G.R. No.
L-47822 December 22, 1988 The Civil Code defines "common carriers" in the following terms:
PEDRO DE GUZMAN, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO CENDANA, respondents.
Facts:
Cendana is a junk dealer in Pangasinan, he brings his scrap material to
Manila for resale using his two (2) six-wheeler trucks. On the return trip he
would load his vehicles with cargo to be delivered to Pangasinan. His rates
are lower compared to the regular commercial rates.
On 1970, petitioner De Guzman contracted the respondent for the hauling
of milk from Makati to Pangasinan. On their way, one of the trucks was
hijacked in Tarlac.
Petitioner commenced an action demanding payment for the lost
merchandise plus damages and attorney’s fees before the RTC Pangasinan.
Arguing that the respondent being a common carrier failed to exercise
extraordinary diligence required.
Respondent denied that he is a common carrier and the cause of loss is
force majeure.
RTC ruled in favor of Petitioner. On appeal CA reversed the judgment.
Issue:
1. Whether respondent is a common carrier?
2. Whether he is liable for the loss?
Held:
1. Yes
Article 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or
associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting
passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air for
compensation, offering their services to the public.
The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal
business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who
does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local Idiom as "a sideline").
Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person
or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis
and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled
basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its
services to the "general public," i.e., the general community or population,
and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment
of the general population.
So understood, the concept of "common carrier" under Article 1732 may be
seen to coincide neatly with the notion of "public service," under the Public
Service Act, as amended, which at least partially supplements the law on
common carriers set forth in the Civil Code. Under Section 13, paragraph (b)
of the Public Service Act, "public service" includes:
... every person that now or hereafter may own, operate, manage,
or control in the Philippines, for hire or compensation, with general
or limited clientele, whether permanent, occasional or accidental,
and done for general business purposes, any common carrier,
railroad, street railway, traction railway, subway motor vehicle,
either for freight or passenger, or both, with or without fixed route
and whatever may be its classification, freight or carrier service of
any class, express service, steamboat, or steamship line, pontines,
ferries and water craft, engaged in the transportation of passengers
or freight or both, shipyard, marine repair shop, wharf or dock, ice
plant, ice-refrigeration plant, canal, irrigation system, gas, electric
 light, heat and power, water supply and power petroleum,
sewerage system, wire or wireless communications systems, wire or
wireless broadcasting stations and other similar public services. ...
(Emphasis supplied)
2. No.
We hold that the occurrence of the loss must reasonably be regarded as
quite beyond the control of the common carrier and properly regarded as a
fortuitous event. It is necessary to recall that even common carriers are not
made absolute insurers against all risks of travel and of transport of goods,
and are not held liable for acts or events which cannot be foreseen or are
inevitable, provided that they shall have complied with the rigorous
standard of extraordinary diligence.
Article 1735, which provides as follows:
In all cases other than those mentioned in numbers 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5
of the preceding article, if the goods are lost, destroyed or
deteriorated, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault
or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as required in Article 1733.
G.R. No. 125948 December 29, 1998
FIRST PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE PATERNO V. TAC-AN, BATANGAS CITY
and ADORACION C. ARELLANO, in her official capacity as City Treasurer of
Batangas, respondents.
Facts:
(FPIC) is a pipeline operator with a government concession granted under
the Petroleum Act. It is engaged in the business of transporting petroleum
products from the Batangas refineries, via pipeline, to Sucat and JTF
Pandacan Terminals.
Petitioner applied for Mayor’s permit on 1995, City treasurer of Batangas
required the petitioner to pay local tax based on its gross receipts pursuant
to the LGC. FPIC paid the tax under protest and in their letter alleged that
Transportation contractors are not included in the enumeration of
contractors under Section 131, Paragraph (h) of the Local Government
Code.
City treasurer denied the protest, resulting for FPIC to file a complaint for
tax refund before the RTC Batangas. Respondent argued that petitioner
cannot be exempt from taxes under Section 133 (j) of the Local Government
Code as said exemption applies only to "transportation contractors and
persons engaged in the transportation by hire and common carriers by air,
land and water." Respondents assert that pipelines are not included in the
term "common carrier" which refers solely to ordinary carriers such as
trucks, trains, ships and the like. Respondents further posit that the term
"common carrier" under the said code pertains to the mode or manner by
which a product is delivered to its destination
Issue:
Whether petitioner is a common carrier thus exempted in the payment of
local tax.
 G.R. No. 157917               August 29, 2012
Held:
Yes. SPOUSES TEODORO1 and NANETTE PERENA, Petitioners,
Art. 1732 of the Civil Code defines a "common carrier" as "any person, vs.
corporation, firm or association engaged in the business of carrying or SPOUSES TERESITA NICOLAS and L. ZARATE, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for RAILWAYS, and the COURT OF APPEALS Respondents.
compensation, offering their services to the public."
The test for determining whether a party is a common carrier of goods is: Facts:
1. He must be engaged in the business of carrying goods for others
as a public employment, and must hold himself out as ready to The Pereñas were engaged in the business of transporting students from
engage in the transportation of goods for person generally as a their respective residences in Parañaque City to Don Bosco in Pasong Tamo,
business and not as a casual occupation; Makati City, and back.
2. He must undertake to carry goods of the kind to which his
On 1996 Zarates contracted the Pereñas to transport Aaron Zarate to and
business is confined;
from Don Bosco. On August 22, 1996 the van was run over by a train (PNR)
3. He must undertake to carry by the method by which his business
in Magallanes en route to Don Bosco resulting to the tragic death of Aaron.
is conducted and over his established roads; and
4. The transportation must be for hire.
Zarate’s commenced this action for damages against Alfaro (driver), the
Pereñas (based on breach of the contract of carriage), PNR (based on quasi-
Based on the above definitions and requirements, there is no doubt that
delict) and Alano (Train operator).
petitioner is a common carrier. It is engaged in the business of transporting
or carrying goods, i.e. petroleum products, for hire as a public employment.
Pereñas adduced evidence to show that they had exercised the diligence of
It undertakes to carry for all persons indifferently, that is, to all persons who
a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of Alfaro, by
choose to employ its services, and transports the goods by land and for
making sure that Alfaro had been issued a driver’s license and had not been
compensation. The fact that petitioner has a limited clientele does not
involved in any vehicular accident prior to the collision; that their own son
exclude it from the definition of a common carrier.
had taken the van daily; and that Teodoro Pereña had sometimes
accompanied Alfaro in the van’s trips transporting the students to school.
As correctly pointed out by petitioner, the definition of "common carriers"
in the Civil Code makes no distinction as to the means of transporting, as PNR tended to show that the proximate cause of the collision had been the
long as it is by land, water or air. It does not provide that the transportation reckless crossing of the van whose driver had not first stopped, looked and
of the passengers or goods should be by motor vehicle. listened; and that the narrow path traversed by the van had not been
intended to be a railroad crossing for motorists.
Aligned with BIR Ruling No. 069-83, Petroleum Act of the Philippines
(Republic Act 387) and Republic Act 387 RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiff
("ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus", ie "where the law
does not distinguish, nor we must distinguish")
Both the Pereñas and PNR appealed, CA affirmed the decision Article 1755 of the Civil Code specifies that the common carrier should
"carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide,
Issue: using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all
the circumstances." To successfully fend off liability in an action upon the
Whether Pereñas is a common carrier and whether they are liable for the death or injury to a passenger, the common carrier must prove his or its
death of Aaron observance of that extraordinary diligence; otherwise, the legal
presumption that he or it was at fault or acted negligently would stand.
Held:

There is no question that the Pereñas as the operators of a school bus

service were: (a) engaged in transporting passengers generally as a business,
not just as a casual occupation; (b) undertaking to carry passengers over
established roads by the method by which the business was conducted; and
(c) transporting students for a fee. Despite catering to a limited clientèle,
the Pereñas operated as a common carrier because they held themselves
out as a ready transportation indiscriminately to the students of a particular
school living within or near where they operated the service and for a fee.

A private carrier is one who, without making the activity a vocation, or

without holding himself or itself out to the public as ready to act for all who
may desire his or its services, undertakes, by special agreement in a
particular instance only, to transport goods or persons from one place to
another either gratuitously or for hire. The provisions on ordinary contracts
of the Civil Code govern the contract of private carriage. The diligence
required of a private carrier is only ordinary, that is, the diligence of a good
father of the family. In contrast, a common carrier is a person, corporation,
firm or association engaged in the business of carrying or transporting
passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation,
offering such services to the public. Contracts of common carriage are
governed by the provisions on common carriers of the Civil Code, the Public
Service Act,13 and other special laws relating to transportation. A common
carrier is required to observe extraordinary diligence, and is presumed to be
at fault or to have acted negligently in case of the loss of the effects of
passengers, or the death or injuries to passengers.  
G.R. No. 92288 February 9, 1993
BRITISH AIRWAYS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Twelfth Division, and FIRST
INTERNATIONAL TRADING AND GENERAL SERVICES, respondents.
Facts:
On 1981, Respondent FITGS, a duly licensed domestic recruitment and
placement agency, received a telex message from its principal in Jeddah to
recruit OFW. Its principal paid British Airways 93 airfare tickets, however the
latter failed to fly said workers. After several rebooking and cancellation, the
respondent decided to buy tickets from another airline to transport the
remaining OFWs.
Respondent sent a letter to the petitioner demanding the latter to pay the
amount of P350,000.00 representing damages and unrealized profit or
income which was denied by the petitioner. On 1982, respondent filed a
complaint for damages against petitioner with the RTC of Manila.
Petitioner in their answer alleged that due to the unavailability of space and
limited time, petitioner had to return to its sponsor in Jeddah the prepaid
ticket advice consequently not even one of the alleged 93 contract workers
were booked in any of its flights. Moreover, in the subsequent bookings,
petitioner's computer system broke down which resulted to petitioner's
failure to get a reconfirmation from Saudi Arabia Airlines causing the
automatic cancellation of the bookings.
RTC ruled in favor of FITGS. CA Affirmed the decision
Issue:
Whether FITGS has a cause of action against British Airways arising from a
perfected contract of carriage
Held:
Yes.
In dealing with the contract of common carriage of passengers for purpose
of accuracy, there are two (2) aspects of the same, namely:
(a) the contract "to carry (at some future time)," which contract is
consensual and is necessarily perfected by mere consent (See
Article 1356, Civil Code of the Philippines), and
(b) the contract "of carriage" or "of common carriage" itself which
should be considered as a real contract for not until the carrier is
actually used can the carrier be said to have already assumed the
obligation of a carrier.
In the instant case, the contract "to carry" is the one involved which is
consensual and is perfected by the mere consent of the parties.
There is no dispute as to the appellee's consent to the said contract "to
carry" its contract workers from Manila to Jeddah. The appellant's consent
thereto, on the other hand, was manifested by its acceptance of the prepaid
ticket advice that the principal has prepaid the airfares of the appellee's
contract workers advising the appellant that it must transport the contract
workers on or before the end of March, 1981 and the other batch in June,
1981.
Even if a prepaid ticket advice is merely an advice from the sponsors that an
airline is authorized to issue a ticket and thus no ticket was yet issued, the
fact remains that the passage had already been paid for by the principal of
the appellee, and the appellant had accepted such payment. The existence
of this payment was never objected to nor questioned by the appellant in
the lower court. Thus, the cause or consideration which is the fare paid for
the passengers exists in this case.
The third essential requisite of a contract is an object certain. In this
contract "to carry", such an object is the transport of the passengers from
the place of departure to the place of destination as stated in the telex.
Accordingly, there could be no more pretensions as to the existence of an
oral contract of carriage imposing reciprocal obligations on both parties.