Chavez vs. Public Lands Authority, G.R. No.

133250, July 9, 2003

Facts:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration from the 2002 SC's decision whereby:
1. A law was passed creating the Public Estate Authority which was granted with the power to transfer
reclaimed lands. 
2. Portions of the Freedom Islands and submerged areas of Manila Bay were sought to be transferred to
AMARI. Such transfer is void for being contrary to Sec. 3 and Sec. 2, Article XII, Constitution which
prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain and the
alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain. 
3. The reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of
PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain.  PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but
may not sell it to them, only to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the
Constitution.
4. The submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain and
outside the commerce of man, until classified as alienable and no longer needed for public service. The
government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged
areas and can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only natural
resources the government can alienate.

Issue: W/N stipulations in the amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of the lands, reclaimed or to be

reclaimed, violate the Constitution. YES
Held:
The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in the Regalian
doctrine, which holds that the State owns all lands and waters of the public domain.    It’s recognized by
the 1987 Constitution.  It declares that all natural  resources  are  owned  by  the  State  and  except  for 
alienable agricultural  lands  of  the  public  domain,  natural  resources  cannot  be alienated. 1935
Constitution, private corporations were allowed to acquire alienable lands of the public domain.  But in 1973
and 1987 Constitution, private corporations were banned from holding, except by lease, alienable lands of the
public domain, this was the prevailing law before, during and after the signing of the Amended JVA.   The other
main reason is that submerged areas of Manila Bay, being part of the sea, are inalienable and beyond the
commerce of man.

However, the law disregards the constitutional disqualification of the buyer to hold land if the land is
subsequently transferred to a qualified party, or the buyer himself becomes a qualified party.  In the instant
case, however, Amari has not transferred the lands. Moreover, special circumstances that disqualify Amari
from invoking equity principles for: (1) Amended JVA was signed a year after, Chavez has already filed
questioning precisely the qualification of Amari to acquire the Freedom Islands. (2) Amari has also not paid to
PEA the full reimbursement cost incurred by PEA in reclaiming the Freedom Islands. (3) Amari doesn’t claim
to have introduced any physical improvement or development on the reclamation project that is the subject of
the Amended JVA.  PEA also claims that it is "similarly situated" as the Bases Conversion Development
Authority which is tasked to sell portions of the Manila military camps and other military reservations.  PEA's
comparison is incorrect.  BCDA's mandate is specific and limited in area, while PEA's mandate is general and
national.  BCDA holds government lands that have been granted e.g. the military services of the armed forces,
and it reclassifies such lands as patrimonial property for sale to private parties.  In contrast, PEA holds the
reclaimed public lands as the government agency "primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and
coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National Government."

Government owned lands, as long they are patrimonial property, can be sold to private parties, whether
Filipino citizens or qualified private corporations.   Likewise, reclaimed alienable lands of the public
domain if sold or transferred to a public corporation for a monetary consideration become patrimonial
property in the hands of the public corporation. Once converted to patrimonial property, the land may
be sold by the public corporation to private parties, whether Filipino citizens or qualified private
corporations.
The Decision does not bar private corporations from participating in reclamation projects and being paid for
their services in reclaiming lands. What the Decision prohibits, following the explicit constitutional mandate, is
for private corporations to acquire reclaimed lands of the public domain. There is no prohibition on the officers
of private corporations, if they are Filipino citizens, from acquiring at public auction reclaimed alienable lands
of the public domain.  They can acquire not more than 12 hectares per individual, and the land thus acquired
becomes private land.
Despite the nullity of the Amended JVA, Amari is not precluded from recovering from PEA in the proper
proceedings, Amari may have incurred in implementing the Amended JVA prior to its declaration of nullity.
Cruz vs. DENR, G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000

Facts:

Cruz and Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the
constitutionality of certain provisions of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 and its IRR for they amount
to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well natural resources
therein, in violation of the Regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:

- Sec 5, in relation to sec 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including inalienable public lands,
bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within are private but community property of the
indigenous peoples;

- Sec 7 and 8 which recognize and enumerate the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral
domains and lands;

- Sec 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the development or exploration of
minerals and other natural resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right
to enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the development and utilization of natural
resources (25 years);

- Sec 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve
the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical watersheds,
mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or reforestation."

Petitioners also contend that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral domains" and
"ancestral lands" which might even include private lands found within said areas, it violate the rights of private
landowners. They question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and
making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands
on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution. Finally, petitioners assail
the validity of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, of 1998, which provides that "the administrative
relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship
for purposes of policy and program coordination."

Issue: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional. It’s constitutional

Held:

No majority vote was reached by the SC so Cruz’s petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. The
provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that
grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the
natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to
the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and
occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these
resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale development and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They are
private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title that existed
irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs
of their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.
Republic vs. Lao, G.R. No. 150413, July 1, 2003

Facts:

Lao filed with the RTC an application for the registration of title over a parcel of land under Property
Registration Decree. She alleged that she acquired the land by purchase from the siblings Noguera and
Valenzuela, who inherited it from Medina. Medina inherited the land from her father, who acquired the same
from Perido by transfer. Lao prayed that the land be awarded to her under the provisions of the Public Land Act,
based on her and her predecessor’s open, public, actual, continuous, and exclusive possession and occupancy
under bona fide claim of ownership for more than 30 years.

RTC: approved application for registration.

Issues: (a) whether or not respondent was able to prove, by the quantum of evidence mandated by law, that she
met the required period of open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession, in the concept of an owner, of
the subject parcel of land; and (b) whether or not respondent was able to show that the land subject of her
application was disposable and alienable land of the public domain. NO

Held:

Sec 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 states that those who by themselves or through their predecessor-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier may
file an application for registration in the RTC

Sec 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act), provides that these provisions shall apply only to
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.

Thus, before one can register his title over a parcel of land, the applicant must show that (a) he, by
himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945
or earlier; and (b) the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.

Republic was right to contend that the Lao did not prove by incontrovertible evidence that she possessed the
property in the manner and time required by law. She did not provide the exact period when her predecessors-
in-interest started occupying the property. No extrajudicial settlement of the property from its previous owners
was shown and she did not show any relationship between the parties where she obtained the deed of sale she
presented. She further did not present any certification from appropriate government agency to show that the
property is re-classified as disposable and alienable land of the public domain. It is incumbent for an applicant
of a land registration to provide these to support her claim for her application. In the absence of these, her
application shall fail. Hence, the petition was granted and her application was denied.

Moreover, the absence of opposition from the government agencies is of no moment because the State cannot
be estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents. Therefore, declassification of forest land
and its conversion into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes requires an express and
positive act from the government. It cannot be presumed; but must be established by convincing proof.
Heirs of Bautista vs. Barza, G.R. No. L-79167, May 7, 1992

In 1946, Bautista applied for a fishpond permit of marshy(swamp) public land. The application was
acknowledge by the then Division of Fisheries. Said application was, however, rejected by the same office in
1948 because the area applied for was needed for firewood production as certified to by the Bureau of Forestry.
Bautista occupied an area which extended beyond the boundary of the one he had applied for and introduced
improvements thereon.

In 1948, Barza filed a fishpond application. Subsequent investigation revealed that the portion applied for by
Barza overlapped the area originally applied for by Bautista. Despite the rejection of his application, Bautista
filed another fishpond application in 1949 with the Bureau of Fisheries. The records of the Bureau of Fisheries
further show that while the property applied for by Barza had been released by the Bureau of Forestry as
available for fishpond purposes, the 49 hectares applied for by Bautista had not yet been similarly released by
the said bureau. It must be emphasized that the area, including the portion applied for by Barza had been greatly
improved by Bautista. 

It was not until 1955, that the Director of Fisheries required Barza to remit the amount of P3, 391.34 or the
value of the improvements introduced by Bautista. This figure was protested by Barza expressing her
willingness to pay the amount of P1, 763.31 only. The Director of Fisheries advised her to remit a reappraised
amount of P2, 263.33. Subsequent reappraisals on the value of the improvements became necessary in view of
Bautista's claim that the improvements were worth P14, 000. The parties could not agree on the amount of
reimbursement and Barza consigned the money.

More than 7 years after the last reappraisal of the improvements, Barza and her husband filed an action against
Bautista praying for recovery of possession over the fishpond area she had applied for, a declaration of the
validity of the consignation she made.
While the case was pending resolution, Bautista died, and his heirs were substituted as party defendants.

Issue: WON the Barzas may rightfully seek enforcement of the decision of the Director of Fisheries and that of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, notwithstanding their refusal to reimburse the Bautistas for
the improvements in the area. YES

Held:

It should be remembered that until timber or forest lands are released as disposable or alienable, neither
the Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, sell, or otherwise dispose of
these lands for homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing purposes, fishpond leases and other modes of
utilization. When Bautista filed Fishpond Application in 1946, the area applied for could not yet be
granted to him as it was yet to be released for public utilization. The situation, however, changed when
Barza filed the Fishpond Application for the area had, by then, been opened for fishpond purposes . Also,
the function of administering and disposing of lands of the public domain in the manner prescribed by law is not
entrusted to the courts but to executive officials or Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. As such, his
discretion must be respected in the absence of a clear showing of abuse.

Bautistas’ contention that the action for recovery of possession had prescribed when the Barzas filed it in
1968 is erroneous for it was filed within the 10-year period for enforcing a judgment. Although Bautista
was in possession of the area for quite a number of years, he ceased to become a  bona fide  possessor upon
receipt of the decision of the Director of Fisheries granting due course to Barza's fishpond application.

Under Art. 528 of the CC:"(p)ossession acquired in good faith does not lose its character except in the case
and from the moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing
improperly or wrongfully." Thus, Bautista should have desisted from introducing improvements on the property
when he learned that Barza's application had been approved.

However, Bautista may not be solely faulted for holding on to the area notwithstanding that he had no right over
it. The Barzas, after receiving the administrative decision in their favor, should have complied with its directive
to reimburse the Bautistas for the improvements introduced thereon. However, such failure to abide by the
decision of the Director of Fisheries rendered "stale" the said decision. Barzas' failure to question the last
reappraisal of the improvements constituted inaction on their part, for which they should bear its consequences.
Barza shall REIMBURSED the amount of P9, 514.33 with legal interest from December 12, 1962 until fully
paid. Upon payment of said reimbursement, the Bautistas shall SURRENDER possession of the properties
including the improvements thereon, for which the Barzas had been granted the right to operate as fishpond.

Heirs of Malabanan vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-179987

Facts:

In 1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property from Velazco, filed an application for
land registration covering the property in the RTC, claiming that the property formed part of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby
entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title. He presented during trial a certification issued by the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of DENR.

RTC: granted application. Mario died during the appeal to CA, and his heirs elevated the CA’s decision SC.

Issue: The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of Section 11(4), in relation to Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, which expressly requires possession by a Filipino citizen of the land since June
12, 1945, or earlier.

Held: Denied the motions for reconsideration.

The heirs failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had
been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Therefore, the land cannot be considered ipso jure
converted to private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable.
Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land has remained ineligible for
registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be
ineligible for land registration under Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the
President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth.

I. Classifications of land according to ownership. Immovable property, may be classified as of:

1. Public dominion- (a) intended for public use; or (b) belongs to the State, without being for public use,
and is intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth
 Patrimonial property of the state- land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or
although of such character but no longer intended for public use or for public service.
Prescription can run against the State.
2. Private ownership- belongs to a private individual.

Regalian Doctrine- all lands of the public domain belong to the State. The State is the source of any asserted
right to ownership of land, and is charged with the conservation of such patrimony. All lands not appearing to
be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands remain part of the
inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to private
persons. (Congress and President can declare)

II. Classifications of public lands

according to alienability
- 1935 Constitution, lands of the public domain were classified into 3: agricultural, timber and mineral.
- 1987 Constitution adopted the 1935 classification: agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral, but
added national parks. (The last 3 are not susceptible of alienation unless classified as agricultural
by the exec. And are outside the Public Land Act’s coverage)

Agricultural lands may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted.
The identification of lands according to their legal classification is done exclusively by and through a
positive act of the Executive.
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated;
all other natural resources may not be.

Categories of Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those
classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code, without limitation; and (b)
lands of the public domain, or the public lands as provided by the Constitution, but with the limitation
that the lands must only be agricultural.

III. Disposition of alienable public lands

Section 11 of the Public Land Act provides the manner by which alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain (agricultural lands) can be disposed of: (1) For homestead settlement (2) By sale (3) By lease (4) By
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles (By judicial legalization or By administrative legalization- free
patent)

We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the requisite possession and
occupation was the sole prerogative of Congress, the determination of which should best be left to the wisdom
of the lawmakers. The character of the property subject of the application as alienable agricultural land of the
public domain determines its eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or title over it.

To be clear, the requirement that the land should have been classified as alienable and disposable agricultural
land at the time of the application for registration is necessary only to dispute the presumption that the land is
inalienable. Where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are complied with through
actual physical, open, continuous, exclusive and public possession of an alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, the possessor is deemed to have acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a
grant by the Government, because it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order that such a grant
be sanctioned by the courts.
Republic vs. Lat Vda de Castillo, G.R. No. L69002, June 30, 1988

Facts:

In 1951, the late Modesto applied for the registration of 2 parcels of lands. Said Modesto Castillo, married to
Amanda Lat, was declared the true and absolute owner of the land with the improvements thereon, for which
Original Certificate of Title was issued to him by the Register of Deeds. After the death of Modesto, Amanda
Lat Vda. de Castillo, et al., executed a deed of partition and assumption of mortgage in favor of Florencio L.
Castillo, et al., as a result of which Original Certificate of Title was cancelled, and new transfer cerficates of
title were issued to Florencio Castillo, et al.

The Republic filed a civil case with the lower court for the annulment of the certificates of title issued to the
heirs/successors of Modesto Castillo, and for the reversion of the lands covered thereby to the State. It was
alleged that said lands had always formed part of the Taal Lake, washed and inundated by the waters thereof,
and being of public ownership, it could not be the subject of registration as private property. Heirs, alleged in
their answer that the Government's action was already barred by the decision of the registration court; that the
action has prescribed.

RTC: cancelled the registration; CA: reversed and set aside

Issue: WON the decision of the Land Registration Court involving shore lands constitutes res adjudicata in an
action instituted by the Republic for the annulment of title? NO.

Held: Affirmed RTC’s decision

There is no question that one of the requisites of res judicata is that the court rendering the final judgment must
have jurisdiction over the subject matter; that shores are properties of the public domain intended for
public use (Article 420, Civil Code) therefore, not registrable. Thus, it has long been settled that portions
of the foreshore or of the territorial waters and beaches cannot be registered. Their inclusion in a
certificate of title does not convert the same into properties of private ownership or confer title upon the
registrant.

It has been satisfactorily established that the properties in question were the shorelands of Taal Lake during the
cadastral survey of 1923.

Lands adjacent to the lake, like the lands in question must be differentiated from foreshore land or that part of
the land adjacent to the sea which is alternately covered and left dry by the ordinary flow of the tides. Such
distinction draws importance from the fact that accretions on the bank of a lake, like Laguna de Bay, belong
to the owners of the estate to which they have been added while accretion on a sea bank still belongs to
the public domain, and is not available for private ownership until formally declared by the government
to be no longer needed for public use. But said distinction will not help Castillos’ because there is no
accretion shown to exist in the case at bar. On the contrary, it was established that the occupants of the lots who
were engaged in duck raising filled up the area with shells and sand to make it habitable.

The defense of long possession is likewise not available in this case because, as already ruled by this
Court, mere possession of land does not by itself automatically divest the land of its public character.
Mendoza vs. Navarette, G.R. No. L-82531, September 30, 1992

Facts:
The legal heirs of Teodoro Mendoza (his wife, Eugenia, and 2 children; Domingo Mendoza and Maria
Mendoza, married to Leoncio Navarette) executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the deceased
where they had agreed to inherit and partition the property left by him, Maria renounced her rights. In
accordance with the said extrajudicial settlement, 2 new tax declarations were issued in favor of Domingo and
Eugenia. Before Eugenia died, had sold her said 1/4 share in the lot to Maria and Leoncio Navarette. However,
it was discovered that Maria and Leoncio fraudulently registered the whole property as Free Patent with the
Bureau of Lands and caused the said whole lot to be titled and declared in the name of Leoncio Navarette,
married to Maria Mendoza.

In 1975, Maria filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that the Domingo’s cause of action is barred by
the statute of limitations because the application for Free Patent and the Original Certificate of Title are dated in
1974— more than 10 years prior to the filing of the complaint. It is contended that an action for annulment of
title and/or reconveyance of real property resulting from fraud must be filed within 4 years from the discovery
of the fraud.
Issues:

1) WON the patent and the corresponding OCT issued covering the lot in controversy are valid.
2) WON prescription as a means of acquiring property has already set in under the factual circumstances of the
case at bar.
Held:
Co-ownership is not at all involved in this case. The Free Patent issued to Leoncio Navarette would be void as
to Domingo’s ¾ share of the property. Thus, he can recover it even beyond the expiration 10 years after the
issuance of the Original Certificate of Title based on the Free Patent. If the registered owner, be he the patentee
or his successor-in-interest to whom the free patent was transferred, knew that the parcel of land described in
the patent and in the Torrens title belonged to another who together with his predecessors-in-interest has been in
possession thereof, and if the patentee and his successor-in-interest were never in possession thereof, then the
statute barring an action to cancel a Torrens title issued upon a free patent does not apply, and the true owner
may bring an action to have the ownership or title to the land judicially settled.

A Free Patent issued over a private land is null and void. The rule laid down in Ramoso v. Obligado, that ‘a
homestead patent, once registered under the Registration Act, becomes as indefeasible as a Torrens Title,
. . .’ is only true and correct if the parcel of agricultural land patented or granted as homestead by the
Government, after the requirements of the law had been complied with, was a part of the public domain.
If it was not but a private land, the patent granted and the Torrens title issued upon the patent or
homestead grant are a nullity.

Then, in the fairly recent case of Agne v. Director of Lands, this Court, ruled:
"We reiterate that private ownership of land is not affected by the issuance of a free patent over the same
land because the Public Land Act applies only to lands of the public domain. Only public land may be
disposed of by the Director of Lands.”
A certificate of title fraudulently secured is null and void ab initio if the fraud consisted in
misrepresenting that the land is part of the public domain, although it is not. The nullity arises, not from the
fraud or deceit but, from the fact that the land is not under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands. The Land
Registration Act as well as the Cadastral Act protects only the holders of a title in good faith and does not
permit its provisions to be used as a shield for the commission of fraud, or that one should enrich himself at the
expense of another.
Thus, the title of Domingo over the land in dispute is superior to the title of the registered owner which is a total
nullity. The long and continued possession of Domingo under a valid claim of title cannot be defeated by the
claim of a registered owner whose title is defective from the beginning.
An action to quiet title to property in one’s possession is imprescriptible. Therefore, Domingo’s cause of action
hasn’t prescribed yet.

Celestial vs. Cachopero, G.R. No. L-142595, October 15, 2003

Facts:
Cachopero, brother of Celestial, filed an MSA (Metropolitan statistical area is the formal definition of a region that consists
of a city and surrounding communities that are linked by social and economic factors) with the Bureau of Lands, alleging that
he had, since 1968, been occupying the land whereon he built a residential house and introduced other
improvements. Celestial filed a protest against Cachopero’s MSA, claiming preferential right over the land
subject is adjacent to, and is the only outlet from her residential house.
Following an ocular inspection, the Bureau of Lands, finding the land subject of Cachopero’s MSA to be
outside the commerce of man, dismissed Celestial’s protest and denied Cachopero’s MSA. Moreover, the office
of the Mayor certified that such whole area is needed by the municipal government for future public
improvements.

A judgment based on a compromise was rendered in the case that Cachopero shall vacate the premises in
question and transfer the old house subject of this ejectment case. Both parties shall remove all their
improvements introduced. Cachopero filed another MSA with the DENR Regional Office involving a portion of
the same lot subject of his 1st MSA, supported by a certification issued by the Mayor and an Indorsement by the
District Engineer of the Department of Public Works and Highways stating that the subject land is suitable for
residential purposes and no longer needed by the municipal government.
Both parties had the same contentions as before and DENR Regional Executive Director issued an Order stating
that it was suitable for residential purposes but that, in light of the conflicting interest of the parties, it be sold at
public auction (based on Public Land Act). In the ocular investigation of the premises, it was established that
the said property is a dried bed of a Creek resulting from the construction of the irrigation canal.

Issue:
whether the DENR Regional Executive Director and OIC Regional Director acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned Orders. YES

Held:
A reading of the Public Land Act shows nothing therein to support the Director’s contention that the pendency
of a protest is a bar to the application of R.A. 730 to an MSA. (R.A. 730 is Sale w/out public auction of public
lands of the phils. for residential purposes to qualified applicants under certain conditions)
Under Public Land Act, there was a positive duty on the part of the DENR Director to process Cachopero’s
MSA, and to ascertain in light of petitioner’s protest, whether Cachopero was qualified to purchase the subject
land at a private sale pursuant to R.A. 730. This, he did not do.
Considering that the assailed Orders of DENR Director and ordering the sale of the subject lot by oral
bidding are patently erroneous, the authority of the court to issue writs of  certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
is warranted. However, this does not mean that Cachopero automatically has the better right to the subject land.
As mandated by law, the Director must process respondent’s MSA, conduct an investigation, and determine
whether the material facts set forth therein are true to bring it within the coverage of R.A. 730.

Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and not susceptible to private
appropriation and acquisitive prescription, the adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of
title in the confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public
domain. It is only after the Government has declared the land to be alienable and disposable agricultural
land that the year of entry, cultivation and exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes
of an imperfect title. A creek, like the Salunayan Creek, is a recess, extending from a river and participating in
the flow of the sea. As such, under Articles 420(1) 44 and 502(1) 45 of the Civil Code, the Creek, including
its natural bed, is property of the public domain which is not susceptible to private appropriation and
acquisitive prescription. Absent any declaration by the government, that a portion of the creek has dried-
up does not, by itself, alter its inalienable character.
It was only after the same offices subsequently certified that the subject land was suitable for residential
purposes and no longer needed by the municipal government that it became alienable and disposable. Had the
disputed portion of the Salunayan Creek dried up after the present Civil Code took effect, the subject land
would clearly not belong to petitioner or her predecessor-in-interest since under the aforementioned provision of
Article 461, "river beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters ipso facto
belong to the owners of the land occupied by the new course," and the owners of the adjoining lots have the
right to acquire them only after paying their value. And both Article 370, Old Code and Article 461, present
Civil Code are applicable only when" [r]iver beds are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the
waters." It is uncontroverted that, as found by both the Bureau of Lands and the DENR Regional Executive
Director, the subject land became dry as a result of the construction of an irrigation canal by the National
Irrigation Administration. The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be considered as forming part of
the land of the public domain which cannot be subject to acquisition by private ownership.

Furthermore, both provisions pertain to situations where there has been a change in the course of a river, not
where the river simply dries up. In the instant Petition, it is not even alleged that the Salunayan Creek changed
its course, therefore, dry river bed remains property of public dominion. Finally, while this Court notes that
Celestial offered to purchase the subject land from the government, she did so through an informal letter instead
of the prescribed form. By such move, she is deemed to have acknowledged that the subject land is public land,
for it would be absurd for her to have applied for its purchase if she believed it was hers. She is thus stopped
from claiming otherwise.
Maneclang vs. IAC, G.R. No. L-66575, September 30, 1986

Maneclang, et al. filed before the RTC a complaint for quieting of title over a certain fishpond located within
the lands belonging to them, and the annulment of Resolutions of the Municipal Council of Bugallon
Pangasinan. RTC: dismissed the complaint upon finding that the body of water traversing the titled properties of
Maneclang is a creek connecting to Agno River; therefore, public in nature and not subject to private
appropriation. It also ordered an ocular inspection of the Cayangan Creek, and authorized the resolution for
public bidding which includes the fishpond under consideration. The parties executed a Compromise
Agreement to maintain to Maneclang the fishponds.

Issue: Whether or not a creek can be registered under the Torrens System? NO

Held:

A creek is a recess/arm extending from a river and participating in the ebb and flow of the sea. It is a
property belonging to the public domain, it is a property belonging to the public domain. it is not
susceptible to appropriation and acquisitive prescription. As a public water, it cannot be registered under
the Torrens System in the name of any individual.

Its nature as property of the public domain cannot be modified by the construction of irrigation dikes by
the National Irrigation Authority, or by its conversion into a fishpond. Hence, a compromise agreement
adjudicating the ownership of such property in favor of an individual is null and void. The compromise
agreement has no legal effect since it is contrary to law and public policy.

The Municipality of Bugallon, acting thru its duly-constituted municipal council is clothed with authority to
pass, as it did the 2 resolutions dealing with its municipal waters, and it cannot be said that Maneclangs were
deprived of their right to due process as mere publication of the notice of the public bidding suffices as a
constructive notice to the whole world. DISMISSED the instant petition for lack of merit.
Mercado vs. Mun. Pres. of Macabebe, G.R. No. L-37986, March 1, 1934

Mercado appealed from a judgment rendered by the RTC dismissing her appeal from an order of the Secretary
of Commerce (directed to her father Romulo Mercado) to remove the 2 dikes which he had constructed at both
ends of the creek, which traverses part of the hacienda, and formerly belonging to said Romulo Mercado, but
which now belongs to her by virtue of a formal donation made to her after the institution of this action. Mercado
alleges creek is not a natural but an artificial creek which had been developed on his hacienda by means of
excavations made by his men. Once the said canal was opened from the Nasi River to Limasan creek, not only
the residents of the hacienda and those who visited it but also some of the residents of the nearby barrios and
municipalities began to use it as a means of communication in attending to their needs, sometimes with the
permission of the owners of the hacienda, and at other times without even the latter's knowledge. It was then
that Romulo Mercado, to convert the said creek into a fish pond and with that, he closed the 2 openings.
Municipality contends that it as always been naturally made and should be opened again to be used by the
general public.

Issue: Whether the subject property belong to Eufemia Mercado. NO

Held:

The pertinent parts of the articles provide as follows:

Property of public ownership is — 1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports
and bridges constructed by the State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character. (Art. 339.)

The following are of public ownership:1. Rivers and their natural channels; 2. Continuous or intermittent
waters from springs or brooks running in their natural channels and the channels themselves; 3. Waters rising
continuously or intermittently on lands of public ownership; 8. Waters which flow continuous or intermittently
from lands belonging to private parties, to the State, to

Although the creek passes through Mercado’s hacienda, it is none the less true that it is not included in
any of the kinds of private property therein enumerated. The appellant and her predecessors in interest,
in closing 2 openings of the said creek and converting it into a fish pond, not only appropriated for
themselves the channel of the said creek but also the creek itself; and a creek is not a brook because the
latter is but a short, almost continuous stream of water, while the former is a recess or arm extending
from a river, which participates in the ebb and flow of the sea.

Under Art. 407, the Batasan-Limasan or Pinac Buñgalun creek may be considered as belonging to the class of
property enumerated in paragraph 8 thereof. If the Mercados had acquired any right to the creek in question by
virtue of excavations which they had made thereon, they had lost such right through prescription inasmuch as
they failed to obtain, and in fact they have not obtained, the necessary authorization to devote it to their own use
to the exclusion of all others. The use and enjoyment of a creek, as any other property susceptible of
appropriation, may be acquired or lost through prescription, and the appellant and her predecessors in interest
certainly lost such right through the said cause, and they cannot now claim it exclusively for themselves after
the general public had been openly using the same from 1906 to 1928. When two different interests, one
being private and the other public, are in conflict with one another, the former should yield to the latter.

The creek could have been of private ownership had not its builder lost it by prescription.