not exceed six thousand pesos.
3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period, if the
amount involved is more than six thousand pesos but is less than twelve thousand pesos.
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved is more
than twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the
latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special
disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the
property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is
chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put
such missing funds or property to personal use.
The elements of malversation, essential for the conviction of an accused, under the above penal provisions are that —
(a) the offender is a public officer;
(b) he has the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;
(c) the funds or property involved are public funds or property for which he is accountable; and
(d) he has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or through abandonment or
negligence permitted, the taking by another person of, such funds or property.
Nizurtado was a public officer, having been the Barangay Captain of Panghulo, Malabon, Metro Manila, from 1983 to
1988; in that capacity, he received and later encashed a check for P10,000.00, specifically intended by way of a loan to
the barangay for its livelihood program; and the funds had come from the Ministry of Human Settlements, the Metro
Manila Commission and "Kilusang Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran."
The only point of controversy is whether or not Nizurtado has indeed misappropriated the funds.
Petitioner was able to encash the check on 18 October 1988 on the basis of a resolution of the Barangay Council,
submitted to the KKK Secretariat, to the effect that a livelihood project, i.e., "T-shirt manufacturing," had already been
identified by the council. The money, however, instead of its being used for the project, was later lent to, along with
petitioner, the members of the Barangay Council. Undoubtedly, the act constituted "misappropriation" within the
meaning of the law. 6
Accused-appellant sought to justify the questioned act in that it was only when the members of the Barangay Council
had realized that P10,000.00 was not enough to support the T-shirt manufacturing project, that they decided to
distribute the money in the form of loans to themselves. He submitted, in support thereof, a belated certification issued
7
by Rodolfo B. Banquicio, Chief of District IV of the Support Staff and Malabon Sub-District Officer of KKK, to the effect
that Barangay Captains were given discretionary authority to invest the money in any viable project not falling within the
list of project modules provided by the MHS-NCR Management. Lending the unutilized funds to the members of the
Barangay council could have hardly been meant to be the viable project contemplated under that certification.
Furthermore, it would appear that only Regional Action Officer Ismael Mathay, Jr., and Deputy Regional Action Officer
Lilia S. Ledesma were the officials duly authorized to approve such projects upon the recommendation of the KKK
Secretariat. We could see no flaw in the ratiocination of the Sandiganbayan, when, in rejecting this defense, it said:
8
The defense evidence that the Barangay Council changed the T-shirt Manufacturing to whatever
business ventures each members of the Council would select for investment of his P1,000.00 has, as
already stated, little, if any, probative value.
But assuming there was such a change, the same is of no avail. The Resolution marked Exhibit D
expressly stated that the P10,000.00 "shall only be appropriated for the purpose/s as provided in the
issued policies and guidelines of the program." The guidelines, in turn, prescribed that the livelihood
project shall be identified from the modules developed by the KKK Secretariat or, as stipulated in the
Resolution itself, in the absence of such modules, shall be chosen by the Samahang Kabuhayan
"subject to the evaluation/validation of the KKK Secretariat." There is absolutely no showing that the
alleged substitute projects which each lendee of P1,000.00 would select were among those of the
developed modules or were submitted to the KKK Secretariat for evaluation/validation. 9
Accused-appellant criticizes the Sandiganbayan for its having failed to consider the fact that no valid demand has been
made, or could have been made, for the repayment of the loaned sum. Demand merely raises a prima
facie presumption that missing funds have been put to personal use. The demand itself, however, is not an element of,
and not indispensable to constitute, malversation. Even without a demand, malversation can still be committed when
enough facts, such as here, are extant to prove it.
10
Accused-appellant was charged with having committed the crime through the falsification of a public document
punishable under paragraph 2 of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.
The pertinent provisions read:
Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. — The penalty
ofprision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer,
employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing
any of the following acts:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact
so participate;
In falsification under the above-quoted paragraph, the document need not be an authentic official paper since its
simulation, in fact, is the essence of falsification. So, also, the signatures appearing thereon need not
necessarily be forged. 11
In concluding that the Barangay Council resolution, Exhibit "D," was a falsified document for which petitioner should be
12
held responsible, the Sandiganbayan gave credence to the testimonies of Barangay Councilman Santos A. Gomez and
Barangay Treasurer Manuel P. Romero. The two testified that no meeting had actually taken place on 25 August 1983,
the date when
"T-shirt manufacturing" was allegedly decided to be the barangay livelihood project. The Sandiganbayan concluded that
Nizurtado had induced Romero and Gomez to sign the blank resolution, Exhibit "J" on the representation that
13
Romero's proposal to build a barangay service center would so later be indicated in that resolution as the barangay
livelihood project.
The established rule is that unless the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are bereft of substantial evidence to
support it, those findings are binding on this court.
The Sandiganbayan has considered the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and restitution in favor of
Nizurtado. Deputy Clerk of Court Luisabel Alfonso Cortez, on 17 January 1989, has certified to the voluntary surrender
of the accused thusly:
CERTIFICATION
THIS CERTIFIES that accused FELIX NIZURTADO in criminal Case No: 13304 voluntarily surrendered
before this court on JANUARY 17, 1989 and posted his bail bond in said case.
Manila, Philippines, JANUARY 17, 1989
(sgd.)
LUISABEL ALFONSO
CORTEZ
Deputy Clerk of Court 14
Voluntary surrender (Art. 13, par. 7, Revised Penal Code), therefore, may thus be treated as a modifying circumstance
independent and apart from restitution of the questioned funds by petitioner (Art. 13, par. 10, Revised Penal Code). We
are convinced, furthermore, that petitioner had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed. (Art. 13, par.
3, Revised Penal Code), entitling him to three distinct mitigating circumstances.
Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or
when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be
imposed, the same (the penalty) to be applied in the maximum period. The penalty prescribed for the offense of
malversation of public funds, when the amount involved exceeds six thousand pesos but does not exceed twelve
thousand pesos, is prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period; in addition, the
offender shall be sentenced to suffer perpetual special disqualification and to pay a fine equal to the amount malversed
(Art. 217[3], Revised Penal Code). The penalty of prision mayor and a fine of five thousand pesos is prescribed for the
crime of falsification under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. The former (that imposed for the malversation), being
more severe than the latter (that imposed for the falsification), is then the applicable prescribed penalty to be imposed in
its maximum period. The actual attendance of two separate mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and
restitution, also found by the Sandiganbayan and uncontested by the Solicitor General, entitles the accused to the
penalty next lower in degree. For purposes of determining that next lower degree, the full range of the penalty
prescribed by law for the offense, not merely the imposable penalty because of its complex nature, should, a priori, be
considered. It is our considered view that the ruling in People vs. Gonzales, 73 Phil. 549, as opposed to that of People
vs. Fulgencio, 92 Phil. 1069, is the correct rule and it is thus here reiterated. In fine, the one degree lower than prision
mayor maximum to reclusion temporal minimum is prision mayor minimum to prision mayor medium (being the next
two periods in the scale of penalties [see Art. 64, par 5, in relation to Art. 61, par 5, Revised Penal Code]) the full range
of which is six years and one day to ten years. This one degree lower penalty should, conformably with Article 48 of the
Code (the penalty for complex crimes), be imposed in its maximum period or from eight years, eight months and one
day to ten years. The presence of the third mitigating circumstance of praeter intentionem (lack of intention to commit
so grave a wrong as that committed) would result in imposing a period the court may deem applicable. Considering,
15
however, that the penalty has to be imposed in the maximum period, the only effect of this additional mitigating
circumstance is to impose only the minimum portion of that maximum period, that is, from eight years, eight months
16
and one day to nine years, six months and ten days, from which range the maximum of the indeterminate sentence
shall be taken.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law (which can apply since the maximum term of imprisonment would exceed one
year), the court is to impose an indeterminate sentence, the minimum of which shall be anywhere within the range of
the penalty next lower in degree (i.e., prision correccional in its medium period to prision correccional in its maximum
period or anywhere from two years, four months and one day to six years) and the maximum of which is that which the
law prescribes after considering the attendant modifying circumstances. In view of the mitigating circumstances present
in this case, the fine of P10,000.00 may also be reduced (Art. 66, Revised Penal Code) and, since the principal penalty
is higher than prision correccional, subsidiary imprisonment would not be warranted. (Art. 39, par. 3, Revised Penal
Code).
The law and the evidence no doubt sustains Nizurtado's conviction. Given all the attendant circumstances, it is,
nevertheless, the personal and humble opinion of the assigned writer of this ponencia that appellant deserves an
executive commutation of the statutory minimum sentence pronounced by this Court.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Sandiganbayan convicting Nizurtado for malversation of public funds through
falsification of public document is AFFIRMED but the sentence, given the circumstances here obtaining, is MODIFIED
by imposing on petitioner a reduced indeterminate sentence of from two years, four months and one day to eight years,
eight months and one day, perpetual special disqualification and a fine of P2,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-92-881 June 2, 1994
ANTONIO A. GALLARDO, ANTONIO AREVALO, CRESENCIO ECHAVEZ, EMMANUEL ARANAS, PALERMO SIA,
RONNIE RAMBUYON, PRIMO NAVARRO and NOEL NAVARRO, petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE SINFOROSO V. TABAMO, JR. respondent.
Hermosisima, Sision & Inso for petitioners.
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:
For this Court's consideration is a letter-complaint, dated May 5, 1992 of Governor Antonio A. Gallardo of the Province
of Camiguin and other officials of the said province, charging Judge Sinforoso V. Tabamo, Jr. of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 28, at Mambajao, Camiguin with manifest bias and partiality and highly irregular and outrightly illegal acts
in connection with two cases filed before his court, namely:
A. Special Civil Case No. 465 entitled "Pedro P. Romualdo vs. Governor Antonio A. Gallardo, et al." for
Injunction, Prohibition, and Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
and Restraining Order; and
B. Criminal Case No. 561 entitled "People vs. Ruel D. Dagondon, et al." for Illegal Possession of Indian
Hemp (marijuana).
In Special Civil Action No. 465, respondent judge issued an Order restraining the continuance of various public works
projects being undertaken by the provincial government and the disbursement of funds therefor, allegedly in violation of
a 45-day ban on public works imposed by the Omnibus Election Code. Complainant alleged that respondent Judge, in
spite of the fact that it was the Commission on Elections, not the Regional Trial Court, which had jurisdiction over the
case, took cognizance of the same and issued the temporary restraining order.
In Criminal Case No. 561, respondent Judge is accused to have imposed the wrong sentence in violation of specific
provisions of the Dangerous Drugs Law, the Indeterminate Sentence Law and the Revised Penal Code in order to afford
the accused in said case the right to avail of provisions of the Probation Law.
Respondent Judge's actuations, according to complainant, were intended to favor the political faction of Congressman
Pedro P. Romualdo in the struggle with the group of Governor Gallardo for political supremacy in the 1992 elections.
This Court, in a resolution dated March 18, 1993, referred the administrative matter to Justice Salome A. Montoya of the
Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation. Complying with said resolution, Justice Montoya, in her
final report, found the evidence as follows:
A. Re: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION NO. 465:
It appears that Cong. Pedro P. Romualdo and Gov. Antonio R. Gallardo were both candidates in the
May 11, 1992 elections for the positions of congressmen and governor, respectively, of Camiguin. They
belonged to opposing political factions and were in a bitter electoral battle.
On April 10, 1992 or about a month before the elections,

Cong. Romualdo filed a petition docketed as Special Civil Action No. 465 before the Regional Trial Court
of Camiguin (Br. 28) presided over by respondent Judge Tabamo against Gov. Gallardo, the Provincial
Treasurer, the Provincial Auditor, the Provincial Engineer, and the Provincial Budget Officer as
respondents. In this petition Cong. Romualdo sought to prohibit and restrain the respondents from
undertaking and/or pursuing certain public works projects and from disbursing, releasing, and/or
spending public funds for said projects, allegedly because, among other reasons, said projects were
undertaken in violation of the 45-day ban on public works imposed by the Omnibus Election Code (B.P.
Blg. 881); that the public works projects were commenced without the approved detailed engineering
plans and specification and corresponding program of works; that the expenditures of the 20%
development fund for projects other than for maintenance violated the Local Government Code; that
locally funded projects had been pursued without the provincial budget having been first approved, and
reviewed by the Department of Budget and Management; and that the illegal prosecution of the said
public works projects requiring massive outlay or public funds during the election period was done
maliciously and intentionally to corrupt voters and induce them to support the candidacy of Gov.
Gallardo and his ticket in the May 11, 1992 elections.
In the afternoon of the same day that the petition was filed, Judge Tabamo issued a temporary
restraining order as prayed for by the petitioner Cong. Romualdo, as follows:
It appearing from the verified petition in this case that great and irreparable damage
and/or injury shall be caused to the petitioner as candidate and taxpayer, such damage
or injury taking the form and shape occasioned by the alleged wanton, excessive,
abusive and flagrant waste of public money, before the matter can be heard on notice,
the respondents are hereby Temporarily Restrained from pursuing or prosecuting the
project itemized in Annexes "A" and "A-1" of the petition; from releasing, disbursing
and/or spending any public funds for such projects; from issuing, using or availing of
treasury warrants or any device undertaking future delivery of money, goods, or other
things of value chargeable against public funds in connection with the said projects.
In the same Order of April 10, 1993 the judge gave the respondents ten (10) days from receipt of a copy
of the petition to answer the same, and set the prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction for
hearing on April 24, 1992 at 8:30 A.M.
Gov. Gallardo testified that when he received a copy of the restraining order and reviewed the petition
filed, being a lawyer, he at once saw that the same was not within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court. He said that the elections were nearing and all their projects were suspended, the laborers could
not get their salaries, and the judge had set the hearing of the injunction on April 24, 1992 or very close
to the elections of May 11, 1992. Believing that he could not get justice from the respondent court, he
decided to go to the Supreme Court where he filed a petition for certiorari (docketed as G.R. No. L-
104848) questioning the issuance of the temporary restraining order and the jurisdiction of the court over
Special Civil Action No. 465.
xxx xxx xxx
On April 13, 1992 a rally or demonstration was held in front of the premises of the Regional Trial Court of
Camiguin. People, composed mostly of the unpaid laborers, carried placards which protested the
restraining order and urged Judge Tabamo to order the release of their salaries. Most of the placards
expressed contempt and ridicule for the judge and referred to him as the "tuta" of Cong. Romualdo and
to the RTC as the "Romualdo-Tabamo-Court" and "Romualdo Tabamo-Corruption".
Respondent Judge Tabamo testified in this regard that the rallyists were laborers affected by the
restraining order. They were taken from all over the island of Camiguin and loaded in several cargo
trucks chartered by the followers of Gov. Gallardo. Judge Tabamo saw some of his relatives among the
rallyists and when he asked them why they were there, he was told that the laborers were gathered on
the representation that they would collect their salaries in Mambajao, they were told that they could not
receive their salaries because of the restraining order issued by Judge Tabamo, and the laborers did not
feel good about it.
xxx xxx xxx
In the afternoon of April 23, 1992 Judge Tabamo received a telegram from the Supreme Court in
connection with G.R. No. L-104848, the petition for certiorari filed by Gov. Gallardo reading as follows:
SUPREME COURT IN AN ORDER DATED APRIL 20 IN G.R. NUMBER 104848

ENTITLED ANTONIO GALLARDO ET AL. VERSUS HONORABLE SINFOROSO
TABAMO JR. ET AL. REQUEST RESPONDENTS TO COMMENT ON PETITION
WITHIN TEN DAYS FROM NOTICE AS WELL AS
ISSUED TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY AND
CONTINUING UNTIL FURTHER ORDERS FROM COURT ORDERING
RESPONDENTS JUDGE TO CEASE AND DESIST FROM IMPLEMENTING AND
ENFORCING YOUR QUESTIONED ORDER DATED APRIL 10, 1992 AND FROM
CONTINUING WITH THE PROCEEDINGS IN SPECIAL ACTION NUMBER 465
ENTITLED PEDRO ROMUALDO VERSUS GOVERNOR ANTONIO GALLARDO ET AL.
STOP FORMAL ORDERS FOLLOWS END. SUPREME COURT ASSISTANT CLERK
LUZVIMINDA PUNO.
After receiving this telegram Judge Tabamo issued an Order on the same day of April 23, 1992
canceling the hearing of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction which had been previously set
for April 24, 1992. He also said that he decided not to go to court on April 24, 1992 in order to avoid
being caught in the crossfire between the two great political leaders in his province.
It appears that on April 24, 1992 people came to the premises of the court for the hearing of the
application for injunction in SP No. 465. They were composed of followers of both Gov. Gallardo and
Cong. Romualdo. Gov. Gallardo said he went there to inform the judge about the temporary restraining
order issued by the Supreme Court, thinking that the same had not been communicated to the judge.
Cong. Romualdo was then likewise present. The Clerk of Court of Judge Tabamo announced that the
case would not be heard any more as the Supreme Court had issued an order for Judge Tabamo not to
hear the case. After this announcement, Cong. Romualdo announced to the people that he had already
ordered Gov. Gallardo to give the salaries of the laborers and when the latter heard the announcement,
he told the people that it was not Cong. Romualdo responsible for the release of the salaries.
Thereafter, there were passionate exchanges of words between the two factions and a rumble occurred
among the followers of Cong. Romualdo and Gov. Gallardo, where many were hurt and during which
Gov. Gallardo claims his life was placed in danger.
Aristeo Marbella, Jr., who testified in this case for the complainants, said that he was then with Gov.
Gallardo and he was choked by Jayjay Romualdo, the eldest son of the congressman; that another son
of Romualdo tried to hit him and still another son, Gogo Romualdo, also choked him; that thereafter,
Jayjay and Gogo attacked Rollie Gallardo, brother of Gov. Gallardo, and when he (Marbella) turned
around, Cong. Romualdo himself choked him and wrestled with him; that he pleaded with the
congressman who was his godfather but the latter continued to pull and wrestle with him and then the
brother of the congressman pulled his hair and George Romualdo, a son of the congressman, hit him at
the back, and he fell down. Marbella said that Gov. Gallardo tried to help him and Rollie Gallardo but
was held down by his bodyguards.
Thereafter, Marbella went to the police and reported the matter, as shown in the police blotter of the
Mambajao Police Station. He said that he decided not to file a case knowing that the same would fall in
the sala of Judge Tabamo and it would be useless as Judge Tabamo is the "tuta" or tool of Cong.
Romualdo.
Another witness for the complainants on rebuttal was Camilo Abanil, who testified that on April 23, 1992
he was with Edmundo Damisa and Ruben Cloma in a Ford Fiera going around the province of Camiguin
on request of Gov. Gallardo who asked them to announce to the laborers that they could already collect
their salaries from the province; that when they reached the town of Sagay, they were stopped by Mayor
Talian and Vice Mayor Mabolo who was angry and said that they were poisoning the minds of the
people; that the younger brother of Vice Mayor Mabolo pulled down Damisa from the Ford Fiera where
they were riding; that he (witness) went down to pacify the person who pulled Damisa but he was the
one mauled; and that he pleaded to the men and to the Mayor, asking the latter to forgive him as they
had not committed any fault but only followed Gov. Gallardo.
Abanil said that he too reported the matter to the police station where the incident was placed in the
blotter, and that he later had himself examined by a doctor who gave him a medical certificate.
Thereafter, he filed a case for slight physical injuries against Tata Mabolo (Crim. Case No. 3488).
Abanil also testified on the incident of April 24, 1992 when he went to the court premises to witness the
hearing because he was among those not paid his salary. He said he saw Junar Marbella being mauled
by the group of Cong Romualdo and Rollie Gallardo being chased by the same group; that he saw Gov.
Gallardo trying to help his brother and Jun Marbella and when he (witness) tried to go near Gov.
Gallardo, he was also chased by the group of Cong. Romualdo who caught him at the steps of the
Capitol Building where Cong. Romualdo boxed him, and Dandan Romualdo kicked him, Gogo
Romualdo boxed him, and Dandan Romualdo wrestled with him; that he fell to the ground and the group
of Cong. Romualdo took turns kicking him; that he has a medical certificate to show the injuries he
sustained; and that he at first thought of filing a case but decided not to, believing that the case will fall in
the sala of Judge Tabamo who is the ‘tuta' or tool of Cong. Romualdo. He further claimed that the
reputation of Judge Tabamo in Camiguin is no longer good and that his court is termed RTC or
Romualdo-Tabamo-Court.
Edmundo Damisa, corroborated the testimony of Camilo Abanil on the incident of April 23, 1992 when
they went around the province to announce that the laborers can get their salaries already, adding that
Mayor Talian told them to leave the municipality of Sagay, otherwise they would be killed. He also
testified that on April 24, 1992 he was outside the Capitol Building when he noticed a big commotion in
front of the RTC which was about 30 to 40 meters away; that he saw Rollie Gallardo being chased by
the men of Cong. Romualdo and saw Junar Marbella being chased and then choked and boxed by the
group of the congressman; that he also saw Gov. Gallardo being held tightly by his security men as he
wanted to free himself and help Marbella and Rollie Gallardo; that he also saw the group run after and
maul Camilo Abanil; that he himself was chased by Cong. Romualdo who was holding a small gun so he
ran up the stairs of the Capitol; and that he helped Gov. Gallardo get inside the Capitol because the
commotion was already very tense.
Damisan said he had known Judge Tabamo since childhood days; that the judge is not popular and is
nicknamed RTC or Romualdo-Tabamo-Court even in the billiard halls and cockpit; and that Judge
Tabamo is often seen in the cockpit because he participates in derbies. He denied that Judge Tabamo
had told him to look for a lawyer instead of making demands in the streets on April 24, 1992 and said
that what Judge Tabamo told him was that it was not easy for him to lift the restraining order because he
has children and it is Cong. Romualdo, who is the godfather of one of his children, who can help them;
and that Judge Tabamo also said that he knew very well on whose side Damisa was and the latter also
knew on whose side he (Judge Tabamo) was.
On January 29, 1993 the Supreme Court rendered its Decision in G.R. No. L-104848, the petition for
certiorari filed by Gov. Antonio Gallardo, et al. against the respondent Judge Sinforoso V. Tabamo, Jr.
and Cong. Pedro P. Romualdo, granting the same. The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent court
had no jurisdiction over Special Civil Action No. 465 and ordered its dismissal. The challenged
temporary restraining order of April 10, 1992 was set aside.
B. RE: CRIMINAL CASE NO. 561:
One Ruel Dagondon was charged of Illegal Possession of Indian Hemp (Marijuana) in Criminal Case
No. 561 filed before the Regional Trial Court of Camiguin (Branch 28).
In a judgment dated July 18, 1991 the respondent Judge Sinforoso V. Tabamo, Jr. found the accused
guilty as charged and sentenced him to an imprisonment for the indeterminate period of from 2 years, 4
months and 1 day of prision correccional in its medium period to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor in
its medium period, and to pay a fine of P6,000.00.
After this judgment was promulgated on July 31, 1991, the accused Dagondon filed a Notice of Appeal
on the same day. On August 7, 1991, however, the accused withdrew his Notice of Appeal and instead
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Judgment on August 9, 1991, praying that the penalty imposed
upon him be reconsidered and that the following circumstances be considered as mitigating in his favor:
(1) that the accused did not intend to commit so grave a wrong, (2) extreme poverty of the accused, (3)
lack of proper education, and (4) voluntary surrender. The respondent Judge asked Public Prosecutor
Julio A. Vivares to comment on the motion. The latter filed a Comment dated August 19, 1991 stating
that the bases for the motion for reconsideration are matters that should have been established during
the trial for the appreciation of the court and that even if these circumstances were directly or indirectly
touched during the presentation of the defense of the accused, their acceptability or credibility is left to
the sound discretion of the judge.
On August 26, 1991 respondent Judge issued an Order modifying the Judgment dated July 18, 1991, by
amending the penalty imposed on the accused Dagondon to a minimum of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day
of prision correccional on its medium period to 6 years of prision correccional in its maximum period, "in
view of the mitigating circumstances of extreme poverty and voluntary surrender."
This modified judgment was promulgated in open court on August 30, 1991 in the presence of the
accused Dagondon and his counsel.
Subsequently, the accused Dagondon applied for probation, which the respondent judge granted in an
Order dated November 13, 1991.
Complainants charge that Judge Tabamo modified the penalty so that Dagondon can apply for
probation, upon orders of Cong. Pedro P. Romualdo who was approached by a close relative of
Dagondon.
In support of this allegation, the complainants presented only the bare testimony of Ceferino E. Chan,
Jr., a former process server in the court of the respondent judge. Chan testified in this regard that he
was employed as process server in Branch 28 from January, 1978 to April 1992 when he took a leave of
absence; that he is familiar with Criminal Case No. 561 because sometime in August, 1991 he served a
copy of an Order modifying the judgment to the mother of Ruel Dagondon as the latter was then not in
the house; and that he told Dagondon's mother that it was good that the decision was changed and the
latter answered that they had gone to Cong. Romualdo to ask for help.
Chan further testified that he resigned from his position as process server sometime in July, 1992
because the people in Camiguin no longer respect the court and even make fun of it, like saying that the
RTC means Romualdo-Tabamo-Court; that people would also say that it one wants to win a case in the
sala of Judge Tabamo, he should first kiss the hand of Cong. Romualdo; and that people used to ask
where else they could go since the court is already controlled by Cong. Romualdo. He stated that Cong.
Romualdo often goes to the chambers of Judge Tabamo sometimes only in shorts and T-shirts.
The respondent judge presented Alfreda Daiz, OIC Clerk of Court of Branch 28 of the RTC of Camiguin.
She testified that although Chan did not tell her the real reason for his resignation from the court, there
was a time that Chan told them that his mother wanted him to administer their vast idle lands because
even they, the owners, did not know the location and boundaries of their lands; and that Chan also had
the plan to put up a business, particularly that of selling motor parts, because he noticed the motorcycle
drivers travel as far as Cagayan de Oro just to buy parts for their motorcycles.
Judge Tabamo denied that he had sent Chan to serve a copy of the modified decision to the residence
of Dagondon. He stated that the modified decision was promulgated in open court on August 30, 1991,
during which the accused was present with his counsel, hence there was no need to serve a copy of the
decision in his house. The judge maintained that in all his 23 years in the judiciary it was never his
practice to serve copies of decisions in criminal cases to parties because they are promulgated in open
court and that his practice was to furnish their counsels after the decision is read and that in the
Dagondon case the lawyer was furnished a copy of the modified judgment in open court. He added that
if Chan had served a copy of the decision before it was promulgated, then Chan had leaked it out and
should have been made to answer for the act had he known earlier about it.
At any rate, Judge Tabamo points out that Chan has not presented any proof to show that he served a
copy of the decision to Dagondon's mother and the records of the case indeed do not show that the
alleged service was made.
Judge Tabamo denied that Cong. Romualdo goes often to his chambers in shorts and T-shirts, since the
congressman stays most of the time in Manila and goes home only for special occasions. He explained
that Cong. Romualdo used to go around the province to inspect his projects and visit his leaders and
constituents, in the same manner that Gov. Gallardo, being a lawyer, makes it a point to visit the offices
of the Register of Deeds, the fiscals, the courts and other offices and engage the officials in conferences
regarding matters of vital concern, like the construction of the Hall of Justice.
Judge Tabamo said that he had to maintain a healthy relationship with the officials of the province.
Incidentally, the Mayor of Mambajao is the wife of Cong. Romualdo.
Judge Tabamo further testified that before Chan resigned on July 1, 1992, the latter went on leave to
campaign for his father who ran for mayor of Mambajao; that Chan's father lost in the elections but Chan
refused to go back to work; and that he had to send Alfreda Daiz to tell Chan to go back to work or to
resign. Judge Tabamo also said that Chan was bitter because a sister of his lost a estafa case in the
court and a brother-in-law of Chan also lost his first case before the court.
The complainants point out in regard to Criminal Case No. 561 that the court considered the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of Dagondon when the records show that he was arrested
in a buy-bust operation; and that the court imposed a maximum of six (6) years and one (1) day provided
under B.P. Blg. 179 for the offense committed by Dagondon.
FINDINGS —
RE: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION NO. 465:
It may be conceded that on the basis alone of the actuations of respondent Judge in relation to Special Civil Case No.
465, there may be no clear and convincing evidence that respondent Judge had acted with manifest bias and partiality
for Cong. Romualdo.
The staging of the rally in front of the courthouse on April 13, 1992 cannot be imputed to respondent Judge. Obviously,
the rally was orchestrated by the group of Gov. Gallardo who picked up the participants from the different parts of the
province. Also, the chaos that took place on April 24, 1992 after this Court set aside the temporary restraining order
issued by respondent Judge was occasioned by the attempt of Cong. Romualdo to get the credit for the fact that the
laborers would now be paid. This was resented by Gov. Gallardo and his followers, resulting in the clash between the
two contending groups. The motive of Gov. Gallardo in initiating the rally is not hard to find. He had sponsored a number
of public works projects and hired hundreds of laborers, which fact boosted his chances of political victory. When the
projects were stopped and the laborers could not get paid, he had to find a scapegoat, thus, the rally against respondent
Judge.
However, respondent Judge can hardly justify his acts not only of entertaining Special Civil Case No. 465 and issuing a
temporary restraining order stopping the prosecution of the public works projects on the ground that it violated the 45-
day ban on public works imposed by the Omnibus Election Code, but also, as will be discussed later, of imposing a
wrong penalty in Criminal Case No. 561 and, almost simultaneously, reducing the penalty with the evident purpose of
allowing the accused to avail of the benefits of the Probation Law. Being an experienced judge, it is highly inconceivable
that he was not aware of Zaldivar vs. Estenzo (23 SCRA 533) where this Court categorically held that considering that
the COMELEC is vested by the Constitution with the exclusive charge of the enforcement of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections, the assumption of jurisdiction by the trial court over a case involving the enforcement of the
Election Code "is at war with the plain constitutional command, the implementing statutory provisions, and the
hospitable scope afforded such grant of authority so clear and unmistakable in recent decisions."
RE: CRIMINAL CASE NO. 561:
We agree with respondent Judge that the testimony of Ceferino E. Chan, Jr. hardly deserves any credence.
Respondent Judge emphasized without contradiction that he had never served copies of his decisions in criminal cases
to the parties; he promulgated his decisions in open court and thereafter furnished copies thereof to counsels. If, indeed,
Chan served a copy of respondent Judge's order modifying his decision to the mother of Ruel Dagondon, during which
the mother allegedly blurted out her having gone to Cong. Romualdo to ask for his help to reduce her son's penalty,
proof of service of the order to the accused's mother should have been presented in evidence. The bare testimony of
Chan lacks any corroboration.
Neither was Chan's declaration that Cong. Romualdo frequented respondent Judge's chambers buttressed by any
independent proof. Respondent Judge admitted though that at times, Cong. Romualdo would make official visits to his
court regarding matters like the construction of the Hall of Justice, in the same way that he would also visit other
provincial offices.
Nonetheless, the facts as established in their totality, more particularly respondent Judge's taking cognizance of Special
Civil Case No. 465, despite his lack of jurisdiction, his issuance of a temporary restraining order in said case, his
imposition of the penalty in Criminal Case No. 561 which was unconscionably unwarranted given the facts and the law
applicable, and his reduction of the penalty by the application of two non-existent mitigating circumstances with the
obvious result of enabling the accused to avail of the Probation Law, demonstrate an unmistakable pattern of highly
irregular acts constitutive of gross ignorance of the law and grave arbitrariness. Respondent Judge has a long
experience as a judge, having been in the judiciary for over 20 years. It is, therefore, difficult for this Court to sustain the
contention that what he had done were mere errors of judgment. In fact, no discretion was required in both instances:
the applicable legal provisions are crystal clear and need no interpretation.
In his July 18, 1991 judgment in Criminal Case No. 561 (People vs. Dagondon, et al.), respondent judge found the
accused guilty as charged of Illegal Possession of Indian Hemp (marijuana) and sentenced him to imprisonment for an
indeterminate period of from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional in its medium period
to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period. Additionally, the accused was ordered to pay a
fine of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00).
On the same day judgment was promulgated, the accused filed a notice of appeal which he later withdrew in favor of a
Motion for Reconsideration of Judgment praying that the circumstances of voluntary surrender, extreme poverty and
lack of proper education be considered as mitigating in his favor. On August 26, 1991, respondent judge issued an
order amending the penalty imposed to a minimum of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional in its medium period to six (6) years of prision correccional in its maximum period. In modifying the
judgment, the alleged mitigating circumstances of extreme poverty and voluntary surrender were taken into
consideration by the respondent judge. The reduction of the penalty enabled the accused, Ruel Dagondon to apply for
probation which was granted by respondent Judge in an Order dated November 13, 1991.
It should be noted that the accused was charged with violation of B.P. Blg. 179 (Dangerous Drugs Act), a special law.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, when an offense is punishable by a law other than the Revised Penal Code,
the court should sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the
maximum fixed by law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same. The accused
Dagondon should have been sentenced to imprisonment anywhere from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years as mandated by B.P. 179. In applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law after finding no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, the minimum penalty originally imposed by respondent Judge should not have been two (2) years, four
(4) months and one (1) day but six (6) years and one (1) day. The incorrect minimum penalty was obviously mistakenly
arrived at by applying the rule applicable only for crimes punishable under the Revised Penal code, not a special law
like B.P. 179. The basic error of respondent Judge stemmed from his unwarranted assumption that the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from 6 years and 1 day to 12 years, provided for the offense involved by Sec. 8 of the governing
law, is the same as prision mayor despite the fact that the technical terminology of penalties for felonies in the Revised
Penal Code were not used in the Dangerous Drugs Act at that time. He should likewise have readily noted that neither
were the terms prision correccional or reclusion temporalused therein and, for that matter, life imprisonment and
not reclusion perpetua was used in and imposed under that law then in force. The inexorable conclusion, therefore, is
that drug offenses were then considered, not as felonies, but as crimes punished under a special law, hence the
provisions of Arts. 13, 64, 71 and 76 of the Revised Penal Code could not be given suppletory effect. Consequently, the
indeterminate sentence should have been within the range for offenses punished by special laws as provided in Sec. 1
of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
To compound his error, respondent Judge considered in favor of the accused the mitigating circumstances of extreme
poverty and voluntary surrender. Justice Montoya noted:
Extreme poverty is not among the mitigating circumstances enumerated in Article 13 of the Revised
Penal Code and it is doubtful whether it may be considered as a circumstance of a similar nature or
analogous to those mentioned in said Article. On the other hand, there appears to be no voluntary
surrender on the part of the accused because the decision itself states that the accused was arrested by
the authorities in a buy-bust operation and was brought to the police station in Mambajao, and later to
the PC-INP Headquarters at Camp Gen. Bonifacio Aranas. In stating that there was voluntary surrender,
the respondent postulated in his Order modifying the judgment that the accused, after committing the
crime and having all the chances to escape, voluntarily gave himself up to the authorities.
It might, perhaps, have been easy for this Court to act with extreme leniency if the only mistake committed by
respondent Judge was the application of Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code to an offense punishable by a special
law. However, the pattern of the "errors" committed one after another, which eventually enabled the respondent Judge
to apply the provisions of the Probation Law in letting off the accused with a virtual slap in the wrist was so gross as to
be unconscionable.
Considering his experience in the bench and the ready availability of legal sources and materials from which he could
check and verify his findings and conclusions, respondent Judge was clearly negligent in misapplying the law. He knew
or ought to know that our laws impose severe penalties on violations of our dangerous drugs laws; consequently, he
should have been alerted to the possibility of error when the penalty imposed was finally reduced to a ridiculously
lenient one. The inexplicably low penalty which respondent Judge meted out on the accused in Criminal Case No. 561,
was certainly out of proportion to the crime for which the latter had been convicted of.
The policy of the law in imposing strict penalties for violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act cannot be gainsaid. The
intendment of the law is to eradicate a menace to our society by a pernicious evil which day in and day out victimizes
our youth. To lightly dismiss the respondent judge's mistakes in Criminal Case No. 561 would be to send the wrong
signals.
The office of a judge exists for one solemn end — to promote justice by administering it fairly and impartially. The judge
is the visible representation of the law and justice. A judge who, through gross ignorance of the law or serious
misconduct frustrates the ends of justice commits a rank disservice to the cause of justice which calls for the application
of appropriate disciplinary measures (Villa vs. Amonoy, 194 SCRA 48 [1991]).
Finally, respondent Judge failed to meet the standard mandated by Rules 3.01 and 3.02 of Canon 3 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, to wit:
Rule 3.01 — A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.
Rule 3.02 — In every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the fact and the applicable law
unswayed by partisan interests, public opinion or fear of criticism.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to hold respondent Judge administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law and
with grave abuse of discretion, and to impose on him a fine of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act or acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

CRIMLAWaaa

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

CRIMLAWaaa

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

G.R. No.

183563 December 14, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

Criminal Case No. 2000-01-46

Criminal Case No. 2000-01-47

Criminal Case No. 2000-01-48

Criminal Case No. 2000-01-49

Criminal Case No. 2000-01-51

Criminal Case No. 2000-01-52

Criminal Case No. 2000-01-47

The Medico-Legal Report stated the following findings:

P. E. Findings: Surg. Findings:

- (-) Physical injuries.

Ext. Genetalia – grossly normal.

Introitus: Old, healed incomplete laceration at 3 & 9 o’clock position

Speculum Exam: not done due to resistance.

Vaginal smear for presence of spermatozoa: = NEGATIVE21

The Judgment of the RTC

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

In the accused-appellant’s brief, the following issues were invoked:

The Ruling of the Court

ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –

a. Through force, threat or intimidation;

c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

[PROSECUTOR EDGAR SABARRE]

A: I was raped by Tiyo Henry.

Q: How did he rape you?

A: He stripped me of my panty, shorts and shirts.

Q: Do you remember what place did he rape you?

A: Yes, sir in our house.

Q: Who were the persons present then at that time?

A: My younger brother and I.

Q: About your mother and step father where were they?

May we make it of record that the witness is crying.

Q: Do you still recall was it in the morning, in the afternoon or evening?

A: He went on top of me.

Q: Was he still with his clothes on or already naked?

Q: Did he pull out his organ?

Q: And where did he place his organ?

Q: When he kept on pumping what did you feel?

Q: Was it in the daytime or night time?

Q: Was it in different nights or on the same night?

A: My Kuya and other siblings.

Q: You have companions why were you raped?

A: Because they were sleeping.

Q: With whom was he drinking?

A: With my step father.

Q: Where did they drink?

Q: What did he do with his penis?

A: He made me hold it.

Q: Then after he made you hold it what did he do with it?

A: (witness did not answer)

Make it of record that the witness is crying again.

Q: Why are you crying?

A: I am angry and hurt.

Q: What was the same thing you are talking about?

A: He pulled down my panty and went on top of me and pump.

Q: When he pump what did you feel?

Why did you feel pain?

A: He placed his penis inside my vagina, everytime I urinate I feel pain.