US vs. Tambunting, G.R. No.

L-16513, January 18, 1921

Facts:
Tambunting and his wife became occupants of the upper floor of the house. In this house the Manila Gas
Corporation had previously installed apparatus for the delivery of gas on both the upper and lower floors,
consisting of the necessary piping and a gas meter. When the occupants at whose request this installation had
been made vacated the premises, the gas company disconnected the gas pipe and removed the meter, thus
cutting off the supply of gas from said premises. One of the inspectors of the gas company visited the house in
question and found that gas was being used, without the knowledge and consent of the gas company, for
cooking in the quarters occupied by the Tambunting and his wife. At the time this discovery was made,
Tambunting, was not at home, but he presently arrived and admitted to the agent to the gas company that he had
made the connection with the rubber tubing between the gas pipe and the stove, though he denied making the
connection below. He also admitted that he knew he was using gas without the knowledge of the company and
that he had been so using it for months.

Issues: (1) whether gas can be the subject to theft (yes) (2) whether the quantity of gas appropriated in the 2
months, during which the accused admitted having used the same, has been established with sufficient certainty
to enable the court to fix an appropriate penalty.

Held:

This court, speaking through Mr. Justice Torres, said ". . . the right of the ownership of electric current is
secured by article 517 and 518 of the RPC; the application of these articles in cases of subtraction of gas, a fluid
used for lighting, and in some respects resembling electricity, is confirmed by the rule laid down in the
decisions of the supreme court of Spain, construing and enforcing the provisions of articles 530 and 531 of the
RPC of that country, articles identical with articles 517 and 518 of the code in force in these Islands." These
expressions were used in a case which involved the subtraction and appropriation of electrical energy and
the court held, in accordance with the analogy of the case involving the theft of gas, that electrical energy
could also be the subject of theft. The same conclusion was reached in U.S. vs. Carlos, which was also a case
of prosecution for stealing electricity.

The precise point whether the taking of gas may constitute larceny has never before, so far as the present writer
is aware, been the subject of adjudication in this court, but the decisions of Spanish, English, and American
courts all answer the question in the affirmative.

In this connection it will suffice to quote the following from the topic "Larceny," of Ruling Case Law: There is
nothing in the nature of gas used for illuminating purposes which renders it incapable of being
feloniously taken and carried away. It is a valuable article of merchandise, bought and sold like other
personal property, susceptible of being severed from a mass or larger quantity and of being transported
from place to place. Likewise, water which is confined in pipes and electricity which is conveyed by wires
are subjects of larceny."

As to the amount and value of the gas appropriated by the accused in the period during which he admits having
used it, the proof is not entirely satisfactory. Nevertheless, we think the trial court was justified in fixing the
value. The market value of the property at the time and place of the theft is of court the proper value to be
proven; and when it is found that the least amount that a consumer can take costs P2 per months, this affords
proof that the amount which the accused took was certainly worth that much. Absolute certainty as to the full
amount taken is of course impossible, because no meter was used; but absolute certainty upon this point is not
necessary, when it is certain that the minimum that could have been taken was worth a determinable amount.

It appears that before the present prosecution was instituted, the accused had been unsuccessfully prosecuted for
an infraction of section 504 of the Revised Ordinances of Manila, under a complaint charging that the accused,
not being a registered installer of gas equipment had placed a gas installation. Upon this it is argued for the
accused that, having been acquitted of that charge, he is not now subject to prosecution for the offense of theft,
having been acquitted of the former charge. The contention is evidently not well-founded, since the two
offenses are of totally distinct nature. Furthermore, a prosecution for violation of a city ordinance is not
ordinarily a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense under the general law of the land. The
conclusion is that the accused is properly subject to punishment, under No. 5 of article 518 of the RPC, for the
gas taken in the course of 2 months at the rate of P2/ month. RTC’s correct and that the amount of the
indemnity which the accused shall pay to the gas company is P4, instead of P2, with subsidiary imprisonment
for one day in case of insolvency.
Hemnani vs. Export Control Committee, G.R. No. L-8414, February 28, 1957

Facts:

Hemnani requested permission from the Export Control Committee, created under section 2 of Republic Act
No. 613 and composed of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as Chairman, the Secretary of
National Defense and the Administrator of the Economic Coordination, as Members, to ship to his Hudson
Sedan to Japan, on board the S. S. President Wilson, "to be used in connection with his business thereat." The
respondent Committee approved the request on the same day, on condition that Hemnani would file a bond
equal to the value of the car, to guarantee the return of the same in the Philippines within 6 months from the
date of its shipment.
Hemnani posted with the Filipinas Compañia de Seguros a surety bond in favor of the Bureau of Customs,
guaranteeing that the car would be re-exported back to the Philippines from Japan within 6 months from the
execution of the bond. Hemnani took the car in question to Japan but failed to bring it back to the Philippines as
promised. Instead, Hemnani filed 2 requests for extension of 6 months each to be followed to re-export the car
back, alleging that he was still on a business tour and it would be impracticable to return the car on time.
However, the car in question was not brought back in the Philippines.
Atty. Roja, in behalf of Hemnani, requested the respondent committee to order the cancellation of the surety
bond that he and the Filipinas Compañia de Seguros had executed, alleging that it would be impracticable and
expensive to return the car to Manila, considering its dilapidated condition and utility in Japan, but it denied
said request, though at its meeting it decided to reduce the liability under the bond for this was the value that the
car would have at the state it was then if it were brought back in the Philippines.
Hemnani filed for reconsideration for the penalty imposed was highly excessive and violative of the
Constitutional prohibition against excessive fines". Again, this motion for reconsideration was denied; hence
the institution of this petition in the CFI which was answered by the Solicitor General in due time.
Issues: 1) In not finding that appellant's car in question is personal effect and therefore not subject to statutory
or reglementary prohibition against exportation; 2) In not sustaining appellant's claim that the bringing out of
his car in the instant case did not constitute exportation;3) In not finding that the respondent had acted without
jurisdiction in requiring appellant to file a bond and later ordering its forfeiture;

Held:

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 613, authorizes the President "to control, curtail, regulate and/or prohibit the
exportation or re-exportation of materials, goods and things referred to in Section 2 of the Act and to issue rules
and regulations as would be necessary to carry out the provisions thereof".
SEC. 1. In order to promote economic rehabilitation and development and to safeguard national security, it
shall be unlawful to any person, association or corporation to export or re-export to any point outside
the PHILIPPINES MACHINERIES AND THEIR SPARE PARTS, scrap metals, medicines, foodstuffs, abaca
seedlings, gasoline, oil, lubricants and military equipment or supplies suitable for military use without a permit
from the President which may be issued in accordance with the provisions of the next succeeding section.
The President amended this EO 453 (2), by another EO No. 482, in the following manner:
SEC. 2. The exportation of all articles in the list , hereto attached as an integral part of this Order,  is absolutely
prohibited; Provided, however, That in exceptionally meritorious cases and where the Committee is fully
satisfied that the overall economic and military requirements of the country are not prejudiced, such
exportation may be allowed subject to the provisions of Section 4 of this Order.
Because of the amendment made, the Hudson Sedan automobile herein involved was allowed by the Committee
to be exported to Japan with the obligation on the part of Hemnani to report it back to the Philippines within the
period granted to him to do so, extensions included, which obligation he failed to fulfill. Naturally, he is in duty
bound to abide by the consequences of his failure and must pay the amount of the bond he posted. He, however,
contends that this car in question was his personal effect and, therefore, not subject to statutory or reglementary
prohibition against exportation. It seems, however, that plaintiff confuses the term "personal effects" with
"property of the person" or personal property". As pointed out by the Solicitor General:

The word "personal" used with "effects" much restrict its meaning, and certainly (that meaning,
cannot be understanding without any qualifying words includes only such tangible property as
attends the person.
Among the articles the exportation of which is prohibited according to said EO are: Imported Machinery
(light and heavy), mechanical, electrical, agricultural, construction, engineering, and  transportation equipment
of all types, including surplus equipment, spare parts, accessories, wires and other allied articles , except those
already approved by the Bureau of Customs or NICA or order Government agencies as well as licenses covered
in section 2 herein.
It is undisputed that petitioner's car is covered with the term "transportation equipment of all types" and not as
"personal effects", as counsel would want to classify it. Petitioner's car was admittedly brought by him to Japan,
"to be used in connection with his business", and that when he asked for extension of time to re-export the
motor vehicle back to the Philippines, his reason was that he was still on a business tour.
If by personal effects of passengers in transit transportation equipment used in one's business were
included, then it would be a simple matter to defeat the intention of the law to promote the economic and
industrial development of the country. To seal any possible loophole, the EO made it clear that
exportation of all articles included in the list is prohibited irrespective of the use for which they were
intended.
If the petitioner violated the provisions of said Executive Orders by not returning or re-exporting back to the
Philippines the automobile in question, and this property cannot be confiscated because it is beyond the
jurisdiction of this country, it would appeal to reason that plaintiff should pay the equivalent value of the
automobile which he placed beyond the reach of the Philippine Govt., That is why he was required to give the
bond and should pay the Government for the automobile that it should not seized and forfeit. But even
assuming arguendo, that the respondent were not authorized to require Hemnani to file the bond in question,
nevertheless, Philippines being a political entity has an incident to its sovereignty the capacity to enter into
contracts and take bonds in cases appropriate to the just exercise of its power through its instrumentalities or
agencies whenever, as in the instant case, such contracts or bonds are not prohibited by law, although the
making of such contracts or the taking of such bonds may not have been specifically prescribed by any pre-
existing statute.
Certainly, Hemnani could not have taken from the Philippines his automobile if he had not furnished the bond
required from him and which he voluntarily furnished. He had been enjoying the benefits which the bond
intended to secure and now he cannot come and allege that he is not bound by the terms of the bond. Affirmed,
with costs in plaintiff.
Chua Guan vs. Samahang Magsasaka, G.R. No. L-42091, November 2, 1935
The case is remarkable for the following reason: that the parties entered into a stipulation in which the
defendants admitted all of the allegations of the complaint and the plaintiff admitted all of the special defenses
in the answer of the defendants, and on this stipulation, they submitted the case for decision.
Facts:
Toco was the owner of 5,894 shares of the capital stock of the said corporation represented by 9 certificates.
Toco mortgaged said shares to Chua Chiu to guarantee the payment of a debt. The said certificates of stock
were delivered with the mortgage to Chua Chiu. The said mortgage was duly registered in the office of the
register of deeds, and in the office of Samahang Magsasaka, Inc., Chua Chiu assigned all his right and interest
in the said mortgage to Chua Guan and the assignment was registered in the office of the register of deeds, and
in the office of the said corporation.
The debtor Toco, having defaulted in the payment of said debt at maturity, Chua Guan foreclosed said mortgage
and delivered the certificates of stock and copies of the mortgage and assignment to the sheriff in order to sell
the said shares at public auction. The sheriff auctioned said shares of stock, and Chua Guan having been the
highest bidder, the sheriff executed in his favor a certificate of sale of said shares. Chua Guan tendered the
certificates of stock standing in the name of Toco to the proper officers of the corporation for cancellation and
demanded that they issue new certificates in the name of the Chua Guan. The said officers (president, secretary
and treasurer) refused and still refuse to issue said new shares in the name of Chua Guan.
No question is raised as to the validity of said mortgage or of said writs of attachment and the sole question
presented for decision is whether the said mortgage takes priority over the said writs of attachment.
Issue: Did the registration of said chattel mortgage in the registry of chattel mortgages in the office of the
register of deeds, give constructive notice to the said attaching creditors?
Held:
The registration of the said chattel mortgage in the office of the corporation was not necessary and had
no legal effect.
The Chattel Mortgage Law, as amended by Act No. 2496, contains the following provision: SEC. 4. A chattel
mortgage shall not be valid against any person except the mortgagor, his executors or administrators, unless
the possession of the property is delivered to and retained by the mortgagee or unless the mortgage is recorded
in the office of the register of deeds of the province in which the mortgagor resides at the time of making the
same, or, if he resides the Philippine Islands, in the province in which the property is situated :  Provided,
however,  That if the property is situated in a different province from that in which the mortgagor resides, the
mortgage shall be recorded in the office of the register of deeds of both the province in which the mortgagor
resides and that in which the property is situated.
It has been doubted whether shares of stock in a corporation are chattels in the sense in which that word is used
chattel mortgage statutes. This doubt is reflected in our own decision which we said:
". . . an equity in shares of stock is of such an intangible character that it is somewhat difficult to see how
it can be treated as a chattel and mortgaged in such a manner that the recording of the mortgage will
furnish constructive notice to 3rd parties. . . ."And we held that the chattel mortgage there involved: "at
least operated as a conditional equitable assignment." In that case we quoted the following from
Spalding vs. Paine's Adm'r., with regard to a chattel mortgage of shares of stock:
"These certificates of stock are in the pockets of the owner, and go with him where he may happen to locate, as
choses in action, or evidence of his right, without any means on the part of those with whom he proposes to deal
on the faith of such a security of ascertaining whether or not this stock is in pledge or mortgaged to others. The
owner may have no fixed or permanent abode, and with his notes in one pocket and his certificates of stock in
the other — the one evidencing the extent of his interest in the stock of the corporation, the other his right to
money owing him by his debtor, we are asked to say that the mortgage is effectual as to the one and inoperative
as to the other."
Section 4 of Act No. 1508 provides two ways for executing a valid chattel mortgage which shall be effective
against 3rd persons. 1st, the possession of the property mortgage must be delivered to and retained by the
mortgagee; 2nd, without such delivery the mortgage must be recorded in the proper office or offices of
the register or registers of deeds. If a chattel mortgage of shares of stock of a corporation may validly be
made without the delivery of possession of the property to the mortgagee and the mere registration of the
mortgage is sufficient to constructive notice to 3rd parties, we are confronted with the question as to the
proper place of registration of such a mortgage.
If with respect to a chattel mortgage of shares of stock of a corporation, registration in the province of the
owner's domicile should be sufficient, those who lend on such security would be confronted with the practical
difficulty of being compelled not only to search the records of every province in which the mortgagor might
have been domiciled but also every province in which a chattel mortgage by any former owner of such shares
might be registered. We cannot think that it was the intention of the legislature to put this almost prohibitive
impediment upon the hypothecation of shares of stock in view of the great volume of business that is done on
the faith of the pledge of shares of stock as collateral.
It is a common but not accurate generalization that the place of shares of stock is at the domicile of the
owner. The term situs is not one of fixed of invariable meaning or usage. Nor should we lose sight of the
difference between the situs of the shares and the situs of the certificates of shares. The situs of shares of
stock for some purposes may be at the domicile of the owner and for others at the domicile of the
corporation; and even elsewhere. It is a general rule that for purposes of execution, attachment and
garnishment, it is not the domicile of the owner of a certificate but the domicile of the corporation which
is decisive.
Apart from the unusual method of hypothecating shares of stock by chattel mortgage, it appears that the only
safe way to accomplish the hypothecation of share of stock of a Philippine corporation is for the creditor to
insist on the assignment and delivery of the certificate and to obtain the transfer of the legal title to him on the
books of the corporation by the cancellation of the certificate and the issuance of a new one to him. From the
standpoint of the debtor this may be unsatisfactory because it leaves the creditor as the ostensible owner of the
shares and the debtor is forced to rely upon the honesty and solvency of the creditor. The mere possession and
retention of the debtor's certificate by the creditor gives some security to the creditor against an attempted
voluntary transfer by the debtor, provided the by-laws of the corporation expressly enact that transfers may be
made only upon the surrender of the certificate. It is to be noted, however, that section 35 of the Corporation
Law enacts that shares of stock "may be transferred by delivery of the certificate endorsed by the owner or his
attorney in fact or other person legally authorized to make the transfer." The transfer by endorsement and
delivery of a certificate with intention to pledge the shares covered thereby should be sufficient to give legal
effect to that intention and to consummate the juristic act without necessity for registration.
We are fully conscious of the fact that our decisions in the case of Monserrat vs. Ceron, and in the present case
have done little perhaps to ameliorate the present uncertain and unsatisfactory state of our law applicable to
pledges and chattel mortgages of shares of stock of Philippine corporations. The remedy lies with the
legislature.
Bachrach Motor vs. Ledesma, G.R. No. L-42462, August 31, 1937
Facts:
Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. obtained judgment in a civil case of the CFI against the Ledesma. That a writ of
execution of said judgment was issued and Orosa was appointed Special sheriff to execute it. Orosa, in
compliance with the writ of execution in question, attached all right, title to and interest which Ledesma may
have in "Any bonus, dividend, share of stock, money, or other property which that Ledesma is entitle to receive
from the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., by virtue of the fact that Ledesma has mortgage his land in favor of the
Philippine National Bank to guarantee the indebtedness of the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., or which Ledesma is
entitled to receive from the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., on account of being a stockholder in the corporation.
That notice of said attachment was served not only upon Ledesma but also upon the Talisay-Silay Milling Co.
A writ of execution of said judgment was issue, thereby causing the attachment, sale and adjudication to
Bachrach Motor Co., Ledesma's right of redemption over the properties .
Talisay-Silay Milling Co. resolved to grant a bonus or compensation to the owners of the real properties
mortgaged to answer for the debts contracted by said central with the PNB, for the risk incurred by said
properties upon being subjected to said mortgage lien.
PNB brought an action against Ledesma and his wife Diaz for the recovery of a mortgage credit which, together
with interest. PNB later amended its complaint by including the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., as party defendant,
because they claim to have some right to certain properties which are the subject matter of this complaint.
PNB sought permission to intervene in the CFI case and after the permission had been granted, said bank filed a
complaint in intervention alleging that it had a preferred right to said bonus granted by the central to Ledesma
as one of the owners of the haciendas which had been mortgaged to said bank to answer for the obligations of
the Central Talisay-Silay Milling Co., basing such allegation on the fact that, as said properties were mortgaged
to it by the debtor Ledesma, not Talisay Milling Co., Inc., but also by virtue of the deed and said bonus being a
civil fruit of the mortgaged lands, said bank was entitled to it on the ground that the mortgage had become due.
Issue: W/N shares of stock are personal property and therefore can be subject to pledge or chattel mortgage?
Held:
The bonus had no immediate relation to the lands in question but merely a remote and accidental one
and it was not a civil fruit of the real properties mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank to secure the
obligation of the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., being a mere personal right of Ledesma.
I. The contention is unfounded because it appears that the stock dividends in question were pledged to the bank
prior to the garnishment and because certificate No. 772 was in the possession of said bank.
II. It appears stipulated by the parties that, by virtue of the letters of the PNB and having been so asked by
Ledesma, certificate No. 772 was delivered as security to Attorney Lacson as representative of the bank, in view
of the fact that the original shares had been previously mortgaged to the same bank. Talisay-Silay Milling Co.,
in conformity with the letter of the PNB cancelled certificate No. 772 and in lieu thereof issued certificate No.
1155 in favor of said bank. On the other hand, the garnishment obtained, upon which it bases all its alleged
preferred right was notified to the parties.
It is true, according to article 1865 of the Civil Code, that in order that a pledge may be effective as
against 3rd person, evidence of its date must appear in a public instrument in addition to the delivery of
the thing pledged to the creditor.
It cannot be denied, however, that section 4 of the Chattel Mortgage Law, implicitly modified article
1865 of the Civil Code in the sense that a contract of pledge and that of chattel mortgage, to be effective
as against 3rd persons, need not appear in public instruments provided the thing pledged or mortgaged
be delivered or placed in the possession of the creditor.
In the case of Mahoney vs. Tuason; "From the provisions of the abovecited Act, it is inferred that the same
does not entirely repeal the provisions of the Civil Code, but only modify them in part and amplify them
in another, as may be seen from a comparison between, the provisions of the Civil Code regarding pledge
and the provisions of Act No. 1508. From the date the said Act No. 1508 was in force, a contract of chattel
mortgage should be deemed legally entered into and should produce all its effects and consequences,
provided it appears to have been in some manner perfected and that the things pledged have been
delivered, and in a contrary case, and even if the creditor has not received them or has not retained them
in his custody, provided that the contract of pledge or chattel mortgage appears in a notarial document
and is inscribed in the registry of deeds of the province." Therefore, this court holds that the pledge of the
6,300 stock dividends is valid against the plaintiff for the reason that the certificate was delivered to the
creditor bank, notwithstanding the fact that the contract does not appear in a public instrument.
Certificates of stock or of stock dividends, under the Corporation Law, are quasi negotiable instruments in the
sense that they may be given in pledge or mortgage to secure an obligation. Certificates of stock, while not
negotiable in the sense of the law merchant (bills and notes)are so framed and dealt with as to be transferable,
when property endorsed, by mere delivery, and as they frequently convey, by estoppel against the corporation
or against prior holders, as good a title to the transferee as if they were negotiable, and inasmuch as a large
commercial use is made of such certificates as collateral security, and it is to the public interest that such use
should be simplify by placing them as nearly as possible on the plane of commercial paper, they are often
spoken of and treated as quasi negotiable, that is as having some of the attributes and partaking of the character
of negotiable instruments, in passing from hand to hand, especially where they are accompanied by an
assignment and power of attorney, executed in blank, to transfer them to anyone who may obtain possession as
holders, even though such assignment and power are under seal.
IV. Inasmuch as this court has declared that the stock dividends in question were pledged to the bank, it follows
that the sale thereof in execution of said judgment is legal and valid.
V. After it has been held that these stock dividends had been pledged to the PNB and that this contract was prior
to the garnishment, it appear clear that the court violated no law in holding the right of the Philippine National
Bank, as pledgee, a superior one.
VI. The case having been decided in favor of the PNB, the appealed judgment is affirmed, with the costs of this
instance to the plaintiff-appellant.
Black Eagle Mining vs. Conroy
Facts:

1. Shares of Stock - Status as Personalty. Whenever the capital stock of any corporation is divided into shares,
and certificates therefor are issued, such shares of stock are personal property.
2. Certificate of Stock as Evidence of Property. A certificate of stock in a corporation is merely the paper
representative of an incorporeal right, and stands on a footing similar to that of other muniments of title. It is not
the property itself, but is merely the symbol or paper evidence of the property, shares of stock.
3. Executors and Administrators- -Situs of Property- -Shares of Corporate Stock.
For the purpose of administration, the situs of shares of stock in a corporation, as evidenced by certificates of
stock, is in the state in which the corporation was organized and has its place of business.
4. Estate of Nonresident -- Right of Creditors to Local Administration.
Where a nonresident died, owning shares of stock in a corporation organized under the laws of this state and
having its principal place of business in this state, and foreign administration acquired possession of the
certificates of stock, the same does not affect the rights of creditors to have an administrator of the estate of said
nonresident appointed in this state, who will have jurisdiction over said shares of stock, which may be subjected
to payment of the indebtedness of the deceased, in this state.

Facts:

The Black Eagle Mining Company is a corporation organized under the laws of Oklahoma, and the books and
records of the corporation and of the shares of stock are kept at Miami; McSpadden, owned stocks in the
Company and held Stock Certificate issued by the company for said stock, and she owned no property except
this stock.

McSpadden was a resident of and died in Arkansas, as the owner of said shares of stock and at the time of her
death she had physical possession of the stock certificate; Conroy was appointed as administrator of the estate
of McSpadden, who took possession of this Stock Certificate and after the estate was administered upon, said
Stock Certificate was distributed under orders of the court to Conroy, M. T. Long and J. A. Long, sole heirs of
McSpadden. While administration was pending, an application was made in Ottawa county court by a creditor
of McSpadden for the appointment of an administrator of the estate of McSpadden, and Johnson was appointed
by the county court of Ottawa, as such administrator, who filed a petition to procure an order from the county
court to sell the shares of stock of McSpadden in the Black Eagle Mining Company for payments of debts due,
said order was granted and the stock was offered for sale and was bid in by Pinnell, doing business under the
firm name of Pinnell Brothers, which sale was confirmed and approved by the county court of Ottawa, and an
order was made by said court directing that the Black Eagle Mining Company issue certificates to Pinnell
Brothers for said stock, which was done.

Conroy contends that the shares of stock of McSpadden in the Black Eagle Mining Company are personal
property and that the situs of this property, for administration purposes, is in Ottawa, the domicile of the
corporation. The Mining Company concede that the shares of stock are personal property but contend that the
situs of said property is at the residence of the owner, and as the stock certificate was in the physical possession
of McSpadden, in Sebastian county at the time of her death and passed into the physical possession of the heirs,
who became the owners of the shares of stock represented by said certificate.

Issue:

1.)Whether the county court of Ottawa county had jurisdiction to administer on the shares of stock of
McSpadden in the Black Eagle Mining Company. If the county court of Ottawa county had such jurisdiction,
then it is by virtue of the 3rd subdivision of section 1088, Comp. Stat. 1921, which provides that letters of
administration may be granted in any county of the state of Oklahoma, in which any part of the property or
estate of the deceased may be, where the decedent died out of the state and was not a resident thereof at the time
of his death.

2.)Whether the shares of stock of McSpadden in the Black Eagle Mining Company are property in Ottawa
county?

Held:

Whenever the capital stock of any corporation is divided into shares, and certificates therefor are issued, such
shares of stock are personal property and may be transferred,"

It will be observed that it is the shares of stock that are personal property and not the certificates of
stock. There is a distinction between a stock certificate and a share of stock.

The stock certificate is merely the evidence of the ownership of stock, just as a note is the evidence of an
indebtedness. It is not in itself property, but is merely the symbol or paper evidence of property; hence
the proprietory right may exist without a certificate.". It is immaterial where the stock certificate is located;
the thing we are concerned with is the location or domicile of the shares of stock.

Shares of stock are defined as personal property. Since shares of stock are personal property in Oklahoma,
the county courts of this state have jurisdiction to appoint an administrator of the estate of a nonresident who
dies owning stock in an Oklahoma corporation. Shares of stock are a peculiar kind of personal property, and are
unlike other classes of personal property in that the property right of shares of stock can only be exercised or
enforced where the corporation is organized and has its place of business and can exist, only, as an incident to
and connected with the corporation, and, this class of property is inseparable from the domicile of the
corporation itself.

The general rule is that shares of stock in a corporation are personal property, whose location is in the
state where the corporation is created. It is true that for purposes of taxation and some other similar
purpose stock follows the domicile of the owner; but considered as property separated from its owner,
stock is in existence only in the state of the corporation.

It is true, however, that for most purposes a chose in action adheres to the person of the owner, but for the
purpose of founding administration this is not true. For such purpose the situs is where the debtor resides. For
this exception there are at least two good reasons: It may be necessary to bring an action upon notes to enforce
payment, and this a foreign administrator or executor cannot do. As to other personal property, it may be
necessary to have the aid of the law for its recovery and protection. But the main reason why local
administration is provided for, is for the protection of local creditors. No state should allow property to be taken
from its borders until debts due its own citizens have been satisfied.

"For the purpose of administration, the situs of the interest in a corporation, as evidenced by certificates of
stock, is in the state in which the corporation was organized and has its place of business; and the fact that a
nonresident died owning stock in a corporation organized and having its place of business in this state, and the
foreign administration acquired possession of the certificates of stock, does not affect the situs of the interest
owned by the decedent in such corporation." The judgment of the trial court is reversed, with instructions to
proceed in conformity with this opinion.
Laurel vs. Abrogar, G.R. No. 155076,  February 27, 2006
DOCTRINE: Telecommunication services and the business of providing said services are not personal
properties and cannot be subject to Article 308 of the RPC. Services in business, although properties, are not
proper subjects of theft under the RPC because the same cannot be "taken" or "occupied".

Facts:
PLDT claims that Luis Marcos P. Laurel, board member and corporate secretary of Baynet Co., Ltd., stole and
used the international long distance calls belonging to PLDT by conducting International Simple Resale (ISR) –
a method of routing and completing international long distance calls using lines, cables, antennae, and/or air
wave frequency which connect directly to the local or domestic exchange facilities of the country where the call
is destined. PLDT alleged that such business was effectively stolen while using their facilities leading to great
damage and prejudice amounting to P20,370,651.92.

Laurel however alleged that the allegations do not constitue the felony of theft under Article 308 of the RPC or
any special law. He claimed that, telephone calls with the use of PLDT telephone lines, whether domestic or
international, belong to the persons making the call, not to PLDT. He argued that the caller merely uses the
facilities of PLDT, and what the latter owns are the telecommunication infrastructures or facilities through
which the call is made. He also asserted that PLDT is compensated for the caller’s use of its facilities by way of
rental; for an outgoing overseas call, PLDT charges the caller per minute, based on the duration of the call.
Thus, no personal property was stolen from PLDT.

The prosecution asserted that the use of PLDT’s intangible telephone services/facilities allows electronic voice
signals to pass through the same, and ultimately to the called party’s number. It averred that such
service/facility is akin to electricity which, although an intangible property, may, nevertheless, be appropriated
and be the subject of theft. The prosecution further alleged that "international business calls and revenues
constitute personal property envisaged in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code." Moreover, the intangible
telephone services/facilities belong to PLDT and not to the movant and the other accused, because they have no
telephone services and facilities of their own duly authorized by the NTC; thus, the taking by the movant and
his co-accused of PLDT services was with intent to gain and without the latter’s consent.

ISSUE:
W/N telephone calls placed by Bay Super Orient Card holders through the telecommunication services provided
by PLDT are considered as personal property, and thus, proper subjects of theft under Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code. -- NO

HELD:
The court finds that the international telephone calls placed by Bay Super Orient Card holders, the
telecommunication services provided by PLDT and its business of providing said services are not personal
properties under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. The rule is that, penal laws are to be construed strictly.
Penal statutes may not be enlarged by implication or intent beyond the fair meaning of the language used; and
may not be held to include offenses other than those which are clearly described.
One is apt to conclude that "personal property" standing alone, covers both tangible and intangible
properties and are subject of theft under the Revised Penal Code. But the words "Personal property" under the
Revised Penal Code must be considered in tandem with the word "take" in the law. The statutory definition of
"taking" and movable property indicates that, clearly, not all personal properties may be the proper subjects of
theft. The general rule is that, only movable properties which have physical or material existence and
susceptible of occupation by another are proper objects of theft.
According to Cuello Callon, in the context of the Penal Code, only those movable properties which can
be taken and carried from the place they are found are proper subjects of theft. Intangible properties such as
rights and ideas are not subject of theft because the same cannot be "taken" from the place it is found and is
occupied or appropriated.
Gas and electrical energy should not be equated with business or services provided by business
entrepreneurs to the public. Business does not have an exact definition. Business is referred as that which
occupies the time, attention and labor of men for the purpose of livelihood or profit. It embraces everything that
which a person can be employed. Business may also mean employment, occupation or profession. Business is
also defined as a commercial activity for gain benefit or advantage. Business, like services in business, although
are properties, are not proper subjects of theft under the Revised Penal Code because the same cannot be
"taken" or "occupied."
PLDT does not acquire possession, much less, ownership of the voices of the telephone callers or of the
electronic voice signals or current emanating from said calls. The human voice and the electronic voice signals
or current caused thereby are intangible and not susceptible of possession, occupation or appropriation by PLDT
or even the petitioner, for that matter. PLDT merely transmits the electronic voice signals through its facilities
and equipment. Baynet Card Ltd., through its operator, merely intercepts, reroutes the calls and passes them to
its toll center.

Laurel vs. Abrogar, G.R. No. 155076, January 13, 2009

Laurel is one of the accused in the charge of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code when they took,
stole and used the international long distance calls belonging to PLDT by conducting International Simple
Resale (ISR), which is a method of routing and completing international long distance calls using lines, cables,
antenae, and/or air wave frequency which connect directly to the local or domestic exchange facilities of the
country where the call is destined, effectively stealing this business from PLDT while using its facilities in the
estimated amount of P20,370,651.92 to the damage and prejudice of PLDT,
Laurel alleged that in the Amended Information do not constitute the felony of theft. RTC denied it. SC held
that the Amended Information does not contain material allegations charging Laurel with theft of personal
property since international long distance calls and the business of providing telecommunication or telephone
services are not personal properties under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.PLDT filed a Motion for
Reconsideration with Motion to Refer the Case to the SC En Banc. It maintains that the Amended Information
charging Laurel with theft is valid and sufficient;
PLDT further insists that the RPC should be interpreted in the context of the Civil Code’s definition of real and
personal property. The enumeration of real properties in Article 415 of the Civil Code is exclusive such that all
those not included therein are personal properties. Since Article 308 of the RPC used the words "personal
property" without qualification, it follows that all "personal properties" as understood in the context of the Civil
Code, may be the subject of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. PLDT alleges that the
international calls and business of providing telecommunication or telephone service are personal properties
capable of appropriation and can be objects of theft. It also argues that "taking" in relation to theft under the
RPC does not require "asportation," the sole requisite being that the object should be capable of "appropriation."
There must be intent to appropriate, which means to deprive the lawful owner of the thing. Thus, the term
"personal properties" under Article 308 of the RPC is not limited to only personal properties which are
"susceptible of being severed from a mass or larger quantity and of being transported from place to place."
According to respondent, the "international phone calls" which are "electric currents or sets of electric impulses
transmitted through a medium, and carry a pattern representing the human voice to a receiver," are personal
properties which may be subject of theft. Article 416(3) of the Civil Code deems "forces of nature" (which
includes electricity) which are brought under the control by science, are personal property.
Laurel claims that a telephone call is a conversation on the phone or a communication carried out using the
telephone. It is not synonymous to electric current or impulses. Hence, it may not be considered as personal
property susceptible of appropriation. Laurel claims that the analogy between generated electricity and
telephone calls is misplaced. PLDT does not produce or generate telephone calls. It only provides the facilities
or services for the transmission and switching of the calls. He also insists that "business" is not personal
property. It is not the "business" that is protected but the "right to carry on a business." This right is what is
considered as property. Since the services of PLDT cannot be considered as "property," the same may not be
subject of theft.
OSG noted that the cases of United States v. Tambunting, which recognized intangible properties like gas and
electricity as personal properties, are deemed incorporated in our penal laws.
Held:
Prior to the passage of the RPC in 1930, the definition of the term "personal property" in the penal code
provision on theft had been established in Philippine jurisprudence. This Court, in US v. Tambunting,
consistently ruled that any personal property, tangible or intangible, corporeal or incorporeal, capable of
appropriation can be the object of theft.
Moreover, since the passage of the RPC, the term "personal property" has had a generally accepted definition in
civil law. Any property which is not included in the enumeration of real properties under the Civil Code and
capable of appropriation can be the subject of theft under the Revised Penal Code.
The only requirement for a personal property to be the object of theft under the RPC is that it be capable
of appropriation. It need not be capable of "asportation," which is defined as "carrying away." Jurisprudence is
settled that to "take" under the theft provision of the penal code does not require asportation or carrying away.
Appropriation of forces of nature which are brought under control by science such as electrical energy can be
achieved by tampering with any apparatus used for generating or measuring such forces of nature, wrongfully
redirecting such forces of nature from such apparatus, or using any device to fraudulently obtain such forces of
nature. In the instant case, Laurel was charged with engaging in the unauthorized routing and completing of
international long-distance calls using lines, cables, antennae, and/or air wave frequency and connecting these
calls directly to the local or domestic exchange facilities of the country where destined.
As early as 1910, the Court declared that ownership over electricity (which an international long-distance call
consists of), as well as telephone service, is protected by the provisions on theft of the RPC.
In the instant case, the act of conducting ISR operations by illegally connecting various equipment or apparatus
to PLDT’s telephone system, through which Laurel is able to resell or re-route international long distance calls
using respondent PLDT’s facilities constitutes acts of subtraction.
The business of providing telecommunication or telephone service is likewise personal property which can be
the object of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. Business may be appropriated under Section 2
of Bulk Sales Law, hence, could be object of theft
Interest in business was declared to be personal property since it is capable of appropriation and not
included in the enumeration of real properties. Article 414 of the Civil Code provides that all things which
are or may be the object of appropriation are considered either real property or personal property. Business is
likewise not enumerated as personal property under the Civil Code. Just like interest in business, however, it
may be appropriated.
Therefore, Laurel’s acts constitute theft of PLDT’s business and service, committed by means of the
unlawful use of the latter’s facilities. In this regard, the Amended Information inaccurately describes the
offense by making it appear that what Laurel took were the international long-distance telephone calls,
rather than PLDT’s business.
In making the international phone calls, the human voice is converted into electrical impulses or electric current
which are transmitted to the party called. A telephone call, therefore, is electrical energy. It was also held in the
assailed Decision that intangible property such as electrical energy is capable of appropriation because it may be
taken and carried away. Electricity is personal property under Article 416 (3) of the Civil Code, which
enumerates "forces of nature which are brought under control by science."
Indeed, while it may be conceded that "international long distance calls," the matter alleged to be stolen in the
instant case, take the form of electrical energy, it cannot be said that such international long distance calls were
personal properties belonging to PLDT since the latter could not have acquired ownership over such calls.
PLDT merely encodes, augments, enhances, decodes and transmits said calls using its complex communications
infrastructure and facilities. PLDT not being the owner of said telephone calls, then it could not validly claim
that such telephone calls were taken without its consent. It is the use of these communications facilities without
the consent of PLDT that constitutes the crime of theft, which is the unlawful taking of the telephone services
and business.
However, the Amended Information describes the thing taken as, "international long-distance calls," and only
later mentions "stealing the business from PLDT" as the manner by which the gain was derived by the accused.
In order to correct this inaccuracy of description, this case must be remanded to the trial court and the
prosecution directed to amend the Amended Information, to clearly state that the property subject of the theft is
the services and business of respondent PLDT. To be sure, the crime is properly designated as one of theft. The
purpose of the amendment is simply to ensure that the accused is fully and sufficiently apprised of the nature
and cause of the charge against him, and thus guaranteed of his rights under the Constitution.