Tañada vs.

Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) 146

SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)

FACTS:

Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that
laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementations and administrative orders.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that
petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid and
enforceable.

HELD:

Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the
law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the general
public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens.
Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia
legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette…. The
word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if
the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance
and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of

due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general application
which have not been published have no force and effect.

TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued
that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise” as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as
to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

HELD:

The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature
may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous
publication.

“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws
relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any
bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires
act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be
directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the
content of the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not
elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the
wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

J. Cruz:

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their
dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding
unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure
and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or
cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

Roy v. CA
G.R. No. 80718
January 29, 1988

FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners,

vs.
CO URT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS
BERNAL, JR., HEIRS OF MARISSA BERNAL, namely, GLICERIA DELA
CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS BERNAL, SR., respondents.
Facts:
The petitioners owned a firewall that had weakened and collapsed on the
tailoring shop owned by the private respondents, causing injuries and death to
Marissa Bernal, a daughter. The RTC ruled that the petitioners were guilty of
gross negligence and awarded damages to respondents. The petitioners
appealed to the CA, but the latter affirmed the decision of the RTC. A copy of
the decision of the CA was received by the petitioners on August 25, 1987. On
September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, the
petitioners asked the CA to extend the time to file a motion for
reconsideration. According to a previous case, Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v.
Japzon, the fifteen-day period  for appealing or for filing a motion for
reconsideration cannot be extended. The petitioners contend that the case of
Habaluyas could not be made binding because it has not been published in the
Official Gazette at the time the CA promulgated its decision.
Issue:
Is the ruling on an unpublished case binding?

Ruling:
Yes. There is no law requiring the publication of a Supreme Court decision for
it to be binding and effective. The counsel of the petitioners should be
responsible for keeping abreast with Supreme Court decisions as a lawyer.
G.R. No. 173615               October 16, 2009

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner,

vs.
CAYETANO A. TEJANO, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

In this petition for review,1 the Philippine National Bank assails the January 3, 2006 Decision 2 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 50084, which reversed Resolution Nos. 980716 and 983099
issued by the Civil Service Commission, respectively dated April 14, 1998 and December 7, 1998,
and referred the case back to said office for further proceedings. The assailed Resolutions, in turn,
dismissed respondent Cayetano A. Tejano’s appeal from the resolution of the Board of Directors of
the Philippine National Bank which found him guilty of grave misconduct in connection with a
number of transactions with certain corporate entities.

The case stems from a number of alleged irregular and fraudulent transactions made by respondent
Cayetano A. Tejano, Jr. supposedly with the participation of eight (8) other employees of petitioner
Philippine National Bank (PNB) in its branch in Cebu City — namely Ma. Teresa Chan, Marcelino
Magdadaro, Douglasia Canuel, Novel Fortich, Jacinto Ouano, Quirubin Blanco, Manuel Manzanares
and Pedrito Ranile. Respondent, together with the other employees, allegedly committed grave
misconduct, gross neglect of duty, conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service and
acts violative of Republic Act No. 3019, relative to the corporate accounts of and transactions with
Pat International Trading Corporation (PITC), Khun Tong International Trading Corporation (KITC),
Pat Garments International Corporation (PGIC), Aqua Solar Trading Corporation, Dacebu Traders
and Exporters, Mancao Mercantile Co., Inc. and V&G Better Homes Subdivision. All of these
transactions transpired at the time that PNB was still a government-owned and controlled
corporation.

Respondent, who was then the Vice-President and Manager of the bank, and the eight other
employees were administratively charged before the PNB Management Hearing Committee on
February 24 and March 17, 1994.3 At the close of the hearing on the merits, the Committee found
that with respect to respondent, he was guilty of gross misconduct in misappropriating the funds of
V&G and of gross neglect in extending unwarranted credit accommodations to PITC, PGIC and
KITC which must serve as an aggravating circumstance. The Committee then recommended that
respondent be meted the penalty of forced resignation without forfeiture of benefits. 4

The PNB Board of Directors differed. In its Resolution No. 885 dated June 21, 1995, it found that
respondent’s gross neglect in giving unwarranted credit to PITC, PGIC and KITC must serve as an
aggravating circumstance in relation to the offense of grave misconduct consisting of
misappropriation of V&G funds and must serve the penalty of forced resignation with forfeiture of
benefits.6

It appears that only herein respondent sought reconsideration but the Board of Directors, in its
Resolution No. 107,7 denied the same. Thereafter, on September 21, 1995, respondent appealed to
the Civil Service Commission (CSC)8 and, on October 19, 1995, he submitted his Memorandum on
Appeal.9

In the meantime, on May 27, 1996, the PNB had ceased to be a government-owned and controlled
corporation, and in view of its conversion into a private banking institution by virtue of Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 80.10 Despite this development, the CSC, on April 14 1998, issued Resolution No.
98071611 dismissing respondent’s appeal for being filed out of time.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration 12 on which the CSC required petitioner to comment. In
its Comment, petitioner theorized that even granting respondent’s appeal was filed on time, the
same must, nevertheless, be dismissed on account of the privatization of PNB which thereby
removed the case from the jurisdiction of the CSC. The CSC found this argument meritorious and,
subsequently, in its Resolution No. 98309913 dated December 7, 1998, it denied respondent’s
reconsideration on that ground.

Respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals on petition for review, 14 docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 50084.

Before the appellate court, respondent, on the one hand, ascribed error to the CSC in denying due
course to his appeal on the basis of the privatization of PNB inasmuch as the incident subject of the
case had transpired way back in 1992, when the bank was still a government-owned and controlled
corporation. He particularly noted that the CSC, before the privatization of the bank, had already
acquired jurisdiction over the appeal upon the filing thereof and subsequent submission of the
memorandum on appeal. This, according to respondent, negated petitioner’s theory that the CSC
could no longer assume jurisdiction and dispose of the appeal on the merits, especially considering
that jurisdiction once acquired generally continues until the final disposition of the case. 15 On the
other hand, petitioner argued in essence that although the jurisdiction to act on the appeal must
continue until the final disposition of the case, this rule admits of exceptions as where, in the present
case, the law must be construed in a way as to operate on actions pending before its enactment. 16

The Court of Appeals found merit in respondent’s appeal. On January 3, 2006, it issued the assailed
Decision reversing the twin resolutions of the CSC. The appellate court pointed out that respondent’s
appeal before the CSC had been filed on time and that the said commission had not lost jurisdiction
over it despite the supervening privatization of PNB. But inasmuch as the assailed Resolutions did
not permeate the merits of respondent’s appeal, the appellate court found it wise to remand the case
to the CSC for further proceedings. It disposed of the appeal as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court is hereby GRANTED. ACCORDINGLY, Resolution No. 980716 dated April 14, 1998 and
Resolution No. 983099 dated December 7, 1998 of the Civil Service Commission are hereby
REVERSED and the case is remanded to the Civil Service Commission for further proceedings.

so ordered.17

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. 18 Hence, it filed the instant petition for review
bearing the same issue as that raised previously.

At the core of the controversy is the question of whether E.O. No. 80 has the effect of removing from
the jurisdiction of the CSC the appeal of respondent which was already pending before the CSC at
the time the said law converted PNB into a private banking institution. Petitioner is insistent that,
indeed, the law does have that effect, and this argument is perched on Section 6 of E.O. No. 80,
which materially provides that the bank would cease to be a government-owned and controlled
corporation upon the issuance of its articles of incorporation by the Securities and Exchange
Commission and would no longer be subject to the coverage of both the CSC and the Commission
on Audit.19 Petitioner believes that while indeed jurisdiction ordinarily continues until the termination
of the case, it advances the opinion that the rule does not apply where the law provides otherwise or
where the said law intends to operate on cases pending at the time of its enactment. 20

For his part, respondent submits that Section 6 of E.O. No. 80 does not provide for the transfer of
jurisdiction over his pending appeal from the CSC to another administrative authority, and that
neither does the provision authorize its retroactive application in a way that would deprive the CSC
of jurisdiction over cases already pending before it prior to its effectivity. 21 Additionally, he invokes
estoppel against petitioner inasmuch as the latter has actively participated in the proceedings before
the CSC and, hence, was already barred from raising the issue of jurisdiction, and alleges that
petitioner’s present recourse was taken merely to cause delay in the final resolution of the
controversy.22

We draw no merit in the petition.

In essence, Section 6 of E.O. No. 80, also known as the Revised Charter of PNB, treats of the
effects of converting the bank into a private financial and banking institution. It states:

Section 6. Change in Ownership of the Majority of the Voting Equity of the Bank. - When the
ownership of the majority of the issued common voting shares passes to private investors, the
stockholders shall cause the adoption and registration with the Securities and Exchange
Commission of the appropriate Articles of Incorporation and revised by-laws within three (3) months
from such transfer of ownership. Upon the issuance of the certificate of incorporation under the
provisions of the Corporation Code, this Charter shall cease to have force and effect, and shall be
deemed repealed. Any special privileges granted to the Bank such as the authority to act as official
government depositary, or restrictions imposed upon the Bank, shall be withdrawn, and the Bank
shall thereafter be considered a privately organized bank subject to the laws and regulations
generally applicable to private banks. The Bank shall likewise cease to be a government-owned or
controlled corporation subject to the coverage of service-wide agencies such as the Commission on
Audit and the Civil Service Commission.

The fact of the change of the nature of the Bank from a government-owned and controlled financial
institution to a privately-owned entity shall be given publicity. 23
In a language too plain to be mistaken, the quoted portion of the law only states no more than the
natural, logical and legal consequences of opening to private ownership the majority of the bank’s
voting equity. This is very evident in the title of the section called Change in Ownership of the
Majority of the Voting Equity of the Bank. Certainly, the transfer of the majority of the bank’s voting
equity from public to private hands is an inevitable effect of privatization or, conversely, the
privatization of the bank would necessitate the opening of the voting equity thereof to private
ownership. And as the bank ceases to be government depository, it would, accordingly be coming
under the operation of the definite set of laws and rules applicable to all other private corporations
incorporated under the general incorporation law. Perhaps the aspect of more importance in the
present case is that the bank, upon its privatization, would no longer be subject to the coverage of
government service-wide agencies such as the CSC and the Commission on Audit (COA).

By no stretch of intelligent and reasonable construction can the provisions in Section 6 of E.O. No.
80 be interpreted in such a way as to divest the CSC of jurisdiction over pending disciplinary cases
involving acts committed by an employee of the PNB at the time that the bank was still a
government-owned and controlled corporation. Stated otherwise, no amount of reasonable inference
may be derived from the terms of the said Section to the effect that it intends to modify the
jurisdiction of the CSC in disciplinary cases involving employees of the government.

Sound indeed is the rule that where the law is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given
its literal meaning and applied without any interpretation or even
construction.24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/may2002/133706.htm - _edn13  This is
based on the presumption that the words employed therein correctly express its intent and preclude
even the courts from giving it a different construction. 25 Section 6 of E.O. No. 80 is explicit in terms. It
speaks for itself. It does not invite an interpretation that reads into its clear and plain language
petitioner’s adamant assertion that it divested the CSC of jurisdiction to finally dispose of
respondent’s pending appeal despite the privatization of PNB.

In the alternative, petitioner likewise posits that the portion of Section 6 of the E.O. No. 80, which
states that the PNB would no longer be subject to the coverage of both the COA and the CSC, must
be understood to be applicable to cases already pending with the CSC at the time of the bank’s
conversion into a private entity. We are not swayed.

While there is no denying that upon its privatization, the bank would consequently be subject to laws,
rules and regulations applicable to private corporations — which is to say that disciplinary cases
involving its employees would then be placed under the operation of the Labor Code of the
Philippines — still, we cannot validate petitioner’s own interpretation of Section 6 of E.O. No. 80 that
the same must be applied to respondent’s pending appeal with the CSC and that, resultantly, the
CSC must abdicate its appellate jurisdiction without having to resolve the case to finality.

It is binding rule, conformably with Article 4 of the Civil Code, that, generally, laws shall have only a
prospective effect and must not be applied retroactively in such a way as to apply to pending
disputes and cases. This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit (the law
looks forward and not backward.)26 The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive: the
retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested or impairs the
obligations of contract and, hence, is unconstitutional. 27 Although the rule admits of certain well-
defined exceptions28 such as, for instance, where the law itself expressly provides for
retroactivity,29 we find that not one of such exceptions that would otherwise lend credence to
petitioner’s argument obtains in this case. Hence, in other words, the fact that Section 6 of E.O. No.
80 states that PNB would be removed from the coverage of the CSC must be taken to govern acts
committed by the bank’s employees after privatization. 1avvphi1
Moreover, jurisdiction is conferred by no other source than law. Once jurisdiction is acquired, it
continues until the case is finally terminated.30 The disciplinary jurisdiction of the CSC over
government officials and employees within its coverage is well-defined in Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 807,31 otherwise known as The Civil Service Decree of the Philippines. Section 37 32 thereof
materially provides that the CSC shall have jurisdiction over appeals in administrative disciplinary
cases involving the imposition of the penalty of suspension for more than thirty days; or fine in an
amount exceeding thirty days’ salary; demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal
from office.

It bears to stress on this score that the CSC was able to acquire jurisdiction over the appeal of
respondent merely upon its filing, followed by the submission of his memorandum on appeal. From
that point, the appellate jurisdiction of the CSC at once attached, thereby vesting it with the authority
to dispose of the case on the merits until it shall have been finally terminated.

Petitioner, however, takes exception. It notes that, while indeed the general rule is that jurisdiction
continues until the termination of the case and is not affected by new legislation on the matter, the
rule does not obtain where the new law provides otherwise, or where said law is intended to apply to
actions pending before its enactment. Again, petitioner insists that E.O. No. 80 is a new legislation of
a character belonging to one of the exceptions inasmuch as supposedly Section 6 thereof expressly
sanctions its application to cases already pending prior to its enactment — particularly that provision
which treats of the jurisdiction of the CSC.33

The argument is unconvincing.

In Latchme Motoomull v. Dela Paz,34 the Court had dealt with a situation where jurisdiction over
certain cases was transferred by a supervening legislation to another tribunal. Latchme involved a
perfected appeal from the decision of the SEC and pending with the Court of Appeals at the time
P.D. No. 902-A was enacted which transferred appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of the SEC
from the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. On the question of whether the tribunal with which
the cases were pending had lost jurisdiction over the appeal upon the effectivity of the new law, the
Court ruled in the negative, citing the earlier case of Bengzon v. Inciong, 35 thus:

The rule is that where a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy,
its jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the cause is not affected by new legislation
placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal. The exception to the rule is where the
statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate as to actions
pending before its enactment. Where a statute changing the jurisdiction of a court has no retroactive
effect, it cannot be applied to a case that was pending prior to the enactment of the statute. 36

Petitioner derives support from the exceptions laid down in the cases of Latchme Motoomull and
Bengzon quoted above. Yet, as discussed above, the provisions in Section 6 of E.O. No. 80 are too
clear and unambiguous to be interpreted in such a way as to abort the continued exercise by the
CSC of its appellate jurisdiction over the appeal filed before the privatization of PNB became
effective. Suffice it to say that nowhere in the said Section can we find even the slightest indication
that indeed it expressly authorizes the transfer of jurisdiction from the CSC to another tribunal over
disciplinary and administrative cases already pending with the said Commission even prior to the
enactment of the law.

All told, the Court finds that no error was committed by the Court of Appeals in reversing the twin
resolutions issued by the CSC. The Court also agrees that because the merits of respondent’s
appeal with the said Commission have not been completely threshed out, it is only correct and
appropriate to remand the case back to it for further proceedings.
With this disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss the other issues propounded by the
parties.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The January 3, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 50084, which reversed and set aside CSC Resolution Nos. 980716 and 983099 and
ordered the remand of the case to the CSC for further proceedings, is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 127753               December 11, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DOMINGO VALDEZ Y DULAY, accused-appellant.

DECISION

BUENA, J.:

For automatic review is the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 45, Anonas,
Urdaneta, Pangasinan convicting appellant Domingo Valdez y Dulay guilty of two crimes: (1) murder
for which he was sentenced to suffer the death penalty and (2) illegal possession of Firearms and
Ammunition under Presidential Decree No. 1866 for which he was sentenced to suffer reclusion
perpetua based on the following criminal indictments:

"CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-8719

That on or about 31st day of October, 1995 at barangay San Roque, Municipality of San Manuel,
Province of Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused with
intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously attack and shot one Labrador Valdez y Madrid, hitting the latter’s chest and the gunshot
wounds inflicted being mortal, caused the direct and immediate death of the said victim, to the
damage and prejudice of his heirs.

Contrary to Article 248, Revised Penal Code." 1

"CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-8720

That on or about the 31st day of October, 1995 at barangay San Roque, Municipality of San Manuel,
Province of Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this honorable Court, the said accused did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have in his possession, control and custody a
firearm of an unknown caliber, make and brand without authority of law, and which he used in
shooting to death Labrador Valdez y Madrid.

Contrary to Presidential Decree No. 1866." 2

On October 31, 1995, at around 9:00 o’clock in the evening at Sitio Laclac, Barangay San Roque,
San Manuel, Pangasinan, Marcelo Valdez was under his nipa house talking with his son Labrador
Valdez. At that time, Marcelo’s other housemates – his wife, son Rolando Valdez, daughter-in-law
Imelda Umagtang and an eight-year-old boy named Christopher Centeno – were staying upstairs
preparing to sleep. In the course of their conversation, Labrador was lying sideways on a carabao
sled, placed under the family nipa house. He was facing his father at the eastern side of the house,
at a distance of about less than two (2) meters from each other. TSN, June 13, 1996, pp. 14 and 17.
3 

3 Suddenly, two consecutive gunshots were fired coming from the western side of the house by an
assailant. The first shot landed on the left forefinger and thumb of Labrador, while the second shot
4 

hit him two (2) inches from the left shoulder, below the neck which exited at the right side just below
his breast. After firing, the assailant immediately ran away towards the west direction.
5  6

Marcelo Valdez who was talking to his son, immediately called for help while the victim managed to
walk upstairs towards the kitchen. The stunning sound of the two gunfire and Marcelo’s cry for help
alerted Imelda Umagtang and her common-law husband Rolando Valdez, who were both lying on
bed, to verge upon the kitchen where they saw the victim bathed in his own blood. When Rolando
inquired from the victim who shot him, the latter replied that it was the appellant. At this time, the
victim’s brother and in-laws arrived. They also asked the victim what happened and the latter once
more said that it was appellant who shot him. At such time, the search for the passenger jeep that
will transport the victim to the hospital continued. After an hour, they were able to find a passenger
jeep but the victim already succumbed to death prior to his transport to the hospital.

The next day, on November 1, 1995, Dr. Asuncion Tuvera of San Manuel Rural Health Unit
conducted the autopsy on the cadaver of the deceased in the latter’s house. The medical
examination revealed the following gunshot wounds-

"A. External findings:

Chest - gunshot wound at the left sternal line 2 inches below the left clavicle, 2 cm in diameter
penetrating

- gunshot wound at the right enterior axillary line at the level of the lumbar area.

Extremities – lacuated wound on the left thumb and index finger with fracture of the phalanges.

"B. Internal findings:

Chest – fracture of the 3rd enterior left rib.

Abdomen placuated wound of the liver.

"Cause of death:

Cardio respiratory arrest secondary to severe hemorrhage secondary to gunshot wound on the chest
and lumbar area." (Exhibit "E"; records, p. 7)

Thereafter, appellant was charged before the trial court with two separate information for murder and
illegal possession of firearms to which he pleaded not guilty. After trial, judgment was rendered
convicting appellant as earlier mentioned. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds:

"IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-8719:

"The accused DOMINGO VALDEZ Y DULAY GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of

MURDER defined and penalized under republic Act No. 7659 otherwise known as the Heinous
Crime Law, the offense having been committed with the attendant aggravating circumstances of
evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and nighttime, hereby sentences him the ultimum
supplicium of DEATH to be executed pursuant to Republic Act No. 8177 known as the Lethal
Injection Law, to pay the heirs of the victim LABRADOR VALDEZ in the amount of ₱50,000.00 as
indemnity; ₱23,500.00 as actual damages; ₱200,000.00 as moral damages; and to pay the costs.

"IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-8720:

"The accused DOMINGO VALDEZ Y DULAY, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition penalized under Presidential Decree No. 1866 and
hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the costs.

"Finally, it is said: "Dura lex, sed lex," translated as "The law is harsh, but that is the law.

"SO ORDERED." 7

Appellant questions his conviction arguing that the court a quo erred -

I. in convicting the accused of murder notwithstanding the failure of the prosecution to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

II. in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery and the aggravating

circumstances of evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and nighttime on the
assumption that indeed accused appellant shot the victim.

III. in not applying the provision of R.A. 8294, amending P.D. 1866

IV. in convicting the accused for two separate offenses

V. finding the accused guilty of violating P.D. 1866" 8

After a careful examination of the records, appellant’s conviction should be upheld. The elements of
murder concur in this case. Appellant shot the victim twice. The wounds sustained by the deceased
at the left thumb, index finger and at the left shoulder below the neck exiting to the right side just
below the breast were caused by bullets. As a result of these gunshot wounds, the victim suffered
"Cardio respiratory arrest secondary to severe hemorrhage secondary to gunshot wound on the
chest and lumbar area" which was described in the medico-legal report as the proximate cause
resulting to his death.

Appellant’s defense is premised primarily on denial and alibi. He argues that on the day of the
incident he was hauling and transporting 27 cavans of palay with Reymante and Conrado
Centino from 6 to 9 o’clock in the evening of October 31, 1995, to the house of Mrs. Juanita Centino.
9 

Thereafter, they took supper at Conrado’s house and drank wine and went home around 11 o’clock
in the evening. His version was corroborated by Reymante and Conrado and the latter’s mother,
Mrs. Centino, a sexagenarian. Such defenses, however, aside from being inherently weak, cannot
prevail against a positive and explicit identification of him not only by Marcelo Valdez but also by the
victim himself. To exculpate himself, appellant must not only show that it was impossible for him to
be at the place where the crime was committed, but it must likewise be demonstrated that he was so
far away that he could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate
vicinity at the time of its commission. The distance between the place where the crime happened, to
10 

the Centinos’ house where appellant claimed he was, is more or less one (1) kilometer, which could
be negotiated by walking for thirty (30) minutes, and twenty (20) minutes by riding a
vehicle. Appellant’s whereabouts at the time of the incident was insufficient to foreclose any
11 

possibility for him to be present at the scene of the crime, given the proximity of the two places.

Appellant further contends that witness Marcelo Valdez could not have positively identified him
because there was only a single kerosene lamp lighting the area and the witness was already
seventy years old, who, at such age, would have a nebulous identification of the assailant.
Appellant’s assertion of impossibility of identification in a period of a "few seconds look" at the time
of the second shot, which was fired successively, was negated by the fact that appellant shot the
victim at a distance of around two meters from the kerosene lamp. The distance of the appellant
from the kerosene lamp does not preclude the possibility of identification since the place was
properly illumined capacitating the witness to identify the assailant. In fact, both Marcelo and the
deceased were able to identify appellant.

Appellant capitalizes on the alleged failure of Lilia Valdez (wife of the deceased) to mention to the
officer who investigated the killing, that she heard her husband say that the appellant was his
assailant. He argues that her testimony in court that she heard her husband say that it was appellant
who shot him, was merely an afterthought. In support thereof, appellant quotes the following
answers of Lilia Valdez during cross-examination -

"ATTY. VIRAY-

"Q: Now, in the sworn statement Madam witness which you gave to the police authorities of San
Manuel, Pangasinan, you never mentioned that your husband told you that he was allegedly shot by
the accused, is this correct?

"A: Yes, sir.

"ATTY. VIRAY:

The answer is not responsive, we request the question to be read back.

"COURT: She said, she did not tell that to the police.

"ATTY. VIRAY:

"Q: Why did you not tell to the police authorities that your husband told you that your husband was
shot by Domingo Valdez?

"A: I forgot, sir." [TSN, July 3, 1996, pp. 24-25]

We have thoroughly reviewed the records and studied the alleged contradiction between the court
testimony and the sworn statement of Lilia Valdez only to find that appellant is misleading the court.
In her sworn statement Lilia Valdez stated -

"15. Q: Was you (sic) husband able to identify his assailant?

A: Yes, sir. He identified Domingo Valdez as his assailant when asked by brother-in-law Rolando
Valdez before he was brought down to kitchen on the way to the hospital, sir." [Exhibit "D", Folder II,
Records, p. 3]
It is also clear from the records that as early as November 1, 1995, the day after the killing, the
principal prosecution witness Marcelo Valdez (father of the deceased), along with Lilia Valdez (wife
of the deceased), Imelda Umagtang (sister-in-law of the deceased) alluded to appellant as the killer
before police officer Avelino Sandi, Jr. who conducted the investigation. Their respective sworn
statements were reduced into writing denouncing and identifying appellant as responsible for the
death of Labrador Valdez. Imelda Umagtang testified to these utterances of the deceased in court.
12 

The victim’s septuagenarian father Marcelo Valdez likewise affirmed the identity of the appellant as
the assailant. He testified in court that he recognized the assailant with the lighting coming from the
kerosene lamp hanging on the wall, which illuminated the whole ground of the nipa hut. He claimed
13 

that he recognized appellant at the second shot at a distance of around three meters (3) away from
14 

him. At the time appellant fired the second shot, appellant was less than a meter away from the
15 

victim and around two meters from the kerosene lamp.

16  17

Lilia Valdez, the victim’s wife, recounting that fateful day, similarly attested appellant’s culpability in
court. She testified that when her husband was shot she was in her house with her children, about
25 to 30 meters from the victim’s location. When she heard the gunfire and the summons of her
18 

parents-in-law that her husband was shot, she rushed to her husband and saw him bloodied, lying
prostrate in the kitchen. She asked the victim what happened and the latter answered that appellant
shot him.

Appellant likewise debunks the probative value given to Imelda Umagtang’s testimony that she
heard the victim say that it was appellant who shot him because such statement was not directed to
her by the victim but to Rolando Valdez. This according to appellant finds support in the following
19 

testimony of Imelda –

"ATTY. VIRAY

"Q: So it is very clear from your statement that it was your live-in boyfriend, Rolando Valdez, who
asked question from the victim not you, is this correct?

"A: Yes, sir.

"Q: You never asked questions from the victim, is this correct?

"A: No, sir. I heard what he revealed to my live-in boyfriend, sir." 20

There is no rule that a person who hears something cannot testify on what she heard. A dying
declaration need not be particularly directed only to the person inquiring from the declarant. Anyone
who has knowledge of the fact of what the declarant said, whether it was directed to him or not, or
whether he had made inquiries from the declarant or not, can testify thereto.

Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, possesses no probative value unless the proponent
can show that the same falls within the exception to the hearsay rule. The statement of the
21 

deceased uttered shortly after being wounded by the gunfire is a "dying declaration," which falls
under the exception to the hearsay rule. It may be proved by the testimony of the witness who heard
22 

the same or to whom it was made. Appellant contends that the identification by the deceased of his
23 

assailant, which was admitted as a "dying declaration" under Section 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, cannot be admitted because "when the said statements were uttered the declarant was not
conscious of his imminent death," relying on the following testimony of Imelda Umagtang and Lilia
24 

Valdez, thus –
"Q: What was your observation when he was lying down waiting for the ride to come?

"A: He was already very weak, sir.

"Q: Did somebody ask of his physical condition at that time?

"A: Yes, sir.

"Q: Who?

"A: Lago Valdez, sir.

"Q: What did he ask?

"A: He asked if he can still manage, sir.

"Q: What did Labrador Valdez answer?

"A: He said, no more, sir.

"Q: What do you mean by he cannot manage anymore?

"A: He was already very weak at that time, sir.

"Q: And?

"A: And he was dying, sir.

"Q: He said he was dying?

"A: No, sir.

"Q: But he was feeling weak already?

"A: Yes, sir." 25

and

"Q: When you were there near your husband lying in the kitchen in the house of your father-in-law,
what was your observation regarding his physical condition?

"A: He was shot, Your Honor.

"Q: Did you ask him what was he feeling at that time?

"A: Yes, sir.

"Q: What did he answer?

"A: He said, he was weak, Your Honor.

"Q: Did he tell you that he is going to die?

"A: No, Your Honor." 26

The victim’s statements prior to his death identifying appellant as his assailant have the vestiges of a
dying declaration, the elements for its admissibility are:

" (1) the declaration was made by the deceased under consciousness of his impending death; (2)
the deceased was at time competent as a witness; (3) the declaration concerns the cause and
surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; and (4) it offered in a criminal case wherein the
declarant’s death is subject of inquiry."
27

These requirements are present in this case. The deceased made, before his death, more than one
statement, naming the person who shot him. The statements uttered by the deceased were in
response to the queries about the identity of the assailant. Such utterances are admissible as a
declaration of the surrounding circumstances of the victim’s death, which were uttered under the
consciousness of an impending death. That the victim was conscious of his impending death is
shown by the extent and seriousness of the wounds inflicted upon the victim. The victim, prior to his
death, was competent to be a witness in court and such dying declaration is offered in a criminal
prosecution for murder where he was himself a victim.

In a further but futile attempt to exculpate himself from liability, appellant contends that he has no
motive to kill the victim. While he admitted that the victim eloped with his wife, he was not the only
suspect having a motive to kill the victim. Suffice it to say that the evidence on motive is
inconsequential when the identity of the culprit has been positively established as in this case.
28 

Ultimately, the issues raised by appellant fall within the sphere of credibility of witnesses which, the
reviewing court on appeal, ordinarily gives deference to the assessments and conclusion of the trial
court provided it is supported by the evidence on record. Findings of facts by the trial court are
usually not disturbed on appeal on the proposition that the lower court had the unique opportunity of
having observed the elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses’ deportment on the
stand while testifying.

The killing was attended by treachery when the deceased was shot at his back while lying on a
carabao sledge conversing with his father, in a sudden and unexpected manner giving him no
opportunity to repel it or defend himself against such attack, and without any provocation on his
29 

part. With respect to the other aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, abuse of
superior strength, and nighttime, this Court cannot appreciate the same against the appellant for lack
of factual basis. There is no evidence on record that appellant contemplated and took some time of
cool reflection before performing his evil act for evident premeditation to set in. The abuse of
superior strength, assuming there is any, is already absorbed in treachery. Nighttime as an
aggravating circumstance was not established for lack of proof that appellant specifically sought the
darkness of night to perpetuate his deed. In the absence of any evidence that nocturnity was
specifically sought for by the offender in the commission of the crime, such aggravating
circumstance may not be validly appreciated.

In criminal prosecutions, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond a
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as,
excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that
degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The prosecution ably
30 

discharged its duty by establishing its case against appellant through the required quantum of proof.

In Criminal Case No. U-8720, appellant was found guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Ammunition punished under P.D. 1866 and was sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay the costs. His separate indictment was on account of the
unlicensed firearm used in the killing. Under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 8294, "if homicide or
31 

murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall
be considered as an aggravating circumstance." Although the crime in this case was committed in
1995, the amendatory law (R.A. No. 8294) which became effective on July 6, 1997, fifteen (15) days
after its publication in Malaya and Philippine Journal on June 21, 1997, since it is favorable to
appellant, shall be given a retroactive effect. Therefore, the illegal possession or use of the
32 

unlicensed firearm may no longer be separately charged and only one offense should be
33 

punished, viz., murder in this case, and the use of unlicensed firearm should only be considered as
an aggravating circumstance. Considering that appellant is liable for murder, the illegal possession
34 

case can no longer be pursued because it is merely treated as an aggravating circumstance.

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes murder with reclusion perpetua to death.  Since the
1âwphi1

killing was committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such circumstance will be treated
merely as an aggravating circumstance under R.A. 8294. Pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code, when the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, such
as reclusion perpetua to death, there being one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty
(death) shall be applied. However, the aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm
cannot be appreciated in this case because its retroactive application would be unfavorable to the
accused, since the higher penalty of death would necessarily be imposed. Thus, we could only
impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua in line with the ruling in People vs. Nepomuceno, Jr. - 35 

"It must be underscored that although R.A. No. 7659 had already taken effect at the time the
violation of P.D. No. 1866 was allegedly committed x x x there is nothing in R. A. No. 7659 which
specifically reimposed the death penalty in P.D. No. 1866. Without such reimposition, the death
penalty imposed in Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 for aggravated illegal possession of firearm shall
remain suspended pursuant to Section 19(1) of Article III of the Constitution. Conformably therewith,
what the trial court could impose was reclusion perpetua."

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is hereby MODIFIED as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. U-8719 for MURDER, the penalty imposed on accused-appellant DOMINGO
VALDEZ Y DULAY is reduced to reclusion perpetua. In addition to the death indemnity of
₱50,000.00, the ₱200,000.00 moral damages awarded by the trial court to the heirs of Labrador
Valdez y Madrid is reduced to ₱50,000.00, and the ₱23,500.00 awarded as actual damages is
likewise reduced to ₱19,000.00, the amount actually proved.

2. In Criminal Case No. U-8720 for ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS, the sentence imposed
on accused-appelant DOMINGO VALDEZ y DULAY is SET ASIDE and ANNULLED and the case is
DISMISSED, the act charged therein being considered merely as an aggravating circumstance
pursuant to P.D. 1866, as amended by Rep. Act No. 8294.

SO ORDERED.

Erectors Inc. vs. NLRCErectors Inc. vs. NLRC

FACTS:
Erectors Inc. challenges the jurisdiction of respondent Labor Arbiter Julio Andres, Jr. to hear and
decide the complaint for underpayment of wages and non-payment of overtime pay filed by
private respondent Florencio Burgos, an overseas contract worker.

In September 1979, Erectors Inc. recruited Florencio Burgos to work in Saudi Arabia as a service
contract worker with a combined salary and allowance of $330/month. Their contract was
approved by the Ministry of Labor and Employment. However, the contract was not followed
because according to Erectors Inc, the position of service contract driver was no longer available.
They executed another contract which changed the position of Burgos to Helper/Laborer with
remuneration totaling just $210/month. He went to Saudi Arabia and finished his contract. Upon
his return to the Philippines, he invoked his first contract and demanded that petitioner pay the
difference between his salary and allowance as indicated in the said contract and the amount
actually paid to him plus his contractual bonus. He filed a complaint with Labor Arbiter against
Erectors Inc for underpayment of wages and non-payment of overtimes pay and contractual
bonus. While the case was still in conciliation stage, EO 797 creating the POEA took effect
which gave POEA the exclusive authority and jurisdiction over all cases including money claims
involving employer-employee relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract
involving Filipino workers for overseas employment. The Labor Arbiter proceeded to try the
case on the merits and rendered a decision in favor of Burgos, rendering Errectors Inc. to pay
Burgos.

Erectors Inc. then questioned the jurisdiction of Labor Arbiter Julio Andres Jr. considering the
enactment of EO 797.

Issue: W/N EO 797 should be applied retroactively and as such, divest the Labor Arbiter of his
jurisdiction over this case

Held:

Jurisdiction over subject matter is determined by the law in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. At the time of the filing of this case, the law in force were PD
1691 and PD 1391 which vested the regional offices of the Ministry of Labor and the Labor
Arbiters with “original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving employer-employee
relations including money claims arising out of any law or contracts involving OFWs. Therefore,
it is clear that the Labor Arbiter had jurisdiction over the case.

REPORT THIS AD

EO 797 was only promulgated after the filing of the above case. As a rule, laws should be
applied prospectively unless the legislative intent to give them retroactive effect is expressly
declared or necessarily implied from the language used (Art. 3 Civil Code) The court further held
that it failed to perceive in the language used that EO 797 an intention to give it retroactive
intent.

Furthermore, EO 797 is not a curative statute. A curative statute is enacted to cure defects in a
prior law or to validate legal proceedings, instruments or acts of public authorities which would
otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain existing legal requirements. EO 797 was
not intended to remedy any defect in the law. It created the POEA to assume the functions of the
Overseas Employment Development Board, the National Seamen Board, and the overseas
employment functions of the Bureau of Employment Services. The rule of prospectivity of laws
should apply to EO 797 and should not affect cases filed prior to its effectivity.

Erectors, Inc., v. NLRC

Full Text: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/may1996/104215.htm

Facts:
In September 1979, Erectors recruited Florencio Burgos to work as Service Contract Driver in Saudi
Arabia for 12 months with a salary of $165 and an allowance of $165 per month. Burgos will also be
entitled a bonus of $1ooo if after the 12-month period, he renews/extends his contract without availing his
vacation or home leave  His contract was approved by the Ministry of Labor and Employment.
However, the contract was not implemented. In December 1979, Erectors notified Burgos that the position
of Service Driver was no longer available. On December 14, 1979, they executed another contract
changing his position from driver to laborer with a salary of $105 and an allowance of $105 per month.
This contract was not submitted to the MLE.
On December 1979, Burgos left the country and worked at Erectors Buraidah Sports Complex project in
Saudi Arabia as a laborer. He received a monthly salary and allowance of $210. Burgos renewed his
contract after one year and his salary and allowance were increased to $231.
Burgos returned to Philippines on August 1981. He then invoked his first employment contract.
He demanded the difference between his salary and allowance in teh said contract and the amount paid
to him.
On March 1982, Burgos filed wiht the Labor Arbiter a complaint for underpayment of wages and non-
payment of overtime pay and bonus.
While his case was still in conciliation stage, EO 797 creating POEA was established  Sec 4(a) of E) 797
vested the POEA with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases including money claims, involving
employer-employee relationship arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers
for overseas employment."
Despite EO 797, Labor Arbiter proceeded to try the case and rendered judgement in favor of Burgos. In
view of EO 797, Erectors questioned the jurisdiction of the LA in NLRC. NLRC dismissed the petitioner's
appeal and upheld the LA's jurisdiction.

Issue:
Whether or not EO 797 applies retroactively to affect pending cases, including the complaint filed by
Burgos.

Held:
No. The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the law in force at the time of the
commencement of the action.  On March 31, 1982, at the time private respondent filed his complaint
against the petitioner, the prevailing laws were Presidential Decree No. 1691 and Presidential Decree No.
1391 which vested the Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor and the Labor Arbiters with "original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving employer-employee relations including money claims arising
out of any law or contracts involving Filipino workers for overseas employment." At the time of the filing of
the complaint, the Labor Arbiter had clear jurisdiction over the same.
Hence, in spite of the existence of dispute or controversy between the parties during the course of
the Subcontract Agreement, HRCC had agreed to continue the performance of its obligations
pursuant to the Subcontract Agreement. In view of the provision of the Subcontract Agreement,
HRCC is deemed to have effectively waived its right to effect extrajudicial rescission of its contract
with FFCCI. Accordingly, HRCC, in the guise of rescinding the Subcontract Agreement, was not
justified in implementing a work stoppage. F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc. vs. HR Construction Corp.; G.R. No.
187521. March 14, 2012

Contracts; waiver of rights under contract. Waiver is defined as “a voluntary and intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or
privilege, which except for such waiver the party would have enjoyed; the voluntary abandonment or
surrender, by a capable person, of a right known by him to exist, with the intent that such right shall
be surrendered and such person forever deprived of its benefit; or such conduct as warrants an
inference of the relinquishment of such right; or the intentional doing of an act inconsistent with
claiming it.”
FFCCI’s voluntary payment in favor of HRCC, albeit in amounts substantially different from those
claimed by the latter, is a glaring indication that it had effectively waived its right to demand for the
joint measurement of the completed works. FFCCI’s failure to demand a joint measurement of
HRCC’s completed works reasonably justified the inference that it had already relinquished its right
to do so. F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc. vs. HR Construction Corp.;  G.R. No. 187521. March 14, 2012
Guy v CA
G.R. No. 163707. September 15, 2006

Facts:
Karen Oanes Wei, a minor by and through her mother Remedios Oanes, filed a petition for
letters of administration before the RTC of Makati. Respondents alleged that they are duly
acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who died intestate in Makati on October 29, 1992,
leaving an estate of P10,000,000.00 consisting of real and personal properties. His known heirs are
his surviving spouse Shirley Guy and children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael, all
surnamed Guy. Respondents are a asking for an appointment of a regular administrator for the
orderly settlement of Sima Wei’s estate. They also want to appoint Michael C. Guy as Special
Administrator of the Estate. Petitioner is praying for the dismissal of the petition for the reason that his
deceased father left no debts and that his estate can be settled without securing letters of
administration. He argued that private respondents should have established their status as illegitimate
children during the lifetime of Sima Wei.

Issues:
1. WoN private respondent’s petition should be dismissed for failure to comply with rules on non-
forum shopping?
2. WoN the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes private respondents from claiming their
Successional Rights?
3. WoN private respondents are barred by prescription from proving filiation?

Held:
1. Yes, the petition lacks merit. The law provides that certification of non-forum should be executed by
the plaintiff or the principal party. Failure to comply means cause for a dismissal of the case. Merits of
the case and the absence of an intention to violate rule with impunity should be considered to temper
the strict application of the rules.
2. Private respondents cannot be bar from claiming successional rights. To be valid and effective,
waiver must be couched clearly and in unequivocal terms to leave no doubt with regards to the
intention of a party in giving up a right or benefit legally pertains to. Waiver cannot be attributed to a
person if it not explicitly and clearly evinces intent to abandon a right. This case has no waiver of
hereditary rights.
3. Private respondents must not be barred from proving filiation because the law provides that filiation
of an illegitimate child is established by a record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment, or an admission by means of a public document or a private handwritten instrument. Action
for recognition may be brought by the child during his/her lifetime. However, action must be based
upon open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child.

CIR vs. PRIMETOWN PROPERTY, G.R. No. 162155, Case Digest

On March 11, 1999, Primetown Property Group, Inc., through its vice chair, applied for the refund or credit of
income tax respondent paid in 1997 due to the slowdown of the real estate industry where respondent
suffered losses. With this, it contended that it was not liable for income taxes. Nevertheless, respondent paid
its quarterly corporate income tax and remitted creditable withholding tax from real estate sales to the BIR
therefore, respondent was entitled to tax refund or tax credit.
On May 13, 1999, revenue officer required respondent to submit additional documents to support its claim. 
Respondent complied but its claim was not acted upon. Thus, on April 14, 2000, it filed a petition for review in
the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).

On December 15, 2000, the CTA dismissed the petition as it was filed beyond the two-year prescriptive period
for filing a judicial claim for tax refund or tax credit as it found that respondent filed its final adjusted return
on April 14, 1998. Thus, its right to claim a refund or credit commenced on that date.

Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 deal
with the same subject matter the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is equivalent to
365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year
is composed of 12 calendar months. Needless to state, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the number of
days is irrelevant.

There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing legal periods under the Civil
Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, we hold that Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law, governs the computation of legal periods.

We therefore hold that respondent's petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was filed on the last day of the 24th
calendar month from the day respondent filed its final adjusted return. Hence, it was filed within the
reglementary period.