Road Space Reallocation According

to Car Congestion Externality

Carlos Alberto González-Guzmán1 and Francesc Robusté2

Abstract: The mobility management tool proposed in this paper estimates the percentage of road space that should be reallocated from
private vehicles to public transport according to internalization of the congestion externality generated by private vehicles. This reallocation
measure could be implemented on a strategic mobility corridor in the city. The initial increase in trip time that a private vehicle experiences
because of the reduction of its road space favors an improvement in mobility. This improved scenario is characterized by a more efficient
reassignment of the traffic of private vehicles in the network, a modal change toward public transport, and better trip times in public transport.
This tool could achieve a better social welfare compared to an uncontrolled user equilibrium condition. It could have, under specific circum-
stances, similar results to those by road pricing regarding the discouragement of the travel demand of automobiles and a greater acceptance on
behalf of citizens and local administrations. DOI: 10.1061/(ASCE)UP.1943-5444.0000070. © 2011 American Society of Civil Engineers.
CE Database subject headings: Transportation management; Travel demand; Traffic management; Traffic capacity; Urban areas.
Author keywords: Transportation management; Travel demand; Traffic management; Traffic capacity; Urban areas.

Introduction
The key task for urban transport sustainability is to understand the
urban road space as a scarce resource, the use of which must be
rationalized according to greater operative and environmental
efficiency of the urban transport system. The practical evidence
shows that an equitable distribution of the travellers according
to the mode of transport is not sufficient, because even though pri-
vate transport, public transport, and other nonmechanized modes
(walking and cycling) had equal parts of the total of trips carried
out in a town, more than 80% of the network is being used by pri-
vate vehicles in many cities of developed countries.
This situation gives rise to a complex situation: the free individ-
ual decisions regarding the purchase and use of private vehicles
conflicts with the welfare of society, because the negative external-
ities that the private vehicle generates largely exceed those of public
transport, and more specifically, private transport requires more
space on the road network and generates more contamination
per passenger than public transport. This gives rise to the need
of developing tools for the management of urban road space to
give priority to public transport. However, if public transport is fa-
vored and there is no penalty for the use of private vehicles, the
demand that public transport could attract from uses of private
transport would be replaced by a potential demand for private
vehicles.
1
Graduate Researcher, School of Civil Engineering, Technical Univ. of
Catalonia (UPC), Campus North, Building B1-006, Jordi Girona St. 1-3,
08034, Barcelona, Spain (corresponding author). E-mail: cargonza6@
gmail.com
2
Professor of Transportation, School of Civil Engineering, Technical
Univ. of Catalonia (UPC), Campus North, Building B1-101, Jordi Girona
St. 1-3, 08034, Barcelona, Spain.
Note. This manuscript was submitted on April 1, 2010; approved on
October 25, 2010; published online on August 15, 2011. Discussion period
open until February 1, 2012; separate discussions must be submitted for
individual papers. This paper is part of the Journal of Urban Planning
and Development, Vol. 137, No. 3, September 1, 2011. ©ASCE, ISSN
0733-9488/2011/3-281–290/$25.00.
From the point of view of economic theory, the use of prices has
been widely defined as the mechanism that guarantees an efficient
use of road infrastructures. After the pioneer task of Pigou (1920),
writers such as Walters (1961) and Vickrey (1963) established the
bases to fix an optimal tax for the use of infrastructure in accor-
dance with the costs of congestion. Recently, this idea has gained
force in multiple theoretical and empirical reports: Newbery
(1990), Hau (2005a, b), Small (1992), Small and Gomez-Ibáñez
(1998), Nash et al. (2000), Nash and Sansom (2001), and DeBorger
and Proost (2001) among others; today, it is the policy established
by the European Commission (1995, 1998, 2001). Thus, conges-
tion pricing has gained great importance as an effective tool for
traffic management to achieve several objectives, such as reducing
emissions and promoting improvements in public transport (Yang
and Zhang 2002; TfL 2005).
In spite of its technical coherence and sufficient theoretical sup-
port, the introduction of congestion tax always implies a high ret-
icence from the citizens because it is a monetary penalty with a
political cost for the local authorities, who have to make the deci-
sions. Several writers such as Rentziou et al. (2011), Ison and Rye
(2005), and Cain (2005) show that gaining public acceptability re-
mains a major barrier in implementing congestion pricing in urban
environments. This is one practical reason why alternative tools to
manage traffic congestion, such as capacity reallocation strategies,
have been explored.
Pulichino and Coughlin (2005) stress the need for implementing
innovative policies to give priority to public transport systems to
mitigate the growing traffic congestion in urban environments.
This improvement in urban mobility is done by offering competi-
tive levels of service in public transport through schedule adherence
and high commercial speeds, among other operational features, to
attract more users from private vehicles. A piece of research con-
ducted on 11 case studies (European, North American, and South
American cities) shows that opposition to preferential treatment
initiatives was not from the general public but from influential
interest groups, which suggests that the principles of preferen-
tial treatment have gained greater public acceptability in re-
cent years.

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 A review made by Johnston et al. (1995) on a variety of existing
and proposed methods for allocating existing highway capacity to
lessen congestion (these schemes take a variety of approaches to
distribute limited roadway capacity so that congestion is reduced
and roadway use is available to certain groups of users) shows that
even though both equity and efficiency criteria are important for
such allocations and pose difficult problems, the potential capacity
cost savings achievable with capacity-allocation methods may be
considerable. Allocation methods might spread traffic-demand
peaks to more efficiently use existing roadway capacity, avoiding
construction of new capacities that may only be needed for a few
hours each day. Alternatively, allocation techniques might function
like market prices to allocate a scarce resource by creating incen-
tives for deferral, consolidation, or elimination of discretion-
ary trips.
Reallocating road space from general traffic to improve condi-
tions for public transport systems, pedestrians, or cyclists is often
predicted to cause major traffic problems on neighboring streets. A
detailed study of over 70 case studies of road space reallocation
from 11 countries (and the collation of opinions from over 200
transport professionals worldwide) reported by Cairns et al.
(2002, 1998) and MVA (1998) suggests that predictions of traffic
problems are often unnecessarily pessimistic, and that, given appro-
priate local circumstances, significant reductions in overall traffic
levels can occur, with people making a far wider range of behav-
ioral responses than has traditionally been assumed. Thus, in the
presence of well-designed and well-implemented road space reallo-
cation schemes in urban environments, traffic levels can be reduced
by significant amounts, with the average being of approximately
11% on the treated road or area. Moreover, these schemes can help
in achieving a wide variety of benefits including accident reduc-
tions, air-quality improvements, increased business investments,
more attractive living and working surroundings, and improved re-
tail vitality.
This is why there is a need to develop an alternative tool of
transport demand management that penalizes the private vehicle
not in monetary terms but in spatial terms by using the generated
congestion externality as a referent for this penalty. The alternative
tool proposed here could achieve better social welfare with respect
to the uncontrolled user equilibrium condition; under specific
circumstances, it could have similar results to those by road pri-
cing regarding the discouragement of the travel demand of auto-
mobiles and greater acceptance on behalf of the citizens and local
administrations.
Road Space Retribution Charge by Congestion
Costs
The reduction of the demand of private vehicles in urban environ-
ments should be found by generating a scenario for the driver in
which he is led to consider two alternative options: a new choice
of the route, opting for an alternative link (underused or less con-
gested) or a modal change toward public transport (understanding
that public transport presents an improvement in trip time as a result
of the implemented measure). In this sense, the tool presented here,
called road space retribution charge by congestion costs (SRC), can
be efficient in generating this scenario.
The SRC expresses the percentage of road space of the private
vehicle in a strategic road for the mobility of the city that should be
transferred to other modes of transport with greater environmental
efficiency according to the internalization of the external cost gen-
erated by the private vehicle. With this transfer of the road space
from the private vehicle to the public transport and other modes, a
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penalty in time units is imposed on the private vehicle, related to a
monetary penalty based on an optimal tax, that increases its trip
time on the regulated link, which favors both a more efficient traffic
reassignment on the network and a change in the modal choice
toward public transport. In other words, it is about the use of
the congestion level as a regulator for modal distribution and route
choice.
As a first approach to the development of this alternative tool for
travel demand management, the first best is used as a pricing
system, and the considered externalities are limited to the conges-
tion. This method is used in accordance with writers like Santos and
Newbery (Working Paper, Univ. of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK),
Yang and Zhang (2003), and Vivas (Working Paper, Universidad
del Valle, Cali, Colombia), among others, who accept the tradi-
tional method of first best to estimate the congestion tax to be
applied for the simple case of two routes, but not for the case
of complex road networks to avoid inequities in taxation of the
different links of the network.
Some important considerations:
1. The existence is formulated of an equivalence between a mone-
tary regulation tool such as the urban toll based on an optimal
tax and a spatial regulation tool based on the reduction of the
road space for private vehicles such as SRC, because both (the
first by means of a monetary penalty and the second by means
of a penalty in trip time) can have a discouraging effect on the
generalized use of private vehicles on a certain link, from the
reduction of the surplus of the consumer (user).
2. In the case of the SRC spatial regulation tool, the initial in-
crease of the trip time produced by the reduction of the road
space of the private vehicle and its transfer to public transport
causes an improvement in mobility by generating a more effi-
cient reassignment of private vehicle traffic on the network
(transferring traffic from the congested link to other underused
or less congested links) and by a modal change toward the pub-
lic transport, the trip time of which has been improved.
3. In principle, this means an intervention applied to a congested
corridor identified as strategic for the mobility of the city that is
needed to give priority to public transport systems (and other
nonmotorized modes); therefore, the penalty is established
from the calculated existing congestion for this corridor. It
is possible to extend the application of this tool to the case
of an area of regulation (particularly the center of a city where
the congestion is greater) identifying a set of strategic links to
be regulated inside this area and establishing penalties from the
existing congestion calculated for this area, but this necessarily
implies making some additional considerations.
4. The SRC searches for a reduction in the surplus of the consu-
mer (surplus of drivers of private vehicles) expressed in time
units. Because the consumer surplus is the difference between
the maximum quantity that the drivers are willing to pay in trip
time to use a given corridor and the amount they are paying at
present to use this corridor, a more rational use of the infra-
structure is encouraged by reducing this surplus (increasing
the price, that is, inducing an additional delay). This promotes
the idea that fewer drivers are willing to choose to travel on the
regulated corridor because it implies a greater trip time than
more competitive alternatives such as nonregulated links
and other transport modes.
5. It is understood that the regulation role of this tool lies not only
in the act of reducing the road space for private vehicles,
because first of all this generates more congestion, but in
the effect that this additional delay has on the decision making
of a driver given the new scenario. This makes it possible that a
reduction in demand is presented on the regulated link because
 of a reassignment on the network and a modal change toward
public transport.
6. Initially, the analysis of the revenue redistribution must be
excluded, because of practical reasons and also to avoid
possible interpretations of social welfare that would invalidate
the equivalence set between the classical model of optimal tax
by congestion and the alternative model SRC proposed here.
This decision is supported by the fact that in the optimal tax
model, in practice, a direct redistribution of revenue of the ur-
ban toll is not carried out between the drivers that decide not to
use the regulated road or the population of the area of influence
that endures the negative effects of the traffic. Nevertheless, in
this paper, an indirect redistribution of the toll collected can be
considered as an investment to improve the public transport
service.
7. The net profit generated by this alternative tool (SRC) can be
understood as the set of negative externalities that the society
stops enduring with the reduction of private vehicle traffic.
This net profit is increased to the detriment of the marginal
benefit of private vehicle users.
Relation between Scheme Reduction of Road Space
Supply and Congestion Tax
The reduction of the road supply for private vehicles and the opti-
mal tax by congestion are tools with a similar capacity to reduce the
quantity of trips in private vehicles, because their penalties (mon-
etary penalty and a spatial penalty that affects the trip time) reduce
the disposition of the driver to use the regulated link by reducing
the consumer’s surplus. As shown in Fig. 1, because the initial
quantity of trips (or equilibrium quantity) q0 is linked to the average
costs (Cme) and initial road supply (S1), a relation between the
variation, or reduction, of trips in private vehicles (Δq) of both
schemes can be established. This relation has to be understood from
the perspective that both tools can generate a similar reduction in
the individual benefit for private vehicle drivers.
A variation in the number of trips in private vehicles (Q) can
depend on variations in the trip cost (C) road supply (S). Reduction
of the road supply (S) generates a reduction of the number of trips
(Q). This reduction of trips can be related to that generated by the
imposition of a tax by congestion that internalizes the social mar-
ginal costs of private vehicles.
The classical theory of the optimal tax on which the tax by con-
gestion is based [Fig. 1(b)] searches for a reduction of the trips in
private vehicles (Q) by means of the imposition of a monetary
S C ( /hr)
Cmg A
Cme A
C*
S1
Ce τ*
S2
C´
D D
* 0 * 0
q q QA q q QA
q q
(a) (b)
Fig. 1. Relation between schemes reduction of road space supply and
congestion tax
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penalty (τ
) that makes the driver internalize his social marginal
costs (in this case, the congestion is the additional delay that he
generates for the other drivers on the road). The increase in cost,
until an optimal cost (C
) is reached, generates a reduction in the
quantity of trips from q0 (related to the intersection of average costs
and marginal benefits or demand) until q
(related to the intersec-
tion of marginal costs and marginal benefits).
However, the reduction in road supply for private vehicles and
its transfer to public transport (and other nonmotorized modes) on
which the SRC is based [Fig. 1(a)] searches for a similar reduction
in demand for trips in private vehicles (Q) by means of a spatial
penalty changing from an initial road supply (S1) to a final road
supply (S2), assuming that in the short term, the road supply
(S) is constant. The reduction in road supply generates a reduction
in demand for trips in private vehicles from q0 to q
, because it
situates the driver in a scenario where given an initial additional
delay, he can opt to choose an alternative route or public transport,
which presents a better trip time. The users that stop using the road
make a new scenario possible where there is a better mobility.
Penalty for the Private Vehicle in Time Units:
Approach to the Problem, Mathematical
Formulation, and Resolution Method
Following part of the methodological approach used in Daganzo
(1995), in which a simple model of supply and demand is used
to explore the possibilities of an alternative strategy of control,
to the classic pricing by congestion; as such, a simple scenario
is considered, with two routes that consist of only one congested
link and other alternatives to go from an origin to a destination. The
spatial nature of the regulation tool presented here (SRC) has re-
quired some adaptations of the mentioned methodology.
Four basic assumptions are made:
1. One congested link (bottleneck);
2. Fixed time and cost for nonusers;
3. Linear utility; and
4. Nondirect returned revenues.
The assumption allows the extra utility of the bottleneck to be
expressed for a specific class i, as a function of the relative cost and
time of the bottleneck (ci yt i ) experienced by class members, the
congestion status of the bottleneck (T), and the toll paid (τ ).
Because this is a spatial regulation tool for reduction of the road
supply, the toll paid τ is the monetary penalty that includes the ex-
ternal cost of the trip in a private vehicle for an initial road supply
and the extra cost linked to the reduction in road space until a final
road supply.
Specifically, the extra utility of the bottleneck for the user of
specific class i is
U i ¼ bci ðΔci þ τ Þ þ bti ½Δti þ TðqÞ ð1Þ
where τ = monetary penalty that includes the external cost of the
trip for the initial road supply and the extra cost linked to the re-
duction of the road space until a final road supply; TðqÞ = time
attributable to the congestion, when q trips choose to use the bottle-
neck; Δci , Δt i = differences in costs and time between the bottle-
neck and other modes when q ¼ 0 and there is no tax; bci , bti =
marginal utilities of money and time; bti =bci = value of the time
i for the class i
Nothing has been said about how society should value the util-
ities of different users or user classes. This (controversial)
assumption of the social welfare approach can be avoided if a single
measure for the resulting improvement in society’s welfare is not
sought.
 Consumers’ surplus
Because this tool intends to maximize the utility of each class i, in time units Congestion function T
Y (hours) T
there is no interest in knowing how society values individual util- (new supply with penalty)
ities, therefore it is a matter of minimizing the generalized cost C i dτ
α
of each category: C i ¼ U i =bci ¼ ðΔci þ τ Þ þ αi ½Δt i þ T ðqÞ . Congestion function T - τ/α
T −τ
This equivalent expression would be more appropriate than the util- ( )
S R q* α (initial supply without penalty)

ity expression, because it is easier to esteem the value of time αi T*

than the conversion constants of time and money, bci and bti .
One Socioeconomic Class
Latent Demand
It is convenient to describe a bivariable function, q, of time and
money, which gives as a result the latent demand for the bottleneck
as a function of the congestion time T, and the charged toll, τ .
Latent demand refers to the quantity of trips that would be disposed
to use the bottleneck under specific conditions. Without a regula-
tion, the latent demand is carried out, and becomes the flow q.
Because the utility is assumed to be linear, which points out that
the bottleneck is chosen by the class i if the relative utility in time
units for the bottleneck is positive, then for those who use the
bottleneck Ci < 0 (U i > 0), the demand can be defined as the fol-
lowing probability function:
qðτ ; TÞ ¼ PrfU i > 0g ¼ PrfC i < 0g
¼ PrfðΔci þ τ Þ þ ðΔt i þ T ðqÞ Þ < 0g
¼ PrfðΔci =α þ Δti Þ > T ðqÞ þ τ =αg
The quantity ðΔci =α þ Δti Þ from Eq. (2) can be seen as a ran-
dom variable R, which represents the equivalent advantage in time
units of the bottleneck when q ¼ 0 and τ ¼ 0 (that is, as though the
bottleneck was not congested). The quantity T ðqÞ þ τ =α can be
interpreted as the penalty time attributable to the congestion and
the tolls.
Thus, if F R denotes the complementary function of distribution
of the variable R (which is a decreasing function independent of the
control strategy), then qðτ ; TÞ can be expressed as
qðτ ; TÞ ¼ F R ðT þ τ =αÞ
This establishes that, if the advantage in time (saved time) of the
bottleneck exceeds the penalty time implied by the congestion and
toll, y ¼ T þ τ =α, the users will choose to use the bottleneck; oth-
erwise, they will not do so. Because every user who chooses to use
the bottleneck will be allowed to do so, the equation qðτ ; TÞ ¼
F R ðT þ τ =αÞ gives the flow q, of the bottleneck, the trips that
are willing to use the bottleneck.
The complementary function of distribution F R of the variable R
is represented in Daganzo (1995), with the flow on the y-axis and
the costs of time and tax on the x-axis, that is qðτ ; TÞ ¼
F R ðT þ τ =αÞ. Like in Robusté and Sarmiento (1999), here an in-
verse function GR ¼ F 1 R will be used to continue using the con-
vention of placing the costs on the y-axis and the flow or quantity of
trips on the x-axis. Then, instead of expressing the demand as
qðτ ; TÞ, it will be expressed as pðt; T ðqÞ Þ, that is, cost in time units
according to q (Fig. 2):
p½t; T ðqÞ  ¼ GR ðT þ τ =αÞ
Fig. 2 represents a hypothetical curve associating the resulting
flow q (or quantity of trips) with a penalty time y. This figure also
shows a supply curve with a tax expressed as T. A differential in-
crease of the tax displaces the supply function T in dτ =α time units.
The elimination of the tax produces a displacement τ =α, which
gives a supply curve without a tax T  τ =α, and a point of equi-
librium (q0 ; T 1 ). The intersection of the curves GR and T and its
d* τ
T1 α
T ´´ GR
P
q* q0 Q (trips)
Fig. 2. Equilibrium analysis with the new supply curve according to
penalty, with costs in time units
projection on the curve without a tax is the short list
(q
; T 00 ; T
). (T 00 on the y-axis corresponds to q
on the x-axis in
the curve without tax).
The increase of the trip time (Y) generates a reduction of the
quantity of trips in private vehicles (Q). This increase in Y is done
by means of a reduction in road supply for private vehicles, chang-
ing from an initial congestion curve to a new congestion curve with
regulation. The reduction of road space for private vehicles is based
ð2Þ on a real penalty in trip time (d
), established from a monetary pen-
alty τ (which includes the optimal tax for an initial road supply and
the variation in cost of the trip linked to the reduction in road sup-
ply) and a subjective value of the time α.
For the i class, the utility relative to the bottleneck expressed in
time units is the difference between the time of advantage (saved
time) of the bottleneck, r i , and the penalty time implied by the con-
gestion and tax, y.
For the i class, the utility of the bottleneck should not be neg-
ative, because negative differences between the time of advantage
and the penalty time result in a nonuse:
U i ¼ maxf0; U i g ¼ maxf0; bci C i g
ð3Þ
¼ maxf0; bci ½ðΔci þ τ Þ þ αðΔti þ TÞg
ð5Þ
U i ¼ maxf0; bti ½ðΔci =α þ Δt i Þ  ðT þ τ =αÞg
¼ ðbti Þ maxf0; ðr i  yÞg
where r i ¼ ðΔci =α þ Δt i Þey ¼ ðT þ τ =αÞ.
The relative utility of the bottleneck expressed in time units is
maxf0; U i g=ðbti Þ ¼ maxf0; ðr i  yÞg ð6Þ
Utility in time units for class i ¼ maxf0; ðr i  yÞg ð7Þ
The utility in time units for class i in equilibrium is given by:
U i in time units ¼ maxf0; ðr i  yÞg; being y ¼ T
ð8Þ
According to Fig. 2, T
is increased by increasing the tax τ ; there-
ð4Þ fore, U i in time units ¼ maxf0; ðr i  yÞg cannot grow for no i
when the tax τ is increased. The utility of all the users is reduced
when a tax is introduced.
The prospect of U i in time units ¼ maxf0; ðr i  yÞg, through i,
is the surplus of the consumer expressed in time units, given by the
shady area above T
in Fig. 2. This surplus of the consumer de-
creases when the tax τ is increased.
If there are different socioeconomic classes and f i is the fraction
of users that belong to each class, the benefit surplus for the

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 P
consumer (user) in time units is ðf i maxf0; U i gÞ. Therefore, the
benefit for the consumer (user) is bti E½maxf0; ðR  yÞg.
Equilibrium is found when y ¼ T
, and the benefit for the con-
sumer in time units, SR , is
SR ¼ E½maxf0; ðR  T
Þg
which is represented in Fig. 2 by the shady area SR above the y-axis
T
, where E is the operator of mathematical expectancy. This ben-
efit for the consumer also can be written as SR ¼ SR ðq
Þ, where q

is the x-axis of T 00 þ τ =α. This benefit for the consumer diminishes
when τ increases, as shown in Fig. 2, when the tax is increased
dτ =α equivalent time units.
The expression τ =α is a theoretical penalty for the private
vehicle in time units. Because this theoretical penalty is material-
ized in practice by means of a reduction in road space (for example,
by reducing one lane for private vehicles), it turns into a real penalty
in time units called d
, which will be greater than the theoretical
one because of the spatial nature of the measure (reduction of road
space) and because the number of lanes is a discrete value, which in
practice always implies an overcharging (which maximum levels
have to be established depending on the initial road supply). In this
way, the real penalty in time units d
includes both the optimal tax
calculated from the external costs for an initial road supply and the
extra costs linked to the reduction of the road capacity.
Reduction of Road Space for Private Vehicles
From the perspective of traffic engineering (Fig. 3), a reduction in
road capacity from C 0 to C 1 implies a change in the congestion
curve of the road, moving its saturation point to the left. Therefore,
for a certain level of flow of private vehicles, q1 , an increase in trip
time from t 0 to t1 is produced.
Fig. 3 shows that the reduction in capacity of private vehicles
ΔC will be optimal when the resultant variation of travel time Δt is
equivalent to the previously calculated penalty in time units d

(Fig. 2). That is, the optimal point of reduction of road space des-
tined for private vehicles, with which the private vehicle internal-
izes its marginal social costs by means of a penalty in time units
added to its travel time, is achieved when Δt ¼ d
.
A reduction in road capacity for private vehicles (C) on a certain
road generates a new congestion curve for this road, so that for a
C1 C 0
t, time
certain flow of private vehicles (Q), there is a new trip time (t)
greater than the initial time. The road capacity has discrete values
(number of lanes).
In a practical way, the tool will work with a simple model
of congestion, the Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) function
ð9Þ (BPR 1964). This model relates link travel times as a function
of the volume/capacity ratio according to

 β 
v
t ¼ tf 1 þ α ð10Þ
c
where t = congested link travel time; t f = link free flow time; v =
link volume; c = link capacity.
With this model, congestion in two different scenarios of road
capacity, C 0 and C 1 , is calculated. Even if this model implies a
crude simplification in calculation of congestion, it is sufficient
for the objectives formulated in the present study.
Numerical Example for the Simple Case of Two
Routes
A first example for the simple case of two routes is developed
(under an analytical approach), which considers one congested link
(where a regulation tool will be implemented) to travel between an
origin-destination pair (A-B) and other alternatives (route, mode) to
travel between the same origin-destination pair
Four basic assumptions are made:
1. One congested link (Link 1);
2. Fixed time and cost for nonusers;
3. Linear utility; and
4. Nondirect returned revenues.
Other aspects to consider:
1. The congested road identified as Link 1 to travel between
an origin-destination pair (A-B) is classified as Urban Street
Class III according to Highway Capacity Manual (TRB
2000), with the following characteristics: length 10 km, speed
at free flow 55 km=h, 4 lanes per direction, and a capacity of
2,960 vehicles/h/direction (for a level of service D).
2. A monetary cost of the trip in a private vehicle of 0.325 Euro
per km. An opportunity cost of the travel time of 0.14 Euro per
min means 8.4 Euro/h [values derived from a study by the
Technical University of Catalonia and University of Barcelona
(2000)].
Considering first the side of the demand of urban transport in the
market, Fig. 4 shows the demand curve of trips along Link 1 for an
20,00
18,00
(monetary and time cost)

16,00
t1 14,00
∆t
Trip cost

t0 12,00
STC
10,00
8,00 PTC
6,00
4,00
q, flow MB
2,00
q0 ´ q0 q1
∆C 0,00
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000
Free flow Congestion 0
Q trips
C STC. Social Trip Cost (Marginal cost)
Free flow Congestion 1 PTC. Private Trip Cost (Average cost)
C MB. Marginal Benefit (Demand)

Fig. 3. Congestion and reduction of road capacity for private vehicles Fig. 4. Trip cost for Link 1 with an initial road supply (4 lanes)

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initial road supply (4 lanes). The horizontal axis measures the num-
ber of vehicles/h/direction. The vertical axis measures the costs of
commuting trips, the sum of the monetary and time costs of the
10 km trip. The demand curve shows, for each trip cost, how many
travellers use Link 1. The demand curve is a marginal-benefit
curve; for each traffic volume, it shows how much the marginal
traveler is willing to pay for the trip on Link 1.
The equilibrium volume of private vehicles, 2,960 (given by the
intersection of the curves of private cost and demand) exceeds the
optimal volume, 2,773 (given by the intersection of the curves of
social cost and demand) because the driver ignores the external
costs of his trip, which necessitates the use of regulation tools that
internalize them. In the particular case of a tool of spatial nature
such as the reduction in road space, one must also bear in mind
that the final trip time in the optimal volume will be calculated
in the new generated scenario with a reduction in capacity.
Table 1 shows the relationships between traffic volume and
trip time, trip costs, and theoretical penalty time for an urban road
(Link 1) with 4 lanes:
1. Column B lists the trip time (per driver) for different traffic
volumes. For traffic volumes up to 800 vehicles/h (per 4 lanes),
there is no congestion: everyone travels at the legal speed limit
of 55 km/hour, and the 10 km trip takes 10.91 min. For traffic
volume above 800 vehicles, the computation is based on the
BPR curve for a road capacity of 2,960 vehicles/h/direction
(with parameters α ¼ 1:8 and β ¼ 3:0).
2. Column C shows the effect of the marginal driver on the trip
times of other drivers.
3. The increase in total travel time (Column D) is simply the extra
time per driver multiplied by the number of other drivers,
which is the congestion externality.
4. The external trip cost (Column E) equals the monetary value of
the congestion externality.
5. The values in Column E are based on the assumption that the
opportunity cost of travel time is 0.14 Euros per min.
Table 1 (Fig. 4) shows two reference levels of traffic for Link 1.
First, it shows an equilibrium traffic level of 2,960 vehicles/h
(with a trip time of 30.55 min), which is the level of traffic pro-
duced without regulation tools because the users of Link 1 do
not internalize the costs they generate for other users, that is, where
the marginal benefit shown by the demand curve is the same as the
private cost of the trip (7.53 Euro). Second, it shows an optimal
traffic level of 2,773 vehicles/h (with a trip time of 27.05 min) that
can only be reached if regulation tools are used to force the users of
Link 1 to assume the costs they generate for the other users, that is,
where the marginal benefit is the same as the social cost of the trip
(9.24 Euro).
Table 1 also shows the theoretical time penalty for the initial
scenario (15.76 min) that should be implemented to generate a re-
duction of the traffic from an equilibrium traffic volume (2,960 ve-
hicles) to optimal traffic volume (2,773) and to reach, in this way, a
provisional trip time of 42.81 min that includes the theoretical time
penalty.
The provisional trip time of the initial scenario (Column J)
will be later contrasted with the trip time of the final scenario
(Column K), calculated with the new congestion curve BPR of
Link 1 once the reduction of the road space for the private vehicle
has been carried out (capacity of 2,220 vehicles/h/direction), as
shown in Table 2.
In the initial scenario with a road supply of 4 lanes, a reduction
of the volume of private vehicles from 2,960 to 2,773 vehicles/h/
direction can be achieved if the cost is increased from 7.53 Euro to
9.24 Euro. A similar reduction could be achieved with a hypotheti-
cal reduction of the road space for the same scenario, based
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on a theoretical time penalty of 15.76 min, increasing the trip time
from an initial time of 30.55 min to a provisional time of 42.81 min.
Because this is a simple case of two routes, the penalty only
applies on one link (Link 1), and the supply of road space (n)
presents discrete values, that is, it is expressed in number of lanes
(for Link 1, n ¼ 4). The minimum reduction and transference of
road space will then be one lane; it is a matter of evaluating the
effect on the network when one lane of the supply destined to
the private vehicle (n  1 ¼ 3) is reduced on Link 1 (see Fig. 5
and Table 1).
Fig. 5 shows that reduction in road capacity for private vehicles
implies a change from congestion curve S1 to congestion curve S2,
so that for an optimal volume of 2,773 there is a final trip time of
49.18 min (greater than the provisional trip time of 42.81 min cal-
culated for the S1 scenario).
Table 2 shows that in the scenario of the new road supply for
private vehicles (3 lanes), for an optimal volume of 2,773 there is a
final trip time of 49.18 min (greater than the provisional trip time of
42.81 min calculated for scenario S1), so there is a real time penalty
of 22.12 min, which in practice means an overcharging of 14.87%
in the trip time.
The trip time with n  1 on Link 1 (Column K) would be
49.18 min, implying a real penalty time (Column L) of
22.12 min, which means an overcharge of the penalty time of
14.87% (Column M). It is estimated that an overcharge close to
15% (because the road supply has discrete values) is acceptable
because the users that continue on Link 1 after having applied
the measure could be favored in the medium term because of a
residual reduction in demand beyond the optimal one calculated
initially.
This makes it possible to state (for the case specified here and
under specific circumstances) that a penalty in the trip time of pri-
vate vehicles (d
) of 22.12 min carried out by means of a reduction
of 25% of its road space would have the same effect as the appli-
cation of an urban toll based on an optimal tax (τ
) of 2.21 Euro per
trip, with regard to the reduction of the quantity of trips in private
vehicles (Q) on a regulated link, changing from 2,960 to 2,733
vehicles/h/direction.
Thus, because both tools, optimal tax by congestion and the
SRC, can cause a similar reduction in the quantity of trips in private
vehicles, they can be considered equivalent for this purpose.
This statement is considered valid, bearing in mind the different
nature of the two tools (the first monetary and the second spatial).
This is not a direct conversion from an optimal monetary tax to an
additional delay of trip time (by means of a reduction in road space)
from a subjective value of time, but rather an approximation of the
reduction in road supply from an optimal tax by congestion.
In general, the implementation of the SRC implies an advantage
over an unregulated situation, and in this way it fulfills its role of
being an alternative mobility management tool.
Fig. 6 shows that a reduction of the quantity of trips of private
vehicles (Q) can be achieved by means of a monetary penalty or
optimal tax (τ
) that internalizes the external costs of the trip or by
means of an equivalent penalty in trip time (d
) generated by a re-
duction in road supply for private vehicles. Because this is a spatial
regulation measure, the penalty in trip time (d
) for an optimal
quantity of trips (q
) must include both the external cost of the trip
(marginal cost) in time units for the initial road supply (S1) and the
additional delay generated by the reduction of the road capacity
from an initial road supply (S1) to a final road supply (S2). Because
both tools can cause, under specific circumstances, a similar reduc-
tion in the quantity of trips for private vehicles, they can be con-
sidered equivalent for this purpose.
 Table 1. Link 1 with Initial Road Supply (4 Lanes): Traffic Volume, Theoretical Time Penalty, and Provisional Trip Time
A B C D E F G H I J
Traffic volume Trip time: urban road Increase in travel Increase in total External trip cost Private Social trip Marginal Theoretical Provisional trip time with
with 4 lanes time per driver travel time or optimal tax τ
trip cost cost benefit penalty time theoretical penalty time (B+I)
Vehicles Min Min Min Euro Euro Euro Euro Min Min
200 10.91 0.000 0.00 0.00 4.78 4.78 32.92 0.00 10.91
400 10.91 0.000 0.00 0.00 4.78 4.78 31.08 0.00 10.91
600 10,91 0.000 0.00 0.00 4.78 4.78 29.24 0.00 10.91
800 10.91 0.000 0.00 0.00 4.78 4.78 27.40 0.00 10.91
1,000 11.67 0.002 0.37 0.05 4.88 4.94 25.56 0.37 12.04
1,200 12.22 0.003 0.92 0.13 4.96 5.09 23.72 0.92 13.14
1,400 12.99 0.004 1.69 0.24 5.07 5.30 21.88 1.69 14.68
1,600 14.01 0.006 2.71 0.38 5.21 5.59 20.04 2.71 16.72
1,800 15.32 0.007 4.03 0.56 5.40 5.96 18.20 4.03 19.35
2,000 16.97 0.009 5.67 0.79 5.63 6.42 16.36 5.67 22.64
2,200 18.97 0.011 7.67 1.07 5.91 6.98 14.52 7.67 26.65
2,400 21.38 0.013 10.08 1.41 6.24 7.65 12.68 10.08 31.46
2,600 24.22 0.015 12.92 1.81 6.64 8.45 10.84 12.92 37.14
2,773 27.05 0.017 15.76 2.21 7.04 9.24 9.24 15.76 42.81
2,800 27.53 0.018 16.23 2.27 7.10 9.38 9.00 16.23 43.76
2,960 30.55 0.020 19.25 2.69 7.53 10.22 7.53 19.25 49.79
3,000 31.35 0.020 20.06 2.81 7.64 10.45 7.16 20.06 51.41
3,200 35.72 0.023 24.42 3.42 8.25 11.67 5.32 24.42 60.14
3,400 40.67 0.026 29.37 4.11 8.94 13.06 3.48 29.37 70.04
3,600 46.24 0.029 34.94 4.84 9.72 14.61 1.64 34.94 81.17

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JOURNAL OF URBAN PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT © ASCE / SEPTEMBER 2011 / 287
 T (time) C ( /q)
Table 2. Link 1 with Final Road Supply (3 Lanes): Traffic Volume, Trip
Time, and Real Penalty in Trip Time S2 Cmg A

A K L M S1 Cme A
Traffic Trip time: urban road Real penalty Overcharge in penalty T* C*
volume with 3 lanes time (K–B) time (K
100=J) d* τ*
Te Ce
Vehicles Min Min % T´ DA C´ DA

200 10.92 0.01 0.13

400 11.02 0.11 1.05
* 0 * 0
600 11.30 0.39 3.55 q q QA q q QA

800 11.83 0.92 8.42

1,000 12.70 1.04 5.55 Fig. 6. Trip time and optimal tax in reduction of number of trips in
1,200 14.01 1.79 6.64 private vehicles
1,400 15.83 2.85 7.88
1,600 18.26 4.25 9.19
1,800 21.38 6.05 10.45
2,000 25.27 8.30 11.62
2,200 30.02 11.05 12.66
2,400 35.72 14.34 13.56
2,600 42.45 18.24 14.32
2,773 49.18 22.12 14.87
2,800 50.31 22.78 14.95
2,960 57.45 26.91 15.38 Link based toll Cordon toll Hybrid cordon toll
3,000 59.37 28.01 15.48 (spatial charge) (spatial charge) (spatial and
3,200 69.72 34.00 15.92 monetary charge)
3,400 81.45 40.78 16.29
Fig. 7. Alternatives for practical application of SRC
3,600 94.64 48.41 16.60

70,00 exaggerated overcharging in penalty trip time would distort the

S2 model owing to the discrete nature of the road capacity) where,
Trip time (minutes)

60,00
3 lanes
50,00 first, it is necessary to implement or to improve the performance
40,00 of the public transport service, and second, it is necessary to give
30,00 S1
4 lanes priority to other nonmotorized transport modes (walking or
20,00 cycling).
10,00 The goal of this kind of application will never be the elimination
0,00 or substantial reduction of congestion on mixed traffic lanes. This is
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500
Q trips because the success of the measure is based on the remaining pri-
vate vehicle drivers experiencing a certain level of congestion,
Fig. 5. Congestion curves for Link 1 with initial and final road supplies which encourages them to a modal shift toward public transport
for private vehicles (which improves its performance with the implementation of an
exclusive lane)
This case is susceptible to the use of the first best (or taxing
Alternatives for the Practical Application of the SRC according to the marginal costs) as a system for fixing prices, be-
cause this is a single link in which the user of a private vehicle
The practical application of the SRC offers various alternatives, would assume the total of the social marginal costs. For the case
which are enunciated here (the first case corresponds to that of more complex road networks, the second best must be used as a
analyzed in this paper and the other two are formulated for future system for fixing prices to avoid inequities in taxation of the differ-
research). The following presents the conditions under which the ent links of the network.
application of the SRC can be recommended (see Fig. 7).

SRC in a City Center (Cordon Toll)

SRC in a Congested Urban Travel Corridor (Link
Based Toll)
This first alternative deals with the application of the SRC on a
congested urban corridor that is strategic for the mobility of the
town. It is a matter of calculating externality by congestion pro-
duced on the chosen congested urban corridor, so that it can be
charged by means of application of the SRC to the users of private
vehicles that choose to travel through this corridor.
This is an application on congested multiple-lane urban arteries
with no less than 4 lanes per direction (in smaller capacity roads, an
A second alternative would be to put the SRC into practice not in a
specific urban corridor, but in a regulation zone such as the center
of a city, because the center concentrates the greatest congestion
levels. In this case, starting with a cordon that delimits the regula-
tion zone of the city and for which externality has been calculated,
it is a matter of applying the SRC in different links (identified as
strategic for mobility) according to the necessities that each one
formulates. For example, whereas in links with more commercial
activity, the enlargement of pedestrian pavements is more conven-
ient, in other strategic links it is more suitable to give priority to

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public transport (bus lane or tramway), or in special itineraries, to
provide a bicycle lane. Thus, the SRC could be expressed in linear
meters of road, which can be carried out through different interven-
tions on the included links in the area.
SRC and Road Pricing in a City Center (Hybrid
Cordon Toll: Spatial and Monetary Charge)
A third alternative deals with the possibility of a mixed application
in which the externality calculated for the regulation area (city
center) is charged to the user of the private vehicle, part as a mon-
etary charge at the accesses of the regulated area (with electronic
road pricing), and another as a spatial charge upon a strategic urban
corridor (with SRC) where there is an evident need to redesign the
road section to give priority to public transport.
In this specific case, it would be convenient to involve various
externalities in addition to congestion. It is possible to approach the
subject not only from the concept of functional capacity of the road
but also from the environmental capacity, as postulated in Ferrari
(1995) and Yang and Bell (1997). This method would rebound to a
more robust general tax that should be sufficient to discourage driv-
ers to enter the regulated area (through the monetary toll at the
accesses), and to cause a more equilibrated traffic reassignment
in city center areas. This method could also promote modal shift
toward public transport, through the spatial charge on the urban
corridor identified as strategic.
Discussion
Even if the improvement in social welfare achieved by implemen-
tation of the proposed tool, in comparison to the inefficient user
equilibrium state, is easily proved, the optimal condition equiva-
lence between the two regulatory tools analyzed here (the marginal
pricing theory and the proposed supply control strategy) can gen-
erate an interesting debate. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify some
points regarding this subject.
It is necessary to understand that this is not a direct conversion
using a subjective value of time from an optimal monetary tax to an
additional delay in trip time (by means of the reduction of road
space to private vehicles), but rather an approximation of the reduc-
tion of road supply for private vehicles from an optimal tax by con-
gestion (to internalize the externalities). Here, this topic is dealt
with by establishing a relative equivalence between the optimal
tax and a trip time penalty by road space reallocation, and not
by establishing equality in the complete sense of the term. Thus,
the equivalence between these two regulatory tools could be con-
sidered valid owing to their different natures: one monetary and the
other spatial.
In this paper, the writers have assumed that in the optimal tax
theory, the collected toll is indirectly transferable to society in the
form of an investment for public transport service improvement,
and thus the maximized social welfare consists of two components,
one experienced by the users and the other transferred as the toll
collected.
In the same way, regarding the proposed supply control strategy,
the trip time collected from private vehicles has to be understood as
a direct consequence of the improvement of alternative modes of
transport (public transport). Because this contributes to generate a
scenario that promotes the modal shift toward more sustainable
transport modes, reducing negative externalities, it can be consid-
ered as a component of maximized social welfare.
From what this paper has established, this is a first step toward
future research on the possible equivalences between congestion
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management tools of different natures (economic and spatial
measures); this implies not only an economic evaluation in the
typical sense, but a multiobjective evaluation of these measures.
In this way, applications of transport economics that are more in
keeping with the needs and realities of urban environments can be
developed.
Conclusions
The simple case of two routes suggests that internalization of the
externalities generated by private vehicles (in this case, congestion)
carried out by means of spatial measures (reallocation of urban road
space) could be an efficient tool to promote sustainable mobility in
urban environments. This is in the context of three specific objec-
tives: to diminish the number of private vehicles on the corridor
until an optimal number is reached; to contribute to a more bal-
anced reassignment between the available options (links) for a
given origin-destination pair, and simultaneously to favor public
transport by means of designating a lane for the exclusive use
of busses or tramways; to generate certain conditions where
encouragement for changes in modal choice are feasible.
The alternative tool for travel demand management presented
here could achieve better social welfare with respect to the uncon-
trolled user equilibrium condition. Under specific circumstances,
the proposed alternative tool could have similar results to those
by road pricing regarding discouragement of the travel demand
of automobiles.
This alternative tool is also considered to have greater accep-
tance on behalf of citizens and local administration than the road
pricing. First, because it is not a direct monetary payment for the
users; second, because of its double function as a tool for sustain-
ability in urban transport: optimal distribution of the use of the road
network and promotion of a change in the modal choice toward
public transport as an alternative of greater environmental effi-
ciency; and third, because its materialization is used to carry out
urban planning actions for improvement of public space.
Other positive environmental and social effects derived from a
more rational use of public space could be considered by local ad-
ministrations to gain citizen support to carry out such initiatives.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank the guest editor, the anonymous
reviewers, and Professor Harvy Vivas of the University of Valle,
who have made valuable suggestions and comments on an earlier
version of this paper. The authors are solely responsible for all
statements in this paper and any remaining deficiencies.
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