Islam in South Asia

Islam is the second largest religion in South Asia with about

600 million Muslims, forming about one-third of South Asia's Muslims of South Asia
population. South Asia has the largest population of Muslims
in the world, with about one-third of all Muslims being from
South Asia.[18][19][20][18][19][20] Islam is the dominant religion
in half of the South Asian countries (Afghanistan, Bangladesh,
Maldives and Pakistan). In India, Islam is the second-largest
religion while in Sri Lanka and Nepal it is the third-largest
religion.

Islam existed in South Asian communities along the Arab

coastal trade routes in Sindh, Gujarat, Kerala, Ceylon, and
Bengal as soon as the religion originated and had gained early
acceptance in the Arabian Peninsula, though the first
incursion through sea by the new Muslim successor states of
the Arab World occurred around 636 CE or 643 AD, during United Nations cartographic map of
the Rashidun Caliphate, long before any Arab army reached South Asia
the frontier of India by land. The Barwada mosque in Ghogha,
Gujarat built before 623 CE and Cheraman Juma Mosque in Total population
Methala, Kerala (629 CE) are two of the first mosques in South c. 600 million (31%)[1][2][3][4][5]
Asia which were built by seafaring Arab
[21][22][23][24][25] Regions with significant
merchants. The connection between the Sind
populations
and Islam was established by the initial Muslim missions
during the Rashidun Caliphate. Al-Hakim ibn Jabalah al-Abdi, Pakistan 200,300,000[6]
who attacked Makran in the year 649 AD, was an early (2017)
partisan of Ali ibn Abu Talib. During the caliphate of Ali, many India 195,000,000[7]
Hindus of Sindh had came under influence of Shi'ism and (2019)
some even participated in the Battle of Camel and died
fighting for Ali. Under the Umayyads (661 – 750 AD), many 149,100,000[8]
Shias sought asylum in the region of Sindh, to live in relative Bangladesh (2017)
peace in the remote area. After the Islamic conquest of Persia 34,000,000[9]
was completed, the Muslim Arabs then began to move towards Afghanistan (2017)
the lands east of Persia and in 652 captured Herat.[26] In 712
Sri Lanka 2,000,000[10]
CE, a young Arab general Muhammad bin Qasim conquered
most of the Indus region for the Umayyad empire, to be made (2011)
the "As-Sindh" province with its capital at Al- Nepal 1,300,000[11]
Mansurah.[27][28][29][30][31] By the end of the 10th century CE, (2017)
the region was ruled by several Hindu Shahi kings who would Maldives 540,000[12][13]
be subdued by the Ghaznavids. Islam arrived in North India in
(2017)
the 12th century via the Ghurids conquest and has since
become a part of India's religious and cultural heritage. Bhutan ≤2,000[14] (2010)
Religions
The Delhi Sultanate and the Mughal Empire have ruled most
of South Asia and the Bengal Sultanate, the Deccan sultanates Islam (vast majority Sunni and
and the Sur Empire have played major economic and political significant minority Shia)
roles.[32][33] Muslims have played a prominent role in India's
economic rise and cultural influence.[34] The peak of the Languages
Islamic rule in South Asia was marked under the sharia and Predominant spoken language
proto-industrialised[35] reign of emperor Aurangzeb, the Urdu
world's largest economy, upon the compilation and
Recognized regional languages
establishment of the Fatawa Alamgiri.[36][37][38] The
Bengali, Punjabi, Pashto, Sindhi,
introduction of further Islamic policies by Mysore King Tipu
Saraiki, Dari, Hindi,[15] Balochi,
Sultan contributed to the South Indian culture.[39][40]
Kashmiri, Maldivian, and other
languages of South Asia[16]

Contents Sacred language

Arabic[17]
History
Early history of South Asian Muslims
Muslim conquest of Sindh
Ghaznavid Sultanate
Delhi Sultanates
Regional empires of the 15th century
Mughal Empire
Disintegration
Eighteenth century onwards
1857 and its aftermath
Colonial rule and freedom movement
After Independence
Pakistan
Bangladesh
India
Conversions
Demographics
Movements
Deobandi
Barelvi
Ahl-e Hadith
Ethnocentrism
See also
References
Citations
Sources

History

Early history of South Asian Muslims

A small Muslim presence in South Asia was established on the southern coasts of India and Sri
Lanka in the early eighth century.[41] A commercial Middle Eastern presence on South Asia's
western coasts pre-dated the emergence of Islam. With the rise of Islam the Arab arrivals became
Muslims.[42] The Muslim mercantile community received patronage from the local non-Muslim
rulers. Intermarriages with the local population in addition to further arrivals and conversions
increased the Muslim population.[41] The Muslim population became more indigenous with the
birth of children to Arab merchants married with local women.[42] Moreover, local non-Muslim
authorities sent children to the Arabs to have them learn maritime skills.[43]

In one early, but disputed, account of Islam in the Malabar region, Muslims are described as
descendants of a Hindu king who had seen the miracle of the moon splitting performed by the
Prophet Muhammad. On a similar note, Tamil Muslims on the eastern coasts also claim that they
converted to Islam in the Prophet's lifetime. The local mosques date to the early 700s.[41] The
scholars, rulers, traders and literate Muslims in the south were more predisposed to their Indian
Ocean links than to the north's Central Asian connections. The southern Muslims employed Arabic
instead of Persian and followed Shafi'i jurisprudence instead of Central Asia's Hanafi
jurisprudence.[44] Because the Islamic authority in the Middle East established Arabic as a lingua
franca for the Indian Ocean basin's commercial community, the status of Muslim Arabs in Malabar
was raised by Arabic literacy.[42]

Muslim conquest of Sindh

Unlike the coasts of Malabar, the northwestern coasts were not as receptive to the Middle Eastern
arrivals. Hindu merchants in Sindh and Gujarat perceived the Arab merchants to be competitors.
The Umayyads came into conflict with Sindh's Hindu rulers over piracy in the maritime trade
routes. The rulers of Sindh had failed to control this piracy (or maybe they had benefited from
it).[45] When in 711 the locals seized a ship that was travelling to the Umayyad dynasty, an
expedition was sent out by the Umayyads to conquer Sindh.[45][46] The expedition, led by the
young Muhammad Bin Qasim, was made up of both an overland and naval army.[46] The conquest
might have been assisted by Mahayana Buddhists struggling against Brahmins for political
reasons.[45]

The Arab conquerors, contrary to popular beliefs about Muslims, did not have an interest in
converting the local populations.[46] Local Sindhi Hindus and Buddhists were accorded dhimmi
status.[46][45] This was the first instance of this status being conferred upon peoples not mentioned
in the Quran.[45] Although a few select temples were destroyed initially, religious life continued as
it had done before.[47] Eventually, most Sindhis became Muslim.[48] While Sindh had been ruled
by a Brahmin in the early 700s the local population had then also comprised Jains, Buddhists and
followers of various cults, contrary to the perception that South Asian Muslims were largely
converts from Hinduism.[46] Evidence about Sindhi conversions during the early period of Arab
rule indicates that converts originated from the higher, rather than lower, echelons of local society,
choosing to incorporate themselves into the Muslim ruling class by virtue of a common religious
identity.[48]

Ghaznavid Sultanate
With the weakening of the Abbasid Caliphate, Mamluks declared themselves independent
sultanates.[49][45] Muslim scholars propounded, especially after the end of the Abbasid Caliphate,
that each sultan should assume the role of caliph in their own area, a proposition known to some
as the "pious sultan" theory.[50] Mahmud who ruled the sultanate of Ghazna expanded his rule
into Punjab, transforming Lahore into both a border cantonment and vital center for Islamic
scholarship.[45] Mahmud's court was both urbane and sophisticated. He provided patron to works
on poetry, science and Sufism. The first Persian Sufi text in South Asia, Kashf al-Mahjub, was
composed in Ghaznavid Lahore by Shaykh Abul Hasan 'Ali Hujwiri, whose shrine is one of the
most important in South Asia. His work was to become a crucial source for early Sufi
philosophy.[48]

Sufi groups entered the Sultanate as Sunni missionaries; Suhrawardi Sufis actively opposed
Ismailis. These included Bahauddin Zakariya, centered in Multan, Sayyid Jalal Bukhari of Uch and
Ali Hujwiri of Lahore.[51] Mahmud also took part in religiopolitical issues. He opposed the Fatimid
presence in Sindh and invaded Sindh.[45] He carried out raids deep in the Gangetic plains and
political accounts claim that his policy was to loot Hindu temples.[52] There is a dispute among
historians if religion was a motive for the looting and what the extent of these activities was. There
is a consensus, however, that the loot acquired funded campaigns to the west of the Sultanate.[51]

Delhi Sultanates
Under Muhammad of Ghor's leadership a fresh current of
Persianized Turks initiated conquests of Ghaznavid
principalities in Punjab. They took Delhi by 1192, and Ajmer
and Kanauj afterwards. Quality horses and horsemanship
characterized their war arsenal.[49] Qutubuddin Aibek
assumed control over Delhi upon Ghori's demise.[49] His
dynasty came to be referred to as the Slave dynasty. In Bengal,
during the establishment of Qutb al-Din Aibak's general
Muhammad bin Bakhtiyar Khalji, the Islamic missionaries of
India achieved their greatest success in terms of dawah and
number of converts to Islam.[54][55] The Khiljis dynasty
extended Delhi's authority into the Deccan and were
succeeded by the Tughluq dynasty which fell victim to Timur's
raids who moved into Delhi in 1398.[49] Most of the sultanates'
populace continued to live as they did before but important
developments took place under the reign of the sultans. These Alai Gate and Qutub Minar were built
included the development of networks all over South Asia and during the Mamluk and Khalji
with Central Asia and the cultivation of Arab and Persian dynasties of the Delhi Sultanate.[53]
traditions.[56]

Their military prowess accorded protection to South Asia from upheavals caused by Mongols in the
thirteenth-century.[56] Scholars and others fleeing Mongol despoliation found sanctuary in South
Asia.[56][51] In this period conversions began of Punjab and Bengal's newly settled
agriculturists.[56] The sultans posited that their rule provided stability which allowed Islamic life to
prosper.[56] Their Islamic rhetoric meant the political supremacy of the Afghan and Sunni Turkic
elite. Despite such rhetoric, growing South Asian Muslim communities outside the sultanate were
recruited into the armies of Hindu kings who were warring against the Turkic sultans. Similarly,
the sultanate also included Hindu soldiers in their militaries.[51]
The Delhi Sultanate favoured the Shafi'i law, although most subcontinental Muslims followed
Hanafi jurisprudence. The administration's official structure included authoritative Islamic
scholars who guided qadis, or Islamic judges.[51][56] While the Delhi Sultanate was formally
Islamic and appointed Islamic scholars to high offices, their state policy was not based on Islamic
law. Their government was based on the pragmatisms surrounding the maintenance of minority
rule over a vast populace. The fourteenth century figure Ziya al-Din Barani criticised both Ala al-
Din Khalji and Muhammad Tughlug for their lack of concern with Islamic law.[57] To one Islamic
scholar, Ala al-Din asserted that his policies were based on state interest, rather than Islamic
injunctions.[58]

Iltumish delineated the role of sharia in shaping the politics of the predominantly non-Muslim
territory. Some scholars had requested that he apply Islamic law to compel Hindus to convert or
else be killed. But the vizier called it unrealistic because of the low Muslim population. Iltumish
ignored Islamic law by selecting his daughter as his heir. He declared, through his refusal to
shelter Khwarem Shah from Genghis Khan, that Delhi's Turkish authority would not participate in
the political struggles in eastern Islamic countries. He also legitimised his goals by acquiring a
letter of appointment from the caliph in Baghdad. His declaration that Indian law would not be
built fully upon Islamic law was apparently supported by the nobility. Eventually, Turkish
authority came to be characterised by the careful balance of the sharia with contemporary
needs.[59] Muslim scholars outside India had already effectively accepted the limitation of religious
law to family and proprietary matters as long as the rulers did not formally reject the authority of
sharia over all aspects of life.[50]

Regional empires of the 15th century

Regional states emerged in the 1400s and early 1500s, providing for a cultural flowering. While
sultans still ruled Delhi, their territorial authority was restricted.[60] As the Delhi Sultanate
weakened, governors in many regions declared independence.[51] In 1406 Malwa, south of Delhi,
became independent. Under the Sharqi dynasty Jaunpur overtook Delhi in importance. Bengal
became independent during Firoz Shah Tughluq's rule. These kingdoms all became intellectual
centers and housed important Sufis.[60] The regional dynasties provided patronage to Sufi leaders
to justify their independence from Delhi.[51]

By the middle of the 1300s, the Deccan's Bahmanid dynasty became independent of Delhi. By the
beginning of the 1500s this kingdom split further into five smaller kingdoms which continued to
exist during the Mughal rule. The development of Dakhni Urdu was a major cultural milestone in
this time.[61] These regional kingdoms often fought each other and also fought against, and
sometimes with, the Hindu-ruled Vijayanagara empire. They also interacted and came into conflict
with the Portuguese, who were on the coasts.[62] The "long fifteenth century" ended with
Muhammad Zahiruddin Babur, later considered the founder of the Mughal empire, defeating the
last Lodhi sultan in 1526.[63]

Mughal Empire
Babur's rule lasted only four years and both him and his successor, Humayun, did little more than
to establish frontier garrisons. The Surs, resurgent Afghans who ruled until Humayun retook
power in his life's final year, laid the foundation for road infrastructure and agricultural surveys.
The Mughal dynasty was to be established as an empire under Humayun's heir, Akbar, who
expanded Mughal frontiers.[65] Akbar sought to build the empire upon an inclusive elite. He
initiated his dynasty's custom of taking Rajput brides without converting them to Islam. The
Mughal elite also included Shia Persians, some local and Arab Muslims, Rajputs, Brahmins and
Marathas. The state's unifying ideology was based on loyalty to the ruler instead of tribal affinities
or Islamic identity. The ideology incorporated the mainly non-Muslim lower officials.[66]

Akbar's teachings, known as din-i-ilahi, drawn from Islam,

Hinduism and Zoroastrianism,[67] were a pivot for a few court
members who took Akbar to be their spiritual, in addition to
royal, head.[68] The inner circle included a few Hindus
including Birbal and Todal Mal. Opposition came from the
court ulama, most famously from Abdul Qadir Badayuni, due
to whom Akbar was remembered for apostasy. Akbar
supported translating the Sanskrit texts of Mahabharata and The Taj Mahal in Agra, India. It was
the Ramayana into Persian and he abolished the jizya, which built under Mughal emperor Shah
was taxed from non-Muslims.[69] Jahan in the 17th century, and
represents Indo-Islamic architecture.
A major issue concerned assimilation and syncretism. The
Delhi Sultanate and the Mughal Empire both generally
safeguarded and commissioned Hindus. This tendency was
epitomized by the policies of Akbar. A difficult issue was that
Hindus who converted to Islam often kept to much of their old
beliefs. Even worse, Sufi and Hindu mystics developed
proximity. Closer contacts between Sufis and Hindus were
encouraged by the influence of Chaitanya, Kabir and
Nanak.[70] These things worried pious Muslims, particularly in
the midst of political turbulence. They wrote against mystics Territorial peak of Mughal India
and to educate the converts. Syncretism was opposed by during the 17th century sharia rule,
Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi,[71] a popular Naqshbandi leader.[72] the world's largest economy (17th
His followers also denounced the mixing of Sufi and century).[64]
Upanishadic philosophies.[67]

Akbar's religious predispositions continued under Jahangir

who was devoted to both the Qadiri saint, Miyan Mir, and the
Vaishnava yogi, Gosain Jadrupp.[69] Initially, Jahangir also
enjoyed cordial relations with the Sufi Naqshbandis, who were
stricter than the Chishtis. But he could not tolerate criticism
from Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi who criticized the government
for failing to follow Islamic sharia law.[72]

One of the reasons for Akbar's success had been his

administrative reforms.[73] Aurangzeb is often blamed for
destroying the empire's administrative efficiency and
pluralism. He had competed with his brother Dara Shikoh for
the throne and the two have been considered ideological
adversaries.[74] Dara Shikoh followed Akbar's tradition and
searched for common religious truths from all religions.[75] Emperor Aurangzeb, the author of
Fatawa 'Alamgiri, reading Quran.
Among his works were the translation of the Sanskrit
Upanishads and Majmua'u'l-bahrain, a treatise connecting sufi
and Upanishadic philosophies. Aurangzeb charged Dara
Shikoh with apostasy.[76]

Aurangzeb created an image of himself as a pious Muslim ruler to disguise his violation of the
sharia when he incarcerated his father.[77] To strengthen his rule Aurangzeb quickly applied a
different kind of Islam. This was not easy because his imprisonment of his father had contravened
both the sharia and the people's sensibilities. Aurangzeb granted large gifts to the Meccan
authorities to improve his image and counter such criticism.[78] While Aurangzeb did shift the
empire's religious policy he did not seriously change it. Aurangzeb supported the ulama and had
Islamic judicial opinions compiled in the Fatawa Alamgiri.[76]

His personal piety led to the court's lifestyle becoming more austere. He banned court music and
the use of gold in male clothing. Painting also declined.[77] He had many mosques constructed,
such as the Badshahi mosque which is still the largest in South Asia, and a mosque inside Shah
Jahan's fort at Delhi. Aurangzeb also initiated a simpler architectural tradition for tombs.[79]
Aurangzeb imposed jizya, required by sharia, on the non-Muslim population, which drew disdain
from the non-Muslim population.[80] The Islamic orthodoxy played a role in alienating the Rajputs
upon whom the dynasty had depended since its beginning.[78]

Disintegration

Factors leading to the Mughal decline included the challenge to Mughal dominance posed by the
emergence of Maratha power, court factionalism, administrative breakdown,[81] Aurangzeb's
extremism[82] and his fixation with the wars in the Deccan.[83] Aurangzeb's military campaigns
had proven costly for the empire and further problems arose with the rural revolts by Marathas,
Sikhs and Jats.[84] By the early 1700s Mughal authority had declined in the face of regional
powers,[85] some of which were breakaway provinces, while others were powerful local heads who
had obtained ruling experience under the Mughals. Rajputs, some of whom had already rebelled
against Aurangzeb, were the most prominent of these. Others were the Marathas, Sikhs in Punjab
and the Jats. The breakaway provinces of Bengal, Hyderabad and Awadh continued pledging a
formal allegiance to the Mughals.[86]

Eighteenth century onwards

Muslim power quickly vaporized in the eighteenth century and was replaced with successor Hindu,
Sikh and Muslim states competing for power with the British East India Company.[87] The loss of
Muslim power to non-Muslims such as the Marathas and Sikhs strengthened calls for a "purist
Islam."[88] Shah Wali Allah, a notable eighteenth century Islamic revivalist,[88] criticized the way
religion was popularly practiced in India at the shrines and emphasized the importance of jihad
against infidels. His instruction had minimal impact while he was alive – even drawing poetic
satire for his attempt to view the Afghan invader, Ahmad Shah Abdali, as a liberator of Islam in the
subcontinent – but they provided an inspiration for Sunni Muslim scholars.[89]

Despite the defeat at the hands of Ahmad Shah Abdali, at the Battle of Panipat in 1761, the
Marathas continued to dominate the subcontinent's western regions until they were finally
conquered in 1818 by the British.[90] After defeating the Marathas the British became the
dominant power.[87] The effect of British rule was different for the various classes of the Muslim
population.[91] For the elite it meant the loss of their culture.[92] The institution of feudalism had
the same impact on Muslim peasants and landlords as it did on non-Muslims. But there were more
Muslim peasants in Bengal to be affected. Similarly, most weavers in Dacca were Muslim, so
Muslims suffered more even though Hindus weavers had also been affected by the Lancashire
competition.[93]

Islamic scholars reacted slowly to the British rule.[93] Shah Abdul Aziz, a leading scholar from
Delhi, had a good relationship with the British.[94] He issued an academic ruling that Indian
territories governed by the British were dar al-harb, to ease the minds of those who had to live
under non-Muslim administration[92] and to give practical guidance in issues which incur different
rulings in a dar ul-harb setting; i.e. interest rates.[95] Even though anti-colonial nationalists
interpreted this fatwa to support jihad against British rule, Shah Abdul Aziz believed that rebellion
against the British authority was unlawful because the British had given Muslims religious
freedom.[95] Sayyid Ahmad of Rai Bareilly actively encouraged the defence of Islamic culture, but
also refrained from actively resisting the East India Company.[96]

Saiyid Ahmad's ideas won significant support in northern India and thousands joined his Sufi
order.[97] In 1826 he and his followers departed on a three thousand mile journey, though
Rajputana, Sindh, Baluchistan and Afghanistan, and arrived in Charsadda, where he declared jihad
against the Sikhs who were ruling Punjab. Nearby Pathan chiefs, including Peshawar's sardars,
joined Saiyid Ahmad,[98] who established a state.[97] He was declared imam in January 1827 and
was given bai'a. However, Saiyid Ahmad's mujahideen were defeated in March after one sardar
from Peshawar, Yar Muhammad Khan, betrayed them. Yar Muhammad Khan was later defeated
by Saiyid Ahmed who established himself at Peshawar. The Pathans disliked foreign rule, even if it
was in Islam's name, and revolted, driving Saiyid Ahmad out and killing many of his tax
collectors.[98] The Sikhs killed Saiyid Ahmad, Shah Ismail and approximately six hundred
followers at the Battle of Balakot in 1831.[97][98] With the Sikhs' own defeat in 1849 by the East
India Company, all of the subcontinent was under Company rule.[95]

1857 and its aftermath

In less than a decade British control was disrupted by an army mutiny and civil unrest in northern
and central parts of India. There were many factors feeding the rebellion such as taxes, army
conditions and random dismissals of princes. Soldiers rallied around the Mughal emperor Bahaur
Shah Zafar, taking him as a symbolic leader. Hindu soldiers were initially dominant and the
strongest rebels included Hindu Marathas. Some ulama also supported the revolt but their role
was minor. Yet the British reprisals targeted Muslims in particular;[99] Delhi and Lucknow were
treated savagely.[100]

Many, especially younger, British administrators suspected a Muslim hand behind the uprising.
But Hindus had also been prominent.[100] The first mutinies were caused by Hindus concerned for
their caste and honour, civil uprisings were usually led by Hindus and most rebellious taluqdars in
Awadh were Hindus.[101] Furthermore, prominent Muslims such as Sayyid Ahmad Khan were
loyal to the British.[100] There was no support for the revolt from Bengali Muslims and Punjabi
Muslims joined the British troops as reinforcements.[100][102]

The rebellion, rather than being a Muslim revolt, was mainly by those who had felt aggrieved
under the British rule.[100] After the uprising, the British distrusted Muslims. This British position
changed by the late nineteenth century when the Muslims sought British protection for their
interests from the Hindu population.[103] Sir Syed Ahmed Khan led the process of Muslim
engagement with the British[104] and in large part cultivated the new image of Muslims as loyalists
of the British.[103]

Colonial rule and freedom movement

British Bengal was divided for administrative reasons.[105] The

new province contained a Muslim majority.[106] Dismayed
Bengali Hindus agitated against this move, political terrorism
characterizing their agitation.[105] The Muslim leadership,
disturbed by Hindu behavior, sought security in the new The 1921 Census of British India
province.[107] The formation of the Muslim League was the shows 69 million Muslims, 217
million Hindus out of a total
most significant outcome of the partition.[108] It was founded
population of 316 million.
by the Muslim elite in Dhaka in 1906 to safeguard Muslim
interests.[109] The League sent a deputation to Lord Minto in
1906 to ask for parliamentary representation for Muslims reflecting their political importance.[110]
The Minto-Morley Reforms in 1909 introduced the separate electorates system which reserved
seats for Muslims.[111]

In 1919, prominent ulama campaigned to defend the Ottoman caliphate in what became known as
the Khilafat Movement.[112] They were backed by Gandhi, partially out of principle and partially to
block the reuse of Muslims to support British authority.[113] By the time Gandhi was released from
imprisonment in 1924 Hindu Muslim relations had deteriorated.[114] Jinnah, once ambassador of
Hindu-Muslim unity and member of both the Congress and Muslim League felt isolated and was
unwanted by the Congress.[115] While in London he encountered and rejected Rahmat Ali's
proposal of a Muslim state called Pakistan.[116]

He returned to India[117] and in the 1936 elections the Muslim League won only a quarter of the
Muslim vote, the Congress 6 percent while the remaining 69 percent was won by regional parties
in the Muslim majority provinces.[118] The results demonstrated that neither the League nor the
Congress represented Muslims, whose politics were provincially oriented.[119] Jinnah turned his
attention to the Muslim majority provinces[118] and proposed a separate Muslim state at a Muslim
League session in Lahore in 1940.[120]

In the ensuing years of the Lahore resolution Jinnah and the League 's power gradually
consolidated.[121] By the end of World War II the League was a mass movement[122] and went into
the 1945–1946 elections solely over its Pakistan campaign.[123] It was victorious and won most
provincial and all central Muslim seats; winning the majority of Muslim seats in Bengal and the
Muslim minority provinces and a plurality in Punjab.[124] Many middle class Muslims had voted
for the League to escape Hindu competition while others had voted for ambitions about Islamic
law and moral authority.[125] Some ulama, including Deobandi, also backed the Pakistan demand
to live under the law of Islam.[125]

After the election victory Jinnah had gained a strong hand to negotiate with the Congress and the
British. The British Cabinet Mission proposed a three-tiered form of government for the Indian
Union.[126] Effectively, the League would have two large semi-autonomous territories inside a
loose federation.[127] Both the League and Congress accepted the plan[126] but on 10 July Nehru
spurned the notion of provincial groupings which comprised the plan.[128] To break the impasse
British Prime Minister sent the last Viceroy Lord Mountbatten. Frustrated with sharing power with
the League in the interim government the Congress agreed to a partition of Punjab and
Bengal.[129] Mountbatten presented the partition plan on 2 June 1947 to the Indian leadership. For
Jinnah it was a bitter pill and a disappointment for the League leaders who were embittered with
the British and Congress for not granting them six whole provinces.[130]

After Independence

Pakistan

Muslims in Pakistan found themselves in the only ever "Muslim" homeland.[131] In the decades
preceding partition the character of the new Muslim polity had been uncertain.[132] Pakistan's new
citizens were unprepared by the time of Partition.[132] Pakistan did not inherit central institutions
as India did. The strongest institution the country inherited was the military, attributable to the
fact that the British had recruited significantly from northwestern Muslim populations.[132] The
army ruled Pakistan for over half the post-Independence period.[133] The ideological character of
the state has been disputed, with Jinnah's 11 August speech apparently supportive of the notion
that the state was formed simply to protect Muslim interests and the ulama envisioning Pakistan
as an Islamic state.[133] Islamist thinker Abul A'la Maududi has been influential in Pakistan and
the ulama of the country increasingly shared his thoughts.[134] Pakistani politics became
intertwined with Afghanistan in the 1980s where a communist coup was supported by a Soviet
military presence.[135]

Millions of Afghan refugees and international resources poured in. The regime of military ruler,
General Zia ul Haq, was strengthened as he introduced Islamic laws.[135] Some attribute Zia's
Islamization to his Deobandi piety, others to his political interests.[136] The Jamaat e Islami
obtained political mileage under Zia ul Haq. Both the military and the United States saw the
backing of jihadi Islam as useful.[135] Unforeseen consequences of Zia's policies and promotion of
jihad included a growth of sectarianism and the civil war in Afghanistan after Soviet withdrawal,
which was mostly controlled by the Taliban by the middle of the 1990s. After 9/11 the United
States destroyed Taliban's power in Afghanistan with Pakistan's reluctant support.[135] The
country was at the time led by military ruler General Pervez Musharraf who did not share Zia's
promotion of Islamic law but support for religious parties grew while he was in power, partially in
protest against his pro-US policies. Elections in 2008 brought back major political parties instead
of Musharraf or the religious parties.[137]

Bangladesh

Many East Pakistanis soon became disillusioned with the new country, feeling colonised by the
predominantly Punjabi army and bureaucracy. The privilege for Urdu and English over Bengali
language was also a cause of disturbance. In 1971 Sheikh Mujib's Awami League was denied office
in spite of its electoral victory. East Pakistan separated. India, flooded with refugees, sided with
Bengal in the violent civil war. The first Constitution declared Bangladesh a secular state and
proscribed religious parties, in response to the wartime support groups such as the Bengali Jamaat
e Islami had given to Pakistan.[137]
However, Islam became more important after the mid-1970s. This global phenomena, relevant
also in Pakistan, was partly a response to the oil boom which was accompanied with opportunities
for poorer nations in the Muslim world. Religion also comprised part of the expression of populist
governments.[137] A 1975 coup against Mujib brought in administrations which supported religious
institutions and developed closer ties with the Muslim world.[138] Islam became the state religion
by a constitutional amendment in 1988. Bangladeshi politics has been dominated by two parties:
the Awami Party and its contender, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party.[139]

India

For Muslims in India, Pakistan was a triumph which instantly turned into a defeat.[140] By voting
in the 1945-6 elections they had stated that Islam required a state of its own.[141] But they were to
live an Islamic life without fulfillment after 1947.[142] India, unusually for new countries in the
1950s, successfully sustained a lively democracy. Muslims in the 1960s voted for the Congress,
which solicited them, but since then have voted for whichever party appears likely to cater to
Muslim interests. Muslims were stereotyped negatively with disloyalty and Pakistani sympathies,
particularly after the 1980s. This was partially a tactic to unite Hindus and partly a surrogate for
government opposition.[139]

Hindu nationalist groups and complicit state officials campaigned against the Babri Mosque,
allegedly constructed on Ram's birthplace.[139] A pogrom took place in Gujarat in 2002.[143] The
defeat of the BJP brought in a more accommodating government under which a committee was
created on the Muslims' socio-economic status. The committee's Sachar report refuted the
perception of Muslim "appeasement" by showing the poor and underrepresented status of India's
Muslims. Despite individual cases of success the report pointed out significant barriers faced by
the large Muslim population.[144]

Conversions
The Islamic ambitions of the sultans and Mughals had concentrated in expanding Muslim power,
not in seeking converts. Evidence of the absence of systematic programs for conversion is the
reason for the concentration of South Asia's Muslim populations outside the main core of the
Muslim polities[145] in the northeast and northwest regions of the subcontinent, which were on the
peripheries of Muslim states.[146]

Another theory propounds that Indians embraced Islam to obtain privileges. There are several
historical cases which apparently bolster this view. Ibn Battuta records that Khalaji sultans
rewarded converts with robes. Old censuses report that many landed north Indian families became
Muslim to avoid penalties for failure to pay taxes. This view could encompass Sind's Amils,
Maharashtra's Parasnis and the Kayasthas and Khatris who fostered Islamic traditions under
government service. However, this theory cannot resolve the large amount of conversions in the
peripheral regions of Bengal and Punjab because state support would diminish further out from
their main areas.[147]

One view among historians is that converts seeking to escape the Brahmin dominated caste
structure were attracted to sufi egalitarianism.[145] This notion has been popular among South
Asian, particularly Muslim, historians.[148] But there is no relation between the areas with
significant numbers of conversions and those regions with Brahminical influence.[145] The areas
which the 1872 census found to have Muslim majorities had not only been distant from the core of
the Muslim states but had also not been assimilated into the Hindu and Buddhist communal
structures by the time of Islam's advent in those areas. Bengali converts were mostly indigenous
peoples who only had light contact with Brahminism. A similar scenario applied with the Jat clans
which ultimately made up the mass of the Punjabi Muslim community.[149]

The sufis did not preach egalitarianism, but played an important role in integrating agricultural
settlements with the larger contemporary cultures. In areas where Sufis received grants and
supervised clearing of forestry they had the role of mediating with worldly and divine authority.
Richard Eaton has described the significance of this in the context of West Punjab and East
Bengal, the two main areas to develop Muslim majorities.[150] The partition was eventually made
possible because of the concentration of Muslim majorities in northwest and northeast India.[151]
The overwhelming majority of the subcontinent's Muslims live in regions which became Pakistan
in 1947.[152]

The Islamisation of Bengal and South Asia in general was very slow. The process can be seen to
comprise three different features. Richard Eaton describes them, in order, as inclusion,
identification and displacement. In the inclusion process Islamic agencies were added to Bengali
cosmology. In the identification process the Islamic agencies fused with the Bengali deities. In the
displacement process the Islamic agencies took the place of the local deities.[153]

Punjabis and Bengalis retained their pre-Islamic practices.[154] The premier challenge to the purity
of Islam in medieval South Asia had neither been from the court nor from the Maratha raids, but
from the rural converts, who were ignorant of Islamic requirements, and from the insidious
influence of Hinduism in their lives.[155] Punjabis, in the words of Mohammed Mujeeb, relied
spiritually on magic[156] while Bengali Muslims were reported to participate in Durga Puja,
worship of Sitala and Rakshya Kali and resorting to Hindu astrologers. In both Punjab and Bengal
Islam was viewed as just one of several methods to seek redress for ordinary problems.[157]

These nominal conversions to Islam, brought about by regional Muslim polities, were followed by
reforms, especially after the 17th century, in which Muslims integrated with the larger Muslim
world. Improved transport services in the nineteenth century brought Muslim masses into contact
with Mecca which facilitated reformist movements stressing Quranic literalism and making people
aware of the differences between Islamic commands and their actual practices.[157]

Islamic reformist movements, such as the Fara'izi, in the nineteenth century rural Bengal aimed to
remove indigenous folk practices from Bengali Islam and commit the population exclusively to
Allah and Muhammad.[158] Politically the reform aspect of conversion, emphasizing exclusiveness,
continued with the Pakistan movement for a separate Muslim state[157] and a cultural aspect was
the assumption of Arab culture.[159]

Demographics
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Muslims Percentage by Country[160][8][161][161][162][163][164][11][165][166]
Afghanistan, and the Maldives Country Percent
are Muslim-majority countries. Maldives   100%
India, a Hindu-majority Afghanistan   99%
country with a Muslim Pakistan   96.28%
population of 14.5%, has the Bangladesh   90.4%
India   14.5%
Sri Lanka   9.71%
largest Muslim population Nepal   4.4%
outside of the Muslim-majority Bhutan   0.2%
countries.[167]

Movements

Deobandi
The British authorities' westernisation policies effectively destroyed the exclusive hold of the
ulama over education and curtailed their administrative influence. In an environment where the
Muslim community lacked power, the ulama invested their efforts into maintaining the Muslim
society. The most significant efforts were spearheaded by those ulama who followed Shah Wali
Allah and were inspired by Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi's jihad. However, the failure of the 1857
rebellion and the British reaction ensured that their jihad would take a different form. Following
Barelvi's reformism they emphasized sharia and study of the revealed rather than rational
sciences.[168]

They shunned all British, Hindu and Shia influences and only permitted some Sufi practices while
completely proscribing the concept of intercession at the shrines. These ulama concentrated at the
Deoband madrasa which was established by Muhammad Qasim Nanawtwi and Rashıd Ahmad
Gangohi in 1867. They stressed the scripture. According to them knowledge of divine law and
expected Muslim behavior was a prerequisite for conserving the Muslim community in the British
era.[168] Lacking state power, they also encouraged the role of the individual conscience to ensure
compliance with the law.[169] They urged followers to ponder over their actions and evoked
Judgement Day.[170]

Barelvi
Pre-reformist conceptions, fueled by resistance to reform, hardened around the late 19th century
scholar Ahmad Rada Khan from Bareilly. He justified the customary Islam, associated with
obtaining intercession to God from saints, with his scholarly Hanafi credentials. If Deobandis had
wanted to preserve Islam as they perceived it to be in the Hanafi texts, the Barelvis desired to
preserve Islam as they understood it in the nineteenth century subcontinent. They propagated
their ideas eagerly and denunciation, sometimes even violence, characterised their relations with
the Ahl i Hadith and Deobandis.[170]

Ahmad Rada Khan sought to highlight even more highly the status of the Prophet. He emphasised
the Sufi belief pertaining to the Prophet's light. By approving the shrines Ahmad Rada Khan
catered to the needs of the illiterate rural population. He shared with his contemporaries the
emphasis on the Prophet, who stressed emulation of his life.[171]

Ahl-e Hadith
The Ahl i Hadith shared the Deobandis' reformist and revivalist roots but believed that they did
not do enough. Their religious ideas were more radical, more sectarian and they came from a more
elite class. They shared the Deobandis' commitment to cleansing Muslim culture of acts not in
compliance with the Sharia. But while the Deobandis espoused taqlid and embraced the Islamic
scholarship they had inherited, the Ahl i Hadith repudiated it and directly used the textual sources
of the Quran and Sunnah and advocated deploying the methodologies used by the original jurists
of the Islamic schools of thought. This methodology meant that the followers would have a heavy
individual duty. To enforce this duty the Ahl i Hadith completely spurned Sufism. They feared
judgement day and the writings of Nawab Siddiq Hasan, a prominent member, reflected fear of
doomsday.[172]

Ethnocentrism
Muslim communities in South Asia apply a system of social stratification. It developed as a result
of ethnic segregation between the foreign conquerors (Ashraf) and the local converts (Ajlaf).

Indian Muslims were primarily divided ethnically between the Ashraf, descendants of Afghan and
Middle Eastern arrivals, and the Ajlaf, who were descended from native converts. The ashraf were
distinguished by their urbane culture and they included the Sayeds, Sheikhs, Mughals and
Pathans. The highest percentage claiming foreign ancestry was in the UP (where 41.1 percent
declared foreign roots in the 1931 census)[16] with Urdu as their language. The ashraf comprised
landowning, administrative and professional echelons of society and are known to be the principal
pioneers of Muslim separatism as they would have been impacted most by Hindu domination.[151]
Most Indian Muslims were ajlaf and spoke regional languages such as Punjabi, Bengali and
Sindhi.[173] They were mainly peasants, merchants and craftsmen such as weavers. Muslims
throughout India were mainly agrarian. A feeling of poverty compared to the prosperous Hindu
elite and middle class was politically important.[174]

See also
Shia Islam in the Indian subcontinent

Islam in Afghanistan
Islam in Bangladesh
Islam in India
Islam in Pakistan
Islam in the Maldives
Islam in Sri Lanka
Islam in Nepal
Islam in Bhutan

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