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 TITLE I: MARRIAGE
MARRIAGE Damages may be recovered for the breach of 
promise to marry although the same is made orally.
BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY
 The rules of court applicable
applicable at the time provides
Cabague v. Auxillo 11/26/1952 that, “ any agreement made upon the consideration
of marriage, other than mutual promise to marry
Facts:
should be in writing, or in any notes or
 There was an agreement
agreement to marry between
between memorandum and subscribed
subscribed by parties,
parties, otherwise
otherwise
Cabagues’s son and Auxillo’s daughter . The it shall be unenforceable.
consideration of which is for Cabague to improve the
house of Auxillo and spend for the wedding feast
and the needs of the bride. When Auxillo’s daughter
daughter Hermosisima v. CA
refused to carry out the agreement,
agreement, Cabague
Cabague filed
an action for damages. Facts:

Issue: Soledad Cagigas, a teacher and 10 years older than

Francisco Hermosisima, they were regarded as
Whether or not the agreement may be proved in engaged. She got pregnant and she told Francisco
court. that she was in the family way, and this was when
Francisco promised to marry her. But, subsequently
Held:
he married other woman.
 The rules of court
court applicable
applicable at the time
time provides
Issue:
that, “ any agreement made upon the consideration
of marriage, other than mutual promise to marry Whether or not moral damages are recoverable for
should be in writing, or in any notes or breach of promise to marry.
memorandum and subscribed
subscribed by parties,
parties, otherwise
otherwise
it shall be unenforceable.
unenforceable. Held:

In this case, the action for damages for the breach
of promise to marry may prosper and evidence of 
such mutual promise is admissible.
admissible. But the
agreement between Cabague and Auxillo may not
prosper , since such agreement is oral and may not
be proven in court.
Domalagan v. Bolifer
Facts:
Domalagan and Bolifer entered into a contract to
marry their son and daughter upon a consideration
that Domalagan will pay Bolifer P500. And So
Domalagan paid P500 and P16 as token of future
marriage. But, Bolifer’s daughter got married with
another man. Domalagan filed an action for
damages, and demanded the return of the money
he has given.
Issue:
Moral Damages cannot be recovered.
In the case of De
of  De Jesus vs. Syquia , 58 Phil., 866, the
supreme court ruled that breach of promise to marry
is not actionable, apart from the right to recover
money or property advanced upon the faith of such
promise. The history of breach of promise suit in the
United States and in England has shown that no
other action lends itself more readily to abuse by
designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this
experience which has led to the abolition of the
rights of action in the so-called Balm suit in many of 
the American States.
An award of moral damages may be recovered in
case there is seduction upon showing that because
of defendant-appellant's seduction power, plaintiff-
appellee, overwhelmed by her love for him finally
yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her age and
self-control, she being a woman after all, we hold
that said defendant-appellant is liable for seduction
and, therefore, moral damages may be recovered
from him under the provision of Article 2219,
paragraph 3, of the new Civil Code.

Whether or not damages may be recovered. but in this case Francisco cannot be liable for
seduction, , not only because he is approximately
Held: ten (10) years younger than the complainant — who
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around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New
enlightened as a former high school teacher and a Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the
life insurance agent are supposed to be — when she cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code.
became intimate with petitioner, then a mere
apprentice pilot, but, also, because, the court of first
instance found that, complainant
complainant "surrendered
"surrendered
herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her
love" for him, she "wanted to bind" "by having a
fruit of their engagement even before they had the
benefit of clergy ."
."

Wassmer v. Velez

Facts:

 They decided to get married.

married. Two days before
before their
wedding day, Wassmer received a telegram from
Velez to postponed the wedding because his mother
opposes it, and yet he reassured Wassmer that
nothing has changed. But on their wedding day, he
did not show up. Despite the fact that Invitations
were printed and distributed to relatives, friends and
acquaintances,
acquaintances, The bride-to-be's trousseau, party
dresses and other apparel for the important
occasion were purchased, Dresses for the maid of  conceived a child; that due to her pregnant
honor and the flower girl were prepared, A
matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought,
Bridal showers were given and gifts received.
Issue:
Whether or not damages may be recovered based
on the beach of promise to marry.
Held:
It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent
to which acts not contrary to law may be
perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article
21 of said Code provides that "any person who
wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
Surely this is not a case of  mere breach of promise
to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to
marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set
a wedding and go through all the above-described
above-described
preparation and publicity,
publicity, only to walk out of it when
the matrimony is about to be solemnized,
solemnized, is quite
different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary
to good customs for which defendant must be held
answerable in damages in accordance with Article
21 aforesaid.
 Tanjanco v. Ca
Facts:
Apolonio Tanjanco, courted the plaintiff, Araceli
Santos, both being of adult age; that in
consideration
consideration of defendant's promise of marriage
marriage
plaintiff consented and acceded to defendant's pleas
for carnal knowledge, as a result of which the latter
condition, to avoid embarrassment and social
humiliation, plaintiff
plaintiff had to resign her job as
secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc., where she was
receiving P230.00 a month; that thereby plaintiff 
became unable to support herself and her baby; that
due to defendant's refusal to marry plaintiff, as
promised, the latter suffered mental anguish,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, and social humiliation. The prayer was for a
decree compelling the defendant to recognize the
unborn child that plaintiff was bearing; to pay her
not less than P430.00 a month for her support and
that of her baby, plus P100,000.00 in moral and
exemplary
exemplary damages, plus P10,000.00 attorney's
fees.
Issue:
Whether or not damages may be recovered under
Article 21. (seduction)
Held:
Damages may not be recovered.
 The Court of Appeals
Appeals seems
seems to have overlooked
overlooked that
the example set forth in the Code Commission's
memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who has
been seduced.
seduced. The essential feature is seduction,
that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or
a breach of a promise of marriage;
marriage; it connotes
essentially
essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior
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power or abuse of confidence on the part of the
seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs.
Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil.
595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case ( supra)
that —
 To constitute seduction there must in all
cases be some sufficient promise or
inducement and the woman must yield
because of the promise or other inducement .
 The facts stand out that for one whole year, from
1958 to 1959, Araceli a woman of adult age,
maintained intimate sexual relations with apolonio
tanjanco, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such
conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction.
Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual
passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had
she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit,
artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she
would not have again yielded to his embraces, much
less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment
of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have
cut chart all sexual relations upon finding that
defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises.
Baksh v. Ca
Facts:
Baksh was an Iranian citizen and an exchange
student taking a medical course. He later courted
and proposed to marry Marilou Gonzales, a 22 year-
old, Filipina and a waitress in a luncheonette, with a
reputation duly respected in their community. Baksh
visited Marilou’s parents to secure their consent.
With the consent of Marilou’s parents they lived
together but defendant would tie plaintiff's hands
and feet while he went to school, and he even gave
her medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning that made
her sleep the whole day and night until the following
day. As a result of this live-in relationship, plaintiff  the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral
became pregnant, but defendant gave her some
medicine to abort the fetus. Still plaintiff continued
to live with defendant and kept reminding him of his
promise to marry her until he told her that he could
not do so because he was already married to a girl
in Bacolod City. That was the time plaintiff left
defendant, went home to her parents.
Issue:
Whether or not damages may be recovered for a
breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21
of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Held:
Damages may be recovered.
Gen. Rule:
 The existing rule is that a breach of promise to
marry per se is not an actionable wrong.
Rationale:
Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of 
the New Civil Code the provisions that would have
made it so. The reason therefor is set forth in the
report of the Senate Committees on the Proposed
Civil Code, from which We quote:
 The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That
breach of promise to marry is not actionable has
been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs.
Syquia. The history of breach of promise suits in the
United States and in England has shown that no
other action lends itself more readily to abuse by
designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this
experience which has led to the abolition of rights of 
action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many of 
the American states. . . .
 This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a
provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand
the concept of torts or quasi-delict  in this jurisdiction
by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold
number of moral wrongs which is impossible for
human foresight to specifically enumerate and
punish in the statute books.
As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
But the Code Commission had gone farther than the
sphere of wrongs defined or determined by positive
law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in
wrongs helpless, even though they have actually
suffered material and moral injury, the Commission
has deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice,
to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the
following rule:
Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury
to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage. An example will illustrate the
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purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the
nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of  seduction.
marriage either has not been made, or can not be
proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the
present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above
nineteen years of age. Neither can any civil action
for breach of promise of marriage be filed.
 Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong has
been committed, and though the girl and family
have suffered incalculable moral damage, she and
her parents cannot bring action for damages. But
under the proposed article, she and her parents
would have such a right of action.
 Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule
is approved, would vouchsafe adequate legal
remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs
which it is impossible for human foresight to provide
for specifically in the statutes.
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article
21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a
man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate
cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and
his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter
becomes the proximate cause of the giving of 
herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he
had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that
the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive
device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to
obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify
the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not
because of such promise to marry but because of  either spouse to commit any act of infidelity, was in
the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury
to her honor and reputation which followed
thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury
should have been committed in a manner contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it
was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive
protestations of love for and promise to marry
plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and
womanhood to him and to live with him on the
honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
promise, and it was likewise these fraud and
deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's
parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him
preparatory to their supposed marriage." 24 In short,
the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the
cherished possession of every single Filipina, not
because of lust but because of moral seduction —
the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its
example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could
not be held liable for criminal seduction punished
under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised
Penal Code because the private respondent was
above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the
MARRIAGE CONTRACT NOT SUBJECT TO
STIPULATION
Selanova v. Mendoza
Facts:
 Judge Alejandro E. Mendoza was charged with gross
ignorance of the law for having prepared and ratified
a document , extrajudicially liquidating the conjugal
partnership of the complainant and his wife, Avelina
Ceniza. One condition of the liquidation was that
either spouse (as the case may be) would withdraw
the complaint for adultery or concubinage which
each had filed against the other and that they
waived their "right to prosecute each other for
whatever acts of infidelity" either one would commit
against the other.
Issue:
Held:
that instrument Judge Mendoza divided the two
pieces of conjugal assets of the spouses by
allocating to the husband a thirteen-hectare riceland
and to the wife the residential house and lot. The
last paragraph of the instrument, which licensed
effect a ratification of their personal separation. The
agreement in question is void because it
contravenes the following provisions of the Civil
Code:têñ.£îhqwâ£
ART. 221. The following shall be void and of no
effect:
(1) Any contract for personal separation between
husband and wife;
(2) Every extrajudicial agreement, during marriage,
for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of 
gains or of the absolute community of property
between husband and wife;
xxx xxx xxx
Even before the enactment of the new Civil Code,
this Court held that the extrajudicial dissolution of 
the conjugal partnership without judicial approval
was void.
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Lichauco de leon v. Ca this document, a pleading being intended by them

to embody and evidence their agreement:
Facts:
Issue:
 Jose Vincent and Sylvia Lichauco were married. A de
facto separation between the spouses occured due Whether or not the Letter-Agreement is valid. The
to irreconcilable marital differences, with Sylvia third paragraph of the Letter-Agreement.
leaving the conjugal home. Sylvia went to the United
States where she obtained American citizenship. Held:
Sylvia filed with the Superior Court of California,
County of San Francisco, a petition for dissolution of 
Sylvia insists that the consideration for her
marriage against Jose Vicente. In the said divorce
execution of the Letter-Agreement was the
proceedings, Sylvia also filed claims for support and
termination of property relations with her husband.
distribution of properties. It appears, however, that
Indeed, Sylvia and Jose Vicente subsequently filed a
since Jose Vicente was then a Philippine resident and
 joint petition for judicial approval of the dissolution
did not have any assets in the United States, Sylvia
of their conjugal partnership, sanctioned by Article
chose to hold in abeyance the divorce proceedings,
191 of the Civil Code. On the other hand, Macaria
and in the meantime, concentrated her efforts to
and Jose Vicente assert that the consideration was
obtain some sort of property settlements with Jose
the termination of marital relationship.
Vicente in the Philippines.
“the parties contemplated not only to agree to a
, Sylvia succeeded in entering into a Letter-
 judicial separation of property of the spouses but
Agreement with her mother-in-law, private
likewise to continue with divorce proceedings”
respondent Macaria De Leon, which We quote in full,
as follows:
 This Court, therefore, finds and holds that the cause
or consideration for the intervenor Macaria De Leon
Obligations of Jose Vicente de Leon and/ or yourself 
in having executed Exhibits 'E' to 'E-2' was the
in a joint and several capacity:
termination of the marital relationship between her
son Jose Vicente De Leon and Sylvia Lichauco de
1. To deliver with clear title free from all liens and Leon.
encumbrances and subject to no claims in any form
whatsoever the following properties to Sylvia
Article 1306 of the New Civil Code provides:
Lichauco-de Leon hereinafter referred to as the wife
Art. 1306. The contracting parties may establish
Obligations of the wife:
such stipulations, clauses, terms, and conditions as
they may deem convenient, provided they are not
1. To agree to a judicial separation of property contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order
in accordance with Philippine law and in this or public policy.
connection to do all that may be necessary to
secure said separation of property including
If the stipulation is contrary to law, morals or public
her approval in writing of a joint petition or
policy, the contract is void and inexistent from the
consent decree.
beginning.
On the same date, Macaria made cash payments to
Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and
Sylvia in the amount of P100,000 and US$35,000.00
void from the beginning:
or P280,000.00, in compliance with her obligations
as stipulated in the aforestated Letter-Agreement.
 Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order or public
On March 30, 1977, Sylvia and Jose Vicente filed
policy;
before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal a joint
petition for judicial approval of dissolution of their
conjugal partnership, the main part of which reads xxx xxx xxx
as follows (pp. 37-38,Rollo):
(7) Those expressly prohibited or declared void by
5. For the best interest of each of them and of their law.
minor child, petitioners have agreed to dissolve their
conjugal partnership and to partition the assets  These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the
thereof, under the following terms and conditions- right to set up the defense of illegality be waived.
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But marriage is not a mere contract but a sacred
social institution. Thus, Art. 52 of the Civil Code
provides:
Art. 52. Marriage is not a mere contract but an
inviolable social institution. Its nature, consequences
and incidents are governed by law and not subject
to stipulations...
From the foregoing provisions of the New Civil Code,
this court is of the considered opinion and so holds
that intervenor's undertaking under Exhibit 'E'
premised on the termination of marital relationship
is not only contrary to law but contrary to Filipino
morals and public Policy. As such, any agreement or
obligations based on such unlawful consideration
and which is contrary to public policy should be
deemed null and void. (emphasis supplied)
Additionally, Article 191 of the Civil Case
contemplates properties belonging to the spouses
and not those belonging to a third party, who, in the
case at bar., is Macaria. In the petition for the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, it was made
to appear that the said properties are conjugal in
nature. However, Macaria was able to prove that the
questioned properties are owned by her. Neither
Sylvia nor Jose Vicente adduced any contrary
evidence.
Granting, in gratia argumenti, that the consideration
of the Letter-Agreement was the termination of  filed months before the date of the elections is but a
property relations, We agree with the respondent
court that (pp. 46-47, Rollo):
... the agreement nevertheless is void because it
contravenes the following provisions of the Civil
Code:
Art. 221. The following shall be void and of no effect:
(1) Any contract for personal separation between
husband and wife;
(2) Every extra-judicial agreement, during marriage,
for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of  protection of the public. This is specially so with
gains or of the absolute community of property
between husband and wife;
FAMILY CODE (ART. 7(2))
Villar v. Paraiso
Facts:
Vilar obtained 1,467 votes while Paraiso garnered
1,509, and as a result the municipal board of 
canvassers proclaimed the latter as the mayor duly
elected with a plurality of 41 votes. However,
contending that Paraiso was ineligible to hold office
as mayor because he was then a minister of the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines and such
was disqualified to be a candidate under section
2175 of the Revised Administrative Code, Vilar
instituted the present quo warranto proceedings
praying that Paraiso be declared ineligible to
assume office and that his proclamation as mayor-
elect be declared null and void. He also prayed that
he be declared duly elected mayor of Rizal, Nueva
Ecija, in lieu of respondent Paraiso.
Issue:
whether respondent, being an ecclesiastic, is
ineligible to hold office under section 2175 of the
Revised Administrative Code, or whether he actually
resigned as minister before the date of the
elections, and his resignation duly accepted, as
claimed, thereby removing his disability.
Held:
we have not found any reason for deviating from the
finding of the trial court that respondent never
ceased as minister of the order to which he
belonged and that the resignation he claims to have
mere scheme to circumvent the prohibition of the
law regarding ecclesiastics who desire to run for a
municipal office. Indeed, if respondent really and
sincerely intended to resign as minister of the
religious organization to which he belonged for the
purpose of launching his candidacy why did he not
resign in due form and have the acceptance of his
resignation registered with the Bureau of Public
Libraries. 1 The importance of resignation cannot be
underestimated. The purpose of registration is two-
fold: to inform the public not only of the authority of 
the minister to discharge religious functions, but
equally to keep it informed of any change in his
religious status. This information is necessary for the
regard to the authority to solemnized marriages, the
registration of which is made by the law mandatory
(Articles 92-96, new Civil Code). It is no argument to
say that the duty to secure the cancellation of the
requisite resignation devolves, not upon respondent,
but upon the head of his organization or upon the
official in charge of such registration, upon proper
showing of the reason for such cancellation, because
the law likewise imposes upon the interested party
the duty of effecting such cancellation, who in the
instant case is the respondent himself. This he failed
to do. And what is more, he failed to attach to his
certificate of candidacy, a copy of his alleged
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resignation as minister knowing full well that a
minister is disqualified by law to run for a municipal
office.
Aranes v. Occiano
Facts:
MARRIAGE CEREMONY
Martinez v. Tan
Facts:
 There was received in evidence at the trial what is
called an expediente de matrimonio civil. It is
written in Spanish and consists, first, of a petition
directed to the justice of the peace, dated on the
25th of September, 1907, signed by the plaintiff and
the defendant, in which they state that they have
mutually agreed to enter into a contract of marriage
before the justice of the peace, and ask that the
 justice solemnize the marriage. Following this is a
document dated on the same day, signed by the
 justice of the peace, by the plaintiff, by the
defendant, and by Zacarias Esmero and Pacita
Ballori. It states the presentation of the petition
above mentioned; that the persons who signed it
where actually present in the office of the justice on
the same day named; that they ratified under oath
the contents of the petition, and that they insisted in
what they had there asked for. It also stated that
being required to produce witnesses of the
marriage, the presented Zacarias Esmero as a
witness for the husband and Pacita Ballori as a
witness for the wife. Following this is a certificate of  peace declaring that they took each other as
marriage signed by the justice of the peace and the
witnesses Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori, dated
the 25th day of September, 1907, in which it is
stated that the plaintiff and the defendant were
legally married by the justice of the peace in the
presence of the witnesses on that day.
 The only direct evidence in favor of the plaintiff is
her own testimony that she never appeared before
the justice of the peace and never was married to
the defendant. She admits that she signed the
document in question, but says that she signed it in
her own home, without reading it, and at the
request of the defendant, who told her that it was a
paper authorizing him to ask the consent of her
parents to the marriage.
Issue:
whether or not the plaintiff and the defendant were
married on the 25th day of September, 1907, before
the justice of the peace, Jose Ballori, in the town of 
Palompon in the Province of Leyte.
Held:
 The parties were legally married.
It is claimed by the plaintiff that what took place
before the justice of the peace, even admitting all
that the witnesses for the defendant testified to, did
not constitute a legal marriage. General orders, No.
68, section 6, is as follows:
No particular form from the ceremony of 
marriage is required, but the parties must
declare in the presence of the person
solemnizing the marriage, that they take
each other as husband and wife.
Zacarias Esmero, one of the witnesses, testified that
upon the occasion in question the justice of the
peace said nothing until after the document was
signed and then addressing himself to the plaintiff 
and the defendant said, "You are married." The
petition signed the plaintiff and defendant contained
a positive statement that they had mutually agreed
to be married and they asked the justice of the
peace to solemnize the marriage. The document
signed by the plaintiff, the defendant, and the
 justice of the peace, stated that they ratified under
oath, before the justice, the contents of the petition
and that witnesses of the marriage were produced.
A mortgage took place as shown by the certificate of 
the justice of the peace, signed by both contracting
parties, which certificates gives rise to the
presumption that the officer authorized the marriage
in due form, the parties before the justice of the
husband and wife, unless the contrary is proved,
such presumption being corroborated in this case by
the admission of the woman to the effect that she
had contracted the marriage certified to in the
document signed by her, which admission can only
mean the parties mutually agreed to unite in
marriage when they appeared and signed the said
document which so states before the justice of the
peace who authorized the same. It was proven that
both the plaintiff and the defendant were able to
read and write the Spanish language, and that they
knew the contents of the document which they
signed; and under the circumstances in this
particular case were satisfied, and so hold, that what
took place before the justice of the peace on this
occasion amounted to a legal marriage.
MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE
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Madridejo v. De leon
Facts:
Eulogio de Leon and Flaviana Perez, man and wife,
had but one child, Domingo de Leon. The wife and
son survived Eulogio de Leon, who died in the year
1915. During her widowhood, Flaviana Perez lived
with Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor. The registry of 
births of the municipality of Siniloan, Laguna, shows
that on June 1, 1917, a child was born to Pedro
Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, which was named
Melecio Madridejo, the necessary data being
furnished by Pedro Madridejo (Exhibit B). On June
17, 1917, a 24-day old child of Siniloan, Laguna, as a
son of Flaviana Perez, no mention being made of the
father (Exhibit 2). On July 8, 1920, Flaviana Perez,
being at death's door, was married to Pedro
Madridejo, a bachelor, 30 years of age, by the parish
priest of Siniloan (Exhibit A). She died on the
following day, July 9, 1920, leaving Domingo de
Leon, her son by Eulogio de Leon, and the plaintiff-
appellee Melecio Madridejo, as well as her alleged
second husband, Pedro Madridejo. Domingo de Leon
died on the 2nd of May, 1928.
With regard to the first assignment of error,
the mere fact that the parish priest of Siniloan,
Laguna, who married Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana
Perez, failed to send a copy of the marriage
certificate to the municipal secretary does not
invalidate the marriage in articulo mortis, it not
appearing that the essential requisites required by
law for its validity were lacking in the ceremony, and
the forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate
is not one of said essential requisites.
MARRIAGES EXEMPT FROM LICENSE REQUIREMENT
Borja-Manzano v. J. Sanchez
Facts:
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of  are without legal impediment to marry each other];
the late David Manzano, having been married to him
on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish,
Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. Four children were
born out of that marriage. On 22 March 1993,
however, her husband contracted another marriage
with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent
 Judge. When respondent Judge solemnized said
marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same
was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract
clearly stated that both contracting parties were
“separated.”
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his
Comment that when he officiated the marriage
between Manzano and Payao he did not know that
Manzano was legally married. What he knew was
that the two had been living together as husband
and wife for seven years already without the benefit
of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage should be exempt.
Held:
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a
man and a woman who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and without
any legal impediment to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in
an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also
state under oath that he ascertained the
qualifications of the contracting parties and found
no legal impediment to the marriage.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital
cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must
concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living
together as husband and wife for at least five years
before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to
marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between
the parties must be present at the time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that
they have lived together for at least five years [and
and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn
statement that he had ascertained the qualifications
of the parties and that he had found no legal
impediment to their marriage.
Not all of these requirements are present in the case
at bar. It is significant to note that in their separate
affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to
before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano
9
and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of  Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for
their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage
contract, it was indicated that both were
“separated.”
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a
subsisting previous marriage is a diriment
impediment, which would make the subsequent
marriage null and void
Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve
the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to
remarry. This holds true all the more when the
separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the
 Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda
Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as
husband and wife for seven years. Just like
separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with
another person for at least five years does not
severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage.
Marital cohabitation for a long period of time
between two individuals who are legally
capacitated to marry each other is merely a
ground for exemption from marriage license. It
could not serve as a justification for respondent
 Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated
by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross
ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and
bigamous marriage.
Ninal v. Bayadog
Facts:
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on
September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were
born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito
resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year
and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986,
Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married
without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito
and Norma executed an affidavit dated December
11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and were
thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On
February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident.
After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition
for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to
lack of a marriage license.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage is void for lack of 
marriage license.
Held:
 The two marriages involved herein having been
solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their
validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect
at the time of their celebration. 5 A valid marriage
license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of 
the Civil Code, 6 the absence of which renders the
marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) 7 in
relation to Article 58. 8 The requirement and
issuance of marriage license is the State's
demonstration of its involvement and participation
in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the
general public is interested. 9 This interest proceeds
from the constitutional mandate that the State
recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording
protection to the family as a basic "autonomous
social institution." 10 Specifically, the Constitution
considers marriage as an "inviolable social
institution," and is the foundation of family life which
shall be protected by the State. 11 This is why the
Family Code considers marriage as "a special
contract of permanent union" 12 and case law
considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime
commitment." 13
However, there are several instances recognized by
the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is
dispensed with, one of which is that provided in
Article 76, 14 referring to the marriage of a man and
a woman who have lived together and exclusively
with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least five
years before the marriage. The rationale why no
license is required in such case is to avoid exposing
the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous
cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due
to the publication of every applicant's name for a
marriage license. The publicity attending the
marriage license may discourage such persons from
legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve peace in the
family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of 
public exposure and contain the source of gossip
10
arising from the publication of their names, the law
deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and
exempt them from that requirement.
 The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to
what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under
Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting
of the five year period in order to exempt the future
spouses from securing a marriage license.
 This 5-year period should be the years immediately
before the day of the marriage and it should be a
period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity
— meaning no third party was involved at anytime
within the 5 years and continuity — that is
unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year
cohabitation is computed without any distinction as
to whether the parties were capacitated to marry
each other during the entire five years, then the law
would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging
parties to have common law relationships and
placing them on the same footing with those who
lived faithfully with their spouse.
It should be noted that a license is required in order
to notify the public that two persons are about to be
united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware
or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of  Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare
the two shall make it known to the local civil
registrar.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's
marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with
each other as husband and wife for at least five
years prior to their wedding day. From the time
Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of  A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally
his marriage with respondent, only about twenty
months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and
his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter
both Pepito and respondent had started living with
each other that has already lasted for five years, the
fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation
was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It
should be in the nature of a perfect union that is
valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by
the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a
subsisting marriage at the time when he started
cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that
when they lived with each other, Pepito had already
been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The
subsistence of the marriage even where there was
actual severance of the filial companionship
between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation
by either spouse with any third party as being one
as "husband and wife".
Having determined that the second marriage
involved in this case is not covered by the exception
to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void
ab initio because of the absence of such element.
 The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have
the personality to file a petition to declare their
father's marriage void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of 
the Family Code 20 cannot be applied even by
analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of 
marriage. The second ground for annulment of 
marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows
"the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at
anytime before the death of either party" is
inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds,
periods and persons who can file an annulment suit,
not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The
the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void
marriages are not identical. A marriage that is
annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the
court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is
considered as having never to have taken place 21
and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be
generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation
or prescription while the other can never be ratified.
except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage
can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void
marriages can be questioned even after the death of 
either party but voidable marriages can be assailed
only during the lifetime of the parties and not after
death of either, in which case the parties and their
offspring will be left as if the marriage had been
perfectly valid. 22 That is why the action or defense
for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable
marriages where the action prescribes. Only the
parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any
proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
Void marriages have no legal effects except those
declared by law concerning the properties of the
alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or
ownership through actual joint contribution, 23 and
its effect on the children born to such void
11
marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to
Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of  action or defense for the declaration of absolute
the Family Code. On the contrary, the property
regime governing voidable marriages is generally
conjugal partnership and the children conceived
before its annulment are legitimate.
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of  However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no
petitioner's father extinguished the alleged marital
bond between him and respondent. The conclusion
is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise
that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved
between the two. It should be noted that their
marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never
existed at all and the death of either extinguished
nothing.
 Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no
 judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the
nullity of a marriage. 24 "A void marriage does not
require a judicial decree to restore the parties to
their original rights or to make the marriage void but
though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely
necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of 
society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it
is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should
be ascertained and declared by the decree of a
court of competent jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary
circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far
as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the
parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken
place. And therefore, being good for no legal
purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any
proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be
material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court
between any parties at any time, whether before or
after the death of either or both the husband and
the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering
such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated
as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a
voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally
attacked except in direct proceeding instituted
during the lifetime of the parties so that on the
death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached,
and is made good ab initio. 26 But Article 40 of the
Family Code expressly provides that there must be a
 judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage, though void, before a party can enter into
a second marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can
be based only on a final judgment to that effect. 28
For the same reason, the law makes either the
nullity of marriage imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily, if 
the death of either party would extinguish the cause
of action or the ground for defense, then the same
cannot be considered imprescriptible.
 judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity.1âwphi1 For other purposes, such as
but not limited to determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of 
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal
case for that matter, the court may pass upon the
validity of marriage even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the same so long as it is
essential to the determination of the case. This is
without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the
case. When such need arises, a final judgment of 
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the
purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the
basis of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code
connotes that such final judgment need not be
obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
ART. 26, FAMILY CODE
Republic v. Orbecido III
Facts:
 There was a valid marriage between two Filipino
citizens, celebrated in the Philippines. Later, the wife
went to the US, and acquired American citizenship.
After, She obtained a divorce decree and remarried
an American while in the US, The Spouse left in the
Philippines, orbecido, invokes art 26, par 2, to allow
him to remarry.
Issue:
Whether or not Orbecido should be capacitated to
remarry under art 26, par 2.
Held:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
12

the country where they were solemnized, and valid law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases
there as such, shall also be valid in this country, not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) they come within its spirit or intent.
and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is follows:
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
1. There is a valid marriage that has been
Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
Legislative Intent foreigner; and

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code
deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2
of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a
member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse.
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
 The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the
parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.

In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its
an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage
origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano.
[10] The Van Dorn case involved a marriage
As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court
subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating
held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained
her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the
by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both
consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to
present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the “divorced”
remarry under Philippine law.
Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
 Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent
PRESUMPTION OF MARRIAGE (RULE 131, SEC 3)
and applying the rule of reason, we hold that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to Perido v. Perido
include cases involving parties who, at the time of 
the celebration of the marriage were Filipino Facts:
citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce Lucio Perido married twice during his lifetime. His
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be first wife was Benita Talorong,. After Benita died
allowed to remarry as if the other party were a Lucio married Marcelina Baliguat. The children and
foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the grandchildren of the first and second marriages of 
marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction Lucio Perido executed a document denominated as
absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of  "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-judicial Partition,"
a statute according to its exact and literal import
 The heirs from the first marriage opposed the
would lead to mischievous results or contravene the
declaration of the CA that Lucio’s children in the 2 nd
clear purpose of the legislature, it should be
marriage are his legitimate chiidren.
construed according to its spirit and reason,
disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the
13
 The first issue pertains to the legitimacy of the five
children of Lucio Perido with Marcelina Baliguat. The
petitioners insist that said children were illegitimate
on the theory that the first three were born out of  presumed, in the absence of any counter-
wedlock even before the death of Lucio Perido's first
wife, while the last two were also born out of  in fact married. The reason is that such is the
wedlock and were not recognized by their parents
before or after their marriage. In support of their
contention they allege that Benita Talorong died in
1905, after the first three children were born, as
testified to by petitioner Margarita Perido and
corroborated by petitioner Leonora Perido; that as
late as 1923 Lucio Perido was still a widower, as
shown on the face of the certificates of title issued
to him in said year; and Lucio Perido married his
second wife, Marcelina Baliguat, only in 1925, as
allegedly established through the testimony of  In view of the foregoing the Court of Appeals did not
petitioner Leonora Perido.
Issue:
Whether or not Lucio is actually married with his 2 nd
wife.
Held:
Petition cannot be sustained.
 This finding conclusive upon us and beyond our
power of review. Under the circumstance, Lucio
Perido had no legal impediment to marry Marcelina
Baliguat before the birth of their first child in 1900.
With respect to the civil status of Lucio Perido as
stated in the certificates of title issued to him in
1923, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the
statement was not conclusive to show that he was
not actually married to Marcelina Baliguat.
Furthermore, it is weak and insufficient to rebut the
presumption that persons living together husband
and wife are married to each other. This
presumption, especially where legitimacy of the
issue is involved, as in this case, may be overcome
only by cogent proof on the part of those who allege
the illegitimacy. In the case of Adong vs. Cheong
Seng Gee 1 this Court explained the rationale
behind this presumption, thus: "The basis of human
society throughout the civilized world is that of   Jesusa C. Maglasang without the dissolution of his
marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a
civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution
in the maintenance of which the public is deeply
interested. Consequently, every intendment of the
law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons
dwelling together in apparent matrimony are
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be
common order of society, and if the parties were not
what they thus hold themselves out as being, they
would he living in the constant violation of decency
and of law. A presumption established by our Code
of Civil Procedure is "that a man and woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage." (Sec.
334, No. 28) Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio —
Always presume marriage."
err in concluding that the five children of Lucio
Perido and Marcelina Baliguat were born during their
marriage and, therefore, legitimate.
BIGAMOUS/POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGE
People v. Aragon
Facts:
 The accused under another name contracted
marriage with his first wife. While his first marriage
was subsisting, he contracted his 2 nd marriage. The
accused and his 2 nd wife did not live happily for the
accused used to maltreat his 2 nd wife. During the
absence of the 2 nd wife, he again contracted a 3 rd
marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of bigamy.
Held:
It was the 2nd marriage which was bigamous.
 The Court of First Instance of Cebu held that even in
the absence of an express provision in Act No. 3613
authorizing the filing of an action for judicial
declaration of nullity of a marriage void ab initio,
defendant could not legally contract marriage with
marriage to Maria Faicol, either by the death of the
latter or by the judicial declaration of the nullity of 
such marriage, at the instance of the latter.
14
 The statutory provision (section 29 of the Marriage
Law or Act No. 3613) plainly makes a subsequent
marriage contracted by any person during the
lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its
performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to
establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere
annullable marriages
It is to be noted that the action was instituted upon
complaint of the second wife, whose marriage with
the appellant was not renewed after the death of  Wiegel v.Sempio-Dy
the first wife and before the third marriage was
entered into. Hence, the last marriage was a valid
one and appellant’s prosecution for contracting this
marriage can not prosper.
 Tolentino V. Paras
Facts:
 The records disclose that Amado Tolentino had
contracted a second marriage with private
respondent herein, Maria Clemente,), while his
marriage with petitioner, Serafia G. Tolentino, was
still subsisting.
Petitioner charged Amado with Bigamy in Criminal,
upon Amado's plea of guilty, sentenced him to suffer
the corresponding penalty. After Amado had served
the prison sentence imposed on him, he continued
to live with private respondent until his death on July
25, 1974. His death certificate carried the entry
"Name of Surviving Spouse — Maria Clemente."
In Special Proceedings No. 1587-M for Correction of  Held:
Entry, petitioner sought to correct the name of the
surviving spouse in the death certificate from "Maria
Clemente" to "Serafia G. Tolentino", her name.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is the lawful surviving
spouse of the deceased.
Held:
Considering that Amado, upon his own plea, was
convicted for Bigamy, that sentence furnishes the
necessary proof of the marital status of petitioner
and the deceased. There is no better proof of   There is likewise no need of introducing evidence
marriage than the admission by the accused of the
existence of such marriage. 5 The second marriage
that he contracted with private respondent during
the lifetime of his first spouse is null and void from
the beginning and of no force and effect. 6 No
 judicial decree is necessary to establish the
invalidity of a void marriage. 7 It can be safely
concluded, then, without need of further proof nor
remand to the Court below, that private respondent
is not the surviving spouse of the deceased Amado,
but petitioner. Rectification of the erroneous entry in
the records of the Local Civil Registrar may,
therefore, be validly made.
Facts:
Respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff therein)
asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage
(celebrated on July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic
Apostolic Christian Church Branch in Makati, Metro
Manila) with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel
(Lilia, for short, and defendant therein) on the
ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage to one
Eduardo A. Maxion, the ceremony having been
performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes
Church in Quezon City. Lilia, while admitting the
existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed
that said marriage was null and void, she and the
first husband Eduardo A. Maxion having been
allegedly forced to enter said marital union
Issue:
Whether or not the status of the 1 st marriage was
void voidable.
 There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first
marriage was vitiated by force committed against
both parties because assuming this to be so, the
marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art.
85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled.
Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear
that when she married respondent she was still
validly married to her first husband, consequently,
her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil
Code).
about the existing prior marriage of her first
husband at the time they married each other, for
then such a marriage though void still needs
according to this Court a judicial declaration 1 of 
15
such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she
would still be regarded as a married woman at the
time she contracted her marriage with respondent
Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of  touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is
petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID
under the law.
Donato v. Luna
Facts:
An information for bigamy was filed against Leonilo
Donato by Paz Abayan. Before Leonilo’s
arraignment, Paz filed a civil action for declaration of 
nullity of her marriage with Leonilo. Said civil case
was based on the ground that private respondent
consented to entering into the marriage, which was
petitioner Donato's second one, since she had no
previous knowledge that petitioner was already
married to a certain Rosalinda R. Maluping.
Petitioner Donato's answer in the civil case for
nullity interposed the defense that his second
marriage was void since it was solemnized without a
marriage license and that force, violence,
intimidation and undue influence were employed by
private respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to
the marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not the criminal case for bigamy which is
pending should be suspended in view of a civil case
for annulment.
Held:
A prejudicial question has been defined to be one
which arises in a case, the resolution of which
question is a logical antecedent of the issue involved
in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to
another tribunal. 3 It is one based on a fact distinct
and separate from the crime but so intimately
connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the
criminal action, it must appear not only that said
case involves facts intimately related to those upon
which the criminal prosecution would be based but
also that in the resolution of the issue or issues
raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined. 4 A
prejudicial question usually comes into play in a
situation where a civil action and a criminal action
may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in
the civil action is resolved would be
determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in a criminal case. 5
 The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain
in the case at bar. It must be noted that the issue
before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
not determinative of petitioner Donato's guilt or
innocence in the crime of bigamy. Furthermore, it
was petitioner's second wife, the herein private
respondent Paz B. Abayan who filed the complaint
for annulment of the second marriage on the ground
that her consent was obtained through deceit.
In order that the case of annulment of marriage be
considered a prejudicial question to the bigamy case
against the accused, it must be shown that the
petitioner's consent to such marriage must be the
one that was obtained by means of duress, force
and intimidation to show that his act in the second
marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the
basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy.
In the case at bar, petitioner has not even
sufficiently shown that his consent to the second
marriage has been obtained by the use of threats,
force and intimidation.
Dorothy Terre v. Atty. Jordan Terre
Facts:
Complainant Dorothy B. Terre charged respondent
 Jordan Terre, a member of the Philippine Bar with
"grossly immoral conduct," consisting of contracting
a second marriage and living with another woman
other than complainant, while his prior marriage
with complainant remained subsisting.
Atty. Terre averred that he had contracted marriage
with complainant Dorothy Terre on 14 June 1977
upon her representation that she was single; that he
subsequently learned that Dorothy was married to a
certain Merlito A. Bercenilla sometime in 1968; that
when he confronted Dorothy about her prior
marriage, Dorothy drove him out of their conjugal
residence; that Dorothy had mockingly told him of 
her private meetings with Merlito A. Bercenilla and
that the child she was then carrying ( i.e., Jason
 Terre) was the son of Bercenilla; that believing in
good faith that his marriage to complainant was null
and void ab initio, he contracted marriage with
Helina Malicdem.
Complainant Dorothy Terre took the witness stand
and testified substantially as follows: she and
respondent met for the first time in 1979 as fourth
16
year high school classmates in Cadiz City High
School, she was then married to Merlito Bercenilla,
while respondent was single respondent was aware
of her marital status p. it was then that respondent
started courting her but nothing happened of the
courtship); they [complainant and respondent]
moved to Manila were they respectively pursued
their education, respondent as a law student at the
Lyceum University ); respondent continued courting
her, this time with more persistence ( ibid, p. 11);
she decided nothing would come of it since she was
married but he [respondent] explained to her that
their marriage was void ab initio since she and her
first husband were first cousins ( ibid, p. 12);
convinced by his explanation and having secured
favorable advice from her mother and
ex-in-laws, she agreed to marry him [respondent]
(ibid, 12-13, 16); in their marriage license, despite
her [complainant's] objection, he [respondent] wrote
"single" as her status explaining that since her
marriage was void ab initio, there was no need to go
to court to declare it as such (ibid, 14-15); they were
married before Judge Priscilla Mijares of the City
Court of Manila on June 14, 1977.
Issue:
Whether or not he should be guilty of gross immoral
conduct.
Held:
Respondent Jordan Terre sought to defend himself 
by claiming that he had believed in good faith that
his prior marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre
was null and void ab initio and that no action for a
 judicial declaration of nullity was necessary.
Respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or
should have known that such an argument ran
counter to the prevailing case law of this Court
which holds that for purposes of determining
whether a person is legally free to contract a second
marriage, a judicial declaration that the first
marriage was null and void ab initio is
essential. 8 Even if we were to
assume, arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held
that mistaken belief in good faith, the same result
will follow. For if we are to hold Jordan Terre to his
own argument, his first marriage to complainant
Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the result
that his second marriage to Helina Malicdem must
be regarded as bigamous and criminal in character.
 That the moral character of respondent Jordan Terre
was deeply flawed is shown by other circumstances.
As noted, he convinced the complainant that her
prior marriage to Bercenilla was null and void ab
initio, that she was still legally single and free to
marry him.
He was disbarred.
Morigo v. People
Facts:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were sweethearts.
 They got married in the phils, but Lucia had to leave
Canada for work. While in Canada, a petition for
divorce was filed by Lucia. Upon learning this, Lucio
got married with another woman in the phils. A year
after, Sept 1993, Lucio filed a case for judicial
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lucia on
the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took
place because what transpired is just a mere signing
of marriage contract without the presence of 
solemnizing officer. In Oct, 1993 L ucio was charged
of bigamy. However, petitioner submits that he
should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon
the divorce decree of the Ontario court. He
highlights the fact that he contracted the second
marriage openly and publicly, which a person intent
upon bigamy would not be doing. The petitioner
further argues that his lack of criminal intent is
material to a conviction or acquittal in the instant
case.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if 
so, whether his defense of good faith is valid.
Held:
 The elements of bigamy thus:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved,
or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse has not been judicially declared
presumptively dead;
17
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid
had it not been for the existence of the first.
 The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that
the accused must have been legally married. But in
this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never
married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first
marriage to speak of. Under the principle of 
retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab
initio, the two were never married "from the
beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears
no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical
conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not
married to Lucia at the time he contracted the
marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the
validity of the first marriage being an essential
element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that
a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained
where there is no first marriage to speak of. The
petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant
charge.
SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE
 Jones v. Hortiguela
Facts:
PHSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
Republic v. Ca and Molina
Facts:
Respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition
for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo
Molina. that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo
showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as
a husband and a father since he preferred to spend
more time with his peers and friends on whom he
squandered his money; that he depended on his
parents for aid and assistance, and was never
honest with his wife in regard to their finances,
resulting in frequent quarrels between them;
couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of 
which their relationship was estranged; that in
March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila
and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that
a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their
child, and had since then abandoned them; that
Reynaldo had thus shown that he was
psychologically incapable of complying with
essential marital obligations and was a highly
immature and habitually quarrel some individual
who thought of himself as a king to be served;
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage should be declared
void.
Held:
 The marriage remains valid.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals 6 this Court,
speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that
"psychological incapacity should refer to no less
than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that
(t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of 
the law has been to confine the meaning of 
'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychologic
condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage
 Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, 7
 Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
 juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no
clear showing to us that the psychological defect
spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be
more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable
differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no
wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not
enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is
essential that they must be shown to be incapable
of doing so, due to some psychological (nor
physical) illness.
18
From their submissions and the Court's own
deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the
Family Code are hereby handed down for the
guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that
both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus,
our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable,"
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of  illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to
the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.
 The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict
on marriage and the family and emphasizes the
permanence, inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity
must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological — not physical.
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
physically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of  as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles
ejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence
may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at
"the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing
when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable
at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in
regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to
the assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing
cure them but may not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in
the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text
of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
19
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should
be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that
Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision
Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of 
Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and
which provides:
 The following are incapable of contracting marriage:
 Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of  included Complaints for perjury,false testimony,
psychological nature. 14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our
Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the
religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that
to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive
weight should be given to decision of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence —
what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be
decreed civilly void.
 This is one instance where, in view of the evident
source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be
given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the
Church — while remaining independent, separate
and apart from each other — shall walk together in
synodal cadence towards the same goal of  "It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing
protecting and cherishing marriage and the family
as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear
as counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed
down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
 The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095.
Leni Choa v. alfonso choa
Facts:
Petitioner and respondent were married.
Respondent filed an annulment of his marriage to
petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity,
because allegedly that the filing by petitioner of a
series of charges against him are proof of the
latter’s psychological incapacity to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage. These charges
concubinage and deportation. And also respondent
basically complains that about three aspects of 
petitioner’s personality; namely, her alleged (1) lack
of attention to their children, (2) immaturity and (3)
lack of an "intention of procreative sexuality."
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage should be void due to
PI.
Held:
In Santos v. CA,37 this Court clearly explained that
"psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c)
incurability."38 Said the Court:
disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the
deliberations of the Family Code Revision
Committee itself, that the use of the phrase
‘psychological incapacity’ under Article 36 of the
Code has not been meant to comprehend all such
possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned
by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low
intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances
(cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's ‘Void and Voidable
Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in
Canon Law,’ quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorder by the American
Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's ‘Handbook
II for Marriage Nullity Cases’). Article 36 of the
Family Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of but must stand in conjunction with,
existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus
correlated, ‘psychological incapacity’ should refer to
no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be
20
assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of ‘psychological incapacity’ to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated."
In the case at bar, the evidence adduced by
respondent merely shows that he and his wife could
not get along with each other. There was absolutely
no showing of the gravity or juridical antecedence or
incurability of the problems besetting their marital
union.
Barcelona v. Ca
Facts:
Respondent Tadeo filed anew a Petition for
Annulment of Marriage against petitioner Diana on
the ground of Psychological incapacity, The petition
further alleged that petitioner Diana was
psychologically incapacitated at the time of the
celebration of their marriage to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage and such
incapacity subsists up to the present time.
5. During their marriage, they had frequent quarrels
due to their varied upbringing. Respondent, coming
from a rich family, was a disorganized housekeeper
and was frequently out of the house. She would go
to her sister’s house or would play tennis the whole
day.
6. When the family had crisis due to several
miscarriages suffered by respondent and the
sickness of a child, respondent withdrew to herself  give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
and eventually refused to speak to her husband.
7. On November 1977, the respondent, who was
five months pregnant with Cristina Maria and on the
pretext of re-evaluating her feelings with petitioner,
requested the latter to temporarily leave their
conjugal dwelling. She further insisted that she
wanted to feel a little freedom from petitioner’s
marital authority and influences. The petitioner
argued that he could occupy another room in their
conjugal dwelling to accommodate respondent’s
desire, but no amount of plea and explanation could
dissuade her from demanding that the petitioner
leave their conjugal dwelling.
8. In his desire to keep peace in the family and to
safeguard the respondent’s pregnancy, the
petitioner was compelled to leave their conjugal
dwelling and reside in a condominium located in
Greenhills.
9. This separation resulted in complete
estrangement between the petitioner and the
respondent. The petitioner waived his right to the
conjugal dwelling in respondent’s favor through an
extrajudicial dissolution of their conjugal partnership
of gains. The separation in fact between the
petitioner and the respondent still subsists to the
present time.
Issue:
w/n the marriage should be void.
Held:
xxx “psychological incapacity” should refer to no
less than mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
psychologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated. xxx.
Subsequent to Santos and Molina, the Court adopted
the new Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of 
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
21
Marriages (“new Rules”).[15] Specifically, Section 2,
paragraph (d) of the new Rules provides:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of  Republic v. Quintero-Hamano
void marriages –
x x x.
(d) What to allege. – A petition under Article 36 of 
the Family Code shall specifically allege the
complete facts showing that either or both parties
were psychologically incapacitated from complying
with the essential marital obligations of marriage at
the time of the celebration of marriage even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its
celebration.
 The complete facts should allege the physical
manifestations, if any, as are indicative of  child.
psychological incapacity at the time of the
celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need
not be alleged. (Emphasis supplied)
Procedural rules apply to actions pending and
unresolved at the time of their passage.[16] The
obvious effect of the new Rules providing that
“expert opinion need not be alleged” in the petition
is that there is also no need to allege the root cause
of the psychological incapacity. Only experts in the
fields of neurological and behavioral sciences are
competent to determine the root cause of  Issue:
psychological incapacity. Since the new Rules do not
require the petition to allege expert opinion on the
psychological incapacity, it follows that there is also
no need to allege in the petition the root cause of 
the psychological incapacity.
In rendering this Decision, this Court is not
prejudging the main issue of whether the marriage
is void based on Article 36 of the Family Code. The
trial court must resolve this issue after trial on the
merits where each party can present evidence to
prove their respective allegations and defenses. We
are merely holding that, based on the allegations in
the second petition, the petition sufficiently alleges
a cause of action and does not violate the rule on
forum shopping.
Facts:
Respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a
complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage
to her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national,
on the ground of psychological incapacity. According
to the complainant, Unknown to respondent, Toshio
was psychologically incapacitated to assume his
marital responsibilities, which incapacity became
manifest only after the marriage. One month after
their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and
promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the
holidays with his family. After sending money to
respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving
financial support. She wrote him several times but
he never responded. Sometime in 1991, respondent
learned from her friends that Toshio visited the
Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their
Court of appeals granted the nullity of marriage, The
appellate court thus concluded that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations to his family, and to "observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help
and support" pursuant to Article 68 of the Family
Code of the Philippines. But the office of the
solicitor general stated that Respondent failed to
prove any severe and incurable personality disorder
on the part of Toshio, in accordance with the
guidelines set in Molina.
Held:
See the case of republic v. Ca and Molina, guidelines
in the interpretation and application of Article 36.
 The guidelines incorporate the three basic
requirements earlier mandated by the Court in
Santos: "psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical
antecedence and (c) incurability."14 The foregoing
guidelines do not require that a physician examine
the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be
"medically or clinically identified." What is important
is the presence of evidence that can adequately
22

establish the party’s psychological condition. For

indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to.

We find that the totality of evidence presented fell

short of proving that Toshio was psychologically
incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities.
 Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly
irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to
be due to some kind of psychological illness.