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Collective Employment Agreement 1

PAVING THE WAY OF IMPLEMENTATION OF CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS

RESPONSIBILITY THROUGH A BINDING TREATY: PRACTICAL CHALLENGES

AND FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES

BY [Student’s Name]

Course’ Tittle

Name of the Professor

Name of the Institution

Location of the Institution

Date
Collective Employment Agreement 2

1. Introduction

After major corporate failures in the past years, the issue of corporate human

rights regulations is being emphasized. This affects the impact of the business

activities of international organizations (TNCs) on aspects of human rights law.

Globalization has provided many opportunities and challenges for corporate

governance to prevent various human rights violations that occur during their

business hours.1 The economic globalization has provided huge opportunities as

well as numerous challenges in regulating the corporations to prevent various

human rights abuses occurring during their business operations. 2 The instances of

human rights abuses occurring in the business corporations include lack of ensuring

labour rights, forced labour, child labour, land grabbing, illegal violence in the

communities, poor maintenance of safety and healthy work environment, polluted

environment and destruction of its resources. 3 Therefore, the roles and power

obligations of companies in their operations are widely considered for ten years to

acquire favourable employment conditions.4

The concept of business and human rights (BHR) has been developed over

the years with the introduction of "soft legislation", meaning non-binding guidelines

and principles, proposed by international organizations, for example, the United

Nations (UN), the OECD-the International Organization for Standardization (OECD) 5,

ISO) and the International Labour Organization (ILO) for provinces to be recognized
1
Elise Groulx Diggs and Mitt Regan and Beatrice Parance, 'Business and Human Rights as a Galaxy
of Norms' (2019) 50 Geo J Int'l L 309
2
Ionel Zamfir, ‘Towards a binding international treaty on business and human rights’ (European
Parliament, April 2018)
<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/620229/EPRS_BRI(2018)620229_EN.p
df> accessed 29 June 2020
3
Ibid
4
Jernej Letnar Cernic and Nicolás Carrillo-Santarelli (eds), The Future of Business and Human
Rights: Theoretical and Practical Considerations for a UN Treaty (Intersentia 2018)
5
UN Human Rights Council, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the
United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, HR/PUB/11/04(2011)
Collective Employment Agreement 3

in the management of international corporations or TNCs and other entities (OBE) 6

The international organizations have laid down broad, non-binding and voluntary

corporate practices and standards to be followed by the TNCs to create positive

impact on economic and social context. 7

However, in 1988, the United Nations (UN) made its first attempt to create a

non-voluntary code of conduct for the BHR called Norms on the Responsories of

Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises on Human Rights ('UN

Norms')8, in order to regulate the TNCs which had been failed upon opposition and

non-adoption by the business enterprises. 9

However, the UN has made further efforts to regulate TNCs by introducing the

Global Compact Human Rights Program as part of corporate ethics and by issuing

the United Nations Guidelines on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) in 2011

based on the three-pillar structure of the 'Protect Framework,' Respect and Remedy

'in this regard10 The UNGP was unanimously approved by the United Nations Human

Rights Council (UNHRC) in June 2011 which mandated that corporate rights

obligations in corporations be included and that international standards be set as a

global standard for protection against human rights abuses by business

organizations. The UNGP was the first official document to be unanimously adopted

and involved all stakeholders with a high level of awareness and willingness to listen

6
Barnali Chowdhury, ‘Balancing soft and hard law for Business and Human rights’ (2018) 67 ICLQ
961–986
7
Ibid
8
UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human
Rights (2003) (E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2)
9
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations
and Related Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (2004) (E/CN.4/
DEC/2004/116)
10
Andreas Rasche, ‘”A Necessary Supplement” – What the United Nations Global Compact Is
and Is Not’ (2009) 48(4) Business Society 511
Collective Employment Agreement 4

to BHR matters and led to the promotion of appropriate guidelines and reports.

However, there have been obstacles to the implementation of UNGPs, especially in

the area of access to remedies and justice for victims of human rights abuses in the

business world. In addition, increased commitment is needed by countries to do so

by developing National Action Plans (NAPs) and strengthening ties effectively rather

than simply declaring that they understand BHR. 11 The UNGPs were the first ever

legitimate document that was unanimously adopted and engaged all the

stakeholders with enhanced awareness and willingness towards listening to the BHR

issues and led to spurring development of the relevant guides and reports. 12

However, still there have been impediments in the implementation of the UNGPs

especially regarding access to the remedies and justice to the victims of abuses of

human rights in the business activities.13 Furthermore, an increased willingness is

required by the states in such implementation by developing National Action Plans

(NAPs) and enforcing the obligations effectively rather than simply declaration of

their understanding of BHR.14

The above-mentioned guidelines of the UN, OECD, ISO and ILO constitute

‘soft law’ framework regarding BHR that consists of characteristics including non-

binding obligations which state to co-operate through legal processes as a form of

remedy to the adverse human rights impacts. 15 However, these instruments cannot

deal particularly with the breach of human rights obligations nor contain specific

provisions on accountability, supervisory and oversight requirements. 16 Therefore,

despite having some hard law characteristics by setting out specific principles on
11
OHCHR, The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights: An Interpretive Guide (United
Nations 2012)
12
Zamfir (n 2)
13
Ibid
14
Ibid
15
Chowdhury (n 3) 967-968
16
Ibid
Collective Employment Agreement 5

controlling corporate conduct, the above-mentioned OECD and ILO guidelines and

UNGPs on BHR fail to provide remedies to the consequences of the breach of

human rights and therefore lack in demonstrating corporate responsibility 17 in this

context.18 Hence, there has been an urge for the inclusion of hard law, i.e. binding

legal instrument, in the BHR context in order to effectively deal with non-compliance

issues by the TNCs19.

However, the debate of whether the soft law remains an essential tool for

governance of the corporations in the context of BHR has been ongoing due to the

reasons of lack of consensus between the states regarding the status of corporations

under international law that determine the extent of such corporate responsibility and

political will in accepting it.20 Thus in order to determine the regulatory framework in

the BHR issues for corporations, the requirement of analyzing the advantages,

disadvantages, risks, threats and practical challenges of implementing corporate

human rights responsibility and enforcing the obligations in a comprehensive manner

by balancing the soft law and hard law approaches is a major concern in recent

times21. This issue has been furthered with the question of necessity of creating a

binding UN Treaty to reach consensus at the international level in implementing the

corporate responsibility that also extends to certain domestic initiatives by the states

to legalize BHR obligations in their own jurisdictions. 22

17
OHCHR, The Corporate Responsibility…’ (n 10)
18
Chowdhury (n 3) 967-968
19
Martens J., and Seitz K., ‘The Struggle for a UN Treaty Towards global regulation on human rights and
business’ (Global Policy Forum, August 2016) <https://rosalux-ba.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/un_treaty_online18.pdf> accessed 01 July 2020
20
JE Alvarez, ‘Are Corporations “Subjects” of International Law?’ (2011) 9 SantaClaraJIntlL 1;
Chowdhury (n 3) 973-974
21
International Organisation for Standardization, ‘Guidance on social responsibility’ ISO 26000:2010(en)
<https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso:26000:ed-1:v1:en> accessed 29 June 2020
22
Chowdhury (n 3) 982
Collective Employment Agreement 6

However, the argument that soft law remains an important tool in corporate

governance in the context of the BHR has been ongoing for reasons of non-

international agreement on corporate status under international law that determines

the extent to which such an obligation to co-operate in the adoption is therefore

determined. Organizational BHR, the need for positive, negative analysis, risks,

threats and practical challenges to implement corporate rights responsibility and

enforce obligations broadly by measuring flexible law and strict legal mechanisms

has become a major problem in recent times 23. This problem has been further

exacerbated by the question of the need to establish a UN Commitment Agreement

in order to reach an international level agreement on the fulfilment of corporate

obligations which also extends to specific provincial plans to authorize BHR

obligations in their territories.24 This endorsement by the UNHRC was an indirect

consequence of the efforts made by the UN since 2005 with its Special

Representative Professor John Ruggie followed by 2008 U.N. Framework on

Business and Human Rights that led to the remarkable adoption of the 2011

UNGPs.25 In view of this, the urgent need for a BHR Agreement was reached in

September 2013 by the Ecuadorian team at the United Nations Human Rights

Council (UNHRC), which said it needed to move forward with a legal obligation to

23
Lavanga V. Wijekoon, Michael G. Congiu, and Stefan J. Marculewicz, ‘United Nations Takes Another Step in
Developing a Treaty on Business and Human Rights’ (Littler Insight, 2020)
<https://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/united-nations-takes-another-step-developing-treaty-
business-and-human> accessed 01 July 2020
24
Olga Fernández Sixto, ‘Business and Human Rights: A study on the implications of the proposed
binding treaty’ (LL.M dissertation, University of Essex 2015) https://www.business-
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/Business%20and%20Human%20Rights.%20A
%20study%20on%20the%20implications%20of%20the%20proposed%20binding%20treaty.pdf>
accessed 29 June 2020
25
Sara McBearty, ‘The Proposed Business and Human Rights Treaty: Four Challenges and an
Opportunity’ (2016) 57 HarvardILJ <https://harvardilj.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/15/McBrearty_0615.pdf> accessed 30 June 2020
Collective Employment Agreement 7

regulate TNCs and ensure justice and remedy for human rights abuses. in the

conduct of business entities26. On June 26, 2014, the UNHRC approved27.

The historic struggle for the UN binding Treaty includes discussions and

considerations in the past five years during 2015-2019 in the sessions of the

OEIGWG that led to the creation of elements of the legally binding treaty 28, a Zero

draft29 and first and second versions of revised draft 30 were published respectively in

September 2017, July 2018, October 2019 and August 2020. 31 These instruments

were the result of negotiations to develop a binding treaty on BHR when the debates

have been persistent in this regard with questions as to how the treaty would deliver

to all the stakeholders, complement the soft laws including UNGPs and the content,

scope and concerns of the drafts to be created. 32

2. Effectiveness of the BHR framework in the implementation of the corporate

human rights responsibilities

This chapter on research provides insights into the study by evaluating the

research topic through various literature. This part of the study helps to evaluate the

current management structure in the implementation of corporate human rights

26
McBearty S., ‘The Proposed Business and Human Rights Treaty: Four Challenges and an Opportunity’ (2016)
57 HarvardILJ <https://harvardilj.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/15/McBrearty_0615.pdf> accessed 30 June
2020
27
McBearty S., ‘The Proposed Business and Human Rights Treaty: Four Challenges and an Opportunity’ (2016)
57 HarvardILJ <https://harvardilj.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/15/McBrearty_0615.pdf> accessed 30 June
2020
28
OEIGWG, ‘Elements for the draft legally binding instrument on transnational corporations and other
business enterprises with respect to human rights’ (OHCHR, 29 September 2017) HRC Res.
A/HRC/RES/26/9
<https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/Session3/LegallyBindingInst
rumentTNCs_OBEs.pdf> accessed 30 June 2020
29
Ibid 213-234
30
OEIGWG, ‘Legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of
transnational corporations and other business enterprises: Revised Draft’ (OHCHR, 16 July 2019)
<https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/OEIGWG_RevisedDraft_LBI
.pdf> accessed 30 June 2020
31
Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, ‘Binding Treaty’ (Business and Human Rights, 2020)
<https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/binding-treaty> accessed 30 June 2020
32
Ibid 254-256
Collective Employment Agreement 8

responsibilities and to address the overall gaps required for the analysis of

innovation. The study finds the chapter through three key areas identified by

research questions such as assessing the effectiveness of the current Business and

Human Rights (PHR) framework in the implementation of corporate human rights

responsibilities; Identifying the justifications for creating a binding agreement in the

BHR and the practical challenges and implications of implementing a binding

agreement in the BHR. Finally, identify future opportunities moving towards a bond

agreement in the BHR.

2.1. Previous BHR Initiatives

Since the 1970s, there have been efforts and initiatives to adopt international

binding agreements and regulate multinational corporations (MNCs) through OECD

guidelines for multinational corporations, which were eventually adopted by the then

UN33. In the code of conduct governing the operations of MNCs 34. The above-

mentioned OECD guidelines were incorporated into the 1976 OECD Declaration on

International Investment and Multinationals, which contained recommendations on a

wide range of policies for MNCs and business responsible business, starting with

consumer interests, science and technology, competition and taxation 3536. These

guidelines have been further revised in 2011 which is a template of

33
OEIGWG, ‘Legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities
of transnational corporations and other business enterprises: Zero draft’ (OHCHR, 16 July 2018)
<https://www.business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/DraftLBI.pdf> accessed 30
June 2020
34
Wettstein, Florian, Elisa Giuliani, Grazia D. Santangelo, and Günter K. Stahl. "International

business and human rights: A research agenda." Journal of World Business 54, no. 1 (2019):

54-65.

35
Hess, David. "The Transparency Trap: Non‐Financial Disclosure and the Responsibility of

Business to Respect Human Rights." American Business Law Journal 56, no. 1 (2019): 5-53.
Collective Employment Agreement 9

recommendations by governments to the TNCs and the only multilaterally agreed

comprehensive code where those governments have committed to promote BHR 37.

Regarding the effectiveness of the OECD guidelines, Ethics on employment,

human rights, the environment and disclosure of information. These guidelines were

further revised in 2011, which is a template for governments' recommendations to

TNCs, and the only comprehensive code of diversity that those governments have

promised to promote PHR.38. In addition to the effectiveness of the OECD

guidelines, it was further argued that these guidelines have though specifically

recommended that the corporations have to be legit in solving the problem. It is

argued that they have the characteristics associated with strict law due to the setting

of precise standards of conduct for organizations. In addition to the effectiveness of

the OECD guidelines, it has been suggested that these guidelines specifically co-

operate with formal processes in resolving aggravated human rights abuses caused

by organizations, but they are not defined as 'formal procedures'. Furthermore, the

guidelines provided their interpretation to third-party review bodies in individual

countries labelled as National Contact Points, which would facilitate enforcement but

would not impose any legal consequences on companies for violating these

guidelines. Therefore, it has been decided that the OECD guidelines are pure soft

36
OEIGWG, ‘Legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities
of transnational corporations and other business enterprises: Zero draft’ (OHCHR, 16 July 2018)
<https://www.business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/DraftLBI.pdf> accessed 30
June 2020
37
OEIGWG, ‘Legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities
of transnational corporations and other business enterprises: Zero draft’ (OHCHR, 16 July 2018)
<https://www.business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/DraftLBI.pdf> accessed 30
June 2020
38
Roos S.R., ‘UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’ in: Idowu S.O., Capaldi N., Zu L.,
Gupta A.D. (eds), Encyclopedia of Corporate Social Responsibility (Springer 2013)
<https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007%2F978-3-642-28036-8_746#howtocite>
accessed 01 July 2020
Collective Employment Agreement 10

law despite some difficult legal characteristics. Therefore, it is concluded that the

OECD guidelines despite having some hard law characteristics are rather pure soft

law39.

The next attempt of creating a BHR regime had been in 1980s, when the

negotiations failed due to the increasing competition by the developing countries in

attracting foreign investment to get rid of the debts resulted from the oil-price crisis of

1979 and consequently, the UN Commission on TNCs was abolished 40. The next

attempt to create a PHR regime was in the 1980s, when negotiations failed due to

increasing competition from developing countries to attract foreign investment to get

out of debt as a result of the 1979 oil price crisis. The TNC Commission was

abolished. The second failed attempt was made in 2003, when the UN recognized

the liability of transnational corporations and other business entities ('UN rules') for

human rights as the first non-binding tool. The security related draft was prepared by

the sub-commission. And the promotion of human rights. It follows the business and

human rights obligations and responsibilities of companies to provide protection to

consumers and to address issues related to the prevention of corruption and

environmental damage41. Therefore, the UN. Although it is not recognized by the

39
Roos S.R., ‘UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’ in: Idowu S.O., Capaldi N., Zu L.,
Gupta A.D. (eds), Encyclopedia of Corporate Social Responsibility (Springer 2013)
<https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007%2F978-3-642-28036-8_746#howtocite>
accessed 01 July 2020
40
Sixto F. O., ‘Business and Human Rights: A study on the implications of the proposed binding
treaty’ (LL.M dissertation, University of Essex 2015) https://www.business-
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/Business%20and%20Human%20Rights.%20A
%20study%20on%20the%20implications%20of%20the%20proposed%20binding%20treaty.pdf>
accessed 29 June 2020
41
Methven O’Brien, Claire, and Jolyon Ford. "Business and Human Rights: From Domestic

Institutionalisation to Transnational Governance and Back Again." Nordic Journal of Human

Rights 37, no. 3 (2019): 216-233.


Collective Employment Agreement 11

Human Rights Commission, the UN, the creation of the regulations is the first

attempt to impose the promotion and protection of human rights by TNCs other than

the states under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This follows the

business and human rights obligations and responsibilities of the companies in order

to provide protection to the consumers and address issues on prevention of

corruption and environmental harm.42.

In 2000, the UN. Global Compact is another internationally recognized

standard, referred to as the "World's Largest Voluntary Corporate Sustainability

Initiative", which aims to encourage businesses to align their strategies and

operations with human rights, labor and environmental rights and anti-corruption

rules. , And make such efforts in support of social goals. UN Convention on

Standards of Corporate Behavior Global Compact has issued ten ambiguous

policies, which, in the absence of monitoring and third-party oversight rules, are

inaccurate in describing such standards and consequences of violation, which

constitutes pure soft law in the BHR framework 43. The UN Global Compact has

provided ten vague principles on standards for corporate conduct and thus lack of

precision in describing such standards and consequences.

In 2005, the then UN44. The Commission on Human Rights called on UN Secretary-

General Kofi Annan to appoint a special envoy for human rights and the TNC and

42
UN Human Rights Council, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the
United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, HR/PUB/11/04(2011)
43
Ibid (n 2) 112-116
44
OEIGWG, ‘Elements for the draft legally binding instrument on transnational corporations and other business
enterprises with respect to human rights’ (OHCHR, 29 September 2017) HRC Res. A/HRC/RES/26/9
<https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/Session3/LegallyBindingInstrumentT
NCs_OBEs.pdf> accessed 30 June 2020
Collective Employment Agreement 12

other business organizations, in response to which John Rocky, a political scientist

and professor at Harvard University, was appointed. For such purpose. 45.

In 2008, after extensive research and consultation with a number of

stakeholders on the fundamentals of the framework, Rocky proposed a three-

member framework in the BHR entitled "Protection, Respect and Resolution": i) The

State has a legal duty to protect individuals against human rights violations by third

parties, including business Within their jurisdiction to protect them; ii) the

responsibility of the business to respect human rights; And iii) the need for more

effective access to solutions for victims of human rights abuses: States have

obligations to provide judicial and non-judicial solutions, while business has a

responsibility to provide non-judicial solutions. Professor Rocky has identified

governance gaps created by globalization as the root causes of contemporary

problems related to PHR. He has also identified international organizations such as

the ILO and O in his studies. He has also found in his studies that the international

organizations such as ILO and OECD have given recognition that the business is

entitled to the responsibility of respecting human rights and joining the UN Global

Compact. Overall, this framework of Ruggie was successful to the extent that his

mandate mentioned in the core principles of the three-part framework was

extrapolated with a margin of about 4 years by the UN Human Rights Council until

201146.

After major corporate failures in recent years, the issue of corporate human

rights obligations is being emphasized. This affects the impact of the business
45
UN Human Rights Council, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the
United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, HR/PUB/11/04(2011)
46
UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human
Rights (2003) (E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2)
Collective Employment Agreement 13

activities of international organizations (TNCs) on aspects of human rights law.

Globalization has provided many opportunities and challenges for corporate

governance to prevent various human rights violations that occur during their

business hours. Conditions of human rights abuses in business enterprises include

uncertainty about workers' rights, coercion, child labour, land grabbing, illegal

community violence, unsafe environmental care and a healthy working environment,

polluted environment and the destruction of its resources. Therefore, the roles and

power obligations of companies in their operations are widely considered for ten

years to acquire human rights in particular, in the sense of business. 47.

The concept of business and human rights (BHR) has been developed over

the years with the introduction of "soft legislation", meaning non-binding guidelines

and principles, proposed by international organizations such as the United Nations

(UN), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the

International Organization for Standardization (OECD). ISO) and the International

Labor Organization (ILO) for provinces to be recognized in the management of

international corporations or TNCs and other entities (OBE) 48. International

47
UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human
Rights (2003) (E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2)

48
Directorate-General for External Policies: Policy Department, ‘Implementation

of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’ (European

Union, February 2017)

<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/578031/EXPO

_STU(2017)578031_EN.pdf> accessed 01 July 2020


Collective Employment Agreement 14

organizations have set wide-ranging, non-binding and voluntary company norms and

standards to be followed by TNCs to create a positive economic and social impact. 49.

However, in 1988, the United Nations (UN) made its first attempt to create a

non-voluntary code of conduct for the BHR called Norms on the Responsriers of

Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises on Human Rights ('UN

Norms'). , in order to control TNCs that have failed in the opposition and rejection of

business entities. Human rights in business context and the responsibility to be taken

by the enterprises in cases of causes relating to “adverse human rights impact” and

risks of abuse of such rights by them and further discussed that how the structure,

size, ownership and operational context is responsible in cases of human rights

violations. The guiding principles also suggest the aspects of preventing and

mitigating the adverse human rights impact by the enterprises and take such

necessary steps in this regard.

However, the study of the European Parliament on the implementation of the

UNGPs on BHR found that there are certain challenges in such case if the principles

are implemented by the states, such as, lack of awareness about these principles

along with broader human rights and business issues among both government

officials and also other stakeholder parties 50. Such lack of understanding and

awareness by the states and the stakeholders were also identified by the UN

Secretary General in its mandate and report in 2011 and 2012 which led to the

creation of global fund by the states to enhance the capacity of the stakeholders in

order to implement the UNGPs and has been supported by the business enterprises
49
UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human
Rights (2003) (E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2)
50
Hess, David. "The Transparency Trap: Non‐Financial Disclosure and the Responsibility of Business to Respect
Human Rights." American Business Law Journal 56, no. 1 (2019): 5-53.
Collective Employment Agreement 15

as well. In addition, another key challenge in such implementation of the UNGPs is

the lack of financial and human resources, which are essential in order to develop

relevant policies, national action plans and regulations, to ensure their effective

implementation, enforcement, monitoring and prosecution. Other major factors that

prevent effective implementation of the UNGPs by the states include: lack of co-

ordination by the government departments; fear of restrain of foreign investment;

lack of good governance, existence of corruption and political limitations imposed by

foreign governments; opposition by business enterprises and governments groups;

lack of international companies involved in human rights abuses and lack of

coherence between international instruments of UN, OECD, etc 51.

2.2. Status of current BHR regime

Currently, there is no comprehensive and legally binding and enforceable UN

treaty on imposing corporate human rights responsibilities upon the TNCs, except

the ongoing attempts of the Zero draft and the revised draft versions created in the

past three years since 2017 which aim for enforcing such treaty in near future 52. It

has been deemed that the zero draft provides crucial provisions in ensuring

corporate accountability by upholding the requirement for the businesses to adopt

human rights due diligence policies and procedures 53. Thus, it has been also stated

51
UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human
Rights (2003) (E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2)
52
Examples’ (New York, 2019) <https://d306pr3pise04h.cloudfront.net/docs/publications
%2FNavigating+the+Future+of+BHR.pdf> accessed 01 July 2020
53
Human Rights Council, Resolution 26/9 on the Elaboration of an international

legally binding instrument on transnational corporations and other business

enterprises with respect to human rights, Geneva, 26th July 2014


Collective Employment Agreement 16

that the governments of the states have to support such draft treaty on imposing

binding obligations upon the business organizations in this regard 54.

Apart from that until such initiatives of draft zero or revised treaty, the

historical context referred the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 1948

which has provided such provisions that covered even business organizations as

organs of society which have to promote respect for the human rights and freedoms

and to secure their universal and effective recognition by progressive means.

However, most of the international laws including the ILO treaties impose indirect

obligations upon states to take action and reasonable measures within their

jurisdiction against violations of human rights by the businesses 55. Moreover, the

nature of the treaties and their ratification is a significant matter for consideration as

such international human rights treaties are neither binding upon all the states nor

universally ratified. In addition, although these general human rights treaties impose

obligations on States, they lack particularity regarding the scope of the duties that

the states have to impose on business organizations and companies 56.

2.3. Limitations of the existing framework

The first vibrant limitation of the currently existing BHR regime towards

binding treaty is lack of enough legally binding and enforceable UN treaty on


54
Buhmann, Karin, Björn Fasterling, and Aurora Voiculescu. "Business & Human Rights

Research Methods." (2018): 323-332.

55
Examples’ (New York, 2019) <https://d306pr3pise04h.cloudfront.net/docs/publications
%2FNavigating+the+Future+of+BHR.pdf> accessed 01 July 2020
56
Examples’ (New York, 2019) <https://d306pr3pise04h.cloudfront.net/docs/publications
%2FNavigating+the+Future+of+BHR.pdf> accessed 01 July 2020
Collective Employment Agreement 17

imposing corporate human rights responsibilities upon the TNCs. The only

outstanding binding treaty is the zero draft, which aims at enforcing such treaty in

near future. Another limitation is the lack of compliance to the laws regarding the

international business and human rights. Diligently, the compliance may occur with

or without consideration to the human rights. For this reason, it is hoped for Europe

to adopt due diligence laws mandatory on human rights for well international

corporation. Lastly, insufficiency witnessed by some of the national laws by certain

countries that fails to protect human rights against some companies remains a great

threat to the international community in terms of business and human rights as per

the TNCs57.

3. Justification of creating a binding treaty

The need for a binding treaty is justified due to reasons relating to the

limitations of the previous and existing BHR framework which include 58:

i) lacking clarity regarding the availability, characteristics and length of corporate

human rights responsibilities under international human rights laws and relevant

conventions and treaties;

ii) states being the principal abusers of business and human rights by being too

corrupt and having no power to protect people from influential business corporations;

57
Examples’ (New York, 2019) <https://d306pr3pise04h.cloudfront.net/docs/publications
%2FNavigating+the+Future+of+BHR.pdf> accessed 01 July 2020

58
Examples’ (New York, 2019) <https://d306pr3pise04h.cloudfront.net/docs/publications
%2FNavigating+the+Future+of+BHR.pdf> accessed 01 July 2020
Collective Employment Agreement 18

iii) absolving of liability against human rights violations by the parent companies

for commission of such abuses by subsidiaries on the basis of norms separating

legal personality and limited liability;

iv) obstacles and legal barriers experienced by the victims in getting access to

justice which include excessive litigation costs and doctrine of forum non

convenience.

Regarding such need for treaty, David Bilchitz argued to impose binding

obligations on corporations, in order to clarify relevant norms and further that the

rights to businesses in international economic transactions and investment treaties

do not always violate human rights and to facilitate victims’ access to remedies 59.

Bilchitz have provided arguments for and against a treaty stating that drafting a

treaty would take time, but in the meantime, other existing non-binding instruments

including the UNGPs are there and has concluded that as the global economic

power which is shifting to the South, so if the BRICS countries support a treaty the

developed countries in the North could not go against it and as a result if the TNCs

are obliged to meet the provisions of the treaty, they would become an international

standard for the corporations60.

As a result of understanding the need for a binding treaty, summing up the timeline

since which the attempts were made of creating a UN international standard binding

treaty include61:

59
Examples’ (New York, 2019) <https://d306pr3pise04h.cloudfront.net/docs/publications
%2FNavigating+the+Future+of+BHR.pdf> accessed 01 July 2020

60
Examples’ (New York, 2019) <https://d306pr3pise04h.cloudfront.net/docs/publications
%2FNavigating+the+Future+of+BHR.pdf> accessed 01 July 2020
61
Examples’ (New York, 2019) <https://d306pr3pise04h.cloudfront.net/docs/publications
%2FNavigating+the+Future+of+BHR.pdf> accessed 01 July 2020
Collective Employment Agreement 19

i) a unanimous adoption of the UNGPs by the UNHRC in June 2011;

ii) the Ecuador’s call for a new binding treaty for negotiation in September 2013;

iii) the Ecuador's resolution on such a binding treaty adopted in the UNHRC and

another resolution placed by Norway confirming the significance of the UNGPs and

asking for an assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of a binding treaty

was unanimously adopted in June 201462;

iv) the first session of the open-ended intergovernmental working group

(OEIGWG) was provided with the task of drafting the new binding treaty in October

2015;

v) the OEIGWG's second session held on October 2016;

vi) the publication of a guiding document called “Elements” by the Chair of the

OEIGWG for a draft binding treaty and a third session held on October 2017;

vii) the endorsement of the “Elements” by the UNHRC and it providing

authorization to the OEIGWG to carry on its work on March 2018;

viii) the first Zero draft of the treaty in June 2018;

ix) the fourth OEIGWG session held in October 2018;

x) the publication of the revised draft on 16th July 2019 by the Chair of the

OEIGWG;

62
Methven O’Brien, Claire, and Jolyon Ford. "Business and Human Rights:

From Domestic Institutionalisation to Transnational Governance and Back

Again." Nordic Journal of Human Rights 37, no. 3 (2019): 216-233.


Collective Employment Agreement 20

xi) the fifth session of the OEIGWG in February-March 2020 and

xii) finally, a second revised draft published on 06.08.2020 under the

chairmanship of the OEIGWG.

Regarding the above-mentioned attempts as a result of justification of creating

a binding treaty, the support of the civil society organizations on the proposal of the

Ecuador in 2013 to negotiate an UN treaty was huge compared to the moderate level

support provided by the UNHRC63. Moreover, even the Ecuador's resolution of June

2014 received only 20 supporting votes in addition to 14 opposing votes by mostly

the industrialized and corporate members and 13 abstention votes by mostly the

Latin American members64. It was argued that although the mandate provided by

the resolution of 2014 is to 'elaborate an international legally binding instrument to

regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of transnational corporations

and other business enterprises', it does not define TNCs and rather only defines

'other business enterprises' (OBEs), where this proposal takes into account all

business enterprises that have a transnational character in their operations but does

not apply to local businesses registered under relevant domestic law 65.

In addition, the second resolution by Norway in June 2014 was supported by

22 other countries from all regions 66. Consequently, placing it in a unique condition

as it requested that the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights to

prepare a report considering the merits and demerits of a legally binding instrument

63
Examples’ (New York, 2019) <https://d306pr3pise04h.cloudfront.net/docs/publications
%2FNavigating+the+Future+of+BHR.pdf> accessed 01 July 2020
64
Ibid (n 2) 211-212)
65
Ibid (n 3) 111-120)
66
UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (2003)
(E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2)
Collective Employment Agreement 21

and further asked the High Commissioner for Human Rights to begin consultation

with stakeholders considering the range of legal and practical aspects to improve

access to remedy for victims of violations of BHR. Furthermore, the first two

sessions of the OEIGWG were related to conducting constructive deliberations on

the content, scope, nature and form of the future international instrument according

to the UNHRC mandate. Whereas, the publication by the OEIGWG Chair entitled

'Elements for the draft legally binding instrument' were later debated in the third

OEIGWG session in 201767.

Therefore, it has been argued that the UNGPs provide recognition that there

are limitations in access to effective remedies for victims of corporations’ failure to

respect human rights, but still do not provide an enforcement mechanism and as a

result its non-binding nature and lack of third party oversight, makes it a form of soft

law rather than hard law 68. Consequently, considering the effectiveness of all the

previous BHR initiatives in determining the necessity of creating a legally binding

obligatory instrument or treaty. It has been argued that none of these attempts could

be concluded as a hard law initiative and hence justifies such necessity (Necessity of

hard law initiatives), although the OECD guidelines possess certain characteristics

that could lead to the hard law end of the continuum, without requiring such adoption

mandatory binding obligations69.


67
Zamfir I., ‘Towards a binding international treaty on business and human rights’ (European
Parliament, April 2018)
<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/620229/EPRS_BRI(2018)620229_EN.
pdf> accessed 29 June 2020
68
Choudhury, Barnali. "Balancing soft and hard law for business and human

rights." International & Comparative Law Quarterly 67, no. 4 (2018): 961-986.

69
UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human
Rights (2003) (E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2)
Collective Employment Agreement 22

Moreover, considering the limitations of both soft law and hard law

approaches, it was concluded that there was dissatisfaction regarding the ineffective

implementation of the UNGPs, despite its higher appreciation during its adoption that

ultimately led to the steps and attempts of drafting an international binding treaty 70.

The voluntary and non-binding character of the UNGPs was deemed to be the

limitations of the UNGPs which have been also recognized by the governments and

civil society organizations. It was further argued that the UNGPs have been around

for some years only and thus their impact has to be assessed with more time 71.

Furthermore, creating a binding treaty was initially said to cause huge complexity of

the business and human rights issues by many experts as it has to include all the

human rights of different kinds of businesses including both national and

transnational; having inherent risks within such framework and taking long time to

conclude with negotiations and thus rather a soft-law approach through the UNGPs

were preferred72.

4. Debates on the binding treaty, practical challenges in its enforcement and

future possibilities

Discussions on the creation of a bond agreement began in June 2014 with

international initiatives as several states began the difficult task of completing a bond

PHR tool with the following impetus:

i) administrative gaps will be covered where states do not implement human

rights protection;

70
UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human
Rights (2003) (E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2)
71
Ibid (n 2) 212-213
72
Ibid (n3) 80-90
Collective Employment Agreement 23

ii) The responsibilities of the companies will be set up from a central source;

iii) UNGPs can be transformed into binding obligations that ensure that all

organizations, regardless of their location, adhere to the same human rights

standards and increase access to effective solutions;

iv) The Working Group chaired talks to achieve the broader range of human

rights that companies can be responsible for.

However, it has been argued since then that creating a binding legal

framework for PHR issues poses some risks related to state approval and a lack of

global support for the binding tool. But many states did not support the proposed

agreement or participate in the negotiations, without the support of these states, the

largest TNCs would not have come under the agreement and therefore left such

administrative gaps. Therefore, it is not clear whether efforts to create such a bond

PHR tool without the support of those key states will significantly improve the

protection of human rights victims in the hands of organizations 73.

The main challenge for draftsmen of draft binding agreements is to consider

their wide range of specific issues, which must be taken into account in making

decisions with the necessary consensus. During the 2015 and 2016 sessions of the

73
Roos S.R., ‘UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’ in: Idowu

S.O., Capaldi N., Zu L., Gupta A.D. (eds), Encyclopedia of Corporate Social

Responsibility (Springer 2013)

<https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007%2F978-3-642-28036-

8_746#howtocite> accessed 01 July 2020


Collective Employment Agreement 24

OEIGWG, the most discussed issues of the day were the proposed binding

agreement on business and human rights liability:

i) the obligation of companies to diligently demonstrate due to human rights as

stated in the ‘Elements’ and the imposition on State Parties to compel TNCs and

OBEs with their subsidiaries;

ii) the expression regulating the legal liability of TNCs and OBEs, according to

the 'elements' relating to administrative, civil and criminal aspects of human rights

violations by their activities;

iii) The concept of broad jurisdiction was another issue because the victims

had to have access to effective solutions in the country where the violation took

place or where the parent company was located or where the treaty states were

expected to impose such an obligation. Guarantee for such solutions;

iv) The 'elements' have proposed the International Court of Justice for

Transnational Institutions and Human Rights, as well as the special chambers of

existing international and regional courts, and to develop an international settlement

mechanism and a non-judicial mechanism, ie to monitor initiatives taken by state

parties and to communicate reports and communications. To receive;

v) Provides 'elements' to facilitate mutual legal assistance to enhance judicial

cooperation and to recognize relevant decisions of the court.

There were also significant problems with the recognition of PHR-related

states' extraterrestrial obligations. The UNGPs said that under international human

rights law, states generally do not need to regulate additional regional activities of

businesses within their jurisdiction and are generally prohibited from doing so in

accordance with international law. Allowing the territory of one state to cause
Collective Employment Agreement 25

damage to the territory of another state. Despite this, some human rights treaty

organizations have suggested that states take action to prevent abuse in other states

by businesses within their territories. Therefore, in view of such issues, the

‘elements’ provided that the future binding agreement should ensure that the

obligations of state parties to protect human rights do not extend beyond their

territorial boundaries. In those times, the highest form of debate was whether the

proposed agreement would be limited to businesses engaged in transnational

activities or would also include local companies. The EU supported the idea of

including all businesses in the agreement, otherwise it would be inappropriate and

an evil compared to local competitors who violate human rights 74.

Whereas the 'Elements' have vividly short challenged the physique and

appearance of the union to the businesses involving transnational operations and

contrasted with the EU's position arguing that validates drafting a treaty specifically

applicable to businesses with transnational operations and excluding the local

companies75. This was argued with the issue that such a binding treaty is to be

drafted in order to complete the international gap in law on parent enterprises liability

determination beyond the government’s limits where the abuses of human rights

were committed. This was further argued with the matter that the TNCs are in the

most beneficial position by being able to avoid responsibility due to their

transnational nature and so limiting the scope of the then proposed or draft treaty

would not be discriminatory with the local companies. Other relevant debate

regarding the 'Elements' was that it provided for a wider view considering every

74
Zamfir I., ‘Towards a binding international treaty on business and human rights’ (European
Parliament, April 2018)
<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/620229/EPRS_BRI(2018)620229_EN.
pdf> accessed 29 June 2020
75
Ibid (n2) 98-110
Collective Employment Agreement 26

dimension recognizing human rights as covered the treaties and international

conventions76. Hence, At the same time, the 'elements' restrict the nature and

purpose of the agreement to businesses engaged in transnational activities and

contradict the EU position.

At the same time, the 'elements' restrict the nature and purpose of the

agreement to businesses engaged in transnational activities and contradict the EU

position77. It was argued that such a binding agreement should be prepared to fill a

gap in international law in determining the liability of parent companies beyond the

jurisdiction of the state where the human rights violations took place. TNCs are in a

very advantageous position of avoiding liability due to their transnational nature, so

restricting the scope of the proposed or draft agreement of the day does not

discriminate with local companies. The other relevant discussion regarding

‘elements’ was that it provided a broader approach considering that all internationally

recognized human rights are included in all human rights treaties and international

conventions. Then, at the third OEIGWG session in 2017, the EU expressed its

strong opposition to the drafting of a binding agreement by UN representatives,

which would not be of little practical importance and would cover up their inability to

uphold human rights by accusing states of using it.

76
Ibid (n3) 78-80
77
Roos S.R., ‘UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’ in: Idowu

S.O., Capaldi N., Zu L., Gupta A.D. (eds), Encyclopedia of Corporate Social

Responsibility (Springer 2013)

<https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007%2F978-3-642-28036-

8_746#howtocite> accessed 01 July 2020


Collective Employment Agreement 27

Regarding the nature and effectiveness of the ILO Tripartite Declaration,

although it imposes reporting obligations on governments, it does not provide for the

consequences of breach of its provisions and also does not specify any enforcement

mechanism. As a consequence, it is argued that although the Declaration contains

fewer hard law features compared to that of the OECD Guidelines, it could not be

still said to be purely soft law.

Among all the UN guidelines (General Principles and Global Compact),

OECD, ISO and ILO, the European Union and many other member states have kept

the UNGP at the forefront of recognizing the relationship between human rights and

business and this has been demonstrated. by establishing national programs in

accordance with these principles in order to operate effectively. According to a study

by the European Parliament in 2017, UNGPs were used to some extent as OECD

guidelines were in line with UNGP; however, there are still many cases of human

rights abuses due to a lack of key mechanisms in ensuring the implementation of the

UNGP and its non-compliant nature.

In the end, the international business community did not support the

"elements" because they appeared to be a major step backwards and jeopardized

the important consensus reached by the UNGPs, their spirit and their words were

undermined. Therefore, the “components” are contradictory and bizarre in PHR

bonds; The agreement and the proposed Option Act were made, which raised

serious concerns for international and regional businesses, but it was argued that

they did not provide a better foundation for the potential BHR framework. Significant

times in human rights


Collective Employment Agreement 28

Taken as a whole, the law governing the implementation of the Zero Pact

Agreement and the Neglected Selection Act are not legally binding; Compare

established standards and rules; It does not work for the purpose of promoting

inclusive economic growth and investment; He is at risk of being prosecuted for

politically motivated crimes; And - in fact - not the power to help all victims of human

rights abuses. In addition, entrepreneurs are deeply concerned about the process

that has led to the publication of the Standardization Agreement and the Draft Option

Protocol. It also says it wants to make a significant contribution to business dialogue

and human rights. However, it is worrying that no real effort has been made to

ensure a solid, transparent and open process that fully embraces the expertise and

experience of all stakeholders. The way in which UNGPs are created reflects the

highest number of meaningful private sector involvement. The business community

encourages all IGWG stakeholders to improve their negotiations with the business in

addressing complex human rights issues78.

Entrepreneurs vehemently reject the Draft Optimization Agreement and the

Draft Option Protocol. I do not believe that these documents make a significant

contribution to the commercial and human rights field; Instead, they underestimate

the significant progress made under the UNGP. In addition, the process followed by

IGWG to date does not give business confidence that the program will provide a

reliable and effective solution to these complex human rights issues. Giving credit to

companies with international functions, not those with domestic jobs or SOEs, even if

78
Methven O’Brien, Claire, and Jolyon Ford. "Business and Human Rights:

From Domestic Institutionalisation to Transnational Governance and Back

Again." Nordic Journal of Human Rights 37, no. 3 (2019): 216-233.


Collective Employment Agreement 29

a few steps have been taken from the perpetrator and there is no control over that

organization or its ability to influence operations, undermines the effective and full

UNGP approach. The Proposed Agreement and the Draft Optional Protocol also

ignore the key factors in determining the company's credit rights, namely the three

ways in which a company could be harmed; The size of; Systematic human rights

issues not only in the organization; Circumstances in which provinces do not meet

international obligations to protect human rights and enforce important levels of

employment. In addition, by increasing the use of foreign power, the Zero Draft

Agreement and Draft Option Protocol ignores the monarchy and ignores human

rights abuses in many provinces, while at the same time looking at international

businesses to fill those human rights gaps. 79.

In doing so, the Zero Draft Agreement and the Draft Options Protocol will

exclude most victims from reaching a decision that will block significant foreign

investment, and that will allow failed states to operate as human rights holders and

send money to certain businesses. None of this will meet the challenges of

globalization and help revitalize all economic growth and social development.

Entrepreneurs want to emphasize that there are many concerns about the Planning

Agreement, the Draft Options Protocol and the IGWG process do not undermine

their commitment to efficiency and respect for human rights. Identifying and

responding to human rights risks, including impact assessments, shareholder

engagement, foreign investment and increased exposure, has become an integral

part of voluntary organization activities and companies are constantly improving their

79
Zamfir I., ‘Towards a binding international treaty on business and human rights’ (European
Parliament, April 2018)
<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/620229/EPRS_BRI(2018)620229_EN.
pdf> accessed 29 June 2020
Collective Employment Agreement 30

efforts in this regard. Similarly, companies do not want to do business directly or

indirectly with suppliers or entrepreneurs who cause human rights violations.

Entrepreneurs do not support the Zero Non-Compliance Agreement or Draft

Option Protocol. Both of these books undermine the business system and human

rights by undermining the UNGP and the failure of countries to meet existing

obligations. Companies create the risk of choosing to “cut and run” from high-risk

countries, postponing investments in key projects to achieve growth and the SDGs

without entering other high-risk markets. Companies must follow strict policies such

as the police in their overseas supply companies to ensure that their business

partners act responsibly. Worryingly, this approach will continue to undermine the

role of the state, and some of its traditional functions and powers - such as testing

and charging fines for business partners - should be shifted to global trade. All of

these unintended consequences will significantly undermine the growth and

partnership model presented under STGs.

5. Research Methodology and Approach

This chapter of the study stipulates the procedure and approach used in

extracting and tabling of the results for this research. It expounds on the research

design, research method and data collection process in details for more valid and

reliable results.

This research falls into the category of practical research as it requires an

analysis of the development and implementation of the corporate human rights

responsibilities in the soft law and hard law framework throughout the years and

assess its impact on the business corporations dealing with the practical challenges

and debates concerning the creation of a binding treaty in the BHR context.
Collective Employment Agreement 31

However, the research questions also require descriptive research since it describes

the ongoing debates on current BHR governance framework and also assess the

significance of the balance between the soft law and hard law approaches. It is also

an exploratory research as it explores the practical challenges and future benefits

and opportunities in creating a binding treaty and justify it in implementing the

corporate human rights responsibilities effectively.

As per research design approach, it is a qualitative research method due to

the subjective assessment of the current corporate human rights framework, to

understand the underlying challenges, standards and practices that prevail until

today in order to draw the findings in favour of the binding treaty. Moreover, an

analytical approach is required here to apply legal reasoning, to interpret laws,

theories and practices of business and human rights and further make a critical

assessment of the necessity, practical challenges and future possibilities of the

binding treaty in implementing corporate human rights responsibilities. Overall, a

socio-legal approach is to be adopted to understand the effect of a binding treaty on

BHR upon attitude, behaviour and organizations of corporate world and vice-versa in

providing remedy to the victims of the society.

This study takes a qualitative approach with insights from practical research,

descriptive research, explanatory, analytical and socio-legal knowledge to vividly

expound on the law issues regarding the international human rights relative to the

topic. Consequently, the study deployed a systematic literature review, a method

which satisfied all the aspects demanded by the approach and design. Using the

method, various literature sources were gathered through different searches with

different key words related to the topic. Key words used during the search included

corporate human rights, implementation of the corporate human rights, corporate


Collective Employment Agreement 32

human rights responsibility, binding treaty, challenges, future opportunities, BHR

Initiatives, previous BHR initiatives, current BHR initiatives, limitations,

consequences, impacts, and advancements.

In this study, the literature materials consulted themselves acted in the

capacity of findings to the research questions. As a result, the analysis and

evaluation of the collected literatures provided the qualitative analysis designed by

the study80.

6. Findings, Recommendations and Conclusion

6.1. Findings

After thin analysis of the previous, current and future BHR initiatives, the study

identified a few challenges and initiative opportunities that hinders the human rights

responsibility internationally81. The BHR initiatives majorly looked into an improved

ethics on employment, human rights, environment and disclosure of information.

Furthermore, the study identified that implementation of corporate human rights

responsibility through a binding treaty in the international community is yet to be

achieved only when the corporate partners sojourned to the understandings of the

binding treaty initiatives put in place 82. For this reason, some of the challenges facing

80
Methven O’Brien, Claire, and Jolyon Ford. "Business and Human Rights:

From Domestic Institutionalisation to Transnational Governance and Back

Again." Nordic Journal of Human Rights 37, no. 3 (2019): 216-233.

81
Methven O’Brien, Claire, and Jolyon Ford. "Business and Human Rights: From Domestic

Institutionalisation to Transnational Governance and Back Again." Nordic Journal of Human

Rights 37, no. 3 (2019): 216-233.

82
Alvarez JE, ‘Are Corporations “Subjects” of International Law?’ (2011) 9 SantaClaraJIntlL 1
Collective Employment Agreement 33

the implementation of the human rights responsibility through binding treaty

initiatives as identified by the study grossed to competition of developing countries

for investment opportunities by foreign countries-possibly the developed countries;

failing of the UN norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and

Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights; Ineffectiveness of the

UNGPs initiatives; oblique ISO guidelines; Insufficiency in ILO guidelines; and lack of

central mechanism in ensuring the implementation of the UNGPs and their non-

binding nature83.

On the other hand, the study identified possibilities of future opportunities of

implementation of human rights responsibilities through binding treaty initiatives

internationally. According to the research, this is only possibly only when the

limitations of the previous and current initiatives are surpassed. Besides, the

possibility of the future implementation of the BHRs initiatives on human rights

responsibility lies on the gap of a binding treaty initiative currently in place. Today,

the only binding treaty initiative available is the zero draft and its subsequent drafts

developed about three years ago 84. As a result, the need for a binding treaty initiative

is justified by this gap of insufficiencies of available initiatives to enact such

guidelines.

Competition of the developing countries for foreign investment opportunities

The study table one of the challenges hindering the implementation of the

human rights responsibility through binding treaty initiatives as the competition of the

developing countries for foreign investment opportunities in their land. For this

reason, there is breach to the guidelines outlined by the OECD annexed to the 1976

83
Alvarez JE, ‘Are Corporations “Subjects” of International Law?’ (2011) 9 SantaClaraJIntlL 1
84
Alvarez JE, ‘Are Corporations “Subjects” of International Law?’ (2011) 9 SantaClaraJIntlL 1
Collective Employment Agreement 34

OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, that

consisted of recommendations on wider range of principles starting from consumer

interests, science and technology, competition and taxation to the responsible

business conduct for MNCs and business ethics on employment, human rights,

environment and disclosure of information 85. For instance, despite the due diligence

of the law, some countries play a disparity in supporting human rights concerning the

key elements outlined by the 1976 OECD declaration. Considerably, there has been

several incidences of breach of these codes of conduct of employees in different

multinational enterprises and transnational corporations, but with little consideration

by the concerned state due to fear of losing the foreign investor in that specific

developing country. Some of the common abuses of the human rights by the

multinational enterprises includes lack of employment ethics, over taxation,

unpleasant environment and restricted freedom. In the pictures captioned below, the

first picture in figure 1 shows child abuse in a mining company while the second

picture captioned as figure 2 shows employees demonstrating on poor mining

environment86. According to the OECD of 1976, human rights covers the protection

of humans against the poor work environment and child labour. However, since the

developing countries needs the companies from the developed countries (the foreign

investors), none will stand out strongly to condemn such acts against human rights

responsibility as outlined by the 1976 OECD principles 87.

Failing of the UN norms on the RTCs and OBEs

85
Chowdhury B., ‘Balancing soft and hard law for Business and Human rights’ (2018) 67 ICLQ 961–
986
86
Ibid (n2) 961–986

87
Ibid (n3) 961–986
Collective Employment Agreement 35

In 2003, the first draft of the Rules on Human Rights ('UN Rules') on the

responsibilities of transnational corporations and other business entities was adopted

by the UN Convention on Security and Development. Came to light as an unbound

tool by the subcommittee. Human rights 88. This came in consideration to the

business and human rights obligations and responsibilities of the companies in order

to provide protection to the consumers and address issues on prevention of

corruption and environmental harm. It considered the business and human rights

obligations and responsibilities of companies to provide protection to consumers and

to address issues related to the prevention of corruption and environmental damage.

This precedes the failure of global compact policies in 2000, which has been referred

to as the “largest voluntary enterprise sustainability initiative in the world”. The main

responsibility of the global compact policy lies in achieving human rights, labour and

environmental rights and anti-corruption rules, and takes such attempts to support

social goals, which ultimately failed. The UN has failed by the rules of the Ten

Unclear Policies on Standards for Corporate Behaviour. Compact is universally

recognized, and thus there is inaccuracy in describing such standards and

consequences as they are violated due to the lack of monitoring and third-party

supervision rules. Law in the BHR Framework.89.

As a result of its failure, the UN the commission was forced to appoint a

special envoy on human rights and the TNC and other businesses, including John

Rocky, a professor at Harvard University. The expert came up with three resolutions

in the BHR; Protection, Settlement and Respect through the following perspectives:

(i) the State has a legal duty to protect her people from abuse, including trade
88
Cassell D., “Building a Treaty on Business and Human Rights: Context and Contours”, (2019) 41(2)
Human Rights Quarterly, 497-508

89
Ibid (n2) 497-508
Collective Employment Agreement 36

Protecting them; ii) the duties of enterprises to protect clients; And iii) transparency.

Professor Ruggy has identified the personality some challenges as causes of

contemporary problems involving PHR. ILO and the OECD recognize that the UN

has a duty to keep human rights. He also found in his studies that it belongs to the

Global Compact. Despite these measures, Professor Rookie conducted further

research in 2011 and proposed the UNGP with the aim of mitigating the

aforementioned governance gaps and ensuring better access to solutions. Victims

soon. Therefore, the first 1-10 policies in the UNGPs are related to the state duty to

protect; Policies 11-24 address the issue of business liability to be respected and

Policies 25-31 addressing the necessities for availing victims with opportunity to legit

solutions to human rights abuses.

Due to such failures, the study table some of the reasons that appeared to be

the source of the failures of such policies. These insufficiencies included and not

limited to; lack of co-ordination by the government departments 90; fear of restrain of

foreign investment; lack of good governance, existence of corruption and political

limitations imposed by foreign governments; opposition by business enterprises and

governments groups; lack of international companies involved in human rights

abuses and lack of coherence between international instruments of UN, OECD, etc.;

lack of awareness about these principles along; and lack of financial and human

resources. As a result, the UNGPs are non-binding soft-law instrument in

authoritative nature and of global standard, with no new obligations but reflecting

international law standards in ensuring human rights in the context of business.

Oblique ISO guidelines


90
Elise Groulx Diggs and Mitt Regan and Beatrice Parance, 'Business and Human Rights as a Galaxy of
Norms' (2019) 50 Geo J Int'l L 309
Collective Employment Agreement 37

Unclear ISO guidelines is one of the factors challenging the implementation of

the human rights responsibility through binding treaty initiatives. However, the (ISO)

26000 in 2010 for Guidance Standard on Social Responsibility has failed to particular

address most of the underlying challenges over the matter of human rights in the

international community91. For instance, the (ISO) 26000 in 2010 for Guidance

Standard on Social Responsibility is another internationally recognized standard

which provided guidance on how business organizations can operate with social

responsibility in socially acceptable manner 92. As a result, an international

organization for standardization appeared incompetent to address most of the

vibrant issues concerning the implementation of human rights responsibilities

through binding treaty initiatives. Even though the policy provides an opportunity to

report obligations on the government, the ILO Tripartite Declaration fails to report

consequences of breach of its provisions and also does not specify any enforcement

mechanism. Finally, the Declaration contains fewer hard law features compared to

that of the OECD Guidelines, it could not be still said to be purely soft law 93.

Insufficiency in International Labour Organization (ILO) guidelines

Implementation of human rights responsibility through binding treaty initiatives

is tabled to have met its backwash through development of insufficient ILO

guidelines. Through this attempts to meeting the goals of BHRs, the International

Labour Organization adopted a “Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning

Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy” in 1977 with a revised version in 2017,

which is another international standard in offering guidelines to TNCs, states’,

91
International Labour Organization, Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational
Enterprises and Social Policy (1978) 17 ILM 422
92
Ibid (n2) 422
93
Ibid (n3) 423
Collective Employment Agreement 38

bosses and servants organizations on labour and employment issues, training, work

and life conditions and industrial relations and based on principles under

international labour conventions and recommendations 94. Regarding the nature and

effectiveness of the ILO Tripartite Declaration, although it imposes reporting

obligations on governments, it does not provide for the impact’s defiance of its

provisions and also does not specify any enforcement mechanism. As a

consequence, it is argued that although the Declaration contains fewer hard law

features compared to that of the OECD Guidelines, it could not be still said to be

purely soft law95.

As described, implementation of human right responsibility through a binding

treaty has faced several challenges on the initiatives put forward to the process.

Development of business and human rights initiatives can be dated back since

1970s to date, with little progress in the transnational and multinational corporations.

Despite of the attempts by the UN agencies to formulate policies against abuse of

human right and mistreatment of human being by corporate states, achieving a

responsible state of human right in the international community remains in its

staggering condition due to several challenges outlined above. The study availed the

evidences of attempts of policy formulations towards upholding human rights in the

transnational and multinational enterprises. Such policies evidenced in the study

included and not limited to; the BHR initiatives, OECD principles, the UN policies.

94
Rasche A., ‘” A Necessary Supplement” – What the United Nations Global Compact Is and Is Not’
(2009) 48(4) Business Society 511

95
Rasche A., ‘” A Necessary Supplement” – What the United Nations Global Compact Is and Is Not’
(2009) 48(4) Business Society 511
Collective Employment Agreement 39

Finally, some issues showing future prospects for completing the process; (i) the

obligation to diligently demonstrate due to human rights as stated in the Institutions

'Elements' and the obligation on State Parties to compel TNCs and OBEs with their

subsidiaries; (ii) the expression regulating the legal liability of TNCs and OBEs,

according to the 'elements' relating to administrative, civil and criminal aspects of

human rights violations by their activities; . States guarantee such solutions. Experts

in monitoring the efforts of state parties, publishing reports and obtaining

communications; Finally, (v) provide 'elements' to facilitate mutual legal assistance to

enhance judicial cooperation and to recognize the relevant decisions of the court.

6.2. Recommendations

The study has identified several challenges hoovering the implementation of the

human rights responsibility through binding treaty initiatives. These challenges must

be solved for the process to reach its fulfilment. Starting from the BHR initiatives,

some of the challenges that must be solved included competition of developing

countries for investment opportunities by foreign countries-possibly the developed

countries; failing of the UN traditions towards RTCs and OBEs as per the law;

Ineffectiveness of the UNGPs initiatives; oblique ISO guidelines; Insufficiency in ILO

guidelines; and lack of central mechanism in ensuring the implementation of the

UNGPs and their non-binding nature. Although, greater solutions lie within the

solution of the gross challenges including, but not limited to; ; lack of co-ordination by

the government departments; fear of restrain of foreign investment; lack of good

governance, existence of corruption and political limitations imposed by foreign

governments; opposition by business enterprises and governments groups; lack of

international companies involved in human rights abuses and lack of coherence


Collective Employment Agreement 40

between international instruments of UN, OECD, etc.; lack of awareness about these

principles along; and lack of financial and human resources.

Some of the recommendations put forward by the study to solve the identified

gaps included96;

(i) Gap: clarification challenge regarding the existence, nature, and extent of

corporate human rights responsibilities.

Recommendation: the existing governance gaps would be covered where

the States do not enforce human rights protections.

(ii) Gap: states being the principal abusers of business and human rights by

being too corrupt and having no power to protect people from influential

business corporations.

Recommendation: the responsibilities of corporations would be set out

from a central source.

(iii) Gap: absolving of liability against human rights violations by the parent

companies for commission of such abuses by subsidiaries on the basis of

doctrines of separate legal personality and limited liability.

Recommendation: the UNGPs could be converted into binding obligations

ensuring that all the corporations, irrespective of their locations, stick to the

same set of human rights standards and increasing access to effective

remedies.

(iv) Gap: obstacles and legal barriers experienced by the victims in getting

access to justice which include excessive litigation costs and doctrine of

forum non convenience.


96
OHCHR, The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights: An Interpretive Guide (United
Nations, 2012)
Collective Employment Agreement 41

Recommendation: the working group headed for the negotiations

achieving a liable international corporation.

The earlier challenges affecting the BHR initiatives could be solved by the John’s

recommendations. Following extensive research and consultation with a number of

stakeholder stakeholders on the key principles of this framework, the BHR structure

entitled "Protection, Respect and Resolution" has three components: (i) the State

has a legal duty to protect her people from abuse, including trade Protecting them; ii)

the duties of enterprises to protect clients; And iii) transparency. Professor Ruggy

has identified the personality some challenges as causes of contemporary problems

involving PHR. ILO and the OECD recognize that the UN has a duty to keep human

rights. He also found in his studies that it belongs to the Global Compact.

6.3. Conclusion

To conclude, the research established that there are a lot of things still

missing for the complete implementation of the human right responsibility through

binding treaty for a safer transnational corporation. Most of the world agencies

aiming at peaceful coexistence among the international community such as the UN

agencies, OECD, ISO, and ILO have attempted to ensure a safer world community

with due diligence of human rights through formulation of various initiatives.

Beginning with the PHR initiatives, the OECD guidelines in some of the efforts to

ensure the implementation of human rights through the Binding Agreement, the UN

Including Global Compact and the then UN Human Rights Commission. The study

identified that the only existing initiative is its latest drafts related to the

implementation of human rights through zero draft and binding contract initiatives.

The (UN), (OECD), International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and


Collective Employment Agreement 42

International Labour Organization (ILO) States should follow suit in managing .NC

and other business entities (OPEs). As a result of its failure, the UN the commission

was forced to appoint a special envoy on human rights and the TNC and other

businesses, including John Rocky, a professor at Harvard University.

The expert came up with three resolutions in the BHR; Protection, Settlement and

Respect through the following perspectives: (i) the State has a legal duty to protect

her people from abuse, including trade Protecting them; ii) the duties of enterprises

to protect clients; And iii) transparency. Professor Ruggy has identified the

personality some challenges as causes of contemporary problems involving PHR.

ILO and the OECD recognize that the UN has a duty to keep human rights. He also

found in his studies that it belongs to the Global Compact. Despite these measures,

Professor Rookie conducted further research in 2011 and proposed the UNGP with

the aim of mitigating the aforementioned governance gaps and ensuring better

access to solutions. Victims soon. Therefore, the first 1-10 policies in the UNGPs are

related to the state duty to protect; Policies 11-24 address the issue of business

liability to be respected and Policies 25-31 addressing the necessities for availing

victims with opportunity to legit solutions to human rights abuses. Hence, after thin

analysis of the previous, current and future BHR initiatives, the study identified a few

challenges and initiative opportunities that hinders the human rights responsibility

internationally97. The BHR initiatives majorly looked into an improved ethics on

employment, human rights, environment and disclosure of information.

97
Methven O’Brien, Claire, and Jolyon Ford. "Business and Human Rights: From Domestic

Institutionalisation to Transnational Governance and Back Again." Nordic Journal of Human

Rights 37, no. 3 (2019): 216-233.


Collective Employment Agreement 43

Furthermore, the study identified that implementation of corporate human rights

responsibility through a binding treaty in the international community is yet to be

achieved only when the corporate partners sojourned to the understandings of the

binding treaty initiatives put in place 98. For this reason, some of the challenges facing

the implementation of the human rights responsibility through binding treaty

initiatives as identified by the study grossed to competition of developing countries

for investment opportunities by foreign countries-possibly the developed countries;

failing of the UN norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and

Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights; Ineffectiveness of the

UNGPs initiatives; oblique ISO guidelines; Insufficiency in ILO guidelines; and lack of

central mechanism in ensuring the implementation of the UNGPs and their non-

binding nature99.

The findings table herein are legible for validity and reliability verification since

the study takes a qualitative approach with insights from practical research,

descriptive research, explanatory, analytical and socio-legal knowledge to vividly

expound on the law issues regarding the international human rights relative to the

topic. Consequently, the study deployed a systematic literature review, a method

which satisfied all the aspects demanded by the approach and design. Using the

method, various literature sources were gathered through different searches with

different key words related to the topic. Key words used during the search included

corporate human rights, implementation of the corporate human rights, corporate

human rights responsibility, binding treaty, challenges, future opportunities, BHR

98
Alvarez JE, ‘Are Corporations “Subjects” of International Law?’ (2011) 9 SantaClaraJIntlL 1
99
Alvarez JE, ‘Are Corporations “Subjects” of International Law?’ (2011) 9 SantaClaraJIntlL 1
Collective Employment Agreement 44

Initiatives, previous BHR initiatives, current BHR initiatives, limitations,

consequences, impacts, and advancements.

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