Kuroda v. Jalandoni, G.R. No.

L-2662, March 26, 1949

DECISION
(En Banc)

MORAN, C.J.:

I.      THE FACTS

Petitioner Shigenori Kuroda, the Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in

the Philippines during the Japanese occupation, was charged before the Philippine Military
Commission of war crimes. He questioned the constitutionality of E.O. No. 68 that created the
National War Crimes Office and prescribed rules on the trial of accused war criminals. He contended
the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land
Warfare and therefore he is charged of crimes not based on law, national and international. 

II.    THE ISSUES

Was E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional?

III.   THE RULING

[The Court DENIED the petition and upheld the validity and constitutionality of E.O. No. 68.]

YES, E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional.

Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that – 

The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation.

In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the present day
including the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international
jurisprudence established by the United Nation all those person military or civilian who have been
guilty of planning preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and
offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the laws and customs of war, of
humanity and civilization are held accountable therefor. Consequently in the promulgation and
enforcement of Execution Order No. 68 the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with
the generally accepted and policies of international law which are part of the our Constitution.

xxx                  xxx                  xxx

Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no jurisdiction to try petitioner for
acts committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the
Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied
that the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions form, part of and are wholly
based on the generally accepted principals of international law. In facts these rules and principles
were accepted by the two belligerent nations the United State and Japan who were signatories to
the two Convention. Such rule and principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the
Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for our Constitution has been
deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and
principle of international law as contained in treaties to which our government may have been or
shall be a signatory.

Issue:

Whether or not Kuruda can be tried in the Philippines.

Held: 

Yes, pursuant to the doctrine of incorporation. It cannot be denied that the rules and
regulations of The Hague and Geneva Conventions form part of Philippine law since
it is wholly based on the generally accepted principles of international law. In fact
these rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nations, the United
States and Japan, who were signatories to the convention. Such rules and principles,
therefore, form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a
signatory to the convention embodying them, for our constitution has been
deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of
rules and principles of international law as contained in treaties to which our
government may have been or shall be a signatory.  

Article II of the Philippine Constitution states that: “The  Philippines renounces  war

as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of  peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.”   

IBP vs. Zamora G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000

IBP vs. Zamora
G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000 

Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution,
the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for
the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or
suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines
in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until
such time when the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the
deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed
forces is subject to judicial review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols
violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian
character of the PNP
Held:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec.
18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency
of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the
revocation or review of the President’s action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places
the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution
would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review
without any qualification.

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant the
President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is
considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the
curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus
necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court.

In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the
necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the
President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such
heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for
calling out the armed forces.

The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of
law enforcement is “militarized” in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The
deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The
calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement.
The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real
authority belonging to the PNP

Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian
character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a
civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was
incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position
to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy
the civilian character of the PNP.