Ang Tibay vs. CIR - GR No.

46496, February 27, 1940

G.R. NO. L-46496             FEBRUARY 27, 1940

ANG TIBAY, REPRESENTED BY TORIBIO TEODORO, MANAGER AND PROPIETOR, AND 

NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, PETITIONERS, VS. 

 THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND NATIONAL LABOR UNION,

INC., RESPONDENTS.

69 Phil. 635 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Due Process in Administrative Bodies

Facts:

Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the Philippine
Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number of his
employees. However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of said lay off
as it averred that the said employees laid off were members of NLU while  no members of the
rival labor union National Workers Brotherhood (NWB) were laid off. NLU claims that NWB is a
company dominated union and Toribio was merely busting NLU.

The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won.
Eventually, NLU went to the Supreme Court invoking its right for a new trial on the ground of
newly discovered evidence. The Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The Solicitor General,
arguing for the CIR, filed a motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to a new trial.

HELD: 

Yes. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained by NLU,
which they attached to their petition with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to them at the
time of the trial that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have
obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. Further, the attached
documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission
would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered (said newly
obtained records include books of business/inventory accounts by Ang Tibay which were not
previously accessible but already existing).

The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly bound by the
Rules of Court must also make sure that they comply to the requirements of due process. For
administrative bodies, due process can be complied with by observing the following:

The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his
own case and submit evidence in support thereof.

Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented.

While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its
decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly
attached.

Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must
be “substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained
in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.

The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate in arriving at a decision.

The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the
reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the
authority conferred upon it.
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 221562-69, October 05, 2016

COMMO. LAMBERTO R. TORRES (RET.), Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION)

AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO JR., J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the
annulment of Sandiganbayan Resolutions dated August 27, 20151 and October 28, 2015,2 with
prayer for the issuance of a status quo order or a temporary restraining order against the
Sandiganbayan.

The Facts

From 1991 to 1993, petitioner Commo. Lamberto R. Torres was the Assistant Chief of the Naval
Staff for Logistics under the Flag Officer In Command of the Philippine Navy. Sometime in July
1991 until June 1992, the Commission on Audit (COA) conducted a special audit at the
Headquarters of the Philippine Navy (HPN) pertaining to the procurement of drugs and medicine
by emergency mode purchase, among others. On June 18, 1993, the COA issued Special Audit
Report No. 92-128, uncovering an alleged overpricing of medicines at the HPN or its units, and
triggering a Fact-Finding Investigation by the Office ofthe Ombudsman.

On December 11, 1996, the Office of the Ombudsman commenced a preliminary investigation
against petitioner and several others or Illegal Use of Public Funds and Violation of Sec. 3 (e) of
Republic Act No. (RA) 301 9, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
docketed as case number OMB-4-97-0789; and for Violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019, docketed
as case number OMB-4-97-0790, based on an Affidavit by COA auditors.

In OMB-4-97-0789, it was alleged that the purchase of additional drugs and medicines worth
P5.56 million was not properly supported and accounted for, and that additional drugs and
medicines purchased were supposedly not included in the list of drugs and medicines received
by the Supply Accountable Officer of the Hospital for that period. Petitioner was included as a
respondent for being a signatory of the checks involved.

In OMB-4-97-0790, it was alleged that supplies and materials amounting to P6,663,440.70 were
purchased but equipment were delivered, instead of the items indicated in the purchase orders.
Petitioner was included as a respondent in the OMB-4-97-0790 because he allegedly
recommended the approval of the purchase orders and signed the certificates of emergency
purchases.
These cases, however, were dismissed against petitioner for lack of probable cause in a Joint
Resolution dated March 8, 1999.

A few years after petitioner's retirement from the service in 2001, Tanodbayan Simeon V.
Marcelo issued an Internal Memorandum dated October 11, 2004, recommending a new fact-
finding investigation and preliminary investigation relative to other transactions in other units and
offices of the Philippine Navy. Pursuant to this Internal Memorandum, a new Affidavit Complaint
dated February 22, 2006 was filed by the Ombudsman against petitioner and several others,
this time, for violation of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019, docketed as case number OMB-P-
C-06-0129-A.

Notices of the new preliminary investigation were, however, sent to petitioner's old address in
Kawit, Cavite, which he had already vacated in 1980. Thus, petitioner was not informed of the
proceedings in the new preliminary investigation. Unknown to petitioner, eight (8) Informations
were filed by the Ombudsman against him and the other accused before the Sandiganbayan
on August 5, 2011. The first set of Informations, consisting of four (4) Informations docketed as
Crim. Case Nos. SB-11-CRM-0423, SB-11-CRM-0424, SB-11-CRM-0426 & SB-11-CRM-0427,
charged petitioner and others with violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019, while the remaining four
(4) Informations, docketed as Crim. Case Nos. SB-11-CRM-0429, SB-11-CRM-0430, SB-11-
CRM-0432 & SB-11-CRM-0433, charged petitioner and others with violation of Sec. 3 (g) of RA
3019.

Petitioner and his co-accused were charged for allegedly g1vmg unwarranted benefit to several
pharmaceutical companies, certifying the existence of an emergency, and approving the
emergency purchase of overpriced medicines without the proper bidding. It was determined that
no emergency existed and the overpriced items bought were only kept in stock and were,
essentially, over-the-counter drugs.

More particularly, petitioner's participation is limited to his issuance of the Certificates of

Emergency Purchase3 that do not indicate the actual condition obtaining at the time of the
purchase to justify the emergency purchase.

It was only sometime in July 2014, when petitiOner was about to travel to the United States, that
he learned of the pending cases before the Sandiganbayan by virtue of a hold departure order
issued against him. Thus, petitioner filed a Motion for Reduction of Bail with Appearance of
Counsel and Motion for Preliminary Investigation before the Sandiganbayan. With his motion
granted, the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan were deferred with respect to petitioner
and a new preliminary investigation for petitioner was conducted.

Petitioner was thereafter allowed to file a Counter-Affidavit before the Office of the Ombudsman,
where he prayed for the dismissal of the case on the ground that his constitutional rights to due
process and speedy trial were violated by the inordinate delay of the case.
In its May 7, 2015 Resolution, the Ombudsman nonetheless resolved to maintain the
Informations filed against petitioner. According to the Ombudsman, the Affidavit Complaint filed
on February 22, 2006, which resulted in the filing of the August 5, 2011 Informations, was based
on a new investigation. Thus, petitioner's "inordinate delay" argument does not apply.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Informations before the Sandiganbayan,
claiming that the Ombudsman had no authority to file the Informations having conducted the
fact-finding investigation and preliminary investigation for too long, in violation of his rights to a
speedy trial and to due process. According to petitioner, the protracted conduct of the fact-
finding and preliminary investigations lasted for eighteen (18) years.

Hence, it was inordinate and oppressive. Petitioner argued that "'there was already this case to
speak of pending against" him since both sets of factfinding and preliminary investigations
conducted by the Ombudsman were triggered by the same COA report.

The Ombudsman filed its Comment and/or Opposition, arguing that the preliminary
investigations conducted against petitioner in the different periods (from 1996 to 1999 and from
2006 to 2011) involved different transactions pursuant to the various findings embodied in the
COA Special Audit Report of 1993. In fact, so the Ombudsman argued, the COA Audit Report is
not a prerequisite to any of its investigation and it may conduct fact-finding and/or preliminary
investigation with or without said repmi.

In his Reply to the Ombudsman's Comment and/or Opposition, petitioner insisted, among
others, that it still took the Ombudsman another six (6) years to file the Informations against him.

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

In a Resolution dated August 27, 2015, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash
and sustained the prosecution's position. The dispositive portion of the Resolution
reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the Motion to Quash is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied in the Sandiganbayan
Resolution dated October 28, 2015.

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner asserts that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction when it denied his Motion to Quash. He argues that the eight (8) Informations
should have been quashed by the Sandiganbayan considering that the Ombudsman had lost its
authority to file them since petitioner's constitutional rights to both the speedy disposition of
cases and to due process were grossly violated by the inordinate delay of almost 18 years in
conducting the fact-finding and preliminary investigations. Petitioner further argues that, with the
Ombudsman losing its authority to file the Information, the Sandiganbayan also lost its
jurisdiction over the crimes charged in consequence.

In its Comment,4 respondent People of the Philippines prays for the dismissal of the petition,
arguing that petitioner's constitutional rights to speedy disposition of cases and to due process
were not violated. Respondent stresses that, prior to 2006, petitioner had no case to speak of
since it was only in 2007 when the Ombudsman recommended his indictment. It differentiated
COA's audit investigation from 1993 to 1996 as administrative in nature, from the preliminary
investigation from 1996 to 2006 for the cases which were dismissed in favor of petitioner, and
from the preliminary investigation conducted from 2006 to 2011 where petitioner's involvement
was established.

Respondent further asserts that the Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion in issuing the
assailed Resolution since it was "firmly anchored on a judicious appreciation of the facts and
relevant case law."

Thereafter, petitioner filed a Reply to Comment (On Petition for Certiorari With Application for
Status Quo Order and/or Temporary Restraining Order) asserting that respondent is guilty of
"hair-splitting" by distinguishing between the fact-finding investigations and preliminary
investigations conducted in 1999 and in 2006 since they both originated from the June 18, 1993
COA Special Audit Report No. 92-128.

The Issue

Essentially, the principal issue is whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioner's Motion to Quash, anchored on the alleged violation of
petitioner's right to speedy disposition of cases.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

There is grave abuse of discretion when an act of a court or tribunal is whimsical, arbitrary, or
capricious as to amount to an "an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, such as where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility."5 Grave abuse of discretion
was found in cases where a lower court or tribunal violates or contravenes the Constitution, the
law, or existing jurisprudence.6chanrobleslaw

In his Motion to Quash, petitioner invoked Section 3, paragraph (d) of Rule 117, asserting that
the Ombudsman had lost its authority to file the Infonnations against him for having conducted
the fact-finding and preliminary investigations too long. He raised a similar argument in the
present petition-that the Ombudsman had no more authority to file the Informations since
petitioner's rights to speedy disposition of cases and to due process were violated.

In denying the Motion to Quash, the Sandiganbayan ruled:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Ultimately, the results of the 2006 preliminary investigation itself may not be impugned due to
inordinate delay that would rise to the level of being violative of herein accused's right to speedy
disposition of cases protected under the Constitution. If ignorance is bliss, the accused had
been spared from the travails of the preliminary investigation which started in 2006, not like the
other respondents who showed up or were involved therein. By this Court's reckoning it took the
OMB-MOLEO only two (2) years, six (6) months and nineteen (days) [sic] from August 7, 2007
after the issues were joined with the filing of the last counteraffidavit therein and the issuance of
the Resolution by Graft Investigator & Prosecution Officer Marissa S. Bernal on February 25,
2010, which terminated the preliminary investigation process, finding probable cause.
Furthermore, as requested by the accused, the OMB-Office of the Special Prosecutor again
conducted a new or another preliminary investigation upon order of this Court, resulting in a new
resolution, dated May 7, 2015, which maintained the informations herein. This was approved by
Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales on May 15, 2015. This investigation only took a little over
than six (6) months and, therefore. could not be said to be violative of movant's right to a
speedy disposition of his case. There is no showing that movant was made to endure any
vexatious process during the said periods of investigation.

We disagree.

In Isabelo A. Braza v. The Honorable Sandiganbayan (First Division),7 this Court has laid down
the guiding principle in determining whether the right of an accused to the speedy disposition of
cases had been violated:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Section 16, Atiicle lil of the Constitution declares in no uncertain tenns that "[A]ll persons shall
have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies." The right to a speedy disposition of a case is deemed violated only when
the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. or when
unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or
justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case
tried. The constitutional guarantee to a speedy disposition of cases is a relative or flexible
concept. It is consistent with delays and depends upon the circumstances. What the
Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays which render rights
nugatory.

In Dela Peña v. Sandiganbayan, the Court laid down certain guidelines to determine whether
the right to a speedy disposition has been violated, as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible. A mere mathematical reckoning of the
time involved is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances
peculiar to each case. Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether that right
has been violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are as follows: (1) the
length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right
by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay. (Emphasis supplied)

In the present case, the lapse of time in the conduct of the proceedings is tantamount to a
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delay, which We find to be in violation of petitioner's
constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases. Below is a summary of the proceedings
conducted:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

  PARTICULARS DATE STARTED DATE ENDED

COA Special Audit On the purchase of drugs and Conducted on July Issued on June 18,
Report No. 92-128 medicines, supplies, materials, 1 to August 11, 1993.
and equipment of the HPN for 1992.
the period of July 1991 to June
1992.

FIRST SET OF INVESTIGATIONS

1. OMB-4-97-0789 For the purchase of additional Complaint filed on Case dismissed on

(based on Affidavit drugs and medicines worth December 11, March 8, 1999 due
of COA Auditors) Php5.56 Million which were not 1996. to lack of probable
properly supported and cause.
accounted for.

OMB-4-97-0790 For the purchase of supplies

and materials which were
instead converted to
equipment.

Internal Recommending that a Issued on Received by the

Memorandum preliminary investigation be September 30, Ombudsman on
issued by conducted with respect to the 2004. October 7, 2004.
Tanodbayan overpricing in the other offices
Simeon V. Marcelo and units in the Philippine
Navy in relation to the COA
Special Audit Report No. 92-
128.

SECOND SET OF INVESTIGATIONS

2. OMB-P-C-06- Giving unwarranted benefit to Complaint filed on First Ombudsman

0129-A pharmaceutical companies, February 22, 2006. Resolution finding
certifying the existence of an probable cause
emergency, and approving the issued on February
 emergency purchase of 25, 2010.
overpriced medicines without
the proper bidding. Informations filed
on August 5, 2011.

OMB-P-C-06- Conducted pursuant to the Sandiganbayan Second

0129-A (Same Sandiganbayan Resolution Resolution issued Ombudsman
case as no. 2) ordering the Ombudsman to on November 10, Resolution finding
conduct a preliminary 2014. probable cause
investigation insofar as issued on May 7,
petitioner is concerned. 2015.

Respondents claim that the investigation conducted by the COA from 1993 to 1996 was a
"special audit which is administrative in nature"; thus, it should not be included in counting the
number of years lapsed. They further contend that the preliminary investigations conducted from
1996 to 2006 which pertain to the "overpricing of medicines" procured through emergency
purchase never included petitioner, but involved other PN officials, employees, and a private
individual. Respondents maintain that it was only in 2006 that petitioner was implicated in said
questionable transactions. Moreover, the preliminary investigations conducted from 1993 to
1996 against petitioner refer to different transactions, specifically, for Unaccounted Drugs and
Medicines (docketed as OMB-4-97-0789) and for Conversion (docketed as OMB-4-97-0790),
thus, cannot be considered in determining if his right to speedy disposition of cases had been
violated.

While it may be argued that there was a distinction between the two sets of investigations
conducted in 1996 and 2006, such that they pertain to distinct acts of different personalities, it
cannot be denied that the basis for both sets of investigations emanated from the same COA
Special Audit Report No. 92-128, which was issued as early as June 18, 1993. Thus, the
Ombudsman had more than enough time to review the same and conduct the necessary
investigation while the individuals implicated therein, such as herein petitioner, were still in
active service.

Even assuming that the COA Special Audit Report No. 92-128 was only turned over to the
Ombudsman on December 11, 1996 upon the filing of the Affidavit ofthe COA Auditors, still, it
had been in the Ombudsman's possession and had been the subject of their review and
scrutiny for at least eight (8) years before Tanodbayan Marcelo ordered the conduct of a
preliminary investigation, and at least sixteen (16) years before the Ombudsman found probable
cause on February 25, 2010.

Nevertheless, even if we start counting from Tanodbayan Marcelo's issuance of Internal

Memorandum on September 30, 2004, there was still at least six (6) years which lapsed before
the Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding probable cause.

We find it necessary to emphasize that the speedy disposition of cases covers not only the
period within which the preliminary investigation was conducted, but also all stages to which the
accused is subjected, even including fact-finding investigations conducted prior to the
preliminary investigation proper. We explained in Dansal v. Fernandez, Sr.:8

Initially embodied in Section 16, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, the aforesaid constitutional
provision is one of three provisions mandating speedier dispensation of justice. It guarantees
the right of all persons to "a speedy disposition of their case"; includes within its contemplation
the periods before, during and after trial, and affords broader protection than Section 14(2),
which guarantees just the right to a speedy trial. It is more embracing than the protection under
Article VII, Section 15, which covers only the period after the submission of the case. The
present constitutional provision applies to civil, criminal and administrative cases. (citations
omitted; Emphasis supplied)

Considering that the subject transactions were allegedly committed in 1991 and 1992, and the
fact-finding and preliminary investigations were ordered to be conducted by Tanodbayan
Marcelo in 2004, the length of time which lapsed before the Ombudsman was able to resolve
the case and actually file the Informations against petitioner was undeniably long-drawnout.

Any delay in the investigation and prosecution of cases must be duly justified. The State must
prove that the delay in the prosecution was reasonable, or that the delay was not attributable to
it.9 Our discussion in Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan (First Division)10 is
instructive:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Verily, the Office of the Ombudsman was created under the mantle of the Constitution,
mandated to be the "protector of the people" and as such, required to "act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or manner against officers and employees of the Government, or of
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, in order to promote efficient service."

This great responsibility cannot be simply brushed aside by ineptitude. Precisely, the Office of
the Ombudsman has the inherent duty not only to carefully go through the particulars of case
but also to resolve the same within the proper length of time. Its dutiful performance should not
only be gauged by the quality of the assessment but also by the reasonable promptness of its
dispensation. Thus, barring any extraordinary complication, such as the degree of difficulty of
the questions involved in the case or any event external thereto that effectively stymied its
normal work activity - any of which have not been adequately proven by the prosecution in the
case at bar - there appears to be no justifiable basis as to why the Office of the Ombudsman
could not have earlier resolved the preliminary investigation proceedings against the petitioners.
(citation omitted; Emphasis supplied)

In the present case, respondents failed to submit any justifiable reason for the protracted
conduct of the investigations and in the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause.
Instead, respondents submit that "the cases subject of this petition involve issues arising from
complex procurement transactions that were conducted in such a way as to conceal overpricing
and other irregularities, by conniving PN officers from different PN units and private individuals."

A review of the COA Special Audit Report No. 92-128, however, shows that it clearly
enumerated the scope of the audit, the transactions involved, the scheme employed by the
concemed PN officers, and the possible basis for the filing of a complaint against the individuals
responsible for the overpricing. Respondents' argument that the case involves "complex
procurement transactions" appears to be unsupported by the facts presented.

There is no question that petitiOner asserted his right to a speedy disposition of cases at the
earliest possible time. In his Counter-Affidavit filed before the Ombudsman during the
reinvestigation of the case in 2014, petitioner had already argued that dismissal of the case is
proper because the long delayed proceedings violated his constitutional right to a speedy
disposition of cases. This shows that petitioner wasted no time to assert his right to have the
cases against him dismissed.

As for the prejudice caused by the delay, respondents claim that no prejudice was caused to
petitioner from the delay in the second set of investigations because he never participated
therein and was actually never even informed of the proceedings anyway. We cannot agree with
this position. A similar assertion was struck down by this Court in Coscolluela, to
wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Lest it be misunderstood, the right to speedy disposition of cases is not merely hinged towards
the objective of spurring dispatch in the administration of justice but also to prevent the
oppression of the citizen by holding a criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite
time. Akin to the right to speedy trial, its "salutary objective" is to assure that an innocent person
may be free from the anxiety and expense of litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt
determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration
of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose. This looming unrest as well as the tactical
disadvantages carried by the passage of time should be weighed against the State and in favor
of the individual. In the context of the right to a speedy trial, the Court in Corpuz v.
Sandiganbayan (Corpuz) illumined:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily compels
the court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.

x x x Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant that the speedy
trial was designed to protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to minimize
anxiety and concerns of the accused to trial; and to limit the possibility that his defense will be
impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately
to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. There is also prejudice if the
defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately the events of the distant past. Even if the
accused is not imprisoned prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and
by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion and often, hostility. His financial resources may be
drained, his association is curtailed, and he is subjected to public obloquy.

Delay is a two-edge sword. It is the government that bears the burden of proving its case
beyond reasonable doubt. The passage of time may make it difficult or impossible for the
government to carry its burden. The Constitution and the Rules do not require impossibilities or
extraordinary efforts, diligence or exertion from courts or the prosecutor, nor contemplate that
such right shall deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly prosecuting criminals. As
held in Williams v. United States, for the government to sustain its right to try the accused
despite a delay, it must show two things: (a) that the accused suffered no serious prejudice
beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay; and (b) that there was no
more delay than IS reasonably attributable to the ordinary processes of justice.

Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification of the State for such delay.
Different weights should be assigned to different reasons or justifications invoked by the State.
For instance, a deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper or prejudice the defense
should be weighted heavily against the State. Also, it is improper for the prosecutor to
intentionally delay to gain some tactical advantage over the defendant or to harass or prejudice
him. On the other hand, the heavy case load of the prosecution or a missing witness should be
weighted less heavily against the State. x x x (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

As the right to a speedy disposition of cases encompasses the broader purview of the entire
proceedings of which trial proper is but a stage. the above-discussed effects in Corpuz should
equally apply to the case at bar.11 x x x (citations omitted; emphasis in the original)

Adopting respondents' position would defeat the very purpose of the right against speedy
disposition of cases. Upholding the same would allow a scenario where the prosecution may
deliberately exclude certain individuals from the investigation only to file the necessary cases at
another, more convenient time, to the prejudice of the accused. Clearly, respondents' assertion
is subject to abuse and cannot be countenanced.

In the present case, petitioner has undoubtedly been prejudiced by virtue of the delay in the
resolution of the cases filed against him. Even though he was not initially included as a
respondent in the investigation conducted from 1996 to 2006 pertaining to the "overpricing of
medicines'' procured through emergency purchase, he has already been deprived of the ability
to adequately prepare his case considering that he may no longer have any access to records
or contact with any witness in support of his defense. This is even aggravated by the fact that
petitioner had been retired for fifteen (15) years. Even if he was never imprisoned and subjected
to trial, it cannot be denied that he has lived under a cloud of anxiety by virtue of the delay in the
resolution of his case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions dated August 27, 2015 and
October 28, 2015 of the Sandiganbayan First Division in Criminal Case Nos. SB-11-CRM-0423,
0424, 0426, 0427, 0429, 0430, 0432, and 0433 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

The Sandiganbayan is likewise ordered to DISMISS Criminal Case Nos. SB-11-CRM-0423,

0424, 0426, 0427, 0429, 0430, 0432, and 0433 for violation of the constitutional right to speedy
disposition of cases of petitioner Commo. Lamberto R. Torres (Ret.).

SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Peralta, Perez, Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

ERWIN LIBO-ON DELA CRUZ

 vs.

 
PEOPLEG.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016

 Routine baggage inspections conducted by port authorities, although done without search
warrants, are notunreasonable searches per se. Constitutional provisions protecting privacy
should not be so literally understood so asto deny reasonable safeguards to ensure the safety
of the traveling public.Dela Cruz, an OJT of an interim-vessel, was at a pier of the
Cebu Domestic Port to go home to Iloilo. While buying aticket, he allegedly left his bag on the
floor with a porter.

When his bag was placed in the x-ray machine, the operatorsaw firearms inside his bag. Upon
seeing the suspected firearms, the operator called the attention of port personnel Archie Igot
(Igot) who was the baggage inspector then. Dela Cruz claimed ownership for the bag and
consented tomanual inspection. Dela Cruz was charged with violation of RA. 8294 for illegal
possession of firearms. The trial courtheld that the search conducted by the port authorities was
reasonable and, thus, valid. The Court finds the accusedguilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 7764 in relation to Section 261 of BP Blg.881.Dela Cruz
argues that there was no voluntary waiver against warrantless search

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner waived his right against unreasonable searches and seizures; and whether
the search was valid

HELD:

If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first
secured if it is to pass thetest of constitutionality. However, the protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures cannot be extended toacts committed by private individuals so as to
bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by thegovernment.

Hence, items seized pursuant to a reasonable search conducted by private persons are not
covered bythe exclusionary rule.However, Court held this doctrine is not applicable in this case
since port security personnel's functions having thecolor of state-related functions and deemed
agents of government. Nevertheless, searches pursuant to port securitymeasures are not
unreasonable per se. The security measures of x-ray scanning and inspection in domestic
portsare akin to routine security procedures in airports.It is axiomatic that a reasonable search
is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according tothe facts of each
case. Given the circumstances obtaining here, we find the search conducted by the
airportauthorities reasonable and, therefore, not violative of his constitutional rights. 

The search rendered was not unreasonable when the baggage inspector opened petitioner’s
bag and called

the attention of the police

. The port personnel's actions proceed from the authority and policy to ensure the safetyof
travelers and vehicles within the port. At this point, petitioner already submitted himself and his
belongings toinspection by placing his bag in the x-ray scanning machine.It is not too
burdensome to be considered as an affront to an ordinary person's right to travel if weighed
against thesafety of all passengers and the security in the port facility.In cases involving the
waiver of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, events must be weighed in
itsentirety. When his bag went through the x-ray machine and the firearms were detected, he
voluntarily submitted hisbag for inspection to the port authorities. It was after the port
personnel's inspection that Officer Abregana's attentionwas called and the bag was inspected
anew with petitioner's consent. Also, there was probable cause that petitionerwas committing a
crime leading to the search of his personal effects.With the foregoing reasons, the search
conducted on petitioner's bag is valid.

PEOPLE VS. EDUARDO

Good Law

SECOND DIVISION G.R. Nos. 138306-07, December 21, 2001 PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. SPO1 EDUARDO ANCHETA Y RODIGOL,
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision of the Regional Trial Court Caloocan City finding SPO1
accused-appellant SPO1 Eduardo Ancheta y Rodigol guilty of Murder in Crim. Case No. C-
44939 and of Frustrated Murder in Crim. Case No. 44940.[1]

SPO1 Eduardo Ancheta y Rodigol[2] was originally charged with Homicide in Crim. Case No. C-

44939 and Frustrated Homicide in Crim. Case No. C-44940. However, upon motion of private
complainant, a reinvestigation was conducted and the Informations were amended to charge
the accused with Murder in Crim. Case No. C-44939 and Frustrated Murder in Crim Case No.
C-44940.

In the amended Information for Murder, it was alleged that the accused "with deliberate intent to
kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously shoot one Julian Ancheta y Rodigol on the left temple, thereby inflicting upon the
latter serious physical injuries, which injuries caused the victim's death."[3] On the other hand, in
the amended Information for Frustrated Murder it was alleged that the accused "with deliberate
intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously shoot with a gun one Jonathan Aromin y Cardinez on the right cheek, thus
performing all the acts of execution which would constitute the crime of Murder as a
consequence but which nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the
will of the herein accused, that is, due to timely, able and efficient medical attendance rendered
to the victim."[4]

During trial, the main witness for the prosecution, Jonathan Aromin, testified that on the night of
2 September 1993 he and his neighbor Julian Ancheta went to the house of the accused who
lived just across them.[5] Julian told Jonathan to knock on the door first but when no one
answered Julian did the knocking himself.[6] When the accused opened the door, Jonathan
immediately noticed that SPO1 Ancheta was armed with a gun. Intimidated, Jonathan began to
move away.[7] As he left the house of the accused, Jonathan suddenly heard two (2) shots
which prompted him to hide behind the nearest wall. But when he looked back the accused
SPO1 Ancheta was already aiming his revolver directly at his face and without hesitation shot
him at close range.[8] Stunned by the gunshot wound, Jonathan momentarily blacked out but
soon regained consciousness when his neighbor, Leonila Lopez, came to his aid and rushed
him to the Jose Reyes Memorial Medical Center.[9] At the hospital, the slug that pierced his
right cheek was removed from his left shoulder and was subsequently released on 7 September
1993.[10]

Leonila Lopez narrated that her house was right across the house of the accused, separated
only by a narrow alley.[11] At around 8:00 o'clock in the evening of 2 September 1993 while she
was preparing dinner, she was startled by the sound of two (2) gunshots coming from the house
of the accused. She immediately told her children to go inside and as she was about to close
her windows she saw Jonathan Aromin running towards her house, followed by the accused.
She then saw the accused shoot Jonathan Aromin on the right cheek. After the accused left,
she helped the hapless victim and brought him to the hospital.[12] She was approximately a
meter away when she witnessed the shooting.[13]

Virginia Ancheta, wife of Julian Ancheta, testified that she and her deceased husband had two
(2) children and that she incurred P54,200.00 as funeral expenses for his burial.[14]

Dr. Roberto Garcia, a Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI, testified that he autopsied the body of
Julian Ancheta on 3 September 1993. Julian sustained three (3) gunshot wounds. One (1) bullet
pierced the the back of his left forearm and exited in front thereof, another entered the rear left
portion of the neck and exited through the right rear portion thereof, while the fatal bullet pierced
the front portion of the left ear without an exit wound.[15] However, although Dr. Garcia
concluded that three (3) bullets hit the deceased, he did not discount the possibility that the
three (3) wounds could have been caused by only two (2) bullets as the left arm, being a
movable part of the body, might have been in the way when the bullet exited through the neck of
the victim.[16]

Police Officer 3 Feliciano Almojuela of the Intelligence and Investigation Division, PNP Station,
Caloocan City, claimed that in the early morning of 3 September 1993 he received a report of a
shooting incident at Block 36, Phase 3-F-1 Dagat-dagatan, Caloocan City.[17] Upon reaching
the crime scene he was informed that the slain victim was S/Sgt. Julian Ancheta of the
Philippine Air Force and the suspect was the deceased's brother SPO1 Eduardo Ancheta.
When he learned that another victim was confined at the Jose Reyes Memorial Medical Center
he went there and found Jonathan Aromin in critical condition. Thinking that the victim might not
survive he immediately interviewed him and took an "ante-mortem" statement.[18] In the
afternoon of the same day, the accused voluntarily surrendered himself as well as his service
firearm at the PNP Station in Caloocan City.[19] At around 11:00 p.m., PO3 Almojuela brought
the accused to the hospital where the latter was positively identified by Jonathan Aromin as the
assailant.[20]

Dr. Abraham Gonzales, the resident physician at the Jose Reyes Memorial Medical Center,
testified that he was on duty on 2 September 1993 when Jonathan Aromin was admitted. Upon
examination he observed that the victim sustained a gunshot wound on the right portion of his
jaw and no exit wound was visible.[21] During treatment, the lead slug was recovered from the
left side of the neck or from the "trapicious muscle."[22] He added that were it not for the timely
medical intervention Jonathan Aromin would have died.[23]

In his defense, the accused claimed that on the night of 2 September 1993 he was sleeping at
home with his wife and son when he was awakened by the sound of someone banging on his
door.[24] After a brief silence he heard him say: "Pare buksan mo ito." Sensing danger, the
accused took his gun from under his pillow and ordered the person to identify himself. But the
stranger just kept on banging the door and insisted that it be opened.[25] When he finally
opened the door, he saw his brother Julian Ancheta and his neighbor Jonathan Aromin. Upon
seeing them, he inquired as to why his brother addressed him as "pare" but instead of
answering, Julian Ancheta angrily asked him why he was holding a gun.[26] To appease his
brother, the accused lowered his pistol and explained that the gun was only for protection as he
had no idea who was banging his door in the middle of the night. He then invited them into the
house, but when he turned around his brother suddenly grabbed his hand from behind to disarm
him.[27] As they grappled, the gun accidentally fired twice and the next thing he saw was his
brother sprawled on the ground and Jonathan Aromin was nowhere to be found. He never knew
what actually happened to Jonathan Aromin as his back was turned against him when the gun
went off.[28]

Confused by the startling events, the accused just took his family to the house of his wife's
cousin. His wife then convinced him to spend the night with them and postpone his surrender
until the next day.[29] At around 6:00 o'clock p.m.[30] of 3 September 1993 he surrendered at
the PNP Station in Caloocan City. After being taken into custody, PO3 Almojuela brought him to
the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital where Jonathan Aromin identified him as the perpetrator.[31]

On 26 March 1999 the trial court, giving credence to the prosecution witnesses, found the
accused guilty of both charges.[32] In Crim. Case No. C- 44939, the accused was found guilty
of Murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He was also ordered to pay the heirs of the
victim P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P54,200.00 as actual and compensatory damages and
the costs. In Crim. Case No. C-44940 the accused was found guilty of Frustrated Murder and
was sentenced to ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years and eight
(8) months of reclusion temporal as maximum. He was also ordered to pay Jonathan Aromin
P30,000.00 as moral damages and the costs.[33]

Accused-appellant, in his brief, raises two (2) points: First, his guilt was not proved beyond
reasonable doubt as the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution failed to
establish that he intended to kill Julian Ancheta and Jonathan Aromin. Second, the court a
quo gravely erred in convicting him of murder and frustrated murder since there was no proof
that the killing was attended by evident premeditation or treachery.[34]

The defense of accused-appellant is that the death of Julian Ancheta and the injury of Jonathan
Aromin were caused by the accidental gunshots which occurred when he and the deceased
grappled for the gun. Thus, absent any intent to kill the victims, he could not be convicted of
homicide or murder.

However, the evidence presented proves otherwise.

The autopsy of Julian Ancheta reveals that he sustained three (3) bullet wounds: one (1) in the
rear of the left forearm, another on the left rear portion of his neck and the most fatal one, on the
front portion of his left temple.

On the other hand, Jonathan Aromin sustained a gunshot wound on his right cheek which would
have caused his death had it not been for the timely medical attention. Based on the number of
bullet wounds and the location of the injuries sustained by the victims it is quite impossible to
believe that such wounds were caused by two (2) accidental gunshots which ensued while the
accused and the deceased wrestled for the gun. On the contrary, the location of the injuries
proves that accused-appellant intentionally shot his own brother to death and thereafter shot the
eyewitness at point blank to permanently silence him.

Further, Jonathan Aromin categorically and positively identified accused-appellant as the person
who pursued and shot him at close range. This Court has no reason to doubt his testimony for
even accused-appellant admitted that he and the witness were in good terms prior to the
incident.[35] Neither does this Court have any ground to question the veracity of Leonila Lopez's
testimony that she saw accused-appellant shoot Jonathan Aromin as there was no proved ill
motive on her part. Thus, where there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or improper
motive why prosecution witnesses should testify falsely against the accused or falsely implicate
him in a heinous crime, such testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit.[36] Besides, it has
been an established rule that unless the trial judge overlooked certain facts of substance and
value, which if considered might affect the result of the case, appellate courts will not disturb the
credence, or lack of it, accorded by the trial court to the testimonies of witnesses.[37] We find no
reason to deviate from this well-entrenched principle.

But although we affirm the factual findings of the trial court on the presence of "intent to kill," we
believe that the killing of Julian Ancheta and the shooting of Jonathan Aromin were not qualified
by treachery.

While it was established that accused-appellant intentionally shot his brother Julian, the
witnesses never saw how the killing started. Treachery cannot be considered where the
witnesses did not see the commencement of the assault and the importance of such testimonies
cannot be overemphasized considering that treachery cannot be presumed nor established from
mere suppositions.[38] And where no particulars are shown as to the manner by which the
aggression was commenced or how the act which resulted in the death of the victim began and
developed, treachery can in no way be established.[39] Hence, without the existence of
treachery accused-appellant can only be convicted of homicide in Crim. Case No. C-44939.

Neither was treachery established in the shooting of Jonathan Aromin. Two (2) conditions must
concur for treachery to exist, namely: (a) the employment of means of execution that gave the
person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and, (b) the means or method
of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted.[40] Both these circumstances must be
proved as indubitably as the crime itself.[41]

In the case at bar, however, there is no sufficient proof to establish with certainty that accused-
appellant deliberately and consciously adopted the means of executing the crime against
Jonathan Aromin. Furthermore, the victim was already aware of the danger as he saw accused-
appellant carrying a gun and heard two (2) gunshots prompting him to run and hide behind a
wall.[42] Thus, there could be no treachery since prior to the attack the victim was forewarned of
the danger to his life and even managed to flee, albeit unsuccessfully.[43] Consequently,
accused-appellant can only be convicted of frustrated homicide in Crim. Case No.C-44940.

It must be noted that the testimonies of the witnesses show that accused-appellant surrendered
himself on 3 September 1993 at the PNP Station in Caloocan City. For voluntary surrender to
be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance the following requisites must concur: (a) the
offender had not been actually arrested; (b) the offender surrendered himself to a person in
authority; and, (c) the surrender was voluntary.[44] All these requisites were present in this case
as PO3 Feliciano Almojuela confirmed that on 3 September 1993, the day after the incident,
accused-appellant voluntarily gave himself up and his service firearm at the PNP Station in
Caloocan City.[45] Thus, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be
appreciated in his favor.

Article 249 of The Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty for homicide is reclusion
temporal. There being one mitigating circumstance, namely, voluntary surrender, the imposable
penalty is reclusion temporal in its minimum period the range of which is twelve (12) years and
one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the maximum shall be taken from the minimum of the imposable penalty while the
minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision mayor the range
of which is six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years.

Article 50 of The Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty next lower in degree than that
prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principal in a
frustrated felony. Thus, in Crim. Case No. C-44940, there also being one (1) mitigating
circumstance, the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence shall be taken from prision
mayor in its minimum period, the range of which is from six (6) years and one (1) day to eight
(8) years, while the minimum term shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which
is prision correccional, in any of its periods, the range of which is six (6) months and one (1) day
to six (6) years.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court appealed from convicting accused-appellant SPO1
Eduardo Ancheta y Rodigol of Murder in Crim. Case No. C-44939 and Frustrated
Murder in Crim. Case No. C-44940, is MODIFIED.

In G.R. No. 138306 (Crim. Case No C-44939), accused-appellant SPO1 Eduardo Ancheta y
Rodigol is found guilty of HOMICIDE and is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of six (6)
years eight (8) months and ten (10) days of prision mayor minimum as minimum to twelve (12)
years six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal minimum as maximum. He is
also ordered to pay the heirs of Julian Ancheta P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P54,200.00 as
actual and compensatory damages, plus the costs.

In G.R. No. 138307 (Crim. Case No. C-44940), accused-appellant SPO1 Eduardo Ancheta y
Rodigol is found guilty of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE and is sentenced to an indeterminate
prison term of two (2) years two (2) months and twenty (20) days of prision
correccional minimum as minimum to six (6) years four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision
mayor minimum as maximum. He is also ordered to pay Jonathan Aromin P30,000.00 as moral
damages plus the costs.
SO ORDERED.

Mendoza, Quisumbing, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Buena, J., on official business.

Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board Case Digest (GR Nos. 157870,
158633, 161658)

JUNE 2, 2019 ~ PINGTHINGLAW

Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board

GR Nos. 157870, 158633, 161658

November 3, 2008

Facts:

Petitioners question the constitutionality of Section 36 of RA 9165, a.k.a. the Comprehensive

Drugs Act of 2002. Section 36 requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office,
students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices,
and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses, particularly those who
are charged with offenses punishable by a penalty of not less than 6 years and 1 day of
imprisonment.

On December 23, 2003, COMELEC issued Resolution 6486, which provides the rules on the
mandatory drugs testing of candidates for public office. It requires the COMELEC offices and
employees concerned to submit two separate lists of candidates: one for those who complied
with the mandatory drug testing and the other of those who failed to comply.

It was Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. who opposed such resolution, contending that it was
unconstitutional as it imposes an additional qualification for senators.

Issues:

1. Do Section 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution 6468 impose an additional

qualification for candidates for senator?

2. Is RA 9165 unconstitutional?

Ruling:

1. Yes. The COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or
promulgating rules and regulations to implement Section 36, validly impose qualifications on
candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution provides. The COMELEC resolution
effectively enlarges that qualification requirements for senator, enumerated under Section 3,
Article VI of the Constitution.

2. The provision of RA 9165 requiring mandatory drug testing for students (Section 36[b]) are
constitutional as long as they are random and suspicionless. This is because schools and their
administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students, and schools have the right to
impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair and non-discriminatory.

The provision requiring mandatory drug testing for officers and employees of public and private
offices (Section 36[d])  are also justifiable. The privacy expectation in a regulated office
environment is reduced. A degree of impingement upon such privacy has been upheld. To the
Court, the need for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug use is substantial enough to
override the individual’s privacy interest under the premises.

On the other hand, the Court finds no justification in the mandatory drug testing of those
prosecuted for crimes punishable by imprisonment of more than 6 years and 1 day (Section
36[f]). The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are randomness and suspicionless.
In this case, it cannot be said that the drug testing is random. To impose mandatory drug testing
on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution,
contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165.

In sum, Section 36(c) and (d) are constitutional, but 36(f) is not.

VALENTINO L. LEGASPI v. CITY OF CEBU, GR No. 159110, 2013-12-10

Facts:

the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cebu enacted Ordinance No. 1664 to authorize the
traffic enforcers of Cebu City to immobilize any motor vehicle violating the parking restrictions
and prohibitions defined in Ordinance No. 801 (Traffic Code of Cebu

City)
Atty. Bienvenido Jaban (Jaban, Sr.) and his son... brought suit in the RTC in Cebu City against
the City of Cebu, then represented by Hon. Alvin Garcia, its City Mayor... seeking the
declaration of Ordinance No. 1644 as unconstitutional for being in violation of due process and
for being contrary to... law, and damages.

Their complaint alleged that

Jaban Sr. had properly parked his car in a paying parking area on Manalili Street, Cebu City to
get certain records and documents from his office;[4] that upon his... return after less than 10
minutes, he had found his car being immobilized by a steel clamp, and a notice being posted on
the car to the effect that it would be a criminal offense to break the clamp;... that he had been
infuriated by the immobilization of... his car because he had been thereby rendered unable to
meet an important client on that day... that the fine was imposed without any court hearing and
without due process of law, for he was not even told why his car had been immobilized... that he
had undergone a similar incident of clamping of his car... without violating any traffic regulation
or causing any obstruction... that he was compelled to pay P1,500.00... for the... violation)
without any court hearing and final judgment

Valentino Legaspi (Legaspi) likewise sued in the RTC the City of Cebu... to demand the delivery
of personal property, declaration of nullity of the Traffic Code of Cebu City, and damages.

He averred that... he had left his car occupying a portion of the sidewalk and the street outside
the gate of his house to make way for the vehicle of the anay exterminator who had asked to be
allowed to unload his materials... and equipment... that unknown persons had clamped the front
wheel of his car;... and that in the late afternoon a group headed by Ricardo Hapitan towed
the... car even if it was not obstructing the flow of traffic.

In separate answers for the City of Cebu and its co-defendants,... the City Attorney of Cebu
presented similar defenses, essentially stating that the traffic enforcers had only upheld the law
by clamping the vehicles of the plaintiffs;[14] and that Ordinance No. 1664 enjoyed the
presumption of constitutionality and validity.

the RTC... rendered... its decision declaring Ordinance No. 1664 as null and void

"procedural due process is that which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry
and renders judgment only... after trial." It contemplate(s) notice and opportunity to be heard
before judgment is rendered affecting ones (sic) person or property."

It should be stressed that the owner of the... immobilized vehicle shall have to undergo all these
ordeals at the mercy of the Traffic Law Enforcer who, as the Ordinance in question mandates, is
the arresting officer, prosecutor, Judge and collector. Otherwise stated, the owner of the
immobilized motor vehicle is deprived of... his right to the use of his/her vehicle and penalized
without a hearing by a person who is not legally or duly vested with such rights, power or
authority.

the CA promulgated its assailed decision,[17] overturning the RTC and declaring Ordinance No.
1664 valid
Issues:

Whether Ordinance No. 1664 was enacted within the ambit of the legislative powers of the City
of Cebu

Whether Ordinance No. 1664 complied with the requirements for validity and constitutionality,
particularly the limitations set by the Constitution and the relevant statutes.

Ruling:

The petitions for review have no merit.

for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by... law, it
must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and...
consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.

the tests are divided into the formal (i.e., whether the ordinance was enacted within the
corporate powers of the LGU, and whether it was passed in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by law), and the substantive (i.e., involving... inherent merit, like the conformity of the
ordinance with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the
requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy).

Was the enactment of Ordinance No. 1664 within the corporate powers of the LGU of the City of
Cebu?

The answer is in the affirmative.

Compliance of Ordinance No. 1664with the substantive requirements

The first substantive requirement for a valid ordinance is the adherence to the constitutional
guaranty of due process of law.

The guaranty of due process of law is a constitutional safeguard against any arbitrariness on the
part of the Government, whether committed by the Legislature, the Executive, or the Judiciary.

If the law itself unreasonably deprives a person of his life, liberty, or property, he is denied the
protection of due process. If the enjoyment of his rights is conditioned on an unreasonable
requirement, due process is likewise violated.

Whatsoever be the... source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or merely a statute, its
unjustified withholding would also be a violation of due process. Any government act that
militates against the ordinary norms of justice or fair play is considered an infraction of the great
guaranty... of due process; and this is true whether the denial involves violation merely of the
procedure prescribed by the law or affects the very validity of the law itself.
This clause has been interpreted as imposing two separate limits on government, usually called
"procedural due process" and "substantive due process."

Procedural due process, as the phrase implies, refers to the procedures that the government
must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property.

hat kind of notice and what form of hearing the government... must provide when it takes a
particular action.

Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks whether the government has an
adequate reason for taking away a person's life, liberty, or property.

looks to whether there is sufficient justification for the government's action.

whether there is such a justification depends very much on the level of scrutiny used.

if a law is in an area where only rational basis review is applied, substantive due process is met
so long as the law is... rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. But if it is an area
where strict scrutiny is used, such as for protecting fundamental rights, then the government will
meet substantive due process only if it can prove that the law is necessary to achieve a
compelling... government purpose.

The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost
observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Such
power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically as its exercise is subject to a...
qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the respect and regard due to the prescription
of the fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights.

according to the foregoing enunciation of the guaranty of due process of law, the contentions of
the petitioners cannot be sustained. Even under strict scrutiny review, Ordinance No. 1664 met
the substantive tests of validity and constitutionality by its conformity with... the limitations under
the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and
its consistency with public policy.

the terms encroachment and obstacles used in Section 458 of the LGC, supra, were broad
enough to include illegally parked vehicles or whatever else obstructed the streets, alleys and
sidewalks, which were precisely the subject of Ordinance No. 1664 in... avowedly aiming to
ensure "a smooth flow of vehicular traffic in all the streets in the City of Cebu at all times"

This aim was borne out by its Whereas Clauses,... Considering that traffic congestions were
already retarding the growth and progress in the population and economic centers of the
country, the plain objective of Ordinance No. 1664 was to serve the public interest and advance
the general welfare in the City of Cebu.

ts adoption... was, therefore, in order to fulfill the compelling government purpose of

immediately addressing the burgeoning traffic congestions caused by illegally parked vehicles
obstructing the streets of the City of Cebu.
Legaspi's attack against the provisions of Ordinance No. 1664 for being vague and ambiguous
cannot stand scrutiny.

As can be readily seen, its text was forthright and unambiguous in all respects. There could be
no confusion on the meaning and coverage of the ordinance. But... should there be any
vagueness and ambiguity in the provisions... there was nothing that a proper application of the
basic rules of statutory construction could not justly rectify.

The petitioners further assert that drivers or vehicle owners affected by Ordinance No. 1664 like
themselves were not accorded the opportunity to protest the clamping, towing, and impounding
of the vehicles, or even to be heard and to explain their side prior to the... immobilization of their
vehicles; and that the ordinance was oppressive and arbitrary for that reason.

The adverse assertions against Ordinance No. 1664 are unwarranted.

Firstly, Ordinance No. 1664 was far from oppressive and arbitrary.

Section 3 of Ordinance No. 1664, supra,... textually afforded an administrative escape in the
form of permitting the release of the immobilized vehicle upon a protest directly made to the
Chairman of CITOM; or to the Chairman of the Committee on Police, Fire and Penology of the
City of Cebu; or to Asst. City Prosecutor

Felipe Belciña officials named in the ordinance itself. The release could be ordered by any of
such officials even without the payment of the stipulated fine. That none of the petitioners, albeit
lawyers all, resorted to such recourse did not diminish the fairness and... reasonableness of the
escape clause written in the ordinance.

Secondly, the immobilization of a vehicle by clamping pursuant to the ordinance was not
necessary if the driver or vehicle owner was around at the time of the apprehension for illegal
parking or obstruction.

In that... situation, the enforcer would simply either require the driver to move the vehicle or
issue a traffic citation should the latter persist in his violation. The clamping would happen only
to prevent the transgressor from using the vehicle itself to escape the due sanctions.

nd,... lastly, the towing away of the immobilized vehicle was not equivalent to a summary
impounding, but designed to prevent the immobilized vehicle from obstructing traffic in the
vicinity of the apprehension and thereby ensure the smooth flow of traffic. The owner of the
towed... vehicle would not be deprived of his property.

Notice and hearing are the essential requirements of procedural due process. Yet, there are
many instances under our laws in which the absence of one or both of such requirements is not
necessarily a denial or deprivation of due process.

ancellation... of the passport of a person being sought for the commission of a crime... the
preventive suspension of a civil servant facing administrative charges... the padlocking of
restaurants found to be unsanitary... arrest of a person in flagrante delicto
As already said, the immobilization of illegally... parked vehicles by clamping the tires was
necessary because the transgressors were not around at the time of apprehension. Under such
circumstance, notice and hearing would be superfluous. Nor should the lack of a trial-type
hearing prior to the clamping constitute a breach of... procedural due process, for giving the
transgressors the chance to reverse the apprehensions through a timely protest could equally
satisfy the need for a hearing.

WHEREFORE... the Court DENIES the petitions for review on certiorari for their lack of merit;
AFFIRMS the decision promulgated... by the Court of Appeals

Principles:

The goal of the decentralization of powers to the local government units (LGUs) is to ensure the
enjoyment by each of the territorial and political subdivisions of the State of a genuine and
meaningful local autonomy. To attain the goal, the National

Legislature has devolved the three great inherent powers of the State to the LGUs. Each
political subdivision is thereby vested with such powers subject to constitutional and statutory
limitations.

In particular, the Local Government Code (LGC) has expressly empowered the LGUs to enact
and adopt ordinances to regulate vehicular traffic and to prohibit illegal parking within their
jurisdictions.

YNOT v. IAC

FACTS

Here, the constitutionality of former President Marcos’s Executive Order No. 626-A is assailed.

Said order decreed an absolute ban on the inter-provincial transportation of carabao (regardless
of age, sex, physical condition or purpose) and carabeef. The carabao or carabeef transported
in violation of this shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government, to be distributed
to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat
Inspection Commission (NMIC) may see fit, in the case of carabeef. In the case of carabaos,
these shall be given to deserving farmers as the Director of Animal Industry (AI) may also see
fit. Petitioner had transported six (6) carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo. These
were confiscated by the police for violation of the above order. He sued for recovery, which the
RTC granted upon his filing of a supersedeas bond worth 12k. After trial on the merits, the lower
court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos, and as they can no longer be produced,
directed the confiscation of the bond. It deferred from ruling on the constitutionality of
the executive order, on the grounds of want of authority and presumed validity. On appeal to
the Intermediate Appellate Court, such ruling was upheld. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari. On the main, petitioner asserts that EO 626-A is unconstitutional insofar as it
authorizes outright confiscation, and that its penalty suffers from invalidity because it is imposed
without giving the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court—as
guaranteed by due process.

ISSUE

Whether  EO 626-A is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process clause.

HELD

YES. To warrant a valid exercise of police power, the following must be present: (a) that the
interests of the public, generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such
interference, and; (b) that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose. In US v. Toribio, the Court has ruled that EO 626 complies with the above
requirements—that is, the carabao, as a poor man’s tractor so to speak, has a direct relevance
to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of the order, and that the method chosen is also
reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive. The
ban of the slaughter of carabaos except those seven years old if male and eleven if female upon
issuance of a permit adequately works for the conservation of those still fit for farm work or
breeding, and prevention of their improvident depletion. Here, while EO 626-A has the same
lawful subject, it fails to observe the second requirement. Notably, said EO imposes an absolute
ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement. The object of the prohibition is
unclear. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to
be achieved by the disputed measure is missing. It is not clear how the interprovincial transport
of the animals can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, as they can be killed anywhere, with
no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining them in one province will
not prevent their slaughter there, any more that moving them to another will make it easier to kill
them there. Even if assuming there was a reasonable relation between the means and the end,
the penalty is invalid as it amounts to outright confiscation, denying petitioner a chance to be
heard. Unlike in the Toribio case, here, no trial is prescribed and the property being transported
is immediately impounded by the police and declared as forfeited for the government.
Concededly, there are certain occasions when notice and hearing can be validly dispensed with,
such as summary abatement of a public nuisance, summary destruction of pornographic
materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs. However, these are justified for reasons of
immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and urgency of the need to correct it. In the
instant case, no such pressure is present. The manner by which the disposition of the
confiscated property also presents a case of invalid delegation of legislative powers since the
officers mentioned (Chairman and Director of the NMIC and AI respectively) are granted
unlimited discretion. The usual standard and reasonable guidelines that said officers must
observe in making the distribution are nowhere to be found; instead, they are to go about it as
they may see fit. Obviously, this makes the exercise prone to partiality and abuse, and even
corruption.

FRANCISCO CHAVEZ v. RAUL M. GONZALES, GR No. 168338, 2008-02-15

Facts:

events that occurred a year after the 2004 national and local elections.

Ignacio Bunye told reporters that the opposition was planning to destabilize the administration
by releasing an audiotape of a mobile phone... conversation allegedly between the President of
the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, and a high-ranking official of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC).

wire-tapping... manipulate the election results in the

President's favor.

respondent Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Raul Gonzales warned reporters that those
who had copies of the compact disc (CD) and those broadcasting or publishing its contents
could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act.

Secretary Gonzales ordered the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to go after media
organizations "found to have caused the spread, the playing and the printing of the contents of a
tape"... he was going to start with Inq7.net, a joint venture between the Philippine Daily Inquirer
and GMA7 televi... personalities have admitted that the taped conversations are products of
illegal wiretapping operations.

warned that their broadcast/airing of such false information and/or willful misrepresentation shall
be just cause for the... suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or
authorizations issued to the said companies.

NTC allegedly assured the KBP that the press release did not violate the constitutional freedom
of speech, of expression, and of the press,... and the right to information. Accordingly, NTC and
KBP issued a Joint Press Statement

Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against respondents
Secretary Gonzales and the NTC, "praying for the issuance of the writs of certior... prevent the...
unlawful, unconstitutional and oppressive exercise of authority by the respondents."[13]... leging
that the acts of respondents are violations of the freedom on expression and of the press, and
the right of the people to information on matters of public concern,... whether the acts of the
respondents abridge freedom of speech and of the press.

Issues:

whether the acts of the respondents abridge freedom of speech and of the press.

Ruling:

Freedom of expression has gained recognition as a fundamental principle of every democratic

government, and given a preferred right that stands on a higher level than substantive economic
freedom or other liberties.

history shows that the struggle to protect the freedom of speech, expression and the press was,
at... bottom, the struggle for the indispensable preconditions for the exercise of other freedoms.
[30] For it is only when the people have unbridled access to information and the press that they
will be capable of rendering enlightened judgments.
The scope of freedom of expression is so broad that it extends protection to nearly all forms of
communication. It protects speech, print and assembly regarding secular as well as political
causes, and is not confined to any particular field of human interest. The protection... covers
myriad matters of public interest or concern embracing all issues

The constitutional protection is not limited to the exposition of ideas. The protection afforded
free speech extends to speech or publications that are entertaining as well as instructive or
informative.

freedom of expression is not an absolute... that in our jurisdiction slander or libel, lewd and
obscene speech, as well as "fighting words" are not entitled to constitutional... protection and
may be penalized.

permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established between the
speech... restrained and the danger contemplated;... standard when courts need to balance
conflicting social values and individual interests,... speech may be restrained because there is
substantial danger that the speech will likely lead to an evil... the government has a right to
prevent.

press freedom

It is the chief source of information on current affairs. It is the most pervasive and... perhaps
most powerful vehicle of opinion on public questions. It is the instrument by which citizens keep
their government informed of their needs, their aspirations and their grievances.

closure of the business and printing offices of certain newspapers, resulting in the
discontinuation of their printing and publication, are... deemed as previous restraint or
censorship.

law or official that requires some form of permission to be had before publication can be made,
commits an infringement of the constitutional right, and remedy can be had at the courts.

A distinction has to be made whether the restraint is (1) a content-neutral regulation... or (2) a
content-based restraint or censorship,... The government has a right to be protected against
broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently overthrow it. Radio and television may not be
used to organize a rebellion or to signal the start of widespread uprising. At the same time, the
people have... a right to be informed.

The stricter system of controls seems to have been adopted in answer to the view that owing to
their particular impact... on audiences, films, videos and broadcasting require a system of prior
restraints, whereas it is now accepted that books and other printed media do not. These media
are viewed as beneficial to the public in a number of respects, but are also seen as possible
sources of... harm.[93]... argument persists that broadcasting is the most influential means of
communication, since it comes into the home, and so much time is spent watching television.
Since it has a unique... impact on people and affects children in a way that the print media
normally does not, that regulation is said to be necessary in order to preserve pluralism.
applicable standard to content-based restrictions on broadcast media

For this failure of the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger
test, the Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free press. There is
no... showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the national
security of the State.

It is sufficient that the press statements were made by respondents while in the exercise of their
official... functions. Undoubtedly, respondent Gonzales made his statements as Secretary of
Justice, while the NTC issued its statement as the regulatory body of media. Any act done, such
as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of the government in an official capacity is covered by...
the rule on prior restraint. The concept of an "act" does not limit itself to acts already converted
to a formal order or official circular. Otherwise, the non formalization of an act into an official
order or circular will result in the easy circumvention of the p

There is enough evidence of chilling effect of the complained acts on record. The warnings
given to media came from no less the NTC,... petition is GRANTED. The writs of certiorari and
prohibition are hereby issued, nullifying the official statements made by respondents on June 8,
and 11, 2005 warning the media on airing the alleged wiretapped conversation between the

President and other personalities, for constituting unconstitutio

Principles:

freedom of the press is crucial and so inextricably woven into the right to free speech and free
expression, that any attempt to restrict it must be met with an examination so critical that only a
danger that is clear and present... would be allowed to curtail it.

free speech and free press may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully
any matter of public interest without censorship and punishment.

To be truly meaningful, freedom of speech and of the press should allow and even encourage
the articulation of the unorthodox view, though it be hostile to or derided by others; or though
such view "induces a... condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or
even stirs people to anger."[39] To paraphrase Justice Holmes, it is freedom for the thought that
we hate, no less than for the thought that agrees with us.[40]... restraints on freedom of speech
and expression are evaluated by either or a combination of three tes... four aspects of freedom
of the press. These are (1) freedom from prior restraint; (2) freedom from punishment
subsequent to publication;[53] (3) freedom of... access to information;[54] and (4) freedom of
circulation.[55]

Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of
expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination.

freedom from government censorship of... publications... not all prior restraints on speech are
invalid. Certain previous restraints may be permitted by the Constitution, but determined only
upon a careful evaluation of the challenged act as... against the appropriate test by which it
should be measured against.

speech restraints take the form of a content-neutral regulation, only a substantial governmental
interest is required for its validity.[62]... governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or
of the press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny in light of its inherent and invasive
impact. Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger... rule will it
pass constitutional muster,[65] with the government having the burden of overcoming the
presumed unconstitutionality.

content-based restrictions, the government must also show the type of harm the speech sought
to be restrained would bring about especially the gravity and the imminence of the threatened
harm otherwise the prior restraint will be invalid.

showing a substantive and imminent evil... question of proximity and degree."[... prior restraint
partakes of a content-neutral regulation, it is subjected to an intermediate review. A content-
based regulation,[73] however, bears a heavy presumption of invalidity and is measured against
the clear and... present danger rule. The latter will pass constitutional muster only if justified by
a compelling reason,... (3)

All forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the
freedom of speech and expression clause. The test for limitations on freedom of expression
continues to be the clear and present danger rule, that words... are used in such circumstances
and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent,... a governmental action that restricts
freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given the strictest... scrutiny, with the
government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and
present danger rule. This rule applies equally to all kinds of media, including broadcast media.

procedural map

(a) the test; (b) the presumption; (c) the burden of proof; (d) the party to discharge the burden;
and (e) the quantum of evidence necessary.

ELISEO F. SORIANO v. MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA, GR No. 164785, 2009-04-29

Facts:
In these two petitions for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Eliseo F. Soriano
seeks to nullify and set aside an order and a decision of the Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board (MTRCB) in connection with certain utterances... he made in his television
show, Ang Dating Daan.

After a preliminary conference in which petitioner appeared, the MTRCB, by Order of August 16,
2004, preventively suspended the showing of Ang Dating Daan program for 20 days, in
accordance with Section 3(d) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1986, creating the MTRCB, in...
relation to Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004 Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of PD
1986 and Sec. 7, Rule VII of the MTRCB Rules of Procedure.[5]  The same order also set the
case for preliminary investigation.

The following day, petitioner sought reconsideration of the preventive suspension order, praying
that Chairperson Consoliza P. Laguardia and two other members of the adjudication board
recuse themselves from hearing the case.[6]  Two days after,... however, petitioner sought to
withdraw[7] his motion for reconsideration, followed by the filing with this Court of a petition for
certiorari and prohibition,[8] docketed as G.R. No. 164785, to nullify the preventive suspension
order... thus issued.

Issues:

THE ORDER OF PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION PROMULGATED BY RESPONDENT [MTRCB]

DATED 16 AUGUST 2004 AGAINST THE TELEVISION PROGRAM ANG DATING DAAN x x x
IS NULL AND VOID FOR BEING ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF

JURISDICTION

We shall first dispose of the issues in G.R. No. 164785, regarding

It is petitioner's threshold posture that the preventive suspension imposed against him and the
relevant IRR provision authorizing it are invalid inasmuch as PD 1986 does not expressly
authorize the MTRCB to issue preventive suspension.

Ruling:

Petitioner's contention is untenable.

Administrative agencies have powers and functions which may be administrative, investigatory,
regulatory, quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial, or a mix of the five, as may be conferred by the
Constitution or by statute.[12]  They have in fine only... such powers or authority as are granted
or delegated, expressly or impliedly, by law.[13]  And in determining whether an agency has
certain powers, the inquiry should be from the law itself. But once ascertained as existing, the
authority given should... be liberally construed.[14]

A perusal of the MTRCB's basic mandate under PD 1986 reveals the possession by the agency
of the authority, albeit impliedly, to issue the challenged order of preventive suspension. And
this authority stems naturally from, and is necessary for the exercise of, its power of... regulation
and supervision.

The issuance of a preventive suspension comes well within the scope of the MTRCB's authority
and functions expressly set forth in PD 1986, more particularly under its Sec. 3(d), as quoted
above, which empowers the MTRCB to "supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel,
permits... for the x x x exhibition, and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures, television
programs and publicity materials, to the end that no such pictures, programs and materials as
are determined by the BOARD to be objectionable in accordance with paragraph (c) hereof shall
be... x x x exhibited and/or broadcast by television."

Recall that the MTRCB is expressly empowered by statute to regulate and supervise
television... programs to obviate the exhibition or broadcast of, among others, indecent or
immoral materials and to impose sanctions for violations and, corollarily, to prevent further
violations as it investigates. Contrary to petitioner's assertion, the aforequoted Sec. 3 of the
IRR... neither amended PD 1986 nor extended the effect of the law. Neither did the MTRCB, by
imposing the assailed preventive suspension, outrun its authority under the law. Far from it. The
preventive suspension was actually done in furtherance of the law, imposed pursuant, to
repeat,... to the MTRCB's duty of regulating or supervising television programs, pending a
determination of whether or not there has actually been a violation.  In the final analysis, Sec. 3,
Chapter XIII of the 2004 IRR merely formalized a power which PD 1986 bestowed, albeit...
impliedly, on MTRCB.

Even if we concede that petitioner's remarks are not obscene but merely indecent speech, still
the Court rules that petitioner cannot avail himself of the constitutional protection of free speech.
Said statements were made in a medium easily accessible to children. With respect... to the
young minds, said utterances are to be treated as unprotected speech.

In ending, what petitioner obviously advocates is an unrestricted speech paradigm in which

absolute permissiveness is the norm. Petitioner's flawed belief that he may simply utter gutter
profanity on television without adverse consequences, under the guise of free speech, does...
not lend itself to acceptance in this jurisdiction. We repeat: freedoms of speech and expression
are not absolute freedoms.  To say "any act that restrains speech should be greeted with
furrowed brows" is not to say that any act that restrains or regulates speech or... expression is
per se invalid.  This only recognizes the importance of freedoms of speech and expression, and
indicates the necessity to carefully scrutinize acts that may restrain or regulate speech.

Principles:

League of Cities v. Comelec

Action:
These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the
Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas assailing the constitutionality of
the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and
respondent municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.

Fact:
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into
cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which
took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by
increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20
million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator
Aquilino Pimentel, “the mad rush” of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger
share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal
independence.

After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted
Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in
RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress.
However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.

During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as
Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again
failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16
municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood
bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million
income requirement in RA 9009.

On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate
also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed
on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March
to July 2007 without the President’s signature.

The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in
each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.

Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation
of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause.
Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the
share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the
same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local
Government Code.
Issue:
The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

Held:
We grant the petitions.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus
unconstitutional.

First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a
prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the
cityhood bills became law more than five years later.

Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of
a city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.

Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a
fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.

Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by
RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no
resort to any statutory construction.

Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the
coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local
Government Code.

Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not
extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.

Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal
protection clause.
 THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE
M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners,

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY.

MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, Respondents.

G.R. No. 205728               January 21, 2015

PONENTE: Leonen

TOPIC: Right to expression, right to political speech, right to property

FACTS:

                On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private
compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately
six feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within
public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the
Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the
subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists
candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with
an “X” mark. The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption
of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing
of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted
against it form “Team Buhay.”

                Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any
candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates for the
2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not
candidates for that election.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a political
question, hence not within the ambit of the Supreme Court’s power of review.
2. Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies as the case was not brought first before the COMELEC En Banc or any
if its divisions.
3. Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens.
4. Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violated
petitioners’ fundamental right to freedom of expression.
5. Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or content-neutral
regulation.
6. Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right to property.
7. Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: No.

                The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise of prudence or
modesty. There is no political question. It can be acted upon by this court through the expanded
jurisdiction granted to this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution..

                The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review when the act of a
constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective right. Even assuming
arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the manner of regulation of the
tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right to expression.

                Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an issue
involves a truly political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the question of
whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political
bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or
instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits.

                A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no constitutionally
imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. Hence, the existence of
constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting the official actions of the body to the scrutiny
and review of this court.

                In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free speech.
Any instance that this right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely
into any doubt that a political question brings.

SECOND ISSUE: No.

                The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
proper in this case.

                Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that the

controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the “prerequisite that something had by
then been accomplished or performed by either branch or in this case, organ of government
before a court may come into the picture.”

                Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their medium,
had understandable relevance especially during the elections. COMELEC’s letter threatening
the filing of the election offense against petitioners is already an actionable infringement of this
right. The impending threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’ speech.

                In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as COMELEC

suggested in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom of speech.

THIRD ISSUE: No.

                Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their position
that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, the Court held that all of these
provisions pertain to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do
they belong to any political party. COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the
enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate in this
case.

FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.

                The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a
high degree of protection.

                Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda, being
petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who
voted for it, holds no water.

                The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the
named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election
propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by any
candidate, political party, or party-list group.

                By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included, while
sponsored messages are covered.

The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech

Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a contribution to public
deliberation about some issue,” “fostering informed and civic minded deliberation.” On the other
hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech that does “no more than propose a
commercial transaction.” The expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is, however,
definitely political speech.

FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.

                Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based on the subject

matter of the utterance or speech.” In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes controls
merely on the incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech.

                The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin
content is not easily divorced from the size of its medium.
                Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court has
used the clear and present danger rule as measure.

                Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
‘extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.’” “Only when the challenged
act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the
government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.”

                Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the
regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of
the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason
for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their
private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone else’s constitutional rights.

SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.

                The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the
tarpaulin remains the private property of petitioners. Their right to use their property is likewise
protected by the Constitution.

                Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private

property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is void,
because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of
the laws.

                The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where decals and
stickers should be posted is “so broad that it encompasses even the citizen’s private property.”
Consequently, it violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which provides that no person
shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.

SEVENTH ISSUE: No.

                The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding
upon this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law
does not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech
solely on such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any
doubt as to its nature as speech with political consequences and not religious speech.

Doctrine of benevolent neutrality

                With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality
allows accommodation of religion under certain circumstances. Accommodations are
government policies that take religion specifically into account not to promote the government’s
favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without
hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise
of, a person’s or institution’s religion.

                As Justice Brennan explained, the “government may take religion into account . . . to
exempt, when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation individuals whose
 religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without state
involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may flourish.”

Lemon test

A regulation is constitutional when:

 Exercise
 
 Bill of rights
 
 Bishop
 
 Collective
 
 Commercial short sales

1. It has a secular legislative purpose;

2. It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
3. It does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.
FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA v. JUDICIAL, GR No. 211833, 2015-04-07
Facts:
Presiding Judge Ferdinand R. Villanueva (petitioner) directly came to this Court via a Petition for
Prohibition, Mandamus, and Certiorari, and Declaratory Relief[1] under Rules 65 and 63 of the
Rules of Court,... respectively, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction, to assail the policy of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC),
requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant
to... second-level courts, on the ground that it is unconstitutional, and was issued with grave
abuse of discretion.
The petitioner was appointed on September 18, 2012 as the Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, Compostela-New Bataan, Poblacion, Compostela Valley Province, Region
XI, which is a first-level court. On September 27, 2013, he applied for the vacant position of
Presiding Judge in the following Regional Trial Courts (RTCs): Branch 31, Tagum City; Branch
13, Davao City; and Branch 6, Prosperidad, Agusan Del Sur.
In a letter[2] dated December 18, 2013, JBC's Office of Recruitment, Selection and Nomination,
informed the petitioner that he was not included in the list of candidates for the said stations. On
the same date, the petitioner sent a letter, through... electronic mail, seeking reconsideration of
his non-inclusion in the list of considered applicants and protesting the inclusion of applicants
who did not pass the prejudicature examination.
The petitioner was informed by the JBC Executive Officer, through a letter[3] dated February 3,
2014, that his protest and reconsideration was duly noted by the JBC en banc. However, its
decision not to include his name in the list of applicants was... upheld due to the JBC's long-
standing policy of opening the chance for promotion to second-level courts to, among others,
incumbent judges who have served in their current position for at least five years, and since the
petitioner has been a judge only for more than a year, he... was excluded from the list. This
caused the petitioner to take recourse to this Court.
In his petition, he argued that: (1) the Constitution already prescribed the qualifications of an
RTC judge, and the JBC could add no more; (2) the JBC's five-year requirement violates the
equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution; and (3) the JBC's five-year...
requirement violates the constitutional provision on Social Justice and Human Rights for Equal
Opportunity of Employment. The petitioner also asserted that the requirement of the
Prejudicature Program mandated by Section 10[4] of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
8557[5] should not be merely directory and should be fully implemented. He further alleged that
he has all the qualifications for the position prescribed by the Constitution and by Congress,
since he has already complied with the requirement of 10 years of... practice of law.
In compliance with the Court's Resolution[6] dated April 22, 2014, the JBC[7] and the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG)[8] separately submitted their Comments. Summing up the
arguments of the JBC and the OSG,... they essentially stated that the petition is procedurally
infirm and that the assailed policy does not violate the equal protection and due process
clauses. They posited that: (1) the writ of certiorari and prohibition cannot issue to prevent the
JBC from performing its... principal function under the Constitution to recommend appointees to
the Judiciary because the JBC is not a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function; (2)
the remedy of mandamus and declaratory relief will not lie because the petitioner has no clear
legal right... that needs to be protected; (3) the equal protection clause is not violated because
the classification of lower court judges who have served at least five years and those who have
served less than five years is valid as it is performance and experience based; and (4) there is
no... violation of due process as the policy is merely internal in nature.
Issues:
The crux of this petition is whether or not the policy of JBC requiring five years of service as
judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts is
constitutional.
Ruling:
Ruling of the Court
Procedural Issues:
Before resolving the substantive issues, the Court considers it necessary to first determine
whether or not the action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and declaratory relief
commenced by the petitioner was proper.
One. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are tenable. "The present Rules of Court uses
two special civil actions for determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. These are the special civil actions for... certiorari and prohibition,
and both are governed by Rule 65."[9] As discussed in the case of Maria Carolina P. Araullo,
etc., et al. v. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, etc., et al.,[10] this Court explained that:
Two. The remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by the petitioner in assailing JBC's policy.
The petitioner insisted that mandamus is proper because his right was violated when he was not
included in the list of candidates for the RTC courts he applied for. He said that... his non-
inclusion in the list of candidates for these stations has caused him direct injury.
Three. The petition for declaratory relief is improper. "An action for declaratory relief should be
filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and
whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or... an ordinance. The
relief sought under this remedy includes the interpretation and determination of the validity of
the written instrument and the judicial declaration of the parties' rights or duties thereunder."[16]
"[T]he purpose of the action is to... secure an authoritative statement of the rights and
obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, contract, etc., for their guidance in its
enforcement or compliance and not to settle issues arising from its alleged breach."
In this case, the petition for declaratory relief did not involve an unsound policy. Rather, the
petition specifically sought a judicial declaration that the petitioner has the right to be included in
the list of applicants although he failed to meet JBC's five-year requirement... policy. Again, the
Court reiterates that no person possesses a legal right under the Constitution to be included in
the list of nominees for vacant judicial positions. The opportunity of appointment to judicial office
is a mere privilege, and not a judicially enforceable right... that may be properly claimed by any
person. The inclusion in the list of candidates, which is one of the incidents of such
appointment, is not a right either. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim any right that could have
been affected by the assailed policy.
Furthermore, the instant petition must necessarily fail because this Court does not have original
jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved.[18]
The special civil action of declaratory relief falls under... the exclusive jurisdiction of the
appropriate RTC pursuant to Section 19[19] of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by
R.A.No. 7691.[20]
Therefore, by virtue of the Court's supervisory duty over the JBC and in the exercise of its
expanded judicial power, the Court assumes jurisdiction over the present petition. But in any
event, even if the Court will set aside procedural infirmities, the instant petition should... still be
dismissed.
Substantive Issues
As an offspring of the 1987 Constitution, the JBC is mandated to recommend appointees to the
judiciary and only those nominated by the JBC in a list officially transmitted to the President may
be appointed by the latter as justice or judge in the judiciary. Thus, the JBC is... burdened with a
great responsibility that is imbued with public interest as it determines the men and women who
will sit on the judicial bench. While the 1987 Constitution has provided the qualifications of
members of the judiciary, this does not preclude the JBC from having its... own set of rules and
procedures and providing policies to effectively ensure its mandate.
The functions of searching, screening, and selecting are necessary and incidental to the JBC's
principal function of choosing and recommending nominees for vacancies in the judiciary for
appointment by the President. However, the Constitution did not lay down in precise terms... the
process that the JBC shall follow in determining applicants' qualifications. In carrying out its
main function, the JBC has the authority to set the standards/criteria in choosing its nominees
for every vacancy in the judiciary, subject only to the minimum qualifications... required by the
Constitution and law for every position. The search for these long held qualities necessarily
requires a degree of flexibility in order to determine who is most fit among the applicants. Thus,
the JBC has sufficient but not unbridled license to act in performing... its duties.
JBC's ultimate goal is to recommend nominees and not simply to fill up judicial vacancies in
order to promote an effective and efficient administration of justice. Given this pragmatic
situation, the JBC had to establish a set of uniform criteria in order to ascertain whether an...
applicant meets the minimum constitutional qualifications and possesses the qualities expected
of him and his office. Thus, the adoption of the five-year requirement policy applied by JBC to
the petitioner's case is necessary and incidental to the function conferred by the
Constitution to the JBC.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MEDARIO CALANTIAO y DIMALANTA,
Accused-Appellant. G.R. No. 203984 June 18, 2014 LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS:

Edwin Lojera narrated that while driving a towing truck and traversing along EDSA, Balintawak,
Quezon City, he had a traffic dispute (gitgitan) with a white taxi cab prompting him to follow said
vehicle until they reached along 8th avenue street. Thereat, the passengers of said taxicab, one
of them is Medario Calantiao (accused), alighted and fired their guns. Surprised, Lojera could
not do anything but continued his driving until he reached a police station nearby where he
reported the incident.

L 

The officers on duty, PO1 Mariano and PO3 Ramirez immediately proceeded to the scene
where they found the white taxi. While approaching said vehicle, two armed men alighted
therefrom, fired their guns towards them (police officers) and ran away. The officers chased
them and recovered from the armed men a black bag containing two cricks of marijuana and a
magazine of super 38 stainless with ammos, and recovered from Calantiao’s companion,
Rommel Reyes, a .38 revolver.

The two suspects and the confiscated items were then turned over to SPO3 Temena, police
investigator at Bagong Barrio Police Station for investigation and markings of the seized items
and forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis. The result of the examination
revealed that the same was positive for marijuana.

RTC:  rendered judgment convicting Calantiao for violating RA 9165, for illegally possessing
997.9 grams of marijuana fruiting tops. RTC held that the illegal drug seized was admissible in
evidence as it was discovered during a body search after Calantiao was caught in flagranted
delicto of possessing a gun and firing at the police officers.

CA: affirmed and found that the warrantless arrest was justified, as the police officers were
acting on a legitimate complaint and had a reasonable suspicion that the persons identified at
the scene were the perpetrators of the offense. Likewise, the search and subsequent seizure of
the marijuana in question as lawful and valid, being incidental to a lawful arrest.

Hence, the present petition.

CALANTIAO’S CONTENTION:

He is questioning the admissibility of the marijuana found in his possession, as evidence against
him on the grounds of illegal search and/or its custodial chain was broken.
ISSUE: WON the arrest is invalid and therefore in violation of Bill of Rights for right against
illegal searches and seizures.

HELD: ARREST WAS VALID.

WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL ARREST

         Searches and seizure incident to a lawful arrest are governed by the revised rules of
criminal procedure. In lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending
officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the
permissible area within the latter’s reach. Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of
evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within the area of
his immediate control.

         The purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest is to
protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed with
a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach. It is
therefore a reasonable exercise of the State’s police power to protect (1) law enforcers from the
injury that may be inflicted on them by a person they have lawfully arrested; and (2) evidence
from being destroyed by the arrestee. It seeks to ensure the safety of the arresting officers and
the integrity of the evidence under the control and within the reach of the arrestee.

         In the case at bar, the marijuana was found in a black bag in Calantiao’s possession and
within his immediate control. He could have easily taken any weapon from the bag or dumped it
to destroy the evidence inside it. As the black bag containg the marijuana was in Calantiao’s
possession, it was within the permissible area that the apprehending officers could validly
conduct a warrantless search.

PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE NOT APPLICABLE IN THE PRESENT CASE

         Calantiano’s argument that the marijuana cannot be said as evidence against him
because its discovery was in violation of the plain view doctrine is misplaced. The plain view
doctrine is not applicable in Calantia’s situation because the police officers purposely searched
him upon his arrest. The police officers did not inadvertently come across the black bag, which
was in Calantiao’s possession; they deliberately opened it, as part of the search incident to
Calantiao’s lawful arrest.

PRESUMPTION OF REGULAR PERFORMANCE OF DUTY

         Unless it can be shown that there was bad faith, ill will, or tampering of the evidence, the
presumption that the integrity of the evidence has been preserved will remain. The burden of
showing the foregoing to overcome the presumption that the police officers handled the seized
drugs with regularity, and that they properly discharged their duties is on Calantiao.
Unfortunately, Calantiao failed to discharge such burden.

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PEOPLE vs. COGAED

6:00 a.m. of November 25, 2005, Police Senior Inspector Sofronio Bayan (PSI Bayan) of the
San

Gabriel Police Station in San Gabriel, La Union, “received a text message from an
unidentifiedcivilian informer”that one Marvin Buya

“[would] be transporting marijuana” from Barangay

Lun-Oy, San Gabriel, La Union to the Poblacion of San Gabriel, La Union.

PSI Bayan organized checkpoints in order “to intercept the suspect. They set up a checkpoint

in the waiting area of passengers from San Gabriel bound for San Fernando City.

A passenger jeepney from Barangay Lun-Oy arrived and the jeepney driver disembarked
andsignalled to SPO1 Taracatac indicating the two male passengers who were carrying
marijuana.

SPO1 Taracatac approached the two male passengers who were later identified as
VictorRomana Cogaed and Santiago Sacpa Dayao. Cogaed was carrying a blue bag and a
sack whileDayao was holding a yellow bag.

 
SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao about the contents of their bags. Cogaed and
Dayaotold SPO1 Taracatac that they did not know since they were transporting the bags as a
favorfor their barriomate named Marvin.

Cogaed opened the blue bag, revealing three bricks of what looked like marijuana. Both ofthem
were then arrested. Case against Dayao was dismissed because he was a minor.ISSUE:
Whether there was a valid search and seizure; and, whether the marijuana confiscated
isadmissible as evidence.HELD: NO. There is no valid search and seizure; thus, the marijuana
confiscated shall not beadmissible as evidence.There was not a single suspicious circumstance
in this case, and there was no approximation forthe probable cause requirement for warrantless
arrest. The person searched was not even theperson mentioned by the informant. The
informant gave the name of Marvin Buya, and the personsearched was Victor Cogaed. Even if it
was true that Cogaed responded by saying that he wastransporting the bag to Marvin Buya, this
still remained only as one circumstance. This should nothave been enough reason to search
Cogaed and his belongings without a valid search warrant.Likewise, the facts of the case do not
qualify as a search incidental to a lawful arrest. Theapprehension of Cogaed was not effected
with a warrant of arrest. None of the instancesenumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of
Court were present when the arrest was made.At the time of his apprehension, Cogaed has not
committed, was not committing, or was about tocommit a crime. There were no overt acts within
plain view of the police officers that suggestedthat Cogaed was in possession of drugs at that
time. Also, Cogaed was not an escapee prisonerthat time; hence, he could not have qualified for
the last allowable warrantless arrest.The Constitution provides that any evidence obtained in
violation of the right againstunreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule or the fruit of the
poisonous tree doctrine, this ruleprohibits the issuance of general warrants that encourage law
enforcers to go on fishingexpeditions.