Technical Article – AS2067:2016 and the 1Ω Target

safearth.com/technical-article-2067-1ohm

October 2, 2015

Articles

AS2067:2016 and the 1Ω Target

This article provides an analysis of traditional resistance target compliance at the
distribution level and why it will need to be phased out with AS2067:2016

Earthing at distribution substations is the front line of protection for Australian

power distributors. Fault currents and voltages are commonly transferred directly
into houses, onto water taps, onto fences, into pools, all protected by the bastion of
safety – 1Ω.

Introduction

“Under all reasonably foreseeable conditions the earthing system should

not impose on any person or group of people an unreasonable risk”
(AS2067:2016). This article demonstrates that it is reasonably foreseeable that
designing distribution earthing systems to a local resistance (RG) limit of 1Ω for
common earthing can present a non-negligible safety risk to the normally behaved and
exposed individual. If the designer is submitting designs under such a pretence and not
actually assessing the risk of fatality, then as the duty holder, it may be true that they
are in contravention of AS2067:2016 and acting with negligence.

AS2067 Changes

AS2067 has recently undergone a major revision from the previous 2008 version. A
significant change between the revisions, reflecting current trends in the industry over
that period, is a shift in the earthing system management paradigm from safety targets
to risk management. AS2067:2008 states its position clearly as: “The earthing system,
in combination with appropriate measures, shall maintain step, touch and transferred
voltages within the voltage limits” (AS2067:2008).

This is in contrast to the position which has been adopted in AS2067:2016, which has as
its key principles in relation to earthing, risk management and due diligence. The risk
in terms of the safety of people should be ‘negligible’ or ‘tolerable’. If the risk is classed
as ‘tolerable’ then it shall be acceptable as long as all reasonable measures are taken to
reduce the risk.

You can see the clear difference between AS2067:2008 and AS2067:2016 being that the
former has distinct pass/fail, safe/deadly, voltage limits whereas the new revision has a
risk management approach. Indeed where the archetypal 1Ω method fits within either
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approach is anyone’s guess but, it’s thought AS3000 is responsible.

The 1Ω Example

Consider the common scenario of a ground-mounted or padmount kiosk substation to

be installed at a new residential subdivision. Let us assume the earth fault level is
provided by the utility at just over 3kA due to an upstream reactive source and line
impedance of 2.3Ω on the 11kV system. We will assume the protection clears the fault in
0.5 seconds. We have designed the HV and LV earthing systems to achieve the target
earthing system resistance of 1Ω each and so the HV and LV earthing systems at the
substation are combined as many standards will sanction. The design meets the 1Ω RG
target and it would be approved and installed. Sounds too good to be true – and yes, it
is!

Note that a 1Ω LV system is quite typical. For example, give some thought to the
builders of the first houses in the development, working prior to the distributed LV
neutral being of sufficiently low resistance to bring about a safer environment.

The Risk of this Design

If we calculate the risk posed by this design, we will find that it is unacceptable. Tools
exist to quantify, and to demonstrate the risk an earthing system presents, however few
distribution earthing designers presently use them. AS2067:2016 requires designers to
be cognisant of risk based methods.

Let us first recalculate the fault current for a HV earth fault, taking into account the
resistance of the buried earthing system at the substation and allows the fault level to be
recalculated as follows – ,noting the source is assumed as purely reactive. and the MEN
is yet to be developed:

IF = (1.1pu × 6.35kV) / (2.33ΩREACTIVE + (1ΩHV || 1ΩLV)) ≈ 3kA.

The EPR at the common substation is:

EPR = 3kA × (1ΩHV || 1ΩLV) = 1.5kV

By using software, or empirical formulae, to model the response of the soil around the
substation due to the fault current, the touch voltage magnitude in this case can be
determined to be approximately 30% of the EPR, so:

1m Touch Voltage = 30% × 1.5kV = 450V

In this instance the applicable resource for safety criteria is AS7000 which is consistent
with the new AS2067. The applicable safety curve from these standards is the TDMEN
contact scenario which implies the exposed individual is in contact with an MEN
referenced item such as a tap that has risen in volts relative to the soil adjacent. The
touch voltage level representing negligible risk based on the TDMEN curve is 272 Volts.

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Hence the safety risk assessment identifies the hazard as non-negligible risk and the
hazard is deemed non-compliant, as shown in Fig 1. Reasonably practicable measures
must now be taken to reduce the risk.

The real problem with this design

approach is that the key player has either
been ignored or is non-existent – the MEN
network! It is the low resistance of the
MEN that delivers safety; if the MEN does
not exhibit low resistance and other Fig. 1: Software Safety Assessment
important characteristics then adequate
safety cannot be guaranteed.

AS2067:2016 Risk vs Resistance Targets

It is clear in the example above that the distribution substation’s local earth resistance
has little to do with the actual risk posed by an earth fault on that installation.
Ultimately, earth fault related voltages must be assessed and controlled to reasonable
levels to exercise our duty of care.

Many service providers submit reticulation designs to power utilities and believe that by
following the standard designs or by meeting stipulated resistance targets such as 1Ω
that they are protected in the event of the unspeakable. But this is simply not true and as
the designer of the earthing system it is incumbent upon the designer and the utility to
manage the risk appropriately: “If hazards cannot be reduced (reasonably practicably)
to negligible levels, an assessment of risk is required” (AS2067:2016). Risk levels are
rarely calculated when an RG target has been met and the utility and designer will be in
breach of AS2067 by not performing this assessment. Even worse is the scenario where
the risk level can easily be shown to be non-negligible and nothing has been done to
ensure risk mitigation is performed to levels as low as is reasonably practicable
(ALARP).

Solution

With the release of AS2067:2016 comes the requirement to assess if the earthing system
imposes an unreasonable risk on any person or group of people. This assessment
requires the designer to be more aware of the key requirements of an earthing design.
Methods of accurately calculating the resistance of the MEN will become crucial and the
earthing design process must be understood and documented. It is becoming clearer
that specialist training and software will need to be made available and a greater level of
understanding and awareness of earthing systems across the industry is desperately
needed.

Summary

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If you are presently designing to a target RG for distribution earthing systems, then the
design may result in a quantifiable and unacceptable risk to personal safety. Ignoring
the risk could then place you at risk of facing the coroner in the event of a fatality.
Safearth provide assistance in these areas by supporting designers with training and
software tools to enable earthing designs within the new risk framework of AS2067.
Remember, ignorance is not a legal defence in the eyes of the court.

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