FIRST DIVISION
 
 
SEVERINO M. MANOTOK IV,              G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605
FROILAN M. MANOTOK,
FERNANDO M. MANOTOK,
FAUSTO MANOTOK III, MA.
MAMERTA M. MANOTOK,
PATRICIA L. TIONGSON, PACITA
L. GO, ROBERTO LAPERAL III,
MICHAEL MARSHALL V. MANOTOK,
MARY ANN MANOTOK, FELISA
MYLENE V. MANOTOK, IGNACIO
MANOTOK, JR., MILAGROS V.
MANOTOK, SEVERINO MANOTOK
III, ROSA R. MANOTOK, MIGUEL
A.B. SISON, GEORGE M. BOCANEGRA,
MA. CRISTINA E. SISON, PHILIPP
L. MANOTOK, JOSE CLEMENTE
L. MANOTOK, RAMON SEVERINO L.
MANOTOK, THELMA R. MANOTOK,
JOSE MARIA MANOTOK, JESUS JUDE
MANOTOK, JR. and MA. THERESA L.
MANOTOK, represented by their
Attorney-in-fact, Rosa R. Manotok,
                             Petitioners,                      Present:
                              
                                                                      Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman),
          - versus -                                               Quisumbing,
                                                                      Ynares-Santiago,
   Carpio, and
   Azcuna, JJ.
HEIRS OF HOMER L. BARQUE,
represented by TERESITA                       Promulgated:
BARQUE HERNANDEZ,                                           
                             Respondents.                      December 12, 2005
 
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
 
DECISION
 
 
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
 
 
These consolidated petitions for review assail, in G.R. No. 162335, the February 24, 2004 Amended Decision [1] of
the Third Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to
cancel petitioners’ TCT No. RT-22481 and directing the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to reconstitute respondents’
TCT No. 210177; and in G.R. No. 162605, the November 7, 2003 Amended Decision [2] of the Special Division of Five of
the Former Second Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel
petitioners’ TCT No. RT-22481, and the LRA to reconstitute respondents’ TCT No. T-210177 and theMarch 12,
2004 Resolution[3] denying the motion for reconsideration.
 
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals[4] are as follows:
 
Petitioners, (respondents herein) as the surviving heirs of the late Homer Barque, filed a petition with the LRA for
administrative reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. 210177 issued in the name of Homer L. Barque, which was
destroyed in the fire that gutted the Quezon City Hall, including the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City,
sometime in 1988.  In support of the petition, petitioners submitted the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 210177, real
estate tax receipts, tax declarations and the Plan FLS 3168 D covering the property.
 
Upon being notified of the petition for administrative reconstitution, private respondents (petitioners herein) filed
their opposition thereto claiming that the lot covered by the title under reconstitution forms part of the land covered by their
reconstituted title TCT No. RT-22481, and alleging that TCT No. 210177 in the name of petitioners’ predecessors-in-
interest is spurious.
 
 
On June 30, 1997, Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos, as reconstituting officer, denied the reconstitution of TCT No.
210177[5] on grounds that:
 
1.         Lots 823-A and 823-B, Fls-3168-D, containing areas of 171,473 Sq. Mtrs. and 171,472 Sq. Mtrs.,
respectively, covered by TCT No. 210177, appear to duplicate Lot 823 Piedad Estate, containing an area of 342,945 Sq.
Mtrs., covered by TCT No. 372302 registered in the name of Severino M. Manotok, et. al., reconstituted under Adm.
Reconstitution No. Q-213 dated February 01, 1991;
 
2.         The submitted plan Fls-3168-D is a spurious document as categorically stated by Engr. Privadi J.G.
Dalire, Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division, Land Management Bureau, in his letter dated February 19, 1997.[6]
 
Respondents’ motion for reconsideration was denied in an order[7] dated February 10, 1998 hence they appealed
to the LRA.
 
The LRA ruled that the reconstituting officer should not have required the submission of documents other than the
owner’s duplicate certificate of title as bases in denying the petition and should have confined himself with the owner’s
duplicate certificate of title.[8]  The LRA further declared:
 
Based on the documents presented, petitioners have established by clear and convincing evidence that TCT NO.
210177 was, at the time of the destruction thereof, valid, genuine, authentic and effective.  Petitioners duly presented the
original of the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 210177 .... The logbook of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City lists
TCT No. 210177 as among the titles lost .... The Register of Deeds of Quezon City himself acknowledged the existence
and authenticity of TCT No. 210177 when he issued a certification to the effect that TCT No. 210177 was one of the titles
destroyed and not salvaged from the fire that gutted the Quezon City Hall on 11 June 1988 ....
 
It is likewise noteworthy that the technical description and boundaries of the lot reflected in TCT No. 210177
absolutely conform to the technical description and boundaries of Lot 823 Piedad Estate ... as indicated in the B. L. Form
No. 28-37-R dated 11-8-94 and B. L. Form No. 31-10 duly issued by the Bureau of Lands ....
 
It therefore becomes evident that the existence, validity, authenticity and effectivity of TCT No. 210177 was
established indubitably and irrefutably by the petitioners.  Under such circumstances, the reconstitution thereof should be
given due course and the same is mandatory.[9]
 
….
 
It would be necessary to underscore that the certified copy of Plan FLS 3168 D was duly issued by the office of
Engr. Ernesto Erive, Chief, Surveys Division LMS-DENR-NCR whose office is the lawful repository of survey plans for lots
situated within the National Capital Region including the property in question.  Said plan was duly signed by the custodian
thereof, Carmelito Soriano, Chief Technical Records and Statistics Section, DENR-NCR.  Said plan is likewise duly
supported by Republic of the Philippines Official Receipt No. 2513818 Q dated 9-23-96 .... Engr. Erive in his letter dated
28 November 1996 addressed to Atty. Bustos … confirmed that a microfilm copy of Plan FLS 3168D is on file in the
Technical Records and Statistics Section of his office.  Engr. Dalire, in his letter dated 2 January 1997 addressed to Atty.
Bustos even confirmed the existence and authenticity of said plan. …
 
.…
 
The claim of Engr. Dalire in his letter dated 19 February 1997 that his office has no records or information about
Plan FLS 3168-D is belied by the certified copy of the computer print-out duly issued by the Bureau of Lands indicating
therein that FLS 3168D is duly entered into the microfilm records of the Bureau of Lands and has been assigned
Accession Number 410436 appearing on Page 79, Preliminary Report No. 1, List of Locator Cards and Box Number 0400
and said computer print-out is duly supported by an Offical Receipt ….
 
 The said Plan FLS 3168D is indeed authentic and valid coming as it does from the legal repository and duly
signed by the custodian thereof.  The documentary evidence presented is much too overwhelming to be simply brushed
aside and be defeated by the fabricated statements and concoctions made by Engr. Dalire in his 19 February 1997 letter.
…[10]
 
 
Nevertheless, notwithstanding its conclusion that petitioners’ title was fraudulently reconstituted, the LRA noted
that it is only the Regional Trial Court (RTC) which can declare that the same was indeed fraudulently reconstituted.  It
thus opined that respondents’ title may only be reconstituted after a judicial declaration that petitioners’ title was void and
should therefore be cancelled.[11]
 
The dispositive portion of the LRA’s decision reads:
 
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 in the name of
Homer L. Barque, Sr. shall be given due course after cancellation of TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) in the name of
Manotoks upon order of a court of competent jurisdiction.
 
SO ORDERED.[12]
 
Petitioners’ filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by respondents with a prayer that reconstitution
be ordered immediately. 
 
On June 14, 2001, petitioners’ motion for reconsideration and respondents’ prayer for immediate reconstitution
were denied.[13]
 
From the foregoing, respondents filed a petition for review[14] with the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 66700 and praying that the LRA be directed to immediately reconstitute TCT No. 210177 without being subjected to
the condition that petitioners’ TCT No. RT-22481 [372302] should first be cancelled by a court of competent jurisdiction.[15] 
Petitioners likewise filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66642.
 
In CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, the Second Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision [16] on September 13,
2002, the dispositive portion of which reads:
 
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered the assailed Resolution of the LRA dated June 24, 1998 is
AFFIRMED in toto and the petition for review is ordered DISMISSED.  No pronouncement as to costs.
 
SO ORDERED.[17]

Respondents moved for reconsideration.[18]  On November 7, 2003, the Special Division of Five of the Former
Second Division rendered an Amended Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, the dispositive portion of which reads:
 
WHEREFORE, our decision dated 13 September 2002 is hereby reconsidered.  Accordingly, the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City is hereby directed to cancel TCT No. RT-22481 of private respondents and the LRA is hereby
directed to reconstitute forthwith petitioners’ valid, genuine and existing Certificate of Title No. T-210177.
 
No pronouncement as to costs.
 
SO ORDERED.[19]
 
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the amended decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 was denied,[20] hence,
this petition docketed as G.R. No. 162605.
 
Meanwhile, in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, the Third Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a
Decision[21] on October 29, 2003, the dispositive portion of which reads:
 
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.  The Resolution of the LRA dated 24 June 1998 is hereby
AFFIRMED.
 
SO ORDERED.[22]
 
 
           In so ruling, the Third Division of the Court of Appeals declared that the LRA correctly deferred in giving due course
to the petition for reconstitution since there is yet no final judgment upholding or annulling respondents’ title.[23]
 
          Respondents’ motion for reconsideration was granted by the Third Division of the Court of Appeals on February 24,
2004, thus:
 
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED.  The Decision of this Court dated 29
October 2003 is RECONSIDERED and a new one is entered ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel
petitioners’ TCT No. RT-22481 and directing the LRA to reconstitute forthwith respondents’ TCT No. T-210177.
 
SO ORDERED.[24]
 
From the foregoing decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 and CA-G.R. SP No. 66642,
petitioners filed separate petitions for review before this Court docketed as G.R. No. 162605 and G.R. No. 162335,
respectively.
 
In G.R. No. 162605, petitioners argue that:
 
ITHE MAJORITY JUSTICES ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE CANCELLATION OF
PETITIONERS’ EXISTING TITLE, CONSIDERING THAT:
 
a.         THEY ORDERED THE CANCELLATION OF TITLE DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAME IS NOT PART OF THE
RELIEF SOUGHT IN A RECONSTITUTION PROCEEDINGS.
 
b.         THEY ALLOWED A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON A TORRENS CERTIFICATE OF TITLE; and
 
c.         THE COURT OF APPEALS, IN RESOLVING AN APPEAL OF THE DECISION OF THE LAND REGISTRATION
AUTHORITY, DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO ORDER THE CANCELLATION OF TITLE, SINCE ONLY A
PROPER REGIONAL TRIAL COURT CAN ORDER THE ANNULMENT/CANCELLATION OF A TORRENS TITLE.  BY
ALLOWING A “SHORT CUT”, THE MAJORITY JUSTICES DEPRIVED THE PETITIONERS OF THEIR PROPERTY AND
THEIR CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
 
II
 
THE MAJORITY JUSTICES GRAVELY MISAPPLIED THE RULING OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN ORTIGAS V.
VELASCO, CONSIDERING THAT:
 
a.         IN THE ORTIGAS CASE, THERE WERE TWO TITLES EXISTING OVER THE SAME PARCEL OF LAND, AS A RESULT
OF THE RECONSTITUTED TITLE ISSUED IN THE NAME OF MOLINA.  IN THE INSTANT CASE, ONLY PETITIONERS
HOLD TITLE TO THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION, AS RESPONDENTS ARE MERELY TRYING TO HAVE TITLE
RECONSTITUTED IN THEIR NAMES.
 
b.         IN ORTIGAS, THERE WERE SEVERAL DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT WHICH PREVIOUSLY RESOLVED
THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP OF ORTIGAS’ PROPERTY.  HENCE, THERE WAS SUFFICIENT GROUND TO ANNUL
MOLINA’S TITLE OUTRIGHT.  IN THE INSTANT CASE, THERE ARE NO SUCH DECISIONS IN FAVOR OF
RESPONDENTS WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY THE CANCELLATION OF THE TITLE OF PETITIONERS WITHOUT ANY
HEARING.[25]
 
          In G.R. No. 162335, petitioners raise the following issues:
 
I.          THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AND GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IN ORDERING THE LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY TO
CANCEL TCT NO. RT-22481 OF PETITIONERS MANOTOK NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT SAID COURT
WAS FULLY COGNIZANT THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO EXERCISE SUCH AUTHORITY AND POWER AND
THE LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY IS EQUALLY DEVOID OF JURISDICTION ON THE MATTER BECAUSE
UNDER THE JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980 SPECIFICALLY SECTION 19 (2) THEREOF, ONLY THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS HAVE EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER CIVIL ACTIONS WHICH INVOLVES
TITLE TO, OR POSSESSION OF, REAL PROPERTY, OR ANY INTEREST THEREIN.
 
II.         THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AND GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IN INVOKING EQUITABLE CONSIDERATION TO JUSTIFY ITS
CHALLENGED AMENDED DECISION DATED FEBRUARY 24, 2004 DIRECTING LRA TO CANCEL PETITIONERS
MANOTOK’S TITLE NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT, AS STATED, THE LAW EXPLICITLY VESTS EXCLUSIVE
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION TO THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS OVER CIVIL ACTIONS WHICH INVOLVES TITLE TO,
OR POSSESSION OF, REAL PROPERTY, OR ANY INTEREST THEREIN.
 
III.       THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FAILING TO ORDER THE SETTING ASIDE OF THE CHALLENGED
RESOLUTION DATED JUNE 24, 1998 OF RESPONDENT LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY IN LRC ADMIN. CASE
NO. Q-547 [97] VIEWED FROM THE FACT THAT SAID RESOLUTION OF LRA IS PATENTLY AT WAR WITH LAW
AND CONTROLLING JURISPRUDENCE THAT PROHIBITS RECONSTITUTION OF TITLE BY THIRD PARTY
ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN LOST OR DESTROYED IF ANOTHER VALID TITLE IS EXISTING COVERING THE LAND
SUBJECT THEREOF.
 
IV.       THE LRA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE RECONSTITUTION OF THE TITLE OF HOMER BARQUE, SR. SUBJECT ONLY
TO THE CONDITION THAT THE TITLE OF PETITIONERS MANOTOK SHOULD FIRST BE ORDERED CANCELLED
BY COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION IN THE FACE OF THE GLARING FACTS THAT SAID TITLE IS HIGHLY
SUSPECT AND BEARS BADGES OF FABRICATION AND FALSIFICATION AND THEREFORE NO OTHER LOGICAL
AND CREDIBLE CONCLUSION CAN BE DRAWN EXCEPT THAT IT IS A FAKE AND SPURIOUS TITLE.
 
V.        THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OF IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ALLOWING RESPONDENTS’ MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
WHICH WAS CLEARLY FILED OUT OF TIME.[26]
 
          On August 2, 2004, the petition in G.R. No. 162605 was consolidated with the petition in G.R. No. 162335.[27]
 
In sum, petitioners contend that (a) the LRA has no authority to annul their title; (b) the reconstitution of
respondents’ Torrens title would be a collateral attack on petitioners’ existing title; (c)  they were not given the opportunity
to be heard, specifically the chance to defend the validity of their Torrens title; (d) the Court of Appeals, in resolving the
appeal from the LRA, has no jurisdiction to order the cancellation of petitioners’ title; and (e)  the ruling in Ortigas   was
misapplied.   
 
 
          The petitions must be denied. 
 
          The LRA properly ruled that the reconstituting officer should have confined himself to the owner’s duplicate
certificate of title prior to the reconstitution.  Section 3 of Republic Act (RA) No. 26[28] clearly provides:
 
Section 3.  Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be
available, in the following order:
 
                 (a)           The owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title;
          ....
 
 
When respondents filed the petition for reconstitution, they submitted in support thereof the owner’s duplicate
certificate of title, real estate tax receipts and tax declaration.  Plainly, the same should have more than sufficed as
sources for the reconstitution pursuant to Section 3 of RA No. 26 which explicitly mandates that the reconstitution shall be
made following the hierarchy of sources as enumerated by law.  In addition, Section 12 of the same law requires that
the petition shall be accompanied with a plan and technical description of the property only if the source of the
reconstitution is Section 3(f) of RA No. 26.  Thus:
 
Section 12. … Provided, That in case the reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources enumerated in section
2(f) or 3(f) of this Act, the petition shall further be accompanied with a plan and technical description of the property duly
approved by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, or with a certified copy of the description taken from a prior
certificate of title covering the same property.[29]    
 
 
Since respondents’ source of reconstitution is the owner’s duplicate certificate of title, there is no need for the
reconstituting officer to require the submission of the plan, much less deny the petition on the ground that the submitted
plan appears to be spurious.  By enumerating the hierarchy of sources to be used for the reconstitution, it is the intent of
the law to give more weight and preference to the owner’s duplicate certificate of title over the other enumerated sources.
 
 The factual finding of the LRA that respondents’ title is authentic, genuine, valid, and existing, while petitioners’
title is sham and spurious, as affirmed by the two divisions of the Court of Appeals, is conclusive before this Court.  It
should remain undisturbed since only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
 
Findings of fact of administrative bodies are accorded respect, even finality by this Court and, when affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, are no longer reviewable except only for very compelling reasons.  Basic is the rule that factual
findings of agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions  … are accorded not only respect but even finality, aside from the
consideration that this Court is essentially not a trier of facts.[30] 
 
Such questions as whether certain items of evidence should be accorded probative value or weight, or rejected as
feeble or spurious, or whether or not the proofs on one side or the other are clear and convincing and adequate to
establish a proposition in issue, are without doubt questions of fact.  Whether or not the body of proofs presented by a
party, weighed and analyzed in relation to contrary evidence submitted by adverse party, may be said to be strong, clear
and convincing; whether or not certain documents presented by one side should be accorded full faith and credit in the
face of protests as to their spurious character by the other side; whether or not inconsistencies in the body of proofs of a
party are of such gravity as to justify refusing to give said proofs weight – all these are issues of fact.  Questions like these
are not reviewable by this court which, as a rule, confines its review of cases decided by the Court of Appeals only to
questions of law raised in the petition and therein distinctly set forth.[31]  A petition for review should only cover questions of
law.  Questions of fact are not reviewable.[32]
 
In Dolfo v. Register of Deeds for the Province of Cavite,[33] this Court categorically declared:
 
Second.  Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals made a factual finding that petitioner’s title to the land is of
doubtful authenticity.
 
Having jurisdiction only to resolve questions of law, this Court is bound by the factual findings of the trial court and
the Court of Appeals....
 
 
In view of the foregoing, it is no longer necessary to remand the case to the RTC for the determination of which
title, petitioners' or respondents', is valid or spurious.  This has been ruled upon by the LRA and duly affirmed by the two
divisions of the Court of Appeals.
 
The LRA has the jurisdiction to act on petitions for administrative reconstitution.  It has the authority to review,
revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal the decision of the reconstituting officer.  The function is adjudicatory in nature
– it can properly deliberate on the validity of the titles submitted for reconstitution.  Logically, it can declare a title as sham
or spurious, or valid on its face.  Otherwise, if it cannot make such declaration, then there would be no basis for its
decision to grant or deny the reconstitution.  The findings of fact of the LRA, when supported by substantial evidence, as
in this case, shall be binding on the Court of Appeals.[34]
 
In the reconstitution proceedings, the LRA is bound to determine from the evidence submitted which between or
among the titles is genuine and existing to enable it to decide whether to deny or approve the petition.   Without such
authority, the LRA would be a mere robotic agency clothed only with mechanical powers.  
 
The Court of Appeals also properly exercised its appellate jurisdiction over the judgment of the LRA.  Under
Sections 1 and 3, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, the appellate court has jurisdiction on appeals from judgments or final
orders of the LRA, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.
 
Indeed, it would be needlessly circuitous to remand the case to the RTC to determine anew which of the two titles
is sham or spurious and thereafter appeal the trial court’s ruling to the Court of Appeals.  After all, the LRA and the two
divisions of the appellate court have already declared that petitioners’ title is forged.   In Mendoza  v. Court of Appeals,
[35]
 we ruled that:
 
Now, technically, the revocation and cancellation of the deed of sale and the title issued in virtue thereof in de los
Santos’ favor should be had in appropriate proceedings to be initiated at the instance of the Government.  However,
since all the facts are now before this Court, and it is not within de los Santos’ power in any case to alter those
facts at any other proceeding, or the verdict made inevitable by said facts, for this Court to direct at this time that
cancellation proceedings be yet filed to nullify the sale to de los Santos and his title, would be needlessly
circuitous and would unnecessarily delay the termination of the controversy at bar, ....  This Court will therefore
make the adjudication entailed by the facts here and now, without further proceedings, as it has done in other
cases in similar premises.
  
 
No useful purpose will be served if a case or the determination of an issue in a case is remanded to the trial court
only to have its decision raised again to the Court of Appeals and then to the Supreme Court.  The remand of the case or
of an issue to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary where the Court is in position to resolve
the dispute based on the records before it and particularly where the ends of justice would not be subserved by the
remand thereof.[36]   
 
The Register of Deeds, the LRA and the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to act on the petition for administrative
reconstitution.   The doctrine laid down in Alabang Dev. Corp., et al. v. Hon. Valenzuela, etc., et al. [37] does not apply in the
instant case.  In Alabang,  the Court stressed that:
 
… [L]ands already covered by duly issued existing Torrens Titles … cannot be the subject of petitions
for reconstitution  of allegedly lost or destroyed titles filed by third parties without first securing by final judgment
the cancellation  of such existing titles. … The courts simply have no jurisdiction over petitions by such third
parties for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles over lands that are already covered by duly issued subsisting
titles in the names of their duly registered owners.  The very concept of stability and indefeasibility  of titles covered under
the Torrens System of registration rules out as anathema the issuance of two certificates of title over the same land to two
different holders thereof. …[38]
 
 
The Alabang ruling was premised on the fact that the existing Torrens title was duly issued and that there is only
one title subsisting at the time the petition for reconstitution was filed.  In the instant case, it cannot be said that
petitioners’ title was duly issued much less could it be presumed valid considering the findings of the LRA and the Court
of Appeals that the same is sham and spurious. 
 
 
          The Court of Appeals properly applied the doctrine laid down in Ortigas in refusing to remand the case to the trial
court.  As expressly declared in Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco:[39]
 
            Ordinarily, the relief indicated by the material facts would be the remand of the reconstitution case (LRC No. Q-
5405) to the Court of origin with instructions that Ortigas’ and the Solicitor General’s appeals from the judgment rendered
therein, which were wrongly disallowed, be given due course and the records forthwith transmitted to the appellate
tribunal.  This, in fact, is a relief alternatively prayed for by petitioner Ortigas.  Considering however the fatal infirmities
afflicting Molina’s theory or cause of action, evident from the records before this Court, such a remand and subsequent
appeal proceedings would be pointless and unduly circuitous.  Upon the facts, it is not possible for Molina’s cause to
prosper.  To defer adjudication thereon would be unwarranted and unjust.
 
 
          The same rationale should apply in the instant case.  As already discussed, the validity of respondents’ and
petitioners’ title have been squarely passed upon by the LRA and reviewed and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which
factual findings are no longer reviewable by this Court.  
 
          A careful examination of the case of Spouses Cayetano, et al. v. CA, et al.,[40] where this Court, as claimed by
petitioners, have affirmed their title over the disputed property, would reveal that the sole issue resolved therein is whether
or not a tenancy relationship exists between the parties.[41]  There was no adjudication on ownership.  In fact, it cannot
even be discerned if the property subject of the Spouses Cayetano case refers to the property subject of the instant
controversy.
 
There is no basis in the allegation that petitioners were deprived of “their property” without due process of law
when the Court of Appeals ordered the cancellation of theirTorrens title, even without a direct proceeding in the RTC.  As
already discussed, there is no need to remand the case to the RTC for a re-determination on the validity of the titles of
respondents and petitioners as the same has been squarely passed upon by the LRA and affirmed by the appellate court. 
By opposing the petition for reconstitution and submitting their administratively reconstituted title, petitioners acquiesced to
the authority and jurisdiction of the reconstituting officer, the LRA and the Court of Appeals, and recognized their authority
to pass judgment on their title.  All the evidence presented was duly considered by these tribunals.  There is thus no basis
to petitioners’ claim that they were deprived of their right to be heard and present evidence, which is the essence of due
process.
 
As held in Yusingco v. Ong Hing Lian:[42]
 
 Therefore, it appearing from the records that in the previous petition for reconstitution of certificates of title, the
parties acquiesced in submitting the issue of ownership for determination in the said petition, and they were given the full
opportunity to present their respective sides of the issues and evidence in support thereof, and that the evidence
presented was sufficient and adequate for rendering a proper decision upon the issue, the adjudication of the issue of
ownership was valid and binding.
 
 
          The reconstitution would not constitute a collateral attack on petitioners’ title which was irregularly and illegally
issued in the first place.[43]  As pertinently held in Dolfo v. Register of Deeds for the  Province of Cavite:[44]
 
The rule that a title issued under the Torrens System is presumed valid and, hence, is the best proof of ownership
of a piece of land does not apply where the certificate itself is faulty as to its purported origin.
 
In this case, petitioner anchors her arguments on the premise that her title to the subject property is indefeasible
because of the presumption that her certificate of title is authentic.  However, this presumption is overcome by the
evidence presented, consisting of the LRA report … that TCT No. T-320601 was issued without legal basis …
 
….
 
Thus, petitioner cannot invoke the indefeasibility of her certificate of title.  It bears emphasis that the Torrens
system does not create or vest title but only confirms and records one already existing and vested.  Thus, while it may be
true, as petitioner argues, that a land registration court has no jurisdiction over parcels of land already covered by a
certificate of title, it is equally true that this rule applies only where there exists no serious controversy as to the
authenticity of the certificate.
 
 
Under similar circumstances, this Court has ruled that wrongly reconstituted certificates of title secured through
fraud and misrepresentation cannot be the source of legitimate rights and benefits.[45]
 
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED.   In G.R. No. 162335, the February 24, 2004 Amended Decision of the
Third Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel
petitioners’ TCT No. RT-22481 and directing the Land Registration Authority to reconstitute respondents’ TCT No.
210177; and in G.R. No. 162605, the November 7, 2003 Amended Decision of the Special Division of Five of the Former
Second Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners’ TCT No.
RT-22481, and the Land Registration Authority to reconstitute respondents’ TCT No. T-210177 and the March 12,
2004 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.      

2009:

On 7 September 2006, Felicitas Manahan and Rosendo Manahan filed a motion to intervene, to which was
attached their petition in intervention.[33]  Movants alleged that the property subject of the petition in G.R. No. 162335 and
G.R. No. 162605 was owned by them. They claimed that their predecessor-in-interest, Vicente Manahan, was issued
Sales Certificate No. 511 which covered lot 823 of the Piedad Estate. Moreover, they attached to their petition the findings
of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) that the documents of the Manotoks were not as old as they were purported
to be.[34] The Director of the Legal Division of the Land Management Bureau (LMB) recommended to the Director of the
LMB that:
 
 
 
 
…steps be taken in the proper court for the cancellation of TCT No. RT-22481(372302) and all its derivative titles so that
the land covered may be reverted to the State.[35]
 
 
Ultimately, the Court found it necessary to involve the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in these cases,
directing the OSG to file its Comment. The OSG filed its Comment on 04 April 2007. Oral arguments were eventually held
on 24 July 2007. 
 
After the oral arguments, the Court required the parties, the intervenors, and the Solicitor General to submit their
respective memoranda.
 
I
 
          As can be gleaned from the foregoing statement of facts, these petitions are attended by a few procedural
unorthodoxies, such as, for example,  the Court en bancs move on the Special First Division’s referral  for reevaluation of
these petitions when an entry of judgment had already been made in favor of the Barques. Yet the prevailing consensus
within the Court en banc was to proceed with the reevaluation of these cases on a pro hac vice basis. There are good
reasons for the Court to act in such rare manner in these cases. Most urgently, the Court had felt that the previous rulings
by the First Division and the Special First Division warranted either affirmation or modification by the Court actingen banc.
 
It is a constitutional principle that “no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the [C]ourt in a decision
rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.” It has been argued that
the 2005 Decision of the First Division is inconsistent with precedents of the Court, and leaving that decision alone without
the imprimatur of the Court en banc would lead to undue confusion within the bar and bench, with lawyers, academics and
judges quibbling over whether the earlier ruling of the Division constitutes the current standard with respect to
administrative reconstitution of titles. Our land registration system is too vital to be stymied by such esoteric wrangling,
and the administrators and courts which implement that system do not deserve needless hassle.
 
          The Office of the Solicitor General correctly pointed out that this Court before had sanctioned the recall entries of
judgment.[36] The power to suspend or even disregard rules of procedure can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter
even that which this Court itself has already declared to be final. [37] The militating concern for the Court en bancin
accepting these cases is not so much the particular fate of the parties, but the stability of the Torrens system of
registration by ensuring clarity of jurisprudence on the field.
 
          It is beyond contention, even by the parties, that since the Court en banc resolved to accept these petitions in 2006,
we have effectively been reviewing the 12 December 2005 Decision of the Court’s First Division, as well as the
Resolutions dated 19 April and 19 June 2006 of that same Division. This Resolution is the result of that review. As earlier
stated, we have opted to do so on a pro hac vice basis to lend much needed jurisprudential clarity as only the Court en
banc can constitutionally provide.
 
II
 
In the context of an administrative reconstitution proceeding before the LRA, the Barques have sought that the
LRA exercise the power to cancel the Manotok title and forthwith cause the reconstitution of their own title. The LRA
refused to do so, although it did rule that the Manotok title was spurious and thus subject to cancellation through the
proper judicial proceeding. Upon appellate review of that LRA decision, the Court of Appeals initially upheld the LRA’s
position, but ultimately, upon motion for reconsideration, directed the cancellation of the Manotok title and the
reconstitution of the Barque title.
 
          Our succeeding discussion centers on the ordered mechanism for the cancellation of Torrens titles in
the Philippines.  
 
          To recall, both assailed Amended Decisions of the Court of Appeals notably directed the cancellation of the
Manotok title even as it mandated the reconstitution of the Barque title.  The obvious question is whether the Court of
Appeals was empowered to direct the annulment of the Manotok title through the petitions raised before it by the Barques
and the Manotoks. It could not.
 
            Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, also known as the Property Registration Decree, provides that
“[a] certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack […and] cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a
direct proceeding in accordance with law.”[38] Clearly, the cancellation of the Manotok title cannot arise incidentally from
the administrative proceeding for reconstitution of the Barque title even if the evidence from that proceeding revealed the
Manotok title as fake. Nor could it have emerged incidentally in the appellate review of the LRA’s administrative
proceeding.
 
          There is no doubt that the Court of Appeals does not have original jurisdiction to annul Torrens titles or to otherwise
adjudicate questions over ownership of property. Its exclusive original jurisdiction is determined by law, particularly by
Batas Pambansa (B.P. 129). Section 9 of that law restricts the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to
special civil actions and to actions for annulment of judgments of the regional trial court. [39]  Still, the Court of Appeals did
acquire jurisdiction over the Barques’ and the Manotoks’ petitions, albeit in the exercise of its exclusive appellate
jurisdiction[40] over the ruling of the LRA, also pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. Thus, for the appellate
court to be able to direct the cancellation of a Torrens title in the course of reviewing a decision of the LRA, the LRA itself
must have statutory authority to cancel a Torrens title in the first place.  
 
           Note that the Office of the Solicitor General, which acts as counsel for the government and its agencies including
the LRA, refutes the contention that the LRA has jurisdiction to cancel the Manotok title, much less jurisdiction to rule on
the validity of a certificate of title.  It invokes the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC under Paragraph 2, Section 19 of
B.P. Blg. 129, conferring jurisdiction on the RTC over “all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of real
property, or any interest therein x x x.” That the RTC has “exclusive original jurisdiction” over actions seeking the
cancellation of title to real property is so cardinal in our remedial law that it is reflected in hundreds if not thousands of
examples in jurisprudence.
 
          Nonetheless, we may inquire whether, notwithstanding the statutory delineation of “exclusive original jurisdiction of
the RTC,” there is statutory basis for the LRA to exercise jurisdiction over the cancellation of Torrens titles. If there is, we
can perhaps assess such law separately from B.P. Blg. 129.
 
Section 6 of P.D. No. 1529 enumerates the general functions of the Land Registration Commissioner, as follows:
 
SEC. 6. General Functions —
 
(1)   The Commissioner of Land Registration shall have the following functions:
 
a)          Issue decrees of registration pursuant to final judgments of the courts in land registration proceedings and cause the
issuance by the Registers of Deeds of the corresponding certificates of title;
b)          Exercise supervision and control over all Registers of Deeds and other personnel of the Commission;
c)          Resolve cases elevated en consulta by, or on appeal from decision of, Registers of Deeds;
d)          Exercise executive supervision over all clerks of court and personnel of the Court of First Instance throughout
the Philippines with respect to the discharge of their duties and functions in relation to the registration of lands;
e)          Implement all orders, decisions, and decrees promulgated relative to the registration of lands and issue, subject to the
approval of the Secretary of Justice, all needful rules and regulations therefor;
)           Verify and approve subdivision, consolidation, and consolidation-subdivision survey plans of properties titled under Act No.
496 except those covered by P.D. No. 957.
 
Nowhere in the aforecited provision is it stated that the LRA has the power to cancel titles. Indeed, the Barques
are unable to point to any basis in law that confirms the power of the LRA to effect such cancellation, even under Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 26 as amended by Rep. Act No. 6732, which authorizes the administrative reconstitution of titles in limited
cases. In fact, as we shall see shortly such laws take great care to ensure that a petition for administrative reconstitution
of title will not disturb existing Torrens titles.
 
          It is thus clear that neither the Court of Appeals nor the LRA had jurisdiction to cancel the Manotok title. The next
matter of inquiry is whether the LRA had acted correctly in ordering, conditional as it may have been, the administrative
reconstitution of the Barque title.
 
          Under Rep. Act No. 26 as amended by Rep. Act No. 6732, administrative reconstitution of titles is permitted where
the certificates of titles have been lost due to “flood, fire and other force majeure.” The petitioner in such a case is required
to execute an affidavit, containing the following averments:
(1) That no deed or other instrument affecting the property had been presented for registration, or, if there be any, the
nature thereof, the date of its presentation, as well as the names of the parties, and whether the registration of such deed
or instrument is still pending accomplishment;
(2) That the owner's duplicate certificate or co-owner's duplicate is in due form without any apparent intentional alterations
or erasures;
(3) That the certificate of title is not the subject of litigation or investigation, administrative or judicial, regarding
its genuineness or due execution or issuance;
(4) That the certificate of title was in full force and effect at the time it was lost or destroyed;
(5) That the certificate of title is covered by a tax declaration regularly issued by the Assessor's Office; and
(6) That real estate taxes have been fully paid up to at least two (2) years prior to the filing of the petition for reconstitution.
[41]

 
 
          Section 19 of Rep. Act No. 26, as amended by Rep. Act  No. 6732, further provides:
Sec. 19. If the certificate of title considered lost or destroyed, and subsequently found or recovered, is not in the
name of the same person in whose favor the reconstituted certificate of title has been issued, the Register of Deeds or the
party concerned should bring the matter to the attention of the proper regional trial court, which, after due notice and
hearing, shall order the cancellation of the reconstituted certificate of title and render, with respect to the memoranda of
new liens and encumbrances, if any, made in the reconstituted certificate of title, after its reconstitution, such judgment as
justice and equity may require: Provided, however, That if the reconstituted certificate of title has been cancelled by virtue
of any deed or instrument, whether voluntary or involuntary, or by an order of the court, and a new certificate of title has
been issued, the procedure prescribed above, with respect to the memorandum of new liens and encumbrances made on
the reconstituted certificate of title, after its reconstitution, shall be followed with respect to the new certificate of title, and
to such new liens and encumbrances, if any, as may have been on the latter, after the issuance thereof.[42]
            Rep. Act No. 6732 itself also states:
Section 11. A reconstituted title obtained by means of fraud, deceit or other machination is void ab initio as
against the party obtaining the same and all persons having knowledge thereof.
 
 
Section 12. Any person who by means of fraud, deceit or other machination obtains or attempts to obtain a
reconstituted title shall be subject to criminal prosecution and, upon conviction, shall be liable for imprisonment for a
period of not less than two years but not exceeding five years or the payment of a fine of not less than Twenty thousand
pesos but not exceeding Two hundred thousand pesos or both at the discretion of the court.
Any public officer or employee who knowingly approves or assists in securing a decision allowing reconstitution in
favor of any person not entitled thereto shall be subject to criminal prosecution and, upon conviction, shall be liable for
imprisonment of not less than five years but not exceeding ten years or payment of a fine of not less than Fifty thousand
pesos but not exceeding One hundred thousand pesos or both at the discretion of the court and perpetual disqualification
from holding public office.[43]
 
          These provisions indubitably establish that the administrative reconstitution of Torrens titles is intended for non-
controversial cases, or especially where the subject property is not covered by an existing title in favor of a person other
than the applicant. Such an implication is consonant with the rule that the reconstitution proceedings are not the venue for
confirmation or adjudication of title, but merely a means by which a previously adjudicated title whose original has been
lost or destroyed may be reissued to its owner.[44]
 
          The Solicitor General pertinently cites the rule in Alabang Development Corporation v. Valenzuela,[45]  which we
held that “[t]he courts simply have no jurisdiction over petitions by such third parties for reconstitution of allegedly lost or
destroyed titles over lands that are already covered by duly issued subsisting titles in the names of their duly registered
owners.”[46] That such doctrine was established for cases of judicial reconstitution does not bar its application to cases of
administrative reconstitution. None of the provisions pertaining to administrative reconstitution in Rep. Act No. 26 or 6732
extraordinarily empowers the LRA to exercise jurisdiction over a petition for reconstitution, where the property is already
covered by a Torrens title. After all, the LRA in such case is powerless to void the previous title or to diminish its legal
effect. Even assuming that the previously issued title is obviously fraudulent or attended by flaws and as such cannot be
countenanced by the legal system, the corrective recourse lies with the courts, and not with the LRA.
 
          If a petition for administrative reconstitution is filed with the LRA, and it appears from the official records that the
subject property is already covered by an existing Torrenstitle in the name of another person, there is nothing further the
LRA can do but to dismiss the petition. The dismissal of such petition is subject to judicial review, but the only relevant
inquiry in such appellate proceeding is on whether or not there is a previously existing title covering that property. Neither
the LRA nor the Court of Appeals at that point may inquire into the validity of the title or the competing claims over the
property. The only remedy is an action before the RTC for the cancellation of the existing title, whether by the competing
claimant or by the OSG on behalf of the Republic.
 
 
III
 
The 2005 Decision placed heavy reliance on Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco, [47] where in the
course of reviewing an action for judicial reconstitution of title, the Court opted not to remand the reconstitution case filed
by Molina to the court of origin in order to permit the appeals of Ortigas and the Solicitor General, which had
been  improvidently disallowed by the trial court. Instead, owing to the “fatal infirmities” of Molina’s cause of action, the
Court itself nullified the reconstituted titles issued by the trial court. Ortigas had been cited by the Court of Appeals and
also by the 2005 Decision, in ruling on the Barques’ petition.
 
The unusual “shortcut” that occurred in Ortigas had become necessary  because in that case the trial court had
denied or stricken out the notices of appeal respectively filed by Ortigas and the Solicitor General from the order for
reconstitution of Molina’s titles. Had these notices of appeal been allowed, the Court of Appeals would have then reviewed
the trial court’s decision on appeal, with the ultimately correct resolution which was the annulment of Molina’s titles.
Ortigas was forced to institute a special civil action of certiorari and mandamus with this Court, praying for either of these
alternative results—the more prudent recourse of directing the trial court to act on the notices of appeal and to forward the
case records to the Court of Appeals, or the more immediate remedy of bypassing the appellate process and the Court
itself by directly annulling Molina’s titles.
 
 The Court of Appeals herein could not have equated its annulment of the Manotok title with that undertaken by the
Court in Ortigas since, unlike in Ortigas, the Court of Appeals was not endowed with the proper appellate jurisdiction to
annul the Manotok title. As earlier pointed out, since the LRA had no original jurisdiction to cancel the Manotok title, it
follows that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdictional competence to extend the same relief, even while reviewing the
LRA’s ruling. Clearly, Ortigas cannot be applied as a binding precedent to these cases. The fundamental jurisdictional
defects that attended the actions of both Divisions of the Court of Appeals have effectively diminished Ortigas as a
persuasive authority.
 
IV
 
The 2005 Decision accepted the findings of the LRA and the Court of Appeals that the Manotok title was spurious
and accordingly sanctioned its cancellation, even though no direct attack on the title had been initiated before a trial court.
That the 2005 Decision erred in that regard is a necessary consequence following our earlier explanation of why the mere
existence of the Manotok title necessarily barred the LRA from inquiring into the validity of that title.
 
Moreover, it would have been pointless for the LRA or the Court of Appeals to have ruled definitively on the
validity of the Barques’ claim to title. After all, since neither the LRA nor the Court of Appeals could cause the cancellation
of the Manotok title, any declaration that the Barque claim was valid would be inutile and inoperable. Still, in order to
effectively review and reverse the assailed rulings, it would be best for this Court to test the premises under which the
LRA and the Court of Appeals had concluded that the Barques had a valid claim to title. The available record before
the Court is comprehensive enough to allow us to engage in that task.
 
          The Barque title, or TCT No. 210177, under which the Barques assert title to Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate, states
that it was transferred from TCT No. 13900. [48] The Barques assert that they bought the subject property from a certain
Setosta. Thus, it could be deduced that TCT No. 13900 should have been registered under the name of Setosta.
However, it was not. TCT No. 13900 was registered under the name of Manotok Realty, Inc. [49] This detracts from the
Barques’ claim that the Manotoks do not have title to the property, as in fact the Barque title was a transfer from a title
registered under the name of the Manotoks. The Barques have failed to explain the anomaly.
 
          The Barques hinge their claim on a purported subdivision plan, FLS-3168-D, made in favor of Setosta. However,
based on the records, it appears that there is a conflict as to its actual existence in the files of the government. Revelatory
is the exchange of correspondence between the LMB and the LRA. The LMB did not have any  copy  of  FLS-3168-
D  in  the EDP listing,[50] nor did the LMB have a record of the plan.[51]  However, a microfilm copy of FLS-3168-D was on
file in the Technical Records and Statistical Section of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Capital
Region (DENR-NCR).[52] The copy with the Technical Records and Statistical Section, which bore the stamp of the LMB,
was denied by the LMB as having emanated from its office.[53]
 
Further, the letter dated 2 January 1997 from the LMB stated that the copy of FLS-3168-D as verified from its
microfilm file was the same as the copy sent by the Technical Records and Statistics Section of the National Capital
Region Lands Management Sector.[54] The LMB, however, denied issuing such letter and stated that it was a forged
document.[55] To amplify the forged nature of the document, the LMB sent a detailed explanation to prove that it did not
come from its office.[56] In a letter to the administrator of the LRA, the hearing officer concluded that “it is evident that there
is an attempt to mislead us into favorable action by submitting forged documents, hence it is recommended that this case
[be] referred to the PARAC for investigation and filing of charges against perpetrators as envisioned by this office under
your administration.”[57]
 
There are significant differences between the technical description of Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate as stated in
FLS-3168-D, the subdivision plan relied on by the Barques, and the technical description provided by the DENR. [58] The
DENR-confirmed technical description reads:
Bounded on the E., along line-2  by Payatas Estate; on the SE., by Tuazon Estate; along line 3-4 by Lot 824;
along line 4-5 by Lot 818; and on the N., along line 5-1 by Lot 822, all of Piedad Estate.[59]
 
 
However, if we examine the subdivision plan, there are critical changes with respect to the boundaries named
therein. In effect, the boundaries as described in the subdivision plan would read:
 
Bounded on the E., along line-2  by Diez Francisco; on the SE., by Diez Francisco; along line 3-4 by Lot 824;
along line 4-5 by Lot 826; and on the N., along line 5-1 by Lot 822, all of Piedad Estate.”[60]
 
 
          The  Barques offered no credible explanation  for the discrepancy between the subdivision plan it relies on and the
DENR record. They also do not contradict the finding of the National Archives that there is no copy in its files of the deed
of sale allegedly executed between Setosta and Barque.[61]
 
          Lastly, in the 1st indorsement issued by the Land Projection Section of the LRA dated 23 August 2006, that Section
stated that upon examination it was found out that the land as described in the Barque title “when plotted thru its tie line
falls outside Quezon City.” This is material, since Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate is within the boundaries ofQuezon City.[62] A
similar finding was made by the Land Management Bureau (LMB). It attested that the line or directional azimuth of Lot No.
823 per  the Barque title locates it at 5,889 meters away from point 1 of Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate.[63]
 
          These discrepancies highlight the error of the LRA and the Court of Appeals in acknowledging the right of the
Barques to seek reconstitution of their purported Barque title. Even assuming that the petition for reconstitution should not
have been dismissed due to the Manotok title, it is apparent that the Barques’ claim of ownership is exceedingly weak.
 
V
 
          In the course of fully reevaluating these cases, the Court could not turn a blind eye on the evidence and points
raised against the Manotok title. The apparent flaws in the Manotoks’ claim are considerable and disturbing enough. The
Court, as the ultimate citadel of justice and legitimacy, is a guardian of the integrity of the land registration system of
the Philippines. We will be derelict in our duty if we remain silent on  the apparent defects of the Manotok title, reflective
as they are of a scourge this Court is dedicated to eliminate.
 
Many of these flaws have especially emerged through the petition-for-intervention of Felicitas and Rosendo
Manahan, whom we have allowed to intervene in these cases. The Manahans had filed a petition with the OSG seeking
that it initiate cancellation/reversion proceedings against the Manotok title. That petition was referred by the OSG to the
LMB of the DENR, which duly investigated the claim of the Manahans. The Chief of the Legal Division of the LMB
recommended that the appropriate proceedings be taken in the proper court for the cancellation of the Manotok title,
through a Memorandum dated 17 April 2000.[64]
 
Around the same time, the LMB referred to the DENR Undersecretary for Legal Affairs Roseller S. dela Peña a
query on whether a deed of conveyance could be issued to Felicitas Manahan. The DENR Undersecretary, in answering
that query through a Memorandum dated 6 July 2000, pointed out that the titles of the Manotoks could not have been
derived from OCT No. 614, the mother title of Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate.[65] The chain of transfers leading from OCT
No. 614 to the Manotok title was a TCT No. 22813, purportedly issued by the Office of the Register of Deeds for
the Province of Rizal. The copy of said TCT No. 22813 submitted to the Court is truncated in the upper half, to the point
that it is not visually discernible what year the same was issued. More crucially, a certification was issued by the Register
of Deeds of Rizal dated 7 January 2000 stating thus:
 
After a thorough verification from the files of this Office, it appears that the documents leading to the issuance of TCT No.
22813, Blk. T-92 cannot be found from the files of this Office.[66]
 
 
          These findings were twice verified with due diligence and reconfirmed by the DENR, according to Undersecretary
Dela Peña.[67]
 
          The DENR also requested the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in conducting the said
investigation. The NBI examined various sales certificates and assignment of sales certificates in the names of the
purported predecessors-in-interest of the Manotoks Regina Geronimo, Modesto Zacarias, and Felicisimo Villanueva—
certificates that were all dated prior to 1930. In its Chemistry Report No. C-99-152 dated 10 June 1999, the Forensic
Chemistry Division of the NBI concluded that the said documents “could not be as old as it (sic) purports to be.”[68]
 
          According to the Manahans, the LMB did eventually forward to the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City a
Deed of Conveyance for registration and mandatory issuance of title to Felicitas Manahan as grantee, pursuant to Section
122 of the Land Registration Act. The registration of said Deed of Conveyance was referred to the Administrator of the
Land Registration Authority en consulta in 2001.
 
          Also on record[69] is an Investigation Report on Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate dated 5 July 1989, authored by
Evelyn C. dela Rosa, Land Investigator of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), NCR-
North Sector and addressed to the CENRO Officer, North CENRO. It was narrated therein that Lot No. 823 had actually
been in the possession of a Valentin Manahan beginning in 1908. In 1939, Valentin Manahan applied for the purchase of
the land, and he was issued Sales Certificate No. 511. The Investigation Report stated:
         Records show that the Sale Certificate No. 511 covering Lot 823, Piedad Estate, was issued to Valentin Manahan
as purchaser and transferred to Hilaria de Guzman Manahan as (Assignee) and sold to Felicitas Manahan by way of
Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 23, 1974. Based on my research at the Land Management Bureau (LMB), Central
Office, it appears that original claimant of lot 823 was Valentin Manahan.[70]
 
 
          All told, these apparent problems with the Manotoks’ claim dissuade us from being simply content in reflexively
dismissing the administrative petition for reconstitution filed by the Barques.  Indeed, we have to take further action.
 
VI
 
          The most formidable impediment to the Court reacting to the problems apparent in the Manotok title is the fact that
we are not engaged in the review of an original action for the cancellation of such title. If, as in Ortigas, the validity of the
questionable title were now properly at issue, the Court would without hesitancy rule on such question. Because it is not,
the matter of how next to proceed warrants more deliberation.
 
          The conservative approach would be to still affirm the continuing validity of the Manotok title until the proper case
for its cancellation is filed with the regional trial court. Within that context, it would also be a plausible recourse for us is to
direct the Solicitor General to duly investigate the circumstances behind the transmission of Lot No. 823, formerly
a Friar Land, to private persons. Thereafter, the Solicitor General can file the appropriate proceedings for cancellation if
warranted. However, it is already apparent, following the evaluation of these cases, that there is evidence—unrefuted thus
far—indicating that the Manotoks’ claim to title is just as flawed as that of the Barques.
 
          Can the Court declare the Manotok title void? In the 2002 decision in Alonso v. Cebu Country Club,[71] the subject
property therein had originally formed part of the Banilad Friar Lands. Cebu Country Club had undertaken the
administrative reconstitution of the title to the property,  leading Alonso to file a complaint for nullification of such title in
order to vindicate his own claims to the property. Alonso’s complaint was dismissed by the trial court and the Court of
Appeals. While the case was pending with this Court, the Solicitor General was required to comment on the validity of
Cebu Country Club’s administratively reconstituted title. Ultimately, the Court concluded that Cebu Country Club had not
been able to establish a clear title over the contested estate, and in the dispositive portion of its decision declared “that Lot
No. 727 D-2 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate covered by Original Certificate of Title Nos. 251, 232, and 253 legally
belongs to the Government of the Philippines.”
 
          The following year, the Court, acting on the motions for reconsideration in Alonso,[72] extensively discussed why it
had taken that extraordinary step even though the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, had not
participated or intervened in that case before the lower courts.
 
It must be borne in mind that the disputed property is part of the "Friar Lands" over which the Government holds
title and are not public lands but private or patrimonial property of the Government and can be alienated only upon proper
compliance with the requirements of Act No. 1120 or the Friar Lands Act.
 
xxx
 
It was thus primordial for the respondent to prove its acquisition of its title by clear and convincing evidence in
view of the nature of the land. In fact, it is essential for both respondent and petitioners to establish that it had become
private property. Both parties failed to do so. As we have held earlier, petitioners have not succeeded to prove their claim
of ownership over the subject property.
 
xxx
 
Neither may the rewards of prescription be successfully invoked by respondent, as it is an iron-clad dictum that
prescription can never lie against the Government. Since respondent failed to present the paper trail of the property's
conversion to private property, the lengthy possession and occupation of the disputed land by respondent cannot be
counted in its favor, as the subject property being a friar land, remained part of the patrimonial property of the
Government. Possession of patrimonial property of the Government, whether spanning decades or centuries, can not ipso
facto ripen into ownership. Moreover, the rule that statutes of limitation do not run against the State, unless therein
expressly provided, is founded on "the great principle of public policy, applicable to all governments alike, which forbids
that the public interests should be prejudiced by the negligence of the officers or agents to whose care they are confided."
 
xxx
 
 
 Finally, our declaration that Lot 727-D-2 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate legally belongs to the Government
does not amount to reversion without due process of law insofar as both parties are concerned. The disputed property is
a Friar Land and both parties failed to show that it had ceased to belong to the patrimonial property of the State or that it
had become private property.[73]
 
 
         
 
 
          The Alonso  approach especially appeals to us because, as in this case, the subject property therein was
a Friar Land which under the Friar Lands Law (Act No. 1120) may be disposed of by the Government only under that law.
Thus, there is greater concern on the part of this Court to secure its proper transmission to private hands, if at all. 
 
          At the same time, the Court recognizes that there is not yet any sufficient evidence for us to warrant the annulment
of the Manotok title. All that the record indicates thus far is evidence not yet refuted by clear and convincing proof that the
Manotoks’ claim to title is flawed. To arrive at an ultimate determination, the formal reception of evidence is in order. This
Court is not a trier of fact or otherwise structurally capacitated to receive and evaluate evidence de novo. However, the
Court of Appeals is sufficiently able to undertake such function.
 
          The remand of cases pending with this Court to the Court of Appeals for reception of further evidence is not a novel
idea. It has been undertaken before – in Republic v. Court of Appeals[74] and more recently in our 2007 Resolution
in Manotok v. Court of Appeals.[75]  Our following explanation in Manotok equally applies to this case:
 
Under Section 6 of Rule 46, which is applicable to original cases for certiorari, the Court may, whenever
necessary to resolve factual issues, delegate the reception of the evidence on such issues to any of its members or to an
appropriate court, agency or office. 80 The delegate need not be the body that rendered the assailed decision.
 
 
 
The Court of Appeals generally has the authority to review findings of fact. Its conclusions as to findings of fact
are generally accorded great respect by this Court. It is a body that is fully capacitated and has a surfeit of experience in
appreciating factual matters, including documentary evidence.
 
             In fact, the Court had actually resorted to referring a factual matter pending before it to the Court of Appeals.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, this Court commissioned the former Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals to hear
and receive evidence on the controversy, more particularly to determine "the actual area reclaimed by the Republic Real
Estate Corporation, and the areas of the Cultural Center Complex which are 'open spaces' and/or ‘areas reserved for
certain purposes,' determining in the process the validity of such postulates and the respective measurements of the
areas referred to." The Court of Appeals therein received the evidence of the parties and rendered a "Commissioner's
Report" shortly thereafter. Thus, resort to the Court of Appeals is not a deviant procedure.   
 
 
             The provisions of Rule 32 should also be considered as governing the grant of authority to the Court of Appeals to
receive evidence in the present case. Under Section 2, Rule 32 of the Rules of Court, a court may, motu proprio, direct a
reference to a commissioner when a question of fact, other than upon the pleadings, arises upon motion or otherwise, in
any stage of a case, or for carrying a judgment or order into effect. The order of reference can be limited exclusively to
receive and report evidence only, and the commissioner may likewise rule upon the admissibility of evidence. The
commissioner is likewise mandated to submit a report in writing to the court upon the matters submitted to him by the
order of reference. In Republic, the commissioner's report formed the basis of the final adjudication by the Court on the
matter. The same result can obtain herein.[76]
            
 
          The primary focus for the Court of Appeals, as an agent of this Court, in receiving and evaluating evidence should
be whether the Manotoks can trace their claim of title to a valid alienation by the
Government  of  Lot  No.  823  of  the  Piedad  Estate,  which was a Friar
 
 
 
Land. On that evidence, this Court may ultimately decide whether annulment of the Manotok title is warranted, similar to
the annulment of the Cebu Country Club title in Alonso. At the same time, the Court recognizes that the respective claims
to title by other parties such as the Barques and the Manahans, and the evidence they may submit on their behalf, may
have an impact on the correct determination of the status of the Manotok title. It would thus be prudent, in assuring the
accurate evaluation of the question, to allow said parties, along with the OSG, to participate in the proceedings before the
Court of Appeals. If the final evidence on record definitively reveals the proper claimant to the subject property, the Court
would take such fact into consideration as it adjudicates final relief.
 
          For the purposes above-stated, the Court of Appeals is tasked to hear and receive evidence, conclude the
proceedings and submit to this Court a report on its findings and recommended conclusions within three (3) months from
notice of this Resolution.
 
          To assist the Court of Appeals in its evaluation of the factual record, the Office of the Solicitor General is directed to
secure all the pertinent  relevant  records  from  the Land Management Bureau and the
 
Department of Environment and Natural Resources and submit the same to the Court of Appeals.
 
          WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 12 June 2005, and the Resolutions dated 19 April and 19 June 2006 of the
Court’s First Division are hereby SET ASIDE, and the Entry of Judgment recorded on 2 May 2006 is RECALLED. The
Amended Decision dated 24 February 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, the Amended Decision dated 7 November
2003and the Resolution dated 12 March 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, and the Resolutions of the Land Registration
Authority dated 24 June 1998  and 14 June 1998 in Admin. Recons. No. Q-547-A[97] are all REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
 
          The instant cases are hereby REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings in accordance with  this
Resolution. The Court of Appeals is directed to raffle these remanded cases immediately upon receipt of this Resolution.
 
          This Resolution is immediately executory.