G.R. No.
L-23825      December 24, 1965 Upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected,
EMMANUEL PELAEZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent.
Zulueta, Gonzales, Paculdo and Associates for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
CONCEPCION, J.:
During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President
of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the
Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121,
124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated
in the margin.1 Soon after the date last mentioned, or on November 10,
1964 petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines
and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of
prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to
restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in
audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said
executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the
ground that said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act
No. 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.
Respondent maintains the contrary view and avers that the present action
is premature and that not all proper parties — referring to the officials of
the new political subdivisions in question — have been impleaded.
Subsequently, the mayors of several municipalities adversely affected by
the aforementioned executive orders — because the latter have taken
away from the former the barrios composing the new political
subdivisions — intervened in the case. Moreover, Attorneys Enrique M.
Fernando and Emma Quisumbing-Fernando were allowed to and did
appear as amici curiae.
The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads:
Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor
their names changed except under the provisions of this Act or
by Act of Congress.
Pursuant to the first two (2) paragraphs of the same Section 3:
All barrios existing at the time of the passage of this Act shall
come under the provisions hereof.
shall first be obtained whenever the boundary of any province
a new barrio may be created or the name of an existing one
may be changed by the provincial board of the province, upon
recommendation of the council of the municipality or
municipalities in which the proposed barrio is stipulated. The
recommendation of the municipal council shall be embodied in
a resolution approved by at least two-thirds of the entire
membership of the said council: Provided, however, That no
new barrio may be created if its population is less than five
hundred persons.
Hence, since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370 became
effective, barrios may "not be created or their boundaries altered nor
their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding
provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas
affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the municipality or
municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated." Petitioner
argues, accordingly: "If the President, under this new law, cannot even
create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of
several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?"
Respondent answers in the affirmative, upon the theory that a new
municipality can be created without creating new barrios, such as, by
placing old barrios under the jurisdiction of the new municipality. This
theory overlooks, however, the main import of the petitioner's argument,
which is that the statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a
new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create
municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios. The cogency
and force of this argument is too obvious to be denied or even
questioned. Founded upon logic and experience, it cannot be offset
except by a clear manifestation of the intent of Congress to the contrary,
and no such manifestation, subsequent to the passage of Republic Act
No. 2379, has been brought to our attention.
Moreover, section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon which
the disputed executive orders are based, provides:
The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may by
executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any
province, subprovince, municipality, [township] municipal
district, or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish
the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into
one or more subprovinces, separate any political division other
than a province, into such portions as may be required, merge
any of such subdivisions or portions with another, name any
new subdivision so created, and may change the seat of
government within any subdivision to such place therein as the
public welfare may require: Provided, That the authorization
of the (Philippine Legislature) Congress of the Philippines
or subprovince is to be defined or any province is to be divided
into one or more subprovinces. When action by the (Governor-
General) President of the Philippines in accordance herewith
makes necessary a change of the territory under the
jurisdiction of any administrative officer or any judicial
officer, the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines,
with the recommendation and advice of the head of the
Department having executive control of such officer, shall
redistrict the territory of the several officers affected and
assign such officers to the new districts so formed.
Upon the changing of the limits of political divisions in
pursuance of the foregoing authority, an equitable distribution
of the funds and obligations of the divisions thereby affected
shall be made in such manner as may be recommended by the
(Insular Auditor) Auditor General and approved by the
(Governor-General) President of the Philippines.
Respondent alleges that the power of the President to create
municipalities under this section does not amount to an undue delegation
of legislative power, relying upon Municipality of Cardona vs.
Municipality of Binañgonan (36 Phil. 547), which, he claims, has settled
it. Such claim is untenable, for said case involved, not the creation of a
new municipality, but a mere transfer of territory — from an already
existing municipality (Cardona) to another municipality
(Binañgonan), likewise, existing at the time of and prior to said
transfer (See Gov't of the P.I. ex rel. Municipality of Cardona vs.
Municipality, of Binañgonan [34 Phil. 518, 519-5201) — in consequence
of the fixing and definition, pursuant to Act No. 1748, of the common
boundaries of two municipalities.
It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix such common
boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between
adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature —
involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into
effect the law creating said municipalities — the authority to create
municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. In the
language of other courts, it is "strictly a legislative function" (State ex
rel. Higgins vs. Aicklen, 119 S. 425, January 2, 1959) or "solely
and exclusively the exercise of legislative power" (Udall vs. Severn, May
29, 1938, 79 P. 2d 347-349). As the Supreme Court of Washington has
put it (Territory ex rel. Kelly vs. Stewart, February 13, 1890, 23 Pac.
405, 409), "municipal corporations are purely the creatures of statutes."
Although1a Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government
the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or
administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the
principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself
— it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate2 — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of
which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.2a Indeed,
without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect,
make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and,
without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to
determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted
within or beyond the scope of his authority.2b Hence, he could thereby
arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make the law, but, also —
and this is worse — to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent
with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying
the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and
balances, and, consequently, undermining the very foundation of our
Republican system.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well
settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details
in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be
carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a
standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to. In
this connection, we do not overlook the fact that, under the last clause of
the first sentence of Section 68, the President:
... may change the seat of the government within any
subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may
require.
It is apparent, however, from the language of this clause, that the phrase
"as the public welfare may require" qualified, not the clauses preceding
the one just quoted, but only the place to which the seat of the
government may be transferred. This fact becomes more apparent when
we consider that said Section 68 was originally Section 1 of Act No.
1748,3 which provided that, "whenever in the judgment of the Governor-
General the public welfare requires, he may, by executive order," effect
the changes enumerated therein (as in said section 68), including the
change of the seat of the government "to such place ... as the public
interest requires." The opening statement of said Section 1 of Act No.
1748 — which was not included in Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code — governed the time at which, or the conditions
under which, the powers therein conferred could be exercised; whereas
the last part of the first sentence of said section referred exclusively to
the place to which the seat of the government was to be transferred.
At any rate, the conclusion would be the same, insofar as the case at bar
is concerned, even if we assumed that the phrase "as the public welfare
may require," in said Section 68, qualifies all other clauses thereof. It is
true that in Calalang vs. Williams (70 Phil. 726) and People vs.
Rosenthal (68 Phil. 328), this Court had upheld "public welfare" and
"public interest," respectively, as sufficient standards for a valid
delegation of the authority to execute the law. But, the doctrine laid
down in these cases — as all judicial pronouncements — must be
construed in relation to the specific facts and issues involved therein,
outside of which they do not constitute precedents and have no binding
effect.4 The law construed in the Calalang case conferred upon the
Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, the power to issue rules and regulations
to promote safe transit upon national roads and streets. Upon the other
hand, the Rosenthal case referred to the authority of the Insular
Treasurer, under Act No. 2581, to issue and cancel certificates or permits
for the sale of speculative securities. Both cases involved grants
to administrative officers of powers related to the exercise of their
administrative functions, calling for the determination of questions
of fact.
Such is not the nature of the powers dealt with in section 68. As above
indicated, the creation of municipalities, is not
an administrative function, but one which is essentially and eminently
legislative in character. The question of whether or not "public interest"
demands the exercise of such power is not one of fact. it is "purely a
legislative question "(Carolina-Virginia Coastal Highway vs. Coastal
Turnpike Authority, 74 S.E. 2d. 310-313, 315-318), or
a political question (Udall vs. Severn, 79 P. 2d. 347-349). As the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin has aptly characterized it, "the question as
to whether incorporation is for the best interest of the community in any
case is emphatically a question of public policy and statecraft" (In re
Village of North Milwaukee, 67 N.W. 1033, 1035-1037).
For this reason, courts of justice have annulled, as constituting undue
delegation of legislative powers, state laws granting the judicial
department, the power to determine whether certain territories should be
annexed to a particular municipality (Udall vs. Severn, supra, 258-359);
or vesting in a Commission the right to determine the plan and frame of
government of proposed villages and what functions shall be exercised
by the same, although the powers and functions of the village are
specifically limited by statute (In re Municipal Charters, 86 Atl. 307-
308); or conferring upon courts the authority to declare a given town or
village incorporated, and designate its metes and bounds, upon petition
of a majority of the taxable inhabitants thereof, setting forth the area
desired to be included in such village (Territory ex rel Kelly vs. Stewart,
23 Pac. 405-409); or authorizing the territory of a town, containing a
given area and population, to be incorporated as a town, on certain steps
being taken by the inhabitants thereof and on certain determination by a
court and subsequent vote of the inhabitants in favor thereof, insofar as
the court is allowed to determine whether the lands embraced in the
petition "ought justly" to be included in the village, and whether the
interest of the inhabitants will be promoted by such incorporation, and to
enlarge and diminish the boundaries of the proposed village "as justice
may require" (In re Villages of North Milwaukee, 67 N.W. 1035-1037);
or creating a Municipal Board of Control which shall determine whether
or not the laying out, construction or operation of a toll road is in the
"public interest" and whether the requirements of the law had been
complied with, in which case the board shall enter an order creating a
municipal corporation and fixing the name of the same (Carolina-
Virginia Coastal Highway vs. Coastal Turnpike Authority, 74 S.E. 2d.
310).
Insofar as the validity of a delegation of power by Congress to the
President is concerned, the case of Schechter Poultry Corporation vs.
U.S. (79 L. Ed. 1570) is quite relevant to the one at bar. The Schechter
case involved the constitutionality of Section 3 of the National Industrial
Recovery Act authorizing the President of the United States to approve
"codes of fair competition" submitted to him by one or more trade or
industrial associations or corporations which "impose no inequitable
restrictions on admission to membership therein and are truly
representative," provided that such codes are not designed "to promote
monopolies or to eliminate or oppress small enterprises and will not
operate to discriminate against them, and will tend to effectuate the
policy" of said Act. The Federal Supreme Court held:
To summarize and conclude upon this point: Sec. 3 of the
Recovery Act is without precedent. It supplies no standards for
any trade, industry or activity. It does not undertake to
prescribe rules of conduct to be applied to particular states of
fact determined by appropriate administrative procedure.
Instead of prescribing rules of conduct, it authorizes the
making of codes to prescribe them. For that legislative
undertaking, Sec. 3 sets up no standards, aside from the
statement of the general aims of rehabilitation, correction and
expansion described in Sec. 1. In view of the scope of that
broad declaration, and of the nature of the few restrictions that
are imposed, the discretion of the President in approving or
prescribing codes, and thus enacting laws for the government
of trade and industry throughout the country, is virtually
unfettered. We think that the code making authority thus
conferred is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power.
If the term "unfair competition" is so broad as to vest in the President a
discretion that is "virtually unfettered." and, consequently, tantamount to
a delegation of legislative power, it is obvious that "public welfare,"
which has even a broader connotation, leads to the same result. In fact, if
the validity of the delegation of powers made in Section 68 were upheld,
there would no longer be any legal impediment to a statutory grant of
authority to the President to do anything which, in his opinion, may be
required by public welfare or public interest. Such grant of authority
would be a virtual abdication of the powers of Congress in favor of the
Executive, and would bring about a total collapse of the democratic
system established by our Constitution, which it is the special duty and
privilege of this Court to uphold.
It may not be amiss to note that the executive orders in question were
issued after the legislative bills for the creation of the municipalities
involved in this case had failed to pass Congress. A better proof of the
fact that the issuance of said executive orders entails the exercise of
purely legislative functions can hardly be given.
Again, Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:
The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision
over all local governments as may be provided by law, and
take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the
President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested
by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of
the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This
power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local
governments are concerned. With respect to the latter, the fundamental
law permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking
whether said local governments or the officers thereof perform their
duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot
interfere with local governments, so long as the same or its officers act
Within the scope of their authority. He may not enact an ordinance
which the municipal council has failed or refused to pass, even if it had
thereby violated a duty imposed thereto by law, although he may see to it
that the corresponding provincial officials take appropriate disciplinary
action therefor. Neither may he vote, set aside or annul an ordinance
passed by said council within the scope of its jurisdiction, no matter how
patently unwise it may be. He may not even suspend an elective official
of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary action against him,
except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding provincial board.5
Upon the other hand if the President could create a municipality, he
could, in effect, remove any of its officials, by creating a new
municipality and including therein the barrio in which the official
concerned resides, for his office would thereby become vacant.6 Thus, by
merely brandishing the power to create a new municipality (if he had it),
without actually creating it, he could compel local officials to submit to
his dictation, thereby, in effect, exercising over them the power of
control denied to him by the Constitution.
Then, also, the power of control of the President over executive
departments, bureaus or offices implies no more than the authority to
assume directly the functions thereof or to interfere in the exercise of
discretion by its officials. Manifestly, such control does not include the policy as regards the new municipalities involved in this case, in the
authority either to abolish an executive department or bureau, or to absence of an allegation to such effect, and none has been made by him.
create a new one. As a consequence, the alleged power of the President
to create municipal corporations would necessarily connote the exercise WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are hereby declared
by him of an authority even greater than that of control which he has null and void ab initio and the respondent permanently restrained from
over the executive departments, bureaus or offices. In other words, passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities above
comply with the constitutional mandate above quoted. Instead of giving referred to. It is so ordered.
the President less power over local governments than that vested in him
over the executive departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the
process and does the exact opposite, by conferring upon Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera and Dizon,
him more power over municipal corporations than that which he has JJ., concur.
over said executive departments, bureaus or offices.
Zaldivar, J., took no part.
In short, even if it did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers,
as it certainly does, said Section 68, as part of the Revised
Administrative Code, approved on March 10, 1917, must be deemed
repealed by the subsequent adoption of the Constitution, in 1935, which
is utterly incompatible and inconsistent with said statutory enactment.7
There are only two (2) other points left for consideration, namely,
respondent's claim (a) that "not all the proper parties" — referring to the
officers of the newly created municipalities — "have been impleaded in
this case," and (b) that "the present petition is premature."
As regards the first point, suffice it to say that the records do not show,
and the parties do not claim, that the officers of any of said
municipalities have been appointed or elected and assumed office. At
any rate, the Solicitor General, who has appeared on behalf of
respondent Auditor General, is the officer authorized by law "to act and
represent the Government of the Philippines, its offices and agents, in
any official investigation, proceeding or matter requiring the services of
a lawyer" (Section 1661, Revised Administrative Code), and, in
connection with the creation of the aforementioned municipalities, which
involves a political, not proprietary, function, said local officials, if any,
are mere agents or representatives of the national government. Their
interest in the case at bar has, accordingly, been, in effect, duly
represented.8
With respect to the second point, respondent alleges that he has not as
yet acted on any of the executive order & in question and has not
intimated how he would act in connection therewith. It is, however, a
matter of common, public knowledge, subject to judicial cognizance,
that the President has, for many years, issued executive orders creating
municipal corporations and that the same have been organized and in
actual operation, thus indicating, without peradventure of doubt, that the
expenditures incidental thereto have been sanctioned, approved or
passed in audit by the General Auditing Office and its officials. There is
no reason to believe, therefore, that respondent would adopt a different

[G.R. NO. 161414 : January 17, 2005]
SULTAN OSOP B. CAMID, Petitioner, v. THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM
MINDANAO, DEPARTMENT of FINANCE, DEPARTMENT of
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, and
the CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES (HOUSE of
REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATE), Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This Petition for Certiorari presents this Court with the prospect of our
own Brigadoon1 the municipality of Andong, Lanao del Sur―which
like its counterpart in filmdom, is a town that is not supposed to exist yet
is anyway insisted by some as actually alive and thriving. Yet unlike in
the movies, there is nothing mystical, ghostly or anything even remotely
charming about the purported existence of Andong. The creation of the
putative municipality was declared void ab initio by this Court four
decades ago, but the present petition insists that in spite of this
insurmountable obstacle Andong thrives on, and hence, its legal
personality should be given judicial affirmation. We disagree.
The factual antecedents derive from the promulgation of our ruling
in Pelaez v. Auditor General2 in 1965. As discussed therein, then
President Diosdado Macapagal issued several Executive Orders3 creating
thirty-three (33) municipalities in Mindanao. Among them was Andong
in Lanao del Sur which was created by virtue of Executive Order No.
107.4
These executive orders were issued after legislative bills for the creation
of municipalities involved in that case had failed to pass
Congress.5 President Diosdado Macapagal justified the creation of these
municipalities citing his powers under Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code. Then Vice-President Emmanuel Pelaez filed a
special civil action for a writ of prohibition, alleging in main that the
Executive Orders were null and void, Section 68 having been repealed
by Republic Act No. 2370,6 and said orders constituting an undue
delegation of legislative power.7
After due deliberation, the Court unanimously held that the challenged
Executive Orders were null and void. A majority of five justices, led by
the ponente, Justice (later Chief Justice) Roberto Concepcion, ruled that
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code did not meet the well-
settled requirements for a valid delegation of legislative power to the
executive branch,8 while three justices opined that the nullity of the
issuances was the consequence of the enactment of the 1935
Constitution, which reduced the power of the Chief Executive over local
governments.9 Pelaez was disposed in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are declared null and
void ab initio and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in
audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said
Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities above
referred to. It is so ordered.10
Among the Executive Orders annulled was Executive Order No. 107
which created the Municipality of Andong. Nevertheless, the core issue
presented in the present petition is the continued efficacy of the judicial
annulment of the Municipality of Andong.
Petitioner Sultan Osop B. Camid (Camid) represents himself as a current
resident of Andong,11 suing as a private citizen and taxpayer whose locus
standi "is of public and paramount interest especially to the people of the
Municipality of Andong, Province of Lanao del Sur."12 He alleges that
Andong "has metamorphosed into a full-blown municipality with a
complete set of officials appointed to handle essential services for the
municipality and its constituents,"13 even though he concedes that since
1968, no person has been appointed, elected or qualified to serve any of
the elective local government positions of Andong.14 Nonetheless, the
municipality of Andong has its own high school, Bureau of Posts, a
Department of Education, Culture and Sports office, and at least
seventeen (17) "barangay units" with their own respective
chairmen.15 From 1964 until 1972, according to Camid, the public
officials of Andong "have been serving their constituents through the
minimal means and resources with least (sic) honorarium and
recognition from the Office of the then former President Diosdado
Macapagal." Since the time of Martial Law in 1972, Andong has
allegedly been getting by despite the absence of public funds, with the
"Interim Officials" serving their constituents "in their own little ways
and means."16
In support of his claim that Andong remains in existence, Camid
presents to this Court a Certification issued by the Office of the
Community Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO) of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) certifying
the total land area of the Municipality of Andong, "created under
Executive Order No. 107 issued [last] October 1, 1964."17 He also
submits a Certification issued by the Provincial Statistics Office of
Marawi City concerning the population of Andong, which is pegged at
fourteen thousand fifty nine (14,059) strong. Camid also enumerates a
list of governmental agencies and private groups that allegedly recognize
Andong, and notes that other municipalities have recommended to the
Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly for the immediate
implementation of the revival or re-establishment of Andong.18
The petition assails a Certification dated 21 November 2003, issued by
the Bureau of Local Government Supervision of the Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG).19 The Certification enumerates
eighteen (18) municipalities certified as "existing," per DILG records.
Notably, these eighteen (18) municipalities are among the thirty-three
(33), along with Andong, whose creations were voided by this Court
in Pelaez. These municipalities are Midaslip, Pitogo, Naga, and Bayog in
Zamboanga del Sur; Siayan and Pres. Manuel A. Roxas in Zamboanga
del Norte; Magsaysay, Sta. Maria and New Corella in Davao; Badiangan
and Mina in Iloilo; Maguing in Lanao del Sur; Gloria in Oriental
Mindoro; Maasim in Sarangani; Kalilangan and Lantapan in Bukidnon;
and Maco in Compostela Valley.20
Camid imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DILG "in not
classifying [Andong] as a regular existing municipality and in not
including said municipality in its records and official database as [an]
existing regular municipality."21 He characterizes such non-classification
as unequal treatment to the detriment of Andong, especially in light of
the current recognition given to the eighteen (18) municipalities
similarly annulled by reason of Pelaez. As appropriate relief, Camid
prays that the Court annul the DILG Certification dated 21 November
2003; direct the DILG to classify Andong as a "regular existing
municipality;" all public respondents, to extend full recognition and
support to Andong; the Department of Finance and the Department of
Budget and Management, to immediately release the internal revenue
allotments of Andong; and the public respondents, particularly the
DILG, to recognize the "Interim Local Officials" of Andong.22
Moreover, Camid insists on the continuing validity of Executive Order
No. 107. He argues that Pelaez has already been modified by
supervening events consisting of subsequent laws and jurisprudence.
Particularly cited is our Decision in Municipality of San Narciso v. Hon.
Mendez,23 wherein the Court affirmed the unique status of the
municipality of San Andres in Quezon as a "de facto municipal
corporation."24 Similar to Andong, the municipality of San Andres was
created by way of executive order, precisely the manner which the Court
in Pelaez had declared as unconstitutional. Moreover, San Narciso cited,
as Camid does, Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991
as basis for the current recognition of the impugned municipality. The
provision reads:
Section 442. Requisites for Creation. - xxx
(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code
shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts
organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and
which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding
office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be
considered as regular municipalities.25
There are several reasons why the petition must be dismissed. These can
be better discerned upon examination of the proper scope and application
of Section 442(d), which does not sanction the recognition of just any
municipality. This point shall be further explained further on.
Notably, as pointed out by the public respondents, through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), the case is not a fit subject for the special
civil actions of certiorari and mandamus, as it pertains to the de
novo appreciation of factual questions. There is indeed no way to
confirm several of Camid's astonishing factual allegations pertaining to
the purported continuing operation of Andong in the decades since it was
annulled by this Court. No trial court has had the opportunity to ascertain
the validity of these factual claims, the appreciation of which is beyond
the function of this Court since it is not a trier of facts.
The importance of proper factual ascertainment cannot be gainsaid,
especially in light of the legal principles governing the recognition
of de facto municipal corporations. It has been opined that municipal
corporations may exist by prescription where it is shown that the
community has claimed and exercised corporate functions, with the
knowledge and acquiescence of the legislature, and without interruption
or objection for period long enough to afford title by
prescription.26 These municipal corporations have exercised their powers
for a long period without objection on the part of the government that
although no charter is in existence, it is presumed that they were duly
incorporated in the first place and that their charters had been
lost.27 They are especially common in England, which, as well-worth
noting, has existed as a state for over a thousand years. The reason for
the development of that rule in England is understandable, since that
country was settled long before the Roman conquest by nomadic Celtic
tribes, which could have hardly been expected to obtain a municipal
charter in the absence of a national legal authority.
In the United States, municipal corporations by prescription are less
common, but it has been held that when no charter or act of
incorporation of a town can be found, it may be shown to have claimed
and exercised the powers of a town with the knowledge and assent of the
legislature, and without objection or interruption for so long a period as
to furnish evidence of a prescriptive right.28
What is clearly essential is a factual demonstration of the continuous
exercise by the municipal corporation of its corporate powers, as well as
the acquiescence thereto by the other instrumentalities of the state.
Camid does not have the opportunity to make an initial factual
demonstration of those circumstances before this Court. Indeed, the
factual deficiencies aside, Camid's plaint should have undergone the
usual administrative gauntlet and, once that was done, should have been
filed first with the Court of Appeals, which at least would have had the
power to make the necessary factual determinations. Camid's seeming
ignorance of the principles of exhaustion of administrative remedies and
hierarchy of courts, as well as the concomitant prematurity of the present
petition, cannot be countenanced.
It is also difficult to capture the sense and viability of Camid's present
action. The assailed issuance is the Certification issued by the DILG.
But such Certification does not pretend to bear the authority to create or
revalidate a municipality. Certainly, the annulment of the Certification
will really do nothing to serve Camid's ultimate cause - the recognition
of Andong. Neither does the Certification even expressly refute the
claim that Andong still exists, as there is nothing in the document that
comments on the present status of Andong. Perhaps the Certification is
assailed before this Court if only to present an actual issuance, rather
than a long-standing habit or pattern of action that can be annulled
through the special civil action of certiorari . Still, the relation of
the Certification to Camid's central argument is forlornly strained.
These disquisitions aside, the central issue remains whether a
municipality whose creation by executive fiat was previously voided by
this Court may attain recognition in the absence of any curative or
reimplementing statute. Apparently, the question has never been decided
before, San Narciso and its kindred cases pertaining as they did to
municipalities whose bases of creation were dubious yet were never
judicially nullified. The effect of Section 442(d) of the Local
Government Code on municipalities such as Andong warrants
explanation. Besides, the residents of Andong who belabor under the
impression that their town still exists, much less those who may comport
themselves as the municipality's "Interim Government," would be well
served by a rude awakening.
The Court can employ a simplistic approach in resolving the substantive
aspect of the petition, merely by pointing out that the Municipality of
Andong never existed.29 Executive Order No. 107, which established
Andong, was declared "null and void ab initio" in 1965 by this Court
in Pelaez, along with thirty-three (33) other executive orders. The phrase
"ab initio" means "from the beginning,"30 "at first,"31 "from the
inception."32 Pelaez was never reversed by this Court but rather it was
expressly affirmed in the cases of Municipality of San Joaquin v.
Siva,33 Municipality of Malabang v. Benito,34 and Municipality of
Kapalong v. Moya.35 No subsequent ruling by this Court declared Pelaez
as overturned or inoperative. No subsequent legislation has been passed
since 1965 creating a Municipality of Andong. Given these facts, there is
hardly any reason to elaborate why Andong does not exist as a duly
constituted municipality.
This ratiocination does not admit to patent legal errors and has the
additional virtue of blessed austerity. Still, its sweeping adoption may
not be advisedly appropriate in light of Section 442(d) of the Local
Government Code and our ruling in Municipality of San Narciso, both of
which admit to the possibility of de facto municipal corporations.
To understand the applicability of Municipality of San Narciso and
Section 442(b) of the Local Government Code to the situation of
Andong, it is necessary again to consider the ramifications of our
decision in Pelaez.
The eminent legal doctrine enunciated in Pelaez was that the President
was then, and still is, not empowered to create municipalities through
executive issuances. The Court therein recognized "that the President
has, for many years, issued executive orders creating municipal
corporations, and that the same have been organized and in actual
operation . . . ."36 However, the Court ultimately nullified only those
thirty-three (33) municipalities, including Andong, created during the
period from 4 September to 29 October 1964 whose existence petitioner
Vice-President Pelaez had specifically assailed before this Court. No
pronouncement was made as to the other municipalities which had been
previously created by the President in the exercise of power the Court
deemed unlawful.
Two years after Pelaez was decided, the issue again came to fore
in Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva.37 The Municipality of Lawigan
was created by virtue of Executive Order No. 436 in 1961. Lawigan was
not one of the municipalities ordered annulled in Pelaez. A petition for
prohibition was filed contesting the legality of the executive order, again
on the ground that Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code was
unconstitutional. The trial court dismissed the petition, but the Supreme
Court reversed the ruling and entered a new decision declaring Executive
Order No. 436 void ab initio. The Court reasoned without elaboration
that the issue had already been squarely taken up and settled
in Pelaez which agreed with the argument posed by the challengers to
Lawigan's validity.38
In the 1969 case of Municipality of Malabang v. Benito,39 what was
challenged is the validity of the constitution of the Municipality of
Balabagan in Lanao del Sur, also created by an executive order,40 and
which, similar to Lawigan, was not one of the municipalities annulled
in Pelaez. This time, the officials of Balabagan invoked de facto status as
a municipal corporation in order to dissuade the Court from nullifying
action. They alleged that its status as a de facto corporation cannot be
collaterally attacked but should be inquired into directly in an action
for quo warranto at the instance of the State, and not by a private
individual as it was in that case. In response, the Court conceded that an
inquiry into the legal existence of a municipality is reserved to the State
in a proceeding for quo warranto, but only if the municipal corporation
is a de facto corporation.41
Ultimately, the Court refused to acknowledge Balabagan as a de
facto corporation, even though it had been organized prior to the Court's
decision in Pelaez. The Court declared void the executive order creating
Balabagan and restrained its municipal officials from performing their
official duties and functions.42 It cited conflicting American authorities
on whether a de facto corporation can exist where the statute or charter
creating it is unconstitutional.43 But the Court's final conclusion was
unequivocal that Balabagan was not a de
facto corporation.ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω  lιbrαrÿ
In the cases where a de facto municipal corporation was recognized as
such despite the fact that the statute creating it was later invalidated, the
decisions could fairly be made to rest on the consideration that there was
some other valid law giving corporate vitality to the organization. Hence,
in the case at bar, the mere fact that Balabagan was organized at a time
when the statute had not been invalidated cannot conceivably make it
a de facto corporation, as, independently of the Administrative Code
provision in question, there is no other valid statute to give color of
authority to its creation.44
The Court did clarify in Malabang that the previous acts done by the
municipality in the exercise of its corporate powers were not necessarily
a nullity.45 Camid devotes several pages of his petition in citing this
point,46 yet the relevance of the citation is unclear considering that
Camid does not assert the validity of any corporate act of Andong prior
to its judicial dissolution. Notwithstanding, the Court
in Malabang retained an emphatic attitude as to the unconstitutionality
of the power of the President to create municipal corporations by way of
presidential promulgations, as authorized under Section 68 of the
Revised Administrative Code.
This principle was most recently affirmed in 1988, in Municipality of
Kapalong v. Moya.47 The municipality of Santo Tomas, created by
President Carlos P. Garcia, filed a complaint against another
municipality, who challenged Santo Tomas's legal personality to institute
suit. Again, Santo Tomas had not been expressly nullified by prior
judicial action, yet the Court refused to recognize its legal existence. The
blunt but simple ruling: "Now then, as ruled in the Pelaez case supra, the
President has no power to create a municipality. Since [Santo Tomas]
has no legal personality, it can not be a party to any civil action'. "48
Nevertheless, when the Court decided Municipality of San Narciso49 in
1995, it indicated a shift in the jurisprudential treatment of municipalities
created through presidential issuances. The questioned municipality of
San Andres, Quezon was created on 20 August 1959 by Executive Order
No. 353 issued by President Carlos P. Garcia. Executive Order No. 353
was not one of the thirty-three issuances annulled by Pelaez in 1965. The
legal status of the Municipality of San Andres was first challenged only
in 1989, through a petition for quo warranto filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Gumaca, Quezon, which did cite Pelaez as
authority.50 The RTC dismissed the petition for lack of cause of action,
and the petitioners therein elevated the matter to this Court.
In dismissing the petition, the Court delved in the merits of the petition,
if only to resolve further doubt on the legal status of San Andres. It noted
a circumstance which is not present in the case at bar that San Andres
was in existence for nearly thirty (30) years before its legality was
challenged. The Court did not declare the executive order creating San
Andres null and void. Still, acting on the premise that the said executive
order was a complete nullity, the Court noted "peculiar circumstances"
that led to the conclusion that San Andres had attained the unique status
of a "de facto municipal corporation."51 It noted that Pelaez limited its
nullificatory effect only to those executive orders specifically challenged
therein, despite the fact that the Court then could have very well
extended the decision to invalidate San Andres as well.52 This statement
squarely contradicts Camid's reading of San Narciso that the creation of
San Andres, just like Andong, had been declared a complete nullity on
the same ground of unconstitutional delegation of legislative power
found in Pelaez.53
The Court also considered the applicability of Section 442(d)54 of the
Local Government Code of 1991. It clarified the implication of the
provision as follows:
Equally significant is Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code to
the effect that municipal districts "organized pursuant to presidential
issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of
elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of
(the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities." No
pretension of unconstitutionality per se of Section 442(d) of the Local
Government Code is preferred. It is doubtful whether such a pretext,
even if made, would succeed. The power to create political
subdivisions is a function of the legislature. Congress did just that
when it has incorporated Section 442(d) in the Code. Curative laws,
which in essence are retrospective, and aimed at giving "validity to acts
done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing
laws have been complied with," are validly accepted in this jurisdiction,
subject to the usual qualification against impairment of vested rights.
(Emphasis supplied)55
The holding in San Narciso was subsequently affirmed in Municipality
of Candijay v. Court of Appeals56 and Municipality of Jimenez v.
Baz57 In Candijay, the juridical personality of the Municipality of Alicia,
created in a 1949 executive order, was attacked only beginning in
1984. Pelaez was again invoked in support of the challenge, but the
Court refused to invalidate the municipality, citing San Narciso at
length. The Court noted that the situation of the Municipality of Alicia
was strikingly similar to that in San Narciso; hence, the town should
likewise "benefit from the effects of Section 442(d) of the Local
Government Code, and should [be] considered as a regular, de
jure municipality." 58
The valid existence of Municipality of Sinacaban, created in a 1949
executive order, was among the issues raised in Jimenez. The Court,
through Justice Mendoza, provided an expert summation of the evolution
of the rule.
The principal basis for the view that Sinacaban was not validly created
as a municipal corporation is the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General that
the creation of municipal corporations is essentially a legislative matter
and therefore the President was without power to create by executive
order the Municipality of Sinacaban. The ruling in this case has been
reiterated in a number of cases later decided. However, we have since
held that where a municipality created as such by executive order is later
impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity, its creation
can no longer be questioned. In Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v.
Mendez, Sr., this Court considered the following factors as having
validated the creation of a municipal corporation, which, like the
Municipality of Sinacaban, was created by executive order of the
President before the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General: (1) the fact that
for nearly 30 years the validity of the creation of the municipality had
never been challenged; (2) the fact that following the ruling in Pelaez
no quo warranto suit was filed to question the validity of the executive
order creating such municipality; and (3) the fact that the municipality
was later classified as a fifth class municipality, organized as part of a
municipal circuit court and considered part of a legislative district in the
Constitution apportioning the seats in the House of Representatives.
Above all, it was held that whatever doubt there might be as to
the de jure character of the municipality must be deemed to have been
put to rest by the Local Government Code of 1991 (R. A. No. 7160),
'442(d) of which provides that "municipal districts organized pursuant to
presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their
respective sets of elective officials holding office at the time of the
effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular
municipalities."
Here, the same factors are present so as to confer on Sinacaban the status
of at least a de facto municipal corporation in the sense that its legal
existence has been recognized and acquiesced publicly and officially.
Sinacaban had been in existence for sixteen years when Pelaez v.
Auditor General was decided on December 24, 1965. Yet the validity of
E.O. No. 258 creating it had never been questioned. Created in 1949, it
was only 40 years later that its existence was questioned and only
because it had laid claim to an area that apparently is desired for its
revenue. This fact must be underscored because under Rule 66, '16 of the
Rules of Court, a quo warranto suit against a corporation for forfeiture
of its charter must be commenced within five (5) years from the time the
act complained of was done or committed. On the contrary, the State and
even the Municipality of Jimenez itself have recognized Sinacaban's
corporate existence. Under Administrative Order No. 33 dated June 13,
1978 of this Court, as reiterated by '31 of the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980 (B. P. Blg. 129), Sinacaban is constituted part of a
municipal circuit for purposes of the establishment of Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in the country. For its part, Jimenez had earlier recognized
Sinacaban in 1950 by entering into an agreement with it regarding their
common boundary. The agreement was embodied in Resolution No. 77
of the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental.
Indeed Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance
appended to the 1987 Constitution, apportioning legislative districts
throughout the country, which considered Sinacaban part of the Second
District of Misamis Occidental. Moreover, following the ruling
in Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., 442(d) of the
Local Government Code of 1991 must be deemed to have cured any
defect in the creation of Sinacaban'.59 Ï‚ηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl
lαω  lιbrαrÿ
From this survey of relevant jurisprudence, we can gather the applicable
rules. Pelaez and its offspring cases ruled that the President has no
power to create municipalities, yet limited its nullificatory effects to the
particular municipalities challenged in actual cases before this Court.
However, with the promulgation of the Local Government Code in 1991,
the legal cloud was lifted over the municipalities similarly created by
executive order but not judicially annulled. The de facto status of such
municipalities as San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban was recognized by
this Court, and Section 442(b) of the Local Government Code deemed
curative whatever legal defects to title these municipalities had labored
under.
Is Andong similarly entitled to recognition as a de facto municipal
corporation? It is not. There are eminent differences between Andong
and municipalities such as San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban. Most
prominent is the fact that the executive order creating Andong was
expressly annulled by order of this Court in 1965. If we were to affirm
Andong's de facto status by reason of its alleged continued existence
despite its nullification, we would in effect be condoning defiance of a
valid order of this Court.ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω
lιbrαrÿ
Court decisions cannot obviously lose their efficacy due to the sheer
defiance by the parties aggrieved.
It bears noting that based on Camid's own admissions, Andong does not
meet the requisites set forth by Section 442(d) of the Local Government
Code. Section 442(d) requires that in order that the municipality created
by executive order may receive recognition, they must "have their
respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of
the effectivity of [the Local Government] Code." Camid admits that
Andong has never elected its municipal officers at all.60 This incapacity
ties in with the fact that Andong was judicially annulled in 1965. Out of
obeisance to our ruling in Pelaez, the national government ceased to
recognize the existence of Andong, depriving it of its share of the public
funds, and refusing to conduct municipal elections for the void
municipality.
The failure to appropriate funds for Andong and the absence of elections
in the municipality in the last four decades are eloquent indicia of the
non-recognition by the State of the existence of the town. The
certifications relied upon by Camid, issued by the DENR-CENRO and
the National Statistics Office, can hardly serve the purpose of attesting to
Andong's legal efficacy. In fact, both these certifications qualify that
they were issued upon the request of Camid, "to support the restoration
or re-operation of the Municipality of Andong, Lanao del Sur,"61 thus
obviously conceding that the municipality is at present
inoperative.ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω  lιbrαrÿ
We may likewise pay attention to the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution, which had also been relied upon in Jimenez and San
Narciso. This Ordinance, which apportioned the seats of the House of
Representatives to the different legislative districts in the Philippines,
enumerates the various municipalities that are encompassed by the
various legislative districts. Andong is not listed therein as among the
municipalities of Lanao del Sur, or of any other province for that
matter.62 On the other hand, the municipalities of San Andres, Alicia and
Sinacaban are mentioned in the Ordinance as part of
Quezon,63 Bohol,64 and Misamis Occidental65 respectively.
How about the eighteen (18) municipalities similarly nullified
in Pelaez but certified as existing in the DILG Certification presented by
Camid? The petition fails to mention that subsequent to the ruling
in Pelaez, legislation was enacted to reconstitute these municipalities.66 It
is thus not surprising that the DILG certified the existence of these
eighteen (18) municipalities, or that these towns are among the
municipalities enumerated in the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution. Andong has not been similarly reestablished through
statute. Clearly then, the fact that there are valid organic statutes passed
by legislation recreating these eighteen (18) municipalities is sufficient
legal basis to accord a different legal treatment to Andong as against
these eighteen (18) other municipalities.
We thus assert the proper purview to Section 442(d) of the Local
Government Code that it does not serve to affirm or reconstitute the
judicially dissolved municipalities such as Andong, which had been
previously created by presidential issuances or executive orders. The
provision affirms the legal personalities only of those municipalities
such as San Narciso, Alicia, and Sinacaban, which may have been
created using the same infirm legal basis, yet were fortunate enough not
to have been judicially annulled. On the other hand, the municipalities
judicially dissolved in cases such as Pelaez, San Joaquin, and Malabang,
remain inexistent, unless recreated through specific legislative
enactments, as done with the eighteen (18) municipalities certified by the
DILG. Those municipalities derive their legal personality not from the
presidential issuances or executive orders which originally created them
or from Section 442(d), but from the respective legislative statutes which
were enacted to revive them.ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω
lιbrαrÿ
And what now of Andong and its residents? Certainly, neither Pelaez or
this decision has obliterated Andong into a hole on the ground. The legal
effect of the nullification of Andong in Pelaez was to revert the
constituent barrios of the voided town back into their original
municipalities, namely the municipalities of Lumbatan, Butig and
Tubaran.67 These three municipalities subsist to this day as part of Lanao
del Sur,68 and presumably continue to exercise corporate powers over the
barrios which once belonged to Andong.
If there is truly a strong impulse calling for the reconstitution of Andong,
the solution is through the legislature and not judicial confirmation of
void title. If indeed the residents of Andong have, all these years, been
governed not by their proper municipal governments but by a ragtag
"Interim Government," then an expedient political and legislative
solution is perhaps necessary. Yet we can hardly sanction the retention
of Andong's legal personality solely on the basis of collective amnesia
that may have allowed Andong to somehow pretend itself into existence
despite its judicial dissolution. Maybe those who insist Andong still
exists prefer to remain unperturbed in their blissful ignorance, like the
inhabitants of the cave in Plato's famed allegory. But the time has come
for the light to seep in, and for the petitioner and like-minded persons to
awaken to legal reality.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 105746 December 2, 1996
MUNICIPALITY OF JIMENEZ, through its MAYOR
ELEUTERIO A. QUIMBO, VICE-MAYOR ROBINSON B. LOMO,
COUNCILORS TEOFILO GALORIO, CASIANO ADORABLE,
MARIO APAO, ANTONIO BIENES, VEDE SULLANO,
MARIETO TAN, SR., HERMINIO SERINO, BENJAMIN DANO,
and CRISPULO MUNAR, and ELEUTERIO A. QUIMBO,
ROBINSON B. LOMO, TEOFILO GALORIO, CASIANO
ADORABLE, MARIO APAO, ANTONIO BIENES, VEDE
SULLANO, MARIETO TAN, SR., HERMINIO SERINO,
BENJAMIN DANO, and CRISPULO MUNAR, in their private
capacities as taxpayer in the Province of Misamis Occidental and in
the Municipality of Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, and BENJAMIN
C. GALINDO and BENHUR B. BAUTISTA, in their private
capacities as taxpayers in the Province of Misamis Occidental and
the Municipality of Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, petitioners,
vs.
HON. VICENTE T. BAZ, JR., Presiding Judge, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 14, 10th JUDICIAL REGION,
OROQUIETA CITY, and MUNICIPALITY OF SINACABAN
through its MAYOR EUFRACIO D. LOOD, VICE-MAYOR
BASILIO M. BANAAG, COUNCILORS CONCEPCION E. LAGA-
AC, MIGUEL F. ABCEDE, JUANITO B. TIU, CLAUDIO T.
REGIL, ANICETO S. MEJAREZ NAZIANCINO PAYE, JOSE P.
BANQUE, NUMERIANO B. MARIQUIT, and FEDERICO
QUINIMON, and THE PROVINCE OF MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL
through the PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL
and its members, VICE-GOVERNOR FLORENCIO L. GARCIA,
BOARD MEMBERS MARIVIC S. CHIONG, PACITA M. YAP,
ALEGRIA V. CARINO, JULIO L. TIU, LEONARDO R.
REGALADO II, CONSTANCIO C. BALAIS, and ERNESTO P.
IRA, and THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, through its Chairman,
HON. EUFEMIO DOMINGO, and THE DEPARTMENT OF
LOCAL GOVERNMENT through its Secretary, HON. LUIS
SANTOS (now HON. CESAR SARINO), and THE DEPARTMENT
OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, through its Secretary, HON.
GUILLERMO CARAGUE (now HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ),
and The Hon. CATALINO MACARAIG (now HON. FRANKLIN
DRILON), EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:p
This is a petition for review of the decision dated March 4, 1992 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 of Oroquieta City, 1 affirming the legal
existence of the Municipality of Sinacaban in Misamis Occidental and
ordering the relocation of its boundary for the purpose of determining
whether certain areas claimed by it belong to it.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by Executive Order No. 258
of then President Elpidio Quirino, pursuant to §68 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917. The full text of the Order reads:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 258
CREATING THE MUNICIPALITY OF
SINACABAN,
IN THE PROVINCE OF MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL
Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of the
Interior, and pursuant to the provisions of Section 68
of the Revised Administrative Code, there is hereby
created, in the Province of Misamis Occidental, a
municipality to be known as the municipality of
Sinacaban, which shall consist of the southern
portion of the municipality of Jimenez, Misamis
Occidental, more particularly described and bounded
as follows:
On the north by a line starting from point 1, the
center of the lighthouse on the Tabo-o point S. 84°
30'W., 7,250 meters to point 2 which is on the bank
of Palilan River branch; thence following Palilan
River branch 2,400 meters southwesterly to point 3,
thence a straight line S 87° 00' W, 22,550 meters to
point 4, where this intersects the Misamis
Occidental-Zamboanga boundary; on the west, by
the present Misamis Occidental-Zamboanga
boundary; and on the south by the present Jimenez-
Tudela boundary; and on the east, by the limits of
the municipal waters which the municipality of
Sinacaban shall have pursuant to section 2321 of the
Revised Administrative Code, (Description based on
data shown in Enlarged Map of Poblacion of
Jimenez, Scale 1:8:000).
The municipality of Sinacaban contains the barrios
of Sinacaban, which shall be the seat of the
municipal government, Sinonoc, Libertad, the
southern portion of the barrio of Macabayao, and the
sitios of Tipan, Katipunan, Estrella, Flores, Senior,
Adorable, San Isidro, Cagayanon, Kamanse,
Kulupan and Libertad Alto.
The municipality of Jimenez shall have its present
territory, minus the portion thereof included in the
municipality of Sinacaban.
The municipality of Sinacaban shall begin to exist
upon the appointment and qualification of the mayor,
vice-mayor, and a majority of the councilors thereof.
The new municipality shall, however, assume
payment of a proportionate share of the loan of the
municipality of Jimenez with the Rehabilitation
Finance Corporation as may be outstanding on the
date of its organization, the proportion of such
payment to be determined by the Department of
Finance.
Done in the City of Manila, this 30th day of August,
in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and forty-
 nine, and of the Independence of the Philippines, the
fourth.
(SGD.) ELPIDIO QUIRINO
President of the Philippines
By the President:
(SGD.) TEODORO EVANGELISTA
Executive Secretary
By virtue of Municipal Council Resolution No 171, 2 dated November
22, 1988, Sinacaban laid claim to a portion of Barrio Tabo-o and to
Barrios Macabayao, Adorable, Sinara Baja, and Sinara Alto,3 based on
the technical description in E.O. No. 258. The claim was filed with the
Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental against the Municipality of
Jimenez.
In its answer, the Municipality of Jimenez, while conceding that under
E.O. No. 258 the disputed area is part of Sinacaban, nonetheless asserted
jurisdiction on the basis of an agreement it had with the Municipality of
Sinacaban. This agreement was approved by the Provincial Board of
Misamis Occidental, in its Resolution No. 77, dated February 18, 1950,
which fixed the common boundary of Sinacaban and Jimenez as
follows: 4
From a point at Cagayanon Beach follow
Macabayao Road until it intersects Tabangag Creek
at the back of the Macabayao Elementary School.
Follow the Tabangag Creek until it intersect the
Macabayao River at upper Adorable. Follow the
Macabayao River such that the barrio of
Macabayao, Sitio Adorable and site will be a part of
Jimenez down and the sitios of San Vicente, Donan,
Estrella, Mapula will be a part of Sinacaban.
(Emphasis added)
In its decision dated October 11, 1989, 5 the Provincial Board declared
the disputed area to be part of Sinacaban. It held that the previous
resolution approving the agreement between the municipalities was void
because the Board had no power to alter the boundaries of Sinacaban as
fixed in E.O. No. 258, that power being vested in Congress pursuant to
the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1983 (B.P. Blg.
337), §134. 6 The Provincial Board denied in its Resolution No. 13-90
dated January 30, 1990 the motion of Jimenez seeking reconsideration. 7
On March 20, 1990, Jimenez filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus in the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City, Branch 14.
The suit was filed against Sinacaban, the Province of Misamis
Occidental and its Provincial Board, the Commission on Audit, the
Departments of Local Government, Budget and Management, and the
Executive Secretary. Jimenez alleged that, in accordance with the
decision in Pelaez v. Auditor General, 8 the power to create
municipalities is essentially legislative and consequently Sinacaban,
which was created by an executive order, had no legal personality and no
right to assert a territorial claim vis-a-vis Jimenez, of which it remains
part. Jimenez prayed that Sinacaban be enjoined from assuming control
and supervision over the disputed barrios; that the Provincial Board be
enjoined from assuming jurisdiction over the claim of Sinacaban; that
E.O. No. 258 be declared null and void; that the decision dated October
11, 1989 and Resolution No. 13-90 of the Provincial Board be set aside
for having been rendered without jurisdiction; that the Commission on
Audit be enjoined from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds
by Sinacaban; that the Department of Budget and Management be
enjoined from allotting public funds to Sinacaban; and that the Executive
Secretary be enjoined from exercising control and supervision over said
municipality.
During pre-trial, the parties agreed to limit the issues to the following:
A. Whether the Municipality of Sinacaban is a legal
juridical entity, duly created in accordance with law;
B. If not, whether it is a de facto juridical entity;
C. Whether the validity of the existence of the
Municipality can be properly questioned in this
action on certiorari;
D. Whether the Municipality of Jimenez which had
recognized the existence of the municipality for
more than 40 years is estopped to question its
existence;
E. Whether the existence of the municipality has
been recognized by the laws of the land; and
F. Whether the decision of the Provincial Board had
acquired finality.
On February 10, 1992, the RTC rendered its decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the finding
of this Court that the petition must be denied and
judgment is hereby rendered declaring a STATUS
QUO, that is, the municipality of Sinacaban shall
continue to exist and operate as a regular
municipality; declaring the decision dated October
11, 1989 rendered by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
fixing the boundaries between Sinacaban and
Jimenez, Misamis Occi. as null and void, the same
not being in accordance with the boundaries
provided for in Executive Order No. 258 creating the
municipality of Sinacaban; dismissing the petition
for lack of merit, without pronouncement as to costs
and damages. With respect to the counterclaim, the
same is hereby ordered dismissed.
The Commissioners are hereby ordered to conduct
the relocation survey of the boundary of Sinacaban
within 60 days from the time the decision shall have
become final and executory and another 60 days
within which to submit their report from the
completion of the said relocation survey.
SO ORDERED.
The RTC, inter alia, held that Sinacaban is a de
facto corporation since it had completely organized itself even
prior to the Pelaez case and exercised corporate powers for
forty years before its existence was questioned; that Jimenez
did not have the legal standing to question the existence of
Sinacaban, the same being reserved to the State as represented
by the Office of the Solicitor General in a quo
warranto proceeding; that Jimenez was estopped from
questioning the legal existence of Sinacaban by entering into
an agreement with it concerning their common boundary; and
that any question as to the legal existence of Sinacaban had
been rendered moot by §442(d) of the Local Government Code
of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which provides:
Municipalities existing as of the date of the
effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and
operate as such. Existing municipal districts
organized pursuant to presidential issuances or
executive orders and which have their respective set
of elective municipal officials holding office at the
time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth
be considered as regular municipalities.
On March 17, 1990, petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the
decision but its motion was denied by the RTC. Hence this petition
raising the following issues: (1) whether Sinacaban has legal personality
to file a claim, and (2) if it has, whether it is the boundary provided for in
E.O. No. 258 or in Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board of
Misamis Occidental which should be used as the basis for adjudicating
Sinacaban's territorial claim.
First. The preliminary issue concerns the legal existence of Sinacaban. If
Sinacaban legally exists, then it has standing to bring a claim in the
Provincial Board. Otherwise, it cannot.
The principal basis for the view that Sinacaban was not validly created
as a municipal corporation is the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General that
the creation of municipal corporations is essentially a legislative matter
and therefore the President was without power to create by executive
order the Municipality of Sinacaban. The ruling in this case has been
reiterated in a number of cases 9 later decided. However, we have since
held that where a municipality created as such by executive order is later
impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity, its creation
can no longer be questioned. In Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon
v. Mendez, Sr., 10 this Court considered the following factors as having
validated the creation of a municipal corporation, which, like the
Municipality of Sinacaban, was created by executive order of the
President before the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General: (1) the fact that
for nearly 30 years the validity of the creation of the municipality had
never been challenged; (2) the fact that following the ruling
in Pelaez no quo warranto suit was filed to question the validity of the
executive order creating such municipality; and (3) the fact that the
municipality was later classified as a fifth class municipality, organized
as part of a municipal circuit court and considered part of a legislative
district in the Constitution apportioning the seats in the House of
Representatives. Above all, it was held that whatever doubt there might
be as to the de jure character of the municipality must be deemed to
have been put to rest by the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No.
7160), §442(d) of which provides that "municipal districts organized
pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have
their respective sets of elective officials holding office at the time of the
effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular
municipalities."
Here, the same factors are present so as to confer on Sinacaban the status
of at least a de facto municipal corporation in the sense that its legal
existence has been recognized and acquiesced publicly and officially.
Sinacaban had been in existence for sixteen years when Pelaez
v. Auditor General was decided on December 24, 1965. Yet the validity
of E.O. No. 258 creating it had never been questioned. Created in 1949,
it was only 40 years later that its existence was questioned and only
because it had laid claim to an area that apparently is desired for its
revenue. This fact must be underscored because under Rule 66, §16 of
the Rules of Court, a quo warranto suit against a corporation for
forfeiture of its charter must be commenced within five (5) years from
the time the act complained of was done or committed. On the contrary,
the State and even the Municipality of Jimenez itself have recognized
Sinacaban's corporate existence. Under Administrative Order No. 33
dated June 13, 1978 of this Court, as reiterated by §31 of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 (B. P. Blg. 129), Sinacaban is constituted
part of a municipal circuit for purposes of the establishment of
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the country. For its part, Jimenez had
earlier recognized Sinacaban in 1950 by entering into an agreement with
it regarding their common boundary. The agreement was embodied in
Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental.
Indeed Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance
appended to the 1987 Constitution, apportioning legislative districts
throughout the country, which considered Sinacaban part of the Second
District of Misamis Occidental. Moreover, following the ruling
in Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., §442(d) of the
Local Government Code of 1991 must be deemed to have cured any
defect in the creation of Sinacaban. This provision states:
Municipalities existing as of the date of the
effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and
operate as such. Existing municipal districts
organized pursuant to presidential issuances or
executive orders and which have their respective set
of elective municipal officials holding office at the
time of the effectivity of the Code shall henceforth
be considered as regular municipalities.
Second. Jimenez claims, however, that R.A. No. 7160, §442(d) is
invalid, since it does not conform to the constitutional and statutory
requirements for the holding of plebiscites in the creation of new
municipalities. 11
This contention will not bear analysis. Since, as previously explained,
Sinacaban had attained de facto status at the time the 1987 Constitution
took effect on February 2, 1987, it is not subject to the plebiscite
requirement. This requirement applies only to new municipalities created
for the first time under the Constitution. Actually, the requirement of
plebiscite was originally contained in Art. XI, §3 of the previous
Constitution which took effect on January 17, 1973. It cannot, therefore,
be applied to municipal corporations created before, such as the
Municipality of Sinacaban in the case at bar.
Third. Finally, Jimenez argues that the RTC erred in ordering a
relocation survey of the boundary of Sinacaban because the barangays
which Sinacaban are claiming are not enumerated in E.O. No. 258 and
that in any event in 1950 the parties entered into an agreement whereby
the barangays in question were considered part of the territory of
Jimenez.
E.O. No. 258 does not say that Sinacaban comprises only the barrios
(now called barangays) therein mentioned. What it says is that
"Sinacaban contains" those barrios, without saying they are the only
ones comprising it. The reason for this is that the technical description,
containing the metes and bounds of its territory, is controlling. The trial
court correctly ordered a relocation survey as the only means of
determining the boundaries of the municipality and consequently the
question to which the municipality the barangays in question belong.
Now, as already stated, in 1950 the two municipalities agreed that
certain barrios belonged to Jimenez, while certain other ones belonged to
Sinacaban. This agreement was subsequently approved by the Provincial
Board of Misamis Occidental. Whether this agreement conforms to E.O.
No. 258 will be determined by the result of the survey. Jimenez
contends, however, that regardless of its conformity to E.O. No. 258, the
agreement as embodied in Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board, is
binding on Sinacaban. This raises the question whether the Provincial
Board had authority to approve the agreement or, to put it in another
way, whether it had the power to declare certain barrios part of one or
the other municipality. We hold it did not if the effect would be to
amend the area as described in E.O. No. 258 creating the Municipality of
Sinacaban.
At the time the Provincial Board passed Resolution No. 77 on February
18, 1950, the applicable law was §2167 of the Revised Administrative
Code of 1917 which provided:
Sec. 2167. Municipal boundary disputes. — How
settled. — Disputes as to jurisdiction of municipal
governments over places or barrios shall be decided
by the provincial boards of the provinces in which
such municipalities are situated, after an
investigation at which the municipalities concerned
shall be duly heard. From the decision of the
provincial board appeal may be taken by the
municipality aggrieved to the Secretary of the
Interior [now the Office of the Executive Secretary],
whose decision shall be final. Where the places or
barrios in dispute are claimed by municipalities
situated in different provinces, the provincial boards
of the provinces concerned shall come to an
agreement if possible, but, in the event of their
failing to agree, an appeal shall be had to the
Secretary of Interior [Executive Secretary], whose
decision shall be final.
As held in Pelaez v. Auditor General, 12 the power of provincial boards
to settle boundary disputes is "of an administrative nature — involving,
as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law
creating said municipalities." It is a power "to fix common boundary, in
order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining
municipalities." It is thus limited to implementing the law creating a
municipality. It is obvious that any alteration of boundaries that is not in
accordance with the law creating a municipality is not the carrying into
effect of that law but its amendment. 13 If, therefore, Resolution No. 77
of the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental is contrary to the
technical description of the territory of Sinacaban, it cannot be used by
Jimenez as basis for opposing the claim of Sinacaban.
Jimenez properly brought to the RTC for review the decision of October
11, 1989 and Resolution No. 13-90 of the Provincial Board. Its action is
in accordance with the Local Government Code of 1983, §79 of which
provides that in case no settlement of boundary disputes is made the
dispute should be elevated to the RTC of the province. In 1989, when the
action was brought by Jimenez, this Code was the governing law. The
governing law is now the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No.
7160), §§118-119.
Jimenez's contention that the RTC failed to decide the case "within one
year from the start of proceedings" as required by §79 of the Local
Government Code of 1983 and the 90-day period provided for in Article
VIII, §15 of the Constitution does not affect the validity of the decision
rendered. For even granting that the court failed to decide within the
period prescribed by law, its failure did not divest it of its jurisdiction to
decide the case but only makes the judge thereof liable for possible
administrative sanction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decisionof the Regional
Trial Court of Oroquieta City, Branch 14 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 176951             November 18, 2008
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented
by LCP National President JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF ILOILO
represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF
CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S.
SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREÑAS in his personal capacity as
taxpayer, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY,
PROVINCE OF LEYTE; MUNICIPALITY OF BOGO,
PROVINCE OF CEBU; MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN,
PROVINCE OF WESTERN SAMAR; MUNICIPALITY OF
TANDAG, PROVINCE OF SURIGAO DEL SUR;
MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN, PROVINCE OF EASTERN
SAMAR; and MUNICIPALITY OF TAYABAS, PROVINCE OF
QUEZON, respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA,
CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY,
CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY,
CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY
OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN,
CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF
TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY
OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN,
CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF
BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM, petitioners-in-
intervention.
x-----------------------------x
G.R. No. 177499             November 18, 2008
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented
by LCP National President JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF ILOILO
represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF
CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S.
SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREÑAS in his personal capacity as
taxpayer, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF
LAMITAN, PROVINCE OF BASILAN; MUNICIPALITY OF
TABUK, PROVINCE OF KALINGA; MUNICIPALITY OF
BAYUGAN, PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL SUR;
MUNICIPALITY OF BATAC, PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE;
MUNICIPALITY OF MATI, PROVINCE OF DAVAO
ORIENTAL; and MUNICIPALITY OF GUIHULNGAN,
PROVINCE OF NEGROS ORIENTAL, respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA,
CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY,
CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY,
CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY
OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN,
CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF
TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY
OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN,
CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF
BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM, petitioners-in-
intervention.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --x
G.R. No. 178056             November 18, 2008
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented
by LCP National President JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF ILOILO
represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF
CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S.
SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREÑAS in his personal capacity as
taxpayer, petitioners
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF
CABADBARAN, PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE;
MUNICIPALITY OF CARCAR, PROVINCE OF CEBU; and
MUNICIPALITY OF EL SALVADOR, MISAMIS
ORIENTAL, respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA,
CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY,
CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY,
CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY
OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN,
CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF
TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY
OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN,
CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF
BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM, petitioners-in-
intervention.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
These are consolidated petitions for prohibition1 with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City
of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas2 assailing the constitutionality of the
subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from conducting plebiscites
pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.
The Facts
th 3
During the 11  Congress,  Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting
33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills
converting 24 other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress,4 Congress enacted into law Republic Act No.
9009 (RA 9009),5 which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended
Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual
income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city
from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was
to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, "the mad rush" of
municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the
Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of
fiscal independence.6
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the
12th Congress7 adopted Joint Resolution No. 29,8 which sought to exempt
from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24
municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the
11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate
approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress,9 the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint
Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the
Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the
Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16
municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual
cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision
exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income
requirement in RA 9009.
On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the
cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February
2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The
cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws10) on various dates from
March to July 2007 without the President's signature.11
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to
determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of
the conversion of their municipality into a city.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws
unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection
clause.12 Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of
municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the
Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same
amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of
the Local Government Code.13
The Issues
The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution; and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection
clause.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petitions.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the
Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.
First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the
present case is a prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA
9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than
five years later.
Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the
criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not
in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution
because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to
local government units.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, as amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city
are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory
construction.
Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain
municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and
was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.
Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills
or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the
13th Congress.
Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, the exemption would still be
unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
Preliminary Matters
Prohibition is the proper action for testing the constitutionality of laws
administered by the COMELEC,14 like the Cityhood Laws, which direct
the COMELEC to hold plebiscites in implementation of the Cityhood
Laws. Petitioner League of Cities of the Philippines has legal standing
because Section 499 of the Local Government Code tasks the League
with the "primary purpose of ventilating, articulating and crystallizing
issues affecting city government administration and securing, through
proper and legal means, solutions thereto."15 Petitioners-in-
intervention,16 which are existing cities, have legal standing because their
Internal Revenue Allotment will be reduced if the Cityhood Laws are
declared constitutional. Mayor Jerry P. Treñas has legal standing
because as Mayor of Iloilo City and as a taxpayer he has sufficient
interest to prevent the unlawful expenditure of public funds, like the
release of more Internal Revenue Allotment to political units than what
the law allows.
Applying RA 9009 is a Prospective Application of the Law
RA 9009 became effective on 30 June 2001 during the 11th Congress.
This law specifically amended Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, which now provides:
Section 450. Requisites for Creation. – (a) A municipality or a
cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if
it has a locally generated average annual income, as certified
by the Department of Finance, of at least One hundred
million pesos (P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2)
consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it
has either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred
(100) square kilometers, as certified by the Land
Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty
thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the
National Statistics Office.
 The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population
and income of the original unit or units at the time of said
creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed
herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be
properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on
land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created
is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not
be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income
accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds,
transfers, and non-recurring income. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for conversion of a
municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. Section 450 of
the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not provide
any exemption from the increased income requirement.
Prior to the enactment of RA 9009, a total of 57 municipalities had
cityhood bills pending in Congress. Thirty-three cityhood bills became
law before the enactment of RA 9009. Congress did not act on 24
cityhood bills during the 11th Congress.
During the 12th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint
Resolution No. 29, exempting from the income requirement of P100
million in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not
acted upon during the 11th Congress. This Resolution reached the
Senate. However, the 12th Congress adjourned without the Senate
approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities mentioned in the
unapproved Joint Resolution No. 29 filed between November and
December of 2006, through their respective sponsors in Congress,
individual cityhood bills containing a common provision, as follows:
Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. - The City of x x x
shall be exempted from the income requirement prescribed
under Republic Act No. 9009.
This common provision exempted each of the 16 municipalities from
the income requirement of P100 million prescribed in Section 450 of
the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. These
cityhood bills lapsed into law on various dates from March to July 2007
after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo failed to sign them.
Indisputably, Congress passed the Cityhood Laws long after the
effectivity of RA 9009. RA 9009 became effective on 30 June 2001 or
during the 11th Congress. The 13th Congress passed in December
2006 the cityhood bills which became law only in 2007. Thus,
respondent municipalities cannot invoke the principle of non-
retroactivity of laws.17 This basic rule has no application because RA
9009, an earlier law to the Cityhood Laws, is not being applied
retroactively but prospectively.
Congress Must Prescribe in the Local Government Code All Criteria
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created,
divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in
the local government code and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected. (Emphasis supplied)
The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must
follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code and not
in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code.18 The
Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government
Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the
conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such
criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.
The criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code govern
exclusively the creation of a city. No other law, not even the charter of
the city, can govern such creation. The clear intent of the Constitution is
to insure that the creation of cities and other political units must follow
the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the
Local Government Code. Any derogation or deviation from the criteria
prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Section 10, Article X
of the Constitution.
RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to
increase the income requirement from P20 million to P100 million for
the creation of a city. This took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from
that moment the Local Government Code required that any
municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the P100 million
income requirement. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as
amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption from this income
requirement.
In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to
respondent municipalities, even though their cityhood bills were pending
in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood Laws, all
enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent
municipalities from the increased income requirement in Section 450 of
the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such exemption
clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and is thus
patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must be
written in the Local Government Code and not in any other law,
including the Cityhood Laws.
Cityhood Laws Violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution
Uniform and non-discriminatory criteria as prescribed in the Local
Government Code are essential to implement a fair and equitable
distribution of national taxes to all local government units. Section 6,
Article X of the Constitution provides:
Local government units shall have a just share, as determined
by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically
released to them. (Emphasis supplied)
If the criteria in creating local government units are not uniform and
discriminatory, there can be no fair and just distribution of the national
taxes to local government units.
A city with an annual income of only P20 million, all other criteria being
equal, should not receive the same share in national taxes as a city with
an annual income of P100 million or more. The criteria of land area,
population and income, as prescribed in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, must be strictly followed because such criteria,
prescribed by law, are material in determining the "just share" of local
government units in national taxes. Since the Cityhood Laws do not
follow the income criterion in Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, they prevent the fair and just distribution of the Internal Revenue
Allotment in violation of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution.
Section 450 of the Local Government Code is Clear,
Plain and Unambiguous
There can be no resort to extrinsic aids – like deliberations of Congress –
if the language of the law is plain, clear and unambiguous. Courts
determine the intent of the law from the literal language of the law,
within the law's four corners.19 If the language of the law is plain, clear
and unambiguous, courts simply apply the law according to its express
terms. If a literal application of the law results in absurdity, impossibility
or injustice, then courts may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory
construction like the legislative history of the law.20
Congress, in enacting RA 9009 to amend Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, did not provide any exemption from the increased
income requirement, not even to respondent municipalities whose
cityhood bills were then pending when Congress passed RA 9009.
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009,
contains no exemption whatsoever. Since the law is clear, plain and
unambiguous that any municipality desiring to convert into a city must
meet the increased income requirement, there is no reason to go beyond
the letter of the law in applying Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, as amended by RA 9009.
The 11th Congress' Intent was not Written into the Local Government
Code
True, members of Congress discussed exempting respondent
municipalities from RA 9009, as shown by the various deliberations on
the matter during the 11th Congress. However, Congress did not write
this intended exemption into law. Congress could have easily included
such exemption in RA 9009 but Congress did not. This is fatal to the
cause of respondent municipalities because such exemption must appear
in RA 9009 as an amendment to Section 450 of the Local Government
Code. The Constitution requires that the criteria for the conversion of a
municipality into a city, including any exemption from such criteria,
must all be written in the Local Government Code. Congress cannot
prescribe such criteria or exemption from such criteria in any other
law. In short, Congress cannot create a city through a law that does
not comply with the criteria or exemption found in the Local
Government Code.
Section 10 of Article X is similar to Section 16, Article XII of the
Constitution prohibiting Congress from creating private corporations
except by a general law. Section 16 of Article XII provides:
The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for
the formation, organization, or regulation of private
corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations
may be created or established by special charters in the interest
of the common good and subject to the test of economic
viability. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Congress must prescribe all the criteria for the "formation,
organization, or regulation" of private corporations in a general law
applicable to all without discrimination.21 Congress cannot create a
private corporation through a special law or charter.
Deliberations of the 11th Congress on Unapproved Bills Inapplicable
Congress is not a continuing body.22 The unapproved cityhood bills
filed during the 11th Congress became mere scraps of paper upon the
adjournment of the 11th Congress. All the hearings and deliberations
conducted during the 11th Congress on unapproved bills also became
worthless upon the adjournment of the 11th Congress. These hearings
and deliberations cannot be used to interpret bills enacted into law
in the 13th or subsequent Congresses.
The members and officers of each Congress are different. All
unapproved bills filed in one Congress become functus officio upon
adjournment of that Congress and must be re-filed anew in order to be
taken up in the next Congress. When their respective authors re-filed the
cityhood bills in 2006 during the 13th Congress, the bills had to start
from square one again, going through the legislative mill just like bills
taken up for the first time, from the filing to the approval. Section 123,
Rule XLIV of the Rules of the Senate, on Unfinished Business, provides:
Sec. 123. x x x
All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon
the expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be taken by the
succeeding Congress as if presented for the first time.
(Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, Section 78 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, on
Unfinished Business, states:
Section 78. Calendar of Business. The Calendar of Business
shall consist of the following:
a. Unfinished Business. This is business being
considered by the House at the time of its last
adjournment. Its consideration shall be resumed until
it is disposed of. The Unfinished Business at the end
of a session shall be resumed at the commencement
of the next session as if no adjournment has taken
place. At the end of the term of a Congress, all
Unfinished Business are deemed
terminated. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the deliberations during the 11th Congress on the unapproved
cityhood bills, as well as the deliberations during the 12th and
13th Congresses on the unapproved resolution exempting from RA 9009
certain municipalities, have no legal significance. They do not qualify as
extrinsic aids in construing laws passed by subsequent Congresses.
Applicability of Equal Protection Clause
If Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009,
contained an exemption to the P100 million annual income requirement,
the criteria for such exemption could be scrutinized for possible violation
of the equal protection clause. Thus, the criteria for the exemption, if
found in the Local Government Code, could be assailed on the ground of
absence of a valid classification. However, Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any
exemption. The exemption is contained in the Cityhood Laws, which are
unconstitutional because such exemption must be prescribed in the Local
Government Code as mandated in Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution.
Even if the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws were written in
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009,
such exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal
protection clause. The exemption provision merely states, "Exemption
from Republic Act No. 9009 ─ The City of x x x shall be exempted
from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No.
9009." This one sentence exemption provision contains no classification
standards or guidelines differentiating the exempted municipalities from
those that are not exempted.
Even if we take into account the deliberations in the 11th Congress that
municipalities with pending cityhood bills should be exempt from
the P100 million income requirement, there is still no valid classification
to satisfy the equal protection clause. The exemption will be based
solely on the fact that the 16 municipalities had cityhood bills
pending in the 11th Congress when RA 9009 was enacted. This is not
a valid classification between those entitled and those not entitled to
exemption from the P100 million income requirement.
To be valid, the classification in the present case must be based on
substantial distinctions, rationally related to a legitimate government
objective which is the purpose of the law,23 not limited to existing
conditions only, and applicable to all similarly situated. Thus, this Court
has ruled:
The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a
valid classification under the following conditions:
1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;
2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the
law;
3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and
 4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the
same class.24
There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending
cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have
pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress
is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from another
for the purpose of the income requirement. The pendency of a cityhood
bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or determine the level of income
of a municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the
11th Congress might even have lower annual income than municipalities
that did not have pending cityhood bills. In short, the classification
criterion − mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress − is not
rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally
non-viable municipalities from converting into cities.
Municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills were not
informed that a pending cityhood bill in the 11th Congress would be a
condition for exemption from the increased P100 million income
requirement. Had they been informed, many municipalities would have
caused the filing of their own cityhood bills. These municipalities, even
if they have bigger annual income than the 16 respondent municipalities,
cannot now convert into cities if their income is less than P100 million.
the classification bears any relation to the public health or
welfare generally; that the provision will discourage
monopoly; or that it was aimed at any abuse, cognizable by
law, in the milk business. In the absence of any such showing,
we have no right to conjure up possible situations which might
justify the discrimination. The classification is arbitrary and
unreasonable and denies the appellant the equal protection of
the law. (Emphasis supplied)
In the same vein, the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives
the 16 municipalities a unique advantage based on an arbitrary date − the
filing of their cityhood bills before the end of the 11th Congress - as
against all other municipalities that want to convert into cities after the
effectivity of RA 9009.
Furthermore, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities
violates the requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly
situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent
municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent
municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the exemption provision found in
the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for violation of the
equal protection clause.

The fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress limits the WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petitions and
exemption to a specific condition existing at the time of passage of RA declare UNCONSTITUTIONAL the Cityhood Laws, namely: Republic
9009. That specific condition will never happen again. This violates the Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407,
requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to existing 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491.
conditions only. This requirement is illustrated in Mayflower Farms, Inc.
v. Ten Eyck,25 where the challenged law allowed milk dealers engaged in SO ORDERED.
business prior to a fixed date to sell at a price lower than that allowed to
newcomers in the same business. In Mayflower, the U.S. Supreme Court
held:

We are referred to a host of decisions to the effect that a

regulatory law may be prospective in operation and may
except from its sweep those presently engaged in the calling or
activity to which it is directed. Examples are statutes licensing
physicians and dentists, which apply only to those entering the
profession subsequent to the passage of the act and exempt
those then in practice, or zoning laws which exempt existing
buildings, or laws forbidding slaughterhouses within certain
areas, but excepting existing establishments. The challenged
provision is unlike such laws, since, on its face, it is not a
regulation of a business or an activity in the interest of, or
for the protection of, the public, but an attempt to give an
economic advantage to those engaged in a given business at
an arbitrary date as against all those who enter the
industry after that date. The appellees do not intimate that

[G.R. No. 118303. January 31, 1996.]
SENATOR HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, SENATOR JOSE D.
LINA, JR., MR. NICASIO B. BAUTISTA, MR. JESUS P.
GONZAGA, MR. SOLOMON D. MAYLEM, LEONORA C.
MEDINA, CASIANO S. ALIPON, Petitioners, v. HON. TEOFISTO
T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON.
RAFAEL ALUNAN, in his capacity as Secretary of Local
Government, HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as
Secretary of Budget, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, HON. JOSE
MIRANDA, in his capacity as Municipal Mayor of Santiago and
HON. CHARITO MANUBAY, HON. VICTORINO MIRANDA,
JR., HON. ARTEMIO ALVAREZ, HON. DANILO VERGARA,
HON. PETER DE JESUS, HON. NELIA NATIVIDAD, HON.
CELSO CALEON and HON. ABEL MUSNGI, in their capacity as
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN MEMBERS, MR. RODRIGO L.
SANTOS, in his capacity as Municipal Treasurer, and ATTY.
ALFREDO S. DIRIGE, in his capacity as Municipal
Administrator, Respondents.
Belo, Gozon, Elma, Parel, Asuncion & Lucila, for Petitioners.
Rene P. Pine, for Private Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE;
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, CONSTRUED. — A local Government Unit
is a political subdivision of the State which is constituted by law and
possessed of substantial control over its own affairs. Remaining to be an
intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, but not intended,
however, to be an emperium in emperia, the local government unit is
autonomous in the sense that it is given more powers, authority,
responsibilities and resources.
2. ID.; ID.; INCOME DEFINED. — Income is defined in the Local
Government Code to be all revenues and receipts collected or received
forming the gross accretions of funds of the local government unit.
3. ID.; ID.; INTERNAL REVENUE ALLOTMENT (IRA) ARE ITEMS
OF INCOME. — The IRAs are items of income because they form part
of the gross accretion of the funds of the local government unit. The
IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without
need of any further action on the part of the local government unit. They
thus constitute income which the local government can invariably rely
upon as the source of much needed funds.
4. ID.; ID.; ANNUAL INCOME DEFINED. — Department of Finance
Order No. 35-93 correctly encapsulizes the full import of the above
disquisition when it defined ANNUAL INCOME to be "revenues and
receipts realized by provinces, cities and municipalities from regular
sources of the Local General Fund including the internal revenue
allotment and other shares provided for in Sections 284, 290 and 291 of
the Code, but exclusive of n.on.-recurring receipts, such as other national
aids, grants, financial assistance, loan proceeds, sales of fixed assets, and
similar others" (Emphasis ours).
5. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; ORDER CONSTITUTING
EXECUTIVE OR CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSTRUCTION OF A
STATUTE BY ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY CHARGED WITH
THE TASK OF INTERPRETING THE SAME, ENTITLED TO FULL
RESPECT. — Such order, constituting executive or contemporaneous
construction of a statute by an administrative agency charged with the
task of interpreting and applying the same, is entitled to full respect and
should be accorded great weight by the courts, unless such construction
is clearly shown to be in sharp conflict with the Constitution, the
governing statute, or other laws.
6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE; BILL CONVERTING
MUNICIPALITY TO CITY MUST ORIGINATE FROM THE HOUSE;
PASSING OF SUBSEQUENT BILL COVERING THE SAME
MUNICIPALITY, NO ADVERSE EFFECT. — Although a bill of local
application like HB No. 8817 should, by constitutional prescription,
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, the claim of
petitioners that Republic Act No. 7720 did not originate exclusively in
the House of Representatives because a bill of the same import, SB No.
1243, was passed in the Senate, is untenable because it cannot be denied
that HB No. 8817 was filed in the House of Representatives first before
SB No. 1243 was filed in the Senate. Petitioners themselves cannot
disavow their own admission that HB No. 8817 was filed on April 18,
1993 while SB No. 1243 was filed on May 19, 1993. The filing of HB
No. 8817 was thus precursive not only of the said Act in question but
also of SB No. 1243. Thus, HB No. 8817, was the bill that initiated the
legislative process that culminated in the enactment of Republic Act No.
7720. No violation of Section 24, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution is
perceptible under the circumstances attending the instant controversy.
7. ID.; ID.; FILING IN THE SENATE OF A SUBSTITUTE BILL IN
ANTICIPATION OF ITS RECEIPT OF THE HOUSE BILL
WITHOUT ACTING THEREON DOES NOT CONTRAVENE
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT. — Petitioners themselves
acknowledge that HB No. 8817 was already approved on Third Reading
and duly transmitted to the Senate when the Senate Committee on Local
Government conducted its public hearing on HB No. 8817. HB No. 8817
was approved on the Third Reading on December 17, 1993 and
transmitted to the Senate on January 28, 1994; a little less than a month
thereafter, or on February 23, 1994, the Senate Committee on Local
Government conducted public hearings on SB No. 1243. Clearly, the
Senate held in abeyance any action on SB No. 1243 until it received HB
No. 8817, already approved on the Third Reading, from the House of
Representatives. The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in
anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, does not contravene
the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should
originate in the House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does
not act thereupon until it receives the House bill.
8. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; PRESUMPTIONS; EVERY LAW
IS PRESUMED CONSTITUTIONAL; CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
R.A. 7720 NOT OVERCOME IN CASE AT BAR. — It is a well-
entrenched jurisprudential rule that on the side of every law lies the
presumption of constitutionality. Consequently, for RA No. 7720 to be
nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of
the Constitution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one; in other
words, the grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable
doubt. Those who petition this court to declare a law to be
unconstitutional must clearly and fully establish the basis that will justify
such a declaration; otherwise, their petition must fail. Taking into
consideration the justification of our stand on the immediately preceding
ground raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of RA No.
7720, the Court stands on the holding that petitioners have failed to
overcome the presumption. The dismissal of this petition is, therefore,
inevitable.
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA. JR., J.:
Of main concern to the petitioners is whether Republic Act No. 7720,
just recently passed by Congress and signed by the President into law, is
constitutionally infirm.
Indeed, in this Petition for Prohibition with prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction, petitioners
assail the validity of Republic Act No. 7720, entitled, "An Act
Converting the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an Independent
Component City to be known as the City of Santiago," mainly because
the Act allegedly did not originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives as mandated by Section 24, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Also, petitioners claim that the Municipality of Santiago has not met the
minimum average annual income required under Section 450 of the
Local Government Code of 1991 in order to be converted into a
component city.
Undisputed is the following chronicle of the metamorphosis of House
Bill No. 8817 into Republic Act No. 7720:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
On April 18, 1993, HB No. 8817, entitled "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City to be
known as the City of Santiago," was filed in the House of
Representatives with Representative Antonio Abaya as principal author.
Other sponsors included Representatives Ciriaco Alfelor, Rodolfo
Albano, Santiago Respicio and Faustino Dy. The bill was referred to the
House Committee on Local Government and the House Committee on
Appropriations on May 5, 1993.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On May 19, 1993, June 1, 1993, November 28, 1993, and December 1,
1993, public hearings on HB No. 8817 were conducted by the House
Committee on Local Government. The committee submitted to the
House a favorable report, with amendments, on December 9, 1993.
On December 13, 1993, HB No. 8817 was passed by the House of
Representatives on Second Reading and was approved on Third Reading
on December 17, 1993. On January 28, 1994, HB No. 8817 was
transmitted to the Senate.
Meanwhile, a counterpart of HB No. 8817, Senate Bill No. 1243,
entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an
Independent Component City to be Known as the City of Santiago," was
filed in the Senate. It was introduced by Senator Vicente Sotto III, as
principal sponsor, on May 19, 1993. This was just after the House of
Representatives had conducted its first public hearing on HB No.
8817.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On February 23, 1994, or a little less than a month after HB No. 8817
was transmitted to the Senate, the Senate Committee on Local
Government conducted public hearings on SB No. 1243. On March 1,
1994, the said committee submitted Committee Report No. 378 on HB
No. 8817, with the recommendation that it be approved without
amendment, taking into consideration the reality that H.B. No. 8817 was
on all fours with SB No. 1243. Senator Heherson T. Alvarez, one of the
herein petitioners, indicated his approval thereto by signing said report
as member of the Committee on Local Government.
On March 3, 1994, Committee Report No. 378 was passed by the Senate
on Second Reading and was approved on Third Reading on March 14,
1994. On March 22, 1994, the House of Representatives, upon being
apprised of the action of the Senate, approved the amendments proposed
by the Senate.
The enrolled bill, submitted to the President on April 12, 1994, was
signed by the Chief Executive on May 5, 1994 as Republic Act No.
7720. When a plebiscite on the Act was held on July 13, 1994, a great
majority of the registered voters of Santiago voted in favor of the
conversion of Santiago into a city.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The question as to the validity of Republic Act No. 7720 hinges on the
following twin issues: (I) Whether or not the Internal Revenue
Allotments (IRAs) are to included in the computation of the average
annual income of a municipality for purposes of its conversion into an
independent component city, and (II) Whether or not, considering that
the Senate passed SB No. 1243, its own version of HB No. 8817,
Republic Act No. 7720 can be said to have originated in the House of
Representatives.
I. The annual income of a local government unit includes the IRAs.
Petitioners claim that Santiago could not qualify into a component city
because its average annual last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991
constant prices falls below the required annual income of Pesos
(P20,000,000.00) for its conversion into a city, petitioners having
computed Santiago’s average annual income in the following manner:
Total income (at 1991 constant prices) for 1991 P20,379,057.07
Total income (at 1991 constant prices) for 1992 P21,570,106.87
——————
Total income for 1991 and 1992 P41,949,163.94
Minus:
IRAs for 1991 and 1992 P15,730,043.00
——————
Total income for 1991 and 1992 P26,219,120.94
Average Annual Income P13,109,560.47
====================================
By dividing the total income of Santiago for calendar years 1991 and
1992, after deducting the IRAs, the average annual income arrived at
would only be P13,109,560.47 based on the 1991 constant prices. Thus,
petitioners claim that Santiago’s income is far below the aforesaid
Twenty Million Pesos average annual income requirement.
The certification issued by the Bureau of Local Government Finance of
the Department of Finance, which indicates Santiago’s average annual
income to be P20,974,581.97, is allegedly not accurate as the Internal
Revenue Allotments were not excluded from the computation.
Petitioners asseverate that the IRAs are not actually income but transfers
and/or budgetary aid from the national government and that they
fluctuate, increase or decrease, depending on factors like population,
land and equal sharing.
In this regard, we hold that petitioners’ asseverations are untenable
because Internal Revenue Allotments form part of the income of Local
Government Units.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It is true that for a municipality to be converted into a component city, it
must, among others, have an average annual income of at least Twenty
Million Pesos for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991
constant prices. 1 Such income must be duly certified by the Department
of Finance. 2
Resolution of the controversy regarding compliance by the Municipality
of Santiago with the aforecited income requirement hinges on a
correlative and contextual explication of the meaning of internal revenue
allotments (IRAs) vis-a-vis the notion of income of a local government
unit and the principles of local autonomy and decentralization
underlying the institutionalization and intensified empowerment of the
local government system.
A Local Government Unit is a political subdivision of the State which is
constituted by law and possessed of substantial control over its own
affairs. 3 Remaining to be an intra sovereign subdivision of one
sovereign nation, but not intended, however, to be an imperium in
imperio, 4 the local government unit is autonomous in the sense that it is
given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources. 5 Power
which used to be highly centralized in Manila, is thereby deconcentrated,
enabling especially the peripheral local government units to develop not
only at their own pace and discretion but also with their own resources
and assets. 6
The practical side to development through a decentralized local
government system certainly concerns the matter of financial resources.
With its broadened powers and increased responsibilities, a local
government unit must now operate on a much wider scale. More
extensive operations, in turn, entail more expenses. Understandably, the
vesting of duty, responsibility and accountability in every local
government unit is accompanied with a provision for reasonably
adequate resources to discharge its powers and effectively carry out its
functions. 7 Availment of such resources is effectuated through the
vesting in every local government unit of (1) the right to create and
broaden its own source of revenue; (2) the right to be allocated a just
share in national taxes such share being in the form of internal revenue
allotments (IRAs); and (3) the right to be given its equitable share in the
proceeds of the utilization and development of the national wealth, if
any, within its territorial boundaries. 8
The funds generated from local taxes, IRAs and national wealth
utilization proceeds accrue to the general fund of the local government
and are used to finance its operations subject to specified modes of
spending the same as provided for in the Local Government Code and its
implementing rules and regulations. For instance, not less than twenty
percent (20%) of the IRAs must be set aside for local development
projects. 9 As such, for purposes of budget preparation, which budget
should reflect the estimates of the income of the local government unit,
among others, the IRAs and the share in the national wealth utilization
proceeds are considered items of income. This is as it should be, since
income is defined in the Local Government Code to be all revenues and
receipts collected or received forming the gross accretions of funds of
the local government unit. 10
The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross
accretion of the funds of the local government unit. The IRAs regularly
and automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of any
further action on the part of the local government unit. 11 They thus
constitute income which the local government can invariably rely upon
as the source of much needed funds. For purposes of converting the
Municipality of Santiago into a city, the Department of Finance certified,
among others, that the municipality had an average annual income of at
least Twenty Million Pesos for the last two (2) consecutive years based
on 1991 constant prices. This, the Department of Finance did after
including the IRAs in its computation of said average annual
income.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Furthermore, Section 450 (c) of the Local Government Code provides
that "the average annual income shall include the income accruing to the
general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring
income.’’ To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil
is there a basis, too, to classify the same as a special fund or transfer,
since IRAs have a technical definition and meaning all its own as used in
the Local Government Code that unequivocally makes it distinct from
special funds or transfers referred to when the Code speaks of "funding
support from the national government, its instrumentalities and
government-owned- or -controlled corporations." 12
Thus, Department of Finance Order No. 35-93 13 correctly encapsulizes
the full import of the above disquisition when it defined ANNUAL
INCOME to be "revenues and receipts realized by provinces cities and
municipalities from regular sources of the Local General Fund including
the internal revenue allotment and other shares provided for in Sections
284, 290 and 291 of the Code, but exclusive of non-recurring receipts,
such as other national aids, grants, financial assistance, loan proceeds,
sales of fixed assets, and similar others" (Underscoring ours). 14 Such
order, constituting executive or contemporaneous construction of a
statute by an administrative agency charged with the task of interpreting
and applying the same, is entitled to full respect and should be accorded
great weight by the courts, unless such construction is clearly shown to
be in sharp conflict with the Constitution, the governing statute, or other
laws. 15
II. In the enactment of RA No. 7720, there was compliance with Section
24, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Although a bill of local application like HB No. 8817 should, by
constitutional prescription, 16 originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, the claim of petitioners that Republic Act No. 7720 did
not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives because a bill
of the same import, SB No. 1243, was passed in the Senate, is untenable
because it cannot be denied that HB No. 8817 was filed in the House of
Representatives first before SB No. 1243 was filed in the Senate.
Petitioners themselves cannot disavow their own admission that HB No.
8817 was filed on April 18, 1993 while SB No. 1243 was filed on May
19, 1993. The filing of HB No. 8817 was thus precursive not only of the
said Act in question but also of SB No. 1243. Thus, HB No. 8817, was
the bill that initiated the legislative process that culminated in the
enactment of Republic Act No. 7720. No violation of Section 24, Article
VI, of the 1987 Constitution is perceptible under the circumstances
attending the instant controversy.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Furthermore, petitioners themselves acknowledge that HB No. 8817 was
already approved on Third Reading and duly transmitted to the Senate
when the Senate Committee on Local Government conducted its public
hearing on HB No. 8817. HB No. 8817 was approved on the Third
Reading on December 17, 1993 and transmitted to the Senate on January
28, 1994; a little less than a month thereafter or on February 23, 1994,
the Senate Committee on Local Government conducted public hearings
on SB No. 1243. Clearly, the Senate held in abeyance any action on SB
No. 1243 until it received HB No. 8817, already approved on the Third
Reading, from the House of Representatives. The filing in the Senate of
a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House,
does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local
application should originate in the House of Representatives, for as long
as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill.
We have already addressed this issue in the case of Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance. 17 There, on the matter of the Expanded Value
Added Tax (EVAT) Law, which, as a revenue bill, is nonetheless
constitutionally required to originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, we explained:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . To begin with, it is not the law — but the revenue bill — which is
required by the Constitution to ‘originate exclusively’ in the House of
Representatives. It is important to emphasize this, because a bill
originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the
Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole as a result of the
Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue
statute — and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process
culminating in the enactment of the law — must substantially be the
same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not only to
‘concur with amendments’ but also to ‘propose amendments.’ It would
be to violate the co-equality of legislative power of the two houses of
Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate.
x       x       x
It is insisted, however, that S. No. 1630 was passed not in substitution of
H. No. 11197 but of another Senate bill (S. No. 1129) earlier filed and
that what the Senate did was merely to ‘take [H. No. 11197] into
consideration’ in enacting S. No. 1630. There is really no difference
between the Senate preserving H. No. 11197 up to the enacting clause
and then writing its own version following the enacting clause (which, it
would seem petitioners admit is an amendment by substitution), and, on
the other hand, separately presenting a bill of its own on the same subject
matter. In either case the result are two bills on the same subject.
Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for
filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the
public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from
the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from
the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more
sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the
senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same
problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to
bear n the enactment of such laws.
Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute
bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as
action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House
Bill. . . ." 18
III. Every law, including RA No. 7720, has in its favor the presumption
of constitutionality.
It is a well-entrenched jurisprudential rule that on the side of every law
lies the presumption of constitutionality. 19 Consequently, for RA No.
7720 to be nullified it must be shown that there is a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful and
equivocal one; in other words, the grounds for nullity must be clear and
beyond reasonable doubt. 20 Those who petition this court to declare a
law to be unconstitutional must clearly and fully establish the basis that
will justify such a declaration; otherwise, their petition must fail. Taking
into consideration the justification of our stand on the immediately
preceding ground raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality
of RA No. 7720, the Court stands on the holding that petitioners have
failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of this petition is,
therefore, inevitable.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit with
costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995
JUANITO MARIANO, JR. et al., petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF
MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, THE MUNICIPAL
TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF
MAKATI, respondents.
G.R. No. 118627 March 7, 1995
JOHN R. OSMEÑA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF
MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, MUNICIPAL TREASURER,
AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
At bench are two (2) petitions assailing certain provisions of Republic
Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional.
R.A. No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of
Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of
Makati."1
G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory
relief. It was filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista,
Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita
Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto
Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The
others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as
taxpayers, they assail as unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A.
No. 7854 on the following grounds:
1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly
identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of
Makati by metes and bounds, with technical
descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of
the Local Government Code;
2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or
restart the "three consecutive term" limit for local
elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X
and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution.
3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional
for:
(a) it increased the legislative
district of Makati only by special
law (the Charter in violation of
the constitutional provision
requiring a general
reapportionment law to be
passed by Congress within three
(3) years following the return of
every census;
(b) the increase in legislative
district was not expressed in the
title of the bill; and
 (c) the addition of another
legislative district in Makati is
not in accord with Section 5 (3),
Article VI of the Constitution for
as of the latest survey (1990
census), the population of
Makati stands at only 450,000.
G.R. No. 118627 was filed by the petitioner John H. Osmeña as senator,
taxpayer, and concerned citizen. Petitioner assails section 52 of R.A. No.
7854 as unconstitutional on the same grounds as aforestated.
We find no merit in the petitions.
I did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area of
Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the
proposed city of Makati, thus:
Sec. 2. The City of Makati. — The Municipality of
Makati shall be converted into a highly urbanized
city to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter
referred to as the City, which shall comprise the
present territory of the Municipality of Makati in
Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has
jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River
and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the
Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the
municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the
southwest by the City of Pasay and the Municipality
of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of
Manila.
The foregoing provision shall be without prejudice
to the resolution by the appropriate agency or forum
of existing boundary disputes or cases involving
questions of territorial jurisdiction between the City
of Makati and the adjoining local government units.
(Emphasis supplied)
In G.R. No. 118577, petitioners claim that this delineation violates
sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code which require that the
area of a local government unit should be made by metes and bounds
with technical descriptions.2
The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries
of a local unit of government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries
must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a
local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government
only within the limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any
uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units will sow costly
conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will
prejudice the people's welfare. This is the evil sought to avoided by the
Local Government Code in requiring that the land area of a local
government unit must be spelled out in metes and bounds, with technical
descriptions.
Given the facts of the cases at bench, we cannot perceive how this evil
can be brought about by the description made in section 2 of R.A. No.
7854, Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land
area of the proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its
boundaries. We note that said delineation did not change even by an inch
the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. Section 2
Makati. In language that cannot be any clearer, section 2 stated that, the
city's land area "shall comprise the present territory of the municipality."
The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason
why the land area of the proposed City of Makati was not defined by
metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. At the time of the
consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the
municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under
court litigation. Out of a becoming sense of respect to co-equal
department of government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left
to the courts to decide. They did not want to foreclose the dispute by
making a legislative finding of fact which could decide the issue. This
would have ensued if they defined the land area of the proposed city by
its exact metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.3 We take judicial
notice of the fact that Congress has also refrained from using the metes
and bounds description of land areas of other local government units
with unsettled boundary disputes.4
We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present
an insurmountable difficulty which will prevent Congress from defining
with reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local
government unit. In the cases at bench, Congress maintained the existing
boundaries of the proposed City of Makati but as an act of fairness, made
them subject to the ultimate resolution by the courts. Considering these
peculiar circumstances, we are not prepared to hold that section 2 of
R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional. We sustain the submission of the
Solicitor General in this regard, viz.:
Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local
Government Code, it is beyond cavil that the
requirement stated therein, viz.: "the territorial
jurisdiction of newly created or converted cities
should be described by meted and bounds, with
technical descriptions" — was made in order to
provide a means by which the area of said cities may
be reasonably ascertained. In other words, the
requirement on metes and bounds was meant merely
as tool in the establishment of local government
units. It is not an end in itself. Ergo, so long as the
territorial jurisdiction of a city may be reasonably
ascertained, i.e., by referring to common boundaries
with neighboring municipalities, as in this case, then,
it may be concluded that the legislative intent behind
the law has been sufficiently served.
Certainly, Congress did not intends that laws
creating new cities must contain therein detailed
technical descriptions similar to those appearing in
Torrens titles, as petitioners seem to imply. To
require such description in the law as a
condition sine qua non for its validity would be to
defeat the very purpose which the Local Government
Code to seeks to serve. The manifest intent of the
Code is to empower local government units and to
give them their rightful due. It seeks to make local
governments more responsive to the needs of their
constituents while at the same time serving as a vital
cog in national development. To invalidate R.A. No.
7854 on the mere ground that no cadastral type of
description was used in the law would serve the
letter but defeat the spirit of the Code. It then
becomes a case of the master serving the slave,
instead of the other way around. This could not be
the intendment of the law.
Too well settled is the rule that laws must be
enforced when ascertained, although it may not be
consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts
will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so
would depart from the true intent of the legislature or
would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with
the general purpose of the act. (Torres v. Limjap, 56
Phil., 141; Tañada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051;
Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 33 SCRA 1105). Legislation is
an active instrument of government, which, for
purposes of interpretation, means that laws have
ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed
as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and
purposes (Bocolbo v. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520).
The same rule must indubitably apply to the case at
bar.
 II
Petitioners in G.R. No. 118577 also assail the constitutionality of section
51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 51 states:
Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. — The
represent elective officials of the Municipality of
Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of
Makati and shall exercise their powers and functions
until such time that a new election is held and the
duly elected officials shall have already qualified
and assume their offices: Provided, The new city will
acquire a new corporate existence. The appointive
officials and employees of the City shall likewise
continues exercising their functions and duties and
they shall be automatically absorbed by the city
government of the City of Makati.
They contend that this section collides with section 8, Article X and
section 7, Article VI of the Constitution which provide:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials,
except barangay officials, which shall be determined
by law, shall be three years and no such official shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length
of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 7. The Members of the House of
Representatives shall be elected for a term of three
years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided
by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following their election.
No Member of the House of Representatives shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length
of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected.
Petitioners stress that under these provisions, elective local officials,
including Members of the House of Representative, have a term of
three (3) years and are prohibited from serving for more than
three (3) consecutive terms. They argue that by providing that the new
city shall acquire a new corporate existence, section 51 of R.A. No. 7854
restarts the term of the present municipal elective officials of Makati and
disregards the terms previously served by them. In particular, petitioners
point that section 51 favors the incumbent Makati Mayor, respondent
Jejomar Binay, who has already served for two (2) consecutive terms.
They further argue that should Mayor Binay decide to run and eventually
win as city mayor in the coming elections, he can still run for the same
position in 1998 and seek another three-year consecutive term since his
previous three-year consecutive term as municipal mayor would not be
counted. Thus, petitioners conclude that said section 51 has been
conveniently crafted to suit the political ambitions of respondent Mayor
Binay.
We cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of section 51.
The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a
law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or
controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the
proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question
must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.5
Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition
is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that
Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he
would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election
for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these
contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a
hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or
controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano)
are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they
hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which
this Court has no jurisdiction.
III
Finally, petitioners in the two (2) cases at bench assail the
constitutionality of section 52, Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 52 of
the Charter provides:
Sec. 52. Legislative Districts. — Upon its conversion
into a highly-urbanized city, Makati shall thereafter
have at least two (2) legislative districts that shall
initially correspond to the two (2) existing districts
created under Section 3(a) of Republic Act. No.
7166 as implemented by the Commission on
Elections to commence at the next national elections
to be held after the effectivity of this Act.
Henceforth, barangays Magallanes, Dasmariñas and
Forbes shall be with the first district, in lieu of
Barangay Guadalupe-Viejo which shall form part of
the second district. (emphasis supplied)
They contend. that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is
unconstitutional for: (1) reapportionment6 cannot made by a special law,
(2) the addition of a legislative district is not expressed in the title of the
bill7 and (3) Makati's population, as per the 1990 census, stands at only
four hundred fifty thousand (450,000).
These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias
v. Abalos.8 In said case, we ruled that reapportionment of legislative
districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a
new city. The Constitution9 clearly provides that Congress shall be
composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250) members, unless
otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not
preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law,
other than a general reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what
was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an
increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold that
reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law,
with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local
government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where
a new city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative
representation for an indeterminate period of time. 10 The intolerable
situations will deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of
their sovereignty. 11 Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction.
It is indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not sovereignty.
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in
Makati is not in accord with section 5(3), Article VI 12 of the
Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of
Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). 13 Said
section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative.
Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood
at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still
be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of
two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population
has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall
be entitled to at least one congressional representative. 14
Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners' contention that the creation
of an additional legislative district in Makati should have been expressly
stated in the title of the bill. In the same case of Tobias v. Abalos, op cit.,
we reiterated the policy of the Court favoring a liberal construction of
the "one title-one subject" rule so as not to impede legislation. To be
sure, with Constitution does not command that the title of a law should
exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all its details. Hence, G.R. No. 146342            October 26, 2001
we ruled that "it should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the
general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general BENJAMIN E. CAWALING, JR., petitioner,
subject." vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, SECRETARY OF THE
No costs. INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT,
SO ORDERED. SOLICITOR GENERAL, PROVINCE OF SORSOGON,
MUNICIPALITY OF SORSOGON, MUNICIPALITY OF
BACON, respondents.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Before us are two (2) separate petitions challenging the constitutionality

of Republic Act No. 8806 which created the City of Sorsogon and the
validity of the plebiscite conducted pursuant thereto.

On August 16, 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law
R.A. No. 8806, an "Act Creating The City Of Sorsogon By Merging The
Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The Province Of Sorsogon,
And Appropriating Funds Therefor."1

Pursuant to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution,2 the Commission

on Elections (COMELEC), on December 16, 2000, conducted a
plebiscite in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon and submitted the
matter for ratification.

On December 17, 2000, the Plebiscite City Board of Canvassers (PCBC)

proclaimed3 the creation of the City of Sorsogon as having been ratified
and approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite.4

Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer of the former Municipality

of Sorsogon, Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. filed on January 2, 2001 the
present petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 146319) seeking the annulment
of the plebiscite on the following grounds:

G.R. No. 146319            October 26, 2001
BENJAMIN E. CAWALING, JR., petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and Rep. Francis Joseph G.
Escudero, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
A. The December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted beyond
the required 120-day period from the approval of R.A. 8806, in
violation of Section 54 thereof; and
B. Respondent COMELEC failed to observe the legal
requirement of twenty (20) day extensive information
campaign in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon before
conducting the plebiscite.
Two days after filing the said action, or on January 4, 2001, petitioner
instituted another petition (G.R. No. 146342), this time for prohibition
seeking to enjoin the further implementation of R.A. No. 8806 for being
unconstitutional, contending, in essence, that:
1. The creation of Sorsogon City by merging two
municipalities violates Section 450(a) of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (in relation to Section 10, Article X
of the Constitution) which requires that only "a municipality or
a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component
city"; and
2. R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2) subjects, namely, the (a)
creation of the City of Sorsogon and the (b) abolition of the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon, thereby violating the
"one subject-one bill" rule prescribed by Section 26(1), Article
VI of the Constitution.
Hence, the present petitions which were later consolidated.5
Significantly, during the pendency of these cases, specifically during the
May 14, 2001 elections, the newly-created Sorsogon City had the first
election of its officials. Since then, the City Government of Sorsogon has
been regularly discharging its corporate and political powers pursuant to
its charter, R.A. No. 8806.
We shall first delve on petitioner's constitutional challenge against R.A.
No. 8806 in G.R No. 146342.
Every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality.6 This
presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers which
enjoins upon the three coordinate departments of the Government a
becoming courtesy for each other's acts.7 The theory is that every law,
being the joint act of the Legislature and the Executive, has passed
careful scrutiny to ensure that it is in accord with the fundamental
law.8 This Court, however, may declare a law, or portions thereof,
unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative
one.9 In other words the grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable
doubt,10 for to doubt is to sustain.11
Petitioner initially reject R.A. No. 8806 because it violates Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution which provides, inter alia:
"SECTION 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay
may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected." (Emphasis ours)
The criteria for the creation of a city is prescribed in Section 450 of the
Local Government Code of 1991 (the Code), thus:
"SECTION 450. Requisites for Creation. — (a) A
municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a
component city if it has an average annual income, as certified
by the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million
(P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based
on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the following
requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred
(100) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty
thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the
National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land
area, population, and income of the original unit or units at the
time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements
prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be
properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on
land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created
is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not
be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income
accruing to the general fund, exclusive of specific funds,
transfers, and non-recurring income." (Emphasis ours)
Petitioner is not concerned whether the creation of Sorsogon City
through R.A. No. 8806 complied with the criteria set by the Code as to
income, population and land area. What he is assailing is its mode of
creation. He contends that under Section 450(a) of the Code, a
component city may be created only by converting "a municipality or a
cluster of barangays," not by merging two municipalities, as what R.A.
No. 8806 has done.
This contention is devoid of merit.
Petitioner's constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code is
erroneous. The phrase "A municipality or a cluster of barangays may
be converted into a component city" is not a criterion but simply one of
the modes by which a city may be created. Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, quoted earlier and which petitioner cited in support of his
posture, allows the merger of local government units to create a province
city, municipality or barangay in accordance with the criteria established
by the Code. Thus, Section 8 of the Code distinctly provides:
"SECTION 8. Division and Merger. — Division and merger
of existing local government units shall comply with the same
requirements herein prescribed for their creation: Provided,
however, That such division shall not reduce the income,
population, or land area of the local government unit or units
concerned to less than the minimum requirements prescribed
in this Code: Provided, further, That the income classification
of the original local government unit or units shall not fall
below its current income classification prior to such
division. . . . ." (Emphasis ours)
Verily, the creation of an entirely new local government unit through
a division or a merger of existing local government units
is recognized under the Constitution, provided that such merger or
division shall comply with the requirements prescribed by the Code.
Petitioner further submits that, in any case, there is no "compelling"
reason for merging the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in order to
create the City of Sorsogon considering that the Municipality of
Sorsogon alone already qualifies to be upgraded to a component city.
This argument goes into the wisdom of R.A. No. 8806, a matter which
we are not competent to rule. In Angara v. Electoral Commission,12 this
Court, through Justice Jose P. Laurel, made it clear that "the judiciary
does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation." In the exercise of judicial power, we are allowed only "to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable,"13 and "may not annul an act of the political
departments simply because we feel it is unwise or impractical. "14
Next, petitioner assails R.A. No. 8806 since it contravenes the "one
subject-one bill" rule enunciated in Section 26 (1), Article VI of the
Constitution, to wit:
"SECTION 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof." (Emphasis ours)
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 8806 actually embraces two principal
subjects which are: (1) the creation of the City of Sorsogon, and (2)
the abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon. While the
title of the Act sufficiently informs the public about the creation of
Sorsogon City, petitioner claims that no such information has been
provided on the abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon.
The argument is far from persuasive. Contrary to petitioner's assertion,
there is only one subject embraced in the title of the law, that is, the
creation of the City of Sorsogon. The abolition/cessation of the corporate
existence of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon due to their
merger is not a subject separate and distinct from the creation of
Sorsogon City. Such abolition/cessation was but the logical, natural and
inevitable consequence of the merger. Otherwise put, it is the necessary
means by which the City of Sorsogon was created. Hence, the title of the
law, "An Act Creating the City of Sorsogon by Merging the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in the Province of Sorsogon, and
Appropriating Funds Therefor," cannot be said to exclude the incidental
effect of abolishing the two municipalities, nor can it be considered to
have deprived the public of fair information on this consequence.
It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the
Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such
precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the
minute details therein.15 The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title
is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the
statute seeks to effect,16 and where, as here, the persons interested are
informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and
its operation.17 Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal
rather than technical construction of the rule "so as not to cripple or
impede legislation."18
Consequently, we hold that petitioner has failed to present clear and
convincing proof to defeat the presumption of constitutionality of R.A.
No. 8806.
We now turn to G.R. No. 146319 wherein petitioner assails the validity
of the plebiscite conducted by the COMELEC for the ratification of the
creation of Sorsogon City.
Petitioner asserts that the plebiscite required by R.A. No. 8806 should be
conducted within 120 days from the "approval" of said Act per express
provision of its Section 54, viz:
"SECTION 54. Plebiscite. — The City of Sorsogon shall
acquire corporate existence upon the ratification of its creation
by a majority of the votes cast by the qualified voters in a
plebiscite to be conducted in the present municipalities of
Bacon and Sorsogon within one hundred twenty (120)
days from the approval of this Act. x x x ." (Emphasis ours)
The Act was approved on August 16, 2000 by former President Joseph
E. Estrada. Thus, petitioner claims, the December 16, 2000 plebiscite
was conducted one (1) day late from the expiration of the 120-day period
after the approval of the Act. This 120-day period having expired
without a plebiscite being conducted, the Act itself expired and could no
longer be ratified and approved in the plebiscite held on December 16,
2000.
In its comment, the COMELEC asserts that it scheduled the plebiscite on
December 16, 2000 based on the date of the effectivity of the Act.
Section 65 of the Act states:
"SECTION 65. Effectivity. — This Act shall take effect upon
its publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general and
local circulation."
The law was first published in the August 25, 2000 issue of TODAY a
newspaper of general circulation. Then on September 01, 2000, it was
published in a newspaper of local circulation in the Province of
Sorsogon. Thus, the publication of the law was completed on September
1, 2000, which date, according to the COMELEC, should be the
reckoning point in determining the 120-day period within which to
conduct the plebiscite, not from the date of its approval (August 16,
2000) when the law had not yet been published. The COMELEC argues
that since publication is indispensable for the effectivity of a law, citing
the landmark case of Tañada vs. Tuvera,19 it could only schedule the
plebiscite after the Act took effect. Thus, the COMELEC concludes, the
December 16, 2000 plebiscite was well within the 120-day period from
the effectivity of the law on September 1, 2000.
The COMELEC is correct.
In addition, Section 10 of the Code provides:
"SECTION 10. Plebiscite Requirement. — No creation,
division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of
boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless
approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called
for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected.
Such plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on
Elections within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date
of the effectivity of the law or ordinance affecting such
action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date."
(Emphasis ours)
Quite plainly, the last sentence of Section 10 mandates that the plebiscite
shall be conducted within 120 days from the date of the effectivity of the
law, not from its approval. While the same provision allows a law or
ordinance to fix "another date" for conducting a plebiscite, still such date
must be reckoned from the date of the effectivity of the law.
Consequently, the word "approval" in Section 54 of R.A. No. 8806,
which should be read together with Section 65 (effectivity of the Act)
thereof, could only mean "effectivity" as used and contemplated in
Section 10 of the Code. This construction is in accord with the
fundamental rule that all provisions of the laws relating to the same
subject should be read together and reconciled to avoid inconsistency or
repugnancy to established jurisprudence. As we stated in Tañada:
"ARTICLE 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take
effect one year after such publication.
After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of
the parties, both on the original petition and on the instant
motion, we have come to the conclusion, and so hold, that the
clause 'unless it is otherwise provided' refers to the date of
effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself,
which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not
mean that the legislature may make the law effective
immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its
previous publication." (Emphasis supplied)
To give Section 54 a literal and strict interpretation would in effect make
the Act effective even before its publication, which scenario is precisely
abhorred in Tañada.
Lastly, petitioner alleges that the COMELEC failed to conduct an
extensive information campaign on the proposed Sorsogon cityhood 20
days prior to the scheduled plebiscite as required by Article 11 (b.4.ii),
Rule II of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Code. However,
no proof whatsoever was presented by petitioner to substantiate his
allegation. Consequently, we sustain the presumption20 that the
COMELEC regularly performed or complied with its duty under the law
in conducting the plebiscite.
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 125646. September 10, 1999.]
CITY OF PASIG, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE
COMMISSION ON ELECTION and THE MUNICIPALITY OF
CAINTA, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, Respondents.
[G.R. No. 128663. September 10, 1999.]
MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, Petitioner,
v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS CITY OF PASIG, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us are two (2) petitions which both question the propriety of the
suspension of plebiscite proceedings pending the resolution of the issue
of boundary disputes between the Municipality of Cainta and the City of
Pasig.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
G.R. No. 125646 involves the proposed Barangay Karangalan while
G.R. No. 128663 involves the proposed Barangay Napico. The City of
Pasig claims these areas as part of its jurisdiction/territory while the
Municipality of Cainta claims that these proposed barangays encroached
upon areas within its own jurisdiction/territory.
The antecedent facts are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
On April 22, 1996, upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village
that they be segregated from its mother Barangays Manggahan and Dela
Paz, City of Pasig, and to be converted and separated into a distinct
barangay to be known as Barangay Karangalan, the City Council of
Pasig passed and approved Ordinance No. 21, Series of 1996, creating
Barangay Karangalan in Pasig City. 1 Plebiscite on the creation of said
barangay was thereafter set for June 22, 1996.
Meanwhile, on September 9, 1996, the City of Pasig similarly issued
Ordinance No. 52, Series of 1996, creating Barangay Napico in Pasig
City. 2 Plebiscite for this purpose was set for March 15, 1997.
Immediately upon learning of such Ordinances, the Municipality of
Cainta moved to suspend or cancel the respective plebiscites scheduled,
and filed Petitions with the Commission on Elections (hereinafter
referred to as COMELEC) on June 19, 1996 (UND No. 96-016) 3 and
March 12, 1997 (UND No. 97-002), respectively. In both Petitions, the
Municipality of Cainta called the attention of the COMELEC to a
pending case before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch
74, for settlement of boundary dispute. 4 According to the Municipality
of Cainta, the proposed barangays involve areas included in the
boundary dispute subject of said pending case; hence, the scheduled
plebiscites should be suspended or cancelled until after the said case
shall have been finally decided by the court.chanrobles law library
In UND No. 96-016, the COMELEC accepted the position of the
Municipality of Cainta and ordered the plebiscite on the creation of
Barangay Karangalan to be held in abeyance until after the court has
settled with finality the boundary dispute involving the two
municipalities. 5 Hence, the filing of G.R. No. 125646 by the City of
Pasig.
The COMELEC, however, ruled differently in UND No. 97-002,
dismissing the Petition for being moot in view of the holding of the
plebiscite as scheduled on March 15, 1997 where the creation of
Barangay Napico was ratified and approved by the majority of the votes
cast therein. 6 Hence, the filing of G.R. No. 128663 by the Municipality
of Cainta.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
The issue before us is whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the
creation of Barangays Karangalan and Napico should be suspended or
cancelled in view of the pending boundary dispute between the two local
governments.
To begin with, we agree with the position of the COMELEC that Civil
Case No. 94-3006 involving the boundary dispute between the
Municipality of Cainta and the City of Pasig presents a prejudicial
question which must first be decided before plebiscites for the creation
of the proposed barangays may be held.
The City of Pasig argues that there is no prejudicial question since the
same contemplates a civil and criminal action and does not come into
play where both cases are civil, as in the instant case. While this may be
the general rule, this Court has held in Vidad v. RTC of Negros Oriental,
Br. 42, 7 that, in the interest of good order, we can very well suspend
action on one case pending the final outcome of another case closely
interrelated or linked to the first.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the case at bar, while the City of Pasig vigorously claims that the
areas covered by the proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico are
within its territory, it can not deny that portions of the same area are
included in the boundary dispute case pending before the Regional Trial
Court of Antipolo. Surely, whether the areas in controversy shall be
decided as within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Cainta
or the City of Pasig has material bearing to the creation of the proposed
Barangays Karangalan and Napico. Indeed, a requisite for the creation of
a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be properly identified by
metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries. 8
Precisely because territorial jurisdiction is an issue raised in the pending
civil case, until and unless such issue is resolved with finality, to define
the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays would only be an
exercise in futility. Not only that, we would be paving the way for entertaining future challenges to their acts if they manage to bring about
potentially ultra vires acts of such barangays. Indeed, in Mariano, Jr. v. a fait accompli." chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Commission on Elections, 9 we held that —
Therefore, the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan should
"The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial be held in abeyance pending final resolution of the boundary dispute
boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be overemphasized. The between the City of Pasig and the Municipality of Cainta by the
boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City. In the same vein, the plebiscite
jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise held on March 15, 1997 to ratify the creation of Barangay Napico, Pasig
powers of government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. City, should be annulled and set aside.
Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any
uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units will sow costly WHEREFORE, premises considered,
conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will
prejudice the people’s welfare. 1. The Petition of the City of Pasig in G.R. No. 125646 is DISMISSED
for lack of merit; while
Moreover, considering the expenses entailed in the holding of
plebiscites, it is far more prudent to hold in abeyance the conduct of the 2. The Petition of the Municipality of Cainta in G.R. No. 128663 is
same, pending final determination of whether or not the entire area of the GRANTED. The COMELEC Order in UND No. 97-002, dated March
proposed barangays are truly within the territorial jurisdiction of the City 21, 1997, is SET ASIDE and the plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 to
of Pasig.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library ratify the creation of Barangay Napico in the City of Pasig is declared
null and void. Plebiscite on the same is ordered held in abeyance until
Neither do we agree that merely because a plebiscite had already been after the courts settle with finality the boundary dispute between the City
held in the case of the proposed Barangay Napico, the petition of the of Pasig and the Municipality of Cainta, in Civil Case No. 94-
Municipality of Cainta has already been rendered moot and academic. 300.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
The issues raised by the Municipality of Cainta in its petition before the
COMELEC against the holding of the plebiscite for the creation of No pronouncement as to costs.
Barangay Napico are still pending determination before the Antipolo
Regional Trial Court. SO ORDERED.
In Tan v. Commission on Elections, 10 we struck down the moot and Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing
academic argument as follows — Purisima, Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
"Considering that the legality of the plebiscite itself is challenged for Davide, Jr., C.J. and Panganiban, J., are on official leave.
non-compliance with constitutional requisites, the fact that such
plebiscite had been held and a new province proclaimed and its officials Pardo, J., took no part; was COMELEC Chair.
appointed, the case before Us cannot truly be viewed as already moot
and academic. Continuation of the existence of this newly proclaimed
province which petitioners strongly profess to have been illegally born,
deserves to be inquired into by this Tribunal so that, if indeed, illegality
attaches to its creation, the commission of that error should not provide
the very excuse for perpetration of such wrong. For this Court to yield to
the respondents’ urging that, as there has been fait accompli, then this
Court should passively accept and accede to the prevailing situation is an
unacceptable suggestion. Dismissal of the instant petition, as respondents
so propose is a proposition fraught with mischief. Respondents’
submission will create a dangerous precedent. Should this Court decline
now to perform its duty of interpreting and indicating what the law is
and should be, this might tempt again those who strut about in the
corridors of power to recklessly and with ulterior motives, create, merge,
divide and/or alter the boundaries of political subdivisions, either
brazenly or stealthily, confident that this Court will abstain from