Wahab L.

Dia Jr

AB – POLSCI 3

The Huk Rebellion and the State of Philippine Foreign Affairs in the Post-War Era

When one looks back on the insurrection, one sees that Ramon Magsaysay defeated
the guerrillas through a campaign that combined American aid and assistance,
domestic social reforms, and a revitalization of both the Philippine military and central
government. Before mid-1950, Manila governments had neither the resources nor the
inclination to attack the insurgents with such a broad socio-military program. Did the
movement's rapid growth after World War II indicate that the people supported their
form of change or does it indicate that Huk leaders merely took advantage of ineffectual
governments in Manila? Perhaps a little of both was true. At various times the Huks
were indeed effective and, at their peak of influence in 1950, kept, the Philippine
president in self-imposed seclusion within Malacanang. Finally, did Magsaysay's
ultimate success indicate that American post-war policy was handled correctly? Indeed
not, for although U.S. policy after mid-1950 allowed Magsaysay to win the battle, U.S.
policy between 1945 and 1950 was certainly deficient. If instead, American policy had
been less complacent and more sensitive to the needs and aspirations of the Filipino
people, the Hukbalahap movement would simply have dried up and blown away after
the war.

The entire insurgency suffered from a variety of ailments at different times during the
course of the insurrection. Each of the key players in the rebellion; the Philippine
government, the United States, and the guerrillas achieved victories between 1946 and
1955. It was this timing of neglect, reaction, victory, and defeat that eventually doomed
the insurrection to failure. U.S. neglect of social problems on Luzon after the war
combined with a series of uncaring governments in Manila to provide the Huks with
fertile ground for their communist based insurgency. Only when the Philippine
government was at the brink of collapse did U.S. policy makers tackle the real problems
facing this allied nation and provide the necessary assistance that allowed Magsaysay
to carry out his strategy to defeat the guerrillas.

The Huk Guerrillas

By taking advantage of World War II to consolidate their organization, the Huks were
able to adapt quickly to post-war conditions in the Philippines. The people of central
Luzon were disillusioned with the post-war government and felt that no one but the
Huks cared about their problems. That the guerrillas were communist inspired made
little difference to a peasant farmer who lacked education, medical care, clean water,
and was deeply in debt to uncaring landlords. The Huks understood this disaffection
and made it the cornerstone for their movement.

At war's end, the Huks had a goal -- the overthrow of the Philippine government and the
establishment of a communist state -- and they possessed the internal organization to
mount an effective campaign to achieve it. Prior to 1951, they had sufficient logistic
support to maintain their forces and to strike out against government police and military
forces who at best, were reluctant to venture far afield to chase them. And, at least
during the first stage of the insurrection, the Huks had the support of the local
population -- the key that made all of their actions possible. This was a population that
had suffered at the hands of the Japanese and was then suffering at the hands of their
own government and its poorly disciplined troops. In both instances, the Huks seemed
the only force visibly fighting against those who were oppressing the peasants.

However, by mid-1950 the Hukbalahap movement began to suffer from symptoms that
had afflicted it during World War II -- over confidence and lapses of security. The
October Manila raid hurt them seriously and disrupted their joint political-military
strategy. Coupled with public outrage over the murder of Senora Quezon and other
atrocities against civilians, the Huks' mass support base developed cracks. Later, when
the government managed to mount a few successful operations, the cracks expanded
and eventually led to the movement's collapse. Taruc knew that he depended on
popular support to survive, but as government pressure built against him, he began
demanding too much from the same peasants he had once vowed to protect from just
that type of abuse. Once his mass support base began to crumble, the end was in sight.
His chief opponent, Ramon Magsaysay, realized the importance of popular support from
his own days as a guerrilla leader, and won it for the government.

Sources:

Abaya, Narciso, Lieutenant Colonel, Armed Forces of the Philippines, Assistant Army
Attache to the United States. Personal interview. Arlington, Virginia, 15 February 1985.

Baclagon, Uldarico S. Lessons from the Huk Campaign in the Philippines. Manila: M.
Colcol and Company, 1956. An analysis by the faculty and students of the Philippine
Army's Infantry School of counterinsurgency operations against the Huks.

Guerrero, Amado, [Jose Maria Sison]. Philippine Society and Revolution. Oakland,
California: International Association of Filipino Patriots, 1979. Third edition of Jose
Maria Sison's views, written using his alias, of the Filipino "revolution" from the CPP
Chairman's perspective in 1970. Also included is "Guerrero's" 1974 document, "Specific
Characteristics of Our People's War."

US Department of State Bulletin, Remarks of President Eisenhower and Secretary of

State Dulles on US Commemorative Stamp Honoring Magsaysay, September 16, 1957,
p. 472.