CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Francesca Lourdes M. Señga

JURISDICTION

1. What are the requisites for the court to acquire criminal jurisdiction?
The court must have jurisdiction over: (1) the subject matter, meaning that the
offense is one which the court is by law authorized to take cognizance; (2)
territory where the offense was committed; and (3) over the person of the
accused, such that the person charged with the offense must have been brought
in to its forum for trial, forcibly by warrant of arrest or upon his voluntary
submission to the court. (Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123340, 29 August
2002; Arula v. Espino, G.R. No. L-28949, 23 June 1969)

2. Meowy was charged in the Manila Regional Trial Court with estafa thru
falsification of public document for executing an affidavit of self-adjudication
of a parcel of land in Bulacan. RTC Manila acquitted Meowy, and in ruling on
the civil aspect of the case, directed the return to the surviving heris of the
Bulacan property. Does the RTC Manila have jurisdiction to rule on the civil
aspect of the case involving a land in Bulacan?
YES. Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person
of the accused, and the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction, the
court necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all issues that the law requires the
court to resolve, such as the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime.
(Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123340, 29 August 2002)

JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER

3. What confers jurisdiction over the subject matter? How is jurisdiction

determined?
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or by law
(Arnado v. Buban, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1543, 31 May 2004). The allegations in the
complaint or information do not confer jurisdiction; it is the law that confers
jurisdiction. The allegations in the complaint or information determines
jurisdiction. (People v. Ocaya, G.R. No. L-47448, May 17, 1978)

4. May the issue of lack of jurisdiction be raised for the first time on
appeal? Why?
Yes. At the first instance or even on appeal, and although the parties do not raise
the issue of jurisdiction, courts are not precluded from ruling that they have no
jurisdiction over the subject matter if such is the situation. An erroneous
assumption of jurisdiction carries with it the nullity of the entire proceedings in
the case. (Arnado v. Buban, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1543, 31 May 2004; Andaya v.
Abadia, et al., G.R. No. 104033, 27 December 1993)


5. An information for serious physical injuries was filed. It stated that the
victim was incapacitated from customary labor for more than 30 days and that
prominent scar was left on the victim's face which considerably deformed her
face. The court motu proprio dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, based on the medical certificate in the case records, stating that
the victims’ injuries would require medical attention from 7-10 days. The
Court opined that the crime may either be slight or less serious physical
injuries only. Was the dismissal proper?
NO. The jurisdiction of a court in criminal cases is determined by the allegations
of the information or criminal complaint and not by the result of the evidence
presented at the trial, or by the judge’s appraisal of the affidavits and exhibits
attached to the record of the case. (People v. Ocaya, G.R. No. L-47448, May 17, 1978)

6. Evidence presented during trial showed that the crime of slight physical
injuries was committed, rather than serious physical injuries as alleged in the
information. Will this deprive the RTC the jurisdiction over the case?
NO. It does not deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction which had vested in it
under the allegations of the information as filed. Once the jurisdiction attaches to
the person and subject matter of the litigation, the subsequent happening of
events, although they are of such a character as would have prevented
jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance, will not operate to oust
jurisdiction already attached. The information for serious physical injuries
properly vested the RTC with jurisdiction to try and hear the case. If from the
evidence submitted a lesser offense was established, the RTC has jurisdiction to
impose the sentence for such lesser offense. (People v. Ocaya, G.R. No. L-47448,
May 17, 1978)

7. Should the aggravating or mitigating circumstances be considered in

determining the jurisdiction of the court?
NO. The jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the penalty
imposable under the law for the offense and not the penalty ultimately imposed
(People vs. Caldito, 72 Phil. 263; People vs. Purisima, 69 SCRA 314; Dioquino vs. Cruz
and People vs. Savellano, 116 SCRA 415)

8. Enumerate the cases over which the MTC exercises exclusive original
jurisdiction.

Except in cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC and of the
Sandiganbayan, the MTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over the
following:
1. Violations of city or municipal ordinances committed within their
respective territorial jurisdiction;

2. All offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding 6 years

irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable
accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such
offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or
amount thereof;
• Note that amount of the fine is disregarded in determining the
jurisdiction of the court
3. Damage to property through criminal negligence;
4. Offenses punishable only by fine with an amount of not more than
P4,000.00. (Section 32 (2) of BP 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691,
Sec. 2);
5. Public officers not falling under Sec. 4(A) of PD 1606, as amended and not
in conspiracy with those under Sec. 4(A) of PD 1606 for the offenses
enumerated therein, who committed offenses punishable by
imprisonment of not more than 6 years or by fine only of not exceeding
P4,000.00;

9. Which cases within the jurisdiction of the MTC are governed by

summary procedure?
1. Violation of traffic rules and regulations;
2. Violations of rental law;
3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
4. All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the
offense charged is imprisonment not exceeding 6 months, or a fine not
exceeding P1,000.00, or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties,
accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability arising therefrom;
5. Offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence,
where the imposable fine does not exceed P10,000.00
• If the imposable fine for Offenses involving damage to property
through criminal negligence exceeds P10,000.00, the case will not be
governed by summary procedure but it will still be within the
jurisdiction of the MTC (Revised Rules on Summary Procedure,
Sec. 1(B))
6. Violations of BP 22 (A.M. No. 00-11-01-SC)

10. Enumerate the cases over which the RTC exercises exclusive original
jurisdiction.
1. All criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal, or body;
2. All offenses punishable with imprisonment exceeding 6 years irrespective
of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or
other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or
predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof

• Applies only to offenses where the imposable penalty is

imprisonment or fine, or both. The amount of the fine is
disregarded in determining the jurisdiction of the court
3. Where the only penalty provided by law is a fine, and the amount exceeds
P4,000.00, including offenses committed by public officers and employees
in relation to their office, where the amount of the fine does not exceed
P6,000.00 (BP 129, Sec. 20; Administrative Circular No. 9-94)
4. Libel (RPC, Art. 360);
• In People v. Benipayo (G.R. Nos. 154473 & 155573, April 24, 2009), the
SC ruled that it does not matter whether the alleged libelous speech
was uttered by the COMELEC Chairman in relation to the
performance of his functions – it is still the RTC that has exclusive
original jurisdiction over libel cases;
5. Violation of Intellectual property rights (RA 8293, Sec. 170, RA 166, Sec.
27);
• Even if the offense is punishable by imprisonment from 2-5 years or
less than 6 years (Samson v. Daway, G.R. Nos. 160054-55, 21 July
2004)
6. Election offenses (Sec. 268, Omnibus Election Code);
7. Violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act 2002, as amended
by RA 10640 (Sec. 90, RA 9165);
• Note that the Family Courts (FC) shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases against minors for violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act (Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 8369; Jurisdiction
Over Drugs Cases Involving Minors, Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 20-03, March 19, 2003);
• If there are no FC but there are special drugs courts, the
latter shall take jurisdiction over the case;
• Where both FC and special drugs courts have been
designated, the case shall be assigned or raffled to an FC;
• Where both family courts and special drugs courts have
not been designated, the case shall be raffled among the
branches of the RTC within the same station;
• Where there is only a single-sala RTC, which has been
designated either as an FC or as a special drugs court or
has not been designated as such at all, it shall take
jurisdiction over the case
• Other cases within the exclusive original jurisdiction of FC
• Criminal cases where one or more of the accused is below
18 years of age, or where one or more of the victims is a
minor at the time of the commission of the offense
• Petitions for guardianship, custody of children, habeas
corpus in relation to the latter;

• Petitions for adoption of children and the revocation

thereof;
• Complaints for annulment of marriage, declaration of
nullity of marriage and those relating to marital status and
property relations of husband and wife or those living
together under different status and agreements, and
petitions for dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains;
• Petitions for support and/or acknowledgment;
• Summary judicial proceedings brought under the
provisions of Executive Order No. 209, or the Family Code
of the Philippines;
• Petitions for declaration of status of children as
abandoned, dependent or neglected children, petitions for
voluntary or involuntary commitment of children; the
suspension, termination, or restoration of parental
authority and other cases cognizable under Presidential
Decree No. 603, Executive Order No. 56, (Series of 1986),
and other related laws;
• Petitions for the constitution of the family home;
• Violations of Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as
the "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act," as amended by
Republic Act No. 7658; and
• Cases of domestic violence against:
• Women — which are acts of gender based violence
that results, or are likely to result in physical, sexual
or psychological harm or suffering to women; and
other forms of physical abuse such as battering or
threats and coercion which violate a woman's
personhood, integrity and freedom of movement; and
• Children — which include the commission of all forms
of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, violence, and
discrimination and all other conditions prejudicial to
their development.
Note: If any question involving any of the above matters should
arise as an incident in any case pending in the regular courts, said
incident shall be determined in that court. (Family Courts Act of
1997, Republic Act No. 8369, October 28, 1997)

8. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with

Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986, where the
information (a) does not allege any damage to the government or any
bribery; or (b) alleges damage to the government or bribery arising from

the same or closely related transactions or acts in an amount not exceeding

P1,000,000.00;
• Cases herein shall be tried in a judicial region other than where the
official holds office (RA 10660, Sec. 2)
9. Public officers not falling under Sec. 4(A) of PD 1606, as amended and not
in conspiracy with those under Sec. 4(A) of PD 1606 for the offenses
enumerated therein, who committed offenses punishable by
imprisonment of more than 6 years, or by fine only exceeding P4,000.00;
10. RTC As Special Agrarian Court – the prosecution of all criminal offenses
under RA 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law).
• The Special Agrarian Courts have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for: (1) the determination of just
compensation to landowners; and (2) the prosecution of all criminal
offenses under RA 6657.

11. Do all cases involving members of the AFP and other persons subject to
military law, including members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical
Unit, fall within the jurisdiction of the Court Martial?
NO. The proper civil courts have jurisdiction over offenses penalized under the
RPC, other special penal laws, or local government ordinances, regardless of
whether or not civilians are co-accused, victims, or offended parties, which may
be natural or juridical persons, provided that they are not service-connected.
(Sec. 1, R.A. No. 7055)

a. What is the rule on the jurisdiction of the court martial?

GENERAL RULE: When the offense, as determined before arraignment by
the civil court, is service-connected
EXCEPTION: When the President of the Philippines, in the interest of
justice, orders or directs at any time before arraignment that any such
crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil courts

b. When is an offense considered to be service-connected?

Service-connected crimes or offenses shall be limited to those defined in
Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth
Act No. 408, as amended (Articles of War).

12. AFP members were charged with coup d’ etat in the RTC. They were
also being charged with violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War,
punishable by dismissal from the service. The Accused alleged that they can
no longer be charged before the Court Martial because the violation of the
Articles of War was already absorbed by coup d’ etat. The RTC declared the
offense to be not service-connected. Was the RTC correct?
NO. Article 96 of the Articles of War is service-connected. In ruling that the
offense was not-service connected despite the fact that Sec. 1, RA 7055 provides

that it is service-connected, the RTC practically amended the law which

expressly vests in the court martial the jurisdiction over service-connected crimes
or offenses. The penalty of dismissal from the service further shows it is service-
connected. The penalty is purely disciplinary in character, intended to cleanse
the military profession of misfits and to preserve the stringent standard of
military discipline. The violation of articles of war is not absorbed by coup d'etat.
The doctrine of “absorption of crimes” applies to crimes punished by the same
statute, unlike here where different statutes are involved. The doctrine also
applies only if the trial court has jurisdiction over both offenses. (Gonzales v.
Abaya, G.R. No. 164007, August 10, 2006)

13. What are the cases over which the Sandiganbayan exercises exclusive
original jurisdiction?

There are 2 classes of offenses:

The first is over offenses in which the public office is a constituent element as
defined by statute and the relation between the crime and the offense is such
that, in a legal sense, the offense committed cannot exist without the office:

1. Violations of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), RA 1379

(Forfeiture of Ill-Gotten Wealth, and Chapter II, Section 2,Title VII, Book I
of the RPC (Bribery: Art. 201 - Direct Bribery; Art. 211 – Indirect Bribery;
Art. 211-A – Qualified Bribery; Art. 212 – Corruption of Public Officials),
where 1 or more more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
a. Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic
Act No. 6758), specifically including:
i. Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;
ii. City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
city department heads;
iii. Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of
consul and higher;
iv. Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and
all officers of higher rank;
v. Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying
the position of provincial director and those holding the
rank of senior superintendent and higher;

vi. City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and

officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman
and special prosecutor;
vii. Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations;
b. Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27
and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989;
c. Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
d. Chairmen and members of the Constitutional Commissions,
without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and
e. All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and
higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989.
The second class involves offenses which are intimately connected with the
public office and are perpetrated by the public officer or employee while in the
performance of his official functions, through improper or irregular conduct:

2. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes

committed by the public officials and employees mentioned above in
relation to their office. (Barriga v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 161784-86, [April
26, 2005; (Sec. 4(A), PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660)
Other cases over which the Sandiganbayan exercises exclusive original
jurisdiction:
3. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. (Sec. 4(A), PD 1606,
as amended by RA 10660)

14. Why does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over forfeiture

proceedings which are civil in nature?
While the proceedings under R.A. No. 1379 do not terminate in the imposition of
a penalty, the forfeiture of illegally acquired property partakes the nature of a
penalty. A forfeiture is a divestiture of property without compensation, in
consequence of a default or an offense. A forfeiture is imposed by way of
punishment to insure a prescribed course of conduct, to restrain the commission
of an offense and to aid in the prevention of such an offense. The effect of such a
forfeiture is to transfer the title to the specific thing from the owner to the
sovereign power. (Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 165835, June 22, 2005)

15. When is an offense considered to be committed in relation to the office?

An offense is committed in relation to the office when it is intimately connected
with the office and was perpetrated while in the performance of official

functions, though improper or irregular. (Antiporda, Jr. v. Garchitorena, G.R. No.

133289, December 23, 1999) It is intimately connected with the office if without the
office, the crime would not have been committed.

16. Can crimes other than violation of RA 3019, Forfeiture of Ill-Gotten

Wealth and Bribery fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan?
YES, if the crime is committed by the officers enumerated in Sec. 4(A) of PD 1606
as amended by RA 10660, and it is intimately connected with their respective
offices and perpetrated while in the performance of their official functions,
though improper or irregular. (Barriga v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 161784-86,
April 26, 2005)

17. The mayor (SG 27) and municipal accountant (SG 24) were charged
charged with malversation and illegal use of public funds. The information
alleged the facts constituting the offense and that they were in conspiracy.
Both officers are assailing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over their
case. Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over the case?
YES. The mayor is among those listed in Sec. 4(A) of PD 1606, as amended, and
the crime was intimately connected with the mayor’s office and perpetrated
while in the performance of official functions, though improper or irregular.
While the accountant’s position is SG 24, the Sandiganbayan still has jurisdiction
over his case because he conspired with the Mayor whose case is within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. (Barriga v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 161784-86,
April 26, 2005)

18. The mayor was charged with grave threats for aiming a gun and
threatening to kill the councilor during a public hearing after the latter
rendered a privilege speech critical of the mayor’s administration. The
information alleged that the mayor was performing his functions at that time
of the offense. Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over the case?
YES. The crime charged is intimately connected with the discharge of the
mayor’s official functions. The accused was performing his official duty as
municipal mayor when he attended said pubic hearing and his violent act was
precipitated by the councilor’s criticism of his administration as the mayor or
chief executive of the municipality, during the latter’s privilege speech. It was his
response to the councilor’s attack to his office. If he was not the mayor, he would
not have been irritated or angered by whatever the councilor might have said
during said privilege speech. (Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 136806,
August 22, 2000)

19. For cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, is it necessary to allege in the information the specific factual
allegations showing the intimate connection between the offense charged and

the public office of the accused, and the discharge of his official duties or
functions, whether improper or irregular?
It depends. If the public office of the accused is by statute a constituent element
of the crime charged, there is no need to do so. Otherwise, there is need to make
such specific allegations. Merely stating that the accused committed the crime
charged in relation to his office, without the specific factual allegations
constituting the same is not enough because that would only be a mere
conclusion of law. (Barriga v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 161784-86, April 26, 2005)

20. The Mayor organized groups pf police patrol and provided them with
high power guns. The group was under the mayor’s command, supervision
and control. Upon the Mayor’s orders, the group arrested and maltreated Mr.
X, who died as a consequence thereof. The Mayor and the group members
were charged with murder in the Sandiganbayan. Did the Sandiganbayan
have jurisdiction over the case?
YES. The group was under the control of the mayor. The offense was intimately
connected with the office of the offenders and perpetrated while in the
performance, though improper or irregular of their official functions. They
would not have committed it had they not held their offices. The group obeyed
the instructions of the mayor, as their superior officer. (People v. Montejo, G.R. No.
L-14595, May 31, 1960)

21. The Mayor is married to the municipal health officer. Both are doctors
and own a medical clinic. Their son killed the municipal guard who was
brought to the mayor’s clinic. The spouses were charged with obstruction of
justice for falsely stating in an autopsy report that there was no blackening
around the victim’s wound when in truth there was, among others. The
information did not allege that the accused committed the offenses charged in
relation to their office. The information alleged that the accused’s son shot the
victim. Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over the case.
NO. There was failure to allege in the information facts showing that the accused
committed the offenses charged in relation to their offices or that there was an
intimate relation/connection between the commission of the offense charged and
the discharge of official functions of the offenders. The autopsy report was not
done by the mayor in the performance of his official function as it is not mong
the duties of the mayor. The allegation in the information that the accused are the
parents of the assailant showed that there was personal motive to fabricate the
autopsy and that they would still do the same even if they were not occupying
their respective positions. (Soller v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 144261-62, [May 9,
2001)

22. Is it correct to say that the Sandiganbayan only covers cases involving
officers with SG 27 and above?

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NO. The enumeration in Sec. 4(A) PD 1606 involves officers with SG below 27.
Also, private individuals and those with SG below 27 may be charged before the
Sandiganbayan if they conspired with officers who fall within the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan.

23. May a student representative member of the UP Board of Regents be

charged with estafa before the Sandiganbayan for swindling government
funds even if accused does not receive any salary as a UP student regent and
she is not a public officer with SG 27 or above?
YES. The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by
public officials enumerated in Section 4(A) of PD 1606 in relation to their office. It
is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers
enumerated in P.D. No. 1606, who may not be SG 27. Accused falls within the
category of Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned
or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations. (Serana v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 162059, January 22, 2008)

24. A was a stockholder of RPN, a private corporation duly registered with

SEC. In 1986, the government sequestered RPN’s properties, assets and
business. In 1990, the PCGG entered into a compromise agreement with A,
who ceded all his shares of stock in RPN to the government, through the
PCGG. Upon PCGG’s motion, the Sandiganbayan directed the transfer of A’s
shares representing 72.4% of the total issued and outstanding stock of RPN. A
timely filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that his RPN shares only
represented 32.4% of RPN’s outstanding capital stock. His motion for
reconsideration was not ruled upon. A assumed office as general manager and
COO of RPN. He was appointed to said position by the RPN Board. The
Ombudsman later administratively charged him with grave misconduct and
for violation of Section 3 (g) of RA 3019. A was alleged to be an official or
employee of a government-owned or controlled corporation, RPN. An
information for violation of Section 3 (g) of RA 3019 was later filed with the
Sandiganbayan.

a. What are government-owned or –controlled corporations?

A corporation is considered a government-owned or -controlled
corporation only when the Government directly or indirectly owns or
controls at least a majority or 51% share of the capital stock. (Carandang v.
Carandang, G.R. No. 148076, 153161, January 12, 2011)

b. Was RPN a government-owned or –controlled corporation?

No. RPN was neither a government-owned nor a controlled corporation
because the Government's total share in RPN's capital stock was only
32.4%. Although the Sandiganbayan ordered the transfer to the PCGG of

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A's shares that represented 72.4% of the total issued and outstanding capital
stock of RPN, such quantification of A's shareholding cannot be controlling
in view of A's timely filing of a motion for reconsideration whereby he
clarified and insisted that the shares ceded to the PCGG had accounted for
only 32.4%, not 72.4%, of RPN's outstanding capital stock. With the extent
of A's holdings in RPN remaining unresolved with finality, concluding that
the Government held the majority of RPN's capital stock as to make RPN a
government-owned or -controlled corporation would be bereft of any
factual and legal basis. (Carandang v. Carandang, G.R. No. 148076, 153161,
January 12, 2011)

c. A claims that he is a private individual and hence, not subject to the

jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan. Is he correct?
YES. While it is true that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over
administrative cases involving grave misconduct committed by the officials
and employees of government-owned or -controlled corporations; and the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction to try and decide criminal actions involving
violations of R.A. 3019 committed by public officials and employees,
including presidents, directors and managers of government-owned or -
controlled corporations, the Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan have no
jurisdiction over A considering that RPN is not a government-owned or -
controlled corporation. A is a private individual and not subject to the
administrative authority of the Ombudsman and to the criminal jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan. (Carandang v. Carandang, G.R. No. 148076, 153161,
January 12, 2011)

25. The ombudsman found probable cause to charge X, a private individual

with violation of RA 3019, in conspiracy with the DOTC secretary in entering
into a contract grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
Only X was indicted because the DOTC Secretary died before the issuance of
the resolution finding probable cause against both accused. No information
was filed against the DOTC Secretary. Does the Sandiganbayan have
jurisdiction over X?
YES. While by reason of the Secretary 's death, there is no longer any public
officer with whom X can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019, it does not mean,
that the allegation of conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or that
their alleged conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing extinguished by the
death of the Secretary is his criminal liability but it did not extinguish the crime
nor did it remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy between him and X. The
death of the Secretary does not mean that there was no public officer who
violated R.A. 3019. The requirement before a private person may be indicted for
violation of Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019, among others, is that such private person
must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The law does
not require that such person must, in all instances, be indicted together with the

12


public officer. It is not necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an

indictment for conspiracy. The death of one of two or more conspirators does not
prevent the conviction of the survivor or survivors. (People v. Go, G.R. No.
168539, March 25, 2014)

26. May the civil aspect of a crime falling within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan be instituted separately from the criminal case?
NO. The criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of
civil liability shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly
determined in, the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan. The filing of the
criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil
action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately from the
criminal action shall be recognized. Where the civil action had been filed
separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case
is thereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan, said civil action shall be transferred to
the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation
and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate civil
action shall be deemed abandoned.
Note: The same rule applies to cases involving public officers within the
jurisdiction of the RTC and MTC. (RA 10660, Sec. 2)

27. May there be an instance where an accused would be estopped to assail

the jurisdiction of the court as an exception to the rule that jurisdiction over
the subject matter may be assailed even on appeal?
YES. In Antiporda v. Garchitorena (G.R. No. 133289, 23 December 1999), the
accused were a mayor, barangay captin and councilman, charged with
kidnapping. The original Information filed with the Sandiganbayan did not
mention that the offense committed by the accused is office-related. It was only
after the same was filed that the prosecution belatedly remembered that a
jurisdictional fact was omitted therein. An amended information was filed.
Accused moved to quash the information, which was denied. The accused
argued that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case
because the original information did not allege that the mayor took advantage of
his position to order the kidnapping of the victim. However, the same accused
also previously challenged the jurisdiction of the RTC over the case and alleged
that the crime is work-connected. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a
court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent, and after obtaining or
failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. The
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case because of estoppel and it was thus
vested with the authority to order the amendment of the Information.

JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON

28. May jurisdiction over the person be waived?

13


YES, if the accused fails to raise the lack of jurisdiction seasonably by motion for
the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court before he enters his plea.
Jurisdiction over the person is waivable unlike jurisdiction over the subject
matter, which is neither subject to agreement nor conferred by consent of the
parties. (Arnado v. Buban, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1543, 31 May 2004) Lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either expressly or
impliedly. (La Naval Drug vs. CA, G.R. No. 103200, 31 August 1994)

29. How is jurisdiction over the person acquired?

Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the court by virtue of the party's or
accused's voluntary submission to the authority of the court or through the
exercise of its coercive processes.1 [Paulino Zamora, et al., v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 78206, 19 March 1990; El Banco Español-Filipino v. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921 (1918)]

30. An information for violation of RA 3019 was filed against Kemekeme

(K) with the Sandiganbayan, which issued an order of arrest against K. In turn,
K opposed the WOA and moved for leave to file MR assailing the
Ombudsman resolution finding probable cause. K also posted bail. K also
sought for extension of time to file said MR assailing the ombudsman
resolution. K then moved for leave travel and for which reason, he was
conditionally arraigned. After being allowed to travel, K moved for extension
of time to stay aborad. The WOA was declared void for being issued without
the court’s personal determination of probable cause. Since the WOA was
declared void, K argued that the Sandiganbayan never acquired jurisdiction
over his person and thus, the Sandiganbayan cannot proceed with trial of the
case. Is K correct?
NO. The infirmity of the WOA was cured by K’s subsequent act of voluntarily
submitting to the court's jurisdiction by: (1) posting his bail; and (2) filing the
following pleadings which sought affirmative relief: (a) Opposition to Issuance of
Warrant of Arrest with Motion for Leave to File Motion for Reconsideration; (b)
Motion for extension of time to file Motion for Reconsideration; and (c) Motion to
Travel Abroad, and extension of time to stay abroad. By posting bail, K cannot
claim exemption from the effect of being subject to the jurisdiction of the court.
While K exerted efforts to dispute the validity of the issuance of the WOA
despite his posting bail, his claim has been negated when he himself invoked the
jurisdiction of the court through the filing of various motions that sought other
affirmative reliefs. (Cojuangco, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 134307, December 21,
1998)

When an accused is brought before a competent court by virtue of a warrant of

arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of his body to the
jurisdiction of the court he must raise the question of the court's jurisdiction over

1 Paulino Zamora, et al., v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78206, 19 March 1990, citing El
Banco Español-Filipino v. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921 (1918).

14


his person at the very earliest opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the
complaint or files any dilatory plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the
court jurisdiction over his person.The act of posting bail or filing motions seeking
affirmative relief is tantamount to submission of accused’s person to the
jurisdiction of the court. (People v. Go, G.R. No. 168539, March 25, 2014)

a. Assuming that during the pendency of the case with the

Sandiganbayan, the Ombudsman reverses its finding of probable
cause against K. Will this warrant the automatic dismissal of the
Sandiganbayan case?
NO. Once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition
of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused
rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the prosecutor
retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases
even while the case is already in Court, he cannot impose his opinion
on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do
with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its
exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case
filed by the prosecution should be addressed to the Court who has the
option to grant or deny the same. (Crespo vs. Mogul, G.R. No.

31. May an accused file a motion to quash on the ground of lack of

jurisdiction over his person in addition to invoking other grounds for quashal
under Rule 117 without being considered to have submitted his person to the
jurisdiction of the Court?
NO. For an accused not to waive this defense of lack of jurisdiction over his
person, he must do so seasonably by motion (before entering his plea) for the
sole and separate purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction. Otherwise, he shall be
deemed to have submitted himself to that jurisdiction. If the appearance is for
any other purpose, he shall be deemed to have submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court, as it partakes of voluntary submission by seeking
affirmative relief from the court. He cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court by
seeking affirmative relied and at the same time, deny the jurisdiction of the court
over his person. (La Naval Drug vs. CA, G.R. No. 103200, 31 August 1994)

32. What are the instances when a motion/pleading filed in court will not
amount to voluntary submission of the person to the jurisdiction of the court?
This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the
jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special appearance. These pleadings
are:
(1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant, whether or not other grounds for
dismissal are included;
(2) in criminal cases, motions to quash an information/complaint solely on

15


the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused, without
including other grounds to quash information/complaint; and
(3) motions to quash warrant of arrest.
The first two are consequences of the fact that failure to file them would
constitute a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person. The
third is a consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of the court process
forcing the submission of the person of the accused that is the very issue in a
motion to quash a warrant of arrest. These pleadings/motions presuppose that
there are no other acts done (like posting bail) or other pleadings/motions
seeking affirmative relief filed in addition to the foregoing. If there would be
posting of bail or filing of other pleadings/motions seeking affirmative relief,
then it would be tantamount to submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
(Miranda v. Tuliao, G.R. No. 158763, March 31, 2006)

33. Is custody of the law required before a court acquires jurisdiction over
the person of the accused?
NO. One can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court even when there is no
custody of law, such as when the accused, without surrendering, files pleadings
or motions seeking affirmative relief or when the accused escapes custody after
trial commence. (Miranda v. Tuliao, G.R. No. 158763, March 31, 2006) Thus, the fact
that the accused is not yet arrested or in detention will not prevent the court from
acting on said accused’s motion/pleading seeking affirmative relief, as the same
amounts to submission of one’s person to the jurisdiction of the court.

34. Distinguish custody of the law from jurisdiction over the person of the
accused.
Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for
bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the accused
where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused. Custody of the law is accomplished
either by arrest or voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction over the person of the
accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of
the court by filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief.

One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of
the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant
files before arraignment a motion to quash the WOA. One can be subject to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law.
Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is deprived
of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the
law. Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It
includes, but is not limited to, detention. (Miranda v. Tuliao, G.R. No. 158763,
March 31, 2006)

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TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION

35. May territorial jurisdiction be waived or be subject to the agreement of

the parties?
NO. In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional or an essential element of
jurisdiction. For jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense
should have been committed or any one if its essential ingredients took place
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. The court cannot take jurisdiction
over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that
limited territory. The jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined
by the allegations in the complaint or information. Once it is shown, the court
may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced
during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court
should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. (Foz v. People, G.R. No.
167764, 9 October 2009)

36. What are the rules on determining the place where the action should be
filed?
a. It should be instituted in the court of the municipality or territory where
the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients
occurred.
b. If the offense is committed in a train, aircraft or other public or private
vehicle in the court of its trip, in the the court of any municipality or
territory where said vehicle passed during its trip, including the place of
departure and arrival.
c. If offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage, in
the court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or territory
where the vessel passed during such voyage, subject to the generally
accepted principles of international law.
• For international crimes against humanity, where it is first filed
d. For offenses committed outside the Philippines but punishable under
RPC, Art. 2, where the criminal action is first filed.

37. For Violation of BP22, where should the action be instituted?

It may be instituted in the place of issuance of the check or the place where the
check bounced/was dishonored, at the option of the filing party.

38. The crime committed was falsification of private documents. The

document was falsified in Quezon City and used in Makati City. Which court
has territorial jurisdiction over the case?
The Quezon City court has territorial jurisdiction. In cases of falsification of
private documents, the venue is the place where the document is actually
falsified to the prejudice of or with the intent to prejudice the third person,
regardless of whether or not the document falsified is put to the improper or

17


illegal use for which it was intended (Navaja v. De Castro, G.R. No. 182926, 22
June 2015)

39. What is the reason behind the rule on territorial jurisdiction?

First, the jurisdiction of the trial courts is limited to well-defined territories such
that a trial court can only hear and try cases involving crimes committed within
its territorial jurisdiction. Second, it is grounded on the necessity and justice of
having an accused on trial in the municipality of province where witnesses and
other facilities for his defense are available. (Uninion Bank of the Philippines v.
People, G.R. No. 192565, 28 February 2012)

40. Baskilikili executed a certification of non-forum shopping in Makati,

where it was also notarized. It contained a false statement as Baskilikili was
actually forum shopping. The certification was attached to a complaint filed in
Pasay City. Which court has territorial jurisdiction over the perjury case?
The Makati Court has territorial jurisdiction because the certification was
notarized in Makati and the statement under oath was made in Makati. (Uninion
Bank of the Philippines v. People, G.R. No. 192565, 28 February 2012)

41. May the venue of proceedings in criminal cases be changed?

YES. Article VIII, Sec. 5(4) of the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court
could order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

In People v. Sola, G.R. No. 56158-64, March 17, 1981, the accused were officials with
power and influence. They were released on bail. Most of the accused were also
at large. The witnesses feared for their safety. There were also reports made to
police of threats made to families of witnesses. They sought change of venue,
which was granted by the Court to prevent miscarriage of justice. To compel the
prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality where its witnesses will not be at
liberty to reveal what they know is to make a mockery of the judicial process,
and to betray the very purpose for which courts have been established. The
witnesses in the case are fearful for their lives. They are afraid they would be
killed on their way to or from Himamaylan during any of the days of trial.
Because of this fear, they may either refuse to testify or testify falsely to save their
lives. For the foregoing reasons, change of venue was allowed. (People v. Sola,
G.R. No. 56158-64, March 17, 1981)

42. Does the rule on venue being jurisdictional run counter to the
constitutional provision allowing change of venue?
NO. The case should still be filed in the court having territorial jurisdiction over
the case. After the case is filed, there may then be an application with the
Supreme Court for the change of venue of proceedings or place of trial to avoid
miscarriage of justice.

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PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

43. What conditions should be met to ensure that procedural due process
has been complied with?
Due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present: (1) there must be
a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter
before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired by it over the person of the
defendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the
defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be
rendered upon lawful hearing. (People v. Dapitan y Martin, G.R. No. 90625, 23
May 1991)

44. Accused was charged with murder. Bail was granted upon accused’s
application without giving the prosecution to be heard. Was procedural due
process complied with?
NO. The prosecution’s right to procedural due process was violated. Justice
requires that the prosecution be given the opportunity to prove that there is
strong evidence of guilt, before bail is granted by the court. (People v. Sola, G.R.
No. 56158-64, March 17, 1981)

Rule 110
PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES

45. How are criminal actions instituted?

Assuming there is no inquest and the accused is not caught in flagrante delicto:

If preliminary investigation is required, or in Manila and chartered cities,

regardless of whether preliminary investigation is required in such cases, by
the filing of the complaint with the office of the prosecutor, except when the
charter of the city provides otherwise.

If offense is committed outside Manila or not in chartered cities, such as in the

provinces, and preliminary investigation is required, by the filing of the
complaint with the office of the prosecutor. Note, that the Municipal Trial Court
no longer conducts preliminary investigation.

If offense is committed outside Manila or not in chartered cities, such as in the

provinces, and preliminary investigation is not required, by filing the complaint
or information directly with the Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts, or the complaint with the office of the prosecutor. (Rule 110, Sec. 1)

46. What is a complaint? What is an information?

A complaint is a sworn written statement charging a person with an offense,
subscribed by the offended party, any peace officer, or other public officer

19


charged with the enforcement of the law violated. An information is an

accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the
prosecutor and filed with the court. The complaint of information shall be in
writing, in the name of the People of the Philippines and against all persons who
appear to be responsible for the offense involved. (RULE 110, Sec. 2-4).

Sufficiency of Information

47. When is a complaint or information considered to be sufficient?

It is sufficient if it states the:
a. name of the accused;
• when an offense is committed by more than 1 person, all of them
shall be included in the complaint or information.
b. designation of the offense given by the statute;
• If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to
the section or subsection of the statute penalizing it (RULE 110, Sec.
8)
• It should specify the qualifying and aggravating circumstances,
including generic aggravating circumstants
c. acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;
• What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the
designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part
thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law
made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged
and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions
complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to
enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is
intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper
judgment. (People v. Caoile, G.R. No. 203041, 5 June 2013)
• The acts or omissions constituting the offense and the qualifying
and aggravating circumstances alleged must be stated in ordinary
and concise language; they do not necessarily need to be in the
language of the statute, and should be in terms sufficient to enable
a person of common understanding to know what offense is
charged and what qualifying and aggravating circumstances are
alleged, so that the court can pronounce judgment (Enrile v. People,
G.R. No. 213455, 11 August 2015)
d. name of the offended party;
e. approximate date of the commission of the offense; and
f. place where the offense was committed. (RULE 110, Sec. 6)
• The Rules do not require the Information to exactly allege the date
and place of the commission of the offense, unless the date and the
place are material ingredients or essential elements of the offense,

20


or are necessary for its identification (Enrile v. People, G.R. No.

213455, 11 August 2015)

The requirement aims to enable the accused to properly prepare for his defense
since he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts constituting
the offense charged. (Enrile v. People, G.R. No. 213455, 11 August 2015)

48. Accused was charged with rape of a demented person. Although the
Information stated that he was being charged with the crime of rape of a
demented person under paragraph 1 (d) of Art. 266 (when an offended party is
12 years of age or is demented), it also stated that the victim AAA was “a
person with a mental age of 7 years old.” AAA was clinically diagnosed to be a
mental retardate. Accused entered a plea of guilty and was convicted. On
appeal, he assailed the sufficiency of the information. The issue is whether
Accused should have instead been charged with committing rape under
paragraph 1(b) or when the victim is deprived of reason as this has been
interpreted to include those clinically diagnosed to be a mental retardate. Was
the information sufficient despite the error in the charge of offense?
YES. Accused did not assail the sufficiency of the information when he entered
his plea. The information also stated particular facts and averments sufficient to
constitute the offense under paragraph 1(b), in that AAA was a person with a
mental age of 7 years old. The particular facts stated in the Information were
averments sufficient to inform the accused of the nature of the charges against
him. (People v. Caoile, G.R. No. 203041, 5 June 2013)

49. Distinguish ultimate facts from evidentiary facts.

An Information only needs to state the ultimate facts constituting the offense; the
evidentiary and other details (i.e., the facts supporting the ultimate facts) can be
provided during the trial. Ultimate facts are those facts which the expected
evidence will support. Ultimate facts are the essential and substantial facts which
either form the basis of the primary right and duty or which directly make up the
wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant, while evidentiary facts are those
which tend to prove or establish said ultimate facts. (Enrile v. People, G.R. No.
213455, 11 August 2015)

50. The information states the acts or omissions constituting the elements
of the crime charged but some of the facts are vague or lack details. Should
accused file a motion to quash the information?
NO. The remedy is to file a motion for bill of particulars. This motion
presupposes that the information is valid and presents all elements of the crime
charged, albeit under vague terms. (Enrile v. People, G.R. No. 213455, 11 August
2015).

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51. An information charged X with qualified theft that was committed “on
or about the 2nd of January 1996”. X assails the sufficiency of the information
because there was a discrepancy between the charge and some of the
testimonies, which alleged that the crime was committed on 29 December 1995.
X claims that the discrepancy in the dates unduly prejudiced her rights as an
accused to be informed of the charges as to enable her to prepare her defense.
Is the information sufficient?

Yes. The information stated the approximate time of the commission of the
offense through the words "on or about the 2nd of January, 1996," and the
accused could reasonably deduce the nature of the criminal act with which she
was charged from a reading of its contents as well as gather by such reading
whatever she needed to know about the charge to enable her to prepare her
defense. The information herein did not have to state the precise date when the
offense was committed, considering that the date was not a material ingredient
of the offense. The offense of qualified theft could be alleged to be committed
on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission. December 29,
1995 and January 2, 1996 were dates only four days apart. (People v. Garcia
Cristobal, G.R. No. 159450, March 30, 2011)

52. X was charged with murder. The information stated, among others, that
X, “with intent to kill, qualified with treachery, evident premeditation and
abuse of superior strength did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, assault, attack and employ personal violence upon the person of
one V by then and there shooting him with a gun, hitting him on his head,
thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wound which was the direct
and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of
the said V.” The RTC convicted X of homicide only, because the information
did not sufficiently allege the attendance of treachery. Was the RTC correct?
Yes. The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption
or preamble of the information, or from the specification of the provision of
law alleged to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by
the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information. The averments of
the informations to the effect that the two accused "with intent to kill, qualified
with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength did . . .
assault, attack and employ personal violence upon" the victim "by then and
there shooting V with a gun, hitting V", "which was the direct and immediate
cause of the death" did not sufficiently set forth the facts and circumstances
describing how treachery attended each of the killings. Merely averring the
killing of a person by shooting him with a gun, without more, did not show
how the execution of the crime was directly and specially ensured without risk
to the accused from the defense that the victim might make. The use of the gun
as an instrument to kill was not per se treachery, for there are other
instruments that could serve the same lethal purpose. Nor did the use of the

22


term treachery constitute a sufficient averment, for that term, standing alone,
was nothing but a conclusion of law, not an averment of a fact. In short, the
particular acts and circumstances constituting treachery as an attendant
circumstance in murder were missing from the information.

To discharge its burden of informing him of the charge, the State must specify
in the information the details of the crime and any circumstance that
aggravates his liability for the crime. The requirement of sufficient factual
averments is meant to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the charge
against him in order to enable him to prepare his defense. It emanates from the
presumption of innocence in his favor, pursuant to which he is always
presumed to have no independent knowledge of the details of the crime he is
being charged with. To have the facts stated in the body of the information
determine the crime of which he stands charged and for which he must be
tried thoroughly accords with common sense and with the requirements of
plain justice. (People v. Valdez, G.R. No. 175602, January 18, 2012)

53. 4. May an accused be convicted of murder if the aggravating qualifying

circumstance was proven but not alleged in the information?
No. A practical consequence of the non-allegation of a detail that aggravates
his liability is to prohibit the introduction or consideration against the accused
of evidence that tends to establish that detail. The allegations in the
information are controlling in the ultimate analysis. When there is a variance
between the offense charged in the information and that proved, and the
offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved,
the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in the offense
charged, or of the offense charged included in the offense proved. In that
regard, an offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some
of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the
information, constitute the latter; an offense charged is necessarily included in
the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or
form part of those constituting the latter. (People v. Valdez, G.R. No. 175602,
January 18, 2012)

54. X was charged with rape under Article 266-B for rape committed with
the use of a deadly weapon, punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The
information did not allege any aggravating circumstance in the commission of
the crime rape. If the aggravating circumstance is proven during the trial, is the
information sufficient to impose the maximum period of reclusion perpetua
should the accused be convicted?
No. Although the information alleged the use by the accused of a deadly
weapon (bolo) in the commission of the rape, the court cannot prescribe the
maximum period of reclusion perpetua because the information did not allege
the attendance of any aggravating circumstances. The Rules require the
information to state the "acts or omissions complained of as constituting the

23


offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances . . . in ordinary and

concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in
terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstance
and for the court to pronounce judgment. The Prosecution became precluded
from establishing any act or circumstance not specifically alleged in the
information if such act or circumstance would increase the penalty to the
maximum period. (People v. Abrencillo, G.R. No. 183100, November 28, 2012)

Prescriptive Period of Crimes

55. How may the period of prescription of the offense be interrupted?

The institution of the criminal action shall interrupt the period of prescription of
the offense charged unless otherwise provided by special laws. (RULE 110, Sec.
1)
a. For crimes defined and punished under the RPC, the filing of the
complaint before the prosecutor, or for purposes of preliminary
investigation interrupts the period of prescription (People v. Galano, G.R.
No. L-42925, January 31, 1977)
b. For violation of special laws, including violation of BP 22, the filing of
the complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation also interrupts the
period of prescription of criminal responsibility (Sanrio Co. Ltd. v. Lim,
G.R. No. 168662, February 19, 2008; People v. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 152662,
June 13, 2012)
• Investigations conducted by the SEC for violations of the Revised
Securities Act and the Securities Regulations Code effectively
interrupts the prescription period because it is equivalent to the
preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases
(Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources
Corporation, et al, G.R. No. 135808, 6 October 2008)
c.

56. What is the effect of the prescription of the offense?

Article 89, RPC provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by the
prescription of the crime, among others.

57. When will an offense prescribe?

Article 90, RPC provides that the prescription of crimes is as follows:

1. 20 years – crimes punishable by death, RP, RT

2. Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties – 15 years

24


3. Correctional penalty – 10 years

4. Exception arresto mayor – 5 years
5. Libel or other similar offenses, 1 year
6. Oral defamation and slander by deed – 6 months
7. Light offenses – 2 months

For offenses not defined and penalized under the RPC:

Sec. 1 of Act. No. 3326, as amended, provides that Violations penalized by

special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance
with the following rules:
(a) after a 1 for offences punished only by a fine or by imprisonment for not more
than 1 month, or both;
(b) after 4 years for those punished by imprisonment for more than 1 month, but
less than 2 years;
(c) after 8 years for those punished by imprisonment for2 years or more, but less
than 6 years; and
(d) after 12 years for any other offence punished by imprisonment for 6 years or
more, except the crime of treason, which shall prescribe after 20 years:
• Provided, hat all offenses against any law or part of law administered
by the BIR shall prescribe after 5 years.
(e) Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after 2 months.
(f) Violations of the regulations or conditions of certificates of public convenience
issued by the Public Service Commission, shall prescribe after 2 months.
(Amendment to Sec. 1 of Act No. 3326, Act No. 3763, [November 26, 1930])

58. How is the period of the prescription of offense computed?

Art. 91, RPC provides that the period of prescription shall commence to run from
the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities,
or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information, and shall commence to run again when such proceeding terminate
without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for
any reason not imputable to him. The term of prescription shall not run when the
offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago.

59. When does prescription of offense begin to run for under Act No. 3326?
First, from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, if such
commission is known; and second, from its discovery, if not then known, and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

60. On March 1, 1990, the OSG filed a complaint for violation of RA 2019
against accused for their investments that were manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government by amending UNICOM’s capitalization
and the amended AOI in relation to that was filed with the SEC on 8 February

25


1980. The prosecution argues that it was only discovered after the 1986 EDSA
Revolution. Has the action prescribed as more than 10 years have lapsed since
the commission of the offense?
YES. Prescription commenced to run on 8 February 1980. The transaction was not
alleged to have been concealed and the prosecution was not shown to have been
denied access to such public records by the SEC. The last day for filing the action
was, at the latest, on February 8, 1990, about four years after martial law ended.
(Republic v. Cojuangco, G.R. No. 139930, June 26, 2012)

61. On 17 May 2003 Sisasisig took and carried away the clamp attached to
the wheel of his car, which clamp was placed because of she illegally parked
her vehicle. A complaint for robbery was filed against her on 28 May 2003 and
preliminary investigation was then conducted. The prosecutor found that no
robbery was committed but that she committed a violation of the Baguio City
Ordinance. The information was filed on 2 October 2003. Has the action
prescribed?
YES. Violations of City or municipal ordinances is governed by the Rule on
Summary Procedure. Section 11 thereof provides that criminal cases governed by
summary procedure shall be commenced wither by filing a complaint or
information, provided that in Metropolitan Manila and chartered cities, it shall
be commenced only by information, except with the offense cannot be
prosecuted de officio. When the complaint before the prosecution was filed, the
prescription period was still running and it continued to run until the filing of
information. They had 2 months from discovery and commission of the offense
to file the information with the MTC. The PI with the original charge of robbery,
the subsequent finding of violation of ordinance did not alter the the period
within which to file the information. (Jadewell Parking Systems Corp. v. Lidua,
Sr., G.R. No. 169588, October 7, 2013)

Prosecution of Criminal Actions

62. Who must prosecute criminal actions?

All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be

prosecuted under the direction and control of the prosecutor. However, in case
of heavy work schedule of public prosecutor or in the event of lack of public
prosecutors, a private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of
the Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecution to prosecute the case
subject to the approval of the court.

Crimes of adultery and concubinage, shall only be prosecuted upon complaint

filed by the offended spouse. The offended party cannot institute criminal
prosecution without including the guilty parties, if both are alive, nor, in any

26


case, if the offended party has consented to the offense or pardoned the
offenders.

Crimes of seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness, shall only be

prosecuted upon complaint filed by the offended party or her parents,
grandparents or guardian, unless the offended party has been expressly
pardoned by any of them. If the offended party dies or becomes incapacitated
before she can file the complaint, and she has no known parents, grandparents or
guardian, the state shall initiate the criminal action in her behalf.
• The right to file action granted to parents, grandparents or guardian shall
be exclusive of all other persons and shall be exercised successively in the
order herein provided
• A complaint was filed by the mother on behalf of the minor victim. The
accused moved to dismiss the same on the ground that it should have
been the father who filed the case. Is the accused correct?
NO. The complaint filed by the mother was sufficient and it conferred
jurisdiction on the court to try the case. The father's passivity should not
preclude the mother from securing redress for the outrage committed
against her daughter. It is not sanctioned by Section 4 of Rule 110 nor by
Article 344 RPC whose provisions do not categorically specify that the
father has the preferential right to file the complaint. The father and
mother jointly exercise parental authority over their legitimate children
who are not emancipated. (People v. Mariano, G.R. No. L-47437, 29
September 1983)

No criminal action for defamation which consists in imputation of any of the

offenses mentioned above shall be brought except at the instance of and upon
complaint filed by the offended party.

In appeals of criminal cases before the CA and the SC, the People is the real
party in interest in a criminal case and only the OSG can represent the People in
criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in the SC. (Jimenez v. Sorongon, G.R.
No. 178607, 5 December 2012)
• The criminal case for estafa before the RTC was dismissed. Private
complainant filed a notice of appeal. Accused moved to expunge the
appeal as the appeal was not authorized. Is accused correct?
YES. The private complainant had no legal personality to assail the
dismissal of the criminal case since the main issue involved the criminal
aspect of the case. This involves the right to prosecute which pertains
exclusively to the People, as represented by the OSG. (Jimenez v.
Sorongon, G.R. No. 178607, 5 December 2012)
However, if the complainant only appealed the civil aspect of the case
then the same may be given due course by the court.

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63. X was charged with libel. Trial was reset several times because the
prosecution had no witnesses to present, although the prosecution never asked
for a subpoena for their witness. Accused moved to terminate the presentation
of prosecution evidence for failure of the prosecution to present witnesses
despite numerous postponements, which the RTC granted. Private
Complainant filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, assailing the RTC’s
order, claiming that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion.

a. Will the petition prosper?

No. The private complainant did not join the People of the Philippines as a
party in his action for certiorari in the CA. Private complainant sought to set
aside the trial court’s order, which concerned the public aspect of the criminal
case. People of the Philippines were indispensable parties therein. The
omission was fatal and already enough cause for the summary rejection of his
petition for certiorari. The OSG shall represent the Government in the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the
Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and
all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which
the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party".
(Golangco v. Fung, G.R. No. 157952, September 8, 2009)

b. Will your answer be the same if the petition for certiorari bore the
conformity of the public prosecutor?

Yes. That conformity alone does not suffice. The authority of the City Prosecutor
or his assistant to appear for and represent the People of the Philippines was
confined only to the proceedings in the trial court, and does not extend to the
petition for certiorari with the CA. (Golangco v. Fung, G.R. No. 157952, September
8, 2009)

64. May the prosecution’s finding of probable cause be the subject of

judicial review?
GENERAL RULE: NO. The right to prosecute vests the public prosecutors with a
wide range of discretion – the discretion and what and whom to charge, the
exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors that are best appreciated
by the public prosecutors. The public prosecutors are solely responsible for the
amount of evidence sufficient to establish probable cause to justify the filing of
appropriate criminal charges against a respondent.
EXCEPTION: Judicial review may be allowed where it is clearly established that
the public prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion, that is, when he has
exercised his discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner
by reason of passion or personal hostility, patent and gross enough as to amount

28


to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by

law. (Ampatuan, Jr., v. De Lima, G.R. No. 197291, 3 April 2013)

65. May a petition for mandamus prosper to direct the prosecutor to find
probable cause against the respondent?
In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus may
only be resorted to in order to compel respondent tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person to take action, but it cannot be used to direct the manner or the
particular way discretion is to be exercised, or to compel the retraction or
reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of judgment or discretion. As
such, the prosecutor may be compelled to act on the complaint-affidavit, but may
not be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to dismiss the complaint or find
probable cause. (Ampatuan, Jr., v. De Lima, G.R. No. 197291, 3 April 2013)

Amendment and Substitution

66. When and how may a complaint or information be amended?

FORMAL AMENDMENT: At any time before accused enters his plea, without
leave of court. If after entering plea, only with leave of court and if it will not
cause prejudice to the rights of the accused.
• Example of formal amendment that would prejudice the rights of the
accused: There was an error in the allegation of age in the information for
rape, stating that the age of the victim was 26 when it should be 6. This
will prejudice the rights of the accused as the change of age will make the
charge of rape qualified.

SUBSTANTIAL AMENDMENT: At any time before accused enters his plea,

without leave of court, unless the amendment: (1) downgrades the nature of
the offense charged; or (2) excludes any accused from the complaint or
information, in which case, the amendment may only be done upon motion by
the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party, and with leave of court.

After arraignment, a substantial amendment is proscribed except if the same is

beneficial to the accused. (Matalam v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 165751, 12 April
2005)

67. When may there be substitution of complaint or information?

If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in
charging the proper offense and the accused cannot be convicted of the offense
charged or any other offense necessarily included therein, the court shall dismiss
the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the
proper offense, provided the accused would not be placed in double jeopardy. In
such a case, the accused shall not be discharged if there appears good cause to

29


detain him and the court shall commit the accused to answer for the proper
offense. (Sec. 19, Rule 119; Sec. 14, Rule 110)

The last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, applies only when the offense charged
is wholly different from the offense proved, i.e., the accused cannot be convicted
of a crime with which he was not charged in the information even if it be proven,
in which case, there must be a dismissal of the charge and a substitution of a new
information charging the proper offense. Section 14 does not apply to a second
information, which involves the same offense or an offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the first information. (Pacoy v. Cajigal, G.R.
No. 157472, 28 September 2007)

68. 4 separate informations for illegal recruitment were filed against the
accused. After her arrest accused posted bail. The prosecution then moved to
amend the informations so there would just be 1 information for illegal
recruitment in large scale. Accused, who had not yet been arraigned, argues
that the amendment would violate her substantial rights for depriving her of
the right to bail she already availed of. May the informations be amended and
lumped into 1 information for illegal recruitment in large scale?
YES. Accused has not yet been arraigned so that complaint or information may
be amended into a non-bailable offense. Although Section 14, Rule 110 uses the
singular word complaint or information, it does not mean that two or more
complaints or Informations cannot be amended into only one Information.
(Fronda-Baggao v. People, G.R. No. 151785, 10 December 2007)

69. What is the test to determine whether the amendment would prejudice
the accused?
The test is whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would
be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant
might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in
the other. (Matalam v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 165751, 12 April 2005)

70. When is an amendment considered as substantial?

A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense
charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are
merely of form. An amendment to an information which does not change the
nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect the essence of the offense or
cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new
averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance. (Matalam v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 165751, 12 April 2005)

71. Give examples of formal amendments.

The following have been held to be merely formal amendments: (1) new
allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might

30


impose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment which does not charge
another offense different or distinct from that charged in the original one; (3)
additional allegations which do not alter the prosecution's theory of the case so
as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will
assume; (4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right
of the accused; (5) an amendment that merely adds specifications to eliminate
vagueness in the information and not to introduce new and material facts, and
merely states with additional precision something which is already contained in
the original information and which adds nothing essential for conviction for the
crime charged. (Matalam v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 165751, 12 April 2005)

72. Lonely was charged with other accused for violation of RA 3019 by
unjustifiably refusing to pay money claims of certain individuals. The
information was amended to exclude all accused except Lonely, and the
amended information further alleged Lonely’s act of illegally dismissing
complainants from the service. Should there have been preliminary
investigation conducted as a consequence of the amendment of information?
YES. The amendment is substantial because the recital of facts constituting the
offense charged was altered. Since the alleged illegal and unjustifiable refusal to
pay monetary is not related to, and did not arise from, the alleged illegal
dismissal from the service of the private complainants, then the accused is
entitled to a preliminary investigation. A substantial amendment in an
information entitles an accused to another preliminary investigation if the
amended information does not contain a charge related to or is included in the
original information. If so related or included, a new preliminary investigation is
not required. (Matalam v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 165751, 12 April 2005)

73. An information for homicide was filed with the RTC against Killy, who
entered a plea of not guilty. The RTC then issued an order directing the
prosecution to amend the information to murder in view of the aggravating
circumstance of disregard of rank alleged in the information (victim was a
second lieutenant). The Prosecution amended it by crossing out the word
“Homicide” in the preamble of the Information and replacing it with the word
“Murder”. When accused was re-arraigned, a plea of not guilty was entered
because of his refusal to enter a plea. Accused moved to quash the
information, which was denied. Accused filed an MR. Since the aggravating
circumstance was generic, the MR was granted and the RTC ruled that the
original information stood. Was the amendment formal or substantial?
It was only formal. The change of the offense charged from Homicide to Murder
is merely a formal amendment as there as there was no change in the recital of
facts constituting the offense charged or in the determination of the jurisdiction
of the court. The averments in the amended Information for Murder are exactly
the same as those already alleged in the original Information for Homicide, as
there was not at all any change in the act imputed to accused, i.e., the killing of

31


without any qualifying circumstance. (Pacoy v. Cajigal, G.R. No. 157472, 28

September 2007)

74. Distinguish amendment from substitution of information or complaint.

1. Amendment may involve either formal or substantial changes;
substitution necessarily involves a substantial change from the original
charge;
2. Amendment before plea is entered can be effected without leave of
court, but substitution of information must be with leave of court as the
original information has to be dismissed;
3. Where the amendment is only as to form, there is generally no need for
another preliminary investigation and the retaking of the plea of the
accused; in substitution of information, another preliminary
investigation is entailed and the accused has to plead anew to the new
information;
4. An amended information refers to the same offense charged in the
original information or to an offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the original charge, hence substantial
amendments to the information after the plea has been taken cannot be
made over the objection of the accused, for if the original information
would be withdrawn, the accused could invoke double jeopardy. On the
other hand, substitution requires or presupposes that the new
information involves a different offense which does not include or is not
necessarily included in the original charge, hence the accused cannot
claim double jeopardy. (Pacoy v. Cajigal, G.R. No. 157472, 28 September
2007)

75. An information is being amended to insert the aggravating

circumstances of dwelling and insult or disregard of the respect due to rank,
age, or sex. Is this a substantial amendment?
NO. It is merely formal. These amendments do not have the effect of charging
another offense different or distinct from the charge of murder as contained in
the original information. They relate only to the range of the penalty that the
court might impose in the event of conviction. (People v. Tubongbanua, G.R. No.
171271m 31 August 2006) If amended after evidence is presented and the accused
did not object, then the accused waived the defense. (People v. Tubongbanua,
G.R. No. 171271m 31 August 2006)
Rule 111

76. The RTC convicted X of qualified theft and directed X, among others to
pay damages to the victim for the crime X committed. X appealed. During the
pendency of the appeal, X died. What is the effect of the death of the accused
on his civil liability?

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By the death of the convict, the civil liability based exclusively on the crime for
which the accused was convicted (i.e., ex delicto), is extinguished, because no final
judgment of conviction was yet rendered by the time of his death. Only civil
liability predicated on a source of obligation other than the delict survived the
death of the accused, which the offended party can recover by means of a
separate civil action. (People v. Bunay y Dam-at, G.R. No. 171268 (Resolution),
September 14, 2010)

77. 2. X was convicted of 2 counts of qualified rape committed against D,

his minor child. The Court awarded civil indemnity of Php75,000.00 and moral
damages of Php50,000.00 for each of the 2 counts of rape. Was the court’s
ruling on the civil liability correct?

No. Being the victim of two counts of qualified rape, D, a minor and the
daughter of the accused, was entitled to recover for each count of rape the
amounts of Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity. The moral damages should be
Php75,000.00. She is also entitled to exemplary damages in the amount of
Php30,000.00 (due to the attendance of the qualifying circumstances of minority
of D and the relationship between her and the accused). (People v. Taguibuya,
G.R. No. 180497 (Resolution), October 5, 2011)

78. Distinguish civil indemnity awarded upon a finding of rape from moral
damages.

Civil indemnity is mandatory upon a finding of the fact of rape; it is distinct from
and should not be denominated as moral damages. Moral damages are granted
to the victim in rape in such amount as the court shall deem just and reasonable
without the necessity of pleading or proof. The fact that the victim suffered the
trauma of mental, physical and psychological sufferings constitute the bases for
moral damages. (People v. Taguibuya, G.R. No. 180497 (Resolution), October 5, 2011)

79. What are exemplary damages and when may they be awarded in
criminal cases?

Exemplary damages, which are intended to serve as deterrents to serious

wrongdoings and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of
the rights of an injured, or as a punishment for those guilty of outrageous
conduct, are awarded under Article 2230 of the Civil Code when the crime is
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, regardless of whether
the aggravating circumstance was ordinary or qualifying. (People v. Taguibuya,
G.R. No. 180497 (Resolution), October 5, 2011) The ordinary or qualifying nature of
an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence
to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. (People v. Dadulla
y Capanas, G.R. No. 172321, February 9, 2011)

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80. May courts impose interest on the civil liability (such as on civil
indemnity for rape, exemplary and moral damages) adjudged in a criminal
case?
Yes. In crimes, interest may be adjudicated in a proper case as part of the
damages in the discretion of the court, such as when there has been delay in
the recovery. The imposition of interest is a natural and probable consequence
of the acts of the accused complained of. The interest to be imposed is the legal
rate of 6% per annum reckoned from the finality of this judgment. (People v.
Taguibuya, G.R. No. 180497 (Resolution), October 5, 2011)

81. Can there be an independent civil action to recover the value of a

bouncing check issued in contravention of BP 22?
No. Sec. 1, (b), Rule 111 provides that the criminal action for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action.
No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed. In view of
this special rule governing actions for violation of B.P. 22, Article 31 of the
Civil Code will not apply. (Heirs of Simon v. Chan, G.R. No. 157547, February 23,
2011

a. Will your answer be the same if the civil action was filed before the
promulgation of the cited rules of court?

Yes. The retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate

any right of a person who may feel adversely affected, nor is it
constitutionally objectionable. As a general rule, no vested right may
attach to, or arise from, procedural laws. Any new rules may validly
be made to apply to cases pending at the time of their promulgation,
considering that no party to an action has a vested right in the rules
of procedure, except that in criminal cases, the changes do not
retroactively apply if they permit or require a lesser quantum of
evidence to convict than what is required at the time of the
commission of the offenses, because such retroactivity would be
unconstitutional for being ex post facto under the Constitution. (Heirs
of Simon v. Chan, G.R. No. 157547, February 23, 2011)

82. What is the rule on payment of filing fees in criminal cases insofar as
the civil aspect thereof is concerned?
For BP 22, Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the
offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check
involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the
complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal,
temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay additional
filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so
alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the

34


filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment.
For all other cases, if offended part seeks to enforce civil liability by way of
moral, nominal, temperate, exemplary damages, without specifying amount
thereif, the filing fees shall constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding
such damages. Where amount of damages, other than actual, is specified, the
filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court.

83. Does a case for estafa based on a dishonored check preclude the
institution of a separate civil action, similar with the prohibition in BP 22?
No. The procedures for the recovery of the civil liabilities arising from these
two distinct crimes of BP 22 and estafa are different and non-interchangeable.
In prosecutions of estafa, the offended party may opt to reserve his right to file
a separate civil action, or may institute an independent action based on fraud
pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code. In prosecutions of violations of BP 22,
however, the Court has adopted a policy to prohibit the reservation or
institution of a separate civil action to claim the civil liability arising from the
issuance of the bouncing check, notwithstanding any allegations of fraud and
deceit. (Heirs of Simon v. Chan, G.R. No. 157547, February 23, 2011) However,
you cannot recover twice for the same act. (Ace Haulers Corp. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 127934, 23 August 2000)

84. There was a vehicular accident. May the complainant recover damages
against the employer of the driver in the criminal case and the civil case for
damages based on quasi delict?
While the private complainant has the option to file action for enforcement of
civil liability based on culpa criminal under Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code and an action for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana under
Article 2176 and Article 2177 of the Civil Code, he cannot recover damages twice
for the same negligent act or omission. (Ace Haulers Corp. v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 127934, 23 August 2000)

85. What is the effect of the death of the accused during the pendency of the
case on his liability?
The death of an accused (even if pending appeal) extinguishes the criminal
liability and the corresponding civil liability based solely on the offense (delict).
The death amounts to an acquittal of the accused based on the constitutionally
mandated presumption of innocence in her favor, which can be overcome only
by a finding of guilt — something that death prevents the court from making.

The independent civil liabilities, however, survive death and an action for
recovery therefore may be generally pursued but only by filing a separate civil
action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended. This separate civil action may be enforced against the estate of the
accused. The same act or omission may give rise to independent civil liabilities

35


based on other sources of obligation. (a) law (b) contracts; (c) quasi-contracts, and
(d) quasi-delicts. Among these are the civil liabilities for intentional torts under
Articles 32 and 34 of the Civil Code and for quasi-delicts under Article 2176 of
Civil Code. For conduct constituting defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, the
Civil Code likewise grants the offended party the right to institute a civil action
independently of the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code.

In BP 22 Cases, the death will not not automatically extinguish the action. The
independent civil liability based on contract, which was deemed instituted in the
criminal action for B.P. 22, may still be enforced against the accused’s estate.
(Bernardo v. People, G.R. No. 182210, 5 October 2015)

86. May an accused be acquitted but still be held civilly liable?

YES. If an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil
liability arising from the crime may be proved by preponderance of evidence
only. But if an accused is acquitted on the basis that he was not the author of the
act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment
that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist), said acquittal closes
the door to civil liability based on the crime or ex delicto. In this second instance,
there being no crime or delict to speak of, civil liability based thereon or ex
delicto is not possible. In this case, a civil action, if any, may be instituted on
grounds other than the delict complained of.

As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will
not be extinguished by an acquittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt
or that accused was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that
there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist). The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a
quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. An acquittal or conviction in the criminal case
is entirely irrelevant in the civil case based on quasi- delict or culpa aquiliana
(Manliclic v. Calaunan, G.R. No. 150157, 25 January 2007)

87. How do we construe the use of the terms “defamation”, “fraud” and
“Physical injuries” in Article 33 of the Civil Code?
Defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary sense because there are no
specific provisions in the RPC using these terms as names of offenses defined
therein. The term "physical injuries" could not have been used in its specific
sense as a crime defined in the RPC. It should be understood to mean bodily
injury, not the crime of physical injuries as defined in the RPC. It could include
death (Carandang v. Santiago, 97 Phil 94 (1955))

36


88. Accused was acquitted of the BP 22 charge as the notice of dishonor was
not proven. Does this bar the claim of civil liability where there are no
findings of fact on the transaction that that gave rise to the civil liability on the
basis of res judiciate or conclusiveness of judgment?
NO. The acquittal does not show that the civil liability does not exist. It does not
bar the recovery of any civil claims. (Chiok v. People, G.R. Nos. 179814 & 180021,
7 December 2015)

89. May an accused be awarded civil damages in the criminal case filed
against him?
NO. A court trying a criminal case cannot award damages in favor of the
accused. The task of the trial court is limited to determining the guilt of the
accused and if proper, to determine his civil liability. A criminal case is not the
proper proceedings to determine the private complainant's civil liability, if any.
(Maccay v. Spouses Nobela, G.R. No. 145823, 31 March 2005)

90. A contract to sell was entered into and the potential buyer paid the price
by post-dated check. The potential buyer assailed the validity of the contract to
sell on the ground that the potential seller failed to show proof of ownership
over the thing subject of the contract to sell, the fraudulent acts of the potential
seller that vitiated the consent of the potential buyer, and alternatively, the
breach by the potential seller of the contract. The check was later dishonored
for insufficiency of funds. Is a rescission of a contract to sell considered a
prejudicial question warranting the suspension of the criminal action for
violation of BP 22 where the check was used as payment of the price in the
contract to sell? In answering the question, discuss the nature of a prejudicial
question.
NO. The civil action for the rescission of contract is not determinative of the guilt
or innocence of the accused. The issue in the criminal actions upon the violations
of BP 22 is whether issued the dishonored checks knowing them to be without
funds upon presentment. The issue in the civil action for rescission is whether or
not the breach in the fulfilment of potential seller's obligation warranted the
rescission of the conditional sale. If, after trial on the merits in the civil action, the
potential seller would be found to have committed material breach as to warrant
the rescission of the contract, such result would not necessarily mean that the
accused would be absolved of the criminal responsibility for issuing the
dishonored checks because, as the elements of BP 22 would show, he already
committed the violations upon the dishonor of the checks that he had issued at a
time when the conditional sale was still fully binding upon the parties. (Reyes v.
Rossi, G.R. No. 159823, February 18, 2013)

91. X testified in a civil case against A, who subsequently caused the filing
of a criminal case against X for false testimony in a civil case. At the time the
criminal case was filed, the civil case was still pending. Will the pendency of

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the civil case be a ground to suspend the criminal case on the ground of
prejudicial question?
YES. The falsity of the testimony is yet to be established. The civil case is still
pending decision. It is only after trial that the civil court can assess the veracity or
falsity of the testimony and correspondingly render a decision. Thus, the civil
case is so intimately connected with the subject crime that it is determinative of
the guilt or innocence of the respondents in the criminal cases. In other words,
whether or not the testimonies of private respondents in the civil cases are false
is a prejudicial question. (Ark Travel Express, Inc. v. Abrogar, G.R. No. 137010,
29 August 2003)

92. Is a petition for nullity of marriage filed after the celebration of the
second marriage a prejudicial question in the crime of bigamy?
NO. The pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a
prejudicial question. Only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it
be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is
that the marriage exists. Article 40 of the Family Code requires a final judgment
before a subsequent marriage may be validly entered into. He who contracts a
second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal
case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for
declaration of nullity. Any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase
the fact that accused entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a
first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the
determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question.
(Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, G.R. No. 138509, 31 July 2000)

93. Accused was married before the effectivity of the Family Code. Without
declaring the first marriage void, he contracted a subsequent marriage during
the effectivity of the Family Code. He then filed a petition for the declaration
of nullity of the subsequent marriage. A case for bigamy was filed against
him. Will the criminal case be suspended on the ground of prejudicial
question?
NO. The contracting of the subsequent marriage before nullifying the first
marriage consummates the crime of bigamy. It is of no moment that the first
marriage was contracted under the Civil Code because the second marriage was
under the Family Code, and thus Art. 40 requires a decree of nullity before a
valid subsequent marriage may be contracted. Art. 40 is a rule of procedure that
may be applied retroactively as it will not impair vested rights. (Montañez v.
Cipriano, G.R. No. 181089, 22 October 2012)

94. A case for the delivery of titles was filed with the HLURB and a
subsequent criminal case was filed for such failure to make the delivery. Is it

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correct to say that there is no prejudicial question as the pending case with the
HLURB is not civil in nature?
NO. While the case is filed with the HLURB, it is still civil in nature, one for
specific performance. It is to compel the seller to deliver the TCTs. The case was
only filed with the HLURB as required by law, having primary jurisdiction over
such cases. It is prejudicial as it must first be resolved whether there is an
obligation to deliver. That will determine the criminal case. (San Miguel
Proeprties, Inc., v. Perez, G.R. No. 166836, 4 September 2013)

RULE 112

RIGHT TO PI

Budiongan, Jr. v. dela Cruz, Jr., G.R. No. 170288, 22 September 2006, The right
to a preliminary investigation is not a constitutional right, but is merely a right
conferred by statute. The absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair
the validity of the Information or otherwise render the same defective. It does not
affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case or constitute a ground for
quashing the Information. 15 If absence of a preliminary investigation does not
render the Information invalid nor affect the jurisdiction of the court over the
case, then the denial of a motion for reinvestigation cannot likewise invalidate
the Information or oust the court of its jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioners were not deprived of due process because they were afforded the
opportunity to refute the charges by filing their counter-affi davits. The
modification of the offense charged did not come as a surprise to the petitioners
because it was based on the same set of facts and the same alleged illegal acts.
Moreover, petitioners failed to aver newly discovered evidence nor impute
commission of grave errors or serious irregularities prejudicial to their interest to
warrant a reconsideration or reinvestigation of the case as required under Section
8, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. 16 Thus,
the modification of the offense charged, even without affording the petitioners a
new preliminary investigation, did not amount to a violation of their rights.

Furthermore, the right to preliminary investigation is deemed waived when the

accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment.
17 Petitioner Budiongan was arraigned in Criminal Case No. 28076 on March 28,
2005. He was also arraigned together with the rest of the petitioners under the
Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 28075 on December 2, 2005.
AHaETS

The purpose of a preliminary investigation is merely to determine whether a

crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the
person accused of the crime is probably guilty thereof and should be held for
trial. 18 A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that
more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the

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suspect. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of
guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and
definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.

Go v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101837, 11 February 1992, Petitioner was not
arrested at all. When he walked into the San Juan Police Station, accompanied by
two (2) lawyers, he in fact placed himself at the disposal of the police authorities.
He did not state that he was "surrendering" himself, in all probability to avoid
the implication he was admitting that he had slain Eldon Maguan or that he was
otherwise guilty of a crime. When the police filed a complaint for frustrated
homicide with the Prosecutor, the latter should have immediately scheduled a
preliminary investigation to determine whether there was probable cause for
charging petitioner in court for the killing of Eldon Maguan. Instead, as noted
earlier, the Prosecutor proceeded under the erroneous supposition that Section 7
of Rule 112 was applicable and required petitioner to waive the provisions of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as a condition for carrying out a
preliminary investigation. This was substantive error, for petitioner was entitled
to a preliminary investigation and that right should have been accorded him
without any conditions. Moreover, since petitioner had not been arrested, with or
without a warrant, he was also entitled to be released forthwith subject only to
his appearing at the preliminary investigation

Turning to the second issue of whether or not petitioner had waived his right to
preliminary investigation, we note that petitioner had from the very beginning
demanded that a preliminary investigation be conducted. As earlier pointed out,
on the same day that the information for murder was filed with the Regional
Trial Court, petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for
immediate release and preliminary investigation. The Solicitor General contends
that that omnibus motion should have been filed with the trial court and not
with the Prosecutor, and that petitioner should accordingly be held to have
waived his right to preliminary investigation. We do not believe that waiver of
petitioner's statutory right to preliminary investigation may be predicated on
such a slim basis. The preliminary investigation was to be conducted by the
Prosecutor, not by the Regional Trial Court. It is true that at the time of filing of
petitioner's omnibus motion, the information for murder had already been filed
with the Regional Trial Court: it is not clear from the record whether petitioner
was aware of this fact at the time his omnibus motion was actually filed with the
Prosecutor. Nonetheless, since petitioner in his omnibus motion was asking for
preliminary investigation and not for a re-investigation and since the Prosecutor
himself did file with the trial court, on the 5th day after filing the information for
murder, a motion for leave to conduct preliminary investigation (attaching to his
motion a copy of petitioner's omnibus motion), we conclude that petitioner's
omnibus motion was in effect filed with the trial court. What was crystal clear
was that petitioner did ask for a preliminary investigation on the very day that
the information was filed without such preliminary investigation, and that the

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trial court was five (5) days later apprised of the desire of the petitioner for such
preliminary investigation. Finally, the trial court did in fact grant the Prosecutor's
prayer for leave to conduct preliminary investigation. Thus, even on the
(mistaken) supposition apparently made by the Prosecutor that Section 7 of Rule
112 of the Revised Court was applicable, the 5-day reglementary period in
Section 7, Rule 112 must be held to have been substantially complied with. We
believe and so hold that petitioner did not waive his right to a preliminary
investigation. The rule is that the right to preliminary investigation is waived
when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at
arraignment. In the instant case, petitioner Go had vigorously insisted on his
right to preliminary investigation before his arraignment. We do not believe that
by posting bail, petitioner had waived his right to preliminary investigation.
Petitioner Go asked for release on recognizance or on bail and for preliminary
investigation in one omnibus motion. He had thus claimed his right to
preliminary investigation before respondent Judge approved the cash bond
posted by petitioner and ordered his release on 12 July 1991. Accordingly, we
cannot reasonably imply waiver of preliminary investigation on the part of
petitioner. In fact, when the Prosecutor filed a motion in court asking for leave to
conduct preliminary investigation, he clearly if impliedly recognized that
petitioner's claim to preliminary investigation was a legitimate one

The prosecutor dismissed the complaint, which the Secretary of Justice

affirmed. The MR was denied and complainant filed a petition under Rule 43
with the CA, to assail the decision and resolution of the Secretary of Justice. Is
this the proper remedy?
NO. The proper remedy is to file a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of
Appeals under Rule 65, if there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. A petition for review under Rule 43 is a mode of appeal to
be taken only to review the decisions, resolutions or awards by the quasi-judicial
officers, agencies or bodies, particularly those specified in Section 1 of Rule 43.
The Secretary of Justice was not an officer performing a quasi-judicial function.
In reviewing the findings of the OCP on the matter of probable cause, the
Secretary of Justice performed an essentially executive function to determine
whether the crime alleged was committed, and whether there was probable
cause to believe that the respondents were guilty thereof. (Callo-Claridad v.
Esteban, G.R. No. 191567, 20 March 2013)

PROBABLE CAUSE

CRUZ V. AREOLA, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1642, 6 March 2002, The 1987 Constitution
provides that no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. In numerous instances,
this Court had ruled that: ". . . Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish

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the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains
whether the offender should be held for trial or released. . . The determination of
probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the judge. The preliminary
investigation proper — whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that
the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he
should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial — is the
function of the Prosecutor. . . . We reiterate that preliminary investigation should
be distinguished as to whether it is an investigation for the determination of a
sufficient ground for the filing of the information or it is an investigation for the
determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first
kind of preliminary investigation is executive in nature. It is part of the
prosecution's job. The second kind of preliminary investigation which is more
properly called preliminary examination is judicial in nature and is lodged with
the judge." In making the required personal determination, a judge is not
precluded from relying on the evidence earlier gathered by responsible officers.
The extent of the reliance depends on the circumstances of each case and is
subject to the judge's sound discretion

CLARIFICATORY HEARING

De Ocampo v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 147932, 25 January 2006, A

clarificatory hearing is not indispensable during preliminary investigation.
Rather than being mandatory, a clarificatory hearing is optional on the part of the
investigating officer as evidenced by the use of the term "may" in Section 3 (e) of
Rule 112. This provision states: (e) If the investigating officer believes that there
are matters to be clarified he may set a hearing to propound clarificatory
questions to the parties or their witnesses, during which the parties shall be
afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-
examine. . . . The use of the word "may" in a statute commonly denotes that it is
directory in nature. The term "may" is generally permissive only and operates to
confer discretion. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 112, it is within the discretion of the
investigation officer whether to set the case for further hearings to clarify some
matters

APPEAL TO DOJ SUSPENSION ARRAIGNMENT

Aguinaldo v. Ventus, G.R. Nos. 176033, 11 March 2015, On the second issue, the
Court disagrees with petitioners' contention that the provision of Section 11 (c),
33 Rule 116 of the Rules of Court limiting the suspension for arraignment to only
sixty (60) days is merely directory; thus, the estafa case against them cannot
proceed until the DOJ resolves their petition for review with finality.
In Samson v. Judge Daway, 34 the Court explained that while the pendency of a
petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the aforecited
provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days

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reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows,
therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to
arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment

WHO CONDUCTS PI

CONCURRENT JURISDICTION

Arroyo v. Department of Justice, G.R. Nos. 199082, 199085 and 199118, 18

September 2012 ELECTORAL FRAUD
The grant to the Comelec of the power to investigate and prosecute election
offenses as an adjunct to the enforcement and administration of all election laws
is intended to enable the Comelec to effectively insure to the people the free,
orderly, and honest conduct of elections. The failure of the Comelec to exercise
this power could result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make
a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to
vote.

As clearly set forth above, instead of a mere delegated authority, the other
prosecuting arms of the government, such as the DOJ, now exercise concurrent
jurisdiction with the Comelec to conduct preliminary investigation of all election
offenses and to prosecute the same.

It is, therefore, not only the power but the duty of both the Comelec and the DOJ
to perform any act necessary to ensure the prompt and fair investigation and
prosecution of election offenses. Pursuant to the above constitutional and
statutory provisions, and as will be explained further below, we nd no
impediment for the Comelec and the DOJ to create the Joint Committee and Fact-
Finding Team for the purpose of conducting a thorough investigation of the
alleged massive electoral fraud and the manipulation of election results in the
2004 and 2007 national elections relating in particular to the presidential and
senatorial elections.

It must be emphasized that the DOJ and the Comelec exercise concurrent
jurisdiction in conducting preliminary investigation of election offenses. The
doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with the same
subject matter. 104 Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, there is no
prohibition on simultaneous exercise of power between two coordinate bodies.
What is prohibited is the situation where one les a complaint against a
respondent initially with one of ce (such as the Comelec) for preliminary
investigation which was immediately acted upon by said of ce and the re- ling
of substantially the same complaint with another of ce (such as the DOJ). The
subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the second of ce over the cases led
will not be allowed. Indeed, it is a settled rule that the body or agency that rst
takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of

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the others.

OMBUDSMAN AND DOJ

Basuego v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 196842, 9 October 2013, Second.
Alfredo claims that the Ombudsman should have referred Rosa's complaint to
the Department of Justice (DOJ), since the crime of Concubinage is not
committed in relation to his being a public officer. This is not a new argument.
The Ombudsman's primary jurisdiction, albeit concurrent with the DOJ, to
conduct preliminary investigation of crimes involving public officers, without
regard to its commission in relation to office, had long been settled in Sen.
Honasan II v. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of DOJ, 17 and affirmed in
subsequent cases:
We clarified that the DOJ and the Ombudsman have concurrent jurisdiction to
investigate off enses involving public offi cers or employees. Nonetheless, we
pointed out that the Ombudsman, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, may take over, at any stage, from any
investigating agency of the government, the investigation of such cases.

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