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Turkey's Cyprus Policy: A Research Agenda

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 Turkey's Cyprus Policy: A Research Agenda
Sergios Zambouras

The prevailing Greek perception of Turkey’s Cyprus policy boils down to one word:
“ expansionism” . Turkish expansionism is certainly no mere figment of nationalist Greek
imagination, but a historical phenomenon, most brutally manifested in the continuing
occupation, ethnic cleansing and colonisation of the island’s northern area, which is also
threatened with outright annexation to Turkey. Since the 1950s, Turkey’s approach to Cyprus
has been predominantly geopolitical, hostile, divisive and antagonistic to the island’s people.
Moreover, beginning with the Turkish government orchestrated pogrom against the Greek
community of Istanbul, in September 1955, consistently, for decades, “ Turkey, instead of
containing the [Cyprus] crisis, chose to intensify its pressure upon Greece, by expanding the
1
conflict on a number of other fronts.”
However, neither the Cyprus problem nor its increasingly complex Turkish dimension can be
reduced to Turkish expansionism alone. A reductionist approach would ignore, indeed may
obfuscate2 the Greek responsibilities in the creation of this problem. It would also fail to
account for the contradictions, ambiguities and potential for change in Turkey’s Cyprus policy.
This paper suggests the need for further research of this last factor, mainly in the light of the
public debate that continues on the issue, in the current Turkish press. 3

The Autonomy of the Turkish-Cypriot Regime

On August 28, 1994, the Turkish-Cypriot “ National Assembly” revoked its earlier pledge to
participate in the United Nations’ efforts for a mutually acceptable, federal settlement of the
Cyprus conflict, and called for the “ economic integration” of the island’s occupied area with
Turkey. Opposed by the Turkish-Cypriot Left, which seemed at the time to become a factor of

1
Vyron Theodoropoulos, ‘E Dethen Diamache sto Aigaio’ [The so-called Aegean Dispute],
Dimitris Kairidis, Robert Pfaltzgraff Jr. and Thomas Varvitsiotis,eds. Asfaleia sti Notio-
anatoliki Evropi kai Ellino-amerikanikes scheseis [Security in Southeastern Europe and Greek-
American Relations] Athens:Fytrakis 1997, 226. That Turkey had no intention of containing the
Cyprus conflict on the island, had been made plainly clear, in advance, to Georgios
Pesmazoglou, the Greek Ambassador in Ankara, in 1956-59. See Georgios Pesmazoglou, To
Chronikon tis Zoes mou [The Chronicle of my Life], Athens:n.p. 1999, 305-306
2
Yannis Papadakis, ‘Enosis and Turkish Expansionism: Real Myths or Mythic Realities?’
Vangelis Calotychos,ed. Cyprus and its People, Colorado: 1998
1
some account in Turkish diplomacy and politics, this resolution seemed “ adventurist” even
from Ankara’s viewpoint.4

It was not until three years later, in 1997, that Ankara endorsed the Turkish-Cypriot regime’s
stance and established an advisory “ Association Council to determine the measures to be
taken with the aim of achieving integration between the two countries” .5“ Joint
declarations” to that end, however, did not signify any agreed “ national policy” for either
the “ integration” or “ independent development of Northern Cyprus” 6. What they did signify
was that , as the Turkish journalist Erdal Guven later put it, Ankara “ is now no longer
confronted with only the [diplomatic] problem of Cyprus, it is also confronted with the
[economic and political] problem of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” 7.

Just like its Unilateral Declaration of Independence, in November 1983, the Turkish-Cypriot
regime’s 1994 resolution was designed to demonstrate its autonomy, vis-à-vis Turkish
governments which “ regarded the Cyprus issue as a troublesome factor standing in the way of
Turkey’s aim to join the European Union.”8

This paradox of the autonomy of an occupation regime points to the need for systematic
research of Turkish-Cypriot affairs. Clearly, we need to move beyond stereotypes which portray
the Turkish-Cypriots as mere pawns of Ankara, or observations that “ Turkish-Cypriot political

3
References to the Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot press are based on the daily English translation
published under the general title Turkish Mass Media Bulletin, by the Press and Information
Office of the Republic of Cyprus
4
Several days before the resolution was passed, Ozker Ozgur, then leader of the leftist Cyprus
Turkish Republican Party (CTP), denounced any such “adventurist idea, which would be
opposed by Turkey too”, KIBRIS, 9.8.1994. Having won well over 20% of the vote, in the 1993
“parliamentary” elections, the CTP agreed to join the Democratic Party of Sedrar Denktash (the
son of Rauf Denktash) in a new coalition “government”, which lasted until late 1996. The
decision to join this coalition was taken by Ozgur, after a “private” visit to Ankara.
5
“Agreement between the Governments of the Republic of Turkey and the Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus on the establishment of an Association Council”, 6.8.1997
6
Hasan Unal, “Helping the North to develop”, ZAMAN, 28.5.1998
7
cited in SIMERINI, 17.12.2000
8
Clement Dodd “Cyprus in Turkish politics and foreign policy” C.H.Dodd,ed. Cyprus-The
Need for New Perspectives, Huntingdon:The Eothern Press 1999, 128; Melek Firat, “Oi
Politikes tis Tourkias sto Kypriako” [Turkey’s policies on the Cyprus issue], SYNCHRONA
THEMATA, No67,1999
2
autonomy, which has been eroding steadily since the 1950s, has diminished even further with
the legal and political incorporation of settlers.” 9

The effects of the colonisation of occupied Cyprus, we should note in this connection, remain
very much an open question. Turkey’s policy of colonisation is anything but problem-free. An
adequate study of the issue should consider the social, economic and political, as well as
geographical limitations to the inflow of settlers. And we can certainly do without
unsubstantiated assertions, as is, for example, the discovery of the “ high birth rates” of the
Turkish settlers in Cyprus. 10Available figures, suggest otherwise: “ [in north Cyprus], the
average annual rate of population growth in the 1990s is about 1.4 percent, which is relatively
low compared to the population growth in many developing countries (for example annual
11
growth in Turkey is 2.5%).” More to the point, we should not underestimate the resilience of
the Turkish-Cypriot community. Turkish colonisation, has been a major cause of protest and
dissent among the Turkish-Cypriots, including the tens of thousands who have been forced to
emigrate to the United Kingdom and other countries, but nevertheless remain politically
assertive and economically influential in occupied Cyprus

Overall, Ioannides pointed out, the biggest wave of Turkish colonisation struck Cyprus in the
years immediately after the 1974 invasion. “ The arrival of settlers continued [in the 1980s] but
at a much slower pace.”12 The regime may well continue to use settlers, in periods of
“ elections” and for purposes of propaganda 13 or psychological warfare against the Cypriot
republic and against the Turkish-Cypriot Left. In 1998, there were Turkish-Cypriot protests
prompted by the fact that the occupation regime had granted “ citizenship” to no less than

9
Christos Ioannides, In Turkey’s Image: The transformation of occupied Cyprus into a Turkish
province, New York:A.Caratzas 1991,167
10
Nicos Mouzelis, “Oi Epoikoi” (The Settlers), TO VIMA, 9.3.1997
11
Behrooz Morvaridi, “Demographic Change, Resettlement and Resource Use”, C.H.Dodd,ed.
The Political, Social and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus, Huntigdon:The Eothen
Press 1993, 219
12
Ioannides, In Turkey’s Image, 31. For an authoritative view on the issue see Council of
Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Doc. 6589, rapoorteur, Alfons Cuco, Report on the
Demographic Structure of the Cypriot Communities, 1992. On the international political
implications, see the interesting remarks of Heinz Richter, Jan-Willem Bertens, Mehmet Ugur,
Nicos Kounoupias and Nicos Trimikliniotis, “General Discussion”, John Charalambous,
Marion Sarafis & Eleni Timini,eds. Cyprus and the European Union: a challenge,
London:University of North London Press 1996, 124-128
13
Vyron Theodoropoulos, Oi Tourkoi kai Emeis [The Turks and Us], Athens:Fytrakis 1988,
262
3
300,000 Turks14 – an extraordinary figure, considering that the total population in occupied
Cyprus numbers less than 200,000. It is significant, however, that the so-called “ Turkish-
Cypriots of Turkey” , do not wish to settle in occupied Cyprus. Also, as the Turkish columnist
Perihan Madgen noted, a large number of settlers have an “ immigrant” rather than nationalist
consciousness. “ I am staying in a hotel, inside Nicosia’s historic walls” , Madgen wrote in a
powerful polemic against the occupation regime. “ This is a beautiful ancient quarter. Yet, only
the jinnis [spirits] roam the streets at night, nobody walks outside, despite the hot weather.
That’s because this place has been abandoned to the immigrants, the easterners. After a number
of robberies, the islanders have become scared of, and have no desire to socialise with the
easterners. They, in their turn, plan to return to their homes, as soon as possible, after making
some money on this bankrupt land.” 15

The autonomization of the occupation regime, has little, if anything, to do with the Turkish-
Cypriot movement for self-assertion, which since its infancy, in the cradle of the Pancyprian
Labour Federation (PEO), in the 1940s and the 1950s, has been an integral part of the struggle
for Cypriot unity and independence. The rise of the occupation regime’s “ ethnic
nationalism” , which Turkish analysts tend to attribute to solely external or international
factors16, is a recent phenomenon that coincided with and can be largely explained by the
intensifying political fragmentation and rivalry within the occupying state itself.

The disintegration of the Kemalist state, an ongoing process which began in the early 1980s,
with the military regime’s economic “ neo-liberalism” and support for Islamism as an
antidote to left-wing politics17, has ended the days when Turkish foreign policy was the
reserved domain of raison d’ etat functionaries. New power-centres have emerged, within and
beyond the civil-military divide. Not least among these, was the “ nationalist para-state” , an

14
AVRUPA, 12.9.1998
15
Perihan Magden, “Frozen in their old ways”, RADIKAL, 15.7.1998. Kutlu Adali, the
Turkish-Cypriot journalist who led the campaign against colonization and was assassinated in
July 1996, also noted the settlers “longing for their homeland”. See in particular his article “We
protest but we still leave”, YENIDUZEN, 30.8.1994. Morvaridi, “Demographic Change”, in
Dodd, Political,Social and Economic Development, 229, pointed out that the occupation regime
“does not allow Turkish settlers the rights to sell land that they have been goven, for fear that
they might sell up and return to Turkey”.
16
Melek Firat, “Oi Politikes tis Tourkias”. For a useful definition of “ethnic nationalism” or
“identity” politics, see Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era,
Cambridge:Polity Press 1999, 77-86
17
Feroz Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey, London & New York:Routledge 1993, 181 ff.
4
amalgamation of special forces, mafia and party political vested interests, which came close to
determining Turkish state policy in the early-mid 1990s, and has since succeeded in securing a
key position in mainstream Turkish politics. 18

Since the Susurluk accident, in November 199619,the decisive role of the para-state has become
increasingly evident in, among other areas, the policy of tension against Greece 20 and the
Turkish-Cypriot regime’s “ integration” with Turkey. The regime’s links with the Turkish
para-state, had already become common knowledge, in the summer of 1996, when Rauf
Denktash organised a “ presidential” reception for the hundreds of “ Grey Wolf”
paramilitaries who had arrived from Turkey in anticipation of the clashes that took place on the
island’s Green Line that year. The regime would later, in 1997 and 1999, repeatedly intervene
to block a Turkish parliamentarian investigation of the Susurluk gang’s money-laundering
activities in the island’s occupied area and involvement in the assassination of the dissident
Turkish-Cypriot journalist Kutlu Adali. 21

Reinforced by the support of such new influential friends in Turkey, the Turkish-Cypriot
regime came to claim a decisive, or at least an "equitable" role,22 in Ankara’s Cyprus policy.
And, as Cyprus has long become the one and only durable manifestation of Turkey's regional
power status,23 the Turkish-Cypriot regime also played an active role in systematically

18
The neo-fascist Nationalist Action Party (MHP) emerged as the second largest party in
Turkey’s 1999 elections and its participation in the collation government became a key factor to
the country’s “political stability” since. Among others, see Zalmay Khalilzad, Ian O. Lesser and
F. Stephen Larrabee, The Future of Turkish-Western Relations: A Strategic Plan, Santa Monica,
Ca.:RAND papers, August 2000
19
In the accident, Huseyin Kocadak, chief of the Istanbul police, Abdullah Catli, a “Grey Wolf”
member and mafia boss, and his mistress, Gonza Uz, were killed while riding a car belonging to
Sedat Bucak, a true Path member of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. Bucak, who was
driving the car, survived and would later tell a Turkish TV channel of his participation in
Turkish intelligence orchestrated arson attacks in Greek island forests. Catli’s activities, later
Turkish court investigations revealed, included the establishment of an off-shore bank in
Cyprus’ occupied area, under the instruction of senior Turkish Intelligence (MIT)
officer,Mehmet Eymur.
20
See Alkis Kourkoulas, Imia: Kritiki Proengisi tou Tourkikou Paragonta [Imia: A critical
approach to the Turkish factor], Athens: Sideris 1997
21
YENIDUZEN, 6.11.1997 and 1.2.1999
22
Melek Firat, “Oi Politikes tis Tourkias”
23
Niyazi Kizilyurek, “To adieksodo tis Tourkias sto Kypriako” [Turkey’s Cyprus Entrapment],
KYRIAKATIKI ELEFTHEROTYPIA, 26.10.1999
5
propagating the post-Cold War nationalistic delusions of "the vast area [that is opening up] to
Turkish influence, stretching from the shores of the Black Sea to the Sea of Japan." 24

In Ankara, however, foreign policy experts understood and warned in the early 1990s, that
aspirations for regional hegemony, in "the uncertain, unknown and unconnected to Turkey
world of the East", provided no alternative and intensified the danger of Turkey's European
marginalization.25 Turkey's growing alienation from Western Europe was Ankara's most
pressing concern. Cyprus, in the words of the then President Turgut Ozal was "a major
problem. One way or another, a solution must be found. This issue is standing in Turkey's way.
It is a major obstacle to Turkey's growth. I say this without hesitation. I have told Denktash to
his face."26

Ozal, his Cypriot counterpart George Vasileiou pointed out at the time, "had realised that no
progress was possible with Mr. Denktash and he therefore introduced a policy of direct contacts
between the Turkish foreign ministry and the United Nations." 27But Ozal's 1991 attempt to
reassert Ankara's control of its own foreign policy agenda, while at the same time maintaining
some neutrality in Turkish-Cypriot politics, was short-lived and has not been repeated since. It
has become a dictum of Turkish policy to-date that "Rauf Denktash is the person who will
decide, not Turkey."28

The Current Turkish Debate

The analysis of Turkey's Cyprus policy has only recently began to move beyond geo-political
assessments of "ultimate" objectives. These objectives have been broadly identified by both
Turkish and Greek commentators. It is generally said that, since 1974, Turkey's Cyprus
ambitions or interests are no longer confined to the consolidation of the island's partition.
Indeed, as Mehmet Ali Birand, among several others, concluded in the 1980s, Turkey may well
oppose such a "solution", to the extent that partition would "allow the Greek-Cypriots to act as
they please". Turkey has an interest in a settlement which would enable it to "exert influence on

24
Sakir Alemdar, “International Aspects of the Cyprus Problem”, Dodd, Political, Social and
Economic Development, 99
25
Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, “Prospects for Southern European Security: A Turkish Perspective,”
Roberto Aliboni,ed. Southern European Security in the 1990s, London:Pinter 1992, 119, 134-5
26
Cited in Dodd, Cyprus:The Need for New Perspectives
27
George Vasileiou, Poreia pros tin lysi [On the Way to Resolution], Athens:Kastaniotis 1992,
192
28
Ismael Cem, interview, Turkiye, 29.9.1999
6
the whole of Cyprus."29 To that end, Ankara has pursued an aggressive policy of maximalist
demands: the international recognition of its "right and obligation" to unilateral intervention as
well as secessionist "rights" for the Turkish Cypriots. As the late Yannos Kranidiotis pointed
out, in 1981, these objectives "do not exclude the possibility that Turkey's ultimate aim may be
the total neutralization of the Greek element and the occupation of the whole island.
Confederation seems to be the first step in this direction. Through complex legal arrangements,
such a settlement would allow the perpetuation of the occupation of northern Cyprus and
[Turkey's] military and political control of the rest of the island. The gradual undermining of
the political and economic power of the Greek-Cypriot community would be the next step, one
which would facilitate Turkey's total conquest of Cyprus." 30

Foreign policy, however, cannot be reduced to ultimate objectives. For external as well as
internal reasons, Turkey is not quite in the position to "act as it pleases" either. Cypriot
independence has survived its Cold War odyssey of countless diplomatic machinations,
political subversions and outright military aggression, thus proving its worth as an integral part
of the international system. Moreover, as the Turkish academic Mehmet Ugur argued in an
unusually frank as well as perceptive book, Greece’s EU membership and the EU orientation of
Cyprus, have decisively enhanced “ the viability of an independent Cypriot state, to which the
31
only threat comes from Turkey.”

The unresolved Cyprus conflict has thus become an increasingly controversial issue in Turkey.
An unprecedented public debate over Cyprus began in late 1997 and early 1998, when, as one
Turkish diplomat put it, the then Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit reduced the Turkish
foreign ministry into a propaganda machine. “ In the past” ,the diplomat told the daily Sabah
newspaper, “ different views were being discussed within the Foreign Ministry which would
formulate a consensus and determine the best course to follow. No longer. Whatever Ecevit
says, that goes. This is a really frightening situation. He’s turning the ministry into a one party
system”32. With the military leadership conspicuously silent on the issue, 33 it was mainly

29
cited in Stavros Lygeros, Kypros: Sta Oria tou Afanismou [Cyprus: on the verge of
extinction], Athens:Nea Synora 1993, 148
30
Yannos Kranidiotis & George Tenekidis,eds. Kypros: Istoria, Provlemata kai Agones tou
Laou tis [Cyprs:History,Problems and Struggles of its People], Athens:Estia 1981, 148
31
Mehmet Ugur, The European Union and Turkey, Aldreshot:Ashgate 1999, 245
32
cited by Sedat Sertoglu in SABAH, 6.4.1998
33
“I do not know what the military thinks about the Cyprus problem, but I can imagine the
consequences of a cutback in US military aid”, Sertoglu wrote in SABAH, 4.10.1999.”Isn’t it
about time, the Chief of the General Staff, General Husseyin Kivrikoglu expressed his views on
7
diplomatic veterans, like the retired ambassador and former foreign minister llter Türkmen and
his colleague and former deputy foreign minister Inal Batu, who went public to warn against the
Yilmaz and Ecevit governments' "distancing from our traditional policy of always keeping the
door open to negotiation on the Cyprus question". 34

Whether or not these diplomatic experts and their many supporters in the mainstream Turkish
media advocate a change of Turkey’s objectives in Cyprus, has been the subject of much
speculation. They themselves maintained from the outset that “ while questions are being
raised about Cyprus… the scope of these questions does not extend to fundamentals and is not
likely, therefore, to provoke a crisis” .35 In the words of Ilter Turkmen, “ Turkey has a Cyprus
doctrine” , which is, in fact, gaining international support36, “ but it has no Cyprus strategy’’37.
Nationalist intransigence is no substitute for strategy. In practice, it has only brought Turkey
“ dangerously close to the point of losing its international credibility” 38 and prevented the
formulation of “ policies that contain alternative scenarios to cope with any eventuality…
Neither the Foreign Ministry, nor the government or the National Security Council” have
made any preparations for the near certainty of Cyprus’ accession in the European Union, they
have yet to seriously assess the arguments for and against Turkish-Cypriot participation in
Cyprus’ EU accession talks, and have developed no proposals for a Cyprus compromise, “ a
synthesis of federal and confederal elements” . 39

It is with such concerns in mind, then, that diplomatic experts and a large section of the media
in Turkey have been calling for what Turkmen described “ a new policy that contains the
settlement of the Cyprus problem within an EU perspective” .40 Whether such a policy would
eventually necessitate a revision of Turkey’s Cyprus “ doctrine” , is of course a different
matter, and one which has not, and probably cannot, be resolved by diplomatic arguments. In

Cyprus to the Prime Minister and tell him of the difficulties that may be faced if the current
posture is maintained? Why does the National Security Council not convene to discuss
Cyprus?”
34
Ilter Turkmen, “Vicious Circle in Cyprus”, YENI YUZUIL, 14.7.1998. See also Inal Batu’s
interviews to KIBRIS, 16.9.1999 and ZAMAN, 18.9.1999
35
Mehmet Ali Birand, “Different Views on our Cyprus policy”, SABAH, 18.10.1999
36
Ilter Turkmen, “Impressions from Cyprus”, HURRIYET, 17.10.1999
37
HURRIYET, 27.1.2000
38
Ilter Turkmen, “The unbearable lightness of our foreign policy”, HURRIYET, 14.10.1999
39
Mehmet Ali Birand “Except Ankara, Everybody Else has a Cyprus Policy”, TURKISH
DAILY NEWS, 21.11.2000
40
Ilter Turkmen in HURRIYET, 27.1.2000
8
their articles and interviews, Batu, Turkmen and the other critics of Ankara’s current
nationalistic posturing, have certainly shied away from even discussing the wisdom of the
aggressive doctrine of Turkey’s unilateral military “ rights” in Cyprus. And, while expressing
“ difficulty to understand” whether the international recognition of a separate Turkish-Cypriot
state is an objective of Turkish policy, let alone a Turkish “ condition” for a negotiated
settlement, they have nevertheless argued that the realistic way to promote this objective,
today, is through the replacement of Turkey’s futile opposition to Cyprus’ EU accession by the
methodical pursuit of an “ equal” Turkish-Cypriot participation in Cyprus’ accession talks.

This ambivalence over objectives is a strong indication that, as the columnist Fehmi Koru
wrote, diplomats often talk of flexibility but rarely intend to "move an inch from their
traditional position." This diplomatic mentality may be as opportunistic or "dangerous" than
nationalist intransigence. As Koru wrote: "When you start moving, with no intention of
changing your original position, as is the case with some Turkish diplomats, you could end up
with either one of two results: you make things worse than when you started or you lose
everything.”41

Be that as it may, the question of mentalities and intentions, just like the question of "ultimate"
objectives, should not divert our attention from the significance of the ongoing Turkish debate
on Cyprus. Foreign policy is not determined by absolute “ national interest” conceptions, in
some international vacuum, but in the context of a state’s international alliances and general
orientation. The Turkish debate is not just about Cyprus, it is one between those who entertain
the idea of a “ strategic conflict” between Turkey and the European Union42 and those who
reject all such thoughts, if only on the grounds that the EU’s expansion in the Eastern
Mediterranean enjoys the full support of Washington.43

The inextricable link between Turkey’s Cyprus imbroglio and the country’s own internal
development and international relations, is now increasingly understood in the country, where
recent polls indicate that a strong majority of some 70-80 per cent of the population44,
unreservedly support European integration, and senior public figures, like Mehmet Ilter
Irtemcelik, former minister for EU affairs, and the retired ambassador Ilter Turkmen have

41
Fehmi Korou, “On Turkey’s New Cyprus Policy”, TDN, 29.9.2000
42
retired ambassador Ozdem Sanberk, cited in KIBRIS, 1.12.2000
43
retired ambassador Yuksel Soylemenez, “Cyprus,Turkey and the EU”, TDN, 23.3.2000
44
Prof. Bakir Caglar, Interview, TDN 30.11.2000
9
 publicly challenged the nationalists to hold a referendum on the issue. 45 In Turkey, of course,
public influence on state policy remains marginal, both because of the continuing state
repression and because Turkey’s private business circles have greatly benefited and largely
continue to rely on state repression. 46 Throughout its history, however, the Kemalist state
largerly relied on a considerable degree of popular legitimacy. It is now clear that the
continuing Turkish occupation of Cypriot territory is now accelerating the erosion of this
legitimacy -rather than reinforcing it, as was the case in the Cold War years. The Milliyet
columnist Yelim Eralp’s prediction, sounds like a pretty safe bet: “ Should we continue to
oppose a reasonable settlement in Cyprus, the Turkish public and Turkish bureaucracy’s
support for the Turkish Republic of Northen Cyprus, will start to diminish” .47

This essay was completed in December 2000 and appeared in C.Yallourides and
P.Tsaconas (eds), Greece and Turkey after the end of the Cold War, New
York:A.Caratzas 2001

Email: serz@btinternet.com

45
TDN, 23.11.2000
46
Feroz Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey, pp.217-8; Mehmet Ugur, “Helsinki:a
predictable decision, uncertain implications”, London:Turkish Study Area Group paper 2000;
see also the comments of Prof. Caglar in TDN,23.11.2000
47
MILLIYET, 15.11.2000
10

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