CASES NO.

5
SEPTEMBER 8, 2018
WILLS AND SUCCESSION

LEGITIME
Concepts
1. Francisco v. Francisco-Alfonso......................................................2
2. Sps. Joaquin v. CA..........................................................................5
3. Maononsong v. Estimo.................................................................10
Who are entitled to Legitimes; Compulsory Heirs
1. Rosales v. Rosales..........................................................................16
2. Ining v. Vega..................................................................................19
3. Uson v. Del Rosario......................................................................25
4. Castro v. CA..................................................................................27
5. Tayag v. CA...................................................................................33
Concurrence of Compulsory Heirs and their corresponding legitimes
1. Sayson v. CA..................................................................................39
2. In the Matter of Adoption of Stephanie Garcia.........................43
3. Reyes v. Sotero..............................................................................48
4. In Re: Petition of Adoption of Michelle Lim..............................52
5. In the Matter of Intestate Estate of Suntay.................................56
6. Suntay v. Suntay...........................................................................62
7. Bartolome v. SSS............................................................................71
Determination or Computation
1. Vda. De Tupas v. RTC..................................................................78
2. Mateo v. Lagua..............................................................................80
3. Natcher v. CA................................................................................83
Collation
1. De Roma v. CA..............................................................................87
2. Vizconde v. CA.............................................................................89
3. Imperial v. CA...............................................................................93
4. Arellano v. Pascual.......................................................................98
 FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 138774            March 8, 2001
REGINA FRANCISCO AND ZENAIDA PASCUAL, petitioners,  complaint against petitioners for annulment of sale with damages.5 She
vs.
AIDA FRANCISCO-ALFONSO, respondent.
PARDO, J.:
May a legitimate daughter be deprived of her share in the estate of her
deceased father by a simulated contract transferring the property of her
father to his illegitimate children?
The case before the Court is an appeal via certiorari from the decision of the
Court of Appeals1 declaring void the deed of sale of two parcels of land
conveyed to petitioners who are illegitimate children of the deceased to the
exclusion of respondent, his sole legitimate daughter.
The facts2 are:
Respondent Aida Francisco-Alfonso (hereafter Aida) is the only daughter
of spouses Gregorio Francisco and Cirila de la Cruz, who are now both
deceased.
Petitioners, on the other hand, are daughters of the late Gregorio Francisco
with his common law wife Julia Mendoza, with whom he begot seven (7)
children.
Gregorio Francisco (hereafter Gregorio) owned two parcels of residential
land, situated in Barangay Lolomboy, Bocaue, Bulacan, covered by TCT
Nos. T-32740 and T-117160. When Gregorio was confined in a hospital in
1990, he confided to his daughter Aida that the certificates of title of his
property were in the possession of Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual.
After Gregorio died on July 20, 1990,3 Aida inquired about the certificates
of title from her half sisters. They informed her that Gregorio had sold the
land to them on August 15, 1983. After verification, Aida learned that there
was indeed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Regina Francisco and Zenaida
Pascual. Thus, on August 15, 1983, Gregorio executed a "Kasulatan sa Ganap
na Bilihan, whereby for P25,000.00, he sold the two parcels of land to Regina
Francisco and Zenaida Pascual. By virtue of the sale, the Register of Deeds of
Bulacan issued TCT No. T-59.585 to Regina Francisco and TCT T-59.586 to
Zenaida Pascual.4
On April 1, 1991, Aida filed with the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan a
alleged that the signature of her late father, Gregorio Francisco, on
the Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan dated August 15, 1983, was a forgery.
In their joint answer to the complaint, petitioners denied the alleged forgery
or simulation of the deed of sale. After due proceedings, on July 21, 1994, the
trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint. The dispositive
portion reads:
"WHEREFORE, on the basis of the evidence adduced and the law
applicable thereon, the Court hereby renders judgment:
"a) sustaining the validity of the "Kasulatan Sa Ganap Na Bilihan"
(Exh."G") executed on 15 August 1993 by the late Gregorio
Francisco in favor of the defendants;
"b) affirming the validity of the Transfer Certificates of Title No.
T-59.585 (Exh. "I") issued to defendant Regina Francisco and No. T-
59.386 (Exh. "H") issued to defendant Zenaida Pascual; and
"c) dismissing the complaint as well as the defendants' counterclaim
for damages and attorney's fees for lack of merit." 6
In time7, respondent Alfonso appealed to the Court of Appeals.8
After due proceedings, on April 30, 1999, the Court of Appeals
promulgated its decision reversing that of the trial court, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 21, 1994 of the court a quo is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another rendered as follows:
"1. The Kasulatan Sa Ganap na Bilihan dated August 15, 1983
(Exhibit "G") is declared null and void from the beginning and TCT
Nos. T-59.585 (M) and T-59-586 (M), both of the Registry of Deeds of
Bulacan (Meycauayan Branch) in the names of Regina Francisco and
Zenaida Pascual, respectively, are annulled and cancelled;
 "2. The Register of Deeds of Bulacan (Meycauayan Branch) is
ordered to cancel the aforementioned TCT Nos. T-59.585 (M) and T-
59.586 (M) and to reinstate Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-
132740 and T-117160 both in the name of Gregorio Francisco.
"3. Defendants-appellees Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual
jointly and solidarily are ordered to pay plaintiff-appellant Alfonso
the amount of P5,000.00 as moral damages, P5,000.00 as exemplary
damages and P5,000.00 as attorney's fees.
"4. The counterclaim of defendants-appellees is dismissed for lack of
merit.
"Costs of suit against said defendants-appellees." 9
Hence, this petition.10
The main issue raised is whether the Supreme Court may review the factual
findings of the appellate court. The jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought
before it from the Court of Appeals under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court is limited to review of pure errors of law. It is not the function of this
Court to analyze or weigh evidence all over again, unless there is a showing
that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are
glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.11
The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals supported by substantial
evidence are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by
this Court,12 unless the case falls under any of the recognized exceptions to
the rule.13
Petitioner has failed to prove that the case falls within the exceptions. 14
We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals because:
First: The kasulatan was simulated. There was no consideration for the
contract of sale. Felicitas de la Cruz, a family friend of the Franciscos,
testified that Zenaida Pascual and Regina Francisco did not have any source
of income in 1983, when they bought the property, until the time when
Felicitas testified in 1991.15
As proof of income, however, Zenaida Pascual testified that she was engaged
in operating a canteen, working as cashier in Mayon Night Club as well as
buying and selling RTW (Ready to Wear) items in August of 1983 and prior
thereto.
Zenaida alleged that she paid her father the amount of P10,000.00. She did
not withdraw money from her bank account at the Rural Bank of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, to pay for the property. She had personal savings
other than those deposited in the bank. Her gross earnings from the RTW for
three years was P9,000.00, and she earned P50.00 a night at the club.16
Regina Francisco, on the other hand, was a market vendor, selling nilugaw,
earning a net income of P300.00 a day in 1983. She bought the property from
the deceased for P15,000.00.17 She had no other source of income.
We find it incredible that engaging in buy and sell could raise the amount of
P10,000.00, or that earnings in selling goto could save enough to pay
P15,000.00, in cash for the land.
The testimonies of petitioners were incredible considering their inconsistent
statements as to whether there was consideration for the sale and also as to
whether the property was bought below or above its supposed market value.
They could not even present a single witness to the kasulatan that would
prove receipt of the purchase price.
Since there was no cause or consideration for the sale, the same was a
simulation and hence, null and void.18
Second: Even if the kasulatan was not simulated, it still violated the Civil
Code19 provisions insofar as the transaction affected respondent's legitime.
The sale was executed in 1983, when the applicable law was the Civil
Code, not the Family Code.
Obviously, the sale was Gregorio's way to transfer the property to his
illegitimate daughters20 at the expense of his legitimate daughter. The sale
was executed to prevent respondent Alfonso from claiming her legitime
and rightful share in said property. Before his death, Gregorio had a
change of heart and informed his daughter about the titles to the property.
According to Article 888, Civil Code:
"The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of
one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother.
 "The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half subject to the
rights of illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as
hereinafter provided."

Gregorio Francisco did not own any other property. If indeed the parcels of
land involved were the only property left by their father, the sale in fact
would deprive respondent of her share in her father's estate. By law, she is
entitled to half of the estate of her father as his only legitimate child.21

The legal heirs of the late Gregorio Francisco must be determined in proper
testate or intestate proceedings for settlement of the estate. His compulsory
heir cannot be deprived of her share in the estate save by disinheritance as
prescribed by law.22

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G. R. CV No. 48545 is AFFIRMED, in toto.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 126376. November 20, 2003]
SPOUSES BERNARDO BUENAVENTURA and CONSOLACION
JOAQUIN, SPOUSES JUANITO EDRA and NORA JOAQUIN,
SPOUSES RUFINO VALDOZ and EMMA JOAQUIN, and
NATIVIDAD JOAQUIN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
SPOUSES LEONARDO JOAQUIN and FELICIANA LANDRITO,
SPOUSES FIDEL JOAQUIN and CONCHITA BERNARDO,
SPOUSES TOMAS JOAQUIN and SOLEDAD ALCORAN,
SPOUSES ARTEMIO JOAQUIN and SOCORRO ANGELES,
SPOUSES ALEXANDER MENDOZA and CLARITA JOAQUIN,
SPOUSES TELESFORO CARREON and FELICITAS JOAQUIN,
SPOUSES DANILO VALDOZ and FE JOAQUIN, and SPOUSES
GAVINO JOAQUIN and LEA ASIS, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] to annul the
Decision[2] dated 26 June 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
41996. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision [3] dated 18 February
1993 rendered by Branch 65 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati (trial court)
in Civil Case No. 89-5174. The trial court dismissed the case after it found
that the parties executed the Deeds of Sale for valid consideration and that
the plaintiffs did not have a cause of action against the defendants.
The Facts
The Court of Appeals summarized the facts of the case as follows:
Defendant spouses Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito are the parents
of plaintiffs Consolacion, Nora, Emma and Natividad as well as of
defendants Fidel, Tomas, Artemio, Clarita, Felicitas, Fe, and Gavino, all
surnamed JOAQUIN. The married Joaquin children are joined in this action
by their respective spouses.
Sought to be declared null and void ab initio are certain deeds of sale of real
property executed by defendant parents Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana
Landrito in favor of their co-defendant children and the corresponding
certificates of title issued in their names, to wit:
1. Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-C-7 of subdivision plan
(LRC) Psd-256395 executed on 11 July 1978, in favor of
defendant Felicitas Joaquin, for a consideration of P6,000.00
(Exh. C), pursuant to which TCT No. [36113/T-172] was issued
in her name (Exh. C-1);
2. Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-I-3 of subdivision plan
(LRC) Psd-256394 executed on 7 June 1979, in favor of
defendant Clarita Joaquin, for a consideration
of P1[2],000.00(Exh. D), pursuant to which TCT No. S-109772
was issued in her name (Exh. D-1);
3 Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-I-1 of subdivision plan
(LRC) Psd-256394 executed on 12 May 1988, in favor of
defendant spouses Fidel Joaquin and Conchita Bernardo, for a
consideration of P54,[3]00.00 (Exh. E), pursuant to which TCT
No. 155329 was issued to them (Exh. E-1);
4. Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-I-2 of subdivision plan
(LRC) Psd-256394 executed on 12 May 1988, in favor of
defendant spouses Artemio Joaquin and Socorro Angeles, for a
consideration of P[54,3]00.00 (Exh. F), pursuant to which TCT
No. 155330 was issued to them (Exh. F-1); and
5. Absolute Sale of Real Property covering Lot 168-C-4 of
subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-256395 executed on 9 September
1988, in favor of Tomas Joaquin, for a consideration
of P20,000.00 (Exh. G), pursuant to which TCT No. 157203 was
issued in her name (Exh. G-1).
 [6. Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-C-1 of subdivision plan
(LRC) Psd-256395 executed on 7 October 1988, in favor of
Gavino Joaquin, for a consideration of P25,000.00 (Exh. K),
pursuant to which TCT No. 157779 was issued in his name
(Exh. K-1).]
In seeking the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid deeds of sale and
certificates of title, plaintiffs, in their complaint, aver:
- XX-
The deeds of sale, Annexes C, D, E, F, and G, [and K] are simulated as they
are, are NULL AND VOID AB INITIO because
a) Firstly, there was no actual valid consideration for the deeds of
sale xxx over the properties in litis;
b) Secondly, assuming that there was consideration in the sums
reflected in the questioned deeds, the properties are more
than three-fold times more valuable than the measly sums
appearing therein;
c) Thirdly, the deeds of sale do not reflect and express the true
intent of the parties (vendors and vendees); and
d) Fourthly, the purported sale of the properties in litis was the
result of a deliberate conspiracy designed to unjustly
deprive the rest of the compulsory heirs (plaintiffs herein) of
their legitime.
- XXI -
Necessarily, and as an inevitable consequence, Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. 36113/T-172, S-109772, 155329, 155330, 157203 [and 157779] issued by
the Registrar of Deeds over the properties in litis xxx are NULL AND
VOID AB INITIO.
Defendants, on the other hand aver (1) that plaintiffs do not have a cause of
action against them as well as the requisite standing and interest to assail
their titles over the properties in litis; (2) that the sales were with sufficient
considerations and made by defendants parents voluntarily, in good faith,
and with full knowledge of the consequences of their deeds of sale; and (3)
that the certificates of title were issued with sufficient factual and legal basis.
[4]
 (Emphasis in the original)
The Ruling of the Trial Court
Before the trial, the trial court ordered the dismissal of the case against
defendant spouses Gavino Joaquin and Lea Asis. [5] Instead of filing an
Answer with their co-defendants, Gavino Joaquin and Lea Asis filed a
Motion to Dismiss.[6] In granting the dismissal to Gavino Joaquin and Lea
Asis, the trial court noted that compulsory heirs have the right to a legitime
but such right is contingent since said right commences only from the
moment of death of the decedent pursuant to Article 777 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines.[7]
After trial, the trial court ruled in favor of the defendants and dismissed
the complaint. The trial court stated:
In the first place, the testimony of the defendants, particularly that of the xxx
father will show that the Deeds of Sale were all executed for valuable
consideration. This assertion must prevail over the negative allegation of
plaintiffs.
And then there is the argument that plaintiffs do not have a valid cause of
action against defendants since there can be no legitime to speak of prior to
the death of their parents. The court finds this contention tenable. In
determining the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of the
testator shall be considered (Art. 908 of the New Civil Code). Hence, the
legitime of a compulsory heir is computed as of the time of the death of the
decedent. Plaintiffs therefore cannot claim an impairment of their legitime
while their parents live.
All the foregoing considered, this case is DISMISSED.
In order to preserve whatever is left of the ties that should bind families
together, the counterclaim is likewise DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.[8]
 The Ruling of the Court of Appeals SO ORDERED.[9]

Hence, the instant petition.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. The
appellate court ruled:

To the mind of the Court, appellants are skirting the real and decisive issue Issues
in this case, which is, whether xxx they have a cause of action against
appellees. Petitioners assign the following as errors of the Court of Appeals:

Upon this point, there is no question that plaintiffs-appellants, like their 1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
defendant brothers and sisters, are compulsory heirs of defendant spouses, THE CONVEYANCE IN QUESTION HAD NO VALID
Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito, who are their parents. However, CONSIDERATION.
their right to the properties of their defendant parents, as compulsory heirs,
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
is merely inchoate and vests only upon the latters death. While still alive,
EVEN ASSUMING THAT THERE WAS A CONSIDERATION,
defendant parents are free to dispose of their properties, provided that such
THE SAME IS GROSSLY INADEQUATE.
dispositions are not made in fraud of creditors.
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
Plaintiffs-appellants are definitely not parties to the deeds of sale in THE DEEDS OF SALE DO NOT EXPRESS THE TRUE INTENT
question. Neither do they claim to be creditors of their defendant OF THE PARTIES.
parents. Consequently, they cannot be considered as real parties in interest to
4. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
assail the validity of said deeds either for gross inadequacy or lack of
THE CONVEYANCE WAS PART AND PARCEL OF A
consideration or for failure to express the true intent of the parties. In point is
CONSPIRACY AIMED AT UNJUSTLY DEPRIVING THE REST
the ruling of the Supreme Court in Velarde, et al. vs. Paez, et al., 101 SCRA
OF THE CHILDREN OF THE SPOUSES LEONARDO
376, thus:
JOAQUIN AND FELICIANA LANDRITO OF THEIR
INTEREST OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES.
The plaintiffs are not parties to the alleged deed of sale and are not
principally or subsidiarily bound thereby; hence, they have no legal capacity 5. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
to challenge their validity. PETITIONERS HAVE A GOOD, SUFFICIENT AND VALID
CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE PRIVATE
Plaintiffs-appellants anchor their action on the supposed impairment of their RESPONDENTS.[10]
legitime by the dispositions made by their defendant parents in favor of their
defendant brothers and sisters. But, as correctly held by the court a quo, the
legitime of a compulsory heir is computed as of the time of the death of the The Ruling of the Court
decedent. Plaintiffs therefore cannot claim an impairment of their legitime
while their parents live.
We find the petition without merit.
With this posture taken by the Court, consideration of the errors assigned by We will discuss petitioners legal interest over the properties subject of
plaintiffs-appellants is inconsequential. the Deeds of Sale before discussing the issues on the purported lack of
consideration and gross inadequacy of the prices of the Deeds of Sale.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs
against plaintiffs-appellants.
Whether Petitioners have a legal interest
 over the properties subject of the Deeds of Sale
Petitioners Complaint betrays their motive for filing this case. In their
Complaint, petitioners asserted that the purported sale of the properties in
litis was the result of a deliberate conspiracy designed to unjustly deprive
the rest of the compulsory heirs (plaintiffs herein) of their legitime.
Petitioners strategy was to have the Deeds of Sale declared void so that
ownership of the lots would eventually revert to their respondent
parents. If their parents die still owning the lots, petitioners and their
respondent siblings will then co-own their parents estate by hereditary
succession.[11]
It is evident from the records that petitioners are interested in the
properties subject of the Deeds of Sale, but they have failed to show any
legal right to the properties. The trial and appellate courts should have
dismissed the action for this reason alone. An action must be prosecuted in
the name of the real party-in-interest.[12]
[T]he question as to real party-in-interest is whether he is the party who
would be benefitted or injured by the judgment, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit.
x x x
In actions for the annulment of contracts, such as this action, the real parties
are those who are parties to the agreement or are bound either principally or
subsidiarily or are prejudiced in their rights with respect to one of the
contracting parties and can show the detriment which would positively
result to them from the contract even though they did not intervene in it
(Ibaez v. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank, 22 Phil. 572 [1912]) xxx.
These are parties with a present substantial interest, as distinguished from
a mere expectancy or future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential
interest. The phrase present substantial interest more concretely is meant
such interest of a party in the subject matter of the action as will entitle him,
under the substantive law, to recover if the evidence is sufficient, or that he
has the legal title to demand and the defendant will be protected in a
payment to or recovery by him.[13]
Petitioners do not have any legal interest over the properties subject
of the Deeds of Sale. As the appellate court stated, petitioners right to their
parents properties is merely inchoate and vests only upon their parents
death. While still living, the parents of petitioners are free to dispose of
their properties. In their overzealousness to safeguard their future
legitime, petitioners forget that theoretically, the sale of the lots to their
siblings does not affect the value of their parents estate. While the sale of
the lots reduced the estate, cash of equivalent value replaced the lots taken
from the estate.
Whether the Deeds of Sale are void
for lack of consideration
Petitioners assert that their respondent siblings did not actually pay the
prices stated in the Deeds of Sale to their respondent father. Thus, petitioners
ask the court to declare the Deeds of Sale void.
A contract of sale is not a real contract, but a consensual contract. As a
consensual contract, a contract of sale becomes a binding and valid contract
upon the meeting of the minds as to price. If there is a meeting of the minds
of the parties as to the price, the contract of sale is valid, despite the manner
of payment, or even the breach of that manner of payment. If the real price is
not stated in the contract, then the contract of sale is valid but subject to
reformation. If there is no meeting of the minds of the parties as to the price,
because the price stipulated in the contract is simulated, then the contract is
void.[14] Article 1471 of the Civil Code states that if the price in a contract of
sale is simulated, the sale is void.
It is not the act of payment of price that determines the validity of a
contract of sale. Payment of the price has nothing to do with the perfection of
the contract. Payment of the price goes into the performance of the
contract. Failure to pay the consideration is different from lack of
consideration. The former results in a right to demand the fulfillment or
cancellation of the obligation under an existing valid contract while the latter
prevents the existence of a valid contract.[15]
Petitioners failed to show that the prices in the Deeds of Sale were
absolutely simulated. To prove simulation, petitioners presented Emma
Joaquin Valdozs testimony stating that their father, respondent Leonardo
Joaquin, told her that he would transfer a lot to her through a deed of sale
without need for her payment of the purchase price. [16] The trial court did not
find the allegation of absolute simulation of price credible. Petitioners failure
to prove absolute simulation of price is magnified by their lack of knowledge
of their respondent siblings financial capacity to buy the questioned lots.
[17]
 On the other hand, the Deeds of Sale which petitioners presented as
evidence plainly showed the cost of each lot sold. Not only did respondents
minds meet as to the purchase price, but the real price was also stated in the
Deeds of Sale. As of the filing of the complaint, respondent siblings have also
fully paid the price to their respondent father.[18]
Whether the Deeds of Sale are void
for gross inadequacy of price
Petitioners ask that assuming that there is consideration, the same is
grossly inadequate as to invalidate the Deeds of Sale.
Moreover, the factual findings of the appellate court are conclusive on
the parties and carry greater weight when they coincide with the factual
findings of the trial court. This Court will not weigh the evidence all over
again unless there has been a showing that the findings of the lower court are
totally devoid of support or are clearly erroneous so as to constitute serious
abuse of discretion.[20] In the instant case, the trial court found that the lots
were sold for a valid consideration, and that the defendant children actually
paid the purchase price stipulated in their respective Deeds of Sale. Actual
payment of the purchase price by the buyer to the seller is a factual finding
that is now conclusive upon us.

Articles 1355 of the Civil Code states: WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Art. 1355. Except in cases specified by law, lesion or inadequacy of cause
shall not invalidate a contract, unless there has been fraud, mistake or Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna,
undue influence. (Emphasis supplied) JJ., concur.

Article 1470 of the Civil Code further provides:

Art. 1470. Gross inadequacy of price does not affect a contract of sale, except

as may indicate a defect in the consent, or that the parties really intended a
donation or some other act or contract.(Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners failed to prove any of the instances mentioned in Articles

1355 and 1470 of the Civil Code which would invalidate, or even affect, the
Deeds of Sale. Indeed, there is no requirement that the price be equal to the
exact value of the subject matter of sale. All the respondents believed that
they received the commutative value of what they gave.As we stated
in Vales v. Villa:[19]

Courts cannot follow one every step of his life and extricate him from bad
bargains, protect him from unwise investments, relieve him from one-sided
contracts, or annul the effects of foolish acts.Courts cannot constitute
themselves guardians of persons who are not legally incompetent. Courts
operate not because one person has been defeated or overcome by another,
but because he has been defeated or overcome illegally. Men may do foolish
things, make ridiculous contracts, use miserable judgment, and lose money
by them indeed, all they have in the world; but not for that alone can the law
intervene and restore. There must be, in addition, a violation of the law, the
commission of what the law knows as an actionable wrong, before the courts
are authorized to lay hold of the situation and remedy it. (Emphasis in the
original)
 FIRST DIVISION
[G. R. No. 136773. June 25, 2003]
MILAGROS MANONGSONG, joined by her husband, CARLITO
MANONGSONG, petitioners, vs. FELOMENA JUMAQUIO
ESTIMO, EMILIANA JUMAQUIO, NARCISO ORTIZ,
CELESTINO ORTIZ, RODOLFO ORTIZ, ERLINDA O. OCAMPO,
PASTOR ORTIZ, JR., ROMEO ORTIZ BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ,
SR., BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ, JR., AURORA NICOLAS, GLORIA
RACADIO, ROBERTO DELA CRUZ, JOSELITO DELA CRUZ and
LEONCIA S. LOPEZ, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before this Court is a petition for review [1] assailing the Decision[2] of 26
June 1998 and the Resolution of 21 December 1998 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 51643. The Court of Appeals reversed the Decision dated 10
April 1995 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 135, in Civil
Case No. 92-1685, partitioning the property in controversy and awarding to
petitioners a portion of the property.
Antecedent Facts
Spouses Agatona Guevarra (Guevarra) and Ciriaco Lopez had six (6)
children, namely: (1) Dominador Lopez; (2) Enriqueta Lopez-Jumaquio, the
mother of respondents Emiliana Jumaquio Rodriguez and Felomena
Jumaquio Estimo (Jumaquio sisters); (3) Victor Lopez, married to respondent
Leoncia Lopez; (4) Benigna Lopez-Ortiz, the mother of respondents Narciso,
Celestino, Rodolfo, Pastor Jr. and Romeo Ortiz, and Erlinda Ortiz Ocampo;
(5) Rosario Lopez-dela Cruz, married to respondent Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr.
and the mother of respondents Benjamin Jr., Roberto, and Joselito, all
surnamed dela Cruz, and of Gloria dela Cruz Racadio and Aurora dela Cruz
Nicolas; and (6) Vicente Lopez, the father of petitioner Milagros Lopez
Manongsong (Manongsong).
The contested property is a parcel of land on San Jose Street, Manuyo
Uno, Las Pias, Metro Manila with an area of approximately 152 square
meters (Property). The records do not show that the Property is registered
under the Torrens system. The Property is particularly described in Tax
Declaration No. B-001-00390[3] as bounded in the north by Juan Gallardo,
south by Calle Velay, east by Domingo Lavana and west by San Jose
Street. Tax Declaration No. B-001-00390 was registered with the Office of the
Municipal Assessor of Las Pias on 30 September 1984 in the name of Benigna
Lopez, et al.[4] However, the improvements on the portion of the Property
denominated as No. 831 San Jose St., Manuyo Uno, Las Pias were separately
declared in the name of Filomena J. Estimo under Tax Declaration No. 90-
001-02145 dated 14 October 1991.[5]
Milagros and Carlito Manongsong (petitioners) filed a Complaint [6] on
19 June 1992, alleging that Manongsong and respondents are the owners pro
indiviso of the Property.Invoking Article 494 of the Civil Code, [7] petitioners
prayed for the partition and award to them of an area equivalent to one-fifth
(1/5) of the Property or its prevailing market value, and for damages.
Petitioners alleged that Guevarra was the original owner of the
Property. Upon Guevarras death, her children inherited the Property. Since
Dominador Lopez died without offspring, there were only five children left
as heirs of Guevarra. Each of the five children, including Vicente Lopez, the
father of Manongsong, was entitled to a fifth of the Property.As Vicente
Lopez sole surviving heir, Manongsong claims her fathers 1/5 share in the
Property by right of representation.
There is no dispute that respondents, who are the surviving spouses of
Guevarras children and their offspring, have been in possession of the
Property for as long as they can remember. The area actually occupied by
each respondent family differs, ranging in size from approximately 25 to 50
square meters. Petitioners are the only descendants not occupying any
portion of the Property.
Most respondents, specifically Narciso, Rodolfo, Pastor Jr., and
Celestino Ortiz, and Erlinda Ortiz Ocampo (Ortiz family), as well as
Benjamin Sr., Benjamin Jr., and Roberto dela Cruz, Aurora dela Cruz Nicolas
and Gloria Dela Cruz Racadio (Dela Cruz family), entered into a compromise
agreement with petitioners. Under the Stipulation of Facts and Compromise
Agreement[8] dated 12 September 1992 (Agreement), petitioners and the Ortiz
and Dela Cruz families agreed that each group of heirs would receive an
equal share in the Property. The signatories to the Agreement asked the trial
court to issue an order of partition to this effect and prayed further that those
who have exceeded said one-fifth (1/5) must be reduced so that those who
have less and those who have none shall get the correct and proper portion.[9]
Among the respondents, the Jumaquio sisters and Leoncia Lopez who
each occupy 50 square meter portions of the Property and Joselito dela Cruz,
did not sign the Agreement.[10] However, only the Jumaquio sisters actively
opposed petitioners claim. The Jumaquio sisters contended that Justina
Navarro (Navarro), supposedly the mother of Guevarra, sold the Property to
Guevarras daughter Enriqueta Lopez Jumaquio.
The Jumaquio sisters presented provincial Tax Declaration No. 911 [11] for
the year 1949 in the sole name of Navarro. Tax Declaration No. 911 described
a residential parcel of land with an area of 172.51 square meters, located on
San Jose St., Manuyo, Las Pias, Rizal with the following boundaries: Juan
Gallardo to the north, I. Guevarra Street to the south, Rizal Street to the east
and San Jose Street to the west. In addition, Tax Declaration No. 911 stated
that the houses of "Agatona Lopez" and "Enriquita Lopez" stood on the
Property as improvements.
The Jumaquio sisters also presented a notarized KASULATAN SA
BILIHAN NG LUPA[12] (Kasulatan) dated 11 October 1957, the relevant
portion of which states:
AKO SI JUSTINA NAVARRO, sapat ang gulang, may asawa, Pilipino at
naninirahan sa LAS PIAS, ay siyang nagma-may-ari at nagtatangkilik ng
isang lagay na lupa na matatagpuan sa Manuyo, Las Pias, Rizal, lihis sa
anomang pagkakautang lalong napagkikilala sa pamamagitan ng mga
sumusunod na palatandaan:
BOUNDARIES:
NORTH: JUAN GALLARDO SOUTH: I. GUEVARRA ST.
EAST: RIZAL ST., WEST: SAN JOSE ST.,
na may sukat na 172.51 metros cuadrados na may TAX
DECLARATION BILANG 911.
NA DAHIL AT ALANG ALANG sa halagang DALAWANG DAAN
LIMANGPUNG PISO (P250.00), SALAPING PILIPINO, na sa akin ay
kaliwang iniabot at ibinayad ni ENRIQUETA LOPEZ, may sapat na gulang,
Pilipino, may asawa at naninirahan sa Las Pias, Rizal, at sa karapatang ito ay
aking pinatutunayan ng pagkakatanggap ng nasabing halaga na buong
kasiyahan ng aking kalooban ay aking IPINAGBILI, ISINALIN AT INILIPAT
sa nasabing, ENRIQUETA LOPEZ, sa kanyang mga tagapagmana at kahalili,
ang kabuuang sukat ng lupang nabanggit sa itaas nito sa pamamagitan ng
bilihang walang anomang pasubali. Ang lupang ito ay walang kasama at
hindi taniman ng palay o mais.
Simula sa araw na ito ay aking ililipat ang pagmamay-ari at pagtatangkilik
ng nasabing lupa kay ENRIQUETA LOPEZ sa kanilang/kanyang
tagapagmana at kahalili x x x.
The Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Manila certified on 1
June 1994 that the KASULATAN SA BILIHAN NG LUPA, between Justina
Navarro (Nagbili) and Enriqueta Lopez (Bumili), was notarized by Atty.
Ruperto Q. Andrada on 11 October 1957 and entered in his Notarial Register
xxx.[13] The certification further stated that Atty. Andrada was a duly
appointed notary public for the City of Manila in 1957.
Because the Jumaquio sisters were in peaceful possession of their
portion of the Property for more than thirty years, they also invoked the
defense of acquisitive prescription against petitioners, and charged that
petitioners were guilty of laches. The Jumaquio sisters argued that the
present action should have been filed years earlier, either by Vicente Lopez
when he was alive or by Manongsong when the latter reached legal
age. Instead, petitioners filed this action for partition only in 1992
when Manongsong was already 33 years old.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
After trial on the merits, the trial court in its Decision [14] of 10 April 1995
ruled in favor of petitioners. The trial court held that the Kasulatan was void,
even absent evidence attacking its validity. The trial court declared:
It appears that the ownership of the estate in question is
controverted. According to defendants Jumaquios, it pertains to them
through conveyance by means of a Deed of Sale executed by their common
ancestor Justina Navarro to their mother Enriqueta, which deed was
presented in evidence as Exhs. 4 to 4-A. Plaintiff Milagros Manongsong
debunks the evidence as fake. The document of sale, in the observance of the
Court, is however duly authenticated by means of a certificate issued by the
RTC of the Manila Clerk of Court as duly notarized public document (Exh.
5). No countervailing proof was adduced by plaintiffs to overcome or
impugn the documents legality or its validity.
xxx The conveyance made by Justina Navarro is subject to nullity because
the property conveyed had a conjugal character. No positive evidence had
been introduced that it was solely a paraphernal property. The name of
Justina Navarros spouse/husband was not mentioned and/or whether the
husband was still alive at the time the conveyance was made to Justina
Navarro. Agatona Guevarra as her compulsory heir should have the legal
right to participate with the distribution of the estate under question to the
exclusion of others. She is entitled to her legitime. The Deed of Sale [Exhs 4 &
4-1(sic)] did not at all provide for the reserved legitime or the heirs, and,
therefore it has no force and effect against Agatona Guevarra and her six (6)
legitimate children including the grandchildren, by right of representation,
as described in the order of intestate succession. The same Deed of Sale
should be declared a nullity ab initio. The law on the matter is clear. The
compulsory heirs cannot be deprived of their legitime, except on (sic) cases
expressly specified by law like for instance disinheritance for cause.
xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Since the other respondents had entered into a compromise agreement
with petitioners, the dispositive portion of the trial courts decision was
directed against the Jumaquio sisters only, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
plaintiffs and against the remaining active defendants, Emiliana Jumaquio
and Felomena J. Estimo, jointly and severally, ordering:
1. That the property consisting of 152 square meters referred to above be
immediately partitioned giving plaintiff Milagros Lopez-Manongsong her
lawful share of 1/5 of the area in square meters, or the prevailing market
value on the date of the decision;
2. Defendants to pay plaintiffs the sum of P10,000.00 as compensatory
damages for having deprived the latter the use and enjoyment of the fruits of
her 1/5 share;
3. Defendants to pay plaintiffs litigation expenses and attorneys fee in the
sum of P10,000.00; and
4. Defendants to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[15] (Emphasis supplied)
When the trial court denied their motion for reconsideration, the
Jumaquio sisters appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioners, in their appellees brief before the Court of Appeals,
presented for the first time a supposed photocopy of the death
certificate[16] of Guevarra, which stated that Guevarras mother was a certain
Juliana Gallardo. Petitioner also attached an affidavit [17] from Benjamin dela
Cruz, Sr. attesting that he knew Justina Navarro only by name and had never
met her personally, although he had lived for some years with Agatona
Guevarra after his marriage with Rosario Lopez. On the basis of these
documents, petitioners assailed the genuineness and authenticity of
the Kasulatan.
The Court of Appeals refused to take cognizance of the death certificate
and affidavit presented by petitioners on the ground that petitioners never
formally offered these documents in evidence.
The appellate court further held that the petitioners were bound by their
admission that Navarro was the original owner of the Property, as follows:
Moreover, plaintiffs-appellees themselves admitted before the trial court that
Justina Navarro and not Juliana Gallardo was the original owner of the
subject property and was the mother of Agatona Navarro (sic). Plaintiffs-
appellees in their Reply-Memorandum averred:
As regards the existence of common ownership, the defendants clearly admit
as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
History of this case tells us that originally the property was owned by
JUSTINA NAVARRO who has a daughter by the name of AGATONA
GUEVARRA who on the other hand has six children namely: xxx xxx xxx.
which point-out that co-ownership exists on the property between the
parties. Since this is the admitted history, facts of the case, it follows that
there should have been proper document to extinguish this status of co-
ownership between the common owners either by (1) Court action or proper
deed of tradition, xxx xxx xxx.
The trial court confirms these admissions of plaintiffs-appellees. The trial
court held:
xxx xxx xxx
With the parties admissions and their conformity to a factual common line of
relationship of the heirs with one another, it has been elicited ascendant
Justina Navarro is the common ancestor of the heirs herein mentioned,
however, it must be noted that the parties failed to amplify who was the
husband and the number of compulsory heirs of Justina
Navarro. xxx xxx xxx
Therefore, plaintiffs-appellees cannot now be heard contesting the fact that
Justina Navarro was their common ancestor and was the original owner of
the subject property.
The Court of Appeals further held that the trial court erred in assuming
that the Property was conjugal in nature when Navarro sold it. The appellate
court reasoned as follows:
However, it is a settled rule that the party who invokes the presumption that
all property of marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership, must first prove
that the property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition
during the coveture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the
presumption in favor of conjugal ownership.
In this case, not a single iota of evidence was submitted to prove that the
subject property was acquired by Justina Navarro during her marriage. xxx
The findings of the trial court that the subject property is conjugal in nature
is not supported by any evidence.
To the contrary, records show that in 1949 the subject property was declared,
for taxation purposes under the name of Justina Navarro alone. This
indicates that the land is the paraphernal property of Justina Navarro.
For these reasons, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial
court, thus:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is hereby rendered DISMISSING
plaintiffs-appellees complaint in so far as defendants-appellants are
concerned.
Costs against plaintiffs-appellees.
SO ORDERED.[18]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the Court of Appeals
denied the same in its Resolution of 21 December 1998.[19]
On 28 January 1999, petitioners appealed the appellate courts decision
and resolution to this Court. The Court initially denied the petition for
review due to certain procedural defects. The Court, however, gave due
course to the petition in its Resolution of 31 January 2000.[20]
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues before this Court:
1. WHETHER PETITIONER HAS NO COUNTERVAILING
EVIDENCE ON THE ALLEGED SALE BY ONE JUSTINA
NAVARRO;
2. WHETHER THERE IS PRETERITION AND THE ISSUES
RAISED ARE REVIEWABLE;
3. WHETHER THERE IS CO-OWNERSHIP PRO INDIVISO;
4. WHETHER THE RULE OF THE MAJORITY CO-OWNERS ON
THE LAND SHOULD PREVAIL;
5. WHETHER THE ALLEGED SALE IS VALID AND BINDS THE
OTHER CO-HEIRS;
6. WHETHER PRESCRIPTION APPLIES AGAINST THE SHARE
OF PETITIONERS.[21]
The fundamental question for resolution is whether petitioners were
able to prove, by the requisite quantum of evidence, that Manongsong is a
co-owner of the Property and therefore entitled to demand for its partition.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
The issues raised by petitioners are mainly factual in nature. In general,
only questions of law are appealable to this Court under Rule 45. However,
where the factual findings of the trial court and Court of Appeals conflict,
this Court has the authority to review and, if necessary, reverse the findings
of fact of the lower courts.[22] This is precisely the situation in this case.
 We review the factual and legal issues of this case in light of the general
rules of evidence and the burden of proof in civil cases, as explained by this
Court in Jison v. Court of Appeals :[23]
xxx Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of
proof, and upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts.
However, in the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out
a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to
defendant to controvert plaintiff's prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must
be returned in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the
burden of proof must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, with
plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the
weakness of the defendants. The concept of preponderance of evidence
refers to evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing, that which
is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth.
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the validity of the
Kasulatan sa Bilihan ng Lupa
Petitioners anchor their action for partition on the claim that
Manongsong is a co-owner or co-heir of the Property by inheritance, more
specifically, as the heir of her father, Vicente Lopez. Petitioners likewise
allege that the Property originally belonged to Guevarra, and that Vicente
Lopez inherited from Guevarra a 1/5 interest in the Property. As the parties
claiming the affirmative of these issues, petitioners had the burden of proof
to establish their case by preponderance of evidence.
To trace the ownership of the Property, both contending parties
presented tax declarations and the testimonies of witnesses. However, the
Jumaquio sisters also presented a notarized KASULATAN SA BILIHAN NG
LUPA which controverted petitioners claim of co-ownership.
The Kasulatan, being a document acknowledged before a notary public,
is a public document and prima facie evidence of its authenticity and due
execution. To assail the authenticity and due execution of a notarized
document, the evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant.[24] Otherwise the authenticity and due execution of the
document should be upheld.[25] The trial court itself held that (n)o
countervailing proof was adduced by plaintiffs to overcome or impugn the
documents legality or its validity.[26]
Even if the Kasulatan was not notarized, it would be deemed an ancient
document and thus still presumed to be authentic. The Kasulatan is: (1) more
than 30 years old, (2) found in the proper custody, and (3) unblemished by
any alteration or by any circumstance of suspicion. It appears, on its face, to
be genuine.[27]
Nevertheless, the trial court held that the Kasulatan was void because
the Property was conjugal at the time Navarro sold it to Enriqueta Lopez
Jumaquio. We do not agree.The trial courts conclusion that the Property was
conjugal was not based on evidence, but rather on a misapprehension of
Article 160 of the Civil Code, which provides:
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or
to the wife.
As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, the presumption under
Article 160 of the Civil Code applies only when there is proof that the
property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the
marriage is an essential condition for the operation of the presumption in
favor of the conjugal partnership.[28]
There was no evidence presented to establish that Navarro acquired the
Property during her marriage. There is no basis for applying the
presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code to the present case. On the
contrary, Tax Declaration No. 911 showed that, as far back as in 1949, the
Property was declared solely in Navarros name. [29] This tends to support the
argument that the Property was not conjugal.
We likewise find no basis for the trial courts declaration that the sale
embodied in the Kasulatan deprived the compulsory heirs of Guevarra of
their legitimes. As opposed to a disposition inter vivos by lucrative or
gratuitous title, a valid sale for valuable consideration does not diminish the
estate of the seller. When the disposition is for valuable consideration, there
is no diminution of the estate but merely a substitution of values, [30] that is,
the property sold is replaced by the equivalent monetary consideration.
Under Article 1458 of the Civil Code, the elements of a valid contract of
sale are: (1) consent or meeting of the minds; (2) determinate subject matter
and (3) price certain in money or its equivalent. [31] The presence of these
elements is apparent on the face of the Kasulatan itself. The Property was
sold in 1957 for P250.00.[32]
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not admitting the documents
presented by petitioners for the first time on appeal
 We find no error in the Court of Appeals refusal to give any probative SO ORDERED.
value to the alleged birth certificate of Guevarra and the affidavit of
Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr. Petitioners belatedly attached these documents to Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna,
their appellees brief. Petitioners could easily have offered these documents JJ., concur.
during the proceedings before the trial court. Instead, petitioners presented
these documents for the first time on appeal without any explanation. For
reasons of their own, petitioners did not formally offer in evidence these
documents before the trial court as required by Section 34, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court.[33] To admit these documents now is contrary to due process,
as it deprives respondents of the opportunity to examine and controvert
them.
Moreover, even if these documents were admitted, they would not
controvert Navarros ownership of the Property. Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr.s
affidavit stated merely that, although he knew Navarro by name, he was not
personally acquainted with her.[34] Guevarras alleged birth certificate casts
doubt only as to whether Navarro was indeed the mother of Guevarra. These
documents do not prove that Guevarra owned the Property or that Navarro
did not own the Property.
Petitioners admitted before the trial court that Navarro was the mother
of Guevarra. However, petitioners denied before the Court of Appeals that
Navarro was the mother of Guevarra. We agree with the appellate court that
this constitutes an impermissible change of theory. When a party adopts a
certain theory in the court below, he cannot change his theory on appeal. To
allow him to do so is not only unfair to the other party, it is also offensive to
the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.[35]
If Navarro were not the mother of Guevarra, it would only further
undermine petitioners case. Absent any hereditary relationship between
Guevarra and Navarro, the Property would not have passed from Navarro to
Guevarra, and then to the latters children, including petitioners, by
succession. There would then be no basis for petitioners claim of co-
ownership by virtue of inheritance from Guevarra. On the other hand, this
would not undermine respondents position since they anchor their claim on
the sale under the Kasulatan and not on inheritance from Guevarra.
Since the notarized Kasulatan is evidence of greater weight which
petitioners failed to refute by clear and convincing evidence, this Court holds
that petitioners were not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that the
Property belonged to Guevarras estate. There is therefore no legal basis for
petitioners complaint for partition of the Property.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of 26 June 1998 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 51643, dismissing the complaint of petitioners against
Felomena Jumaquio Estimo and Emiliana Jumaquio, is AFFIRMED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-40789 February 27, 1987
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES, IRENEA C.
ROSALES, petitioner,  February 4, 1975.
vs.
FORTUNATO ROSALES, MAGNA ROSALES ACEBES,
MACIKEQUEROX ROSALES and ANTONIO ROSALES, respondents.
Jose B. Echaves for petitioner.
Jose A. Binghay and Paul G. Gorres for respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
In this Petition for Review of two (2) Orders of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu the question raised is whether the widow whose husband predeceased
his mother can inherit from the latter, her mother-in-law.
It appears from the record of the case that on February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra V.
Rosales, a resident of Cebu City, died intestate. She was survived by her
husband Fortunate T. Rosales and their two (2) children Magna Rosales
Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosales, predeceased
her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea C.
Rosales, the herein petitioner. The estate of the dismissed has an estimated
gross value of about Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00).
On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased in the Court of First Instance of Cebu.
The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3204-R. Thereafter, the
trial court appointed Magna Rosales Acebes administratrix of the said estate.
In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order
dated June 16, 1972 declaring the following in individuals the legal heirs of
the deceased and prescribing their respective share of the estate —
Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes
(daughter), 1/4; Macikequerox Rosales, 1/4; and Antonio
Rosales son, 1/4.
This declaration was reiterated by the trial court in its Order I dated
These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of
the estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales,
son of the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-
law together with her son, Macikequerox Rosales.
Thus, Irenea Rosales sought the reconsideration of the aforementioned
Orders. The trial court denied her plea. Hence this petition.
In sum, the petitioner poses two (2) questions for Our resolution petition.
First — is a widow (surviving spouse) an intestate heir of her mother-in-law?
Second — are the Orders of the trial court which excluded the widow from
getting a share of the estate in question final as against the said widow?
Our answer to the first question is in the negative.
Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely, those who
inherit by their own right, and those who inherit by the right of
representation. 1 Restated, an intestate heir can only inherit either by his own
right, as in the order of intestate succession provided for in the Civil
Code, 2 or by the right of representation provided for in Article 981 of the
same law. The relevant provisions of the Civil Code are:
Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit
from him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in
equal shares.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of
other children who are dead, survive, the former shall
inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of
representation.
 Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shag
inherit by right of representation, and if any one of them
should have died, leaving several heirs, the portion
pertaining to him shall be divided among the latter in equal
portions.
Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives with
legitimate children or their descendants and illegitimate
children or their descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, such widow or widower shall be entitled to the
same share as that of a legitimate child.
There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving
spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of
any provision which entitles her to inherit from her mother-in- law either by
her own right or by the right of representation. The provisions of the Code
which relate to the order of intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014)
enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a decedent, with
the State as the final intestate heir. The conspicuous absence of a provision
which makes a daughter-in-law an intestate heir of the deceased all the more
confirms Our observation. If the legislature intended to make the surviving
spouse an intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it would have so provided in
the Code.
Petitioner argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with the
provisions of Article 887 of the Civil Code which provides that:
Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to
their legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and
ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and
descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by
legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287;
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not
excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they exclude
one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be
duly proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three
classes mentioned, shall inherit from them in the manner
and to the extent established by this Code.
The aforesaid provision of law 3 refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in
which case the surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a compulsory heir. It
does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law.
Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the
estate of the parent-in-law. We had occasion to make this observation
in Lachenal v. Salas, 4 to Wit:
We hold that the title to the fishing boat should be
determined in Civil Case No. 3597 (not in the intestate
proceeding) because it affects the lessee thereof, Lope L.
Leoncio, the decedent's son-in-law, who, although married to
his daughter or compulsory heir, is nevertheless a third person
with respect to his estate. ... (Emphasis supplied).
By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of the Civil Code aforecited
does not support petitioner's claim. A careful examination of the said Article
confirms that the estate contemplated therein is the estate of the deceased
spouse. The estate which is the subject matter of the intestate estate
proceedings in this case is that of the deceased Petra V. Rosales, the mother-
in-law of the petitioner. It is from the estate of Petra V. Rosales that
Macikequerox Rosales draws a share of the inheritance by the right of
representation as provided by Article 981 of the Code.
The essence and nature of the right of representation is explained by Articles
970 and 971 of the Civil Code, viz —
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law,
by virtue of which the representative is raised to the place
and the degree of the person represented, and acquires the
rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he
could have inherited.
 Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the
law and not by the person represented. The representative does
not succeed the person represented but the one whom the
person represented would have succeeded. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales is called to

succession by law because of his blood relationship. He does not succeed his
father, Carterio Rosales (the person represented) who predeceased his
grandmother, Petra Rosales, but the latter whom his father would have
succeeded. Petitioner cannot assert the same right of representation as she
has no filiation by blood with her mother-in-law.

Petitioner however contends that at the time of the death of her husband
Carterio Rosales he had an inchoate or contingent right to the properties of
Petra Rosales as compulsory heir. Be that as it may, said right of her husband
was extinguished by his death that is why it is their son Macikequerox
Rosales who succeeded from Petra Rosales by right of representation. He did
not succeed from his deceased father, Carterio Rosales.

On the basis of the foregoing observations and conclusions, We find it

unnecessary to pass upon the second question posed by the petitioner.

Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that a surviving

spouse is not an intestate heir of his or her parent-in-law.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED for

lack of merit, with costs against the petitioner. Let this case be remanded to
the trial-court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano and Sarmiento, JJ.,

concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 174727               August 12, 2013
ANTIPOLO INING (DECEASED), SURVIVED BY MANUEL
VILLANUEVA, TEODORA VILLANUEVA-FRANCISCO, CAMILO
FRANCISCO, ADOLFO FRANCISCO, LUCIMO FRANCISCO, JR.,
MILAGROS FRANCISCO,* CELEDONIO FRANCISCO,
HERMINIGILDO FRANCISCO; RAMON TRESVALLES, ROBERTO
TAJONERA, NATIVIDAD INING-IBEA (DECEASED) SURVIVED BY
EDILBERTO IBEA, JOSEFA IBEA, MARTHA IBEA, CARMEN IBEA,
AMPARO IBEA-FERNANDEZ, HENRY RUIZ, EUGENIO RUIZ AND
PASTOR RUIZ; DOLORES INING-RIMON (DECEASED) SURVIVED BY
JESUS RIMON, CESARIA RIMON GONZALES AND REMEDIOS
RIMON CORDERO; AND PEDRO INING (DECEASED) SURVIVED BY
ELISA TAN INING (WIFE) AND PEDRO INING, JR., PETITIONERS,  Villanueva, daughter Teodora Villanueva-Francisco (Teodora), Camilo
vs.
LEONARDO R. VEGA, SUBSTITUTED BY LOURDES VEGA,
RESTONILO I. VEGA, CRISPULO M. VEGA, MILBUENA VEGA-
RESTITUTO, AND LENARD VEGA, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does not inherit from
the latter and cannot become a co-owner of the decedent’s property.
Consequently, he cannot effect a repudiation of the co-ownership of the
estate that was formed among the decedent’s heirs.
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 are the March 14, 2006
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 74687 and its
September 7, 2006 Resolution3 denying petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration.4
Factual Antecedents
Leon Roldan (Leon), married to Rafaela Menez (Rafaela), is the owner of a
3,120-square meter parcel of land (subject property) in Kalibo, Aklan covered
by Original Certificate of Title No. (24071) RO-6305 (OCT RO-630). Leon and
Rafaela died without issue. Leon was survived by his siblings Romana
Roldan (Romana) and Gregoria Roldan Ining (Gregoria), who are now both
deceased.
Romana was survived by her daughter Anunciacion Vega and grandson,
herein respondent Leonardo R. Vega (Leonardo) (also both deceased).
Leonardo in turn is survived by his wife Lourdes and children Restonilo I.
Vega, Crispulo M. Vega, Milbuena Vega-Restituto and Lenard Vega, the
substituted respondents.
Gregoria, on the other hand, was survived by her six children: petitioners
Natividad Ining-Ibea (Natividad), Dolores Ining-Rimon (Dolores), Antipolo,
and Pedro; Jose; and Amando. Natividad is survived by Edilberto Ibea,
Josefa Ibea, Martha Ibea, Carmen Ibea, Amparo Ibea-Fernandez, Henry Ruiz
and Pastor Ruiz. Dolores is survived by Jesus Rimon, Cesaria Rimon
Gonzales and Remedios Rimon Cordero. Antipolo is survived by Manuel
Francisco (Camilo), Adolfo Francisco (Adolfo), Lucimo Francisco, Jr. (Lucimo
Jr.), Milagros Francisco, Celedonio Francisco, and Herminigildo Francisco
(Herminigildo). Pedro is survived by his wife, Elisa Tan Ining and Pedro
Ining, Jr. Amando died without issue. As for Jose, it is not clear from the
records if he was made party to the proceedings, or if he is alive at all.
In short, herein petitioners, except for Ramon Tresvalles (Tresvalles) and
Roberto Tajonera (Tajonera), are Gregoria’s grandchildren or spouses thereof
(Gregoria’s heirs).
In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half of subject property belonged to him
as Romana’s surviving heir, Leonardo filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan Civil Case No. 52756 for partition, recovery of
ownership and possession, with damages, against Gregoria’s heirs. In his
Amended Complaint,7 Leonardo alleged that on several occasions, he
demanded the partition of the property but Gregoria’s heirs refused to heed
his demands; that the matter reached the level of the Lupon Tagapamayapa,
which issued a certification to file a court action sometime in 1980; that
Gregoria’s heirs claimed sole ownership of the property; that portions of the
property were sold to Tresvalles and Tajonera, which portions must be
collated and included as part of the portion to be awarded to Gregoria’s
heirs; that in 1979, Lucimo Francisco, Sr. (Lucimo Sr.), husband of herein
petitioner Teodora, illegally claimed absolute ownership of the property and
transferred in his name the tax declaration covering the property; that from
1988, Lucimo Sr. and Teodora have deprived him (Leonardo) of the fruits of
the property estimated at ₱1,000.00 per year; that as a result, he incurred
expenses by way of attorney’s fees and litigation costs. Leonardo thus prayed
that he be declared the owner of half of the subject property; that the same be
partitioned after collation and determination of the portion to which he is
entitled; that Gregoria’s heirs be ordered to execute the necessary documents
or agreements; and that he (Leonardo) be awarded actual damages in the
amount of ₱1,000.00 per year from 1988, attorney’s fees of ₱50,000.00, and
lawyer’s appearance fees of ₱500.00 per hearing.
In their Answer8 with counterclaim, Teodora, Camilo, Adolfo, Lucimo Jr. and
Herminigildo claimed that Leonardo had no cause of action against them;
that they have become the sole owners of the subject property through
Lucimo Sr. who acquired the same in good faith by sale from Juan Enriquez
(Enriquez), who in turn acquired the same from Leon, and Leonardo was
aware of this fact; that they were in continuous, actual, adverse, notorious
and exclusive possession of the property with a just title; that they have been
paying the taxes on the property; that Leonardo’s claim is barred by estoppel
and laches; and that they have suffered damages and were forced to litigate
as a result of Leonardo’s malicious suit. They prayed that Civil Case No. 5275
be dismissed; that Leonardo be declared to be without any right to the
property; that Leonardo be ordered to surrender the certificate of title to the
property; and that they be awarded ₱20,000.00 as moral damages, ₱10,000.00
as temperate and nominal damages, ₱20,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and double
costs.
The other Gregoria heirs, as well as Tresvalles and Tajonera were declared in
default.9
As agreed during pre-trial, the trial court commissioned Geodetic Engineer
Rafael M. Escabarte to identify the metes and bounds of the property.10 The
resulting Commissioner’s Report and Sketch,11 as well as the Supplementary
Commissioner’s Report,12 were duly approved by the parties. The parties
then submitted the following issues for resolution of the trial court:
Whether Leonardo is entitled to a share in Leon’s estate;
Whether Leon sold the subject property to Lucimo Sr.; and
Whether Leonardo’s claim has prescribed, or that he is barred by estoppel or
laches.13
In the meantime, Leonardo passed away and was duly substituted by his
heirs, the respondents herein.14
During the course of the proceedings, the following additional relevant facts
came to light:
1. In 1995, Leonardo filed against petitioners Civil Case No. 4983 for
partition with the RTC Kalibo, but the case was dismissed and
referred to the Kalibo Municipal Trial Court (MTC), where the case
was docketed as Civil Case No. 1366. However, on March 4, 1997,
the MTC dismissed Civil Case No. 1366 for lack of jurisdiction and
declared that only the RTC can take cognizance of the partition
case;15
2. The property was allegedly sold by Leon to Enriquez through an
unnotarized document dated April 4, 1943.16 Enriquez in turn
allegedly sold the property to Lucimo Sr. on November 25, 1943 via
another private sale document;17
3. Petitioners were in sole possession of the property for more than
30 years, while Leonardo acquired custody of OCT RO-630;18
4. On February 9, 1979, Lucimo Sr. executed an Affidavit of
Ownership of Land19 claiming sole ownership of the property which
he utilized to secure in his name Tax Declaration No. 16414 (TD
16414) over the property and to cancel Tax Declaration No. 20102 in
Leon’s name;20
5. Lucimo Sr. died in 1991; and
6. The property was partitioned among the petitioners, to the
exclusion of Leonardo.21
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On November 19, 2001, the trial court rendered a Decision,22 which decreed
as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
Dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs’ right of action has
long prescribed under Article 1141 of the New Civil Code;
Declaring Lot 1786 covered by OCT No. RO-630 (24071) to be the common
property of the heirs of Gregoria Roldan Ining and by virtue whereof, OCT
No. RO-630 (24071) is ordered cancelled and the Register of Deeds of the
Province of Aklan is directed to issue a transfer certificate of title to the heirs
of Natividad Ining, one-fourth (1/4) share; Heirs of Dolores Ining, one-
fourth (1/4) share; Heirs of Antipolo Ining, one-fourth (1/4) share; and Heirs
of Pedro Ining, one-fourth (1/4) share.
For lack of sufficient evidence, the counterclaim is ordered dismissed.
With cost against the plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.23
The trial court found the April 4, 1943 and November 25, 1943 deeds of sale
to be spurious. It concluded that Leon never sold the property to Enriquez,
and in turn, Enriquez never sold the property to Lucimo Sr., hence, the
subject property remained part of Leon’s estate at the time of his death in
1962. Leon’s siblings, Romana and Gregoria, thus inherited the subject
property in equal shares. Leonardo and the respondents are entitled to
Romana’s share as the latter’s successors.
However, the trial court held that Leonardo had only 30 years from Leon’s
death in 1962 – or up to 1992 – within which to file the partition case. Since
Leonardo instituted the partition suit only in 1997, the same was already
barred by prescription. It held that under Article 1141 of the Civil Code,24 an
action for partition and recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of
land is a real action over immovable property which prescribes in 30 years.
In addition, the trial court held that for his long inaction, Leonardo was
guilty of laches as well. Consequently, the property should go to Gregoria’s
heirs exclusively.
Respondents moved for reconsideration25 but the same was denied by the
RTC in its February 7, 2002 Order.26
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Only respondents interposed an appeal with the CA. Docketed as CA-G.R.
CV No. 74687, the appeal questioned the propriety of the trial court’s
dismissal of Civil Case No. 5275, its application of Article 1141, and the
award of the property to Gregoria’s heirs exclusively.
On March 14, 2006, the CA issued the questioned Decision,27 which
contained the following decretal portion:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this appeal is GRANTED. The
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 8, Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case No.
5275 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, judgment is rendered as
follows:
1. Declaring 1/2 portion of Lot 1786 as the share of the plaintiffs as
successors-in-interest of Romana Roldan;
2. Declaring 1/2 portion of Lot 1786 as the share of the defendants as
successors-in-interest of Gregoria Roldan Ining;
3. Ordering the defendants to deliver the possession of the portion
described in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Commissioner’s Report
(Supplementary) to the herein plaintiffs;
4. Ordering the cancellation of OCT No. RO-630 (24071) in the name
of Leon Roldan and the Register of Deeds of Aklan is directed to
issue transfer certificates of title to the plaintiffs in accordance with
paragraphs 8 and 9 of the sketch plan as embodied in the
Commissioner’s Report (Supplementary) and the remaining portion
thereof be adjudged to the defendants.
Other claims and counterclaims are dismissed.
Costs against the defendants-appellees.
SO ORDERED.28
The CA held that the trial court’s declaration of nullity of the April 4, 1943
and November 25, 1943 deeds of sale in favor of Enriquez and Lucimo Sr.,
respectively, became final and was settled by petitioners’ failure to appeal
the same. Proceeding from the premise that no valid prior disposition of the
property was made by its owner Leon and that the property – which
remained part of his estate at the time of his death – passed on by succession
to his two siblings, Romana and Gregoria, which thus makes the parties
herein – who are Romana’s and Gregoria’s heirs – co-owners of the property
in equal shares, the appellate court held that only the issues of prescription
and laches were needed to be resolved.
The CA did not agree with the trial court’s pronouncement that Leonardo’s
action for partition was barred by prescription. The CA declared that
prescription began to run not from Leon’s death in 1962, but from Lucimo
Sr.’s execution of the Affidavit of Ownership of Land in 1979, which
amounted to a repudiation of his co-ownership of the property with
Leonardo. Applying the fifth paragraph of Article 494 of the Civil Code,
which provides that "[n]o prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-
heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly
recognizes the co-ownership," the CA held that it was only when Lucimo Sr.
executed the Affidavit of Ownership of Land in 1979 and obtained a new tax
declaration over the property (TD 16414) solely in his name that a
repudiation of his co-ownership with Leonardo was made, which
repudiation effectively commenced the running of the 30-year prescriptive
period under Article 1141.
The CA did not consider Lucimo Sr.’s sole possession of the property for
more than 30 years to the exclusion of Leonardo and the respondents as a
valid repudiation of the co-ownership either, stating that his exclusive
possession of the property and appropriation of its fruits – even his
continuous payment of the taxes thereon – while adverse as against
strangers, may not be deemed so as against Leonardo in the absence of clear
and conclusive evidence to the effect that the latter was ousted or deprived
of his rights as co-owner with the intention of assuming exclusive ownership
over the property, and absent a showing that this was effectively made
known to Leonardo. Citing Bargayo v. Camumot29 and Segura v.
Segura,30 the appellate court held that as a rule, possession by a co-owner
will not be presumed to be adverse to the other co-owners but will be held to
benefit all, and that a co-owner or co-heir is in possession of an inheritance
pro-indiviso for himself and in representation of his co-owners or co-heirs if
he administers or takes care of the rest thereof with the obligation to deliver
the same to his co-owners or co-heirs, as is the case of a depositary, lessee or
trustee.
The CA added that the payment of taxes by Lucimo Sr. and the issuance of a
new tax declaration in his name do not prove ownership; they merely
indicate a claim of ownership. Moreover, petitioners’ act of partitioning the
property among themselves to the exclusion of Leonardo cannot affect the
latter; nor may it be considered a repudiation of the co-ownership as it has
not been shown that the partition was made known to Leonardo.
The CA held further that the principle of laches cannot apply as against
Leonardo and the respondents. It held that laches is controlled by equitable
considerations and it cannot be used to defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud;
it cannot be utilized to deprive the respondents of their rightful inheritance.
On the basis of the above pronouncements, the CA granted respondents’
prayer for partition, directing that the manner of partitioning the property
shall be governed by the Commissioner’s Report and Sketch and the
Supplementary Commissioner’s Report which the parties did not contest.
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration31 which the CA denied in
its assailed September 7, 2006 Resolution.32 Hence, the present Petition.
Issues
Petitioners raise the following arguments:
I
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT ON THE GROUND THAT LUCIMO FRANCISCO
REPUDIATED THE CO-OWNERSHIP ONLY ON FEBRUARY 9,
1979.
II
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DISMISSING THE
COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION AND
LACHES.33
Petitioners’ Arguments
Petitioners insist in their Petition and Reply34 that Lucimo Sr.’s purchase of
the property in 1943 and his possession thereof amounted to a repudiation of
the co-ownership, and that Leonardo’s admission and acknowledgment of
Lucimo Sr.’s possession for such length of time operated to bestow upon
petitioners – as Lucimo Sr.’s successors-in-interest – the benefits of
acquisitive prescription which proceeded from the repudiation.
Petitioners contend that Leonardo’s inaction – from Lucimo Sr.’s taking
possession in 1943, up to 1995, when Leonardo filed Civil Case No. 4983 for
partition with the RTC Kalibo – amounted to laches or neglect. They add that
during the proceedings before the Lupon Tagapamayapa in 1980, Leonardo
was informed of Lucimo Sr.’s purchase of the property in 1943; this
notwithstanding, Leonardo did not take action then against Lucimo Sr. and
did so only in 1995, when he filed Civil Case No. 4983 – which was
eventually dismissed and referred to the MTC. They argue that, all this time,
Leonardo did nothing while Lucimo Sr. occupied the property and claimed
all its fruits for himself.
Respondents’ Arguments
Respondents, on the other hand, argue in their Comment 35 that –
For purposes of clarity, if [sic] is respectfully submitted that eighteen (18)
legible copies has [sic] not been filed in this case for consideration in banc
[sic] and nine (9) copies in cases heard before a division in that [sic] all copies
of pleadings served to the offices concern [sic] where said order [sic] was
issued were not furnished two (2) copies each in violation to [sic] the adverse
parties [sic] to the clerk of court, Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Kalibo,
Aklan, Philippines; to the Honorable Court of Appeals so that No [sic] action
shall be taken on such pleadings, briefs, memoranda, motions, and other
papers as fail [sic] to comply with the requisites set out in this paragraph.
The foregoing is confirmed by affidavit of MERIDON F. OLANDESCA, the
law secretary of the Petitioner [sic] who sent [sic] by Registered mail to Court
of Appeals, Twentieth Division, Cebu City; to Counsel for Respondent [sic]
and to the Clerk of Court Supreme Court Manila [sic].
These will show that Petitioner has [sic] violated all the requirements of
furnishing two (2) copies each concerned party [sic] under the Rule of Courts
[sic].36
Our Ruling
The Court denies the Petition.
The finding that Leon did not sell the property to Lucimo Sr. had long been
settled and had become final for failure of petitioners to appeal. Thus, the
property remained part of Leon’s estate.
One issue submitted for resolution by the parties to the trial court is whether
Leon sold the property to Lucimo Sr.1âwphi1The trial court, examining the
two deeds of sale executed in favor of Enriquez and Lucimo Sr., found them
to be spurious. It then concluded that no such sale from Leon to Lucimo Sr.
ever took place. Despite this finding, petitioners did not appeal.
Consequently, any doubts regarding this matter should be considered
settled. Thus, petitioners’ insistence on Lucimo Sr.’s 1943 purchase of the
property to reinforce their claim over the property must be ignored. Since no
transfer from Leon to Lucimo Sr. took place, the subject property clearly
remained part of Leon’s estate upon his passing in 1962.
Leon died without issue; his heirs are his siblings Romana and Gregoria.
Since Leon died without issue, his heirs are his siblings, Romana and
Gregoria, who thus inherited the property in equal shares. In turn, Romana’s
and Gregoria’s heirs – the parties herein – became entitled to the property
upon the sisters’ passing. Under Article 777 of the Civil Code, the rights to
the succession are transmitted from the moment of death.
Gregoria’s and Romana’s heirs are co-owners of the subject property.
Thus, having succeeded to the property as heirs of Gregoria and Romana,
petitioners and respondents became co-owners thereof. As co-owners, they
may use the property owned in common, provided they do so in accordance
with the purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure
the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it
according to their rights.37 They have the full ownership of their parts and of
the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and may alienate, assign or
mortgage them, and even substitute another person in their enjoyment,
except when personal rights are involved.38 Each co-owner may demand at
any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is
concerned.39 Finally, no prescription shall run in favor of one of the co-heirs
against the others so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-
ownership.40
For prescription to set in, the repudiation must be done by a co-owner.
Time and again, it has been held that "a co-owner cannot acquire by
prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent any clear repudiation of
the co-ownership. In order that the title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner,
the following requisites must concur: (1) the co-owner has performed
unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-
owners; (2) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the
other co-owners; and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing." 41
From the foregoing pronouncements, it is clear that the trial court erred in
reckoning the prescriptive period within which Leonardo may seek partition
from the death of Leon in 1962. Article 1141 and Article 494 (fifth paragraph)
provide that prescription shall begin to run in favor of a co-owner and
against the other co-owners only from the time he positively renounces the
co-ownership and makes known his repudiation to the other co-owners.
Lucimo Sr. challenged Leonardo’s co-ownership of the property only
sometime in 1979 and 1980, when the former executed the Affidavit of
Ownership of Land, obtained a new tax declaration exclusively in his name,
and informed the latter – before the Lupon Tagapamayapa – of his 1943
purchase of the property. These apparent acts of repudiation were followed
later on by Lucimo Sr.’s act of withholding Leonardo’s share in the fruits of
the property, beginning in 1988, as Leonardo himself claims in his Amended
Complaint. Considering these facts, the CA held that prescription began to
run against Leonardo only in 1979 – or even in 1980 – when it has been made
sufficiently clear to him that Lucimo Sr. has renounced the co-ownership and
has claimed sole ownership over the property. The CA thus concluded that
the filing of Civil Case No. 5275 in 1997, or just under 20 years counted from
1979, is clearly within the period prescribed under Article 1141.
More significantly, the property, which is registered under the Torrens
system and covered by OCT RO-630, is in Leon’s name. Leon’s ownership
ceased only in 1962, upon his death when the property passed on to his heirs
by operation of law.
In fine, since none of the co-owners made a valid repudiation of the existing
co-ownership, Leonardo could seek partition of the property at any time.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed March 14, 2006 Decision
and the September 7, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 74687are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

What escaped the trial and appellate courts’ notice, however, is that while it
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
may be argued that Lucimo Sr. performed acts that may be characterized as a
Associate Justice
repudiation of the co-ownership, the fact is, he is not a co-owner of the
property. Indeed, he is not an heir of Gregoria; he is merely Antipolo’s son-
in-law, being married to Antipolo’s daughter Teodora.42 Under the Family WE CONCUR:
Code, family relations, which is the primary basis for succession, exclude
relations by affinity. ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Art. 150. Family relations include those: Chairperson

(1) Between husband and wife; ARTURO D. BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice
(2) Between parents and children;
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and Associate Justice

(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.

In point of law, therefore, Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the property;

Teodora is. Consequently, he cannot validly effect a repudiation of the co-
ownership, which he was never part of. For this reason, prescription did not
run adversely against Leonardo, and his right to seek a partition of the
property has not been lost.

Likewise, petitioners’ argument that Leonardo’s admission and

acknowledgment in his pleadings – that Lucimo Sr. was in possession of the
property since 1943 – should be taken against him, is unavailing. In 1943,
Leon remained the rightful owner of the land, and Lucimo Sr. knew this very
well, being married to Teodora, daughter of Antipolo, a nephew of Leon.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4963             January 29, 1953
MARIA USON, plaintiff-appellee,  defendants. It likewise appears that Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 much
vs.
MARIA DEL ROSARIO, CONCEPCION NEBREDA, CONRADO
NEBREDA, DOMINADOR NEBREDA, AND FAUSTINO NEBREDA,
Jr., defendants-appellants.
Priscilo Evangelista for appellee.
Brigido G. Estrada for appellant.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is an action for recovery of the ownership and possession of five (5)
parcels of land situated in the Municipality of Labrador, Province of
Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson against Maria del Rosario and her four
children named Concepcion, Conrado, Dominador, and Faustino, surnamed
Nebreda, who are all of minor age, before the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan.
Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in
1945 left the lands involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other
heir except his widow Maria Uson. However, plaintiff claims that when
Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his common-law wife Maria del Rosario took
possession illegally of said lands thus depriving her of their possession and
enjoyment.
Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that on February 21,
1931, Maria Uson and her husband, the late Faustino Nebreda, executed a
public document whereby they agreed to separate as husband and wife and,
in consideration of their separation, Maria Uson was given a parcel of land
by way of alimony and in return she renounced her right to inherit any other
property that may be left by her husband upon his death (Exhibit 1).
After trial, at which both parties presented their respective evidence, the
court rendered decision ordering the defendants to restore to the plaintiff the
ownership and possession of the lands in dispute without special
pronouncement as to costs. Defendants interposed the present appeal.
There is no dispute that Maria Uson, plaintiff-appellee, is the lawful wife of
Faustino Nebreda, former owner of the five parcels of lands litigated in the
present case. There is likewise no dispute that Maria del Rosario, one of the
defendants-appellants, was merely a common-law wife of the late Faustino
Nebreda with whom she had four illegitimate children, her now co-
prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code. With this background, it is
evident that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land he
was seized of at the time passed from the moment of his death to his only
heir, his widow Maria Uson (Article 657, old Civil Code).As this Court aptly
said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the
ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them
a deed for the same before his death" (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil.,
321). From that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson
over the lands in question became vested.
The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over
the lands in question because she expressly renounced to inherit any future
property that her husband may acquire and leave upon his death in the deed
of separation they had entered into on February 21, 1931, cannot be
entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the
subject of a contract nor can it be renounced (1 Manresa, 123, sixth edition;
Tolentino on Civil Code, p. 12; Osorio vs. Osorio and Ynchausti Steamship
Co., 41 Phil., 531).
But defendants contend that, while it is true that the four minor defendants
are illegitimate children of the late Faustino Nebreda and under the old Civil
Code are not entitled to any successional rights, however, under the new
Civil Code which became in force in June, 1950, they are given the status and
rights of natural children and are entitled to the successional rights which the
law accords to the latter (article 2264 and article 287, new Civil Code), and
because these successional rights were declared for the first time in the new
code, they shall be given retroactive effect even though the event which gave
rise to them may have occurred under the prior legislation (Article 2253, new
Civil Code).
There is no merit in this claim. Article 2253 above referred to provides
indeed that rights which are declared for the first time shall have retroactive
effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred
under the former legislation, but this is so only when the new rights do not
prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin. Thus, said article
provides that "if a right should be declared for the first time in this Code, it
shall be effective at once, even though the act or event which gives rise
thereto may have been done or may have occurred under the prior
legislation, provided said new right does not prejudice or impair any vested
or acquired right, of the same origin." As already stated in the early part of
this decision, the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in
question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband and this
is so because of the imperative provision of the law which commands that
the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death (Article
657, old Civil Code). The new right recognized by the new Civil Code in
favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be
asserted to the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands
in dispute.

As regards the claim that Maria Uson, while her deceased husband was lying
in state, in a gesture of pity or compassion, agreed to assign the lands in
question to the minor children for the reason that they were acquired while
the deceased was living with their mother and Maria Uson wanted to
assuage somewhat the wrong she has done to them, this much can be said;
apart from the fact that this claim is disputed, we are of the opinion that said
assignment, if any, partakes of the nature of a donation of real property,
inasmuch as it involves no material consideration, and in order that it may
be valid it shall be made in a public document and must be accepted either in
the same document or in a separate one (Article 633, old Civil Code).
Inasmuch as this essential formality has not been followed, it results that the
alleged assignment or donation has no valid effect.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without costs.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo and
Labrador, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-50974-75 May 31, 1989
JUAN CASTRO and FELICIANA CASTRO, petitioners,  The Court of Appeals correctly summarized the facts of the case as follows:
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, CIPRIANO NAVAL and BENITA C.
NAVAL, respondents.
Luis R. Reyes for petitioners.
Marcelino U. Aganon for private respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks the reversal of the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Nos. 47262 and 47263-R, which affirmed the
decision of the then Court of First Instance of Tarlac in Civil Case Nos. 3762-
3763. The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
defendants and against plaintiffs in the above-entitled cases:
1) Declaring defendant Benita Castro Naval a duly
acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child of
Eustaquio Castro;
2) Awarding the sum of P2,000.00 to defendants by way of
attorney's fee and expenses of litigation (one-half to be paid
by plaintiffs, jointly and severally, in Civil Case No. 3762
and one-half by plaintiff in Civil Case No. 3763); and
3) Pending the partition or distribution of the properties
involved herein in appropriate proceedings or by mutual
agreement, and so as to preserve the status quo, the writ of
preliminary injunction of February 10, 1967 shall continue to
remain in full force and effect.
With costs against plaintiffs, one-half chargeable to plaintiffs
in Civil Case No. 3762 and the other half to plaintiff in Civil
Case No. 3763. (Record on Appeal, pp. 137-138)
Petitioners Juan Castro and Feliciana Castro are the brother and sister of the
late Eustaquio Castro while respondent Benita Castro Naval is the only child
of Eustaquio. Respondent Cipriano Naval is the husband of Benita Castro.
In Civil Case No. 3762 entitled Juan Castro and Feliciana
Castro v. Benita Castro, the plaintiffs filed an action for
partition of properties against the defendant alleging, among
other things that they are the forced heirs of Pedro Castro
who died in Mayantoc, Tarlac on May 27, 1923 (p. 6, Record
on Appeal).
In Civil Case No. 3763 plaintiff Marcelina Bautista also filed
an action for partition of properties against defendant Benita
Castro Naval alleging, among other things, that they are also
compulsory heirs of Eustaquio Castro who died in
Mayantoc, Tarlac on August 24, 1961 and that they are
entitled to the partition of the properties of said deceased (p.
32, Record on Appeal).
The defendants in their amended answer in both cases allege
that Benita Castro Naval is the only child of the deceased
Eustaquio and that said Eustaquio Castro is the son of Pedro
Castro, therefore, the complaint for partition has no cause of
action (p. 25, Record on Appeal).
With leave of Court, plaintiffs filed their amended
complaints whereby they converted the original action for
partition into an action for quieting of title. Defendant's
husband Cipriano Naval was forthwith impleaded as party-
defendant (p. 32, Record on Appeal).
In the meantime, defendant Benita Naval filed a petition for
appointment as receiver and for preliminary injunction in
Civil Case No. 3762. The trial court, however, denied said
petition for appointment of receiver, but granted the petition
for writ of preliminary injunction and also adjudged
Marcelina Bautista who is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 3762
guilty of contempt and ordering her to pay a fine of P100. 00
(p. 97, Record on Appeal).
Considering that evidence in these incidents of appointing a
receiver and preliminary injunction as well as the motion for
contempt were related to the merits of the case, the parties
stipulated that evidence therein be considered as evidence in
the trial on the merits.
During the pre-trial the parties agreed that the main issue to
be resolved in this case is as to whether or not defendant
Benita Castro Naval is the acknowledged natural child of
Eustaquio Castro. In view of this stipulation, defendant
Benita Naval was allowed to introduce evidence to show
that she was indeed the acknowledged natural child of
Eustaquio Castro.
The evidence on record shows that Juan Castro and Feliciana
Castro, plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3762 and Eustaquio
Castro who was already dead were the children of the
deceased spouses Pedro Castro and Cornelia Santiago.
Marcelina Bautista, one of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
3763, is the surviving spouse of the deceased Eustaquio
Castro. Eustaquio Castro died on August 23, 1961 and
Pricola Maregmen died on September 11, 1924.
It appears that defendant Benita Castro Naval, a child of
Eustaquio Castro and Pricola Maregmen, was born on
March 27, 1919 in San Bartolome, Tarlac (Exhibit A).
Eustaquio Castro, who caused the registration of said birth
gave the date indicated in the civil registry that he was the
father. Benita Castro was later baptized in the Roman
Catholic Church of Camiling, Tarlac, wherein the baptismal
certificate appeared that her parents are deceased Eustaquio
Castro and Pricola Maregmen (Exhibit C). When Eustaquio
Castro died, pictures were taken wherein the immediate
members of the family in mourning were present, among
whom was Benita Castro Naval (Exhibits D and D-1). On
this score, the plaintiffs in their complaint in Civil Case No.
3762 admitted that defendant Benita C. Naval is the forced
heir of Eustaquio Castro and a compulsory heir of Eustaquio
Castro in Civil Case No. 3763.
The evidence further shows that Pricola Maregmen, the
natural mother of Benita C. Naval who was a resident of
Mayantoc, Tarlac, was wedded to Felix de Maya of Anoling
Canaling, Tarlac against her wishes on May 23, 1913. While
the celebration of the wedding in Anong, Camiling, Tarlac
was going on, the guests soon found out that Pricola
Maregmen surreptitiously left the party and went to the
house of her first cousin Bernarda Pagarigan at Barrio
Malacampa, also in Anoling Camiling, Tarlac, and there she
cried that she did not want to get married to Felix de Maya.
That evening Pricola proceeded to Barrio San Bartolome,
Mayantoc, Tarlac, where she united with her real
sweetheart, Eustaquio Castro, the father of Benita Castro
Naval.
Antonio Maregmen, the brother'. of Pricola Maregmen who
was then in the wedding party learned of the disappearance
of his sister. He finally found her living with Eustaquio
Castro. A few days later Eustaquio Castro accompanied by
two persons went to the parents of Pricola Maregmen at
Mayantoc, Tarlac and informed them that Pricola was
already living with him as husband and wife. Pricola's
parents merely submitted to their daughter's wishes, so
Eustaquio Castro and Pricola Maregmen lived as husband
and wife until the death of Pricola on September 11, 1924.
There is no dispute that Eustaquio Castro at the time he
lived with Pricola Maregmen, was a widower, and was,
therefore, free to marry Pricola. As a result of their
cohabitation Benita Castro Naval, herein defendant, was
born on March 27, 1919. After the death of her mother, when
she was only five years old, she continued to live with her
father Eustaquio Castro until his death on August 22, 1961
(Exhibit 11). Moreover, when Benita Castro Naval got
married to Cipriano Naval, it was Eustaquio Castro who
gave her away in marriage. Even after Benita's marriage, she
was taken care of by her father. (Rollo, pp. 11-13).
The trial court ruled that respondent Benita Castro Naval is the
acknowledged and recognized child of Eustaquio Castro and is, therefore,
entitled to participate in the partition of the properties left by him. These
properties are the subject of the civil cases. As stated earlier, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
The main issue raised in this petition is whether or not respondent Benita
Castro Naval is the acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child of
Eustaquio Castro.
The Court of Appeals justified its pronouncement that the private
respondent is an acknowledged and recognized child of Eustaquio Castro in
the following manner:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . The recognition of Benita Castro as a natural child of
Eustaquio Castro appears in the records of birth and
partition. Recognition shall be made in the record of birth, a
will, a statement before a court of record, or any authentic
writing (Art. 278, Civil Code). It was a voluntary recognition
already established which did not need any judicial
pronouncement (Gut, 68 Phil. 385; Root v. Root, (CA), 71
O.G. 3061). In Javelona v. Onteclaro, 74 Phil. 393, the
Supreme Court clarified the distinction between voluntary
recognition and compulsory recognition. In the first place, a
voluntary recognition is made in a public document,
whereas in the indubitable writing under Article 135 is a
private document. (Manresa, Vol. 1, p. 579). The father
would ordinarily be more careful about what he said in a
public document than in a private writing, so that even an
incidental mention of the child as his in a public document
deserves full faith and credit. In the second place, in an
action on Article 131 (voluntary recognition) the natural
child merely asks for a share in the inheritance in virtue of
his having been acknowledged as such, and is not trying to
compel the father or his heirs to make the acknowledgment,
whereas the action based on Article 135 is to compel the
father or his heirs to recognize the child. In the former case,
acknowledgment has been formally and legally
accomplished because the public character of the document
makes judicial pronouncement unnecessary, while in the
latter case, recognition is yet to be ordered by the courts
because a private writing, lacking the stronger guaranty and
higher authenticity of a public document is not self-
executory. A judgment in favor of the status of a natural
child according to Art. 135 must therefore be based on an
express recognition so found and declared by the court after
hearing. At this juncture, it is to be noted that an action
based on voluntary acknowledgment may be brought after
the death of the father, but. not an action to compel
acknowledgment, as a general rule, (Art. 137, Civil Code)
which shows the liberality of the law as to voluntary
recognition, and its strictness toward compulsory
acknowledgment.
While it is true that Pricola Maregmen, Benita's mother was
married to Naval (sic), it is the rule, however, that in case the
recognition is made by only one of the parents, it will be
presumed that the child is natural if the parents recognizing
it had the legal capacity to contract marriage at the time of
the conception (Art. 277, Civil Code; Borres and Barza v.
Municipality of Panay, 42 Phil. 643; Capistrano v. Gabino, 8
Phil. 135). The presumption arises from the act of
recognition.
What is more is that plaintiffs in their amended complaint
admitted that Benita Castro was the compulsory heir of
Eustaquio Castro. They cannot now contradict their own
allegations (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 232). (Rollo, pp.
14-15)
The Court of Appeals has correctly stated the principles but the petitioners
contend that it erred in applying these principles to the facts of this case.
The law which now governs paternity and filiation is Title VI of the Family
Code of the Philippines, Executive Order No. 209, July 6,1987 as amended by
Executive Order No. 227, July 17, 1987. We have to examine the earlier
provisions, however, because the Family Code provides in its Article 256
that:
This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance
with the Civil Code or other laws. (Emphasis supplied)
There is no question that the private respondent is an illegitimate child of
Eustaquio Castro. Her father Eustaquio was a widower when Pricola
Maregmen, her mother, went to live with him. The two could not validly
enter into a marriage because when Pricola fled from her own wedding party
on May 23, 1913, the wedding rites to Felix de Maya had already been
solemnized. In other words, the marriage was celebrated although it could
not be consummated because the bride hurriedly ran away to join the man
she really loved.
Under the Civil Code, whether "new" or "old", illegitimate children or
those who are conceived and born out of wedlock were generally classified
into two groups: (1) Natural, whether actual or by fiction, were those born
outside of lawful wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception of the
child, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other.
(Article 119, old Civil Code; Article 269, new Civil Code) and (2) Spurious,
whether incestuous, adulterous or illicit, were those born of parents who,
at the time of conception, were disqualified to marry each other on account
of certain legal impediments.
Since Eustaquio Castro was a widower when Benita was conceived, Benita is
Ms natural child. (See Borres and Barza v. Municipality of Panay, 42 Phil.
643,647 [1922]). However, from the viewpoint of the mother who had a
subsisting marriage to Felix de Maya, Benita was her spurious child.
Under the Civil Code, for an illegitimate child other than natural to inherit,
she must first be recognized voluntarily or by court action. (Berciles v.
Government Service Insurance System, 128 SCRA 53 [1984]; Divinagracia v.
Rovira, 72 SCRA 307 [1976]; Vda. de Clemena v. Clemena 24 SCRA 720
[1968]; Noble v. Noble, 18 SCRA 1104 [1966]; Republic v. Workmen's
Compensation Commission, 13 SCRA 272 [1965]; Paulino v. Paulino 3 SCRA
730 [1961]; Barles, et al. v. Ponce Enrile, 109 Phil. 522 [1960]; and Reyes v.
Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439 [1985]). This arises from the legal principle
that an unrecognized spurious child like a natural child has no rights from
her parents or to their estate because her rights spring not from the filiation
or blood relationship but from the child's acknowledgment by the parent.
(Alabat v. Vda. de Alabat, 21 SCRA 1479 [1967]; Mise v. Rodriguez, 95 Phil.
396 [1954]; Magallanes, et al.v. Court of Appeals, et al., 95 Phil. 795 [1954];
Canales v. Arrogante, et al., 91 Phil. 6 [1952]; Malonda v. Malonda, 61 Phil.
149 [1948]; Buenaventura v. Urbano, et al., 5 Phil. 1 [1905]; and Reyes v.
Court of Appeals, supra). In other words, the rights of an illegitimate child
arose not because she was the true or real child of her parents but because
under the law, she had been recognized or acknowledged as such a child.
This brings us to the question whether or not the private respondent is an
acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child of Eustaquio Castro.
Under the Civil Code, there are two kinds of acknowledgment — voluntary
and compulsory. The provisions on acknowledgement are applied to natural
as well as spurious children (Clemena v. Clemena supra; Reyes v. Court of
Appeals, supra).
Article 131 of the old Civil Code provides for voluntary acknowledgment by
the father or mother, while Article 135 and Article 136 of the same Code
provide for the compulsory acknowledgment by the father and mother
respectively. Article 131 of the old Civil Code states that "The
acknowledgment of a natural child must be made in the record of birth, in a
will or in some other public document."
In these cases, the appellate court ruled that the private respondent was
voluntarily recognized by her father, Eustaquio Castro through the record of
birth, hence there was no need for any judicial pronouncement.
The record of birth referred to by the appellate court is actually the birth
certificate of the private respondent. It appears in the certificate that
Eustaquio Castro is the respondent's father.
The petitioners take exception to the respondent court's ruling on voluntary
recognition.
Strictly speaking, a birth certificate to be sufficient for purposes of
recognizing a child must be signed by the father and mother jointly and if the
father refuses, by the mother alone otherwise she may be penalized. (Section
5, Article 3753; Madridejo v. de Leon, 55 Phil. 1 [1930]). What is signed is a
loose form whose contents are later transferred by a municipal employee to
the local registry book of births which is preserved. An examination of
Exhibition F, Birth Certificate of Benita Castro, Folder of Exhibits, p. 112,
shows that this "birth certificate" was in turn copied on October 17, 1961 from
Book page No. 28, and Registry No. 47 of the book bound records where
"Eustaquio Castro" appears under the column "Remarks." This is no question
that Eustaquio himself reported the birth of his daughter but this record is
not determinative of whether or not he also signed the easily lost looseleaf
form of the certificate from where the entry in book bound or logbook record
was taken in March, 1919.
The ruling in Roces v. Local Civil Registrar of Manila (102 Phil. 1050 [1958])
and Berciles v. Government Service Insurance System (128 SCRA 53 [1984]) that
if the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the
mother, doctor, registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of
paternity does not apply to this case because it was Eustaquio himself who
went to the municipal building and gave all the data about his daughter's
birth. In Berciles we find no participation whatsoever in the registration by
Judge Pascual Berciles, the alleged father.
We likewise see no application of the statement in Madridejo v. de
Leon (supra), that the father, apart from furnishing the necessary data must
also sign the certificate itself In that case, Pedro Madridejo, the father was
still alive when the 1930 case was brought to court. Pedro himself testified
that Melecio Madridejo was conceived and born to him, a bachelor, and
Flaviana Perez, a widow. The two were validly maried when Flaviana was
about to die. If the situation of Benita Castro Naval were similar, there would
be no need to even discuss whether or not the father signed the birth
certificate. Under the present law, the subsequent wedding of a man and
woman whose child was conceived when there were no legal impediments
to a valid marriage gives that child the lights of a legitimate off-spring. The
situation is different in the present case.
We apply the more liberal provisions of the new Family Code considering
the facts and equities of this case.
First, Benita Castro Naval is unquestionably the daughter of the late
Eustaquio Castro who was qualified to legally marry when she was
conceived and born. From her birth on March 27, 1919 until the father's death
on August 22, 1961 or for 42 years, Benita lived with her father and enjoyed
the love and care that a parent bestows on an only child. The private
respondents, themselves, admitted in their complaint in Civil Case No. 3762
that Benita is a forced heir of Eustaquio Castro.
Second, the rule on separating the legitimate from the illegitimate family is of
no special relevance here because Benita and her mother Pricola Maregmen
were the only immediate family of Eustaquio. There are no legitimate
children born of a legitimate wife contesting the inheritance of Benita.
Third, it was Eustaquio himself who had the birth of Benita reported and
registered. There is no indication in the records that Eustaquio should have
known in 1919 that apart from reporting the birth of a child, he should also
have signed the certificate and seen to it that it was preserved for 60 years.
Or that he should have taken all legal steps including judicial action to
establish her status as his recognized natural child during the reglementary
period to do so.
Fourth, it was Eustaquio who gave away Benita during her wedding to
Cipriano Naval. The couple continued to live with the father even after the
wedding and until the latter's death.
Fifth, the certificate of baptism and the picture of the Castro family during
the wake for Eustaquio may not be sufficient proof of recognition under the
Civil Code (Reyes v. Court of Appeals, supra; People v. Villeza. 127 SCRA
349 [1984]; Cid v. Burnaman, 24 SCRA 434 [1968]; Capistrano, et al. v.
Gabino, 8 Phil. 135 [1907]) but they add to the equities of this case favoring
the petitioner.
To remove any possible doubts about the correctness of the findings and
conclusions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, we, therefore, apply
the provision of the Family Code which states that it shall have retroactive
effect since the respondents have no clear vested rights in their favor.
Under the Code's Title VI on Paternity and Filiation there are only two
classes of children — legitimate and illegitimate. The fine distinctions among
various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated.
Article 175 provides that "Illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children." (Emphasis supplied).
Articles 172 and 173 on establishing the filiation of legitimate children
provide:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by
any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document
or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws. (265a, 266a; 267a)
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by
the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted
to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state
of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of
five years within which to institute the action.
 The action already commenced by the child shall survive
notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.
(268a)

There can be no dispute that Benita Castro enjoyed the open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child of Eustaquio Castro and that
the action of Benita in defending her status in this case is similar to an "action
to claim legitimacy" brought during her lifetime.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The

questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan , C.J. (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines 3. Plaintiff has been estranged from her husband, Jose
SUPREME COURT Cuyugan, for several years now and during which time,
Manila plaintiff and Atty. Ricardo Ocampo had illicit amorous
relationship with each other that, as a consequence thereof,
FIRST DIVISION they begot a child who was christened Chad Cuyugan in
accordance with the ardent desire and behest of said Atty.
G.R. No. 95229 June 9, 1992 Ocampo;

CORITO OCAMPO TAYAG, petitioner,  4. Chad, the son of plaintiff by the late Atty. Ricardo
vs. Ocampo, who was born in Angeles City on October 5, 1980
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIE DAYRIT bad been sired, showered with exceptional affection, fervent
CUYUGAN, respondent. love and care by his putative father for being his only son as
can be gleaned from indubitable letters and documents of
the late Atty. Ocampo to herein plaintiff, excerpts from some
REGALADO, J.:
of which are hereunder reproduced;
The instant petition seeks to reverse and set aside the decision 1 of
. . . Keep good keep faith keep Chad and
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 20222, entitled "Corito
yourself for me alone and for me all the
Ocampo Tayag vs. Hon. Norberto C. Ponce, Judge, Regional Trial Court of
time. As I have now I shall save my heart to
San Fernando, Pampanga and Emilde Dayrit Cuyugan," promulgated on
you and to Chad.
May 10, 1990, and its resolution denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. 2 Said decision, now before us for review, dismissed
petitioner's Petition for Certiorariand Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction . . . Please take good care and pray to Sto.
on the ground that the denial of the motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 7938 of Niño for our sake and for the child sake.
the court a quo is an interlocutory order and cannot be the subject of the said
special civil action, ordinary appeal in due time being petitioner's remedy. . . . Keep him. Take good care of him.

In said Civil Case No, 7938, herein private respondent, in her capacity as . . . I'm proud that you are his mother. . . I'm
mother and legal guardian of minor Chad D. Cuyugan, filed on April 9, 1987 proud of him and you. Let me bless him by
a complaint denominated "Claim for Inheritance" against herein petitioner as my name and let me entitle him to all what I
the administratrix of the estate of the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo. The am and what I've got.
operative allegations in said complaint are as follows:
. . . I have vowed to recognize him and be
xxx xxx xxx my heir.

2. Plaintiff is the mother and legal guardian of her minor . . . How is CHAD and you . . .
son, Chad Cuyugan, by the father of the defendant, the late
Atty. Ricardo Ocampo; and the defendant is the known . . . Why should we not start now to own
administratrix of the real and personal properties left by her him, jointly against the whole world. After
deceased father, said Atty. Ocampo, who died intestate in all we love each other and CHAD is the
Angeles City on September 28, 1983; product of our love.
 5. The minor, Chad D. Cuyugan, although illegitimate is
nevertheless entitled to a share in the intestate estate left by
his deceased father, Atty. Ricardo Ocampo as one of the
surviving heirs;
6. The deceased Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, at the time of his
death was the owner of real and personal property, located
in Baguio City, Angeles City and in the Province of
Pampanga with approximate value of several millions of
pesos;
7. The estate of the late Atty. Ocampo has not as yet been
inventoried by the defendant and the inheritance of the
surviving heirs including that of said Chad has not likewise
been ascertained;
8. The only known surviving heirs of the deceased Atty.
Ricardo Ocampo are his children, namely: Corito O. Tayag,
Rivina O. Tayag, Evita O. Florendo, Felina Ocampo, and said
minor Chad, for and in whose behalf this instant complaint
is filed;
9. Plaintiff has no means of livelihood and she only depends
on the charity of friends and relatives for the sustenance of
her son, Chad, such that it is urgent, necessary and
imperative that said child be extended financial support
from the estate of his putative father, Atty. Ricardo Ocampo;
10. Several demands, verbal and written, have been made for
defendant to grant Chad's lawful inheritance, but despite
said demands, defendant failed and refused and still fails
and refused and still fails and refuses to satisfy the claim for
inheritance against the estate of the late Atty. Ocampo; 3
x x x           x x x          x x x
Plaintiff thereafter prays, among others, that judgment be rendered ordering
defendant to render an inventory and accounting of the real and personal
properties left by Atty. Ricardo Ocampo; to determine and deliver the share
of the minor child Chad in the estate of the deceased; and to give him
support pendente lite.
Petitioner, as defendant therein, filed her answer with counterclaim on June
3, 1987, disputing the material allegations in the complaint. She maintained
by way of affirmative defenses, inter alia, that the complaint states no cause
of action; that the action is premature; that the suit as barred by prescription;
that respondent Cuyugan has no legal and judicial personality to bring the
suit; that the lower court was no jurisdiction over the nature of the action;
and that there is improper joinder of causes of action. 4
After the hearing of the motion to dismiss on the grounds asserted as
affirmative defenses, the trial court issued the following order on October 20,
1987:
xxx xxx xxx
The Court is of the considered opinion that there is a need of
further proceedings to adduce evidence on the various
claims of the parties so as to hear their respective sides
WHEREFORE, resolution on the preliminary hearing which
partakes of the nature of a motion to dismiss requiring
additional evidence is in the meantime held in abeyance. The
Motion to Dismiss is hereby denied and the case as set for
pre-trial . . . 5
With the denial of her motion for reconsideration of said order on November
19, 1987, 6 petitioner filed on December 10, 1987 a petition for certiorari and
prohibition before the Court of Appeals, docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No.
13464, which was granted by the Sixth Division of respondent court on
August 2, 1989 and enjoined respondent judge to resolve petitioner's motion
praying for the dismissal of the complaint based on the affirmative defenses
within ten (10) days from notice thereof. 7
In compliance with said decision of respondent court, the trial court acted on
and thereafter denied the motion to dismiss, which had been pleaded in the
affirmative defenses in Civil Case No. 7938, in an order dated October 24,
1989, resolving the said motion in the following manner:
xxx xxx xxx
The Court now resolves:
No. 1. The complaint sufficiently shows that a cause of
action exists in favor of the plaintiff. A cause of action being
the "primary right to redress a wrong" (Marquez vs. Valera,
48 OG 5272), which apparently on the face of the complaint,
plaintiff has a right to enforce through this case. Defendant's
protestation that there is no sufficient cause of action is
therefore untenable.
No. 2. The present action. despite the claim of defendant is
not premature. It is exactly filed in order to prove filiation,
and then recognition. To go about the step by step procedure
outlined by the defendant by filing one action after another
is definitely violative of the prohibition against splitting a
cause of action.
No. 3. It is not the plaintiff that is now bringing the case
before the Court. It is (her) spurious child that she represents
as natural guardian that is instituting the action.
No. 4. Prescription has not set in if we consider that a
spurious child may file an action for recognition within four
years from his attainment of majority (New Civil Code. Art,
285, No. 2). Whether the letters of the putative father, Atty.
Ocampo, is evidence, that should be inquired into in a
hearing on the merits.
No. 5. Several causes of action may be joined in one
complaint as was done in this case. The defendant's claim
that there was a misjoinder is untenable.
No. 6. The Court being a court of general jurisdiction, and of
special jurisdiction, such as a probate court has capacity to
entertain a complaint such as the one now before it.
The nature of the case "CLAIM FOR INHERITANCE" does
not control the body of the complaint.
From all the foregoing, the Court finds that the complaint is
sufficient' in form and substance and, therefore, the motion
to dismiss could not be granted until after trial on the merits
in which it should be shown that the allegations of the
complaint are unfounded or a special defense to the action
exists.
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED. 8
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said order was denied by the trial
court on January 30, 1990. 9 As a consequence, another petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction was filed by
petitioner on March 12, 1990 with respondent court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 20222, praying that the orders dated October 24, 1989 and January 30,
1990 of the trial court be annulled and set aside for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
On May 10, 1990, as earlier stated, respondent court promulgated its decision
dismissing the petition, and likewise denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration in a resolution dated September 5, 1990, hence the present
petition for review on certiorari.
In elevating the case before us, petitioner relies on these grounds:
a. The Honorable Respondent Court of Appeals dismissed
Petitioner's Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition in UTTER
DISREGARD OF APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT providing clear exceptions to the
general rule that interlocutory orders may not be elevated by
way of the special civil action of certiorari;
b. Respondent Court refused to resolve certain issues raised
by Petitioner before the Regional Trial Court and before
Respondent Court of Appeals involving QUESTIONS OF
SUBSTANCE not theretofore determined by this Honorable
Court, such as the interpretation and application of Art. 281
of the Civil Code requiring judicial approval when the
recognition of an illegitimate minor child does not take place
in a record of birth or in a will: of Art. 175, Par. 2, in relation
to Art. 172, Par. 2 of the Family Code, providing for the
prescriptive period with respect to the action to establish
illegitimate filiation; and of Art. 285 of the Civil Code,
providing for the prescriptive period with respect to the
action for recognition of a natural child; and
c. Respondent Court has sanctioned a DEPARTURE by the
Regional Trial Court from the accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings. 10
Petitioner contends that the action to claim for inheritance filed by herein
private respondent in behalf of the minor child, Chad Cuyugan, is premature
and the complaint states no cause of action, she submits that the recognition
of the minor child, either voluntarily or by judicial action, by the alleged
putative father must first be established before the former can invoke his
right to succeed and participate in the estate of the latter. Petitioner
asseverates that since there is no allegation of such recognition in the
complaint denominated as "Claim for Inheritance," then there exists no basis
for private respondent's aforesaid claim and, consequently, the complaint
should be dismissed.
The instant case is similar to the case of Paulino vs. Paulino, et al.,  11 wherein
the petitioner, as plaintiff, brought an action against the private respondents,
as defendants, to compel them to give her share of inheritance in the estate of
the late Marcos Paulino, claiming and alleging, inter alia, that she is the
illegitimate child of the deceased; that no proceedings for the settlement of
the deceased's estate had been commenced in court; and that the defendants
had refused and failed to deliver her share in the estate of the deceased. She
accordingly prayed that the defendants therein be ordered to deliver her
aforesaid share. The defendants moved for the dismissal of her complaint on
the ground that it states no cause of action and that, even if it does, the same
is barred by prescription.
The only difference between the aforecited case and the case at bar is that at
the time of the filing of the complaint therein, the petitioner in that case had
already reached the age of majority, whereas the claimant in the present case
is still a minor. In Paulino, we held that an illegitimate child, to be entitled to
support and successional rights from the putative or presumed parent, must
prove his filiation to the latter. We also said that it is necessary to allege in
the complaint that the putative father had acknowledged and recognized the
illegitimate child because such acknowledgment is essential to and is the
basis of the right to inherit. There being no allegation of such
acknowledgment, the action becomes one to compel recognition which
cannot be brought after the death of the putative father. The ratio
decidendi in Paulino, therefore, is not the absence of a cause of action for
failure of the petitioner to allege the fact of acknowledgment in the
complaint, but the prescription of the action.
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, although petitioner
contends that the complaint filed by herein private respondent merely
alleges that the minor Chad Cuyugan is an illegitimate child of the deceased
and is actually a claim for inheritance, from the allegations therein the same
may be considered as one to compel recognition. Further that the two causes
of action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may
be joined in one complaint is not new in our jurisprudence.
As early as 1922, we had occasion to rule thereon in Briz vs. Briz, et
al.,  12 wherein we said:
The question whether a person in the position of the present
plaintiff can any event maintain a complex action to compel
recognition as a natural child and at the same time to obtain
ulterior relief in the character of heir, is one which, in the
opinion of this court must be answered in the affirmative,
provided always that the conditions justifying the joinder of
the two distinct causes of action are present in the particular
case. In, other words, there is no absolute necessity requiring
that the action to compel acknowledgment should have been
instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to
the action in which that same plaintiff seers additional relief
in the character of heir. Certainly, there is nothing so
peculiar to the action to compel acknowledgment as to
require that a rule should be here applied different from that
generally applicable in other cases. . .
The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore
explicitly formulated by this court, is undoubtedly to some
extent supported by our prior decisions. Thus, we have held
in numerous cases, and the doctrine must be considered well
settled, that a natural child having a right to compel
acknowledgment, but who has not been in fact legally
acknowledged, may maintain partition proceedings for the
division of the inheritance against his co-heirs . . .; and the
same person may intervene in proceedings for the
distribution of the estate of his deceased natural father, or
mother . . . In neither of these situations has it been thought
necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling
acknowledgment. The obvious reason is that in partition
suits and distribution proceedings the other persons who
might take by inheritance are before the court; and the
declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings.
The next question to be resolved is whether the action to compel recognition
has prescribed.
Petitioner argues that assuming arguendo that the action is one to compel
recognition, private respondent's cause of action has prescribed for the
reason that since filiation is sought to be proved by means of a private
handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned, then under
paragraph 2, Article 175 of the Family Code, the action to establish filiation
of the illegitimate minor child must be brought during the lifetime of the
alleged putative father. In the case at bar, considering that the complaint was
filed after the death of the alleged parent, the action has prescribed and this
is another ground for the dismissal of the complaint. Petitioner theorizes that
Article 285 of the Civil Code is not applicable to the case at bar and, instead,
paragraph 2, Article 175 of the Family Code should be given retroactive
effect. The theory is premised on the supposition that the latter provision of
law being merely procedural in nature, no vested rights are created, hence it
can be made to apply retroactively.
Article 285 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children
may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed
parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the
child, in which case the latter may file the action before the
expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;
x x x           x x x          x x x
On the other hand, Article 175 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate
filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified
in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second
paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Under the last-quoted provision of law, therefore, if the action is based on
the record of birth of the child, a final judgment, or an admission by the
parent of the child's filiation in a public document or in a private
handwritten signed instrument, then the action may be brought during the
lifetime of the child. However, if the action is based on the open and
continuous possession by the child of the status of an illegitimate child, or on
other evidence allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, the view has
been expressed that the action must be brought during the lifetime of the
alleged parent. 13
Petitioner submits that Article 175 of the Family Code applies in which case
the complaint should have been filed during the lifetime of the putative
father, failing which the same must be dismissed on the ground of
prescription. Private respondent, however, insists that Article 285 of the Civil
Code is controlling and, since the alleged parent died during the minority of
the child, the action for filiation may be filed within four years from the
attainment of majority of the minor child.
Article 256 of the Family Code states that "[t]his Code shall have retroactive
effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." It becomes essential,
therefore, to determine whether the right of the minor child to file an action
for recognition is a vested right or not.
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right
of action of the minor child bas been vested by the filing of the complaint in
court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code. 14 We herein adopt our ruling in the recent case of Republic of
the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 15 where we held that the fact of filing
of the petition already vested in the petitioner her right to file it and to have
the same proceed to final adjudication in accordance with the law in force at
the time, and such right can no longer be prejudiced or impaired by the
enactment of a new law.
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the provision of the Family Code in
question is procedural in nature, the rule that a statutory change in matters
of procedure may affect pending actions and proceedings, unless the
language of the act excludes them from its operation, is not so pervasive that
it may be used to validate or invalidate proceedings taken before it goes into
effective, since procedure must be governed by the law regulating it at the
time the question of procedure arises especially where vested rights may be
prejudiced. Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper
application to the instant case since it will ineluctably affect adversely a right
of private respondent and, consequentially, of the mind child she represents,
both of which have been vested with the filing of the complaint in court. The
trial court is therefore, correct in applying the provisions of Article 285 of the
Civil Code and in holding that private respondent's cause of action has not
yet prescribed.
Finally, we conform with the holding of the Court of Appeals that the
questioned order of the court below denying the motion to dismiss is
interlocutory and cannot be the subject of a petition for certiorari. The
exceptions to this rule invoked by petitioner and allegedly obtaining in the
case at bar, are obviously not present and may not be relied upon.
WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is DENIED and the assailed decision and
resolution of respondent Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Paras and Padilla, JJ., concur.

Nocon, J., is on leave.

 Republic of the Philippines On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this
SUPREME COURT time for the accounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and
Manila Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's four surviving children. This was
docketed as Civil Case No. 1042 in the Regional Trial Court of Albay, Branch
FIRST DIVISION 12. The complainants asserted the defense they raised in Civil Case No. 1030,
to wit, that Delia and Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel was
  the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they were entitled to
inherit Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by right of representation.
G.R. Nos. 89224-25 January 23, 1992
Both cases were decided in favor of the herein private respondents on the
basis of practically the same evidence.
MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-MALONDA, BASILISA
SAYSON-LIRIO, REMEDIOS SAYSON-REYES and JUANA C.
BAUTISTA, petitioners,  Judge Rafael P. Santelices declared in his decision dated May 26, 
vs. 1986, 1 that Delia and Edmundo were the legally adopted children of
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA SAYSON, assisted by Teodoro and Isabel Sayson by virtue of the decree of adoption dated March
her husband, CIRILO CEDO, JR., EDMUNDO SAYSON AND DORIBEL 9, 1967. 2 Doribel was their legitimate daughter as evidenced by her birth
SAYSON, respondents. certificate dated February 27, 1967. 3 Consequently, the three children were
entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by right of representation.
CRUZ, J.:
In his decision dated September 30, 1986, 4 Judge Jose S. Sañez dismissed
Civil Case No. 1030, holding that the defendants, being the legitimate heirs
At issue in this case is the status of the private respondents and their capacity
of Teodoro and Isabel as established by the aforementioned evidence,
to inherit from their alleged parents and grandparents. The petitioners deny
excluded the plaintiffs from sharing in their estate.
them that right, asserting if for themselves to the exclusion of all others.

Both cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals, where they were
The relevant genealogical facts are as follows.
consolidated. In its own decision dated February 28, 1989, 5 the respondent
court disposed as follows:
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario,
Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and
WHEREFORE, in Civil Case No. 1030 (CA-G.R. No. 11541),
Rafaela on May 15, 1976. Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died on
the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED. In Civil case
March 23, 1972. His wife died nine years later, on March 26, 1981. Their
No. 1042 (CA-G.R. No. 12364), the appealed decision is
properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all
MODIFIED in that Delia and Edmundo Sayson are
surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children.
disqualified from inheriting from the estate of the deceased
spouses Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, but is affirmed in all
On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with other respects.
Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and
accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. It was
SO ORDERED.
docketed as Civil Case No. 1030 in Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court of
Albay. The action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, who
alleged successional rights to the disputed estate as the decedents' lawful That judgment is now before us in this petition for review by certiorari.
descendants. Reversal of the respondent court is sought on the ground that it disregarded
the evidence of the petitioners and misapplied the pertinent law and
jurisprudence when it declared the private respondents as the exclusive heirs
of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson.
The contention of the petitioners is that Delia and Edmundo were not legally
adopted because Doribel had already been born on February 27, 1967, when
the decree of adoption was issued on March 9, 1967. The birth of Doribel
disqualified her parents from adopting. The pertinent provision is Article 335
of the Civil Code, naming among those who cannot adopt "(1) Those who
have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natural
children by legal fiction."
Curiously enough, the petitioners also argue that Doribel herself is not the
legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel but was in fact born to one Edita
Abila, who manifested in a petition for guardianship of the child that she
was her natural mother. 6
The inconsistency of this position is immediately apparent. The petitioners
seek to annul the adoption of Delia and Edmundo on the ground that
Teodoro and Isabel already had a legitimate daughter at the time but in the
same breath try to demolish this argument by denying that Doribel was born
to the couple.
On top of this, there is the vital question of timeliness. It is too late now to
challenge the decree of adoption, years after it became final and executory.
That was way back in 1967. 7 Assuming the the petitioners were proper
parties, what they should have done was seasonably appeal the decree of
adoption, pointing to the birth of Doribel that disqualified Teodoro and
Isabel from adopting Delia and Edmundo. They did not. In fact, they should
have done this earlier, before the decree of adoption was issued. They did
not, although Mauricio claimed he had personal knowledge of such birth.
As the respondent court correctly observed:
When Doribel was born on February 27, 1967, or about TEN
(10) days before the issuance of the Order of Adoption, the
petitioners could have notified the court about the fact of
birth of DORIBEL and perhaps withdrew the petition or
perhaps petitioners could have filed a petition for the
revocation or rescission of the adoption (although the birth
of a child is not one of those provided by law for the
revocation or rescission of an adoption). The court is of the
considered opinion that the adoption of the plaintiffs DELIA
and EDMUNDO SAYSON is valid, outstanding and binding
to the present, the same not having been revoked or
rescinded.
Not having any information of Doribel's birth to Teodoro and Isabel Sayson,
the trial judge cannot be faulted for granting the petition for adoption on the
finding inter alia that the adopting parents were not disqualified.
A no less important argument against the petitioners is that their challenge to
the validity of the adoption cannot be made collaterally, as in their action for
partition, but in a direct proceeding frontally addressing the issue.
The settled rule is that a finding that the requisite
jurisdictional facts exists, whether erroneous or not, cannot
be questioned in a collateral proceeding, for a presumption arises
in such cases where the validity of the judgment is thus
attacked that the necessary jurisdictional facts were proven
[Freeman on Judgments, Vol. I, Sec. 350, pp. 719-720].
(Emphasis supplied.)
In the case of Santos v. Aranzanso, 8 this Court declared:
Anent this point, the rulings are summed up in 2 American
Jurisprudence, 2nd Series, Adoption, Sec. 75, p. 922, thus:
An adoption order implies the finding of the
necessary facts and the burden of proof is on
the party attacking it; it cannot be
considered void merely because the fact
needed to show statutory compliance is
obscure. While a judicial determination of
some particular fact, such as the
abandonment of his next of kin to the
adoption, may be essential to the exercise of
jurisdiction to enter the order of adoption,
this does not make it essential to the
jurisdictional validity of the decree that the
fact be determined upon proper evidence, or
necessarily in accordance with the truth; a
mere error cannot affect the jurisdiction, and
the determination must stand until reversed
on appeal, and hence cannot be collaterally
attacked. If this were not the rule, the status
of adopted children would always be
 uncertain, since the evidence might not be
the same at all investigations, and might be
regarded with different effect by different
tribunals, and the adoption might be held by
one court to have been valid, while another
court would hold it to have been of no avail.
(Emphasis supplied.)
On the question of Doribel's legitimacy, we hold that the findings of the trial
courts as affirmed by the respondent court must be sustained. Doribel's birth
certificate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the prescribed means
of recognition under Article 265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the
Family Code. It is true, as the petitioners stress, that the birth certificate
offers only prima facie evidence 9 of filiation and may be refuted by contrary
evidence. However, such evidence is lacking in the case at bar.
Mauricio's testimony that he was present when Doribel was born to Edita
Abila was understandbly suspect, coming as it did from an interested party.
The affidavit of Abila 10 denying her earlier statement in the petition for the
guardianship of Doribel is of course hearsay, let alone the fact that it was
never offered in evidence in the lower courts. Even without it, however, the
birth certificate must be upheld in line with Legaspi v. Court of
Appeals, 11where we ruled that "the evidentiary nature of public documents
must be sustained in the absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of
its falsity or nullity."
Another reason why the petitioners' challenge must fail is the impropriety of
the present proceedings for that purpose. Doribel's legitimacy cannot be
questioned in a complaint for partition and accounting but in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party.
The presumption of legitimacy in the Civil Code . . . does not
have this purely evidential character. It serves a more
fundamental purpose. It actually fixes a civil status for the
child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked
collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be impugned only
in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties,
and within the period limited by law.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of
defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a different
purpose. . . . 12 (Emphasis supplied.)
In consequence of the above observations, we hold that Doribel, as the
legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and Edmundo,
as their adopted children, are the exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of the
deceased couple, conformably to the following Article 979 of the Civil Code:
Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed
the parents and other ascendants, without distinction as to
sex or age, and even if they should come from different
marriages.
An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting
parents in the same manner as a legitimate child.
The philosophy underlying this article is that a person's love descends first to
his children and grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and thereafter
spreads among his collateral relatives. It is also supposed that one of his
purposes in acquiring properties is to leave them eventually to his children
as a token of his love for them and as a provision for their continued care
even after he is gone from this earth.
Coming now to the right of representation, we stress first the following
pertinent provisions of the Civil Code:
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law,
by virtue of which the representative is raised to the place
and the degree of the person represented, and acquires the
rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he
could have inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the
law and not by the person represented. The representative
does not succeed the person represented but the one who the
person represented would have succeeded.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of
other children who are dead, survive, the former shall
inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of
representation.
There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the
granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her
deceased father in the distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents.
Under Article 981, quoted above, she is entitled to the share her father would
have directly inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of
her grandparents' other children. 13

But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and

Edmundo, to whom the grandparents were total strangers. While it is true
that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the
same right as the latter, these rights do not include the right of
representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only the
adopting parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood
relatives of either party. 14

In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as the
adopted children and Doribel as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro Sayson
and Isabel Bautista, are their exclusive heirs and are under no obligation to
share the estate of their parents with the petitioners. The Court of Appeals
was correct, however, in holding that only Doribel has the right of
representation in the inheritance of her grandparents' intestate estate, the
other private respondents being only the adoptive children of the deceased
Teodoro.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of the

Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the petitioners.

Narvasa, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines petitioner’s care and custody of the child since her birth up to the present
SUPREME COURT constitute more than enough compliance with the requirement of Article 35
of Presidential Decree No. 603.
THIRD DIVISION
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005 is GRANTED. Henceforth, Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is hereby freed
from all obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to her
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY natural mother, and for civil purposes, shall henceforth be the petitioner’s
ASTORGA GARCIA legitimate child and legal heir. Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code of
the Philippines, the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY
CATINDIG.
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.

Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in the Local Civil
DECISION
Registrar concerned pursuant to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Let copy of this Decision be furnished the National Statistics Office for record
purposes.
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the
surname of her natural mother as her middle name? This is the issue raised
SO ORDERED."4
in the instant case.

On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or

The facts are undisputed.
reconsideration5 praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the
surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name.
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a
petition1 to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga
On May 28, 2001,6 the trial court denied petitioner’s motion for
Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie was born on June
reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an
26, 1994;2that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been
adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle
using her mother’s middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower
name.
and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle
name Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her mother’s surname, and that her
surname "Garcia" be changed to "Catindig," his surname. Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an illegitimate child
may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is
subsequently adopted by her natural father.
On March 23, 2001,3 the trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting
the adoption, thus:
Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a
middle name as a consequence of adoption because: (1) there is no law
"After a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the petitioner,
prohibiting an adopted child from having a middle name in case there is
and in the absence of any opposition to the petition, this Court finds that the
only one adopting parent; (2) it is customary for every Filipino to have as
petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualification
middle name the surname of the mother; (3) the middle name or initial is a
provided for by law as an adoptive parent, and that as such he is qualified to
part of the name of a person; (4) adoption is for the benefit and best interest
maintain, care for and educate the child to be adopted; that the grant of this
of the adopted child, hence, her right to bear a proper name should not be
petition would redound to the best interest and welfare of the minor
violated; (5) permitting Stephanie to use the middle name "Garcia" (her
Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. The Court further holds that the
mother’s surname) avoids the stigma of her illegitimacy; and; (6) her
continued use of "Garcia" as her middle name is not opposed by either the
Catindig or Garcia families.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with
petitioner that Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the
surname of her natural mother for the following reasons:
First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie’s filiation with her
natural mother because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to
be an intestate heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless
hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of that relationship with her
natural mother should be maintained.
Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname
of her natural mother as her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it
allows.
Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules
which regulate the use of surname10 of an individual whatever may be his
status in life, i.e., whether he may be legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted
child, a married woman or a previously married woman, or a widow, thus:
"Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use
the surname of the father.
Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
xxx
Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage
shall principally use the surname of the father.
Art. 370. A married woman may use:

Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is (1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or
ordinarily the surname of the mother. This custom has been recognized by
the Civil Code and Family Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or
that "the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname
of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the surname of the
mother."7 (3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his
wife, such as ‘Mrs.’
We find merit in the petition.
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party,
she shall resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent
Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law –
spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname. However, she may
choose to continue employing her former husband's surname, unless:
For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by
which he is known and called in the community in which he lives and is best
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
known. It is defined as the word or combination of words by which a person
is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation
which he bears for the convenience of the world at large addressing him, or (2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
in speaking of or dealing with him.8 It is both of personal as well as public
interest that every person must have a name. Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue
using her name and surname employed before the legal separation.
The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and
(2) the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he
given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other were still living, in accordance with Article 370.
individuals. The surname or family name is that which identifies the family
to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall
may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which be obliged to use such additional name or surname as will avoid confusion.
the child is entitled is fixed by law.9
Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and
descendants, the word ‘Junior’ can be used only by a son. Grandsons and
other direct male descendants shall either:
(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,
(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.
x x x"
Law Is Silent As To The Use Of
Middle Name –
As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a
middle name. Even Article 17611 of the Family Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as "An Act Allowing Illegitimate
Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father," is silent as to what middle name
a child may use.
The middle name or the mother’s surname is only considered in Article
375(1), quoted above, in case there is identity of names and surnames
between ascendants and descendants, in which case, the middle name or the
mother’s surname shall be added.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may
use. Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides that "an adopted child shall
bear the surname of the adopter." Also, Article 189 of the Family Code,
enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter,
thus:
"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child
of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations
arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the
adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
x x x"
However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil
Code and Family Law Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized
the Filipino custom of adding the surname of the child’s mother as his
middle name. In the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and
Family Law Committees, the members approved the suggestion that the
initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname
of the father, thus
"Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference between the use by the
wife of the surname and that of the child because the father’s surname
indicates the family to which he belongs, for which reason he would insist
on the use of the father’s surname by the child but that, if he wants to, the
child may also use the surname of the mother.
Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use the surname of
the mother, how will his name be written? Justice Caguioa replied that it is
up to him but that his point is that it should be mandatory that the child
uses the surname of the father and permissive in the case of the surname
of the mother.
Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioa’s point is covered by the present
Article 364, which reads:
Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the
father.
Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through no choice of the
person himself precisely because of this misunderstanding. He then cited the
following example: Alfonso Ponce Enrile’s correct surname is Ponce since the
mother’s surname is Enrile but everybody calls him Atty. Enrile. Justice Jose
Gutierrez David’s family name is Gutierrez and his mother’s surname is
David but they all call him Justice David.
Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article (12) be modified to the
effect that it shall be mandatory on the child to use the surname of the
father but he may use the surname of the mother by way of an initial or a
middle name. Prof. Balane stated that they take note of this for inclusion in
the Chapter on Use of Surnames since in the proposed Article (10) they are
just enumerating the rights of legitimate children so that the details can be
covered in the appropriate chapter.
xxx
Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the simplification suggested by
Justice Caguioa that the surname of the father should always be last because
there are so many traditions like the American tradition where they like to
use their second given name and the Latin tradition, which is also followed
by the Chinese wherein they even include the Clan name.
 xxx
Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the Chapter on
the Use of Surnames, they should say that initial or surname of the mother
should immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second
name, if any, will be before the surname of the mother. Prof. Balane added
that this is really the Filipino way. The Committee approved the
suggestion."12 (Emphasis supplied)
In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that "the adopted shall bear
the surname of the adopters."13 Again, it is silent whether he can use a middle
name. What it only expressly allows, as a matter of right and obligation, is
for the adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the
decree of adoption.14
The Underlying Intent of
Adoption Is In Favor of the
Adopted Child –
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not
to the adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate
child.15 It is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a
relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and
filiation.16 The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act to establish
a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act which endows the child
with a legitimate status.17 This was, indeed, confirmed in 1989, when
the Philippines, as a State Party to the Convention of the Rights of the
Child initiated by the United Nations, accepted the principle that adoption
is impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying
intent is geared to favor the adopted child.18 Republic Act No. 8552,
otherwise known as the "Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,"19 secures these rights
and privileges for the adopted.20
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a
legitimate child of the adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to
Article 18921 of the Family Code and Section 1722 Article V of RA 8552.23
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that
Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child
without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the
surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above. This is
consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family
Law Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that
the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the
surname of the father.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie’s continued use of
her mother’s surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her
maternal lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code
and Section 1824, Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that the
adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence,
Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural
mother in the future.
Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in
the house built by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag,
Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their needs. Stephanie is closely attached
to both her mother and father. She calls them "Mama" and "Papa". Indeed,
they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her
mother’s surname as her middle name will not only sustain her continued
loving relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her
illegitimacy.
Liberal Construction of
Adoption Statutes In Favor Of
Adoption –
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should
be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption.25 The
interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount
consideration,26 hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to
promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.27
Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:
"In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed
that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail."
This provision, according to the Code Commission, "is necessary so that it
may tip the scales in favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or
obscure. It will strengthen the determination of the courts to avoid an
injustice which may apparently be authorized by some way of interpreting
the law."28

Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her

natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s surname,
we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly

MODIFIED in the sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her
mother’s surname "GARCIA" as her middle name.

Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be entered in
the decree of adoption.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, (Chairman), Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.


FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 167405             February 16, 2006
ANA JOYCE S. REYES, Petitioner,  was unnecessary, since she was the only heir of Lising who passed away
vs.
HON. CESAR M. SOTERO, Presiding Judge, RTC of Paniqui, Tarlac,
Branch 67, ATTY. PAULINO SAGUYOD, the Clerk of Court of Branch 67
of the RTC at Paniqui, Tarlac in his capacity as Special Administrator,
CORAZON CHICHIOCO, ANGELITO LISING, ERLINDA ESPACIO,
GONZALO ZALZOS and ERNESTO LISING,Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review seeks to modify the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated May 14, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 74047 as well as the Resolution dated
May 14, 2005 denying the motion for reconsideration. In the assailed
judgment, the Court of Appeals annulled and set aside the September 18,
2002 and November 12, 2002 Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch 67 in Spec. Proc. No. 204 but refrained from
dismissing the petition for letters of administration and settlement of estate
on the ground that petitioner must first prove that she was legally adopted
by the decedent, Elena Lising.
On September 15, 1998, respondent Corazon L. Chichioco filed a petition for
the issuance of letters of administration and settlement of estate of the late
Elena Lising before the RTC of Paniqui, Tarlac, where it was docketed as
Spec. Proc. No. 204 and raffled to Branch 67. Chichioco claimed that she was
the niece and heir of Lising who died intestate on July 31, 1998. Named as co-
heirs of Chichioco were Rosario L. Zalzos, Florante Zalzos, Erlinda Lising,
Manuel Lising, Evelyn Lising, Josephine Lising, Alfredo Lising and
respondents Ernesto Lising and Erlinda Espacio.
According to Chichioco, the deceased left real properties located in the
municipalities of Ramos and Paniqui, Tarlac, as well as assorted pieces of
jewelry and money which were allegedly in the possession of petitioner Ana
Joyce S. Reyes, a grandniece of the deceased. Chichioco prayed that she be
appointed administrator of the estate, upon payment of a bond, pending
settlement and distribution of Lising’s properties to the legal heirs. 1
On November 6, 1998, petitioner Reyes filed an Opposition2 to the petition,
claiming that she was an adopted child of Lising and the latter’s husband,
Serafin Delos Santos, who died on November 30, 1970. She asserted that the
petition should be dismissed and that the appointment of an administrator
without leaving any debts. She further asserted that Chichioco is unfit to
serve as administrator of Lising’s estate because of her "antagonistic
interests" against the decedent. Chichioco and her alleged co-heirs have
questioned the decedent’s title to a piece of real property which forms a large
part of the estate.
On November 11, 1998, petitioner filed a Supplement to the
Opposition3 attaching thereto the Certification4 issued by the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Paniqui, Tarlac stating that on page 76, Book No. 01 of the
Register of Court Decrees, Reyes was adopted by Elena Lising and Serafin
Delos Santos pursuant to a decision rendered in Spec. Proc. No. 1410 by
Judge Julian Lustre of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Tarlac, Branch 3,
promulgated on December 21, 1968 and duly registered with the Office of the
Civil Registrar on January 29, 1969.
Petitioner also submitted a Certification5 issued by the Clerk of Court of the
RTC-Tarlac City, stating that a judgment was rendered in Spec. Proc. No.
1410 on December 21, 1968 decreeing petitioner’s adoption by Elena Lising
and Serafin Delos Santos. She also presented a copy of Judicial Form No.
436 indicating that the adoption decree was on file in the General Docket of
the RTC-Tarlac City, wherein the dispositive portion of the adoption decree
was recorded as follows:
In view of the foregoing, the court finds this petition a proper case for
adoption and therefore grants the same. Consequently, the Court declares
that henceforth, the child Ana Joyce C. Zalzos is freed from all legal
obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural parents
Orlando Zalzos and May C. Castro, and is to all legal intents and purposes
the child of the petitioners Serafin delos Santos and Elena Lising.7
Petitioner likewise submitted a Decree of Final Distribution8 issued by the
Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (PVAO) showing that, upon the death of
Serafin Delos Santos, death benefits were paid to his widow, Elena Lising,
and his "daughter", Ana Joyce Delos Santos, in accordance with pertinent
provisions of law.
On April 5, 1999, the RTC ordered respondents to submit documentary
evidence to prove the jurisdictional facts of the case and to comment on
petitioner’s opposition.9 Only Rosario L. Zalsos appears to have filed a
Comment/Reply to Oppositor’s Opposition,10 after which the RTC ordered
the parties to submit memoranda thereon.11 On July 22, 1999, the case was
deemed submitted for resolution.12
Meanwhile, on June 30, 1999, Chichioco and her alleged co-heirs filed before
the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the adoption decree
docketed as SP No. 53457.13 They claimed that no proceedings for the
adoption of petitioner took place in 1968 since the Provincial Prosecutor of
Tarlac and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) had no records of the
adoption case. Petitioner’s natural mother supposedly connived with the
court personnel to make it appear that petitioner was adopted by the Delos
Santos spouses and that the CFI’s order for initial hearing was published in a
weekly newspaper which was not authorized to publish court orders in
special proceedings.
Upon motion of Chichioco, the RTC ordered on October 4, 1999, the
suspension of hearings in Spec. Proc. No. 204 pending the outcome of SP No.
53457.14 Subsequently, however, the Court of Appeals dismissed15 SP No.
53457 for failure to comply with the third paragraph of Section 4, Rule 47 of
the Rules of Court.16 The said dismissal became final and executory on March
8, 2000.17
Thereafter, on August 22, 2000, petitioner filed a motion before the RTC
praying that the opposition to Spec. Proc. No. 204 be finally resolved and
that the petition be dismissed.18 This was followed by an Urgent Ex Parte
Motion19filed by petitioner on October 17, 2000 praying for the immediate
resolution of her opposition.
On November 16, 2000, respondents filed a Comment20 to the opposition
stating that reasonable doubts have been cast on petitioner’s claim that she
was legally adopted due allegedly to certain "badges of fraud." Respondents
also informed the RTC that they have filed a criminal complaint against
petitioner before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Tarlac City, for
alleged falsification of the adoption decree and Judicial Form No. 43,
docketed as I.S. No. 00-1016.
Subsequently, the RTC issued a Resolution21 dated December 12, 2000
deferring resolution of petitioner’s opposition to Spec. Proc. No. 204,
pending the outcome of the criminal case filed against the latter. In the
meantime, the parties were enjoined from dissipating or disposing any or all
of the properties included in the estate of Elena Lising without order from
this Court.
On December 13, 2000, Chichioco filed an Urgent Motion to Appoint Special
Administrator22 before the RTC on the ground that there was yet no true
determination and appraisal of the decedent’s universal estate. It was prayed
therein that the Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Paulino Saguyod, be appointed
special administrator as he was "an experienced and able person in the
management of properties" and is "honest, impartial, competent and
acceptable to the majority of the interested parties."
In the meantime, the Provincial Prosecutor found probable cause to charge
petitioner with falsification of public documents per resolution dated
January 5, 2001.23 Petitioner thus appealed the said finding to the Office of
the Regional State Prosecutor.
On August 8, 2001, the RTC granted respondents’ motion for the
appointment of a special administrator and appointed its branch clerk of
court, Atty. Saguyod.24 Petitioner moved for reconsideration on the grounds
that the branch clerk of court was disqualified from taking on the task of
special administrator, and that Atty. Saguyod was appointed without being
required to file a bond. Petitioner also reiterated that the petition should be
dismissed because she is the sole heir of the decedent.25 However, the RTC
denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on November 5, 2001.26
On January 14, 2002, the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor reversed the
findings of the Provincial Prosecutor and dismissed the criminal complaint
against petitioner.27 Undaunted, Chichioco filed a petition for review before
the Department of Justice (DOJ).
Simultaneously, Chichioco and the other alleged co-heirs filed a motion
before the RTC to enjoin petitioner from conducting business in a property
belonging to the estate. Respondent Chichioco alleged that petitioner
converted the basement of Lising’s residence into a billiard hall without
authority of the special administrator.28
Acting on said motion, the RTC issued a resolution on September 18, 2002,
the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Oppositor Ana Joyce Reyes is hereby enjoined from
conducting business activity in any of the properties left by the decedent.
The Special Administrator is also empowered to take control and possession
of the listed personal and real properties of the decedent and those that may
be found to be owned or registered in the name of the same.
SO ORDERED.29
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the above resolution which
was denied by the RTC on November 12, 2002. On even date, the DOJ also
issued a resolution dismissing respondent Chichioco’s petition for review in
the criminal case.30
Subsequently, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74047,31 assailing the
September 18, 2002 and November 12, 2002 resolutions of the RTC. Petitioner
alleged that said resolutions were issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction since as sole heir, she had the
right to possess and use the decedent’s property, title over which
automatically passed on to her upon the latter’s death. Moreover, the special
administrator, Atty. Saguyod, had yet to file a bond and submit an inventory
of the decedent’s estate.
Additionally, petitioner insisted that Spec. Proc. No. 204 should be dismissed
since the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of SP No. 53457 constituted res
judicata as to the former. There was likewise no valid challenge to her
adoption and she consequently remains to be the sole heir of the decedent.
Thus, she stressed that there was no need for the appointment of an
administrator or for the settlement proceedings.
In due course, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment32 nullifying the
resolutions of the trial court. It held that the presiding judge, Judge Cesar M.
Sotero, gravely abused his discretion in appointing his branch clerk of court
as special administrator. Citing Balanay, Jr. v. Martinez,33 the appellate court
reasoned that such act could engender a suspicion that Judge Sotero and his
clerk are in cahoots in milking the decedent’s estate. Moreover, Atty.
Saguyod failed to comply with the requirements of a bond and inventory
and could not therefore take control and possession of any of the decedent’s
properties.
However, the appellate court refused to dismiss Spec. Proc. No. 204 since the
dismissal of SP No. 53457 was not a judgment on the merits and did not
operate as res judicata to the former. It was also incumbent upon petitioner
to prove before the trial court that she was indeed adopted by the Delos
Santos spouses since, according to the appellate court, "imputations of
irregularities permeating the adoption decree render its authenticity under a
cloud of doubt."
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration having been denied on March 15,
2005,34 hence this petition on the following assigned errors:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PETITIONER HAD TO PROVE THE VALIDITY OF HER
ADOPTION DUE TO IMPUTATIONS OF IRREGULARITIES IN
VIEW OF SECTION 47 OF RULE 39.35
B. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
DISMISSAL IN SP NO. 53457 WAS NOT A DISMISSAL ON THE
MERITS.36
The petition is meritorious.
On the first assigned error, we agree with petitioner that she need not prove
her legal adoption by any evidence other than those which she had already
presented before the trial court. To recall, petitioner submitted a certification
from the local civil registrar’s office that the adoption decree was registered
therein and also a copy of Judicial Form No. 43 and a certification issued by
the clerk of court that the decree was on file in the General Docket of the
RTC-Tarlac City. Both certifications were issued under the seal of the issuing
offices and were signed by the proper officers. These are thus presumed to
have been regularly issued as part of the official duties that said public
officers perform.37
It should be borne in mind that an adoption decree is a public
document38 required by law to be entered into the public records, the official
repository of which, as well as all other judicial pronouncements affecting
the status of individuals, is the local civil registrar’s office as well as the court
which rendered the judgment.
Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated.39 As such, the certifications issued by the local civil
registrar and the clerk of court regarding details of petitioner’s adoption
which are entered in the records kept under their official custody, are prima
facie evidence of the facts contained therein. These certifications suffice as
proof of the fact of petitioner’s adoption by the Delos Santos spouses until
contradicted or overcome by sufficient evidence. Mere "imputations of
irregularities" will not cast a "cloud of doubt" on the adoption decree since
the certifications and its contents are presumed valid until proof to the
contrary is offered.
In this regard, it must be pointed out that such contrary proof can be
presented only in a separate action brought principally for the purpose of
nullifying the adoption decree. The latter cannot be assailed collaterally in a
proceeding for the settlement of a decedent’s estate, as categorically held in
Santos v. Aranzanso.40 Accordingly, respondents cannot assail in these
proceedings the validity of the adoption decree in order to defeat petitioner’s
claim that she is the sole heir of the decedent. Absent a categorical
pronouncement in an appropriate proceeding that the decree of adoption
is void, the certifications regarding the matter, as well as the facts stated
therein, should be deemed legitimate, genuine and real. Petitioner’s status
as an adopted child of the decedent remains unrebutted and no serious
challenge has been brought against her standing as such. Therefore, for as
long as petitioner’s adoption is considered valid, respondents cannot claim
any interest in the decedent’s estate. For this reason, we agree with
petitioner that Spec. Proc. No. 204 should be dismissed.
As succinctly held in Santos v. Aranzanso:41
From all the foregoing it follows that respondents - x x x and those who, like
them x x x, claim an interest in the estate x x x as alleged first cousins, cannot
intervene, as such, in the settlement proceedings, in view of the fact that in
the order of intestate succession adopted children exclude first cousins
(Articles 979 and 1003, New Civil Code). The same holds true as long as the
adoption must be - as in the instant case - considered valid. (Emphasis
added)
pending incident before the RTC. The parties have likewise amply ventilated
their positions on the matter through their respective pleadings filed before
the lower courts. No useful purpose will thus be served if we let the RTC
resolve the matter, only for its ruling to be elevated again to the Court of
Appeals and subsequently to this Court. The remand of the case to the lower
court for further reception of evidence is not necessary where the Court is in
a position to resolve the dispute based on the evidence before it.42 This is in
keeping with the avowed purpose of the rules of procedure which is to
secure for the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every
action or proceeding.43 Hence, since the grounds for the dismissal of Spec.
Proc. No. 204 are extant in the records and there is no cogent reason to
remand the case to the RTC, Spec. Proc. No. 204 should be dismissed.
Based on the foregoing, the Court sees no need to discuss petitioner’s second
assigned error.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Special Proceedings No.
204 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City, Branch 67 is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson

Petitioner, whose adoption is presumed to be valid, would necessarily

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
exclude respondents from inheriting from the decedent since they are
Associate Justice Asscociate Justice
mere collateral relatives of the latter. To allow the proceedings below to
continue would serve no salutary purpose but to delay the resolution of
the instant case. After all, the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 204 is the logical MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
consequence of our pronouncement relative to the presumed validity of Associate Justice
petitioner’s adoption.

Moreover, it must be stressed that all the evidence pertinent to the resolution
of the petitioner’s opposition, which is actually a motion to dismiss the
petition for letters of administration and settlement of the estate, is a matter
of record in the instant case. The same has in fact been submitted for
resolution before the RTC more than six years ago and is so far the only
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 168992-93               May 21, 2009
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM,
MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM,
MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Monina P. Lim (petitioner)
seeking to set aside the Decision1 dated 15 September 2004 of the Regional
Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 (trial court), in SPL. PROC. Case
Nos. 1258 and 1259, which dismissed without prejudice the consolidated
petitions for adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim.
The Facts
The following facts are undisputed. Petitioner is an optometrist by
profession. On 23 June 1974, she married Primo Lim (Lim). They were
childless. Minor children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to
them by a certain Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so eager to have a child of
their own, petitioner and Lim registered the children to make it appear that
they were the children’s parents. The children2 were named Michelle P. Lim
(Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael). Michelle was barely eleven
days old when brought to the clinic of petitioner. She was born on 15 March
1977.3 Michael was 11 days old when Ayuban brought him to petitioner’s
clinic. His date of birth is 1 August 1983.4
The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They
sent the children to exclusive schools. They used the surname "Lim" in all
their school records and documents. Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998,
Lim died. On 27 December 2000, petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), an
American citizen.
Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the
amnesty5 given under Republic Act No. 85526(RA 8552) to those individuals
who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed
separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial
court docketed as SPL PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259, respectively. At the
time of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and
already married, while Michael was 18 years and seven months old.
Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by
their Affidavits of Consent.7 Michael also gave his consent to his adoption as
shown in his Affidavit of Consent.8 Petitioner’s husband Olario likewise
executed an Affidavit of Consent9 for the adoption of Michelle and Michael.
In the Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD), Michelle was considered as an abandoned child and
the whereabouts of her natural parents were unknown.10 The DSWD issued a
similar Certification for Michael.11
The Ruling of the Trial Court
On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the
petitions. The trial court ruled that since petitioner had remarried, petitioner
should have filed the petition jointly with her new husband. The trial court
ruled that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory citing
Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family Code.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but the motion
was denied in the Order dated 16 June 2005. In denying the motion, the trial
court ruled that petitioner did not fall under any of the exceptions under
Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552. Petitioner’s argument that mere consent
of her husband would suffice was untenable because, under the law, there
are additional requirements, such as residency and certification of his
qualification, which the husband, who was not even made a party in this
case, must comply.
As to the argument that the adoptees are already emancipated and joint
adoption is merely for the joint exercise of parental authority, the trial court
ruled that joint adoption is not only for the purpose of exercising parental
authority because an emancipated child acquires certain rights from his
parents and assumes certain obligations and responsibilities.
Hence, the present petition.
Issue
Petitioner appealed directly to this Court raising the sole issue of whether or
not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.
The Court’s Ruling
Petitioner contends that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed because it
is the duty of the court and the State to protect the paramount interest and
welfare of the child to be adopted. Petitioner argues that the legal maxim
"dura lex sed lex" is not applicable to adoption cases. She argues that joint
parental authority is not necessary in this case since, at the time the petitions
were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael
was already 18 years of age. Parental authority is not anymore necessary
since they have been emancipated having attained the age of majority.
We deny the petition.
Joint Adoption by Husband and Wife
It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed,
petitioner had already remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without
being joined by her husband Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm
the trial court’s decision denying the petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed
lex. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads:
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil
capacity and legal rights, of good moral character, has not been
convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, emotionally and
psychologically capable of caring for children, at least sixteen (16)
years older than the adoptee, and who is in a position to support and
care for his/her children in keeping with the means of the family.
The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference between the age of
the adopter and adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the
biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptee’s
parent;
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for
Filipino nationals: Provided, That his/her country has diplomatic
relations with the Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been
living in the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years prior
to the filing of the application for adoption and maintains such
residence until the adoption decree is entered, that he/she has been
certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate
government agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in
his/her country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee to
enter his/her country as his/her adopted son/daughter: Provided,
further, That the requirements on residency and certification of the
alien’s qualification to adopt in his/her country may be waived for
the following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative
within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity; or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of
his/her Filipino spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to
adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative within the
fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the
Filipino spouses; or
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the
guardianship and clearance of his/her financial accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter
of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate
son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse has
signified his/her consent thereto; or
 (iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate
son/daughter of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the
spouses. (Emphasis supplied)
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint
adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance
with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal
situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate
child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also
insures harmony between the spouses.12
The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having
remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly
adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself,
without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in denying
the petitions for adoption on this ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in
Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of
petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the children are not the
illegitimate children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not
legally separated from each other.
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his
Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are certain requirements that
Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the
qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that
his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2)
he must have been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous
years prior to the filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain
such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity
to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the
adopter’s country as the latter’s adopted child. None of these qualifications
were shown and proved during the trial.
These requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification
to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or
adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or
affinity of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate
children of petitioner.
Effects of Adoption
Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore necessary
since the children have been emancipated having reached the age of
majority. This is untenable.
Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic
consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and
physical character and well-being.13 The father and the mother shall jointly
exercise parental authority over the persons of their common
children.14 Even the remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the
parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another
person to be the guardian of the person or property of the children.15
It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation — that is, when
he attains the age of majority or 18 years of age16 — emancipation terminates
parental authority over the person and property of the child, who shall then
be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life.17 However, parental
authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. Article V of RA
8552 enumerates the effects of adoption, thus:
ARTICLE V
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION
SEC. 16. Parental Authority. - Except in cases where the biological parent is
the spouse of the adopter, all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and
the adoptee shall be severed and the same shall then be vested on the
adopter(s).
SEC. 17. Legitimacy. - The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate
son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as such is
entitled to all the rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate
sons/daughters born to them without discrimination of any kind. To this
end, the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and support in keeping with
the means of the family.
SEC. 18. Succession. - In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the
adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from
legitimate filiation. However, if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s)
had left a will, the law on testamentary succession shall govern.
Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the
biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the
spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the case for dissolution of his marriage to petitioner in the Los Angeles Superior
adopter; and (3) give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations Court.
arising from the relationship of parent and child, including but not limited
to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between
and (ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs petitioner and Olario is of no moment. It is not equivalent to a decree of
of each other.18 Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental dissolution of marriage. Until and unless there is a judicial decree for the
authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario, the marriage still
with all the rights19 of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
the father and the mother; (2) to receive support from their parents; and (3) required. We reiterate our ruling above that since, at the time the petitions
to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely, the for adoption were filed, petitioner was married to Olario, joint adoption is
adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the mandatory.
benefits to which biological parents are entitled20 such as support21 and
successional rights.22 WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 15
September 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22
We are mindful of the fact that adoption statutes, being humane and in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259. Costs against petitioner.
salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount
consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care and SO ORDERED.
education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the
protection of society and family, as well as to allow childless couples or
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in
Associate Justice
the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental
instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and
fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.23 But, as we have WE CONCUR:
ruled in Republic v. Vergara:24
REYNATO S. PUNO
We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the Chief Justice 
promotion of the welfare of the children. Accordingly, the law should be Chairperson
construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than defeat said
purpose. The law must also be applied with compassion, understanding and TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
RENATO C. CORONA
less severity in view of the fact that it is intended to provide homes, love, CASTRO
Associate Justice
care and education for less fortunate children. Regrettably, the Court is not in Associate Justice
a position to affirm the trial court’s decision favoring adoption in the case at
bar, for the law is clear and it cannot be modified without violating the LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
proscription against judicial legislation. Until such time however, that the Associate Justice
law on the matter is amended, we cannot sustain the respondent-spouses’
petition for adoption. (Emphasis supplied)1avvphi1.zw+ CERTIFICATION

Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
should have jointly filed the petitions with her husband. We cannot make conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
our own legislation to suit petitioner. the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent events would show REYNATO S. PUNO
that joint adoption could no longer be possible because Olario has filed a Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 183053               June 16, 2010
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF CRISTINA
AGUINALDO-SUNTAY; EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III,Petitioner,  As previously adverted to, the marriage between Emilio I and Isabel was
vs.
ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Unlike Pope Alexander VI1 who, faced with the impasse between Spain and
Portugal, deftly and literally divided the exploration, or more appropriately,
the riches of the New World by issuing the Inter Caetera,2 we are confronted
with the difficult, albeit, all too familiar tale of another family imbroglio over
the estate of a decedent.3
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
74949,4 reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 78,
Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95.5
Before anything else, we disentangle the facts.
On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina), married
to Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico), died intestate. In 1979, their only son,
Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (Emilio I), predeceased both Cristina and Federico.
At the time of her death, Cristina was survived by her husband, Federico,
and several grandchildren, including herein petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay
III (Emilio III) and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay.
During his lifetime, Emilio I was married to Isabel Cojuangco, and they
begot three children, namely: herein respondent, Isabel; Margarita; and
Emilio II, all surnamed Cojuangco-Suntay. Emilio I’s marriage to Isabel
Cojuangco was subsequently annulled. Thereafter, Emilio I had two children
out of wedlock, Emilio III and Nenita Suntay Tañedo (Nenita), by two
different women, Concepcion Mendoza and Isabel Santos, respectively.
Despite the illegitimate status of Emilio III, he was reared ever since he was a
mere baby, nine months old, by the spouses Federico and Cristina and was
an acknowledged natural child of Emilio I. Nenita is an acknowledged
natural child of Emilio I and was likewise brought up by the spouses
Federico and Cristina.
annulled.6 Consequently, respondent and her siblings Margarita and Emilio
II, lived with their mother on Balete Drive, Quezon City, separately from
their father and paternal grandparents.
Parenthetically, after the death of Emilio I, Federico filed a petition for
visitation rights over his grandchildren: respondent Isabel, Margarita, and
Emilio II. Although the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court in Quezon
City granted the petition and allowed Federico one hour of visitation
monthly, initially reduced to thirty minutes, it was altogether stopped
because of a manifestation filed by respondent Isabel, articulating her
sentiments on the unwanted visits of her grandparents.
Significantly, Federico, after the death of his spouse, Cristina, or on
September 27, 1993, adopted their illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and
Nenita.7
On October 26, 1995, respondent filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor, containing the following allegations:
[A]t the time of [the decedent’s] death, [she] was a resident of the
Municipality of Hagonoy, Province of Bulacan; that the [decedent] left an
estate of real and personal properties, with a probable gross value of
₱29,000,000.00; that the names, ages and residences of the surviving heirs of
the [decedent] are: (1) Federico C. Suntay, 89 years old, surviving spouse and
a resident of x x x; (2) Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay, 36 years old, legitimate
granddaughter and a resident of x x x; (3) Margarita Cojuangco-Suntay, 39
years old, legitimate granddaughter and a resident of x x x; and (4) Emilio
Cojuangco-Suntay, 35 years old, legitimate grandson and a resident of x x x;
and that as far as [respondent] knew, the decedent left no debts or obligation
at the time of her death.8
Disavowing the allegations in the petition of his grandchild, respondent
Isabel, Federico filed his opposition on December 21, 1995, alleging, among
others, that:
[B]eing the surviving spouse of Cristina, he is capable of administering her
estate and he should be the one appointed as its administrator; that as part
owner of the mass of conjugal properties left by Cristina, he must be
accorded legal preference in the administration thereof; that Isabel and her
family had been alienated from their grandparents for more than thirty (30)
years; that the enumeration of heirs in the petition was incomplete as it did
not mention the other children of his son[,] namely: Emilio III and Nenita S.
Tañedo; that he is better situated to protect the integrity of the estate of
Cristina as even before the death of his wife[,] he was already the one who
managed their conjugal properties; that the probable value of the estate as
stated in the petition was grossly overstated (sic); and that Isabel’s allegation
that some of the properties are in the hands of usurpers is untrue.9
Meanwhile, after a failed attempt by the parties to settle the proceedings
amicably, Federico filed a Manifestation dated March 13, 1999, nominating
his adopted son, Emilio III, as administrator of the decedent’s estate on his
behalf, in the event he would be adjudged as the one with a better right to
the letters of administration.
Subsequently, the trial court granted Emilio III’s Motion for Leave to
Intervene considering his interest in the outcome of the case. Emilio III filed
his Opposition-In-Intervention, which essentially echoed the allegations in
his grandfather’s opposition, alleging that Federico, or in his stead, Emilio
III, was better equipped than respondent to administer and manage the
estate of the decedent, Cristina. Additionally, Emilio III averred his own
qualifications that: "[he] is presently engaged in aquaculture and banking; he
was trained by the decedent to work in his early age by involving him in the
activities of the Emilio Aguinaldo Foundation which was established in 1979
in memory of her grandmother’s father; the significant work experiences
outside the family group are included in his curriculum vitae; he was
employed by the oppositor [Federico] after his graduation in college with
management degree at F.C.E. Corporations and Hagonoy Rural Bank; x x
x."10
In the course of the proceedings, on November 13, 2000, Federico died.
After the testimonies of both parties’ witnesses were heard and evidence on
their respective allegations were adduced, the trial court rendered a decision
on November 9, 2001, appointing herein petitioner, Emilio III, as
administrator of decedent Cristina’s intestate estate, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition of Isabel Cojuangco[-]Suntay is DENIED and the
Opposition[-]in[-]Intervention is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay, III is hereby appointed
administrator of the estate of the decedent Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay, who
shall enter upon the execution of his trust upon the filing of a bond in the
amount of ₱200,000.00, conditioned as follows:
(1) To make and return within three (3) months, a true and complete
inventory;
(2) To administer the estate and to pay and discharge all debts,
legatees, and charge on the same, or dividends thereon;
(3) To render a true and just account within one (1) year, and at any
other time when required by the court, and
(4) To perform all orders of the Court.
Once the said bond is approved by the court, let Letters of Administration be
issued in his favor.
SO ORDERED.11
Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal before the CA, which reversed and set
aside the decision of the RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration issued
to Emilio III, and appointed respondent as administratrix of the intestate
estate of the decedent, Cristina, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the assailed decision dated
November 9, 2001 of Branch 78, Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan in
SPC No. 117-M-95 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the letters of
administration issued by the said court to Emilio A.M. Suntay III, if any, are
consequently revoked. Petitioner Isabel Cojuangco[-]Suntay is hereby
appointed administratrix of the intestate estate of Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay.
Let letters of administration be issued in her favor upon her filing of a bond
in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand (₱200,000.00) Pesos.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.12
The motion for reconsideration of Emilio III having been denied, he appeals
by certiorari to this Court, raising the following issues:
A. IN THE APPOINTMENT OF AN ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE
UNDER SECTION 6 OF RULE 78 OF THE RULES OF COURT, WHETHER
ARTICLE 992 OF THE CIVIL CODE APPLIES; and
B. UNDER THE UNDISPUTED FACTS WHERE HEREIN PETITIONER
WAS REARED BY THE DECEDENT AND HER SPOUSE SINCE INFANCY,
WHETHER ARTICLE 992 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE APPLIES SO AS TO
BAR HIM FROM BEING APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
DECEDENT’S ESTATE.13
In ruling against the petition of herein respondent, the RTC ratiocinated,
thus:
Evidence objectively assessed and carefully evaluated, both testimonial and
documentary, the court opines that it is to the best interest of the estate of the
decedent and all claimants thereto, that the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay
III, be appointed administrator of the estate in the above-entitled special
proceedings.
Based on the evidence and demeanor of the parties in court, [respondent’s
immediate] family and that of the decedent are apparently estranged. The
root cause of which, is not for this court to ascertain nor is this the right time
and the proper forum to dwell upon. What matters most at this time is the
welfare of the estate of the decedent in the light of such unfortunate and
bitter estrangement.
The Court honestly believes that to appoint the petitioner would go against
the wishes of the decedent who raised [Emilio III] from infancy in her home
in Baguio City as her own child. Certainly, it would go against the wishes of
the surviving spouse x x x who nominated [Emilio III] for appointment as
administrator.
As between [respondent] and the oppositor [Federico], the latter is accorded
preference as the surviving spouse under Sec 6(a), Rule 78, Rules of Court.
On the basis of such preference, he vigorously opposed the appointment of
the petitioner and instead nominated [Emilio III], his grandchild and
adopted child. Such nomination, absent any valid and justifiable reason,
should not be imperiously set aside and insouciantly ignored, even after the
oppositor [Federico] has passed away, in order to give effect to the order of
preference mandated by law. Moreover, from the viewpoint of the estate, the
nomination of [Emilio III] appear[s] intrinsically meritorious. For the benefit
of the estate and its claimants, creditors, as well as heirs, the administrator
should be one who is prepared, academically and by experience, for the
demands and responsibilities of the position. While [respondent], a
practicing physician, is not unqualified, it is clear to the court that when it
comes to management of real estate and the processing and payment of
debts, [Emilio III], a businessman with an established track record as a
manager has a decided edge and therefore, is in a position to better handle
the preservation of the estate.14
In marked contrast, the CA zeroed in on Emilio III’s status as an illegitimate
child of Emilio I and, thus, barred from representing his deceased father in
the estate of the latter’s legitimate mother, the decedent. On the whole, the
CA pronounced that Emilio III, who was merely nominated by Federico, and
which nomination hinged upon the latter’s appointment as administrator of
the decedent’s estate, cannot be appointed as the administrator of the
decedent’s estate for the following reasons:15
1. The appointment of Emilio III was subject to a suspensive
condition, i.e., Federico’s appointment as administrator of the estate,
he being the surviving spouse of Cristina, the decedent. The death of
Federico before his appointment as administrator of Cristina’s estate
rendered his nomination of Emilio III inoperative;
2. As between the legitimate offspring (respondent) and illegitimate
offspring (Emilio III) of decedent’s son, Emilio I, respondent is
preferred, being the "next of kin" referred to by Section 6, Rule 78 of
the Rules of Court, and entitled to share in the distribution of
Cristina’s estate as an heir;
3. Jurisprudence has consistently held that Article 99216 of the Civil
Code bars the illegitimate child from inheriting ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother. Thus,
Emilio III, who is barred from inheriting from his grandmother,
cannot be preferred over respondent in the administration of the
estate of their grandmother, the decedent; and
4. Contrary to the RTC’s finding, respondent is as much competent
as Emilio III to administer and manage the subject estate for she
possesses none of the disqualifications specified in Section 1,17 Rule
78 of the Rules of Court.
The pivotal issue in this case turns on who, as between Emilio III and
respondent, is better qualified to act as administrator of the decedent’s estate.
We cannot subscribe to the appellate court’s ruling excluding Emilio III in
the administration of the decedent’s undivided estate. Mistakenly, the CA
glosses over several undisputed facts and circumstances:
1. The underlying philosophy of our law on intestate succession is to
give preference to the wishes and presumed will of the decedent,
absent a valid and effective will;
2. The basis for Article 992 of the Civil Code, referred to as the iron
curtain bar rule,18 is quite the opposite scenario in the facts obtaining
herein for the actual relationship between Federico and Cristina, on
one hand, and Emilio III, on the other, was akin to the normal
relationship of legitimate relatives;
3. Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent, Cristina, and
her husband, Federico, who both acknowledged him as their
grandchild;
4. Federico claimed half of the properties included in the estate of the
decedent, Cristina, as forming part of their conjugal partnership of
gains during the subsistence of their marriage;
5. Cristina’s properties forming part of her estate are still
commingled with that of her husband, Federico, because her share in
the conjugal partnership, albeit terminated upon her death, remains
undetermined and unliquidated; and
6. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to share in
the distribution of the latter’s estate as a direct heir, one degree from
Federico, not simply representing his deceased illegitimate father,
Emilio I.
From the foregoing, it is patently clear that the CA erred in excluding Emilio
III from the administration of the decedent’s estate. As Federico’s adopted
son, Emilio III’s interest in the estate of Cristina is as much apparent to this
Court as the interest therein of respondent, considering that the CA even
declared that "under the law, [Federico], being the surviving spouse, would
have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the
decedent, aside from his share in the conjugal partnership." Thus, we are
puzzled why the CA resorted to a strained legal reasoning – Emilio III’s
nomination was subject to a suspensive condition and rendered inoperative
by reason of Federico’s death – wholly inapplicable to the case at bar.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists the order of preference in the
appointment of an administrator of an estate:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no executor
is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the
trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be
granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of
kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such
surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have
appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of
kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or
if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days
after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request
that administration be granted to some other person, it may be
granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and
willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may
be granted to such other person as the court may select.
However, the order of preference is not absolute for it depends on the
attendant facts and circumstances of each case.19 Jurisprudence has long held
that the selection of an administrator lies in the sound discretion of the trial
court.20 In the main, the attendant facts and circumstances of this case
necessitate, at the least, a joint administration by both respondent and Emilio
III of their grandmother’s, Cristina’s, estate.
In the case of Uy v. Court of Appeals,21 we upheld the appointment by the
trial court of a co-administration between the decedent’s son and the
decedent’s brother, who was likewise a creditor of the decedent’s estate. In
the same vein, we declared in Delgado Vda. de De la Rosa v. Heirs of
Marciana Rustia Vda. de Damian22 that:
[i]n the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the
interest in the estate of the one to be appointed. The order of preference does
not rule out the appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases where
justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in
the management of the estates, a situation which obtains here.
Similarly, the subject estate in this case calls to the succession other putative
heirs, including another illegitimate grandchild of Cristina and Federico,
Nenita Tañedo, but who was likewise adopted by Federico, and the two (2)
siblings of respondent Isabel, Margarita and Emilio II. In all, considering the
conflicting claims of the putative heirs, and the unliquidated conjugal
partnership of Cristina and Federico which forms part of their respective
estates, we are impelled to move in only one direction, i.e., joint
administration of the subject estate.
One final note. Counsel for petitioner meticulously argues that Article 992 of
the Civil Code, the successional bar between the legitimate and illegitimate
relatives of a decedent, does not apply in this instance where facts
indubitably demonstrate the contrary – Emilio III, an illegitimate grandchild
of the decedent, was actually treated by the decedent and her husband as
their own son, reared from infancy, educated and trained in their businesses,
and eventually legally adopted by decedent’s husband, the original
oppositor to respondent’s petition for letters of administration.
We are not unmindful of the critiques of civilists of a conflict and a lacuna in
the law concerning the bone of contention that is Article 992 of the Civil
Code, beginning with the eminent Justice J.B.L. Reyes:
In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was admitted
only within the legitimate family; so much so that Article 943 of that Code
prescribed that an illegitimate child can not inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father and mother. The Civil Code of
the Philippines apparently adhered to this principle since it reproduced
Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its own Art. 992, but with fine
inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995 and 998) our Code allows the
hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass to his own descendants,
whether legitimate or illegitimate. So that while Art. 992 prevents the
illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from representing him in the intestate
succession of the grandparent, the illegitimates of an illegitimate child can
now do so. This difference being indefensible and unwarranted, in the future
revision of the Civil Code we shall have to make a choice and decide either
that the illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases the right of representation, in
which case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said article
and modify Articles 995 and 998. The first solution would be more in accord
with an enlightened attitude vis-à-vis illegitimate children.23
Manresa explains the basis for the rules on intestate succession:
The law [of intestacy] is founded… on the presumed will of the deceased…
Love, it is said, first descends, then ascends, and, finally, spreads sideways.
Thus, the law first calls the descendants, then the ascendants, and finally the
collaterals, always preferring those closer in degree to those of remoter
degrees, on the assumption that the deceased would have done so had he
manifested his last will… Lastly, in default of anyone called to succession or
bound to the decedent by ties of blood or affection, it is in accordance with
his presumed will that his property be given to charitable or educational
institutions, and thus contribute to the welfare of humanity.24
Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect the basis of
intestate succession, i.e., love first descends, for the decedent, Cristina, did
not distinguish between her legitimate and illegitimate grandchildren.
Neither did her husband, Federico, who, in fact, legally raised the status of
Emilio III from an illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate child. The
peculiar circumstances of this case, painstakingly pointed out by counsel for
petitioner, overthrow the legal presumption in Article 992 of the Civil Code
that there exist animosity and antagonism between legitimate and
illegitimate descendants of a deceased.
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial restraint impels us to refrain
from making a final declaration of heirship and distributing the presumptive
shares of the parties in the estates of Cristina and Federico, considering that
the question on who will administer the properties of the long deceased
couple has yet to be settled.
Our holding in Capistrano v. Nadurata25 on the same issue remains good
law:
[T]he declaration of heirs made by the lower court is premature, although the
evidence sufficiently shows who are entitled to succeed the deceased. The
estate had hardly been judicially opened, and the proceeding has not as yet
reached the stage of distribution of the estate which must come after the
inheritance is liquidated.
Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court does not depart from the foregoing
admonition:
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue is made. – x x x. If there is a
controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased
person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under
the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above ANTONIO T. CARPIO
mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of Associate Justice
them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the Chairperson, Second Division
payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.
CERTIFICATION
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74949 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Letters of Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
issue to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III and respondent Isabel had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment by each of a bond to be set by the Regional of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-
M-95. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is likewise RENATO C. CORONA
directed to make a determination and to declare the heirs of decedent Chief Justice
Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay according to the actual factual milieu as proven
by the parties, and all other persons with legal interest in the subject estate. It
is further directed to settle the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay
with dispatch. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ*

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND SPECIAL DIVISION
G.R. No. 183053               October 10, 2012
EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III, Petitioner,  infancy by the spouses Federico and Cristina. Their legitimate grandchildren,
vs.
ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
The now overly prolonged, all-too familiar and too-much-stretched
imbroglio over the estate of Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay has continued. We
issued a Decision in the dispute as in Inter Caetera.1 We now find a need to
replace the decision.
Before us is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay (respondent Isabel) of our Decision2 in G.R. No. 183053
dated 16 June 2010, directing the issuance of joint letters of administration to
both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and respondent. The
dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74949 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Letters of
Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall
issue to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III and respondent Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment by each of a bond to be set by the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-
M-95. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is likewise
directed to make a determination and to declare the heirs of decedent
Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay according to the actual factual milieu as proven
by the parties, and all other persons with legal interest in the subject estate. It
is further directed to settle the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay
with dispatch. No costs.3
We are moved to trace to its roots the controversy between the parties.
The decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died intestate on 4 June
1990. Cristina was survived by her spouse, Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico)
and five grandchildren: three legitimate grandchildren, including herein
respondent, Isabel; and two illegitimate grandchildren, including petitioner
Emilio III, all by Federico’s and Cristina’s only child, Emilio A. Suntay
(Emilio I), who predeceased his parents.
The illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita, were both reared from
Isabel and her siblings, Margarita and Emilio II, lived with their mother
Isabel Cojuangco, following the separation of Isabel’s parents, Emilio I and
Isabel Cojuangco. Isabel’s parents, along with her paternal grandparents,
were involved in domestic relations cases, including a case for parricide filed
by Isabel Cojuangco against Emilio I. Emilio I was eventually acquitted.
In retaliation, Emilio I filed a complaint for legal separation against his wife,
charging her among others with infidelity. The trial court declared as null
and void and of no effect the marriage of Emilio I and Isabel Cojuangco on
the finding that:
From February 1965 thru December 1965 plaintiff was confined in the
Veterans memorial Hospital. Although at the time of the trial of parricide
case (September 8, 1967) the patient was already out of the hospital, he
continued to be under observation and treatment.
It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiffs mental
aberration classified as schizophernia (sic) had made themselves manifest
even as early as 1955; that the disease worsened with time, until 1965 when
he was actually placed under expert neuro-psychiatrist (sic) treatment; that
even if the subject has shown marked progress, the remains bereft of
adequate understanding of right and wrong.
There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties was effected
on July 9, 1958, years after plaintiffs mental illness had set in. This fact would
justify a declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 85 of the Civil
Code which provides:
Art. 95. (sic) A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes
after (sic) existing at the time of the marriage:
xxxx
(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming
to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife.
There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage defendant knew about
the mental condition of plaintiff; and there is proof that plaintiff continues to
be without sound reason. The charges in this very complaint add emphasis
to the findings of the neuro-psychiatrist handling the patient, that plaintiff
really lives more in fancy than in reality, a strong indication of schizophernia
(sic).4
Intent on maintaining a relationship with their grandchildren, Federico and
Isabel filed a complaint for visitation rights to spend time with Margarita,
Emilio II, and Isabel in the same special lower court. The Juvenile Domestic
Relations Court in Quezon City (JDRC-QC) granted their prayer for one hour
a month of visitation rights which was subsequently reduced to thirty
minutes, and ultimately stopped, because of respondent Isabel’s testimony in
court that her grandparents’ visits caused her and her siblings stress and
anxiety.5
On 27 September 1993, more than three years after Cristina’s death, Federico
adopted his illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita.
On 26 October 1995, respondent Isabel, filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration over Cristina’s estate docketed as Special Proceeding Case
No. 117-M-95. Federico, opposed the petition, pointing out that: (1) as the
surviving spouse of the decedent, he should be appointed administrator of
the decedent’s estate; (2) as part owner of the mass of conjugal properties left
by the decedent, he must be accorded preference in the administration
thereof; (3) Isabel and her siblings had been alienated from their
grandparents for more than thirty (30) years; (4) the enumeration of heirs in
the petition was incomplete as it did not mention the other children of his
son, Emilio III and Nenita; (5) even before the death of his wife, Federico had
administered their conjugal properties, and thus, is better situated to protect
the integrity of the decedent’s estate; (6) the probable value of the estate as
stated in the petition was grossly overstated; and (7) Isabel’s allegation that
some of the properties are in the hands of usurpers is untrue.
Federico filed a Motion to Dismiss Isabel’s petition for letters of
administration on the ground that Isabel had no right of representation to the
estate of Cristina, she being an illegitimate grandchild of the latter as a result
of Isabel’s parents’ marriage being declared null and void. However, in
Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, we categorically declared that Isabel and her
siblings, having been born of a voidable marriage as opposed to a void
marriage based on paragraph 3, Article 85 of the Civil Code, were legitimate
children of Emilio I, who can all represent him in the estate of their
legitimate grandmother, the decedent, Cristina.
Undaunted by the set back, Federico nominated Emilio III to administer the
decedent’s estate on his behalf in the event letters of administration issues to
Federico. Consequently, Emilio III filed an Opposition-In-Intervention,
echoing the allegations in his grandfather’s opposition, alleging that
Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III, was better equipped than respondent to
administer and manage the estate of the decedent, Cristina.
On 13 November 2000, Federico died.
Almost a year thereafter or on 9 November 2001, the trial court rendered a
decision appointing Emilio III as administrator of decedent Cristina’s
intestate estate:
WHEREFORE, the petition of Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay is DENIED and the
Opposition-in-Intervention is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay, III (sic) is hereby appointed
administrator of the estate of the decedent Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay, who
shall enter upon the execution of his trust upon the filing of a bond in the
amount of ₱ 200,000.00, conditioned as follows:
(1) To make and return within three (3) months, a true and complete
inventory;
(2) To administer the estate and to pay and discharge all debts, legatees, and
charge on the same, or dividends thereon;
(3) To render a true and just account within one (1) year, and at any other
time when required by the court, and
(4) To perform all orders of the Court.
Once the said bond is approved by the court, let Letters of Administration be
issued in his favor.6
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the
RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III, and
appointed respondent as administratrix of the subject estate:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the assailed decision dated
November 9, 2001 of Branch 78, Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan in
SPC No. 117-M-95 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the letters of
administration issued by the said court to Emilio A.M. Suntay III, if any, are
consequently revoked. Petitioner Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay is hereby
appointed administratrix of the intestate estate of Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay.
Let letters of administration be issued in her favor upon her filing of a bond
in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand (₱ 200,000.00) Pesos.7
As previously adverted to, on appeal by certiorari, we reversed and set aside
the ruling of the appellate court. We decided to include Emilio III as co-
administrator of Cristina’s estate, giving weight to his interest in Federico’s
estate. In ruling for co-administration between Emilio III and
Isabel, we considered that:
1. Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent, Cristina, and
her husband, Federico, who both acknowledged him as their
grandchild;
2. Federico claimed half of the properties included in the estate of the
decedent, Cristina, as forming part of their conjugal partnership of
gains during the subsistence of their marriage;
3. Cristina’s properties, forming part of her estate, are still
commingled with those of her husband, Federico, because her share
in the conjugal partnership remains undetermined and unliquidated;
and
4. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to share in
the distribution of the latter’s estate as a direct heir, one degree from
Federico, and not simply in representation of his deceased
illegitimate father, Emilio I.
In this motion, Isabel pleads for total affirmance of the Court of Appeals’
Decision in favor of her sole administratorship based on her status as a
legitimate grandchild of Cristina, whose estate she seeks to administer.
Isabel contends that the explicit provisions of Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules
of Court on the order of preference for the issuance of letters of
administration cannot be ignored and that Article 992 of the Civil Code must
be followed. Isabel further asserts that Emilio III had demonstrated adverse
interests and disloyalty to the estate, thus, he does not deserve to become a
co-administrator thereof.
Specifically, Isabel bewails that: (1) Emilio III is an illegitimate grandchild
and therefore, not an heir of the decedent; (2) corollary thereto, Emilio III, not
being a "next of kin" of the decedent, has no interest in the estate to justify his
appointment as administrator thereof; (3) Emilio III’s actuations since his
appointment as administrator by the RTC on 9 November 2001 emphatically
demonstrate the validity and wisdom of the order of preference in Section 6,
Rule 78 of the Rules of Court; and (4) there is no basis for joint administration
as there are no "opposing parties or factions to be represented."
To begin with, the case at bar reached us on the issue of who, as between
Emilio III and Isabel, is better qualified to act as administrator of the
decedent’s estate. We did not choose. Considering merely his demonstrable
interest in the subject estate, we ruled that Emilio III should likewise
administer the estate of his illegitimate grandmother, Cristina, as a co-
administrator. In the context of this case, we have to make a choice and
therefore, reconsider our decision of 16 June 2010.
The general rule in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a
decedent is laid down in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no executor is
named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the
trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be
granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or
both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving
husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and
willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or
the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband
or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the
person to apply for administration or to request that administration be
granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the
principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is not such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be
granted to such other person as the court may select.
Textually, the rule lists a sequence to be observed, an order of preference, in
the appointment of an administrator. This order of preference, which
categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors
in the appointment of an administrator, has been reinforced in
jurisprudence.8
The paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator over
the estate of a decedent is the prospective administrator’s interest in the
estate.9 This is the same consideration which Section 6, Rule 78 takes into
account in establishing the order of preference in the appointment of
administrator for the estate. The rationale behind the rule is that those who
will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and economical administration of the
estate, or, in the alternative, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence
or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to
administer the estate correctly.10 In all, given that the rule speaks of an order
of preference, the person to be appointed administrator of a decedent’s estate
must demonstrate not only an interest in the estate, but an interest therein
greater than any other candidate.
To illustrate, the preference bestowed by law to the surviving spouse in the
administration of a decedent’s estate presupposes the surviving spouse’s
interest in the conjugal partnership or community property forming part of
the decedent’s estate.11 Likewise, a surviving spouse is a compulsory heir of a
decedent12 which evinces as much, if not more, interest in administering the
entire estate of a decedent, aside from her share in the conjugal partnership
or absolute community property.
It is to this requirement of observation of the order of preference in the
appointment of administrator of a decedent’s estate, that the appointment of
co-administrators has been allowed, but as an exception. We again refer to
Section 6(a) of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court which specifically states that
letters of administration may be issued to both the surviving spouse and the
next of kin. In addition and impliedly, we can refer to Section 2 of Rule 82 of
the Rules of Court which say that "x x x when an executor or administrator
dies, resigns, or is removed, the remaining executor or administrator may
administer the trust alone, x x x."
In a number of cases, we have sanctioned the appointment of more than one
administrator for the benefit of the estate and those interested therein.13 We
recognized that the appointment of administrator of the estate of a decedent
or the determination of a person’s suitability for the office of judicial
administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court
exercising the power of appointment.14
Under certain circumstances and for various reasons well-settled in
Philippine and American jurisprudence, we have upheld the appointment of
co-administrators: (1) to have the benefits of their judgment and perhaps at
all times to have different interests represented;15 (2) where justice and equity
demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management
of the estate of the deceased; (3) where the estate is large or, from any cause,
an intricate and perplexing one to settle;16 (4) to have all interested persons
satisfied and the representatives to work in harmony for the best interests of
the estate;17 and when a person entitled to the administration of an estate
desires to have another competent person associated with him in the office.18
In the frequently cited Matias v. Gonzales, we dwelt on the appointment of
special co-administrators during the pendency of the appeal for the probate
of the decedent’s will. Pending the probate thereof, we recognized Matias’
special interest in the decedent’s estate as universal heir and executrix
designated in the instrument who should not be excluded in the
administration thereof. Thus, we held that justice and equity demands that
the two (2) factions among the non-compulsory heirs of the decedent,
consisting of an instituted heir (Matias) and intestate heirs (respondents
thereat), should be represented in the management of the decedent’s estate. 19
Another oft-cited case is Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete, where we held that
"inasmuch as petitioner-wife owns one-half of the conjugal properties and
that she, too, is a compulsory heir of her husband, to deprive her of any hand
in the administration of the estate prior to the probate of the will would be
unfair to her proprietary interests."20
Hewing closely to the aforementioned cases is our ruling in Ventura v.
Ventura21 where we allowed the appointment of the surviving spouse and
legitimate children of the decedent as co-administrators. However, we drew
a distinction between the heirs categorized as next of kin, the nearest of kin
in the category being preferred, thus:
In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio Ventura is
Juana Cardona while the next of kin are: Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura
and Maria and Miguel Ventura. The "next of kin" has been defined as those
persons who are entitled under the statute of distribution to the decedent’s
property (citations omitted). It is generally said that "the nearest of kin,
whose interest in the estate is more preponderant, is preferred in the choice
of administrator. ‘Among members of a class the strongest ground for
preference is the amount or preponderance of interest. As between next of
kin, the nearest of kin is to be preferred.’" (citations omitted)
As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme Court,
Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the legitimate children of Gregorio
Ventura and his wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano. Therefore, as the nearest
of kin of Gregorio Ventura, they are entitled to preference over the
illegitimate children of Gregorio Ventura, namely: Maria and Miguel
Ventura. Hence, under the aforestated preference provided in Section 6 of
Rule 78, the person or persons to be appointed administrator are Juana
Cardona, as the surviving spouse, or Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura as
nearest of kin, or Juana Cardona and Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in the
discretion of the Court, in order to represent both interests. 22 (Emphasis
supplied)
In Silverio, Sr. v. Court of Appeals,23 we maintained that the order of preference
in the appointment of an administrator depends on the attendant facts and
circumstances. In that case, we affirmed the legitimate child’s appointment
as special administrator, and eventually as regular administrator, of the
decedent’s estate as against the surviving spouse who the lower court found
unsuitable. Reiterating Sioca v. Garcia24 as good law, we pointed out that
unsuitableness for appointment as administrator may consist in adverse
interest of some kind or hostility to those immediately interested in the
estate.
In Valarao v. Pascual,25 we see another story with a running theme of heirs
squabbling over the estate of a decedent. We found no reason to set aside the
probate court’s refusal to appoint as special co-administrator Diaz, even if he
had a demonstrable interest in the estate of the decedent and represented one
of the factions of heirs, because the evidence weighed by the probate court
pointed to Diaz’s being remiss in his previous duty as co-administrator of the
estatein the early part of his administration. Surveying the previously
discussed cases of Matias, Corona, and Vda. de Dayrit, we clarified, thus:
Respondents cannot take comfort in the cases of Matias v. Gonzales, Corona
v. Court of Appeals, and Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete, cited in the assailed
Decision. Contrary to their claim, these cases do not establish an absolute
right demandable from the probate court to appoint special co-
administrators who would represent the respective interests of squabbling
heirs. Rather, the cases constitute precedents for the authority of the probate
court to designate not just one but also two or more special co-administrators
for a single estate. Now whether the probate court exercises such prerogative
when the heirs are fighting among themselves is a matter left entirely to its
sound discretion.
Furthermore, the cases of Matias, Corona and Vda. de Dayrit hinge upon
factual circumstances other than the incompatible interests of the heirs which
are glaringly absent from the instant case. In Matias this Court ordered the
appointment of a special co-administrator because of the applicant's status as
the universal heir and executrix designated in the will, which we considered
to be a "special interest" deserving protection during the pendency of the
appeal. Quite significantly, since the lower court in Matias had already
deemed it best to appoint more than one special administrator, we found
grave abuse of discretion in the act of the lower court in ignoring the
applicant's distinctive status in the selection of another special administrator.
In Corona we gave "highest consideration" to the "executrix's choice of Special
Administrator, considering her own inability to serve and the wide latitude
of discretion given her by the testatrix in her will," for this Court to compel
her appointment as special co-administrator. It is also manifest from the
decision in Corona that the presence of conflicting interests among the heirs
therein was not per se the key factor in the designation of a second special
administrator as this fact was taken into account only to disregard or, in the
words of Corona, to "overshadow" the objections to the appointment on
grounds of "impracticality and lack of kinship."
Finally in Vda. de Dayrit we justified the designation of the wife of the
decedent as special co-administrator because it was "our considered opinion
that inasmuch as petitioner-wife owns one-half of the conjugal properties
and that she, too, is a compulsory heir of her husband, to deprive her of any
hand in the administration of the estate prior to the probate of the will would
be unfair to her proprietary interests." The special status of a surviving
spouse in the special administration of an estate was also emphasized in Fule
v. Court of Appeals where we held that the widow would have more interest
than any other next of kin in the proper administration of the entire estate
since she possesses not only the right of succession over a portion of the
exclusive property of the decedent but also a share in the conjugal
partnership for which the good or bad administration of the estate may affect
not just the fruits but more critically the naked ownership thereof. And in
Gabriel v. Court of Appeals we recognized the distinctive status of a
surviving spouse applying as regular administrator of the deceased spouse's
estate when we counseled the probate court that "there must be a very strong
case to justify the exclusion of the widow from the administration."
Clearly, the selection of a special co-administrator in Matias, Corona and
Vda. de Dayrit was based upon the independent proprietary interests and
moral circumstances of the appointee that were not necessarily related to the
demand for representation being repeatedly urged by
respondents.26(Emphasis supplied)
In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, we unequivocally declared the mandatory
character of the rule on the order of preference for the issuance of letters of
administration:
Evidently, the foregoing provision of the Rules prescribes the order of
preference in the issuance of letters of administration, it categorically seeks
out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors, and requires that
sequence to be observed in appointing an administrator. It would be a grave
abuse of discretion for the probate court to imperiously set aside and
insouciantly ignore that directive without any valid and sufficient reason
therefor.27
Subsequently, in Angeles v. Angeles-Maglaya, we expounded on the legal
28  case even as we reiterate Isabel’s and her sibling’s apparent greater interest
contemplation of a "next of kin," thus:
Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of
administrator of the estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred
over the next of kin of the decedent. When the law speaks of "next of kin,"
the reference is to those who are entitled, under the statute of distribution, to
the decedent's property; one whose relationship is such that he is entitled to
share in the estate as distributed, or, in short, an heir. In resolving, therefore,
the issue of whether an applicant for letters of administration is a next of kin
or an heir of the decedent, the probate court perforce has to determine and
pass upon the issue of filiation. A separate action will only result in a
multiplicity of suits. Upon this consideration, the trial court acted within
bounds when it looked into and passed upon the claimed relationship of
respondent to the late Francisco Angeles.29
Finally, in Uy v. Court of Appeals,30 we took into consideration the size of, and
benefits to, the estate should respondent therein be appointed as co-
administrator. We emphasized that where the estate is large or, from any
cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle, the appointment of co-
administrators may be sanctioned by law.
In our Decision under consideration, we zeroed in on Emilio III’s
demonstrable interest in the estate and glossed over the order of preference
set forth in the Rules. We gave weight to Emilio III’s demonstrable interest in
Cristina’s estate and without a closer scrutiny of the attendant facts and
circumstances, directed co-administration thereof. We are led to a review of
such position by the foregoing survey of cases.
The collected teaching is that mere demonstration of interest in the estate to
be settled does not ipso facto entitle an interested person to co-
administration thereof. Neither does squabbling among the heirs nor adverse
interests necessitate the discounting of the order of preference set forth in
Section 6, Rule 78. Indeed, in the appointment of administrator of the estate
of a deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the
interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as administrator.31 Given
Isabel’s unassailable interest in the estate as one of the decedent’s legitimate
grandchildren and undoubted nearest "next of kin," the appointment of
Emilio III as co-administrator of the same estate, cannot be a demandable
right. It is a matter left entirely to the sound discretion of the Court 32 and
depends on the facts and the attendant circumstances of the case.33
Thus, we proceed to scrutinize the attendant facts and circumstances of this
in the estate of Cristina.
These considerations do not warrant the setting aside of the order of
preference mapped out in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. They
compel that a choice be made of one over the other.
1. The bitter estrangement and long-standing animosity between
Isabel, on the one hand, and Emilio III, on the other, traced back
from the time their paternal grandparents were alive, which can be
characterized as adverse interest of some kind by, or hostility of,
Emilio III to Isabel who is immediately interested in the estate;
2. Corollary thereto, the seeming impossibility of Isabel and Emilio
III working harmoniously as co-administrators may result in
prejudice to the decedent’s estate, ultimately delaying settlement
thereof; and
3. Emilio III, for all his claims of knowledge in the management of
Cristina’s estate, has not looked after the estate’s welfare and has
acted to the damage and prejudice thereof.
Contrary to the assumption made in the Decision that Emilio III’s
demonstrable interest in the estate makes him a suitable co-administrator
thereof, the evidence reveals that Emilio III has turned out to be an
unsuitable administrator of the estate. Respondent Isabel points out that after
Emilio III’s appointment as administrator of the subject estate in 2001, he has
not looked after the welfare of the subject estate and has actually acted to the
damage and prejudice thereof as evidenced by the following:
 1. Emilio III, despite several orders from the probate court for a
complete inventory, omitted in the partial inventories34 he filed
therewith properties of the estate35 including several parcels of land,
cash, bank deposits, jewelry, shares of stock, motor vehicles, and
other personal properties, contrary to Section 1,36paragraph a, Rule
81 of the Rules of Court.
2. Emilio III did not take action on both occasions against Federico’s
settlement of the decedent’s estate which adjudicated to himself a
number of properties properly belonging to said estate (whether
wholly or partially), and which contained a declaration that the
decedent did not leave any descendants or heirs, except for Federico,
entitled to succeed to her estate.37
In compliance to our Resolution dated 18 April 2012 requiring Emilio III to
respond to the following imputations of Isabel that:
1. Emilio III did not file an inventory of the assets until November 14, 2002;
2. The inventory Emilio III submitted did not include several properties of
the decedent;
3. That properties belonging to the decedent have found their way to
different individuals or persons; several properties to Federico Suntay
himself; and
4. While some properties have found their way to Emilio III, by reason of
falsified documents;38
Emilio III refutes Isabel’s imputations that he was lackadaisical in assuming
and performing the functions of administrator of Cristina’s estate:
1. From the time of the RTC’s Order appointing Emilio III as
administrator, Isabel, in her pleadings before the RTC, had
vigorously opposed Emilio III’s assumption of that office, arguing
that "the decision of the RTC dated 9 November 2001 is not among
the judgments authorized by the Rules of Court which may be
immediately implemented or executed;"
2. The delay in Emilio III’s filing of an inventory was due to Isabel’s
vociferous objections to Emilio III’s attempts to act as administrator
while the RTC decision was under appeal to the Court of Appeals;
3. The complained partial inventory is only initiatory, inherent in the
nature thereof, and one of the first steps in the lengthy process of
settlement of a decedent’s estate, such that it cannot constitute a
complete and total listing of the decedent’s properties; and
4. The criminal cases adverted to are trumped-up charges where
Isabel, as private complainant, has been unwilling to appear and
testify, leading the Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44 of
Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, to warn the prosecutor of a
possible motu propio dismissal of the cases.
While we can subscribe to Emilio III’s counsel’s explanation for the blamed
delay in the filing of an inventory and his exposition on the nature thereof,
partial as opposed to complete, in the course of the settlement of a decedent’s
estate, we do not find any clarification on Isabel’s accusation that Emilio III
had deliberately omitted properties in the inventory, which properties of
Cristina he knew existed and which he claims to be knowledgeable about.
The general denial made by Emilio III does not erase his unsuitability as
administrator rooted in his failure to "make and return x x x a true and
complete inventory" which became proven fact when he actually filed partial
inventories before the probate court and by his inaction on two occasions of
Federico’s exclusion of Cristina’s other compulsory heirs, herein Isabel and
her siblings, from the list of heirs.
As administrator, Emilio III enters into the office, posts a bond and executes
an oath to faithfully discharge the duties of settling the decedent’s estate
with the end in view of distribution to the heirs, if any. This he failed to do.
The foregoing circumstances of Emilio III’s omission and inaction become
even more significant and speak volume of his unsuitability as administrator
as it demonstrates his interest adverse to those immediately interested in the
estate of the decedent, Cristina.
In this case, palpable from the evidence on record, the pleadings, and the
protracted litigation, is the inescapable fact that Emilio III and respondent
Isabel have a deep aversion for each other.1awp++i1 To our mind, it becomes
highly impractical, nay, improbable, for the two to work as co-administrators
of their grandmother’s estate. The allegations of Emilio III, the testimony of
Federico and the other witnesses for Federico and Emilio III that Isabel and
her siblings were estranged from their grandparents further drive home the
point that Emilio III bears hostility towards Isabel. More importantly, it
appears detrimental to the decedent’s estate to appoint a co-administrator
(Emilio III) who has shown an adverse interest of some kind or hostility to
those, such as herein respondent Isabel, immediately interested in the said
estate.
Bearing in mind that the issuance of letters of administration is simply a
preliminary order to facilitate the settlement of a decedent’s estate, we here
point out that Emilio III is not without remedies to protect his interests in the
estate of the decedent. In Hilado v. Court of Appeals,39 we mapped out as
among the allowable participation of "any interested persons" or "any
persons interested in the estate" in either testate or intestate proceedings:
xxxx
4. Section 640 of Rule 87, which allows an individual interested in the estate of
the deceased "to complain to the court of the concealment, embezzlement, or
conveyance of any asset of the decedent, or of evidence of the decedent’s title
or interest therein;"
5. Section 1041 of Rule 85, which requires notice of the time and place of the
examination and allowance of the Administrator’s account "to persons
interested;"
6. Section 7(b)42 of Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice "to the
persons interested" before it may hear and grant a petition seeking the
disposition or encumbrance of the properties of the estate; and
7. Section 1,43 Rule 90, which allows "any person interested in the estate" to
petition for an order for the distribution of the residue of the estate of the
decedent, after all obligations are either satisfied or provided for.44
In addition to the foregoing, Emilio III may likewise avail of the remedy
found in Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or
administrator. Proceedings upon death, resignation, or removal. – If an
executor or administrator neglects to render his account and settle the estate
according to law, or to perform an order or judgment of the court, or a duty
expressly provided by these rules, or absconds, or becomes insane, or
otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust, the court may
remove him, or, in its discretion, may permit him to resign. When an
executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed, the remaining
executor or administrator may administer the trust alone, unless the court
grants letters to someone to act with him. If there is no remaining executor or
administrator, administration may be granted to any suitable person.
Once again, as we have done in the Decision, we exercise judicial restraint:
we uphold that the question of who are the heirs of the decedent Cristina is
not yet upon us. Article 992 of the Civil Code or the curtain bar rule is
inapplicable in resolving the issue of who is better qualified to administer the
estate of the decedent.
Thus, our disquisition in the assailed Decision:
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial restraint impels us to refrain
from making a final declaration of heirship and distributing the presumptive
shares of the parties in the estates of Cristina and Federico, considering that
the question on who will administer the properties of the long deceased
couple has yet to be settled.
Our holding in Capistrano v. Nadurata on the same issue remains good law:
The declaration of heirs made by the lower court is premature, although the
evidence sufficiently shows who are entitled to succeed the deceased. The
estate had hardly been judicially opened, and the proceeding has not as yet
reached the stage of distribution of the estate which must come after the
inheritance is liquidated.
Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court does not depart from the foregoing
admonition:
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue is made. - x x x. If there is a
controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased
person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under
the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above
mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of
them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the
payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.45
Lastly, we dispose of a peripheral issue raised in the Supplemental
Comment46 of Emilio III questioning the Special Second Division which
issued the 18 April 2012 Resolution. Emilio III asseverates that "the operation
of the Special Second Division in Baguio is unconstitutional and void" as the
Second Division in Manila had already promulgated its Decision on 16 June
2010 on the petition filed by him:
7. The question is: who created the Special Second Division in Baguio, acting
separately from the Second Division of the Supreme Court in Manila? There
will then be two Second Divisions of the Supreme Court: one acting with the
Supreme Court in Manila, and another Special Second Division acting
independently of the Second Division of the Supreme Court in Manila.47
If the ponente and all the Members of the Division that rendered the
Decision or signed Resolution are no longer Members of the Court, the case
shall be raffled to any Member of the Court and the motion shall be acted
upon by him or her with the participation of the other Members of the
Division to which he or she belongs.

For Emilio III’s counsels’ edification, the Special Second Division in Baguio is
not a different division created by the Supreme Court.
The Second Division which promulgated its Decision on this case on 16 June
2010, penned by Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, now has a different
composition, with the advent of Justice Nachura’s retirement on 13 June
2011. Section 7, Rule 2 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court provides:
Sec. 7. Resolutions of motions for reconsideration or clarification of decisions or
signed resolutions and all other motions and incidents subsequently filed; creation of
a Special Division. – Motions for reconsideration or clarification of a decision
or of a signed resolution and all other motions and incidents subsequently
filed in the case shall be acted upon by the ponente and the other Members
of the Division who participated in the rendition of the decision or signed
resolution.
If the ponente has retired, is no longer a Member of the Court, is disqualified,
or has inhibited himself or herself from acting on the motion for
reconsideration or clarification, he or she shall be replaced through raffle by
a new ponente who shall be chosen among the new Members of the Division
who participated in the rendition of the decision or signed resolution and
who concurred therein. If only one Member of the Court who participated
and concurred in the rendition of the decision or signed resolution remains,
he or she shall be designated as the new ponente.
If there are pleadings, motions or incidents subsequent to the denial of the
motion for reconsideration or clarification, the case shall be acted upon by
the ponente on record with the participation of the other Members of the
Division to which he or she belongs at the time said pleading, motion or
incident is to be taken up by the Court. (Emphasis supplied)
As regards the operation thereof in Baguio City, such is simply a change in
venue for the Supreme Court's summer session held last April.48
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED.
Our Decision in G.R. No. 183053 dated 16 June 2010 is MODIFIED. Letters of
Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall
solely issue to respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment of a bond
to be set by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special
Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 78,
Malolos, Bulacan is likewise directed to settle the estate of decedent Cristina
Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

If a Member (not the ponente) of the Division which rendered the decision or
signed resolution has retired, is no longer a Member of the Court, is
disqualified, or has inhibited himself or herself from acting on the motion for
reconsideration or clarification, he or she shall be replaced through raffle by
a replacement Member who shall be chosen from the other Divisions until a
new Justice is appointed as replacement for the retired Justice. Upon the
appointment of a new Justice, he or she shall replace the designated Justice
as replacement Member of the Special Division.

Any vacancy or vacancies in the Special Division shall be filled by raffle from
among the other Members of the Court to constitute a Special Division of five
(5) Members.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 192531               November 12, 2014
BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, Petitioner, 
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES,
INC., Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Nature of the Case
This Appeal, filed under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, seeks to annul the
March 17, 2010 Decision1 of the Employees Compensation Commission
(ECC) in ECC Case No. SL-18483-0218-10, entitled Bernardina P. Bartolome
v. Social Security System (SSS) [Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc.}, declaring
that petitioner is not a beneficiary of the deceased employee under
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the
Philippines, as amended by PD 626.2
The Facts
John Colcol (John), born on June 9, 1983, was employed as electrician by
Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., on board the vessel Maersk Danville, since
February 2008. As such, he was enrolled under the government's Employees'
Compensation Program (ECP).3 Unfortunately, on June 2, 2008, an accident
occurred on board the vessel whereby steel plates fell on John, which led to
his untimely death the following day.4
John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner
Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole
remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits under PD 626 with the
Social Security System (SSS) at San Fernando City, La Union. However, the
SSS La Union office, in a letter dated June 10, 20095 addressed to petitioner,
denied the claim, stating:
We regret to inform you that wecannot give due course to your claim
because you are no longer considered as the parent of JOHN COLCOL as he
was legally adopted by CORNELIO COLCOL based on documents you
submitted to us.
The denial was appealed tothe Employees’ Compensation Commission
(ECC), which affirmed the ruling of the SSS La Union Branch through the
assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED and the claim is hereby
dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.6
In denying the claim, both the SSS La Union branch and the ECC ruled
against petitioner’s entitlement to the death benefits sought after under PD
626 on the ground she can no longer be considered John’s primary
beneficiary. As culled from the records, John and his sister Elizabeth were
adopted by their great grandfather, petitioner’s grandfather, Cornelio Colcol
(Cornelio), by virtue of the Decision7 in Spec. Proc. No. 8220-XII of the
Regional Trial Court in Laoag City dated February 4, 1985, which decree of
adoption attained finality.8 Consequently, as argued by the agencies, it is
Cornelio who qualifies as John’s primary beneficiary, not petitioner. Neither,
the ECC reasoned, would petitioner qualify as John’s secondary beneficiary
even if it wereproven that Cornelio has already passed away. As the ECC
ratiocinated:
Under Article 167 (j) of P.D. 626, as amended, provides (sic) that beneficiaries
are the "dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent children, who
are the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parentsand
subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate
children and legitimate descendants who are the secondary beneficiaries;
Provided; that the dependent acknowledged natural child shall be
considered as a primary beneficiary when there are no other dependent
children who are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit."
The dependent parent referred to by the above provision relates to the
legitimate parent of the covered member, as provided for by Rule XV,
Section 1 (c) (1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation. This
Commission believes that the appellant is not considered a legitimate parent
of the deceased, having given up the latter for adoption to Mr. Cornelio C.
Colcol. Thus, in effect, the adoption divested her of the statusas the
legitimate parent of the deceased.
xxxx
In effect, the rights which previously belong [sic] to the biological parent of
the adopted child shall now be upon the adopting parent. Hence, in this case,
the legal parent referred to by P.D. 626, as amended, as the beneficiary, who
has the right to file the claim, is the adoptive father of the deceased and not
herein appellant.9 (Emphasis supplied)
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was likewise
denied by the ECC.10 Hence, the instant petition.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues in the petition:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I. The Honorable ECC’s Decision is contrary to evidence on record.
II. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse in denying the just,
due and lawful claims of the petitioner as a lawful beneficiary of her
deceased biological son.
III. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse of discretion in not
giving due course/denying petitioner’s otherwise meritorious
motion for reconsideration.11
In resolving the case, the pivotal issue is this: Are the biological parents of
the covered, but legally adopted, employee considered secondary
beneficiaries and, thus, entitled, in appropriate cases, to receive the benefits
under the ECP?
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The ECC’s factual findings are not consistent with the evidence on record
To recall, one of the primary reasons why the ECC denied petitioner’s claim
for death benefits is that eventhough she is John’s biological mother, it was
allegedly not proven that his adoptive parent, Cornelio, was no longer alive.
As intimated by the ECC:
Moreover, there had been no allegation in the records as to whether the
legally adoptive parent, Mr. Colcol, is dead, which would immediately
qualify the appellant [petitioner] for Social Security benefits. Hence, absent
such proof of death of the adoptive father, this Commission will presume
him to be alive and well, and as such, is the one entitled to claim the benefit
being the primary beneficiary of the deaceased. Thus, assuming that
appellant is indeed a qualified beneficiary under the Social Security law, in
view of her status as other beneficiary, she cannot claim the benefit legally
provided by law to the primary beneficiary, in this case the adoptive father
since he is still alive.
We disagree with the factual finding of the ECC on this point.
Generally, findings of fact by administrative agencies are generally accorded
great respect, if not finality, by the courts by reason of the special knowledge
and expertise of said administrative agenciesover matters falling under their
jurisdiction.12 However, in the extant case, the ECC had overlooked a crucial
piece of evidence offered by the petitioner – Cornelio’s death certificate.13
Based on Cornelio’s death certificate, it appears that John’s adoptive father
died on October 26, 1987,14 or only less than three (3) years since the decree of
adoption on February 4, 1985, which attained finality.15 As such, it was error
for the ECC to have ruled that it was not duly proven that the adoptive
parent, Cornelio, has already passed away.
The rule limiting death benefits claims to the legitimate parents is contrary to
law
This brings us to the question of whether or not petitioner is entitled to the
death benefits claim in view of John’s work-related demise. The pertinent
provision, in this regard, is Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended,
which reads:
ART. 167. Definition of terms. - Asused in this Title unless the context
indicates otherwise:
xxxx
(j) 'Beneficiaries' means the dependent spouse until he remarries and
dependent children, who are the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the
dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent
children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are the
secondary beneficiaries; Provided, that the dependent acknowledged natural
child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary when there are no other
dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly income
benefit. (Emphasis supplied)
Concurrently, pursuant to the succeeding Article 177(c) supervising the ECC
"[T]o approve rules and regulations governing the processing of claims and
the settlement of disputes arising therefrom as prescribed by the System," the
ECC has issued the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation,
interpreting the above-cited provision as follows:
RULE XV – BENEFICIARIES
SECTION 1. Definition. (a) Beneficiaries shall be either primary or secondary,
and determined atthe time of employee’s death.
(b) The following beneficiaries shall be considered primary:
(1) The legitimate spouse living with the employee
at the time of the employee’s death until he
remarries; and
(2) Legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted or
acknowledged natural children, who are unmarried
not gainfully employed, not over 21 years of age, or
over 21 years of age provided that he is
incapacitated and incapable of self - support due to
physicalor mental defect which is congenital or
acquired during minority; Provided, further, that a
dependent acknowledged natural child shall be
considered as a primary beneficiary only when there
are no other dependent children who are qualified
and eligible for monthly income benefit; provided
finally, that if there are two or more acknowledged
natural children, they shall be counted from the
youngest and without substitution, but not
exceeding five.
(c) The following beneficiaries shall be considered
secondary:
(1) The legitimate parentswholly dependent upon
the employee for regular support;
(2) The legitimate descendants and illegitimate
children who are unmarried, not gainfully
employed, and not over 21 years of age, or over 21
years of age providedthat he is incapacitated and
incapable of self - support dueto physical or mental
defect which is congenital or acquired during
minority. (Emphasis supplied)
Guilty of reiteration, the ECC denied petitioner’s claim on the ground that
she is no longer the deceased’s legitimate parent, as required by the
implementing rules. As held by the ECC, the adoption decree severed the
relation between John and petitioner, effectively divesting her of the status of
a legitimate parent, and, consequently, that of being a secondary beneficiary.
We disagree.
a. Rule XV, Sec. 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation
deviates from the clear language of Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as
amended
Examining the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation in light of the
Labor Code, as amended, it is at once apparent that the ECC indulged in an
unauthorized administrative legislation. In net effect, the ECC read into Art.
167 of the Code an interpretation not contemplated by the provision.
Pertinent in elucidating on this point isArticle 7 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, which reads:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or
non-observance shall not beexcused by disuse, or custom or practice to the
contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the
former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only
when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.(Emphasis
supplied)
As applied, this Court held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fortune
Tobacco Corporation16 that:
As we have previously declared, rule-making power must be confined to
details for regulating the mode or proceedings in order to carry into effect
the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand
the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute.
Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with the provisions
of the law because any resulting discrepancy between the two will always be
resolved in favor of the basic law. (Emphasis supplied)
Guided by this doctrine, We find that Rule XV of the Amended Rules on
Employees’ Compensation is patently a wayward restriction of and a
substantial deviation from Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code when it
interpreted the phrase "dependent parents" to refer to "legitimate parents."
It bears stressing that a similar issue in statutory construction was resolved
by this Court in Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court17 in this wise:
It is Our shared view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its
general acceptation. Amicus curiae Prof. Ruben Balane has this to say:
The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not defined by
it. In accordancetherefore with the canons of statutory interpretation, it
should beunderstood to have a general and inclusive scope, inasmuch as the
term is a general one. Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda. That the
law does not make a distinction prevents us from making one: Ubi lex non
distinguit, nec nos distinguera debemus. xxx
According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in a
more restrictive sense thanit is used and intended is not warranted by any
rule ofinterpretation. Besides, he further states that when the law intends to
use the termin a more restrictive sense, it qualifies the term with the word
collateral, as in Articles 1003 and 1009 of the New Civil Code.
Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it
embraces not only collateral relatives but also all the kindred of the person
spoken of, unless the context indicates that it was used in a more restrictive
or limited sense — which as already discussed earlier, is not so in the case at
bar. (Emphasis supplied)
In the same vein, the term "parents" in the phrase "dependent parents" in the
afore-quoted Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is usedand ought to be taken in
its general sense and cannot be unduly limited to "legitimate parents" as
what the ECC did. The phrase "dependent parents" should, therefore,
include all parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate and whether by nature
or by adoption. When the law does not distinguish, one should not
distinguish. Plainly, "dependent parents" are parents, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, biological or by adoption,who are in need of support or
assistance.
Moreover, the same Article 167 (j),as couched, clearly shows that Congress
did not intend to limit the phrase "dependent parents" to solely legitimate
parents. At the risk of being repetitive, Article 167 provides that "in their
absence, the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on
dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants
who are secondary beneficiaries." Had the lawmakers contemplated
"dependent parents" to mean legitimate parents, then it would have simply
said descendants and not "legitimate descendants." The manner by which the
provision in question was crafted undeniably show that the phrase
"dependent parents" was intended to cover all parents – legitimate,
illegitimate or parents by nature or adoption.
b. Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’
Compensation is in contravention of the equal protection clause
To insist that the ECC validly interpreted the Labor Code provision is an
affront to the Constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the laws for
the rule, as worded, prevents the parents of an illegitimate child from
claiming benefits under Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended by PD
626. To Our mind, such postulation cannot be countenanced.
As jurisprudence elucidates, equal protection simply requires that all persons
or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and
institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner.18 In
other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to
govern impartially, and it may not drawdistinctions between individuals
solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental
objective.19
The concept of equal protection, however, does not require the universal
application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it
simply requires isequality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such
classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The
test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane tothe purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
"Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."20
In the instant case, there is no compelling reasonable basis to discriminate
against illegitimate parents. Simply put, the above-cited rule promulgated by
the ECC that limits the claim of benefits to the legitimate parents miserably
failed the test of reasonableness since the classification is not germane to the
law being implemented. We see no pressing government concern or interest
that requires protection so as to warrant balancing the rights of unmarried
parents on one hand and the rationale behind the law on the other. On the
contrary, the SSS can better fulfill its mandate, and the policy of PD 626 – that
employees and their dependents may promptly secure adequate benefits in
the event of work-connected disability or death - will be better served if
Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is not so narrowly interpreted.
There being no justification for limiting secondary parent beneficiaries to the
legitimate ones, there can be no other course of action to take other than to
strikedown as unconstitutional the phrase "illegitimate" as appearing in Rule
XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation.
Petitioner qualifies as John’s dependent parent
In attempting to cure the glaring constitutional violation of the adverted rule,
the ECC extended illegitimate parents an opportunity to file claims for and
receive death benefitsby equating dependency and legitimacy to the exercise
of parental authority. Thus, as insinuated by the ECC in its assailed Decision,
had petitioner not given up John for adoption, she could have still claimed
death benefits under the law.
To begin with, nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that "legitimate
parents" pertain to those who exercise parental authority over the employee
enrolled under the ECP. Itwas only in the assailed Decision wherein such
qualification was made. In addition, assuming arguendothat the ECC did not
overstep its boundaries in limiting the adverted Labor Code provision to the
deceased’s legitimate parents, and that the commission properly equated
legitimacy to parental authority, petitioner can still qualify as John’s
secondary beneficiary.
True, when Cornelio, in 1985, adoptedJohn, then about two (2) years old,
petitioner’s parental authority over John was severed. However, lest it be
overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed, aside from Cornelio’s death, was
that when the adoptive parent died less than three (3) years after the
adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4) years of age.
John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in the
case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed
to have reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into
account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and
that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption,21 who was then left
to care for the minor adopted child if the adopter passed away?
To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of the
biological parents is not a novel concept. Section 20 of Republic Act No.
855222 (RA 8552), otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act, provides:
Section 20. Effects of Rescission.– If the petition [for rescission of adoption] is
granted, the parental authority of the adoptee's biological parent(s), if
known, or the legal custody of the Department shall be restored if the
adoptee is still a minoror incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations
of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be extinguished.
(emphasis added)
The provision adverted to is applicable herein by analogy insofar as the
restoration of custody is concerned.1âwphi1 The manner herein of
terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the grounds for
rescission,23 justifies the retention of vested rights and obligations between
the adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent restoration of parental
authority in favor of the biological parents, simultaneously, ensures that the
adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to fend for himself at such a tender
age.
To emphasize, We can only apply the rule by analogy, especially since RA
8552 was enacted after Cornelio’s death. Truth be told, there is a lacuna in
the law as to which provision shall govern contingencies in all fours with the
factual milieu of the instant petition. Nevertheless, We are guided by the
catena of cases and the state policies behind RA 855224 wherein the
paramount consideration is the best interest of the child, which We invoke to
justify this disposition. It is, after all, for the best interest of the child that
someone will remain charged for his welfare and upbringing should his or
her adopter fail or is rendered incapacitated to perform his duties as a parent
at a time the adoptee isstill in his formative years, and, to Our mind, in the
absence or, as in this case, death of the adopter, no one else could reasonably
be expected to perform the role of a parent other than the adoptee’s
biological one.
Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though parental
authority is severed by virtue of adoption, the ties between the adoptee and
the biological parents are not entirely eliminated. To demonstrate, the
biological parents, insome instances, are able to inherit from the adopted, as
can be gleaned from Art. 190 of the Family Code:
Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall be
governed by the following rules:
xxx
(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants
of the adopted concur withthe adopter, they shall divide the entire estate,
one-half tobe inherited by the parents or ascendants and the other half, by
the adopters;
xxx
(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then the
ordinary rules of legal or intestate succession shall apply.
Similarly, at the time of Cornelio Colcol’s death, which was prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code, the governing provision is Art. 984 of the New
Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no children or
descendants, his parents and relatives by consanguinity and not by adoption,
shall be his legal heirs.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their
rights of succession tothe estate of their child who was the subject of
adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered
employee do not form part of the estateof the adopted child, the pertinent
provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the
rights of the biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to
receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain rights still
attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain obligations,
which, We rule, include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the
untimely passing of their minor offspring’s adoptive parent. We cannot leave
undetermined the fate of a minor child whose second chance ata better life
under the care of the adoptive parents was snatched from him by death’s
cruel grasp. Otherwise, the adopted child’s quality of life might have been
better off not being adopted at all if he would only find himself orphaned in
the end. Thus, We hold that Cornelio’s death at the time of John’sminority
resulted in the restoration of petitioner’s parental authority over the adopted
child.
On top of this restoration of parental authority, the fact of petitioner’s
dependence on John can be established from the documentary evidence
submitted to the ECC. As it appears in the records, petitioner, prior to John’s
adoption, was a housekeeper. Her late husband died in 1984, leaving her to
care for their seven (7) children. But since she was unable to "give a bright
future to her growing children" as a housekeeper, she consented to
Cornelio’s adoption of Johnand Elizabeth in 1985.
Following Cornelio’s death in 1987, so records reveal, both petitioner and
John repeatedly reported "Brgy. Capurictan, Solsona, Ilocos Norte" as their
residence. In fact, this veryaddress was used in John’s Death
Certificate25 executed in Brazil, and in the Report of Personal Injury or Loss
of Life accomplished by the master of the vessel boarded by John.26 Likewise,
this is John’s known address as per the ECC’s assailed Decision. 27Similarly,
this same address was used by petitioner in filing her claim before the SSS La
Union branch and, thereafter, in her appeal with the ECC. Hence, it can be
assumed that aside from having been restored parental authority over John,
petitioner indeed actually execised the same, and that they lived together
under one roof.
Moreover, John, in his SSS application,28 named petitioner as one of his
beneficiaries for his benefits under RA 8282, otherwise known as the "Social
Security Law." While RA 8282 does not cover compensation for work-related
deaths or injury and expressly allows the designation of beneficiaries who
are not related by blood to the member unlike in PD 626, John’s deliberate
act of indicating petitioner as his beneficiary at least evinces that he, in a
way, considered petitioner as his dependent. Consequently, the confluence
of circumstances – from Cornelio’s death during John’s minority, the
restoration ofpetitioner’s parental authority, the documents showing
singularity of address, and John’s clear intention to designate petitioner as a
beneficiary - effectively made petitioner, to Our mind, entitled to death
benefit claims as a secondary beneficiary under PD 626 as a dependent
parent.
All told, the Decision of the ECC dated March 17, 2010 is bereft of legal basis.
Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not deprive petitioner of the
right to receive the benefits stemming from John’s death as a dependent
parent given Cornelio’s untimely demise during John’s minority. Since the
parent by adoption already died, then the death benefits under the
Employees' Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner,
John's sole remaining beneficiary.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court's Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The March 17, 2010

Decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission, in ECC Case No. SL-
18483-0218-10, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ECC is hereby directed to
release the benefits due to a secondary beneficiary of the deceased covered
employee John Colcol to petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE*

Associate Justice Associate Justice

FRANCIS F. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
G.R. No. L-65800 October 3, 1986
PARTENZA LUCERNA VDA. DE TUPAS, petitioner-appellant,  being a stranger and not a compulsory heir, the
vs.
BRANCH XLIII of the HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL, respondent, and TUPAS FOUNDATION, INC.,
private respondent-appellee.
NARVASA, J.:
Involved in this appeal is the question of whether or not a donation inter
vivos by a donor now deceased is inofficious and should be reduced at the
instance of the donor's widow.
Epifanio R. Tupas died on August 20, 1978 in Bacolod City, childless, leaving
his widow, Partenza Lucerna, as his only surviving compulsory heir. He also
left a win dated May 18, 1976, which was admitted to probate on September
30, 1980 in Special Proceedings No. 13994 of the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental. Among the assets listed in his will were lots Nos. 837, 838
and 839 of the Sagay Cadastre, admittedly his private capital. However, at
the time of his death, these lots were no longer owned by him, he having
donated them the year before (on August 2, 1977) to the Tupas Foundation,
Inc., which had thereafter obtained title to said lots.
Claiming that said donation had left her practically destitute of any
inheritance, Tupas' widow brought suit against Tupas Foundation, Inc. in the
same Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental (docketed as Civil Case
No. 16089) to have the donation declared inofficious insofar as it prejudiced
her legitime, therefore reducible " ... by one-half or such proportion as ...
(might be deemed) justified ... and " ... the resulting deduction ... " restored
and conveyed or delivered to her. The complaint also prayed for attorney's
fees and such other relief as might be proper.
The Trial Court did not see things her way. Upon the facts above stated, on
which the parties stipulated, 1 said Court dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit, rejecting her claim on several grounds, viz.:
... (1) Article 900 relied upon by plaintiff is not applicable
because the properties which were disposed of by way of
donation one year before the death of Epifanio Tupas were
no longer part of his hereditary estate at the time of his death on
August 20, 1978; (2) the donation properties were Epifanio's
capital or separate estate; and (3) Tupas Foundation, Inc.
donation inter vivos made in its favor was not subject to
collation under Art. 106 1, C.C.2
The Trial Court is in error on all counts and must be reversed.
A person's prerogative to make donations is subject to certain limitations,
one of which is that he cannot give by donation more than he can give by
will (Art. 752, Civil Code). 3 If he does, so much of what is donated as
exceeds what he can give by will is deemed inofficious and the donation is
reducible to the extent of such excess, though without prejudice to its taking
effect in the donor's lifetime or the donee's appropriating the fruits of the
thing donated (Art. 771, Civil Code). Such a donation is, moreover,
collationable that is, its value is imputable into the hereditary estate of the
donor at the tune of his death for the purpose of determining the legitime of
the forced or compulsory heirs and the freely disposable portion of the
estate. This is true as well of donations to strangers as of gifts to compulsory
heirs, although the language of Article 1061 of the Civil Code would seem to
limit collation to the latter class of donations. And this has been held to be a
long-established rule in Liguez vs. Honorable Court of Appeals, et al.,  4 where
this Court said:
... Hence, the forced heirs are entitled to have the donation
set aside in so far as inofficious: i.e., in excess of the portion of
free disposal (Civil Code of 1889, Articles 636, 645),
computed as provided in Articles 818 and 819, and bearing
in mind that collationable gifts' under Article 818 should
include gifts made not only in favor of the forced heirs, but
even those made in favor of strangers, as decided by the
Supreme Court of Spain in its decision of 4 May 1899 and 16
June 1902. So that in computing the legitimes, the value of
the property donated to herein appellant, Conchita Liguez,
should be considered part of the donor's estate. Once again,
only the court of origin has the requisite data to determine
whether the donation is inofficious or not. 5
The fact, therefore, that the donated property no longer actually formed part
of the estate of the donor at the time of his death cannot be asserted to
prevent its being brought to collation. Indeed, it is an obvious proposition
that collation contemplates and particularly applies to gifts inter vivos.  6 The
further fact that the lots donated were admittedly capital or separate
property of the donor is of no moment, because a claim of inofficiousness
does not assert that the donor gave what was not his, but that he gave more
than what was within his power to give.
Since it is clear that the questioned donation is collationable and that, having
been made to a stranger (to the donor) it is, by law 7 chargeable to the freely
disposable portion of the donor's estate, to be reduced insofar as inofficious,
i.e., it exceeds said portion and thus impairs the legitime of the compulsory
heirs, in order to find out whether it is inofficious or not, recourse must be
had to the rules established by the Civil Code for the determination of the
legitime and, by extension, of the disposable portion. These rules are set
forth in Articles 908, 909 and 910 of the Code, on the basis of which the
following step-by-step procedure has been correctly outlined:
of said excess. In this case, if any excess be shown, it shall be returned or
reverted to the petitioner-appellant as the sole compulsory heir of the
deceased Epifanio R. Tupas.
For obvious reasons, this determination cannot now be made, as it requires
appreciation of data not before this Court and may necessitate the
production of evidence in the Court a quo.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is reversed and petitioner-appellant
Partenza Lucerna Vda. de Tupas is adjudged entitled to so much of the
donated property in question, as may be found in excess of the freely
disposable portion of the estate of Epifanio B. Tupas, determined in the
manner above-indicated. Let the case be remanded to the Trial Court for
further appropriate proceedings in accordance with this decision.
SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, JJ., concur.

(1) determination of the value of the property which

remains at the time of the testator's death;

(2) determination of the obligations, debts, and charges

which have to be paid out or deducted from the value of
the property thus left;

(3) the determination of the difference between the assets

and the liabilities, giving rise to the hereditary estate;

(4) the addition to the net value thus found, of the value, at
the time they were made, of donations subject to collation;
and

(5) the determination of the amount of the legitimes by

getting from the total thus found the portion that the law
provides as the legitime of each respective compulsory
heir.8

Deducting the legitimes from the net value of the hereditary estate leaves the
freely disposable portion by which the donation in question here must be
measured. If the value of the donation at the time it was made does not
exceed that difference, then it must be allowed to stand. But if it does, the
donation is inofficious as to the excess and must be reduced by the amount
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-26270            October 30, 1969
BONIFACIA MATEO, ET AL., petitioners, 
vs.
GERVASIO LAGUA, ET AL., respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals (In CA-
G.R. Nos. 30064-R and 30065-R), raising as only issue the correctness of the
appellate court's reduction of a donation propter nuptias, for being
inofficious.
The established facts of this case are as follows:
Cipriano Lagua was the original registered owner of 3 parcels of land
situated in Asingan, Pangasinan, referred to as Lot No. 998, with an area of
11,080 sq.m., more or less and covered by O.C.T. No. 362; Lot No. 6541, with
an area of 808 sq.m., more or less, covered by O.C.T. No. 6618; and Lot No.
5106, with an area of 3,303 sq.m., covered by O.C.T. No. 8137. Sometime in
1917, Lagua and his wife Alejandra Dumlao, in a public instrument, donated
Lots 998 and 6541 to their son Alejandro Lagua, in consideration of the
latter's marriage to Bonifacia Mateo. The marriage was celebrated on 15 May
1917, and thereafter, the couple took possession of the properties, but the
Certificates of Title remained in the donor's name.
In 1923, the son, Alejandro, died. His widow, Bonifacia Mateo, and her infant
daughter lived with her father-in-law, Cipriano Lagua, who then undertook
the farming of the donated lots. It seems that at the start, Cipriano Lagua was
giving to Bonifacia the owner's share of the harvest from the land. In 1926,
however, Cipriano refused to deliver the said share, thus prompting
Bonifacia to resort to the Justice of the Peace Court of Asingan, Pangasinan,
from where she obtained a judgment awarding to her possession of the two
lots plus damages.
On 31 July 1941, Cipriano Lagua, executed a deed of sale of the same two
parcels of land in favor of his younger son, Gervasio. This sale
notwithstanding, Bonifacia Mateo was continuously given the owner's share
of the harvest until 1956, when it was altogether stopped. It was only then
that Bonifacia Mateo learned of the sale of the lots to her brother-in-law, who
had the sale in his favor registered only on 22 September 1955. As a
consequence, TCT Nos. 19152 and 19153 of the Register of Deeds of
Pangasinan were issued to Gervasio.
Bonifacia Mateo and her daughter, Anatalia, assisted by her husband, Luis
Alcantara, went to the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Civil Case No.
T-339), seeking annulment of the deed of sale in favor of Gervasio Lagua and
for recovery of possession of the properties. On 3 January 1957, judgment
was rendered in the case —
... declaring the sale executed by Cipriano Lagua in favor of the other
defendants, Gervasio Lagua and Sotera Casimero, as null and void
and non-existent; ordering the Register of Deeds for the Province of
Pangasinan, to cancel Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 19152 and
19153; condemning the defendants to pay jointly and severally to the
plaintiffs the sum of P200.00; ordering the defendants Gervasio
Lagua and Sotera Lagua to vacate and deliver the possession over
the two parcels of land to the plaintiffs, and to pay the costs of this
suit.
The decision became final, and Bonifacia Mateo, and her daughter, Anatalia
Lagua, were installed in possession of the land.
On 18 August 1957, the spouses Gervasio Lagua and Sotera Casimero
commenced in the Justice of the Peace Court of Asingan, Pangasinan, an
action against Bonifacia Mateo and her daughter for reimbursement of the
improvements allegedly made by them on Lots 998 and 6541, plus damages.
Dismissed by the Justice of the Peace Court for being barred by the judgment
in Civil Case No. T-339, therein plaintiffs appealed to the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. T-433.
At about the same time, another case was filed, this time by Gervasio Lagua
and Cipriano Lagua, for annulment of the donation of the two lots, insofar as
one-half portion thereof was concerned (civil Case No. T-442). It was their
claim that in donating the two lots, which allegedly were all that plaintiff
Cipriano Lagua owned, said plaintiff not only neglected leaving something
for his own support but also prejudiced the legitime of his forced heir,
plaintiff Gervasio Lagua.
Being intimately related, the two cases were heard jointly. On November 12,
1958, while the cases were pending final resolution, plaintiff Cipriano Lagua
died. On 23 December 1960, the court rendered a single decision dismissing
Civil Case No. T-433 for lack of cause of action, plaintiffs spouses Gervasio
Lagua and Sotera Casimero having been declared possessors in bad faith in
Civil Case No. T-339 and, therefore, not entitled to any reimbursement of the
expenses and improvements put up by them on the land. The other suit,
Civil Case No. T-442, was, likewise, dismissed on the ground of prescription,
the action to annul the donation having been brought only in 1958, or after
the lapse of 41 years. Defendants' counterclaims were similarly dismissed
although they were awarded attorneys' fees in the sum of P150.00.
Plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. Nos. 30064
and 30065-R). Said tribunal, on 18 March 1966, affirmed the ruling of the trial
court in Civil Case No. T-433 denying plaintiffs' claim for reimbursement of
the improvements said to have been made on the land. In regard to the
annulment case (C.F.I. No. T-442), however, the Court of Appeals held that
the donation to Alejandro Lagua of the 2 lots with a combined area of 11,888
square meters execeeded by 494.75 square meters his (Alejandro's) legitime
and the disposable portion that Cipriano Lagua could have freely given by
will, and, to the same extent prejudiced the legitime of Cipriano's other heir,
Gervasio Lagua. The donation was thus declared inofficious, and
defendants-appellees were ordered to reconvey to plaintiff Gervasio Lagua a
portion of 494.15 square meters to be taken from any convenient part of the
lots. The award of attorneys' fees to the defendants was also eliminated for
lack of proper basis.
Bonifacia Mateo, et al., then resorted to this Court, assailing the decision of
the Court of Appeals insofar as it ordered them to reconvey a portion of the
lots to herein respondent Gervasio Lagua. It is petitioners' contention that (1)
the validity of the donation proper nuptias having been finally determined in
Civil Case No. T-339, any question in derogation of said validity is already
barred; (2) that the action to annul the donation, filed in 1958, or 41 years
after its execution, is abated by prescription; (3) that a donation proper
nuptias is revocable only for any of the grounds enumerated in Article 132 of
the new Civil Code, and inofficiousness is not one of thorn; and (4) that in
determining the legitime of the Lagua brothers in the hereditary estate of
Cipriano Lagua, the Court of Appeals should have applied the provisions of
the Civil Code of 1889, and not Article 888 of the new Civil Code.
Petitioners' first two assigned errors, it may be stated, are non-contentious
issues that have no bearing in the actual controversy in this case. All of them
refer to the validity of the donation — a matter which was definitively settled
in Civil Case No. T-339 and which, precisely, was declared by the Court of
Appeals to be "beyond the realm of judicial inquiry." In reality, the only
question this case presents is whether or not the Court of Appeals acted
correctly in ordering the reduction of the donation for being inofficious and
in ordering herein petitioners to reconvey to respondent Gervasio Lagua an
unidentified 494.75 square-meter portion of the donated lots.
We are in accord with the Court of Appeals that Civil Case No. 442 is not one
exclusively for annulment or revocation of the entire donation, but of merely
that portion thereof allegedly trenching on the legitime of respondent
Gervasio Lagua;1 that the cause of action to enforce Gervasio's legitime,
having accrued only upon the death of his father on 12 November 1958, the
dispute has to be governed by the pertinent provisions of the new Civil
Code; and that a donation proper nuptias property may be reduced for being
inofficious. Contrary to the views of appellants (petitioners),
donations proper nuptias (by reason of marriage) are without onerous
consideration, the marriage being merely the occasion or motive for the
donation, not its causa. Being liberalities, they remain subject to reduction for
inofficiousness upon the donor's death, if they should infringe the legitime of
a forced heir.2
It is to be noted, however, that in rendering the judgment under review, the
Court of Appeals acted on several unsupported assumptions: that the three
(3) lots mentioned in the decision (Nos. 998, 5106 and 6541) were
the only properties composing the net hereditary estate of the deceased
Cipriano Lagua; that Alejandro Lagua and Gervasio Lagua were his only
legal heirs; that the deceased left no unpaid debts, charges, taxes, etc., for
which the estate would be answerable.3 In the computation of the heirs'
legitime, the Court of Appeals also considered only the area, not the value, of
the properties.
The infirmity in the above course of action lies in the fact that in its Article
908 the new Civil Code specifically provides as follows:
ART. 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the property left at
the death of the testator shall be considered, deducting all debts, and
charges, which shall not include those imposed in the will.
To the net value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the value of
all donations by the testator that are subject to collation, at the time
he made them.
In other words, before any conclusion about the legal share due to a
compulsory heir may be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be taken
first. The net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting an
payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the
deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation
would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the legitimes
of the compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only thereafter can it
be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes.
Certainly, in order that a donation may be reduced for being inofficious,
there must be proof that the value of the donated property exceeds that of
the disposable free portion plus the donee's share as legitime in the
properties of the donor.4 In the present case, it can hardly be said that, with
the evidence then before the court, it was in any position to rule on the
inofficiousness of the donation involved here, and to order its reduction and
reconveyance of the deducted portion to the respondents.

FOR THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the decision of the Court of

Appeals, insofar as Civil Case No. 442 of the court a quo is concerned, is
hereby set aside and the trial court's order of dismissal sustained, without
prejudice to the parties' litigating the issue of inofficiousness in a proper
proceeding, giving due notice to all persons interested in the estate of the late
Cipriano Lagua. Without costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando,

Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
 SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 133000           October 2, 2001
PATRICIA NATCHER, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. COURT OFAPPEALS AND THE HEIR OF GRACIANO DEL
ROSARIO – LETICIA DEL ROSARIO, EMILIA DEL RESORIO –
MANANGAN, ROSALINDA FUENTES LLANA, RODOLFO FUENTES,
ALBERTO FUENTES, EVELYN DEL ROSARIO, and EDUARDO DEL
ROSARIO, respondent.
BUENA, J.:
May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an
action for reconveyance annulment of title with damages, adjudicate matters
relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person particularly on
questions as to advancement of property made by the decedent to any of the
heirs?
Sought to be reversed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is
the decision1 of public respondent Court of Appeals, the decretal portion of
which declares:
"Wherefore in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment
appealed from is reversed and set aside and another one entered
annulling the Deed of Sale executed by Graciano Del Rosario in
favor of defendant-appellee Patricia Natcher, and ordering the
Register of Deeds to Cancel TCT No. 186059 and reinstate TCT No.
107443 without prejudice to the filing of a special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of Graciano Del Rosario in a proper court. No
costs.
"So ordered."
Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners
of a parcel of land with an area of 9,322 square meters located in Manila and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11889. Upon the death of
Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his six children, namely: Bayani,
Ricardo, Rafael, Leticia, Emiliana and Nieves, entered into an extrajudicial
settlement of Graciana's estate on 09 February 1954 adjudicating and
dividing among themselves the real property subject of TCT No. 11889.
Under the agreement, Graciano received 8/14 share while each of the six
children received 1/14 share of the said property. Accordingly, TCT No.
11889 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 35980 was issued in the
name of Graciano and the Six children.1âwphi1.nêt
Further, on 09 February 1954, said heirs executed and forged an "Agreement
of Consolidation-Subdivision of Real Property with Waiver of Rights" where
they subdivided among themselves the parcel of land covered by TCT No.
35980 into several lots. Graciano then donated to his children, share and
share alike, a portion of his interest in the land amounting to 4,849.38 square
meters leaving only 447.60 square meters registered under Graciano's name,
as covered by TCT No. 35988. Subsequently, the land subject of TCT No.
35988 was further subdivided into two separate lots where the first lot with a
land area of 80.90 square meter was registered under TCT No. 107442 and
the second lot with a land area of 396.70 square meters was registered under
TCT No. 107443. Eventually, Graciano sold the first lot2 to a third person but
retained ownership over the second lot.3
On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher.
During their marriage, Graciano sold the land covered by TCT No. 107443 to
his wife Patricia as a result of which TCT No. 1860594 was issued in the
latter's name. On 07 October 1985,Graciano died leaving his second wife
Patricia and his six children by his first marriage, as heirs.
In a complaint5 filed in Civil Case No. 71075 before the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 55, herein private respondents alleged that upon
Graciano's death, petitioner Natcher, through the employment of fraud,
misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT No. 107443, by making it
appear that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale dated 25 June 19876 in favor
herein petitioner resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. 107443 and the
issuance of TCT no. 186059 in the name of Patricia Natcher. Similarly, herein
private respondents alleged in said complaint that as a consequence of such
fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been impaired.
In her answer7 dated 19 August 1994, herein petitioner Natcher averred that
she was legally married to Graciano in 20 March 1980 and thus, under the
law, she was likewise considered a compulsory heir of the latter. Petitioner
further alleged that during Graciano's lifetime, Graciano already distributed,
in advance, properties to his children, hence, herein private respondents may
not anymore claim against Graciano's estate or against herein petitioner's
property.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, rendered a decision
dated 26 January 1996 holding:8
"1) The deed of sale executed by the late Graciano del Rosario in
favor of Patricia Natcher is prohibited by law and thus a complete
nullity. There being no evidence that a separation of property was
agreed upon in the marriage settlements or that there has been
decreed a judicial separation of property between them, the spouses
are prohibited from entering (into) a contract of sale;
"2) The deed as sale cannot be likewise regarded as a valid donation
as it was equally prohibited by law under Article 133 of the New
Civil Code;
"3) Although the deed of sale cannot be regarded as such or as a
donation, it may however be regarded as an extension of advance
inheritance of Patricia Natcher being a compulsory heir of the
deceased."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the lower court's
decision ratiocinating, inter alia:
"It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just
and legal distribution of the estate. The court a quo, trying an
ordinary action for reconveyance / annulment of title, went beyond
its jurisdiction when it performed the acts proper only in a special
proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person. XXX
"X X X Thus the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property
as advance inheritance. What the court should have done was
merely to rule on the validity of (the) sale and leave the issue on
advancement to be resolved in a separate proceeding instituted for
that purpose. XXX"
Aggrieved, herein petitioner seeks refuge under our protective mantle
through the expediency of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and assails the
appellate court's decision "for being contrary to law and the facts of the case."
We concur with the Court of Appeals and find no merit in the instant
petition.
Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action and
special proceedings, in this wise:
"XXX a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong.
"A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are
government by the rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to specific
rules prescribed for a special civil action.
"XXX
"c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right or a particular fact."
As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction
between an action and a special proceeding. An action is a formal demand of
one's right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by
the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite
established rules. The term "special proceeding" may be defined as an
application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a
particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are
required unless the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the
remedy is granted generally upon an application or motion."9
Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted authority in Remedial Law
expounds further:
"It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those
proceedings which are instituted and prosecuted according to the
ordinary rules and provisions relating to actions at law or suits in
equity, and that special proceedings include those proceedings
which are not ordinary in this sense, but is instituted and prosecuted
according to some special mode as in the case of proceedings
commenced without summons and prosecuted without regular
pleadings, which are characteristics of ordinary actions. XXX A
special proceeding must therefore be in the nature of a distinct and
independent proceeding for particular relief, such as may be
instituted independently of a pending action, by petition or motion
upon notice."10
Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title
with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the
estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the
decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly
requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of
Court.
Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the
decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate court in the
exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to
advancement made or alleged to have been made by the deceased to any heir
may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate
proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the
person raising the questions and on the heir.
While it may be true that the Rules used the word "may", it is nevertheless
clear that the same provision11contemplates a probate court when it speaks of
the "court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings".
Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general
jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render an adjudication and resolve the
issue of advancement of the real property in favor of herein petitioner
Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 471075 for reconveyance and
annulment of title with damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to
thresh out said question. Moreover, under the present circumstances, the
RTC of Manila, Branch 55 was not properly constituted as a probate court so
as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the decedent
Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher.
At this point, the appellate court's disquisition is elucidating:
"Before a court can make a partition and distribution of the estate of
a deceased, it must first settle the estate in a special proceeding
instituted for the purpose. In the case at hand, the court a quo
determined the respective legitimes of the plaintiffs-appellants and
assigned the subject property owned by the estate of the deceased to
defendant-appellee without observing the proper proceedings
provided (for) by the Rules of Court. From the aforecited
discussions, it is clear that trial courts trying an ordinary action
cannot resolve to perform acts pertaining to a special proceeding
because it is subject to specific prescribed rules. Thus, the court a quo
erred in regarding the subject property as an advance inheritance."12
In resolving the case at bench, this Court is not unaware of our
pronouncement in Coca vs. Borromeo13 and Mendoza vs. Teh14 that whether
a particular matter should be resolved by the Regional Trial Court (then
Court of First Instance) in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its limited
probate jurisdiction is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of
procedure. In essence, it is procedural question involving a mode of practice
"which may be waived".15
Notwithstanding, we do not see any waiver on the part of herein private
respondents inasmuch as the six children of the decedent even assailed the
authority of the trail court, acting in its general jurisdiction, to rule on this
specific issue of advancement made by the decedent to petitioner.
Analogously, in a train of decisions, this Court has consistently enunciated
the long standing principle that although generally, a probate court may not
decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the interested parties are all
heirs, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties
consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights
of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to
decide the question of ownership.16
Similarly in Mendoza vs. Teh, we had occasion to hold:
"In the present suit, no settlement of estate is involved, but merely an
allegation seeking appointment as estate administratrix which does
not necessarily involve settlement of estate that would have invited
the exercise of the limited jurisdiction of a probate
court.17 (emphasis supplied)
Of equal importance is that before any conclusion about the legal share due
to a compulsory heir may be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be
taken first.18 The net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting
all payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by
the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation
would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the legitime
of the compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only thereafter can it
be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes. 19
A perusal of the records, specifically the antecedents and proceedings in the
present case, reveals that the trial court failed to observe established rules of
procedure governing the settlement of the estate of Graciano Del Rosario.
This Court sees no cogent reason to sanction the non-observance of these
well-entrenched rules and hereby holds that under the prevailing
circumstances, a probate court, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is
indeed the best forum to ventilate and adjudge the issue of advancement as
well as other related matters involving the settlement of Graciano Del
Rosario's estate.1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of

Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DISMISSED for
lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing, De Leon, Jr., Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-46903               July 23, 1987
BUHAY DE ROMA, petitioner,  donation did not impair the legitimes of the two adopted daughters
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and FELICIDAD CARINGAL,
as Guardian of Rosalinda de Roma,respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Candelaria de Roma had two legally adopted daughters, Buhay de Roma
and Rosalinda de Roma. She died intestate on April 30, 1971, and
administration proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of
Laguna by the private respondent as guardian of Rosalinda. Buhay was
appointed administratrix and in due time filed an inventory of the estate.
This was opposed by Rosalinda on the ground that certain properties earlier
donated by Candelaria to Buhay, and the fruits thereof, had not been
included.1
The properties in question consisted of seven parcels of coconut land worth
P10,297.50.2 There is no dispute regarding their evaluation; what the parties
cannot agree upon is whether these lands are subject to collation. The private
respondent rigorously argues that it is, conformably to Article 1061 of the
Civil Code. Buhay, for her part, citing Article 1062, claims she has no
obligation to collate because the decedent prohibited such collation and the
donation was not officious.
The two articles provide as follows:
Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other
compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any
property or right which he may have received from the decedent
during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other
gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the
determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the
partition.
Article 1062. Collation shall not take place among
compulsory heirs if the donor should have so expressly
provided, or if the donor should repudiate the inheritance,
unless the donation should be reduced as inofficious.
The issue was resolved in favor of the petitioner by the trial
court,* which held that the decedent, when she made the donation in
favor of Buhay, expressly prohibited collation. Moreover, the
as it could be accommodated in, and in fact was imputed to, the free
portion of Candelaria's estate.3
On appeal, the order of the trial court was reversed, the respondent
court** holding that the deed of donation contained no express
prohibition to collate as an exception to Article 1062. Accordingly, it
ordered collation and equally divided the net estate of the decedent,
including the fruits of the donated property, between Buhay and
Rosalinda.4
The pertinent portions of the deed of donation are as follows:
IKALAWA. Na alang-alang sa aking pagmamahal, pagtingin at
pagsisilbi sa akin ng aking anak na si BUHAY DE ROMA, kasal kay
Arabella Castaneda, may karampatang gulang, mamamayang
Pilipino at naninirahan at may pahatirang-sulat din dito sa Lunsod
ng San Pablo sa pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito ay kusang-loob
kong ibinibigay, ipinagkakaloob at inililipat sa nabanggit na BUHAY
DE ROMA, sa kanyang mga kahalili at tagapagmana, sa
pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli, ang lahat
ng mga lagay ng lupa na sinasabi sa itaas, sa ilalim ng kasunduan na
ngayon pa ay siya na ang nagmamay-aring tunay ng mga lupang ito
at kanya nang maaring ipalipat ang mga hoja declaratoria ng mga
lupang ito sa kanyang pangalan, datapwa't samantalang ako ay
nabubuhay, ay ako rin ang makikinabang sa mga mapuputi at
mamomosesion sa mga nasabing lupa;
IKATLO. Na pinagtibay ko na ako ay marami pang ibang mga pag-
aari sa sapat pang aking ikabuhay at sa pagbibigay kong ito ay hindi
masisira ang legitimate ng mga tao na dapat magmana sa akin,
sapagkat ang mga lupang sinasabi sa itaas ay bahagui ng aking
kabuhayan na ako ay may layang ipamigay kahit na kaninong tao na
kung tawagin ay Libre Disposicion. 5
We agree with the respondent court that there is nothing in the above WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against
provisions expressly prohibiting the collation of the donated properties. As the petitioner. It is so ordered.
the said court correctly observed, the phrase "sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay
na di na mababawing muli" merely described the donation as "irrevocable" Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Paras and Gancayco, JJ., concur.
and should not be construed as an express prohibition against collation.6 The
fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the subject
thereof from the collation required under Article 1061.

We surmise from the use of such terms as "legitime" and "free portion" in the
deed of donation that it was prepared by a lawyer, and we may also presume
he understood the legal consequences of the donation being made. It is
reasonable to suppose, given the precise language of the document, that he
would have included therein an express prohibition to collate if that had
been the donor's intention.

Anything less than such express prohibition will not suffice under the clear
language of Article 1062.1awphil The suggestion that there was
an implied prohibition because the properties donated were imputable to the
free portion of the decedent's estate merits little consideration. Imputation is
not the question here, nor is it claimed that the disputed donation is officious
The sole issue is whether or not there was an express prohibition to collate,
and we see none.

The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and

unequivocally as an exception to the general rule announced in Article 1062.
Absent such a clear indication of that intention, we apply not the exception
but the rule, which is categorical enough.

There is no need to dwell long on the other error assigned by the petitioner
regarding the decision of the appealed case by the respondent court beyond
the 12-month period prescribed by Article X, Section 11 (1) of the 1973
Constitution. As we held in Marcelino v. Cruz,7 the said provision was merely
directory and failure to decide on time would not deprive the corresponding
courts of jurisdiction or render their decisions invalid.

It is worth stressing that the aforementioned provision has now been

reworded in Article VIII, Section 15, of the 1987 Constitution, which also
impresses upon the courts of justice, indeed with greater urgency, the need
for the speedy disposition of the cases that have been clogging their dockets
these many years. Serious studies and efforts are now being taken by the
Court to meet that need.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 118449 February 11, 1998
LAURO G. VIZCONDE, petitioner, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 120, Caloocan
City, and RAMON G. NICOLAS, respondents.
FRANCISCO, J.:
Petitioner Lauro G. Vizconde and his wife Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde had
two children, viz., Carmela and Jennifer. Petitioner's wife, Estrellita, is one of
the five siblings of spouses Rafael Nicolas and Salud Gonzales-Nicolas. The
other children of Rafael and Salud
are Antonio Nicolas; Ramon Nicolas; Teresita Nicolas de Leon,
and RicardoNicolas, an incompetent. Antonio predeceased his parents and is
now survived by his widow, Zenaida, and their four children.
On May 22, 1979, Estrellita purchased from Rafael a parcel of land with an
area of 10,110 sq. m. located at Valenzuela, Bulacan (hereafter Valenzuela
property) covered by TCT No. (T-36734) 13206 for One Hundred Thirty Five
Thousand Pesos (P135,000.00), evidenced by a "Lubusang Bilihan ng Bahagi ng
Lupa na Nasasakupan ng Titulo TCT No. T-36734".1 In view thereof, TCT No. V-
554 covering the Valenzuela property was issued to Estrellita. 2 On March 30,
1990, Estrellita sold the Valenzuela property to Amelia Lim and Maria
Natividad Balictar Chiu for Three Million, Four Hundred Five Thousand, Six
Hundred Twelve Pesos (P3,405,612.00).3 In June of the same year, Estrellita
bought from Premier Homes, Inc., a parcel of land with improvements
situated at Vinzon St., BF Homes, Parañaque (hereafter Parañaque property)
using a portion of the proceeds of sale of the Valenzuela property. The
remaining amount of the proceeds was used in buying a car while the
balance was deposited in a bank.
The following year an unfortunate event in petitioner's life occurred.
Estrellita and her two daughters, Carmela and Jennifer, were killed on June
30, 1991, an incident popularly known as the "Vizconde Massacre". The
findings of the investigation conducted by the NBI reveal that Estrellita died
ahead of her daughters.4 Accordingly, Carmela, Jennifer and herein
petitioner succeeded Estrellita and, with the subsequent death of Carmela
and Jennifer, petitioner was left as the sole heir of his daughters.
Nevertheless, petitioner entered into an "Extra-Judicial Settlement of the
Estate of Deceased Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde With Waiver of Shares", 5 with
Rafael and Salud, Estrellita's parents. The extra-judicial settlement provided
for the division of the properties of Estrellita and her two daughters between
petitioner and spouses Rafael and Salud. The properties include bank
deposits, a car and the Parañaque property. The total value of the deposits
deducting the funeral and other related expenses in the burial of Estrellita,
Carmela and Jennifer, amounts to Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00).6 The
settlement gave fifty percent (50%) of the total amount of the bank deposits
of Estrellita and her daughters to Rafael, except Savings Account No. 104-
111211-0 under the name of Jennifer which involves a token amount. The
other fifty percent (50%) was allotted to petitioner. The Parañaque property
and the car and were also given to petitioner with Rafael and Salud waiving
all their "claims, rights, ownership and participation as heirs" 7 in the said
properties.
On November 18, 1992, Rafael died. To settle Rafael's estate, Teresita
instituted an intestate estate proceeding8 docketed as Sp. Proc. No. C-1679,
with Branch 120 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City listing as
heirs Salud, Ramon, Ricardo, and the wife (Zenaida) and children of
Antonio. Teresita prayed to be appointed Special Administratrix of Rafael's
estate. Additionally, she sought to be appointed as guardian ad litem of
Salud, now senile, and Ricardo, her incompetent brother Herein private
respondent Ramon filed an opposition9 dated March 24, 1993, praying to be
appointed instead as Salud and Ricardo's guardian. Barely three weeks
passed, Ramon filed another opposition 10 alleging, among others, that
Estrellita was given the Valenzuela property by Rafael which she sold for not
less than Six Million Pesos (P6,000,000.00) before her gruesome murder.
Ramon pleaded for the court's intervention "to determine the legality and
validity of the intervivos distribution made by deceased Rafael to his
children," 11Estrellita included. On May 12, 1993, Ramon filed his own
petition, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. C-1699, entitled "In The Matter Of The
Guardianship Of Salud G. Nicolas and Ricardo G. Nicolas" and averred that
their legitime should come from the collation of all the properties distributed
to his children by Rafael during his lifetime. 12 Ramon stated that herein
petitioner is one of Rafael's children "by right of representation as the
widower of deceased legitimate daughter of Estrellita." 13
In a consolidated Order, dated November 9, 1993, the RTC appointed Ramon
as the guardian of Salud and Ricardo while Teresita, in turn, was appointed
as the Special Administratrix of Rafael's estate. The court's Order did not
include petitioner in the slate of Rafael's heirs. 14 Neither was the Parañaque
property listed in its list of properties to be included in the
estate. 15 Subsequently, the RTC in an Order dated January 5, 1994, removed
Ramon as Salud and Ricardo's guardian for Selling his ward's property
without the court's knowledge and permission. 16
Sometime on January 13, 1994, the RTC released an Order giving petitioner
"ten (10) days . . . within which to file any appropriate petition or motion
related to the pending petition insofar as the case is concerned and to file any
opposition to any pending motion that has been filed by both the counsels
for Ramon Nicolas and Teresita de Leon." In response, petitioner filed a
Manifestation, dated January 19, 1994, stressing that he was neither a
compulsory heir nor an intestate heir of Rafael and he has no interest to
participate in the proceedings. The RTC noted said Manifestation in its Order
dated February 2, 1994. 17Despite the Manifestation, Ramon, through a
motion dated February 14, 1994, moved to include petitioner in the intestate
estate proceeding and asked that the Parañaque property, as well as the car
and the balance of the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property, be
collated. 18 Acting on Ramon's motion, the trial court on March 10, 1994
granted the same in an Order which pertinently reads as follows:
x x x           x x x          x x x
On the Motion To Include Lauro G. Vizconde In Intestate
proceedings in instant case and considering the comment on
his Manifestation, the same is hereby granted.19
x x x           x x x          x x x
Petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Order which
Ramon opposed. 20 On August 12, 1994, the RTC rendered an Order denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration. It provides:
x x x           x x x          x x x
The centerpoint of oppositor-applicant's argument is that spouses
Vizconde were then financially incapable of having purchased or
acquired for a valuable consideration the property at Valenzuela
from the deceased Rafael Nicolas. Admittedly, the spouses
Vizconde were then living with the deceased Rafael Nicolas in the
latter's ancestral home. In fact, as the argument further goes, said
spouses were dependent for support on the deceased Rafael
Nicolas. And, Lauro Vizconde left for the United States in, de-
facto separation, from the family for sometime and returned to the
Philippines only after the occurrence of violent deaths of Estrellita
and her two daughters.
To dispute the contention that the spouses Vizconde were
financially incapable to buy the property from the late Rafael
Nicolas, Lauro Vizconde claims that they have been engaged in
business venture such as taxi business, canteen concessions and
garment manufacturing.However, no competent evidence has been
submitted to indubitably support the business undertakings
adverted to.
In fine, there is no sufficient evidence to show that the acquisition
of the property from Rafael Nicolas was for a valuable
consideration.
Accordingly, the transfer of the property at Valenzuela in favor of
Estrellita by her father was gratuitous and the subject property in
Parañaque which was purchased out of the proceeds of the said
transfer of the property by the deceased Rafael Nicolas in favor of
Estrellita, is subject to collation.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby
DENIED. 21 (Emphasis added)
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
respondent Court of Appeals. In its decision of December 14, 1994,
respondent Court of Appeals 22 denied the petition stressing that the
RTC correctly adjudicated the question on the title of the Valenzuela
property as "the jurisdiction of the probate court extends to matters
incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in
handling the settlement of the estate of the deceased (Cf.: Sec. 1, Rule
90, Revised Rules of Court)." 23 Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the
instant petition for review on certiorari. Finding prima faciemerit, the
Court on December 4, 1995, gave due course to the petition and
required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
The core issue hinges on the validity of the probate court's Order, which
respondent Court of Appeals sustained, nullifying the transfer of the
Valenzuela property from Rafael to Estrellita and declaring the Parañaque
property as subject to collation.
The appeal is well taken.
Basic principles of collation need to be emphasized at the outset. Article 1061
of the Civil Code speaks of collation. It states:
Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other
compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any
property or right which he may have received from the
decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of
donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may
be computed in the determination of the legitime of each
heir, and in the account of the partition.
Collation is the act by virtue of which descendants or other forced heirs who
intervene in the division of the inheritance of an ascendant bring into the
common mass, the property which they received from him, so that the
division may be made according to law and the will of the
testator. 24 Collation is only required of compulsory heirs succeeding with
other compulsory heirs and involves property or rights received by donation
or gratuitous title during the lifetime of the decedent. 25 The purpose is to
attain equality among the compulsory heirs in so far as possible for it is
presumed that the intention of the testator or predecessor in interest making
a donation or gratuitous transfer to a forced heir is to give him something in
advance on account of his share in the estate, and that the predecessor's will
is to treat all his heirs equally, in the absence of any expression to the
contrary. 26 Collation does not impose any lien on the property or the subject
matter of collationable donation. What is brought to collation is not the
property donated itself, but rather the value of such property at the time it
was donated, 27 the rationale being that the donation is a real alienation
which conveys ownership upon its acceptance, hence any increase in value
or any deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of the heir or donee. 28
The attendant facts herein do not make a case of collation. We find that the
probate court, as well as respondent Court of Appeals, committed reversible
errors.
First: The probate court erred in ordering the inclusion of petitioner in the
intestate estate proceeding. Petitioner, a son-in-law of Rafael, is not one of
Rafael's compulsory heirs. Article 887 of the Civil Code is clear on this point:
Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to
their legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the following, legitimate parents and
ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and
ascendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by
legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not
excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they exclude
one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be
duly proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three
classes mentioned, shall inherit from them in the manner
and to the extent established by this Code.
With respect to Rafael's estate, therefore, petitioner who was not
even shown to be a creditor of Rafael is considered a third person or
a stranger. 29 As such, petitioner may not be dragged into the
intestate estate proceeding. Neither may he be permitted or allowed
to intervene as he has no personality or interest in the said
proceeding, 30 which petitioner correctly argued in his
manifestation. 31
Second: As a rule, the probate court may pass upon and determine the title or
ownership of a property which may or may not be included in the estate
proceedings. 32 Such determination is provisional in character and is subject
to final decision in a separate action to resolve title. 33 In the case at bench,
however, we note that the probate court went beyond the scope of its
jurisdiction when it proceeded to determine the validity of the sale of the
Valenzuela property between Rafael and Estrellita and ruled that the transfer
of the subject property between the concerned parties was gratuitous. The
interpretation of the deed and the true intent of the contracting parties, as
well as the presence or absence of consideration, are matters outside the
probate court's jurisdiction. These issues should be ventilated in an
appropriate action. We reiterate:
. . . we are of the opinion and so hold, that a court which
takes cognizance of testate or intestate proceedings has
power and jurisdiction to determine whether or not the
properties included therein or excluded therefrom
belong prima facie to the deceased, although such a
determination is not final or ultimate in nature, and without
prejudice to the right of the interested parties, in a proper
action, to raise the question bearing on the ownership or
existence of the right or credit.34
Third: The order of the probate court subjecting the Parañaque property to
collation is premature. Records indicate that the intestate estate proceedings
is still in its initiatory stage. We find nothing herein to indicate that the
legitime of any of Rafael's heirs has been impaired to warrant collation. We
thus advert to our ruling in Udarbe v. Jurado, 59 Phil. 11, 13-14, to wit:
collation of the Parañaque property is improper for, to repeat, collation
covers only properties gratuitously given by the decedent during his lifetime
to his compulsory heirs which fact does not obtain anent the transfer of the
Parañaque property. Moreover, Rafael, in a public instrument, voluntarily
and willfully waived any "claims, rights, ownership and participation as
heir" 38 in the Parañaque property.
Fifth: Finally, it is futile for the probate court to ascertain whether or not the
Valenzuela property may be brought to collation. Estrellita, it should be
stressed, died ahead of Rafael. In fact, it was Rafael who inherited from
Estrellita an amount more than the value of the Valenzuela
property. 39 Hence, even assuming that the Valenzuela property may be
collated collation may not be allowed as the value of the Valenzuela property
has long been returned to the estate of Rafael. Therefore, any determination
by the probate court on the matter serves no valid and binding purpose.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals appealed from is hereby
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

We are of the opinion that this contention is untenable. In SO ORDERED.

accordance with the provisions of article 1035 35 of the Civil
Code, it was the duty of the plaintiffs to allege and prove Narvasa, C.J., Romero, Kapunan and Purisima, JJ., concur.
that the donations received by the defendants were
inofficious in whole or in part and prejudiced the legitime or
hereditary portion to which they are entitled. In the absence
of evidence to that effect, the collation sought is untenable
for lack of ground or basis therefor.

Fourth: Even on the assumption that collation is appropriate in this case the
probate court, nonetheless, made a reversible error in ordering collation of
the Parañaque property. We note that what was transferred to Estrellita, by
way of deed of sale, is the Valenzuela property. The Parañaque property
which Estrellita acquired by using the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela
property does not become collationable simply by reason thereof. Indeed,
collation of the Parañaque property has no statutory basis. 36 The order of the
probate court presupposes that the Parañaque property was gratuitously
conveyed by Rafael to Estrellita. Records indicate, however, that the
Parañaque property was conveyed for and in consideration of
P900,000.00, 37 by Premier Homes, Inc., to Estrellita. Rafael, the decedent, has
no participation therein, and petitioner who inherited and is now the present
owner of the Parañaque property is not one of Rafael's heirs. Thus, the
probate court's order of collation against petitioner is unwarranted for the
obligation to collate is lodged with Estrellita, the heir, and not to herein
petitioner who does not have any interest in Rafael's estate. As it stands,
 Republic of the Philippines rights of petitioner to the land donated; and (2) petitioner agreed to sell a
SUPREME COURT designated 1,000-square meter portion of the donated land, and to deposit
Manila the proceeds thereof in a bank, for the convenient disposal of Leoncio. In case
of Leoncio's death, it was agreed that the balance of the deposit will be
THIRD DIVISION withdrawn by petitioner to defray burial costs.

  On January 8, 1962, and pending execution of the above judgment, Leoncio

died, leaving only two heirs — the herein petitioner, who is his
G.R. No. 112483 October 8, 1999 acknowledged natural son, and an adopted son, Victor Imperial. On March
8, 1962, Victor was substituted in place of Leoncio in the above-mentioned
case, and it was he who moved for execution of judgment. On March 15,
ELOY IMPERIAL, petitioner,
1962, the motion for execution was duly granted.
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LEGASPI CITY,
CESAR VILLALON, JR., TERESA VILLALON, ANTONIO VILLALON, Fifteen years thereafter, or on July 26, 1977, Victor died single and without
AUGUSTO VILLALON, ROBERTO VILLALON, RICARDO VILLALON issue, survived only by his natural father, Ricardo Villalon, who was a lessee
and ESTHER VILLALON, respondents. of a portion of the disputed land. Four years hence, or on September 25, 1981,
Ricardo died, leaving as his only heirs his two children, Cesar and Teresa
Villalon.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

Five years thereafter, or sometime in 1986, Cesar and Teresa filed a

Petitioner seeks to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals
complaint for annulment of the donation with the Regional Trial Court of
in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 31976 1, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial
Legazpi City, docketed as Civil Case No. 7646. Petitioner moved to dismiss
Court of Legaspi City 2, which rendered inofficious the donation made by
on the ground of res judicata, by virtue of the compromise judgment rendered
Leoncio Imperial in favor of herein petitioner, to the extent that it impairs the
by the Court of First Instance of Albay. The trial court granted the motion to
legitime of Victor Imperial, and ordering petitioner to convey to herein
dismiss, but the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order and
private respondents, heirs of said Victor Imperial, that portion of the donated
remanded the case for further proceedings.
land proportionate to Victor Imperial's legitime.

On October 18, 1989, Cesar and Teresa filed an amended complaint in the
Leoncio Imperial was the registered owner of a 32,837-square meter parcel of
same case, Civil Case No. 7646, for "Annulment of Documents,
land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 200, also known as Lot 45 of
Reconveyance and Recovery of Possession" with the Regional Trial Court of
the Cadastral Survey of Albay. On July 7, 1951, Leoncio sold the said lot for
Legazpi City, seeking the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale affecting
P1.00 to his acknowledged natural son, petitioner herein, who then acquired
the above property, on grounds of fraud, deceit and inofficiousness. In the
title over the land and proceeded to subdivide it into several lots. Petitioner
amended complaint, it was alleged that petitioner caused Leoncio to execute
and private respondents admit that despite the contract's designation as one
the donation by taking undue advantage of the latter's physical weakness
of "Absolute Sale", the transaction was in fact a donation.1âwphi1.nêt
and mental unfitness, and that the conveyance of said property in favor of
petitioner impaired the legitime of Victor Imperial, their natural brother and
On July 28, 1953, or barely two years after the donation, Leoncio filed a predecessor-in-interest. 4
complaint for annulment of the said Deed of Absolute Sale, docketed as Civil
Case No. 1177, in the then Court of First Instance of Albay, on the ground
In his Answer, petitioner: (1) alleged that Leoncio had conveyed sufficient
that he was deceived by petitioner herein into signing the said document.
property to Victor to cover his legitime, consisting of 563 hectares of
The dispute, however, was resolved through a compromise agreement,
agricultural land in Manito, Albay; (2) reiterated the defense of res judicata,
approved by the Court of First Instance of Albay on November 3, 1961 3 ,
and (3) raised the additional defenses of prescription and laches.
under which terms: (1) Leoncio recognized the legality and validity of the
Plaintiff Cesar Villalon died on December 26, 1989, while the case was
pending in the Regional Trial Court, and was substituted in this action by his
sons, namely, Antonio, Roberto, Augusto, Ricardo and Cesar, Jr., all
surnamed Villalon, and his widow, Esther H. Villalon.
The RTC held the donation to be inofficious and impairing the legitime of
Victor, on the basis of its finding that at the time of Leoncio's death, he left no
property other than the 32,837-square meter parcel of land which he had
donated to petitioner. The RTC went on further to state that petitioner's
allegation that other properties existed and were inherited by Victor was not
substantiated by the evidence. 5
The legitime of Victor was determined by the trial court in this manner:
Considering that the property donated is 32,837 square
meters, one half of that or 16,418 square meters becomes the
free portion of Leoncio which could be absorbed in the
donation to defendant. The other half, which is also 16,418
square meters is where the legitime of the adopted son
Victor Imperial has to be taken.
The proportion of the legitime of the legitimate child
(including the adopted child) in relation to the
acknowledged natural child (defendant) is 10 is to 5[,] with
the acknowledged natural child getting 1/2 of the legitime
of the legitimate (adopted) child, in accordance with Art. 895
of the New Civil Code which provides:
The legitime of each of the acknowledged
natural children and each of the natural
children by legal fiction shall consist of one-
half of the legitime of each of the legitimate
children or descendants.
From the 16,418 square meters left (after the free portion has
been taken) plaintiffs are therefore entitled to 10,940 square
meters while defendant gets 5,420 square meters. 6
The trial court likewise held that the applicable prescriptive period is 30
years under Article 1141 of the Civil Code 7, reckoned from March 15, 1962,
when the writ of execution of the compromise judgment in Civil Case 1177
was issued, and that the original complaint having been filed in 1986, the
action has not yet prescribed. In addition, the trial court regarded the defense
of prescription as having been waived, this not being one of the issues
agreed upon at pre-trial.
Thus, the dispositive portion of the RTC's Decision of December 13, 1990
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Deed of Absolute
Sale otherwise known as Doc. No. 8; Book No. 14; Page No.
1; Series of 1951 of the Notarial file of Pompeyo B. Calleja
which is considered a donation, is hereby reduced
proportionately insofar as it affected the legitime of the late
Victor Imperial, which share is inherited by the plaintiffs
herein, to the extent that plaintiffs are ordered to be given by
defendant a portion of 10,940 square meters thereof.
In order to avoid further conflict, the 10,940 share to be given
to plaintiffs should include the portion which they are
presently occupying, by virtue of the extended lease to their
father Ricardo Villalon, where the bungalow in question
stands.
The remaining portion to be given to plaintiffs may come
from any other portion that may be agreed upon by the
parties, otherwise, this court will appoint a commissioner to
undertake the partition.
The other 21,897 square meters should go to the defendant
as part of his legitime and by virtue of the reduced donation.
No pronouncement as to damages as they were not
sufficiently proved.
SO ORDERED. 8
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision in toto.
Before us, petitioner questions the following findings of respondent court: (1)
that there was no res judicata, there being no identity of parties and cause of
action between the instant case and Civil Case No. 1177; (2) that private
respondents had a right to question the donation; (3) that private
respondents' action is barred by prescription, laches and estoppel; and (4)
that the donation was inofficious and should be reduced.
It is an indispensable requirement in res judicata that there be, between the
first and second action, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of
action. 9 A perusal of the records leads us to conclude that there is no identity
of parties and of cause of action as between Civil Case No. 1177 and Civil
Case No. 7646. Civil Case No. 1177 was instituted by Leoncio in his capacity
as donor of the questioned donation. While it is true that upon his death,
Victor was substituted as plaintiff of the action, such does not alter the fact
that Victor's participation in the case was in representation of the interests of
the original plaintiff, Leoncio. The purpose behind the rule on substitution of
parties is to ensure that the deceased party would continue to be properly
represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative of the
estate 10, or his heir, as in this case, for which no court appointment is
required. 11 Petitioner's argument, therefore, that there is substantial identity
between Leoncio and private respondents, being heirs and successors-in-
interest of Victor, is unavailing.
Moreover, Leoncio's cause of action as donor of the property was fraud,
purportedly employed upon him by petitioner in the execution of the
donation. While the same circumstances of fraud and deceit are alleged in
private respondents' complaint, it also raises the additional ground of
inofficiousness of donation.
Contrary to petitioner's contentions, inofficiousness of donation does not,
and could not, form part of Leoncio's cause of action in Civil Case No. 1177.
Inofficiousness as a cause of action may arise only upon the death of the
donor, as the value of the donation will then be contrasted with the net value
of the estate of the donor-deceased. 12
Consequently, while in Civil Case No. 1177, Leoncio sought the revocation in
full of the donation on ground of fraud, the instant case actually has two
alternative causes of action. First, for fraud and deceit, under the same
circumstances as alleged in Leoncio's complaint, which seeks the annulment
in full of the donation, and which the trial court correctly dismissed because
the compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 1177 served as a ratification
and waiver on the part of Leoncio of whatever defects in voluntariness and
consent may have been attendant in the making of the donation. The second
cause of action is the alleged inofficiousness of the donation, resulting in the
impairment of Victor's legitime, which seeks the annulment, not of the entire
donation, but only of that portion diminishing the legitime. 13 It is on the
basis of this second cause of action that private respondents prevailed in the
lower courts.
Petitioner next questions the right of private respondents to contest the
donation. Petitioner sources his argument from Article 772 of the Civil Code,
thus:
Only those who at the time of the donor's death have a right
to the legitime and their heirs and successors in interest may
ask for the reduction of inofficious donations . . . .
As argued by petitioner, when Leoncio died on January 8, 1962, it was only
Victor who was entitled to question the donation. However, instead of filing
an action to contest the donation, Victor asked to be substituted as plaintiff in
Civil Case No. 1177 and even moved for execution of the compromise
judgment therein.
No renunciation of legitime may be presumed from the foregoing acts. It
must be remembered that at the time of the substitution, the judgment
approving the compromise agreement has already been rendered. Victor
merely participated in the execution of the compromise judgment. He was
not a party to the compromise agreement.
More importantly, our law on succession does not countenance tacit
repudiation of inheritance. Rather, it requires an express act on the part of the
heir. Thus, under Article 1051 of Civil Code:
The repudiation of an inheritance shall be made in a public
or authentic instrument, or by petition presented to the court
having jurisdiction over the testamentary or intestate
proceedings.
Thus, when Victor substituted Leoncio in Civil Case No. 1177 upon the
latter's death, his act of moving for execution of the compromise judgment
cannot be considered an act of renunciation of his legitime. He was,
therefore, not precluded or estopped from subsequently seeking the
reduction of the donation, under Article 772. Nor are Victor's heirs, upon his
death, precluded from doing so, as their right to do so is expressly
recognized under Article 772, and also in Article 1053:
If the heir should die without having accepted or repudiated
the inheritance, his right shall be transmitted to his heirs.
Be that as it may, we find merit in petitioner's other assignment of errors.
Having ascertained this action as one for reduction of an inofficious
donation, we cannot sustain the holding of both the trial court and the Court
of Appeals that the applicable prescriptive period is thirty years, under
Article 1141 of the Civil Code. The sense of both courts that this case is a "real
action over an immovable" allots undue credence to private respondents'
description of their complaint, as one for "Annulment of Documents,
Reconveyance and Recovery of Possession of Property", which suggests the
action to be, in part, a real action enforced by those with claim of title over
the disputed land.1âwphi1.nêt
Unfortunately for private respondents, a claim for legitime does not amount
to a claim of title. In the recent case of Vizconde vs. Court of
Appeals 14, we declared that what is brought to collation is not the donated
property itself, but the value of the property at the time it was donated. The
rationale for this is that the donation is a real alienation which conveys
ownership upon its acceptance, hence, any increase in value or any
deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of the heir or donee. 15
What, then, is the prescriptive period for an action for reduction of an
inofficious donation? The Civil Code specifies the following instances of
reduction or revocation of donations: (1) four years, in cases of subsequent
birth, appearance, recognition or adoption of a child; 16 (2) four years, for
non-compliance with conditions of the donation; 17 and (3) at any time during
the lifetime of the donor and his relatives entitled to support, for failure of
the donor to reserve property for his or their support. 18 Interestingly,
donations as in the instant case, 19 the reduction of which hinges upon the
allegation of impairment of legitime, are not controlled by a particular
prescriptive period, for which reason we must resort to the ordinary rules of
prescription.
Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, actions upon an obligation created by
law must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action
accrues. Thus, the ten-year prescriptive period applies to the obligation to
reduce inofficious donations, required under Article 771 of the Civil Code, to
the extent that they impair the legitime of compulsory heirs.
From when shall the ten-year period be reckoned? The case of Mateo vs.
Lagua, 29 SCRA 864, which involved the reduction for inofficiousness of a
donation propter nuptias, recognized that the cause of action to enforce a
legitime accrues upon the death of the donor-decedent. Clearly so, since it is
only then that the net estate may be ascertained and on which basis, the
legitimes may be determined.
It took private respondents 24 years since the death of Leoncio to initiate this
case. The action, therefore, has long prescribed.
As for the trial court's holding that the defense of prescription had been
waived, it not being one of the issues agreed upon at pre-trial, suffice it to
say that while the terms of the pre-trial order bind the parties as to the
matters to be taken up in trial, it would be the height of injustice for us to
adhere to this technicality when the fact of prescription is manifest in the
pleadings of the parties, as well as the findings of fact of the lower courts. 20
A perusal of the factual antecedents reveals that not only has prescription set
in, private respondents are also guilty of estoppel by laches. It may be
recalled that Leoncio died on January 8, 1962. Fifteen years later, Victor died,
leaving as his sole heir Ricardo Villalon, who also died four years later.
While Victor was alive, he gave no indication of any interest to contest the
donation of his deceased father. As we have discussed earlier, the fact that he
actively participated in Civil Case No. 1177 did not amount to a renunciation
of his inheritance and does not preclude him from bringing an action to
claim his legitime. These are matters that Victor could not possibly be
unaware of, considering that he is a lawyer 21. Ricardo Villalon was even a
lessee of a portion of the donated property, and could have instituted the
action as sole heir of his natural son, or at the very least, raised the matter of
legitime by way of counterclaim in an ejectment case 22 filed against him by
petitioner in 1979. Neither does it help private respondents' cause that five
years have elapsed since the death of Ricardo in 1981 before they filed their
complaint with the RTC.
Estoppel by laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable or
unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier, warranting a presumption that the
person has abandoned his right or declined to assert it. 23 We find the
necessity for the application of the principle of estoppel by laches in this case,
in order to avoid an injustice.
A final word on collation of donations. We observe that after finding the
donation to be inofficious because Leoncio had no other property at the time
of his death, the RTC computed the legitime of Victor based on the area of
the donated property. Hence, in its dispositive portion, it awarded a portion
of the property to private respondents as Victor's legitime. This was upheld
by the Court of Appeals.
Our rules of succession require that before any conclusion as to the legal
share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, the following steps must be
taken: (1) the net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all
the payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by
the deceased at the time of his death; (2) the value of all donations subject to
collation would be added to it. 24
Thus, it is the value of the property at the time it is donated, and not the
property itself, which is brought to collation. Consequently, even when the
donation is found inofficious and reduced to the extent that it impaired
Victor's legitime, private respondents will not receive a corresponding share
in the property donated. Thus, in this case where the collatable property is an
immovable, what may be received is: (1) an equivalent, as much as possible,
in property of the same nature, class and quality; 25 (2) if such is
impracticable, the equivalent value of the impaired legitime in cash or
marketable securities; 26 or (3) in the absence of cash or securities in the
estate, so much of such other property as may be necessary, to be sold in
public auction. 27

We believe this worth mentioning, even as we grant the petition on grounds

of prescription and laches.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No.

31976, affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case
No. 7646, is reversed and set aside. No costs.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Melo, Vitug, Panganiban and Purisima, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
G.R. No. 189776               December 15, 2010
AMELIA P. ARELLANO, represented by her duly appointed guardians,
AGNES P. ARELLANO and NONA P. ARELLANO, Petitioner,  donation, or any other gratuitous title in order that it may be computed in
vs.
FRANCISCO PASCUAL and MIGUEL PASCUAL, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his
siblings, namely: petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is represented by her
daughters1 Agnes P. Arellano (Agnes) and Nona P. Arellano, and
respondents Francisco Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual. 2
In a petition for "Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of
Letters of Administration," docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. M-5034,
filed by respondents on April 28, 2000 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati, respondents alleged, inter alia, that a parcel of land (the donated
property) located in Teresa Village, Makati, which was, by Deed of Donation,
transferred by the decedent to petitioner the validity of which donation
respondents assailed, "may be considered as an advance legitime" of
petitioner.
Respondent’s nephew Victor was, as they prayed for, appointed as
Administrator of the estate by Branch 135 of the Makati RTC.3
Respecting the donated property, now covered in the name of petitioner by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 181889 of the Register of Deeds of Makati,
which respondents assailed but which they, in any event, posited that it
"may be considered as an advance legitime" to petitioner, the trial court,
acting as probate court, held that it was precluded from determining the
validity of the donation.
Provisionally passing, however, upon the question of title to the donated
property only for the purpose of determining whether it formed part of the
decedent’s estate,4 the probate court found the Deed of Donation valid in
light of the presumption of validity of notarized documents. It thus went on
to hold that it is subject to collation following Article 1061 of the New Civil
Code which reads:5
Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must
bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have
received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of
the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the
partition.
The probate court thereafter partitioned the properties of the intestate estate.
Thus it disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
that:
1. The property covered by TCT No. 181889 of the Register of Deeds
of Makati as part of the estate of Angel N. Pascual;
2. The property covered by TCT No. 181889 to be subject to collation;
3. 1/3 of the rental receivables due on the property at the mezzanine
and the 3rd floor of Unit 1110 Tanay St., Makati City form part of the
estate of Angel N. Pascual;
4. The following properties form part of the estate of Angel N.
Pascual:
a. 1/3 share in the House and Lot at 1110 Tanay St., Rizal
Village Makati TCT No. 348341 and 1/3 share in the rental
income thereon;
b. 1/3 share in the Vacant Lot with an area of 271 square
meters located at Tanay St., Rizal Village, Makati City, TCT
No. 119063;
c. Agricultural land with an area of 3.8 hectares located at
Puerta Galera Mindoro covered by OCT No. P-2159;
 d. Shares of stocks in San Miguel Corporation covered by the Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner faulted the trial court in holding that
following Certificate Numbers: A0011036, A006144,
A082906, A006087, A065796, A11979, A049521, C86950, I
C63096, C55316, C54824, C120328, A011026, C12865, A10439,
A021401, A007218, A0371, S29239, S40128, S58308, S69309; . . . THE PROPERTY DONATED TO APPELLANT AMELIA PASCUAL
ARELLANO IS PART OF THE ESTATE OF ANGEL PASCUAL, JR.
e. Shares of stocks in Paper Industries Corp. covered by the
following Certificate Numbers: S29239, S40128, S58308, II
S69309, A006708, 07680, A020786, S18539, S14649;
. . . THE PROPERTY DONATED TO APPELLANT IS SUBJECT TO
f. ¼ share in Eduardo Pascual’s shares in Baguio Gold COLLATION UNDER ARTICLE 1061 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.
Mining Co.;
III
g. Cash in Banco De Oro Savings Account No. 2 014 12292 4
in the name of Nona Arellano;
. . . APPELLEES WHO ARE MERELY COLLATERAL RELATIVES OF
DECEASED ANGEL N. PASCUAL JR. AS HIS COMPULSORY
i. Property previously covered by TCT No. 119053 now HEIRS ENTITLED TO LEGITIMES.
covered by TCT No. 181889, Register of Deeds of Makati
City;
xxxx

j. Rental receivables from Raul Arellano per Order issued by

and
Branch 64 of the Court on November 17, 1995.
V
5. AND the properties are partitioned as follows:
. . . IN NOT PARTITIONING THE ESTATE OF ANGEL N. PASCUAL
a. To heir Amelia P. Arellano-the property covered by TCT
JR. EQUALLY AMONG HIS LEGAL OR INTESTATE HEIRS.6 (underscoring
No. 181889;
supplied)

b. To heirs Francisco N. Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual-the

real properties covered by TCT Nos. 348341 and 119063 of
the Register of Deeds of Makati City and the property
covered by OCT No. 2159, to be divided equally between
them up to the extent that each of their share have been
equalized with the actual value of the property in 5(a) at the
time of donation, the value of which shall be determined by
an independent appraiser to be designated by Amelia P.
Arellano, Miguel N. Pascual and Francisco N. Pascual. If the
real properties are not sufficient to equalize the shares, then
Francisco’s and Miguel’s shares may be satisfied from either
in cash property or shares of stocks, at the rate of quotation.
The remaining properties shall be divided equally among
Francisco, Miguel and Amelia. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
By Decision7 of July 20, 2009, the Court of Appeals found petitioner’s appeal
"partly meritorious." It sustained the probate court’s ruling that the property
donated to petitioner is subject to collation in this wise:
Bearing in mind that in intestate succession, what governs is the rule on
equality of division, We hold that the property subject of donation inter
vivos in favor of Amelia is subject to collation. Amelia cannot be considered
a creditor of the decedent and we believe that under the circumstances, the
value of such immovable though not strictly in the concept of advance
legitime, should be deducted from her share in the net hereditary estate. The
trial court therefore committed no reversible error when it included the said
property as forming part of the estate of Angel N. Pascual.8 (citation omitted;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)1avvph!1
The appellate court, however, held that, contrary to the ruling of the probate
court, herein petitioner "was able to submit prima facie evidence of shares of
stocks owned by the [decedent] which have not been included in the
inventory submitted by the administrator."
Thus, the appellate court disposed, quoted verbatim:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby PARTLY
GRANTED. The Decision dated January 29, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City, Branch 135 in Special Proceeding Case No. M-5034 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the order of inclusion of
properties of the Intestate Estate of Angel N. Pascual, Jr. as well as
the partition and distribution of the same to the co-heirs are concerned.
The case is hereby REMANDED to the said court for further proceedings in
accordance with the disquisitions herein.9 (underscoring supplied)
Petitioner’s Partial Motion for Reconsideration10 having been denied by the
appellate court by Resolution11 of October 7, 2009, the present petition for
review on certiorari was filed, ascribing as errors of the appellate court its
ruling
I compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be safeguarded.15
. . . THAT THE PROPERTY DONATED BY ANGEL N. PASCUAL, JR. TO
PETITIONER AMELIA PASCUAL ARELLANO IS PART OF HIS ESTATE
AT THE TIME OF HIS DEATH.
II
. . . THAT THE PROPERTY DONATED TO PETITIONER IS SUBJECT TO
COLLATION UNDER ARTICLE 1061 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.
III
. . . THAT RESPONDENTS ARE COMPULSORY HEIRS OF THEIR
DECEASED BROTHER ANGEL N. PASCUAL JR. AND ARE ENTITLED TO
LEGITIMES.
IV
. . . IN NOT PARTITIONING THE ESTATE OF ANGEL N. PASCUAL,
JR. EQUALLY AMONG PETITIONER AND RESPONDENTS, AS HIS
LEGAL OR INTESTATE HEIRS.12 (underscoring supplied)
Petitioners thus raise the issues of whether the property donated to
petitioner is subject to collation; and whether the property of the estate
should have been ordered equally distributed among the parties.
On the first issue:
The term collation has two distinct concepts: first, it is a mere mathematical
operation by the addition of the value of donations made by the testator to
the value of the hereditary estate; and second, it is the return to the
hereditary estate of property disposed of by lucrative title by the testator
during his lifetime.13
The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory heirs
in so far as is possible, and to determine the free portion, after finding the
legitime, so that inofficious donations may be reduced.14
Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes
being to determine the legitime and the free portion. If there is no
The records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary, or
concurring compulsory heirs. He was only survived by his siblings, who are
his collateral relatives and, therefore, are not entitled to any legitime – that
part of the testator’s property which he cannot dispose of because the law
has reserved it for compulsory heirs.16
The compulsory heirs may be classified into (1) primary, (2) secondary, and
(3) concurring. The primary compulsory heirs are those who have
precedence over and exclude other compulsory heirs; legitimate children and
descendants are primary compulsory heirs. The secondary compulsory heirs
are those who succeed only in the absence of the primary heirs; the
legitimate parents and ascendants are secondary compulsory heirs. The
concurring compulsory heirs are those who succeed together with the
primary or the secondary compulsory heirs; the illegitimate children, and the
surviving spouse are concurring compulsory heirs.17
The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any
legitime, he was at liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was
left for his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His donation to petitioner,
assuming that it was valid,18 is deemed as donation made to a "stranger," MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
chargeable against the free portion of the estate.19There being no compulsory Associate Justice
heir, however, the donated property is not subject to collation.

On the second issue:

The decedent’s remaining estate should thus be partitioned equally among

his heirs-siblings-collateral relatives, herein petitioner and respondents,
pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code, viz:

Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a

surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of
the deceased in accordance with the following articles. (underscoring
supplied)

Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood,
they shall inherit in equal shares. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision

ordering the collation of the property donated to petitioner, Amelia N.
Arellano, to the estate of the deceased Angel N. Pascual, Jr. is set aside.

Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the court of origin, Branch 135
of the Makati Regional Trial Court, which is ordered to conduct further
proceedings in the case for the purpose of determining what finally forms
part of the estate, and thereafter to divide whatever remains of it equally
among the parties.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA*
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA**

Associate Justice Associate Justice