Parliament of India

Bicameralism
◼ Bi (two) – Camera (Chamber)
◼ Consent of two differently constituted Houses for
making or changing laws
◼ Unicameralism only one house
◼ Bicameralism - More common in large federal states
◼ Unicameralism – More common unitary small states
Bicameralism
◼ Reasons/Advantages
◼ Ensuring representation of different sections of the
population/diversity (geographic, regional, social and
economic)
◼ Improving scrutiny and review of legislation – dispassionate
way
◼ Providing additional democratic checks and balances in the
legislative process
◼ Deliberative body
Bicameralism
◼ Demerits
◼ Conflict, delay and responsibility – clog in the wheel
◼ Unnecessary and duplication
◼ Cost
Bicameralism
◼ India
◼ Parliament – Art. 79
◼ State Legislatures - Art. 168 (Andhra Pradesh, Bihar,
Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu,
Telangana and Uttar Pradesh)
◼ Assam (1969), Bombay (1960), Jammu and Kashmir
(2019), Madhya Pradesh (1969), Punjab (1969), Tamil
Nadu (1986), West Bengal (1969)
Union Legislature
◼ Part V Ch. II
◼ Articles 79 – 122
◼ Constitution of Parliament.—There shall be a
Parliament for the Union which shall consist of the
President and two Houses to be known respectively as
the Council of States and the House of the People.
(Article 79)
Union Legislature
◼ Rajya Sabha
◼ Indirect election (Art. 80)
◼ Permanent body (Art. 83)
◼ Council of Ministers is not responsible in the strict sense of
the term
◼ Special powers and responsibilities in many matters on
Centre – State relations
Union Legislature
◼ Rajya Sabha
◼ Seasoned and experienced men in public life can enter
without going through the arduous process of elections –
talent, experience and knowledge
◼ Debating chamber – mature, impassioned debates – check
on undue haste in legislative process – revising chamber
◼ Chamber where the States are represented
Union Legislature
◼ Rajya Sabha
◼ Composition (Article 80)
◼ 238 representatives of states and UTs (Fourth Schedule)
◼ 12 nominated members (persons having special knowledge
or practical experience in respect of such matters as the
following: Literature, science, art and social service)
◼ Total: 250 members
Union Legislature
◼ Rajya Sabha
◼ The seats in the Upper House are allotted among the various States
and Union Territories on the basis of population, the formula being
one seat for each million of population for the first five million and
thereafter one seat for every two million population. A slight
advantage is, therefore, given to States with small population over
the States with bigger population. This is called "weighted
proportional representation". The system of proportional
representation helps in giving due representation to minority groups.
◼ Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India (2006)
Union Legislature
◼ Rajya Sabha
◼ The representatives of each State in the Council of States
shall be elected by the elected members of the Legislative
Assembly of the State in accordance with the system of
proportional representation by means of the single
transferable vote.
◼ The representatives of the Union Territories in the Council
of States shall be chosen in such manner as Parliament
may by law prescribe. (Jammu and Kashmir 4, Delhi 3 and
Puducherry 1)
Union Legislature
◼ Rajya Sabha
◼ Composition of Parliament India's Parliament is bicameral.
The two Houses along with the President constitute
Parliament [Article 79]. The Houses differ from each other
in many respects. They are constituted on different
principles, and, from a functional point of view, they do not
enjoy a co-equal status. Lok Sabha is a democratic
chamber elected directly by the people on the basis of adult
suffrage. It reflects popular will. It has the last word in
matters of taxation and expenditure…
Union Legislature
◼ Rajya Sabha
◼ The Council of Ministers is responsible to the Lok Sabha.
Rajya Sabha, on the other hand, is constituted by indirect
elections. The Council of Ministers is not responsible to the
Rajya Sabha. Therefore, the role of Rajya Sabha is
somewhat secondary to that of Lok Sabha, barring a few
powers in the arena of Centre-State relationship. Rajya
Sabha is a forum to which experienced public figures get
access without going through the din and bustle of a
general election which is inevitable in the case of Lok
Sabha. It acts as a revising chamber over the Lok Sabha…
Union Legislature
◼ Rajya Sabha
◼ The existence of two debating chambers means that all
proposals and programmes of the Government are
discussed twice. As a revising chamber, the Rajya Sabha
helps in improving Bills passed by the Lok Sabha.
◼ Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India (2006)
Union Legislature
◼ Rajya Sabha – Qualification (Art. 84)
◼ Citizen of India
◼ Not less than 30 years of age
◼ Possesses such other qualifications as may be prescribed in
that behalf by or under any law made by Parliament
 Rajya Sabha - Qualification
R. P. Act, 1951
◼ Qualification for membership
of the Council of States. A
person shall not be qualified to be
chosen as a representative of any
State or Union territory in the
Council of States unless he is an
elector for a Parliamentary
Constituency in that State or
territory. S. 3
R. P. (Amendment) Act, 2003
◼ Qualification for membership of
the Council of States. A person
shall not be qualified to be chosen
as a representative of any State or
Union territory in the Council of
States unless he is an elector for a
Parliamentary Constituency in
India. S. 3
 Rajya Sabha - Qualification
R. P. Act, 1951 R. P. (Amendment) Act, 2003
◼ Manner of voting at elections. ◼ Manner of voting at elections.

At every election where a poll is At every election where a poll is

taken votes shall be given by ballot taken votes shall be given by ballot
in such manner as may be in such manner as may be
prescribed and no votes shall be prescribed and no votes shall be
received by proxy. S. 59 received by proxy.
◼ Provided that the votes at every
election to fill a seat or seats in the
Council of States shall be given by
open ballot. S. 59
Union Legislature
◼ Rajya Sabha
◼ 2003 amendments were challenged as violative of
federalism, a basic feature of the Constitution
◼ “Although the Rajya Sabha is designed to serve as a
Chamber where the States and the Union of India are
represented, in practice, the Rajya Sabha does not act as a
champion of local interests. Even though elected by the
State Legislatures, the members of the Rajya Sabha vote
not at the dictate of the State concerned, but according to
their own views and party affiliation.”
Union Legislature
◼ Rajya Sabha
◼ It is no part of Federal principle that the representatives of the States
must belong to that State. There is no such principle discernible as an
essential attribute of Federalism, even in the various examples of
upper chamber in other countries…The various constitutions of other
countries show that residence, in the matter of qualifications,
becomes a constitutional requirement only if it is so expressly stated
in the Constitution. Residence is not the essence of the structure of
the Upper House. The Upper House will not collapse if residence as
an element is removed. Therefore, it is not a prerequisite of
federalism.
Union Legislature
◼ Rajya Sabha
◼ It can be safely said that as long as the State has a right to be
represented in the Council of States by its chosen representatives,
who are citizens of the country, it cannot be said that federalism is
affected. It cannot be said that residential requirement for
membership to the Upper House is an essential basic feature of all
Federal Constitutions. Hence, if the Indian Parliament, in its wisdom
has chosen not to require residential qualification, it would definitely
not violate the basic feature of Federalism. Our Constitution does not
cease to be a federal constitution simply because a Rajya Sabha
Member does not "ordinarily reside" in the State from which he is
elected.
Union Legislature
◼ Rajya Sabha
◼ The doctrine of 'Basic Feature' in the context of our
Constitution, thus, does not apply to ordinary legislation
which has only a dual criteria to meet, namely:
◼ (i) It should relate to a matter within its competence;
◼ (ii) It should not be void under Article 13 as being an
unreasonable restriction on a fundamental right or as being
repugnant to an express constitutional prohibition.
Union Legislature
◼ Rajya Sabha
◼ The challenge to a law made, within its legislative
competence, by Parliament on the ground of violation of
the basic structure of the Constitution is thus not available
to the petitioners. As stated above, 'residence' is not the
constitutional requirement and, therefore, the question of
violation of basic structure does not arise.
Union Legislature
◼ Rajya Sabha
◼ The names given to the two Houses are proper nouns and
do not spell out any right or obligation, much less
limitations on Parliament's legislative power available to it
under Article 84 (c). Parity in the matter of qualification to
the extent concerning residence of a person seeking to be
elected as member of either House does not make one
House duplicate of the other. Their role, functions, powers
or prerogatives, especially in the matter of legislation,
remain unchanged.
Union Legislature
◼ Rajya Sabha
◼ Voting at elections to the Council of States cannot be
compared with a general election. In a general election, the
electors have to vote in a secret manner without fear that
their votes would be disclosed to anyone or would result in
victimization. There is no party affiliation and hence the
choice is entirely with the voter. This is not the case when
elections are held to the Council of States as the electors
are elected members of the legislative assemblies who in
turn have party affiliations.
Union Legislature
◼ Rajya Sabha
◼ Where elections are direct, secret voting is insisted upon.
Where elections are indirect and where members are
chosen by indirect means, such as, by parliament or by
legislative assembly or by executive, then open ballot can
be introduced as a concept under the electoral system of
voting. In the case of direct elections, members are chosen
directly by popular vote which is not the case under indirect
elections. Therefore, it cannot be said that the concept of
open ballot would defeat the attainment of free and fair
elections.
Union Legislature
◼ Rajya Sabha
◼ In the present case, the question of denial of right to vote would be
self inflicted only on the member of the Legislative Assembly
declining to show his vote to the authorized representative of the
party. If a MLA casts a vote in favour of any person he thinks
appropriate and shows his vote to the authorized representative of
the political party to which he belongs, Rules do not contemplate
cancellation of such a vote. It cannot be forgotten that the existence
of political parties is an essential feature of our Parliamentary
democracy and that it can be a matter of concern for Parliament if it
finds that electors were resorting to cross voting under the garb of
conscience voting, flouting party discipline in the name of secrecy of
voting.
Union Legislature
◼ Rajya Sabha
◼ This would weaken the party discipline over the errant
Legislators. Political parties are the sine qua non of
Parliamentary democracy in our country and the protection of
party discipline can be introduced as an essential feature of the
purity of elections in case of indirect elections. Parliamentary
Democracy and multi party system are an inherent part of the
basic structure of Indian Constitution. It is political parties that
set up candidates at an election who are predominantly elected
as Members of the State Legislatures.
Union Legislature
◼ Rajya Sabha
◼ If secrecy becomes a source for corruption then sunlight
and transparency have the capacity to remove it. We can
only say that Legislation pursuant to a legislative policy that
transparency will eliminate the evil that has crept in would
hopefully serve the larger object of free and fair elections.
◼ Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India (2006)
Union Legislature
◼ Rajya Sabha
◼ The Vice- President of India shall be ex officio Chairman of
the Council of States (Art. 89)
◼ Removal of Vice President (Art. 67)
◼ Rajya Sabha to elect a Deputy Chairman
◼ Vacate office when he ceases to be a member
◼ Resign
◼ Remove by a resolution by Rajya Sabha (Art. 90)
Union Legislature
◼ Rajya Sabha
◼ Council of Ministers Collective responsibility to Lok Sabha
(Art. 75 (3))
◼ Money Bill cannot be introduced
◼ Only can give recommendation on a Money Bill
◼ Recommendations can be rejected by the Lok Sabha
◼ Can hold a Money Bill only for a period of 14 days
◼ If not returned within that period, it shall be deemed to
have been passed
◼ Article 109
Union Legislature
◼ Rajya Sabha – Special Powers
◼ Removal of Vice President initiation (Art. 67)
◼ Legislation by Parliament on a State List matter – resolution passed
by Rajya Sabha by two thirds majority that it is necessary and
expedient in the national interest (Art. 249)
◼ Creation of All India Services – Resolution by two thirds majority it is
necessary and expedient in the national interest (Art. 312)
◼ Proclamation of Emergency when the Lok Sabha is dissolved – A
resolution approving the proclamation of emergency (Art. 352)
continue to be in force up to a maximum period of 30 days from its
reconstitution (Article 352 (4))
◼ Similar powers under Art. 356 (3)
Union Legislature
◼ Rajya Sabha – equal powers as Lok Sabha
◼ Law making except Money Bill (Art. 107)
◼ Election and impeachment of the President (Articles 54 and
61)
◼ The election and removal of the Vice-President (Article 66)
◼ To make law defining parliamentary privileges and also to
punish for contempt (Article 105)
◼ To approve the Proclamation of Emergency (issued under
Article 352) Proclamations regarding failure of the
Constitutional machinery in States (issued under Article 356)
◼ Amendment of the Constitution (Art. 368)
Union Legislature
◼ Rajya Sabha – equal powers as Lok Sabha
◼ to receive reports and papers from various statutory authorities,
namely:
◼ (a) Annual Financial Statement [Article 112(1)];
◼ (b) Audit Reports from the Comptroller and Auditor General of India
[Article 151(1)];
◼ (c) Reports of the Union Public Service Commission. [Article 323(1)];
◼ (d) Reports of the Special Officer for the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes [Article 338(2)];
◼ (e) Report of the Commission to investigate the conditions of the
Backward Classes [Article 340(3)];
◼ (f) Report of the Special Officer for Linguistic Minorities [Article 350
B(2)].
Union Legislature
◼ Lok Sabha – Composition (Art. 81)
◼ 530 members to be directly elected from territorial
constituencies within the states
◼ 20 members to be chosen in such manner as the
Parliament by law prescribe to represent Union Territories
◼ The Union Territories (Direct Election to the House of People) Act,
1965
◼ S. 3, Direct Election, each UT to be one Parliamentary
Constituency
◼ Two nominated members belonging to Anglo Indian
Community (Art. 331)
Union Legislature
◼ Lok Sabha – Constituencies
◼ Proportional Representation
◼ One Person One Vote
◼ There shall be allotted to each State a number of seats in the
House of the People in such manner that the ratio between that
number and the population of the State is, so far as practicable,
the same for all States (1971 Census)
◼ Shall not be applicable for the purpose of allotment of seats in
the House of the People to any State so long as the population
of that State does not exceed six millions. (Art. 81)
Union Legislature
◼ Lok Sabha – Constituencies
◼ Each State shall be divided into territorial constituencies in
such manner that the ratio between the population of each
constituency and the number of seats allotted to it is, so far
as practicable, the same throughout the State (2001
Census)
◼ Last preceding census of which the relevant figures have
been published shall, until the relevant figures for the first
census taken after the year 2026 have been published,
Union Legislature
◼ Lok Sabha – Constituencies
◼ Readjustment to be done after each census
◼ Such authority as parliament by law constitute
◼ Reallocation of seats to the states not necessary until the
figures after the 2026 census is published
◼ The Delimitation Act, 2002
◼ Constituencies within the states were readjusted
◼ Delimitation of Parliamentary and Assembly Constituencies
Order, 2008
State Actual 2011 2026
Tamil Nadu 39 32 31
AP & Telengana 42 37 34
Kerala 20 15 12
Odhisha 21 18 18
West Bengal 42 40 38
Karnataka 28 27 26
H.P. 4 3 3
Punjab 13 12 12
U.K. 5 4 4
Assam 14 14 14
J&K 6 6 6
Chhattisgarh 11 11 12
Delhi 7 7 8
Maharashtra 48 49 48
Gujarat 26 27 27
State Actual 2011 2026

Haryana 10 11 11

Jharkhand 14 15 15

M.P. 29 32 33

Rajasthan 25 30 31

Bihar 40 46 50

U.P. 80 88 91

Milan Vaishnav and Jamie Hintson (2019), India’s Emerging Crisis of

Representation, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Union Legislature
◼ Lok Sabha
◼ Largest Constituency: Malkajgiri (Telngana) – 31.83L
◼ Smallest Constituency: Lakshadweep – 49,922
◼ Largest in area: Ladakh - 173,266.37 sq.km. (173,829
voters)
◼ Smallest in area: Chandni Chowk – 10 sq.km. (15,61,876)
Union Legislature
◼ Lok Sabha
◼ Reservation for SC/STs (Article 330)
◼ Proportionate to the population in a particular state
◼ 2001 census
◼ To continue for seventy years from the commencement of
the constitution (Article 334)
Union Legislature
◼ Lok Sabha
◼ Duration
◼ Unless sooner dissolved, continue for five years (Art. 83
(2))
◼ When proclamation of emergency is in operation, can be
extended by a period not exceeding one year – six months
at a time by Parliamentary law (Art. 83 (2 proviso))
Union Legislature
◼ Lok Sabha – Special Powers
◼ Money Bill (Article 109)
◼ Council of Ministers’ collective responsibility (Article 75 (3))
Union Legislature
◼ Functions of Parliament
◼ Legislation
◼ Control of the Executive
◼ Control of Public Finance
◼ Deliberation and Discussion
◼ Removal of Certain High Officials
◼ Constituent Function
Union Legislature
◼ Legislation
◼ Primary function
◼ Ordinary Bill can originate in either House (Except Money
Bill) – Art. 107 (1)
◼ Procedure: Three Readings
◼ When passed by both Houses presented to the President
◼ If there is disagreement between two Houses, a Joint
Session is called
Union Legislature
◼ Legislation
◼ Joint Session (Art. 108)
◼ Bill is rejected by the other House
◼ Bill is passed with Amendments and the originating House
disagrees
◼ Bill is not passed by the other House within a period of six
months
◼ In calculating six months, if the House is prorogued or
adjourned for more than 4 consecutive days, shall not be
counetd
Parliament
◼ Legislation: Joint Session
◼ If the Bill is elapsed due to the dissolution of Lok Sabha, no
joint session (107 (5) – conditions mentioned)
◼ But if the dissolution happens after the summoning of joint
session-it can be held
◼ Speaker shall preside or in his absence any other person as
determined by the rules (Art. 118 (4))
◼ If the disagreement is with regard to the amendments, only
those amendments and further amendments relating to
those can be considered
Parliament
◼ Legislation: Joint Session
◼ To be passed by a majority of the members present and
voting
◼ Not in the case of Money Bill and Constitution Amendment
Bills
◼ Only three joint sittings so far
◼ The Dowry Prohibition Bill, 1959 (1961)
◼ The Banking Services Commission (Repeal) Bill, 1977 (1978)
◼ The Prevention of Terrorism Bill, 2002 (2002)
Parliament
◼ Legislation: President’s Assent (Art. 111)
◼ Assent or withhold his assent
◼ Send it back for reconsideration with a message
◼ If passed again by both the Houses, he has to give his
assent
◼ The Post Office Bill, 1986
◼ The Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Amendment
Bill, 2006
Parliament
◼ Control of Executive
◼ Collective responsibility to the Lok Sabha
◼ Question hour
◼ MPs can raise questions to Ministers on various policy matters and
decisions
◼ Zero hour
◼ Can raise issues of urgent public importance
Parliament
◼ Control of Executive
◼ Committees
◼ Small group of MPs
◼ Financial Committees
◼ Department Related Standing Committees
◼ Other Parliamentary Standing Committees
◼ Ad Hoc Committees
Parliament
◼ Control of Public Finance
◼ Four Principles
◼ 1. No taxation without the authority of law (Art. 265)
◼ 2. Relation between the two Houses in financial matters –
Lok Sabha/Money Bills
◼ 3. Restriction on the power of Parliament to authorise
expenditure – Only on demand by the executive
◼ 4. Cannot impose tax except on the recommendation of the
executive
Parliament
◼ Control of Public Finance
◼ Distinction between Money Bill/Financial Bill/Ordinary Bill
◼ Money Bill (Arts. 109 & 110)
◼ Contains provisions only relating to matters mentioned in Art. 110
◼ Lok Sabha – Special powers
◼ Cannot be returned by the President
◼ Financial Bill (Art. 117)
◼ All Money Bills are Financial Bills
◼ In addition to taxation etc. contains other matters
◼ President’s recommendation necessary for introduction
◼ Treated like other Bills – Rajya Sabha assent needed
Parliament
◼ Control of Public Finance: Money Bill
◼ A Bill shall be deemed to be a Money Bill if it contains only
provisions dealing with all or any of the following matters,
namely:
◼ (a) the imposition, abolition, remission, alteration or
regulation of any tax;
◼ (b) the regulation of the borrowing of money or the giving
of any guarantee by the Government of India, or the
amendment of the law with respect to any financial
obligations undertaken or to be undertaken by the
Government of India;
Parliament
◼ Control of Public Finance: Money Bill
◼ (c) the custody of the Consolidated Fund or the
Contingency Fund of India, the payment of moneys into or
the withdrawal of moneys from any such Fund;
◼ (d) the appropriation of moneys out of the Consolidated
Fund of India;
◼ (e) the declaring of any expenditure to be expenditure
charged on the Consolidated Fund of India or the
increasing of the amount of any such expenditure;
Parliament
◼ Control of Public Finance: Money Bill
◼ (f) the receipt of money on account of the Consolidated
Fund of India or the public account of India or the custody
or issue of such money or the audit of the accounts of the
Union or of a State; or
◼ (g) any matter incidental to any of the matters specified in
sub-clauses (a) to (f).
◼ Art. 110 (1)/Art. 199
Parliament
◼ Control of Public Finance: Money Bill
◼ A Bill shall not be deemed to be a Money Bill by reason only that it provides
for the imposition of fines or other pecuniary penalties, or for the demand
or payment of fees for licences or fees for services rendered, or by reason
that it provides for the imposition, abolition, remission, alteration or
regulation of any tax by any local authority or body for local purposes. 110
(2)
◼ If any question arises whether a Bill is a Money Bill or not, the decision of
the Speaker of the House of the People thereon shall be final. 110 (3)
◼ There shall be endorsed on every Money Bill when it is transmitted to the
Council of States under article 109, and when it is presented to the
President for assent under article 111, the certificate of the Speaker of the
House of the People signed by him that it is a Money Bill. 110 (4)
Parliament
◼ Control of Public Finance: Money Bill
◼ Cannot be introduced in Rajya Sabha. 109 (1)
◼ After passed by Lok Sabha, transmitted to the Rajya Sabha
for its recommendations.
◼ To give recommendations within 14 days
◼ Lok Sabha can either accept or reject the recommendations
109 (2)
◼ If not returned within 14 days, deemed to have been
passed by both the Houses at the expiration of 14 days 109
(5)
Parliament
◼ Control of Public Finance: Money Bill
◼ The body set up or fund generated to protect ecology and
provide for regeneration cannot in constitutional scheme of
things be considered and treated as a fund under Article
266 or Article 283 or Article 284 of the Constitution of
India. When seen in this light, neither Article 110 nor Article
199 and/or Article 294 or Article 295 would have any
application.
◼ T. N. Godavarman Tirumulpad v. Union of India
(26/09/2005)
Parliament
◼ Control of Public Finance: Money Bill
◼ Whether the decision of the Speaker subject to judicial review?
◼ The Mysore existing Laws (Construction of References to Values) Act, 1957
enacted in furtherance of Indian Coinage (Amendment) Act, 1955
challenged
◼ “Even assuming that it is a taxing measure its validity cannot be challenged
on the ground that it offends Arts. 197 to 199 and the procedure laid down
in Art. 202 of the Constitution. Article 212 prohibits the validity of any
proceedings in a legislature of a State from being called in question on the
ground of any alleged irregularity of procedure and Art. 255 lays down the
requirements as to recommendation and previous sanction are to be
regarded as matters of procedure only.”
◼ Mangalore Ganesh Beedi Works v. State of Mysore (1962)
Parliament
◼ Control of Public Finance: Money Bill
◼ In terms of Article 199(3), the decision of the Speaker of the Legislative
Assembly that the Bill in question was a Money Bill is final and the said
decision cannot be disputed nor can the procedure of State Legislature be
questioned by virtue of Article 212.
◼ The decision of the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly that the Bill in
question was a Money Bill is final and the said decision cannot be disputed
nor can the procedure of the State Legislature be questioned by virtue
of Article 212. Further, as noted earlier, Article 255 also shows that under
the Constitution the matters of procedure do not render invalid an Act to
which assent has been given to by the President or the Governor, as the
case may be.
◼ Mohd. Saeed Siddiqui v. State of U.P (2014)
Parliament
◼ Control of Public Finance: Money Bill
◼ In our considered opinion, the authorities cited by the learned Counsel for
the Appellants do not render much assistance, for the introduction of a bill,
as has been held in Mohd. Saeed Siddiqui, comes within the concept of
‘irregularity’ and it does come with the realm of substantiality. What has
been held in the Special Reference No. 1 of 1964 (supra) has to be
appositely understood. The factual matrix therein was totally different than
the case at hand as we find that the present controversy is wholly covered
by the pronouncement in Mohd. Saeed Siddiqui and hence, we
unhesitatingly hold that there is no merit in the submission so assiduously
urged by the learned Counsel for the Appellants
◼ Yogendra Kumar Jaiswal v. State of Bihar (2015)
Parliament
◼ Control of Public Finance: Money Bill
◼ The Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other
Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016
◼ S. 7 is the core of the Act and it satisfies the conditions of
Article 110.
◼ We are of the opinion that Bill was rightly introduced as Money
Bill. Accordingly, it is not necessary for us to deal with other
contentions of the petitioners, namely, whether certification by
the Speaker about the Bill being Money Bill is subject to judicial
review or not, whether a provision which does not relate to
Money Bill is severable or not.
Parliament
◼ Control of Public Finance: Money Bill
◼ We reiterate that main provision is a part of Money Bill and
other are only incidental and, therefore, covered by clause
(g) of Article 110 of the Constitution…We, thus, hold that
the Aadhaar Act is validly passed as a ‘Money Bill’.
◼ Majority (Dipak Misra CJ, A. K. Sikri and A. M. Khanwilkar
JJ)
◼ Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2018)
Parliament
◼ Control of Public Finance: Money Bill
◼ Based on S. 3 of Parliament Act, 1911. But the deviance
from the language reflects the intention of the framers of
the Constitution that they did not want to confer the same
status on power assigned to the Speaker of Lok Sabha as is
provided to the Speaker of the House of Commons.
◼ British system is based on Parliamentary supremacy. But in
India, Constitution is supreme. Judicial Review is an
essential component of constitutional supremacy.
Parliament
◼ Control of Public Finance: Money Bill
◼ Checks and balances are envisaged in our constitutional scheme. The
contention that judicial review does not lie is contrary to the entire
scheme of the Constitution, which is premised on transparency, non-
arbitrariness and fairness.
◼ The finality clauses contained in Article 217(3), 311(3) and in
paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule were held not to exclude
judicial review since the essential nature of the power is judicial.
◼ The fact that the power which is entrusted to the Speaker under
Article 110(3) is integral to the legislative process is not sufficient to
lead to the conclusion that a finality clause governing the exercise of
that power makes it immune from judicial review.
Parliament
◼ Control of Public Finance: Money Bill
◼ What is protected under Article 122 is procedures
formulated under Article 118 (irregularity of procedure). It
does not exempt compliance to constitutional requirements.
Article 122 does not envisage exemption from judicial
review, if there has been a constitutional infirmity.
Parliament
◼ Control of Public Finance: Money Bill
◼ The judgment in Yogendra Kumar followed Mohd Saeed
Siddiqui. Siddiqui was based on an erroneous
understanding of Mangalore Beedi. The decision of the
Speaker under Articles 110(3) and 199(3) is not immune
from judicial review. The three judge Bench decision in
Mohd Saeed Siddiqui and the two judge Bench decision
in Yogendra Kumar are overruled.
Parliament
◼ Control of Public Finance: Money Bill
◼ For a Bill to be a Money Bill, it must contain “only
provisions” dealing with every or any one of the matters set
out in sub-clauses (a) to (g) of clause 1 of Article 110. The
expression “if it contains only provisions dealing with all or
any of the following matters, namely...” is crucial. Firstly,
the expression “if” indicates a condition and it is only upon
the condition being fulfilled that the deeming fiction of a Bill
being a Money Bill for the purposes of the Chapter will
arise.
Parliament
◼ Control of Public Finance: Money Bill
◼ Secondly, to be a Money Bill, the Bill should have only
those provisions which are referable to clauses (a) to (g).
The condition is much more stringent than stipulating that
the Bill should incorporate any of the matters spelt out in
clauses (a) to (g). The words “only provisions” means that
besides the matters in sub clauses (a) to (g), the Bill shall
not include anything else. Otherwise, the expression “only”
will have no meaning. The word “only” cannot be treated to
be otiose or redundant.
Parliament
◼ Control of Public Finance: Money Bill
◼ Thirdly, the two expressions “if it contains only provisions”
and “namely” indicate that sub-clauses (a) to (g) are
exhaustive of what a Money Bill may contain. The contents
of a Money Bill have to be confined to all or any of the
matters specified in sub-clauses (a) to (g).
Parliament
◼ Fourthly, sub-clause (g) covers any matter incidental to sub-clauses
(a) to (f). A matter is incidental when it is ancillary to what is already
specified. Sub-clause (g) is not a residuary entry which covers all
other matters other than those specified in sub-clauses (a) to (f). If
sub-clause (g) were read as a catch-all residuary provision, it would
defeat the purpose of defining a class of Bills as Money Bills. What is
incidental under sub-clause (g) is that which is ancillary to a matter
which is already specified in sub-clauses (a) to (f). The test is not
whether it is incidental to the content of a Bill but whether it is
incidental to any of the matters specifically enumerated in sub-
clauses (a) to (f).
Parliament
◼ The deletion of the word ‘only’ was rejected by the
Constituent Assembly
◼ Difference between Money Bill and Financial Bill
◼ If a Bill contains provisions which fall outside sub-clauses
(a) to (g), it is not a Money Bill. The Rajya Sabha is entitled
as part of its constitutional function to legislative
participation. The entirety of the Bill cannot be regarded as
a Money Bill, once it contains any matters which fall beyond
sub-clauses (a) to (g).
Parliament
◼ Bicameralism is a founding value of our democracy. It is a
part of the basic structure of the Constitution. Introduction
and passing of a Bill as a Money Bill, which does not qualify
to be a Money Bill under Article 110(1) of the Constitution,
is plainly unconstitutional.
◼ A political party or a coalition which holds the majority in
the Lok Sabha cannot subvert the working of the
Constitution, against which Dr B R Ambedkar had warned in
the Constituent Assembly. A ruling government has to work
within constitutional parameters and has to abide by
constitutional morality.
Parliament
◼ Introducing the Aadhaar Act as a Money Bill has bypassed
the constitutional authority of the Rajya Sabha. The
passage of the Aadhaar Act as a Money Bill is an abuse of
the constitutional process. It deprived the Rajya Sabha
from altering the provisions of the Bill by carrying out
amendments. On the touchstone of the provisions of Article
110, the Bill could not have been certified as a Money Bill.
Parliament
◼ The Act thus fails to qualify as a Money Bill under Article
110 of the Constitution. Since the Act was passed as a
Money Bill, even though it does not qualify to be so, the
passage of the Act is an illegality. The Aadhaar Act is in
violation of Article 110 and therefore is liable to be declared
unconstitutional.
◼ D. Y. Chandrachud (Dissenting)
◼ Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2018)
Parliament
◼ The decision of the Speaker under Article 110 (3) is subject
to judicial review
◼ Aadhar Act satisfies the requirements of Article 110 (1) and
is a Money Bill
◼ Concurring Opinion (Ashok Bhushan J)
◼ Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2018)
Parliament
◼ Control of Public Finance: Money Bill
◼ Roger Mathew v. South Indian Bank (2019)
◼ Part XIV of the Finance Act, 2017 and the Rules made
thereunder are challenged
◼ 25 different enactments amended – sweeping changes to
the requisite qualifications, method of appointment, terms
of office, salaries and allowances, and various other terms
and conditions of service of the members and presiding
officers of different statutory Tribunals
Parliament
◼ Control of Public Finance: Money Bill
◼ On the substantive question of whether the Finance Act,
2017 was a ‘money bill’ under Article 110(3) it must be
noted that until the turn of the twenty-first century, this
Court took a consistent position that Article 110(3) of the
Constitution would act as an express bar against judicial
inquiry into the correctness of the certificate of ‘money bill’
given by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha.
Parliament
◼ Control of Public Finance: Money Bill
◼ The majority opinion in Puttaswamy by examining whether or not the
impugned enactment was in fact a ‘money bill’ under Article 110
without explicitly dealing with whether or not certification of the
speaker is subject to judicial review, has kept intact the power of
judicial review under Article 110(3). It was further held therein that
the expression ‘money bill’ cannot be construed in a restrictive sense
and that the wisdom of the Speaker of the Lok Sabha in this regard
must be valued, save where it is blatantly violative of the scheme of
the Constitution. We respectfully endorse the view in Puttaswamy
and are in no doubt that Md. Siddiqui and Yogendra Kumar Jaiswal in
so far as they put decisions of the Speaker under Article 110(3)
beyond judicial review, cannot be relied upon.
Parliament
◼ Control of Public Finance: Money Bill
◼ It must be emphasized that the scope of judicial review in
matters under Article 110(3) is extremely restricted, with
there being a need to maintain judicial deference to the Lok
Sabha Speaker’s certification.
◼ There would be a presumption of legality in favour of the
Speaker’s decision and onus would undoubtedly be on the
person challenging its validity to show that such
certification was grossly unconstitutional or tainted with
blatant substantial illegality.
Parliament
◼ Control of Public Finance: Money Bill
◼ Judicial review must be restricted to only the very extreme
instance where there is a complete disregard to the
Constitutional scheme itself.
◼ It is not the function of Constitutional Courts to act as
appellate forums, especially on the opinion of the Speaker,
for doing so would invite the risk of paralyzing the
functioning of the Parliament.
Parliament
◼ Control of Public Finance: Money Bill
◼ The majority in Puttaswamy pronounced the nature of the
impugned enactment without first delineating the scope of
Article 110(1) and principles for interpretation or the
repercussions of such process. It is clear to us that the majority
dictum in Puttaswamy did not substantially discuss the effect of
the word ‘only’ in Article 110(1) and offers little guidance on the
repercussions of a finding when some of the provisions of an
enactment passed as a “Money Bill” do not conform to Article
110(1)(a) to (g).
◼ To be placed before the CJI for constitution of a larger bench
◼ Roger Mathew v. South Indian Bank (2019)
Parliament
◼ Control of Public Finance: Money Bill
◼ Money Bill cannot be returned by the President for
reconsideration (Art. 111)
◼ President cannot withhold assent to a Money Bill - Seervai
Parliament
◼ Control of Public Finance: Executive’s Responsibility
◼ 3. Restriction on the power of Parliament to authorise
expenditure – Only on demand by the executive
◼ 4. Cannot impose tax except on the recommendation of the
executive
◼ Arts. 113 (3) – Demand for grants; Art. 117 (3) – Financial
Bill – recommendation of President necessary
Parliament
◼ Control of Public Finance: Different Funds
◼ Consolidated Fund
◼ Contingency Fund
◼ Public Fund
Parliament
◼ Control of Public Finance: Consolidated Fund
◼ All revenues received by the Government of India
◼ All loans raised by that Government by the issue of treasury
bills, loans or ways and means advances; and
◼ All moneys received by the Government in repayment of
loans Art. 266 (1)
◼ No moneys out of the Consolidated Fund of India shall be
appropriated except in accordance with law and for the
purposes and in the manner provided in this Constitution.
Art. 266 (3)
Parliament
◼ Control of Public Finance: Consolidated Fund
◼ The custody of the Consolidated Fund of India, the
payment of moneys into such Funds, the withdrawal of
moneys therefrom and all other matters connected with or
ancillary to matters aforesaid shall be regulated by law
made by Parliament, and, until provision in that behalf is so
made, shall be regulated by rules made by the President.
Art. 283 (1)
◼ No money shall be withdrawn from the Consolidated Fund
of India except under appropriation Act. Art. 114 (3)
Parliament
◼ Control of Public Finance: Consolidated Fund
◼ All government expenditures are met by consolidated fund
except a few made by contingency fund or public fund
◼ Expenses charged on the Consolidated Fund – No voting
takes place on these. Art. 113 (1)
◼ Salaries and allowances of President/Chairman and Deputy
Chairman of Rajya Sabha/Speaker and Deputy Speaker of
Lok Sabha/Supreme Court Judges/CAG. Art. 112 (3)
◼ Other expenditure – charges granted by Parliament on
annual basis. Arts. 112 (2) (b), 113 and 114
Parliament
◼ Control of Public Finance: Contingency Fund
◼ Unforeseen expenditure
◼ Parliamentary law needed for establishment of the Fund.
◼ Shall be placed at the disposal of the President to enable
advances to be made by him out of such Fund for the
purposes of meeting unforeseen expenditure pending
authorisation of such expenditure by Parliament by law
under article 115 or article 116 Art. 267
◼ Contingency Fund of India Act, 1950
Parliament
◼ Control of Public Finance: Public Account
◼ Art. 266 (2)
◼ All other public money (other than those covered under the
Consolidated Fund of India) received by or on behalf of the
Indian Government are credited to this account/fund.
◼ Bank savings account of the various
ministries/departments etc.
◼ No parliamentary approval is needed
Parliament
◼ Control of Public Finance: Committees
◼ Public Accounts Committee
◼ Grants made to different departments are used for that purpose
◼ Examines the CAG Reports
◼ Estimates Committee
◼ Only Lok Sabha Members
◼ Examines the details of the estimates presented to the Lok Sabha
Parliament
◼ Procedure in Financial Matters
◼ Arts. 112 – 117
◼ Different stages
◼ Annual Financial Statement – Art. 112
◼ Demands for grants – Art. 113
◼ Appropriation Bill – Art. 114
◼ Votes on Account – Art. 116
◼ Financial Bill – Art. 117
Parliament
◼ Functions: Deliberation and Discussion
◼ Legislation
◼ Control of public finance
◼ Discussion on Presidential Address
◼ Policy
◼ Adjournment motion
◼ Vote of Confidence/non-confidence
Parliament
◼ Functions: Removal of High Officials
◼ Impeachment of President – Art. 61
◼ Removal of SC and HC judges – Art. 124 (4) & Art. 217 (1)
(b)
◼ Removal of the Vice President – Art. 67 (b)
◼ CAG – Art. 148 (1) – SC Judge
◼ CEC – Art. 324 (5) Proviso – SC Judge
◼ State ECs – Art. 243K (2) Proviso – HC Judge
Parliament
◼ Functions: Constituent Functions
◼ Amendment of the Constitution
◼ Art. 368