[G.R. No. L-30323. August 31, 1973.

THE CITY OF TAGBILARAN AND ITS CITY BOARD, oppositors-petitioners, v. SEVERIANO G.

LIM, applicant-respondent.

City Fiscal Jovencio S. Orcullo, for Petitioners.

Angel Marave for Respondent.

DECISION
FERNANDO, J:

The City of Tagbilaran, oppositor before the Public Service Commission and now petitioner, would have us
reverse its decision authorizing applicant, and now respondent, Severiano G. Lim, to operate fifty units of
motorized tricycles within the city boundaries. This petition for review is primarily based on its contention that
the competence to grant such privilege belongs to it and not the Public Service Commission. Such an argument
was raised and considered in the proceedings before the Commission. It was rejected as there was no showing
that the charter of the City of Tagbilaran 1 did empower it. Undeterred, it would persist in such a claim.
Unfortunately for it, there is no statutory basis in support thereof. That is all that needs be said in disposing of
this appeal by way of certiorari, as the other points raised are factual in character, the determination of which
by the Commission is not for us to disturb. We affirm.

The facts are undisputed. The decision of the Public Service Commission, dated December 20, 1968, started
with a statement that what was before it was an application for the certificate of public convenience filed by
Severiano G. Lim to operate a motorized tricycle service for the transportation of passengers within the
territorial limits of Tagbilaran City with the use of fifty units. It was then noted that an opposition was
registered by the City of Tagbilaran, its stand being that such power to grant authority to operate a motorized
tricycle service within its territorial jurisdiction is vested in its city board. Then came the hearing on such
application, with the applicant submitting affidavits of application and testifying that he is a naturalized Filipino
citizen and a businessman with enough funds, income and property to finance the project, included in which are
several parcels of land in Tagbilaran. He likewise mentioned the fact of his being a majority stockholder of the
Provincial Bus Company, a grantee of a certificate of public convenience, operating forty buses, and that he was
operating a gasoline station, the backyard of which he proposed to utilize as a garage for the tricycles. As to the
need for the proposed service, it was his testimony that there are 20,000 to 30,000 students living within the
suburbs of the City of Tagbilaran who could utilize public convenience, as there were no calesas, taxi-cabs and
auto-calesas operating therein. Evidence was likewise offered on behalf of the City of Tagbilaran. 2 Then came
this portion of the decision explaining why the application should be approved: "After a careful consideration of
the evidence submitted by the parties and an examination of the records of existing service in Tagbilaran City,
the Commission finds that public convenience will be promoted by the grant of the present application.
Tagbilaran has been converted to a city because of its rapid growth and expansion and therefore is in need of
more transportation facilities to cater to the needs of thousands of students who flock to the city to obtain higher
learning as well as the barrio folks who commute daily to the city to work, sell their produce and buy their
necessities; that the opposition of the city that the grant of this application would aggravate the existing
difficulty in the control of this application would aggravate the existing difficulty in the control and supervision
of the already congested motorized tricycles actually operating is not substantiated by evidence for the records
of the Commission do not show that any motorized tricycle has been authorized to operate as a public service in
the said city. Further, the testimony of the Vice Mayor of the city tends to establish the fact that the real reason
for the city’s opposition to the grant of this application is that it fears that the city revenue would be depleted if
the city is deprived of the authority to grant permits for the operation of this service. The fear of the city is
unfounded for in the exercise of its authority to regulate this kind of service it retains the right to impose license
fees. The claim of the oppositor that the 50 units proposed to be operated by applicant are actually owned and
possessed by several and different individuals is unfounded for applicant has been offered new units by two
companies to be paid on installment basis and as to the complaint of Mr. Erdulfo G. Boiser against applicant,
the fiscal admitted it has been dismissed." 3 Then came this portion of the decision explaining why the
application should be approved: "In view of the foregoing, and it appearing from the evidence that the applicant
is a naturalized Filipino Citizen and is financially capable of operating and maintaining the proposed service
and that the operation of the same will promote public interest in a proper and suitable manner, the Commission
believes that the opposition of the city of Tagbilaran is without merit and should be as it is overruled, and it is
ordered that a certificate of public convenience be issued to applicant authorizing the operation of fifty (50)
units motorized tricycle service within Tagbilaran City pursuant to Section 15, Commonwealth Act 146, as
amended, subject to the following: . . ." 4

The City of Tagbilaran would have been well advised not to interpose an appeal. Contrary to its pretension,
there is nothing in its charter that would empower it to issue the authorization for the operation of the motorized
tricycle service. Nor can it now seriously assert that the finding as to public service and convenience being
served with the approval of the application by appellee Lim should not be allowed by this Court to remain
undisturbed. Consequently, as set forth in the opening paragraph of this opinion, there is no justification for the
reversal sought.

1. It is to be admitted that the counsel of the City of Tagbilaran, Fiscal Jovencio S. Orcullo, did file a brief that
presented its contention as to the assertion of competence in the most favorable light. The fact that such valiant
effort is not to be rewarded with success is solely due to the authoritative principle that there must be a showing
of the grant of authority by a municipal corporation to enable it to exercise such competence. In the first case
where this question was considered, Switzer v. Municipality of Cebu, 5 promulgated in 1911, Justice Mapa for
the Court emphasized the grant of "specific and definite power." 6 Then came United States v. Ten Yu, 7 where
it was held: "Municipal corporations have only such powers as are expressly delegated to them and such other
powers as are necessarily implied from such express powers." 8 Such a doctrine was slightly recast, but on a
purely verbal level, by Justice, later Chief Justice, Abad Santos, in People v. Lardizabal 9 thus: "It is well
settled that municipal corporations may exercise such powers as are expressly granted to them, and such other
powers as are necessarily implied from those expressly granted." 10 That was merely to emphasize that
municipal corporations, as noted by the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Concepcion, "are mere creatures of
Congress." 11 As such then, they "have only such powers as the legislative department may have deemed fit to
grant them." 12 The very same language found expression anew from the same jurist in Unson v. Lacson, 13
decided three years later. So it has continued up to the present. 14 Even with reference to a municipal
corporation’s taxing attribute, the same principle controls. 15

Necessarily then, the burden was on the City of Tagbilaran to demonstrate that the competence asserted had
been granted, whether expressly or impliedly. That it failed to do. That it could not do, simply because there
would he no statutory basis for such a claim. The task from the beginning then was an impossible one. Congress
did not deem fit to vest it with such power. Its fiscal did try to locate what is in reality a nonexistent attribute.
His effort was in vain. His reliance on the particular provision in the city charter which, is his opinion, did lend
plausibility to his contention, was misplaced. All that he could manage to bring to the surface was the confusion
of a subsection that authorized the City to impose municipal license taxes or fees on persons operating
motorized tricycles. 16 That is one thing. It is an entirely different matter from what is in issue. It would
presuppose that the business of motorized tricycles is there to tax. It does not by any means follow that it is the
City that could allow its operation. It is, to repeat, unwarranted to come out with such a conclusion. Thus is the
principal error as to the City of Tagbilaran being vested with "the right to grant [a] certificate of public
convenience for the operation of motorized tricycles" disposed of.

2. The other errors assigned, five in number, hardly deserve any extended discussion. They are factual in
character. At the most, they would evince an approach on the part of the City of Tagbilaran different from that
followed by the Public Service Commission. Since the power to determine what facts are deemed relevant and
controlling belongs to the Commission and not the City, the discretion of the former agency should not be
interfered with. So we have decided time and time again. A recent case, Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v.
Gabatin 17 states the controlling principle as to the findings of fact of the Public Service Commission having
well-nigh the impress of finality. Thus: "Where the petition for review disputes merely the sufficiency of the
evidence, the finding cannot be disturbed. It is not for this Court to determine credibility and preponderance of
proof nor to examine the proof de novo and determine for itself whether or not the preponderance of evidence
really justifies the decision. It is not to substitute its discretion for that of the Public Service Commission on
questions of fact. The lack of wisdom of the conclusion reached by the Public Service Commission affects
neither its authority to decide nor the validity of its decision." 18 The above decision was cited with approval in
the later case of Ledesma v. Public Service Commission. 19 Even more recently, in Intestate Estate of Tiongson
v. Public Service Commission, 20 this Court, through Acting Chief Justice Makalintal, reiterated such a
doctrine in these words: "On the whole, we find no reason to deviate from the rule heretofore consistently
applied that findings and conclusions of fact made by the Public Service Commission, when supported by
evidence, are binding upon this Court." 21

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Public Service Commission of December 20, 1968 is affirmed. No costs.

Makalintal, Actg. C . J., Zaldivar, Teehankee, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., concurring:

I agree that it is in the exclusive jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission or its present counterpart to
grant certificates of public convenience. Definitely, the City of Tagbilaran possesses no such power.

To be very exact, however, in delineating the prerogatives of the City vis-a-vis the certificates granted by the
Commission, I believe it is pertinent to refer to the rulings of this Court in Luque v. Villegas, 30 SCRA 408,
wherein it was held:

"Commercial law; Public Service Law; Power of Public Service Commission and City of Manila over motor
traffic; Ordinance 4986 of the City of Manila approved on July 18, 1964 rerouting traffic on roads and streets in
the City of Manila is valid. — Ordinance 4986 of the City of Manila approved on July 13, 1964 rerouting traffic
on roads and streets in the City of Manila is valid. First, Republic Act No. 409, as amended, otherwise known as
the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, is a special law and of later enactment than Commonwealth Act No.
548 and the Public Service Law (Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended) so that even if conflict exists
between the two, Republic Act No. 409 should prevail as a later act than Commonwealth Acts Nos. 548 and
146. Second, the powers conferred by law upon the Public Service Commission were not designed to deny or
supersede the regulatory power of local governments over motor traffic, in streets subject to their control."
(Syllabus)

and in City of Manila v. Public Service Commission, 62 Phil. 515, in which Justice Malcolm ruled as follows:

"Id.; Id.; Id.; Id.; — It was not the legislative intent as disclosed by the Public Service Law to grant power to the
Public Service Commission to abrogate the franchise provisions of the Manila Electric Company concerning
abandonment and substitution of service. The agency of the Government of the Philippine Islands to which is
confided the power to authorize the Manila Electric Company to abandon a trolley bus service and a street car
service and to substitute therefor exclusively an auto bus service is the City of Manila and not the Public
Service Commission." (Syllabus)

In other words, I just want to make it clear that the City of Tagbilaran is not entirely without any power to
regulate the operation of tricycles within the City notwithstanding the certificate issued by the Commission. It
can make reasonable regulations in connection therewith and the Certificate of the Public Service Commission
would be subject to said regulations. It is up to the people of the City to cause its officials to take the required
steps so that the certificate and the city regulations may be reconciled with each other to best serve the interests
of the inhabitants of the City.
Castro, J., concurs.

G.R. No. L-48634             October 8, 1941

JUAN SUMULONG, in his capacity as President of the POPULAR FRONT, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Lorenzo Sumulong and Ruperto V. Suñga for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor-General de la Costa and Acting Assistant Solicitor-General Gianzon for the respondent.

MORAN, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to review the resolution of the Commission on Elections granting the Popular
Front Party headed by the Pedro Abad Santos the exclusive right to propose the minority election inspector in
the second congressional district of Pampanga for the forthcoming national elections.

In the elections of 1938, the Popular Front Party, supporting the candidacies of Francisco Lazatin and Joaquin
Alejandrino for the first and second legislative districts of Pampanga, polled more than ten per centum of the
total votes cast in said legislative districts. It appears, however, that said Popular Front Party was then a mere
coalition of several minority groups among which are the Popular Front faction of Juan Sumulong and that of
Pedro Abad Santos. These two factions now stand out as separate and independent minority parties supporting
different sets of candidacies for the forthcoming national elections. On September 15, 1941, the Commission on
Elections granted to the Popular Front Party of Abad Santos the right to propose the minority inspector in the
second congressional district of said province. On September 26, 1941, on motion for reconsideration by
Francisco M. Ramos, candidate of the Popular Front of Abad Santos and that the Popular Front Party of
Sumulong has but a nominal existence in the province," modified its ruling of the 15th of September by
awarding the minority inspector to the Popular Front Party of Abad Santos. This resolution is the subject of
review in this petition for certiorari.

It is now a well-settled rule that where the minimum number of votes required by law (Commonwealth Act No.
657, sec. 5) was polled by a mere coalition or alliance of minority parties, the right to minority representation in
the board of elections inspectors to which such coalition is entitled, cannot be claimed by any of the component
parties which have thereafter separated. (Sumulong vs. Commission on Elections, 40 Off. Gaz. [9th Sup.], No.
13, pp. 226, 230-231; Vinzons vs. Commission on Elections et al., G.R. No. 48596, October 1, 1941.) And
where such situation obtains, the Commission shall have the discretion to choose the minority inspector.
(Commonwealth Act No. 657, sec. 5; Vinzons vs. Commission on Elections et al., supra;
Rimando vs. Commission on Elections et al., G.R. No. 48603, October 1, 1941.) The modification by the
Commission of its ruling of September 15th awarding the minority inspector to the Popular Front Party headed
by Abad Santos is a legal exercise of the discretion vested in it by law.

The resolution of the Commission is affirmed, with costs against petitioner.

Diaz, Laurel, and Horrilleno, MM., concur.

Separate Opinions

OZAETA, J., dissenting:
I maintain here my dissent in the analogous cases of Vinzons and Rimando, G.R. Nos. 48596 and 48603,
respectively.

The Commission on Elections having found that neither the Sumulong nor the Abad Santos faction of the
Popular Front was entitled under the law to the minority inspector, it should have followed what the law to the
minority inspector, it should have followed what the law provides in such a case, namely, to choose such
inspector at its discretion (sec. 5, Commonwealth Act No. 657), and the person so chosen should be nonpartisan
(sec. 6, id.). When the Commission allowed the Abad Santos faction of the Popular Front to choose the
inspector for it, it abdicated the power and authority vested in it by law in favor of said faction, and at the same
time unconsciously laid itself bare to criticism of partiality from the Sumulong faction.

It must be borne in mind that the coming election is not for Representatives only but also for President, Vice-
President , and Senators-at-large. With more reason, therefore, should the Commission on Elections have
appointed a person of its own choice for the second inspector in order better to safeguard the interests of all the
contending parties.

There is another reason why in my opinion the award by the Commission on Elections of the second inspector
to the Abad Santos faction is particularly unfortunate. It is a notorious fact that the party headed by Mr. Pedro
Abad Santos is the Communist Party of the Philippines. Before said party joined the Pagkakaisa ng Bayan,
which was organized by Mr. Juan Sumulong, in December, 1936, it was known as the Socialist Party of
Pampanga. After said party headed by Mr. Abad Santos has separated from the Pagkakaisa ng Bayan or
Popular Front, and has reverted to its former independent existence, the Commission on Elections now permits
it not only to parade as Popular Front — and not as Communist Party — but also to have the second inspector to
which it admittedly is not entitled. I cannot bring myself to sanction that result.
 G.R. No. 230107, July 24, 2018

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (DOTR), MARITIME INDUSTRY AUTHORITY

(MARINA), AND PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD (PCG), Petitioners, v. PHILIPPINE PETROLEUM
SEA TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION, HERMA SHIPPING TRANSPORT CORPORATION, ISLAS
TANKERS SEATRANSPORT CORPORATION, MIS MARITIME CORPORATION, PETROLIFT,
INC., GOLDEN ALBATROSS SHIPPING CORPORATION, VIA MARINE CORPORATION, AND
CARGOMARINE CORPORATION, Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO JR., J.:

The Case

This case concerns the constitutionality of establishing the "Oil Pollution Management Fund," under Section
22(a) of Republic Act No. (RA) 9483 and Section 1, Rule of its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR), by
imposing "ten centavos (10c) per liter for every delivery or transshipment of oil made by tanker barges and
tanker haulers."

Antecedents

The value of the Philippine marine ecosystem cannot be overemphasized. The country is part of an important
marine biosphere known as the "coral triangle" that includes Malaysia, Indonesia and Papua New Guinea.
Marine scientists working in the area have referred to this ocean corridor as the marine equivalent of the
Amazon.1 At the center of it all is the Philippines "with the richest concentration of marine life on the entire
planet."2 Characterized by extensive coral reefs, sea-grass beds, and dense mangrove forests, Philippine waters
indeed contain some of the world's most diverse ecosystems.3

In a report, it was explained that "[t]he full extent of the Philippines' marine biodiversity is not known, but the
best information available reveals an astounding variety of marine life: 5,000 species of clams, snails and
mollusks; 488 species of corals; 981 species of bottom-living algae, and thousands of other organisms. Five of
the seven sea turtle species known to exist in the world today occur in Philippine waters." 4

Repeated oils spills, however, have threatened this national treasure.

In December 2005, a power barge ran aground off the coast of Antique, dumping 364,000 liters of bunker oil.
This oil spill severely polluted 40 kilometers of Antique's coastline and decimated more than 230 hectares of
pristine mangrove forest. Rehabilitation costs have been estimated at USD million.5

A few months after the Antique incident, or on August 11, 2006, a Petron-chartered single hull vessel carrying
2.1 million liters of oil sank in the Guimaras Strait, causing the Philippines' worst oil spill. 6 Dubbed an
"ecological time bomb," the sunken vessel leaked an estimated 100 to 200 liters of oil per hour, while roughly
320 kilometres of coastline was covered in thick sludge. Miles of coral reef and mangrove forests were laid to
waste and more than 1,100 hectares of marine sanctuaries and reserves were badly damaged. And with all
fishing activities put to a halt, around 40,000 people were affected.
The aftereffects of the Guimaras disaster were felt few days later on August 22, 2006, when sludge washed up
on Panay, threatening rich fishing grounds.

The sunken ship was too deep for divers to reach and the Philippines, lacking heavy salvage equipment,
appealed for international help to prevent the disaster from getting worse.7 Help came from experts from the
United States and Japan who helped assess the clean-up operations and suggested measures on how to stop the
slick from spreading further to vast mangrove areas and fishing grounds.8

On August 23, 2006, the oil spill claimed its first human victim. Health officials said the man inhaled the fumes
of the thick, tar-like substance outside his home on Guimaras island. Villagers reported that skin and breathing
problems became commonplace. The government hired locals for the clean-up, paying them less than $4 day to
scoop up the sludge on the shores, with no protective gear and using their bare hands.9

Recognizing the gravity and extent of the Guimaras oil spill, the lack of proper response strategy, the absence of
the necessary equipment for containing, cleaning up, and removing spilled oil, and the difficulty in pinning the
liability on oil companies, Congress was prompted to pass law implementing the International Convention on
Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (1969 Civil Liability Convention) and the International Convention on
the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (1992 Fund
Convention).10 The 1969 Civil Liability Convention was later amended by the 1992 Protocol (1992 Civil
Liability Convention).11

The legislative measure began as Senate Bill No. (SB) 2600 sponsored by then Senator Pia S. Cayetano. With
sixteen (16) senators voting in favor, SB 2600 was sent to the House of Representatives where it was adopted as
an amendment to House Bill No. 4363. With the concurrence of both houses, the enrolled copy of the
consolidated bill was sent to the Office of the President for signature.

On June 2, 2007, RA 9483, entitled "An Act Providing For The Implementation of the Provisions of the 1992
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage and the 1992 International Convention on
the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, Providing Penalties
for Violations thereof, and for Other Purposes" or simply the "Oil Pollution Compensation Act of 2007," was
signed into law. The provision relevant to this case, Section 22 of RA 9483, provides for the establishment of an
"Oil Pollution Management Fund" (OPMF) and states as follows:
SEC. 22. Oil Pollution Management Fund. - An Oil Pollution Management Fund (OPMF) to be administered
by the MARINA is hereby established. Said Fund shall be constituted from:

(a) Contributions of Owners and operators of tankers and barges hauling Oil and for petroleum products in
Philippine waterways and coast wise shipping routes. During its first year of existence, the Fund shall be
constituted by an impost of ten centavos (10c) per liter for every delivery or transshipment of Oil made by
tanker barges and tanker haulers. For the succeeding fiscal years, the amount of contribution shall be jointly
determined by Marina, other concerned government agencies, and representatives from the Owners of tankers
barges, tankers haulers, and Ship hauling Oil and/or petroleum products. In determining the amount of
contribution, the purposes for which the fund was set up shall always be considered; and

(b) Fines imposed pursuant to this Act, grants, donations, endowment from various sources, domestic or
foreign, and amounts specifically appropriated for OPMF under the annual General Appropriations Act.

The Fund shall be used to finance the following activities:

(a) Immediate containment, removal and clean-up operations of the PCG in all Oil pollution cases,
whether covered by this Act or not; and
(b) Research, enforcement and monitoring activities of relevant agencies such as the PCG, MARINA and
PPA, and other ports authority of the DOTC, Environmental Management Bureau of the DENR, and the
DOE: Provided, That ninety percent (90%) of the Fund shall be maintained annually for the activities set
forth under item (a) of this paragraph: Provided, further, That any amounts specifically appropriated for
said Fund under the General Appropriations Act shall be used exclusively for the activities set forth
under item (a) of this paragraph.

In no case, however, shall the Fund be used for personal services expenditures except for the
compensation of those involved in clean-up operations.
Provided, That amounts advanced to a responding entity or claimant shall be considered as advances in case of
final adjudication/award by the RTC under Section 18 and shall be reimbursed to the Fund. (emphasis ours)
Nine years later, or on April 12, 2016, the IRR of RA 9483 was promulgated, with Section 1, Rule thereof
implementing the questioned Section 22 of RA 9483. It states:
RULE
FINAL PROVISIONS

Section 1. Oil Pollution Management Fund (OPMF) - Administration of the OPMF shall be [the]
responsibility of the Maritime Industry Authority.

1.1. Establishment of the OPMF The Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) is hereby authorized to
establish and open a trust fund account with any government depository bank for OPMF - the OPMF
shall be available for disbursement/payment of expenses immediately after any occurrence of any oil
pollution case or incident.
1.2. Source/Composition of OPMF - OPMF shall be composed mainly from the following sources[:]
1.2.1. Contribution of Owners and Operators of Tankers and barges hauling oil and/or petroleum
products in Philippines (sic) waterways and coastwise shipping routes;
1.2.1.1. During its first year of existence from the date of implementation of the Act(,)
[t]he OPMF shall be constituted through an impost of levy of ten centavos (0.10)
per liter for every delivery of transshipment of oil received by tanker barges or
tanker hauler from an oil depot, refinery, or other storage facility for carriage to its
point of destination regardless of any intervening or intermediate point for
consolidation, de consolidation or change of means of transportation of such oil.
1.2.1.2. An OPMF Committee shall be constituted to determine the amount of contribution
for the succeeding years.
1.2.2. Fines and Penalties under Section 1, Rule IX of this IRR and other fines and penalties that
may be determined by the OPMF Committee;
1.2.3. Grants, donations and endowment from various domestic and foreign sources; and
1.2.4. Amounts appropriated under the Annual General Appropriations Act pursuant to Section 2,
Rule of this IRR.
1.3. The OPMF Committee shall be constituted as follows:
 Chairman - Administrator, MARINA
 Vice Chairman - Commandant, PCG
 Members: representative from the following:
 DOTC
 PPA
  DOE
 DENR-EMB
 Tanker Association
 (to be designated/appointed by the association members)
 Secretariat - MARINA staff designated by the Administrator
1.4. The OPMF Committee shall perform the following Duties and Functions:
1.4.1. Determine the contribution for the year based on the utilization of the OPMF;
1.4.2. Conduct/undertake an annual review and evaluation to determine the need to
increase/decrease the amount of contribution for the following year/period;
1.4.3. Issue circulars to prescribe the rate/amount of contributions of Owners and Operators of
Tankers and barges hauling oil and/or petroleum products in Philippines (sic) waterways and
coastwise shipping routes for any particular period;
1.4.4. Issue, in addition to the violations provided under Section 1, Rule of this IRR Circular
prescribing fines and penalties for additional violations of (sic) relative to the implementation
of this Act;
1.4.5. Determine/approve amount for the initial and succeeding transfer of funds to the PCG, in
accordance with National Oil Spill Contingency Plan;
1.4.6. Determine/approve the conduct of research activities pursuant to Para. (sic) 1.4.1.2, of this
Rule; and
1.4.7. Approve the proposed annual budget for the enforcement and monitoring activities of
concerned agencies/offices.
1.5. Utilization of the OPMF
1.5.1. Transfer or funds/disbursement from OPMF shall be with prior approval of the OPMF
Committee which will cover expenditures relative to the following:
1.5.1.1. For the immediate containment, removal and clean-up operations of the PCG in all
Oil Pollution cases the amount shall be in accordance with the Claims Manual.
1.5.1.2. Research, enforcement and monitoring activities as approved by the OPMF
Committee.
1.5.2. Reimbursement of expenses incurred for immediate containment, removal and clean-up
operations undertaken following an incident shall require approval from the OPMF
Committee;
1.5.3. Total expenses for immediate containment, removal and clean-up operations undertaken
following an incident shall not exceed 90% of the funds available in the OPMF on the date of
the incident;
1.5.4. Amounts appropriated under the General Appropriations Act for the immediate containment,
removal and clean-up operations undertaken following an incident.
1.5.5. The fund shall not be used for payment of personal services expenditures, except for the
compensation of those involved in clean-up operations undertaken following [an] incident.
1.5.6. Total expenses for research, enforcement and monitoring activities as approved by the OPMF
Committee shall not exceed 10% of the total funds available in the OPMF for any given
calendar year.
1.6. Procedures for the Collection and Deposit/Remittance of the OPMF:
1.6.1. Owners and Operators of Tankers and barges hauling oil and/or petroleum products in the
Philippines (sic) waterways and coastwise shipping routes shall pay their monthly
contributions to the MARINA Central Office or to any of its Maritime Regional Offices
(MROs) within the first days of the succeeding month;
1.6.2. In the case of economic zone authorizes (sic) with special charters, MARINA shall put up
collection desk in its premises, monthly contributions shall be paid to the MARINA
collecting officer.
1.6.3. Contribution shall be computed based on the rate prescribed by the OPMF Committee and the
number of liters of oil delivered/transported as reflected/reported in the Monthly Voyage
Report (MVR). The MVR shall be supported with copies of the bill of lading issued for the
month;
1.6.4. MARINA Collection/Accountable Officers shall deposit all collection received for the OPMF
intact the following day to the OPMF Fund Account;
1.6.5. MARINA Collecting Officers in the MROs and (sic) shall submit to the Central Office a
Monthly Report of Collection and Deposits.
1.7. Transfer/Disbursement of Funds
1.7.1. Immediately after receipt of report from PCG of any incident of oil spill/pollution, the
MARINA shall transfer to the latter the amount covering the initial requirements for the
containment and removal of the spill;
1.7.2. The amount transfer (sic) shall be considered as Revolving fund by the PCG;
1.7.3. The PCG shall request MARINA for the replenishment of the Revolving Fund when
disbursement has reached at least 75% of the total amount;
1.7.4. Disbursement or payment of expenses relative to the containment, removal and clean-up
operations undertaken by other government agencies/offices or private companies shall be
made by the PCG;
1.7.5. Any unexpended portion of the cash advance shall be refunded to the OPMF.
1.8. Disbursement Procedures (10%):
1.8.1. MARINA, PCG, PPA, and other government agencies/offices concerned shall submit annual
plans and budget estimates covering enforcement/monitoring and research activities, pursuant
to Section 1.4.1.2 to 1.4.1.4 of this Rule.
1.8.2. Annual Plans and Budget estimates for research, enforcement and monitoring activities shall
be submitted to the OPMF for deliberation and approval.
1.8.3. Any new research proposal, in addition to the annual plan may be submitted to the OPMF
Committee for deliberation/approval.
1.8.4. Transfer of funds for research activities shall be as approved by the OPMF Committee.
1.9. Reimbursement to the OPMF:
1.9.1. MARINA shall be provided copy of any decision/order issued by the RTC on the settlement
of claims for compensation for pollution damages.
1.10. Audit of the OPMF
 1.10.1. The OPMF shall be subjected to the usual audit procedures by the Commission on
Audit (COA).
1.11. Reporting
1.11.1. The MARINA, as administrator of the OPMF, shall prepare the following quarterly reports
and submit the same to the Secretary of the DOTC, the members of the OPMF Committee
and other concerned government offices;
1.11.1.1. Collection and Deposit
1.11.1.2. Disbursement
1.11.1.3. Status of Funds
1.11.2. An audited report of disbursement shall be prepared and submitted by PCF to the MARINA
within 90 days after the termination of the clean-up operations.
1.11.3. MARINA shall submit financial reports as required by COA, Bureau of Treasury and
Department of Budget (DBM) and Congress.
Respondents lost no time in assailing the law and the IRR. A month after the promulgation of the IRR, they
filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief (with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction) under Rule 63, contesting Section 22 (a) of RA 9483, as well as Section 1, Rule
of its IRR. The petition was raffled off and heard by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 216, Quezon City (RTC).

There, they argued that the obligation to contribute to the OPMF solely imposed upon the owners and operators
of oil/petroleum tankers and barges violates their right to equal protection of the law; that the ten-centavo (10c)
impost is confiscatory and, thus, violates their right to due process; Section 22 (a) is a prohibited rider; and,
finally, the provision provides an undue delegation of legislative power.12

In an Order13 dated July 25, 2016, the RTC granted the prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
and enjoined the implementation of the assailed provision and IRR.14

RTC Decision

On February 22, 2017, the RTC rendered the questioned Decision granting the petition for declaratory relief and
ruling in favor of respondents.

The trial court held that there is no clear and valid reason as to why the oil/petroleum tankers and barges are
being treated differently from other vessels. For the trial court, there is no substantial distinction between
tankers and barges and these other vessels in terms of their potential to cause oil pollution or effect damage as a
consequence thereof. The RTC agreed with respondents that to be valid, all potential marine pollutants should
be required to contribute to the OPMF.15

With respect to the 10-centavo per liter imposition, the RTC agreed with respondents that the amount is
confiscatory and that said amount will cripple, if not bankrupt, the respondents' businesses.16

As regards the allegation that Section 22 is a rider, the trial court agreed. It held that based on the title, it is clear
that RA 9483 was enacted merely to implement the provisions of the 1992 Civil Liability and the 1992 Fund
Conventions.17 The trial court noted that these Conventions do not order the creation of an OPMF. 18

Lastly, the RTC ruled that the law does not set specific parameters to guide the implementing agencies on how
to determine the amount of contribution for the succeeding years after the first year of existence where the 10-
centavo amount applies.19
We quote the decretal portion of the assailed Decision:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby granted. The court renders judgment as follows:

1) The Injunction enjoining the respondents from implementing Assailed Provision (Section 22, paragraph
(a) of Republic Act No. 9483), and Assailed IRR (Section 1, Rule of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Republic Act No. 9438) is made permanent; and
2) Section 22, paragraph (a) of Republic Act No. 9483, and Section 1, Rule of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Republic Act No. 9483 are declared unconstitutional.

SO ORDERED.20
Aggrieved, petitioners are now with this Court via the present petition for review on certiorari assailing the
February 22, 2017 Decision of the RTC. Petitioners argue that the RTC erred in declaring Section 22(a) of RA
9483 and its implementing rule unconstitutional, given that respondents' petition for declaratory relief
questioned the wisdom behind them and was, thus, beyond the lower court's jurisdiction. Petitioners further add
that the classification in Section 22 of RA 9483 and its IRR is reasonable and just, and does not violate the
equal protection clause. Likewise, petitioners maintain that public interest in protecting the marine wealth of the
country warrants the imposition of the 10-centavo impost. Finally, the petitioners insist that the creation of the
OPMF is relevant to the subject matter of RA 9483.21

In its July 3, 2017 Resolution, the Court required the respondents to file their Comment within non-extendible
period of ten days22 from receipt of the resolution. On September 2, 2017, respondents filed their Comment on
the Petition,23 mainly reiterating their contentions before the trial court.24

The Issue

The core issue to be resolved in this case is whether Section 22 (a) of RA 9483 and Section 1, Rule of its IRR
are unconstitutional.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is impressed with merit.

The Creation of the OPMF can be the subject of judicial inquiry

We agree with respondents that the issue presented is a justiciable question which allows the exercise by this
Court of its judicial power, and does not involve political question. In Tañada and Macapagal v. Cuenco, et
al.,25 the Court summarized the concept of political questions in this manner:
x x it refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive
branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.
In the case at bar, however, while it may appear that contesting the creation of the OPMF amounts to
questioning the wisdom behind the measure, such is not the case. As correctly argued by respondents, the Court
may take judicial action on said question since it is not contesting the creation of the OPMF per se, but rather its
inclusion in RA 9483, and the specific parameters incorporated by the legislature in the implementation of the
contested provision. More importantly, violations of the due process and the equal protection clauses of the
1987 Constitution alleged by the respondents are well-recognized grounds for a judicial inquiry into a
legislative measure.

The Petition for Declaratory Relief is not the proper remedy

One of the requisites for an action for declaratory relief is that it must be filed before any breach or violation of
an obligation. Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court states, thus:

Section 1. Who may file petition. - Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other
governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof bring an action in the appropriate Regional
Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or
duties, thereunder.
Thus, there is no actual case involved in a Petition for Declaratory Relief. It cannot, therefore, be the proper
vehicle to invoke the judicial review powers to declare a statute unconstitutional.

It is elementary that before this Court can rule on a constitutional issue, there must first be a justiciable
controversy. A justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory. 26 As We emphasized in Angara v.
Electoral Commission,27 any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and
to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.

To question the constitutionality of the subject issuances, respondents should have invoked the
expanded certiorari jurisdiction under Section of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. The adverted section
defines judicial power as the power not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable," but also "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."

There is a grave abuse of discretion when there is patent violation of the Constitution, the law, or existing
jurisprudence. On this score, it has been ruled that "the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily
broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of
jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions, but also to set right, undo[,] and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if
the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions."28 Thus, petitions
for certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies where an action of the legislative branch is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution.29

In any case, even if the petition for declaratory relief is not the proper remedy, the need to finally resolve the
issues involved in this case far outweighs the rigid application of the rules. The Court, thus, treats the petition
filed by the respondents before the court a quo as a petition for certiorari and prohibition.

Section 22(a)of RA 9483 creating the Oil Pollution Management Fund is not proscribed rider

Respondents argue that since RA 9483 was passed to implement the 1992 Civil Liability and the 1992 Fund
Conventions, the creation of the OPMF must be found in said Conventions for it to be validly included in RA
9483. Otherwise, according to respondents, its inclusion in said law is constitutionally infirm for being a 
proscribed rider.

At first glance, one might easily agree with respondent's proposition. The title of RA 9483 is phrased in this
manner:
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE 1992
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON CIVIL LIABILITY FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE AND THE
1992 INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL FUND
FOR COMPENSATION FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE, PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS
THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
On the basis thereof, respondents draw this Court's attention to the two mentioned Conventions and bid us to
examine both documents to see that the OPMF cannot be found therein.

Concisely, the respective subject matters of the two Conventions are as follows:
The 1992 Civil Liability Convention governs the liability of shipowners for oil pollution damage. The
Convention lays down the principle of strict liability for shipowners and creates a system of compulsory
liability insurance. The shipowner is normally entitled to limit its liability to an amount which is linked to the
tonnage of its ship.

The 1992 Fund Convention, which is supplementary to the 1992 Civil Liability Convention, establishes regime
for compensating victims when the compensation under the applicable Civil Liability Convention is inadequate.
The International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund 1992, generally referred to as the 1992 Fund, was set up
under the 1992 Fund Convention. The 1992 Fund is worldwide intergovernmental organization established for
the purpose of administering the regime of compensation created by the 1992 Fund Convention. By becoming
Party to the 1992 Fund Convention, a State becomes a Member of the 1992 Fund. The IOPC Funds
headquarters is based in London.30
Indeed, as argued by respondents, the thrust of the 1992 Civil Liability and the 1992 Fund Conventions is to
impose upon covered shipowners strict liability for pollution damage arising from oil spills and to provide
compensation for the victims thereof. On the other hand, the questioned OPMF governs the immediate
containment, removal, and clean-up operations in oil pollution cases and provides for the conduct of research,
enforcement, and monitoring activities of relevant agencies.

On the basis thereof, it would appear that the Conventions and the OPMF cover two different subject matters-
that is, providing compensation versus pollution containment and clean-up-as asserted by respondents.
Thus, prima facie, one would easily agree with respondents' contention.

Such simplistic, if not myopic, view is not the proper measure to determine whether a provision of law
should be declared as unconstitutional. To determine whether there has been compliance with the
constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court has repeatedly laid
down the rule that -

Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly
construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall be
expressed in its title should receive reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be
comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without
expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that
object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the act.31
Also, in Sumulong v. Comelec,32 the Court held that all that can reasonably be required is that the title shall not
be made to cover legislation incongruous in itself, and which by no fair intendment can be considered as having
necessary or proper connection, viz:

As stated by the Supreme Court of the United States: "We must give the constitutional provision reasonable
construction and effect. The constitution requires no law to embrace more than one subject, which shall be
expressed in its title. Now the object may be very comprehensive and still be without objection, and the one
before us is of that character. But it is by no means essential that every end and means necessary or
convenient for the accomplishment of the general object should be either referred to or necessarily
indicated by the title. All that can reasonably be required is that the title shall not be made to cover
legislation incongruous in itself, and which by no fair intendment can be considered as having a necessary
or proper connection."33 (emphasis ours)
Thus, following these jurisprudential guides, it would undoubtedly be improper for this Court to make a
superficial reading of the texts of the conventions in order to determine whether the inclusion of Section 22 in
RA 9483, which was enacted to implement these Conventions, is infirm more in-depth analysis of the
conventions is necessary.

A review of the Conventions reveals that they do not only cover damage claims by affected individuals but also
all amounts encompassed by the term "pollution damage" which is defined therein as:
(a) loss or damage caused outside the ship by contamination resulting from the escape or discharge of oil from
the ship, wherever such escape or discharge may occur, provided that compensation for impairment of the
environment other than loss of profit from such impairment shall be limited to costs of reasonable measures of
reinstatement actually undertaken or to be undertaken;
(b) the costs of preventive measures34 and further loss or damage caused by preventive measures.35
In its 2011 Annual Report, the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund (IOPCF) enumerated the types of
claims that are admissible, thus:
An oil pollution incident can generally give rise to claims for five types of pollution damage:

• Property damage

• Costs of clean-up operations at sea and on shore

• Economic losses by fisher folk or those engaged in mariculture

• Economic losses in the tourism sector

• Costs for reinstatement of the environment.36

The Conventions, therefore, also cover damage to property, containment, clean-up, and rehabilitation.
Thus, the policy underpinning the establishment of the OPMF in Section 22(a) of RA 9483 and its IRR is
wholly consistent with the objectives of the conventions. Section of RA 9483 states:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State, in the protection of its marine wealth in its archipelagic waters,
territorial sea and exclusive economic zone, adopts internationally accepted measures which and ensure prompt
and adequate compensation for persons who suffer such damage. This Act adopts and implements the
provisions of the 1992 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage and the 1992
International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution
Damage.
Indeed, by employing preventive and/or immediate containment measures or response techniques, the State is
but affording protection to persons or all stakeholders who stand to suffer from oil pollution incidents-the main
thrust of the conventions that is now effectively translated and implemented in Section 22 (a) of RA 9483 and
its IRR. In other words, by creating the OPMF, Congress sought to ensure that our enforcement agencies are
capable of protecting our marine wealth and preventing harm from being caused to the people and their
livelihood by reason of these unfortunate events.

Time is of the essence when it comes to oil spill response. Whether this will be taken in the context of damage
to the environment and its inhabitants or from a monetary perspective, the conclusion will be the same. We
cannot simply submit to respondents' proposition that compensation for damages and oil spill response are two
unrelated subjects that cannot be tackled in a single piece of legislation. To Our mind, oil spill response and
containment is directly connected to compensation for damages brought about by the incident. In fact, the
two concepts are inversely proportional to each other in that a more effective and efficient oil spill response and
clean up results in lesser pollution damage; and, ultimately, smaller pollution damage means reduced financial
liability on the part of the shipowner.

With these, We find that Section 22 is not a rider but is an essential provision to attain the purpose of RA 9483.

The classification in Section 22 of RA 9483 and its IRR does not violate the equal protection clause

We likewise cannot sustain the RTC's finding that the assailed provisions violate the equal protection guarantee
when it singled out "owners and operators of oil or petroleum tankers and barges."

The equal protection guaranty under the Constitution means that "no person or class of persons shall be
deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and
in like circumstances."37 However, this clause does not preclude classification as long as the classification is
reasonable and not arbitrary.38 In Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima,39 the Court elucidated, thus:
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the
other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they
agree with one another in certain particulars law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of
classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner
determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be
reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make
for real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held
that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or
rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
In the instant case, We agree with petitioners that separating "tankers and barges hauling oil and for petroleum
products in Philippine waterways and coast wise shipping routes" from other sea-borne vessels does not violate
the equal protection clause.

For one, bear in mind that the purpose of the subject legislation is the implementation of the 1992 Civil Liability
Convention and the 1992 Fund Convention. Both Conventions only expressly cover "sea-going vessel and
seaborne craft of any type whatsoever constructed or adapted for the carriage of oil in bulk as cargo x x
x."40 This alone already forecloses any argument against the validity of the alleged classification since the
implementation by RA 9483 of the subject Conventions necessarily carries with it the adoption of the coverage
and limitations employed in said texts.

Furthermore, We cannot subscribe to respondents' proposition that since all vessels plying Philippine waters are
susceptible to accidents which may cause oil spills, all should be made to contribute to the OPMF. While all
vessels, channels, and storage facilities that carry or store oil are capable of causing oil pollution, this does not
make them "similarly situated" within the context of the equal protection clause.

Aside from the difference in the purposes behind their existence and navigation, it is internationally well-
recognized that oil tankers pose a greater risk to the environment and to people. As matter of fact, these types of
vessels have long been considered as separate class and are being given a different treatment by various
organizations.

The International Maritime Organization (IMO), expounding on the International Convention for the Safety of
Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974, highlighted that the SOLAS includes special requirements for tankers.41 Citing an
example, the IMO stated that "[f]ire safety provisions x x x are much more stringent for tankers than ordinary
dry cargo ships, since the danger of fire on board ships carrying oil and refined products is much greater." 42 The
IMO likewise mentioned some of the measures specifically required of oil tankers, such as making it mandatory
for tankers to have double hulls, as opposed to single hulls, the phasing-out of single-hull tankers, and
designating protective locations of segregated ballast tanks, among others, in order to ensure their safety. 43 In
fact, Annex of the revised Marpol 73/78 44 sets forth the numerous technical and safety requirements for oil
tankers.45 This list is not exhaustive as there are numerous regulations and requirements applicable only to the
subject vessels. What these show, however, is that a vessel that carries oil in bulk has been recognized and is
treated as a separate class of vessel. This sufficiently justifies the segregation done by Congress.

It bears to stress that "[i]n the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws over
matters within its jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying a wide range of discretion." 46 Concomitantly,
neither should the Court adopt such a restrictive-if not counterproductive approach-in interpreting and applying
the equal protection guarantee under the Constitution. To do otherwise would be to unduly restrict the power of
Congress in enacting laws by unjustifiably imposing erroneously stringent requirements and excessively high
standards in the crafting of each and every piece of legislation, depriving our lawmakers of the much needed
elbowroom the discharge of their functions.

As regards respondents' contention that since RA 9483 came about because of the spate of oil spillage at the
time of its enactment, this violates the requirement that the classification must not be limited to existing
conditions only, the argument does not hold water.

A statute or provision thereof is said to be limited to existing conditions only if it cannot be applied to future
conditions as well.47 Here, We cannot, by any stretch of imagination, agree with respondents' proposition.
Suffice it to state that enacting a piece of legislation as a response to a problem, incident, or occurrence does not
make it "limited to existing conditions only." Assessing whether a statute or provision meets said requirement
necessitates a review of the provision or statute itself and not the cause or trigger for its enactment. To require
otherwise would be to improperly tie the hands of our legislature in enacting laws designed to address the
various matters, incidents, and occurrences that may arise in a highly-dynamic and unpredictable society.

Viewed within the purview of RA 9483, it can easily be seen that the statute also applies to future conditions as
it covers any and all oil spills that may occur within Philippine waters.

The conferment on the OPMF Committee of the authority to determine the rate of imposition for the second
year of its implementation onwards is not an undue delegation of legislative power
Arguing that the assailed provision is also an undue delegation of legislative power, respondents allege that
giving the OPMF Committee the authority to jointly determine the amount of contribution after the one-year
imposition of the 10-centavo contribution is an undue delegation since no fixed parameters were given
therefor.48

We disagree.

For valid delegation of power, it is essential that the law delegating the power must be (1) complete in itself,
that it must set forth the policy to be executed by the delegate and (2) it must fix standard - limits of which are
sufficiently determinate or determinable - to which the delegate must conform. 49 On the second
requirement, Osmeña v. Orbos50 explained that a sufficient standard need not be spelled out and could be
implied from the policy of the law:

The standard, as the Court has already stated, may even be implied. In that light, there can be no ground upon which to
sustain the petition, inasmuch as the challenged law sets forth a determinable standard which guides the exercise of
the power granted to the ERB. By the same token, the proper exercise of the delegated power may be tested with ease. It
seems obvious that what the law intended was to permit the additional imposts for as long as there exists a need to protect
the general public and the petroleum industry from the adverse consequences of pump rate fluctuations. "Where the
standards set up for the guidance of an administrative officer and the action taken are in fact recorded in the
orders of such officer, so that Congress, the courts and the public are assured that the orders in the judgment of
such officer conform to the legislative standard, there is no failure in the performance of the legislative functions."
This Court thus finds no serious impediment to sustaining the validity of the legislation; the express purpose
for which the imposts are permitted and the general objectives and purposes of the fund are readily
discernible, and they constitute a sufficient standard upon which the delegation of power may be
justified. (Citations omitted; emphasis ours)
Further, in Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, We stated that courts bend as far back as possible to
sustain the constitutionality of laws which are assailed as unduly delegating legislative powers:
The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in our constitutional landscape. As sagely
observed, delegation of legislative power has become an inevitability in light of the increasing complexity of
the task of government. Thus, courts bend as far back as possible to sustain the constitutionality of laws
which are assailed as unduly delegating legislative powers. Citing Hirabayashi v. United States as authority,
Mr. Justice Isagani Cruz states "that even if the law does not expressly pinpoint the standard, the courts
will bend over backward to locate the same elsewhere in order to spare the statute, if it can, from
constitutional infirmity."51 (emphasis ours)
Thus, this Court has previously instructed that a standard as general as the phrases "as far as practicable,"
"decline of crude oil prices in the world market," and "stability of the peso exchange rate to the US dollar" are
neither unclear nor inconcrete in meaning, but are in fact determinable by the simple expedient of referring to
their dictionary meanings.52 The Court even stated that "[t]he fear of petitioners that these words will result in
the exercise of executive discretion that will run riot is thus groundless. To be sure, the Court has sustained
the validity of similar, if not more general standards in other cases."53 Indeed, the Court has, in numerous
instances, accepted as sufficient standards policies as general as:
x x x "public interest" in People v. Rosenthal, "justice and equity" in Antamok Gold Fields v. CIR, "public
convenience and welfare" in Calalang v. Williams, and "simplicity, economy and efficiency" in Cervantes v.
Auditor General, to mention only a few cases. In the United States, the "sense and experience of men" was
accepted in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission, and "national security" in Hirabayashi v. United
States.54 (citations omitted)
Thus, applying this commitment to sift each and every part of the assailed law or provision thereof in order to
locate any and all standards possible provided therein, We are duty bound to analyze the statute in question to
determine once and for all whether indeed the legislature failed to incorporate therein a standard of such
character as will pass this test of constitutionality. We shall first tackle the standards expressly embodied in
Section 22. To recall, the assailed provision containing the questioned delegation reads:
SEC. 22. Oil Pollution Management Fund. - An Oil Pollution Management Fund (OPMF) to be administered
by the MARINA is hereby established. Said Fund shall be constituted from:

(a) Contributions of Owners and operators of tankers and barges hauling Oil and for petroleum products in Philippine
waterways and coast wise shipping routes. During its first year of existence, the Fund shall be constituted by an impost of
ten centavos (IOc) per liter for every delivery or transshipment of Oil made by tanker barges and tanker haulers.  For the
succeeding fiscal years, the amount of contribution shall be jointly determined by Marina, other concerned
government agencies, and representatives from the Owners of tankers barges, tankers haulers, and Ship hauling
Oil and/or petroleum products. In determining the amount of contribution, the purposes for which the fund was
set up shall always be considered; and

(b) Fines imposed pursuant to this Act, grants, donations, endowment from various sources, domestic or foreign, and
amounts specifically appropriated for OPMF under the annual General Appropriations Act.

The Fund shall be used to finance the following activities:

(a) Immediate containment, removal and clean-up operations of the PCG in all Oil pollution cases, whether
covered by this Act or not; and

(b) Research, enforcement and monitoring activities of relevant agencies such as the PCG, MARINA and PPA, and
other ports authority of the DOTC, Environmental Management Bureau of the DENR, and the DOE:  Provided,
That ninety percent (90%) of the Fund shall be maintained annually for the activities set forth under item (a) of
this paragraph: Provided, further, That any amounts specifically appropriated for said Fund under the General
Appropriations Act shall be used exclusively for the activities set forth under item (a) of this paragraph.

In no case, however, shall the Fund be used for personal services expenditures except for the
compensation of those involved in clean-up operations.

Provided, That amounts advanced to a responding entity or claimant shall be considered as advances in case of
final adjudication/award by the RTC under Section 18 and shall be reimbursed to the Fund. (emphasis ours)
A review of the contested provision reveals that contrary to respondents' assertion that the law only provides a
vague standard for the exercise of the delegated authority, there are in fact a number of set parameters included
therein within which the authority to fix the amount of the impost shall be exercised. These are:

1. the purposes for which the fund was set up;

2. the Fund shall be used to finance the following activities:

a. Immediate containment, removal and clean-up operations of the PCG in all Oil pollution cases, whether
covered by this Act or not; and

b. Research, enforcement and monitoring activities of relevant agencies such as the PCG, MARINA and PPA,
and other ports authority of the DOTC, Environmental Management Bureau of the DENR, and the DOE;
3. Ninety percent (90%) of the Fund shall be maintained annually for the activities set forth under item (a) of this
paragraph;

4. Any amounts specifically appropriated for said Fund under the General Appropriations Act shall be used exclusively
for the activities set forth under item (a) of this paragraph;

5. In no case shall the Fund be used for personal services expenditures except for the compensation of those involved
in clean-up operations.

Put otherwise, in authorizing the OPMF Committee in determining the rate of impost for the succeeding years,
Congress in fact directed them to ensure that 90% of the funds that will be accumulated will be enough to
finance the following: (1) emergency response measures for oil pollution cases; (2) clean-up operations for oil
spill incidents; (3) research; (4) enforcement; and (5) monitoring activities of the stated agencies in connection
with oil pollution.

These parameters-the specified inclusions and exclusions, and the share that the itemized activities shall have in
the OPMF-to Us, adequately meet the required standards that make a delegation of legislative power valid. By
being statutorily mandated to work within this identified scope and these limitations, the OPMF Committee
does not actually have free reign in the exercise of its functions under Section 22. It has to ensure that the
amount of impost that it will set, in addition to any sum that they may receive from the GAA and from
other sources such as fines, penalties, grants, donations, and endowments, is sufficient to meet the above
stated needs and activities necessary for the promotion of the thrust of RA 9483, which is the protection
of the environment and the people from oil pollution damage.

These scopes and limitations contained in the entirety of Section 22, without a doubt, substantially exceed the
general policies that have been recognized and upheld in the past as sufficient standards. Viewed with the
multifariousness of oil spill response and clean-up in mind, We find that the parameters set forth in the assailed
provision successfully overcome this test of constitutionality, despite the absence of numerical gauges.

Another ground that favors the validity of the assailed provision is that what Section 22 vested in them is
merely the authority to fix the rate of the impost, taking into consideration the parameters therein clearly
stated. In other words, this authority is actually limited by the sufficiency of the Fund to meet the
identified items. They were not given any discretion to add to these parameters or to disregard them. In other
words, the delegates are expected to faithfully follow these standards set by the law, lest their actions will be
struck down as illegal for having exceeded the terms of the agency.55

As aptly stated in People v. Vera,56 the true distinction "is between the delegation of power to make the law,
which necessarily involves discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid
objection can be made." In other words, the policy must be determined by the legislature and the executive's
authority is limited only to the furtherance of this identified policy. The executive cannot add, modify, or delete
such.

With respect to measuring the adequacy of the country's capability to protect our waters, shores, and the
stakeholders from the effects of oil spills as mandated under the law, Sections and of RA 9483, which reflect
certain policies under the Conventions, provide the gauge therefor. Said provisions read:
SEC. 4. Incorporation of the 1992 Civil Liability Convention and 1992 Fund Convention. - Subject to the
provisions of this Act, the 1992 Civil Liability Convention and 1992 Fund Convention and their subsequent
amendments shall form part of the law of the Republic of the Philippines.

xxxx

SEC. 6. Liability on Pollution Damage. - The Owner of the Ship at the time of an Incident, or where the
Incident consists of a series of occurrences, at the time of the first such occurrence, shall be liable for any
Pollution Damage caused by the Ship as a result of the Incident. Such damages shall include, but not limited to:

(a) Reasonable expenses actually incurred in clean-up operations at sea or on shore;

(b) Reasonable expenses of Preventive Measures and further loss or damage caused by preventive measures;

(c) Consequential loss or loss of earnings suffered by Owners or users of property contaminated or damaged as
a direct result of an Incident;

(d) Pure economic loss or loss of earnings sustained by persons although the property contaminated or damaged
as a direct result of an Incident does not belong to them;

(e) Damage to human health or loss of life as a direct result of the Incident, including expenses for rehabilitation
and recuperation: Provided, That costs of studies or diagnoses to determine the long-term damage shall also be
included; and

(f) Environmental damages and other reasonable measures of environmental restoration.

As for the Conventions which the subject statute expressly adopts and incorporates therein, making the
Conventions form part of the law of the country, it bears to stress that the respective thrusts thereof are to
provide "adequate compensation available to persons who suffer damage caused by pollution resulting from the
escape or discharge of oil from ships"57 and "compensation for victims who do not obtain full compensation
under the 1992 Civil Liability Convention."58

And again, the term "pollution damage" under RA 9483 covers the following:
(a) Reasonable expenses actually incurred in clean-up operations at sea or on shore;

(b) Reasonable expenses of Preventive Measures and further loss or damage caused by preventive measures;

(c) Consequential loss or loss of earnings suffered by Owners or users of property contaminated or damaged as
a direct result of an Incident;
(d) Pure economic loss or loss of earnings sustained by persons although the property contaminated or damaged
as a direct result of an Incident does not belong to them;

(e) Damage to human health or loss of life as a direct result of the Incident, including expenses for rehabilitation
and recuperation: Provided, That costs of studies or diagnoses to determine the long-term damage shall also be
included; and

(f) Environmental damages and other reasonable measures of environmental restoration.

The rate of impost should, thus, be enough to accumulate an amount that, when combined with the funds that
will be derived from the appropriations under the GAA, grants, donations, and endowment from various
sources, domestic or foreign, can sufficiently enable our agencies to fulfill their duty of protecting the country's
marine wealth and the stakeholders by ensuring that any damage caused by oil spills is minimal and the
resulting cost can be fully or adequately covered by the Conventions. Put differently, the rate of the impost for
the succeeding years must not be so low as to be insufficient to meet the budgetary needs of the agencies
for the items identified under Section 22. This is so since the mandate of the law will not be fulfilled if the
agencies' capacity for oil spill response is inadequate, ineffective, or less than what is necessary for the
declared purpose. Conversely, it must also not be so high that the totality of the amount accumulated
from the various sources gravely exceeds the financial requirements for said items. Simply put, the sum
of the amounts to be collected or received from the various sources must not exceed the administrative
costs and expenses of implementing the activities.

With these, We find that the evils that the sufficient standards test seeks to prevent are amply addressed by the
questioned Section 22, as well as the abovementioned provisions which provide the guidelines therefor. By
setting forth the identified parameters and the policy that the funds to be accumulated by virtue of the impost
are for the purpose of protecting the country's marine wealth and ensuring full or adequate compensation to the
victims of oil spills, the metes and bounds of the exercise of the delegated authority have been sufficiently laid
out. Consequently, the manner by which the delegates are to exercise the conferred authority can be
measured against these parameters and checked for any evidence of arbitrariness or excessiveness.

It is also important to note that Congress included the representatives from the owners of tankers barges,
tankers haulers, and ship hauling oil and/or petroleum products as part of the group tasked to determine
the rates for the following years. In so doing, Congress not only valued their inputs but also gave them an
avenue to protect their businesses by ensuring that the effect of the imposition on the private sector
would be factored in and not seen as mere recommendations. As a matter of fact, the legislature placed them
in position that is more than consultative. By making them part of the group authorized to determine the amount
of impost, they were given not just the opportunity to be heard but the capability to directly influence the rate of
the impost. This certainly goes beyond mere consultation or advice.

What further convinces Us that any additional specification of limitations-which Congress opted away from-
may actually do more harm than good is the fact that numerous factors affect the extent and severity of oil
pollution caused by spills. As summarized by the International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation Limited
(ITOPF):
The effects of an oil spill will depend on a variety of factors including, the quantity and type of oil spilled,
and how it interacts with the marine environment. Prevailing weather conditions will also influence the
oil's physical characteristics and its behaviour. Other key factors include the biological and ecological
attributes of the area; the ecological significance of key species and their sensitivity to oil pollution as well
as the time of year. It is important to remember that the clean-up techniques selected will also have a bearing
on the environmental effects of a spill.59 (emphasis ours)
This highly multifaceted character of oil spill incidents, coupled with the fact that the Philippine archipelago is
comprised of thousands of islands with varying sizes and ecology and has one of the longest coastlines in the
world-estimated at 36,289 kilometers, reflects a certain complexity in its state of affairs that undoubtedly makes
the setting of rigid and exhaustive parameters difficult, if not impossible.

Apropos, in Osmeña,60 this Court, tackling the question whether there was an undue delegation of legislative
power when the Energy Regulatory Board was conferred the authority to impose additional amounts on
petroleum products, held that the dynamic character of the circumstances within which the authority is to
be exercised must be considered in determining whether the assailed provision provides a sufficient
standard.

The Court's pronouncement in the cited case could not be more fitting. Indeed, oil spill response and clean-up,
and rehabilitation of affected areas, among others, are affected by great number of factors, most of which are
outside the control of man. Philippine waters are so vast, diverse, and rich that we cannot possibly require
Congress to comprehensively set forth any and all factors that must be considered in the determination of the
metes and bounds for the setting of the questioned impost, more so numerical restrictions. Furthermore, with the
unpredictability and uncontrollability of the accumulation of costs of pollution damage in oil spills, an
exhaustive list of parameters may not work to our country's advantage.

The imposition of the 10-centavo impost does not violate the due process clause

Section 1, Article III, of the Constitution guarantees that no person shall be deprived of property without due
process of law. While there is no controlling and precise definition of due process, it furnishes a standard to
which governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each
appropriate case, be valid.61

Relevant to the instant case is the doctrine's application to businesses and trade where this basic pledge ensures
that insofar as the property of private corporations and partnerships is concerned, these entities enjoy the
promise of protection against arbitrary regulation.62 Thus, the Court, in JMM Promotion and Management, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals, held that:
A profession, trade or calling is property right within the meaning of our constitutional guarantees. One cannot be
deprived of the right to work and the right to make living because these rights are property rights , the arbitrary and
unwarranted deprivation of which normally constitutes an actionable wrong. 63
Nonetheless, equally well-settled is the rule that "where the due process and equal protection clauses are invoked,
considering that they are not fixed rules but rather broad standards, there is a need for proof of such persuasive character
as would lead to such a conclusion. Absent such a showing, the presumption of validity must prevail." 64 

Thus, in asserting that the 10-centavo per liter impost is unconstitutional, respondents have the burden of
proof to convince this Court that indeed said imposition is arbitrary, oppressive, excessive, and
confiscatory, thereby violating the constitutional proscription against deprivation of property without
due process of law.

Respondents, however, by providing nothing more than hypothetical computations of their losses, failed to
discharge this burden. Indeed, persuading this Court that their businesses would suffer to large extent if they
will be made to shoulder the 10-centavo/liter impost cannot be satisfactorily discharged, as to overcome a
strong presumption of constitutionality, by the mere expedient of presenting sample scenario, the truthfulness or
accuracy of which has not even been proven.

It would be improper to declare an imposition as unlawful or unconstitutional on the basis of purely

hypothetical and unsubstantiated computations. In refusing to declare a provision of law as unconstitutional
based on theoretical assumptions, this Court, in Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita, emphatically stated that
"[t]he Court will not engage in a legal joust where premises are what ifs, arguments, theoretical and facts,
uncertain. Any disquisition by the Court on this point will only be, as Shakespeare describes life in Macbeth,
'full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.'"65
The hypothetical computations provided by the respondents do not equate to a material and actual impact that
the questioned impost will have on their businesses. In other words, these are mere mock-up situations which
discount several factors, including any adjustments that a business may undertake to secure profits despite the
impost. As a matter of fact, respondents themselves state that they have the option of passing the expense to the
consumers.66 We are not here saying that respondents should adopt said course of action, but what is obvious is
that they have sufficient leeway in the conduct of their business that would allow them to realize profits
notwithstanding the enforcement of Section 22.

What further prevents Us from relying on said computations is that it would be imprudent for this Court to take
these computations without grain of salt. While it is possible that these income statements are truthful, it is also
possible that they are not. The Court is allowed some degree of skepticism and is not expected to take these
"evidence" hook, line and sinker especially when what is in question is the constitutionality and validity of a
legislative enactment. Echoing this necessary skepticism is the Court's pronouncement in the case of Churchill
v. Concepcion, thus:
Surely, before the courts are called upon to adjudge an act of the legislature fixing the maximum passenger rates for
railroad companies to be unconstitutional, on the ground that its enforcement would prevent the stockholders from
receiving any dividends on their investments, or the bondholders any interest on their loans, they should be fully advised
as to what is done with the receipts and earnings of the company; for if so advised, it might clearly appear that a prudent
and honest management would, within the rates prescribed, secure to the bondholders their interest, and to the
stockholders reasonable dividends. While the protection of vested rights of property is a supreme duty of the courts, it has
not come to this, that the legislative power rests subservient to the discretion of any railroad corporation which may, by
exorbitant and unreasonable salaries, or in some other improper way, transfer its earnings into what it is pleased to call
'operating expenses.'67
Additionally, the error in said computations lies in the fact that it failed to consider the operation of Section 22
which dictates that the impost shall be 10 centavos per liter only on the first year. This allows for a retention,
increase, or reduction in the succeeding years, whichever is determined to be necessary. This scenario was
obviously not taken into account when respondents made said computations.

But respondents, adamant in having the impost invalidated, draw Our attention to their computation of the
amount that would be collected if said imposition would be enforced. Respondents contend that the imposition
of the 10-centavo charge for the years 2007-2012 would have yielded approximately Two Billion Pesos
(Php2,000,000,000.00) annually.68 They then compare this with the cost of the clean-up for the Guimaras Oil
Spill, by far the worst oil spill in Philippine history. According to them, it only amounted to Php775,594,885.00,
which amount is significantly lower than the amount that the imposition would yield. 69

The arguments fail to persuade.

The determination of whether a measure or charge is confiscatory or not, within the purview of the due process
clause, will not solely depend on the amount that will be accumulated therefrom. Such a gauge is downright
erroneous. Other factors must likewise be considered such as the purposes for which the fund will be used and
the costs which said purposes entail, among others. Viewed from the context of oil spills and the current
incapacity of our enforcement agencies to timely and adequately respond to oil spill incidents, plus the
aforementioned characteristics of our natural resources and the environment, We cannot safely conclude that
any amount, even millions or billions, is actually exorbitant or excessive in the furtherance of RA 9483's
objectives.

And these computations fail to take into account the fact that, guilty of reiteration, the impost is not perpetually
fixed at 10 centavos per liter. Thus, if the laudable purposes of RA 9483 can be sufficiently met and financed by
a lesser impost, then there is nothing to prevent the proper reduction of the rate.

Another flaw in the arguments is that they are incomplete in the sense that without any data as to the costs of the
necessary tools, equipment, inventories, trainings, research, among others, needed for the furtherance of RA
9483, there is no way to determine whether the initial amount that will be collected from the 10-centavo impost
during the first year of operation of Section 22 is already unjustifiably massive, making the 10-centavo rate
exorbitant and confiscatory.

We cannot simply rely on the cost of the Guimaras oil spill clean-up because as repeatedly intimated, oil spills
are unpredictable and their extent is almost entirely uncontrollable. One incident cannot serve as the basis for
estimating the costs needed for oil spill response, among others. Furthermore, the OPMF does not only cover
the conduct of the clean-up itself. The OPMF, as previously explained, was primarily created for capacity-
building, that is, to give our local agencies the capability to render emergency response measures and not rely
heavily, if not entirely, on foreign assistance. Thus, to use the cost of the clean-up in the Guimaras incident as
the benchmark for determining whether the impost is reasonable or not will definitely lead to misguided
conclusions.

Most importantly, it must be borne in mind that the impost provided in Section 22 is not revenue-raising tax
intended to supplement the government's treasury. What Section 22 does is to regulate the conduct of the
business of owners and operators of oil tankers and barges by imposing upon them the duty to contribute to the
protection of Philippine waters which they directly use in the conduct of their trade, and which they expose to
risk of possibly irreparable destruction brought about by the spillage or leakage of the product that they carry
and profit from.

In other words, the 10 centavos is an administrative charge or fee which, in the case at hand, was imposed on
covered entities to protect a resource and territory that those in the industry directly use in the conduct of their
business, that is, the country's maritime domain. Such administrative charge is a valid charge. On this matter,
We refer to the pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court in Edye v. Robertson.70 Thus:
If it were necessary to prove that the imposition of this contribution on owners of ships is made for the general
welfare of the United States, it would not be difficult to show that it is so, and particularly that it is among the
means which congress may deem necessary and proper for that purpose, and beyond this we are not permitted
to inquire. But the true answer to all these objections is that the power exercised in this instance is not the taxing
power. The burden imposed on the ship-owner by this statute is the mere incident of the regulation of
commerce-of that branch of foreign commerce which is involved in immigration. x x x

It is true, not much is said about protecting the ship-owner. But he is the man who reaps the profit from the
transaction, who has the means to protect himself, and knows well how to do it, and whose obligations in the
premises need the aid of the statute for their enforcement. The sum demanded of him is not, therefore,
strictly speaking, a tax or duty within the meaning of the constitution. The money thus raised, though
paid into the treasury, is appropriated in advance to the uses of the statute, and does not go to the general
support of the government.71 x x x
The same situation obtains in the present case. The 10-centavo impost is collected from the covered owners and
operators, taking into consideration their use of the country's waters and the exposure of this natural resource to
a risk of grave and irreparable damage brought about by said use. Moreover, the amounts collected are to be
used solely for the identified items in the assailed law and only for the furtherance of the declared purposes of
the statute. As stated by the Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc in Teter v. Clark County:72
x x x In Craig v. Macon, 543 S.W.2d 772 (Mo. 1976), the court held valid the charges imposed by the city for
solid waste disposal, even though appellants did not have their garbage removed by the city and thus obtained
no "service". The Missouri Supreme Court held that the statute under which the city acted was a public health
regulation, intended to protect the entire population. As a police power measure, the statute enabled the city
to take whatever measures were reasonably required to meet the public health needs. The charges were
only incidental to the regulatory scheme: the payments went only toward the costs of that program; none
of the money went into general revenue. Thus, because the money was collected for a specific purpose (to
pay the cost of a public health program) the charge was deemed valid. x x x In Hobbs, the city enacted a
garbage collection ordinance and charged property owners for collection; appellant property owners did not use
the city's service. There the court held that a due process violation did not exist because the ordinance is a
health measure and the charges are not merely for the specific act of garbage removal, but to defray the
expenses of the entire program. Further, appellants received a general benefit from the removal of others'
garbage the control of insects, etc.73
The collection of administrative charges and fees on vessels is not new. To name a few, reference may be made
to RA 137174 which imposes upon owners and operators of vessels various charges and fees for the use of
Philippine ports, among others.75

Through the imposition in Section 22 of RA 9483, Congress did not just direct the protection of the country's
marine resource, it also promoted the constitutionally-protected right of the people to balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature76 and the basic and constitutional right to health.77 On
the basis thereof, it can be said that the questioned imposition is an exercise of police power by the State.

Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish wholesome and
reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, not repugnant to the Constitution, for the good and welfare of the
people.78 This power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, education, good order or safety, and
general welfare of the people flows from the recognition that salus populi est suprema lex-the welfare of the
people is the supreme law.79

The creation of the OPMF is, thus, not a burdensome cross that the respondents have to bear. Rather, it is an
opportunity for them to have an important role in the protection of the environment which they navigate and
directly utilize in the conduct of their business. It is but proper and timely to remind respondents that the
conduct of a business is mere. privilege which is subject to the regulatory authority of the State. Property rights
may be interfered with, especially if it is for the furtherance of the common good. few business adjustments and
sacrifices, weighed against the prevention of the possibly irreparable destruction of the country's natural
resources, must necessarily take a back seat. We have the duty to protect our environment for the future
generations, and all must share in this responsibility, including legal entities.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The February 22, 2017 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 216, Quezon City is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The constitutionality and validity of sub-paragraph a, Section 22 of Republic Act No. 9483, as well as Section 1, Rule of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of said law are
hereby UPHELD.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Senior Associate Justice), Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Jardeleza, Caguioa, Martires, Tijam, Reyes, Jr., and Gesmundo, JJ.,
concur.

[G.R. No. L-9659. May 29, 1957.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VALERIANO VALENSOY Y

MASA, Defendant-Appellant.

Rosauro L. Alvarez for Appellant.

Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Assistant Solicitor General Jose G. Bautista for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PROHIBITION AGAINST ENACTMENT OF LAW EMBRACING MORE

THAN ONE SUBJECT, PROSPECTIVE; LAWS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH CONSTITUTION REMAIN
OPERATIVE. — The constitutional provision that "No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more
than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill," has reference to bills henceforth to be enacted
into law and not to a law in force and existing at the time the Constitution was adopted or took effect. It refers to
the procedure to be followed by the Congress in the enactment of laws. As the provisions of section 26 of Act
No. 1780 germane to the subject expressed in the title of the Act was validly enacted under the Organic Law
then in force (Act of Congress of 1 July 1902), it remained operative at the time the Constitution took effect
because it was not inconsistent with the Constitution, pursuant to section 2, Article XVI, of the Constitution.

DECISION

PADILLA, J.:

Valeriano Valensoy y Masa was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with a violation of section 26,
Act No. 1780 (concealment of a bolo, about 9" blade with a leather sheath, a deadly weapon) in criminal case
No. 32068. He moved to quash the information on the ground that as the title of Act No. 1780, to wit: "An Act
to regulate the importation, acquisition, possession, use, and transfer of firearms, and to prohibit the possession
of same except in compliance with the provisions of this Act," does not embrace weapon other than firearms,
the inclusion of section 26 in the said Act outlawing the concealment about one’s person of a bowie knife, dirk,
dagger, kris, or other deadly weapon, violates the constitutional provision that "No bill which may be enacted
into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill." 1 The trial court
denied the motion on the ground that at the time of the enactment of Act No. 1780 the prohibition had reference
to private or local bills only and "that when a law containing a subject- matter not expressed in the title is valid
under existing constitutional provisions when enacted it remains valid thereafter regardless of any change or
amendment in such constitutional provision which would have otherwise rendered the law void had the
amendment or the change existed at the time of the enactment of the bill into law."cralaw virtua1aw library

At the trial the defendant, after consultation with counsel de oficio, admitted the facts alleged in the information
but asserted that he was not guilty of any offense for the reasons already stated. Whereupon, the trial court,
reiterating the grounds relied upon in the order denying the motion to quash, found the defendant guilty as
charged and sentenced him to pay a fine of P10, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
the costs. The defendant has appealed.

At the time of the enactment of Act No. 1780 on 12 October 1907, the constitutional prohibition against the
enactment of bills into law embracing more than one subject not expressed in the title of the bills, referred to
private or local bills only. Section 5 of the Act of Congress of 1 July 1902, the Organic Law then in force, in
part provided —

That no private or local bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject, and that such
shall be expressed in the title of the bill.

Counsel de oficio for the appellant contends that when the Constitution took effect on 8 February 1935
providing that "No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill," Act No. 1780, validly passed under the Act of Congress of 1 July 1902,
became repugnant to, or was repealed by, the Constitution. This constitutional provision has reference to bills
henceforth to be enacted into law and not to a law in force and existing at the time the Constitution was adopted
or took effect. It refers to the procedure to be followed by the Congress in the enactment of laws. The provisions
of section 26 of Act No. 1780 germane to the subject expressed in the title of the Act validly enacted under the
Organic Law then in force (Act of Congress of 1 July 1902) remained operative at the time the Constitution
took effect because it was not inconsistent with the Constitution, pursuant to section 2, Article XVI, of the
Constitution, which provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

All laws of the Philippine Islands shall continue in force until the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines; thereafter, such laws shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution, until
amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the Congress of the Philippines, and all references in such laws to
the Government or officials of the Philippines shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the
Government and corresponding officials under this Constitution.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the Appellant.

Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and
Felix, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. L-32476. October 20, 1970.]

SIMEON G. DEL ROSARIO, Petitioner, v. UBALDO CARBONELL, JAIME N. FERRER, LINO

PATAJO and CESAR MIRAFLOR, Respondents.

Simeon G. del Rosario in his own behalf.

Solicitor General for Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONGRESS, ACTING AS CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY,

NOT SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL INTERFERENCE. — The charge whether Congress abdicated its power as a
constituent body in favor of the Constitutional Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution clearly
ignores Article XV of the Constitution which authorizes Congress to sit as a Constituent Assembly, either to
propose amendments or to call a convention for the purpose. The choice of either alternative is solely
committed to Congress, which cannot be inquired into nor interfered with by the court, the same being purely a
political question.

2. ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTION HANDIWORK OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION; ONCE RATIFIED,

VALID. — Whether the Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the Constitution or
entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an entirely new Constitution based on an ideology
foreign to the democratic system, is of no moment because the same will be submitted to the people for
ratification and, once ratified, there can be no debate about its validity.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; AMENDMENT THERETO; WHAT IT INCLUDES. — The fact that the present Constitution
may be revised and replaced with a new one is no argument against the validity of the Constitutional Comention
law because "amendment" includes the revision or total overhaul of the entire Constitution. Whether the
Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or totally changed would become immaterial the moment the
same is ratified by the people.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUFFICIENCY OF TITLE. — The rule that only one subject shall be embraced in the bill
which shall be expressed in the title thereof, clearly had not been disregarded in the case of the Constitutional
Convention Law. The power to propose amendments to the Constitution is implicit in the call for the convention
itself, whose raison detre is to revise the present Constitution. There is no fraud or surprise perpetrated by the
questioned title on the legislature and the public. It is not required that the title of the bill be an index to the
body of the act or be comprehensive in manners of detail. It is enough that it fairly indicates the general subject
and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act so as not to mislead Congress or the people. All the details
provided for in R.A. No. 6132 are germane to and are comprehended by its title.
DECISION
MAKASIAR, J.:

This petition for declaratory relief was filed pursuant to Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 6132 by petitioner Simeon G. del
Rosario against the National Treasurer as well as the Chairman and members of the Commission on Elections,
praying that the entire R.A. No. 6132 be declared unconstitutional.

The Solicitor General filed his answer to the petition in behalf of respondents.

The petition does not contain sufficient averments as to the particular right of the petitioner that may be affected
by any provision of the law. Assuming as true his allegation — which respondents specifically deny — that he
is a temporary staff writer of the Weekly Nation Magazine, a permanent international Research Officer of the
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization since October 5, 1957 and as such is on home leave and awaiting recall and
re-instatement to his post in Bangkok, Thailand by the Department of Foreign Affairs, the same does not
indicate that he is a prospective candidate or is a member of any political party or any civic, religious,
professional, or labor organization whose rights may be impaired by Sec. 6(A), par. 5 and Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No.
6132, which he challenges as oppressive.

Because he assails the appropriation of twenty-nine million pesos in Sec. 21 of the law as simply a waste of
public funds, because there is no time limit for the duration of the Constitutional Convention, which may
dissipate its time in pointless discussion without reaching any consensus or conclusion and thus degenerate into
a "Debating Club, Unlimited," his interest as a taxpayer on this score to contest the validity of the law may be
sustained.

1. The charge of petitioner that Congress abdicated its power as a constituent body to propose amendments in
favor of the Constitutional Convention, is refuted by Art. XV of the Constitution which authorizes Congress
sitting as a Constituent Assembly either to propose amendments or to call a convention for the purpose. The
choice of either alternative is solely committed to Congress, which cannot be inquired into nor interfered with
by this Tribunal, the same being purely a political question. 1

2. Likewise, whether there is necessity for amending the Constitution is also addressed to the wise judgment of
Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly, against which the Court cannot pit its own judgment.

3. And whether the Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the Constitution or entirely
overhaul the present Constitution and propose an entirely new Constitution based on an ideology foreign to the
democratic system, is of no moment; because the same will be submitted to the people for ratification. Once
ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no debate about the validity of the new Constitution.

4. The fact that the present Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one by the Constitutional
Convention called in Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4, respectively, of 1967 and 1969, because under Sec. 6(A), par. 5,
of the law, a candidate may include a concise statement of his principal constitutional reforms, programs or
policies, is no argument against the validity of the law because "amendment" includes the "revision" or total
overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate, whether the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised
or totally changed would become immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people.

5. This Court, in a decision dated September 11, 1970 in the cases of Imbong v. Ferrer, Et. Al. and Gonzales v.
Ferrer, Et Al., G.R. Nos. L-32432 and L-32443, held that neither R.A. No. 6132 nor its Sections 2, 5 and 8 (a),
paragraph one, can be declared unconstitutional.

6. This Court also sustained the validity of Sec. 4 and the second paragraph of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 in a
decision dated September 3, 1970. 2

7. Petitioner impugns the constitutionality of the title of R.A. No. 6132 as embracing more than one subject and
is therefore violative of paragraph 1, Sec. 21 of Art. VI of the Constitution, simply because it failed to include
the phrase "TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES."

The title of the law reads "An Act Implementing Resolution of Both Houses Numbered Two as Amended by
Resolution of Both Houses Numbered Four of the Congress of the Philippines Calling for a Constitutional
Convention, Providing for Proportional Representation Therein and Other Details Relating to the Election of
Delegates to and the Holding of the Constitutional Convention, Repealing for the Purpose Republic Act Four
Thousand Nine Hundred Fourteen, and for Other Purposes."cralaw virtua1aw library

It is patent from the aforequoted title that the inclusion of the phrase "To propose amendments to the
Constitution of the Philippines" is superfluous and therefore unnecessary; because the very title expressly states
that the act implements Resolutions of Both Houses Nos. 2 and 4, respectively of 1967 and 1969, and both
Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 likewise categorically state in their titles that the Constitutional Convention called for
therein is "to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines," which phrase is reiterated in Sec. 1 of
both Resolutions.

Moreover, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution is implicit in the call for the convention itself,
whose raison d’etre is to revise the present Constitution. Consequently, there is no fraud or surprise that is
perpetrated by the questioned title on the legislature and the public, which is sought to be avoided by the
constitutional requirement that only one subject shall be embraced in the bill which shall be expressed in the
title thereof.

Furthermore, it is not required that the title of the bill be an index to the body of the act or be comprehensive in
matters of detail. It is enough that it fairly indicates the general subject and reasonably covers all the provisions
of the act so as not to mislead Congress or the people. 3 All the details provided for in R.A. No. 6132 are
germane to and are comprehended by its title.

WHEREFORE, the prayer in the petition is hereby denied and R.A. No. 6132 is not unconstitutional. Without
costs.

Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J., Dizon, Makalintal and Castro, JJ., concur.

Zaldivar, J., reserves his vote.

Fernando, J., concurs and dissents in accordance with his separate opinion in Imbong v. Comelec, L-32432 and
Gonzalez v. Comelec, L-32443.

Teehankee, J., concurs on Items 1 to 7, excluding Item 5, and dissents on said Item 5 in accordance with his
separate opinion in Badoy, Jr. v. Ferrer, L-32456 and L-32551, October 17, 1970.

Barredo, J., dissents insofar as Item 5 is concerned and concurs in all other respects.

Villamor, J., concurs in the result.

Concepcion, C.J., is on official leave.

G.R. No. L-24396           July 29, 1968

SANTIAGO P. ALALAYAN, ET AL., suing in his behalf and for the benefit of all other persons having
common or general interest with him in accordance with Sec. 12, Rule 3, Rules of Court, petitioners-
appellants,
vs.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION and ADMINISTRATOR OF ECONOMIC
COORDINATION, respondents-appellees.

Alafriz Law Offices for petitioners-appellants.

The Government Corporate Counsel and Office of the Solicitor General for respondents-appellees.

FERNANDO, J.:

This declaratory relief proceeding was started in the lower court by petitioners, Alalayan and Philippine Power
and Development Company, both franchise holders of electric plants in Laguna, to test the validity of a section
of an amendatory act,1 empowering respondent National Power Corporation "in any contract for the supply of
electric power to a franchise holder," receiving at least 50% of its electric power and energy from it to require as
a condition that such franchise holder "shall not realize a net profit of more than twelve percent annually of its
investments plus two-month operating expenses." Respondent, under such provision, could likewise "renew all
existing contracts with franchise holders for the supply of electric power and energy," so that the provisions of
the Act could be given effect.2 This statutory provision was assailed on the ground that, being a rider, it is
violative of the constitutional provision requiring that a bill, which may be enacted into law, cannot embrace
more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title, 3 as well as the due process guarantee, the liberty to
contract of petitioners being infringed upon. The lower court sustained its validity. We sustain the lower court
in this appeal.

In the petition for declaratory relief, after the usual allegations as to parties, it was stated that respondent
National Power Corporation "has for some years now been, and still is, by virtue of similar, valid and existing
contracts entered into by it with one hundred and thirty seven (137) natural persons and corporations distributed
all over the country, supplying, distributing, servicing and selling electric power and energy at fixed rites
schedules to the latter who have for some years now been and still are, legally engaged in resupplying,
redistributing, reservicing and reselling the said electric power and energy to individual customers within the
coverage of their respective franchises."4 Petitioners are included among the said 197 natural persons and
entities.5 Then, reference was made to the particular contracts petitioners entered into with respondent, the
contracts to continue indefinitely unless and until either party would give to the other two years previous notice
in writing of its intention to terminate the same. 6 After which, it was noted that on June 18, 1960, an act
authorizing the increase of the capital stock of the National Power Corporation to P100 million took effect. 7 A
year later, on June 17, 1961, it was alleged that the challenged legislation became a law, purportedly to increase
further the authorized capital stock, but including the alleged rider referred to above, which, in the opinion of
petitioners, transgressed the constitutional provision on the subject matter and title of bills as well as the due
process clause.8 Mention was then made of the National Power Corporation approving a rate increase of at least
17.5%, the effectivity of which, was at first deferred to November 1, 1962, then subsequently to January 15,
1963, with the threat that in case petitioners would fail to sign the revised contract providing for the increased
rate, respondent National Power Corporation would then cease "to supply, distribute and service electric power
and energy to them."9

That would be, in the opinion of petitioners, violative of their rights, proceeding from legislation suffering from
constitutional infirmities.10 A declaration of unconstitutionality was therefore sought by them. It was prayed:
"(1) To give due course to this petition; (2) To issue a writ of preliminary injunction, upon the posting of the
requisite bond, enjoining respondent NPC from carrying or prosecuting its threat to enforce the provisions of
the rider or Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3043 ... in the manner stated in paragraph 18 of this petition until this
Honorable Court shall have finally decided or disposed, by final judgment, of the issues raised in this petition;
(3) After due hearing, to declare the rider or Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3043 null and void for being illegal
and unconstitutional, and to issue a permanent injunction requiring respondent NPC to refrain from enforcing or
implementing the provisions of the same law."11

Soon after, petitioner Philippine Power and Development Company moved that insofar as it was concerned, the
case be dismissed, which motion was granted by the lower court on January 25, 1963. 12 The sole petitioner is
therefore Santiago P. Alalayan, suing in his behalf and for the benefit of all other persons having common or
general interest with him. Respondent National Power Corporation filed an opposition on February 15, 1963,
opposing the issuance of a writ for preliminary injunction. 13 On March 21, 1963, the lower court, considering
that there was "no sufficient ground for the issuance of the writ for preliminary injunction," denied the same.14

There was in the answer, dated March 29, 1963, an admission of the main facts alleged, with a denial of the
legal conclusion which petitioner would deduce therefrom, respondent National Power Corporation upholding
the validity of the challenged provision. Then, came a partial stipulation of facts submitted on October 1, 1964,
consisting of a resolution of the Philippine Electric Plant Owners Association to take the necessary steps to stop
respondent National Power Corporation from enforcing its announced increase, samples of contracts between
electric plant operators on the one hand and respondent National Power Corporation on the other, the contract
with petitioner Alalayan, dated May 26, 1956, showing that he did purchase and take power and energy as
follows: "Sixty (60) kilowatts and of not less than 140,000 kilowatt-hours in any contract year at the rate of
P120.00 per kilowatt per year" payable in twelve equal monthly installments, "plus an energy charge of P0.013
per kilowatt hour, payable on the basis of monthly delivery"; a letter of June 22, 1962 of respondent National
Power Corporation to petitioner approving his 17.5% rate increase of power so that beginning July 1, 1962, the
demand charge would be P10.00 per kilowatt per month and the energy charge would be P0.02 per kilowatt
hour; a letter of August 15, 1962, wherein respondent National Power Corporation notified petitioner that it
deferred the effectivity of the new rates, but it will be enforced on November 1, 1962; a letter of June 25, 1963
enforcing respondent National Power Corporation deferring once again the effectivity of the new rates until
January 1, 1964; as well as the congressional transcripts on House Bill No. 5377 and Senate Bill No. 613, now
Republic Act No. 3043.15

In an order of November 5, 1964, the lower court gave the parties a period of twenty days within which to
submit simultaneously their respective memoranda. After the submission thereof, the lower court, in a decision
of January 30, 1965, sustained the validity and constitutionality of the challenged provision. Hence, this appeal.

As was set forth earlier, this appeal cannot prosper. We share the view of the lower court that the provision in
question cannot be impugned either on the ground of its being violative of the constitutional requirement that a
bill cannot embrace more than one subject to be expressed in its title or by virtue of its alleged failure to satisfy
the due process criterion.

1. We consider first the objection that the statute in question is violative of the constitutional provision that no
bill "which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in [its]
title ... "16 This provision is similar to those found in many American State Constitutions. It is aimed against the
evils of the so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as well as surreptitious or unconsidered
enactments.17 Where the subject of a bill is limited to a particular matter, the lawmakers along with the people
should be informed of the subject of proposed legislative measures. This constitutional provision thus precludes
the insertion of riders in legislation, a rider being a provision not germane to the subject matter of the bill.
Petitioner Alalayan asserts that the provision objected to is such a rider.

To lend approval to such a plea is to construe the above constitutional provision as to cripple or impede proper
legislation. To impart to it a meaning which is reasonable and not unduly technical, it must be deemed sufficient
that the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect
without expressing each and every end and means necessary for its accomplishment. Thus, mere details need
not be set forth. The legislature is not required to make the title of the act a complete index of its contents. The
provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating to its subject finding expression in its title. 18 More
specifically, if the law amends a section or part of a statute, it suffices if reference be made to the legislation to
be amended, there being no need to state the precise nature of the amendment.19

It was in 1938, in Government v. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank,20 where, for the first time after the inauguration
of the Commonwealth, this Court passed upon a provision of that character. We held there that the
Reorganization Law,21 providing for the mode in which the total annual expenses of the Bureau of Banking
could be reimbursed through assessment levied upon all banking institutions subject to inspection by the Bank
Commissioner was not violative of such a requirement in the Jones Law, the previous organic act. Justice
Laurel, however, vigorously dissented, his view being that while the main subject of the act was reorganization,
the provision assailed did not deal with reorganization but with taxation. This case of Government v. Hongkong
& Shanghai Bank was decided by a bare majority of four justices against three. Thereafter, it would appear that
the constitutional requirement is to be given the liberal test as indicated in the majority opinion penned by
Justice Abad Santos, and not the strict test as desired by the minority headed by Justice Laurel.
Such a trend is made manifest in the cases beginning with Sumulong v. Commission on Elections, 22 up to and
including Felwa v. Salas,23 a 1966 decision, the opinion coming from Chief Justice Concepcion. There is
nothing in Lidasan v. Commission on Elections, 24 where a statute25 was annulled on this ground, to indicate the
contrary. As aptly expressed by Justice Sanchez: "Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to
employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the
contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional
demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the
nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the
body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud
upon the legislators."

We thus hold that there is no violation of the constitutional provision which requires that any bill enacted into
law shall embrace only one subject to be expressed in the title thereof.

2. Nor is petitioner anymore successful in his plea for the nullification of the challenged provision on the
ground of his being deprived of the liberty to contract without due process of law.

It is to be admitted of course that property rights find shelter in specific constitutional provisions, one of which
is the due process clause. It is equally certain that our fundamental law framed at a time of "surging unrest and
dissatisfaction",26 when there was the fear expressed in many quarters that a constitutional democracy, in view
of its commitment to the claims of property, would not be able to cope effectively with the problems of poverty
and misery that unfortunately afflict so many of our people, is not susceptible to the indictment that the
government therein established is impotent to take the necessary remedial measures. The framers saw to that.
The welfare state concept is not alien to the philosophy of our Constitution. 27 It is implicit in quite a few of its
provisions. It suffices to mention two.

There is the clause on the promotion of social justice to ensure the well-being and economic security of all the
people,28 as well as the pledge of protection to labor with the specific authority to regulate the relations between
landowners and tenants and between labor and capital. 29 This particularized reference to the rights of working
men whether in industry and agriculture certainly cannot preclude attention to and concern for the rights of
consumers, who are the objects of solicitude in the legislation now complained of. The police power as an
attribute to promote the common weal would be diluted considerably of its reach and effectiveness if on the
mere plea that the liberty to contract would be restricted, the statute complained of may be characterized as a
denial of due process. The right to property cannot be pressed to such an unreasonable extreme.

It is understandable though why business enterprises, not unnaturally evincing lack of enthusiasm for police
power legislation that affect them adversely and restrict their profits could predicate alleged violation of their
rights on the due process clause, which as interpreted by them is a bar to regulatory measures. Invariably, the
response from this Court, from the time the Constitution was enacted, has been far from sympathetic. Thus,
during the Commonwealth, we sustained legislation providing for collective bargaining, 30 security of
tenure,31 minimum wages,32 compulsory arbitration,33 and tenancy regulation.34 Neither did the objections as to
the validity of measures regulating the issuance of securities35 and public services36 prevail.

For it is to be remembered that the liberty relied upon is not freedom of the mind, which occupies a preferred
position, nor freedom of the person, but the liberty to contract, associated with business activities, which, as has
been so repeatedly announced, may be subjected, in the interest of the general welfare under the police power,
to restrictions varied in character and wide ranging in scope as long as due process is observed. In Calalang v.
Williams,37 this Court found no objection to an enactment limiting the use of and traffic in the national roads
and streets as against the assertion that the exercise of such an authority amounted to an unlawful interference
with legitimate business and abridgment of personal liberty. The opinion by Justice Laurel explains why such
an argument was far from persuasive. Thus: "In enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was
prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion
of traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the
enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty,
with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of
restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state ... " 38 The above
doctrine, valid then and equally valid now, constituted more than sufficient justification for statutes curtailing
the liberty enjoyed by business enterprises, whether conducted by natural or juridical persons, to satisfy the
needs of public welfare.

So it continues to be under the Republic. This Court has invariably given the seal of approval to statutes
intended to improve the lot of tenants,39 who thereafter were given the option to transform their relationship
with landowners to one of lease, which grant of authority was sustained in 1964. 40 Retail trade was nationalized,
the measure receiving judicial approval as against due process objection, 41 a decision foreshadowed earlier with
the favorable action taken on legislation granting preference to Filipino citizens in the lease of public market
stalls.42 It is easily understandable why the regulation of practice of medicine; 43 limitation of the hours of
labor;44 imposition of price control;45 requirement of separation pay for one month 46 as well as a social security
scheme47 cannot be impugned as unconstitutional. While not exhaustive, the above decisions manifest in no
certain terms the inherent difficulty of assailing regulatory legislation based on alleged denial of due process.

It would thus appear that unless this Court is prepared to overturn a doctrine so firmly adhered to in a number of
cases notable for the unanimity of their response to an objection similar to the one here raised, petitioner
Alalayan cannot prevail. Certainly, this Court is not prepared to take that step. For in the face of a constitutional
provision that allows deprivation of liberty, including liberty of contract, as long as due process is observed, the
alleged nullity of a legislative act of this character can only be shown if in fact there is such a denial. The
relevant question then is, what does due process require?

The holding of this Court in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Asso. v. City Mayor,48 sheds some light.
Thus: "There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which
governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate
case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and as substantive
requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any governmental action for that matter, from the imputation of
legal infirmity sufficient to spell its doom? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the
dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process
requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer
oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly has it
been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play. It exacts
fealty "to those strivings for justice" and judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch "in the light of reason
drawn from considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and political thought." It is not
a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances," decisions
based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society."
Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrases." .

The due process objection is sought to be bolstered by an allegation that such power conferred in the challenged
legislation to limit the net profits to "12% annually of [petitioner's] investments plus two-month operating
expenses" has a confiscatory aspect. This argument has the ring of futility. Precisely, in Manila Electric Co. v.
Public Service Commission,49 this Court in an opinion by the present Chief Justice upheld such a figure as
against the contention that it was rather too generous to the public utility. To speak of it as confiscatory then is
to employ the language by hyperbole. Moreover, in the absence any evidence to demonstrate the alleged
confiscatory effect of the provision in question, there would be no basis for its nullification, in view of the well-
known presumption of validity that every statute has in its favor.50

In the light of the above, there is thus clearly no occasion for yielding assent to the claim of petitioner that the
legislation assailed contravenes the due process clause. 1äwphï1.ñët
3. While not explicitly avowed by petitioner, there is the intimation that to apply the challenged legislation to
contracts then in existence would be an infringement of the constitutional prohibition against any law impairing
the obligation of contracts.51 No such fear need be entertained. A citation from a 1940 decision of this Court,
in Pangasinan Transportation Co. v. Public Service Commission,52 is particularly relevant. In the language of
Justice Laurel, speaking for the Court: "Upon the other hand, statutes enacted for the regulation of public
utilities, being a proper exercise by the state of its police power, are applicable not only to those public utilities
coming into existence after its passage, but likewise to those already, existence established and in
operation."53 Such a doctrine was followed in the case of a tenancy legislation, the Congress undoubtedly
having in mind and not having failed to take notice "of the existence of contracts" which stipulated a division of
the crops on a 50-50 basis and therefore must have intended to regulate the same. There was thus no impairment
of an obligation of contract, such an enactment under the police power being remedial in nature, the non-
applicability of which to existing conditions would be self-defeating in character.54

In Abe v. Foster Wheeler Corp.,55 Justice Barrera, speaking for the Court, took note of the contention "that as
the contracts of employment were entered into at a time when there was no law granting the workers said right,
the application as to them of the subsequent enactment restoring the same right constitutes an impairment of
their contractual obligations." Then he, made clear why the Court was of a contrary view as, "the constitutional
guaranty of non-impairment ... is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of
public health, safe, morals and general welfare." Thus was reaffirmed what previously had been announced as
the rule. Such a doctrine was reiterated early this year in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. v. Auditor
General,56 where this Court found no objection to the applicability of the Margin Law,57 even if it be assumed
that a reinsurance treaty was already in existence and had imposed the corresponding obligation on the parties
prior to its enactment.

This is not to say that in each and every case the invocation of the protection of the non-impairment clause
would be unavailing once the legislation complained of is shown to be an exercise of the police power.
Otherwise, that would render nugatory the constitutional guarantee of non-impairment, and for that matter both
the equal protection and due process clauses which equally serve to protect property rights. Here, as in other
cases where governmental authority may trench upon property rights, the process of balancing, adjustment or
harmonization is called for.

Rutter v. Esteban58 lends support to such an approach. In that leading case, the continued operation and
enforcement of the Moratorium Act59 which allowed an eight-year period of grace for the payment of pre-war
obligations on the part of debtors who suffered as a consequence of World War II was, in a 1953 decision, held
"unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute longer" for being violative of the
constitutional provision prohibiting the impairment of the obligation of the contracts "and, therefore, ... should
be declared null and void and without effect."60 As of the date of its enactment in 1948, the police power could
be relied upon to sustain its validity, in view of the serious economic condition faced by the country upon
liberation and the state of penury that then afflicted a greater portion of the Filipino people. By 1953 however,
the Moratorium Act could be rightfully considered as an infringement of the non-impairment clause, as the
economy had in the meanwhile considerably changed for the better.

There is no clearer instance then of the process of harmonization and balancing which is incumbent upon the
judiciary to undertake whenever a regulatory measure under the police power is assailed as violative of
constitucess or equal protection, all of which are intended to safeguard property rights. Three leading decisions
of the United States Supreme Court, Home Building & Loan Astional guarantees, whether of non-impairment,
due prosociation v. Blaisdell,61 Nebbia v. New York,62 and Norman v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., 63 speak
similarly.

Even if, therefore, reliance be had on the non-impairment clause by petitioner and the process of adjustment or
harmonization be undertaken to ascertain whether the applicability of the statutory provision assailed to existing
contracts would run counter to such a guarantee, still the same conclusion emerges. There is a failure to make
out a case for its invalidity.

WHEREFORE, there being no showing that Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3043 is unconstitutional, the
decision of the lower court, dismissing the petition, is affirmed. With costs against petitioner Alalayan.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ., c

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR

BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN
VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA
CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his
capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article
IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be
published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to
compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders.

Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:

a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286,
298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445,
447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731,
733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165,
1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826,
1829-1840, 1842-1847.

b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161,
173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239,
241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303,
309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405,
438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609,
610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940,
964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.

c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.

d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535,
1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-
1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754,
1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826,
1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866,
1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984,
1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.

e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510,
522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594,
598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.

f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95,
107, 120, 122, 123.

g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that
petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the
absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-
publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality
to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:

SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
 office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to
Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason
of the wrongful acts of the defendant.

Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its
object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition
to be given due course.

The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor
General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private
individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some
particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the
public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs.
Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the object of the
mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest
and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special
interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the
laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].

Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the
mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the position of
municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent
said:

We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the
relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be
enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable
to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular
case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the particular
circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance
upon the rule may well lead to error'

No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the
respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the United
States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other person could
be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and
represent the people in cases of this character.

The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case
apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public
right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this
proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the
Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his
appearance for respondents in this case.

Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the
effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that
since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect,
publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on
Article 2 of the Civil Code:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in
the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...

The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long line
of decisions,4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the
legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for
determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law
itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.

Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the
fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is
easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even
if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as
follows:

Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and
resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and
administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3]
decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be
deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or classes
of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of
documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general
applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws
which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be
no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not
even a constructive one.

Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital
significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed
solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in
the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records—no such publicity
accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of
knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing
themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la
denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones,
Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad.5

The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official
Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty
must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be
given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette.
Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or
excluded from such publication.

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by
law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or
otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other
presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and
executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6

It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he
must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in  Peralta
vs. COMELEC 7:

In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law
of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette
as the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders
and instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published,
shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling
effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were
published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's declaration
of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is
all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth
in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to
be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no
duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118
U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however,
that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken
with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to
invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct,
private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior
determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light
of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These
questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state
and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban  9 sustained the right of a party under the
Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by this
Court.

Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official
Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute
retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."

From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought
by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive,
1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of
these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it
is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government.
In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to
apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons
affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the
manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations
of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication,
even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding
force and effect.

SO ORDERED.

Relova, J., concurs.

Aquino, J., took no part.

Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.

Separate Opinion

FERNANDO, C.J.,  concurring (with qualification):

There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of Justice
Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of
publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and effect.

I shall explain why.

1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if made to apply
adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act having the force
and effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From
the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It
does not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute,
presidential decree or any other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and effect.
To so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the
interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in
the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is
true that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to
my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to
be impressed with binding force or effectivity.

2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets
forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does
not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It
may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can
be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process
clause is not that precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the
majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be
bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that
such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. 2
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government "must be
ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere
futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus
essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be
sure once published therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still
for me that does not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive
acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted
themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of publication
in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous transactions based on such "Presidential
Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to
hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is
made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil
cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of
arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued under the police
power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There must still
be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In
traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application. That is as far as it
goes.

4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication is
essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in agreement with
the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly
recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication
in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is
itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a
constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally
provide for a different rule.

5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential decrees
and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal character.
That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences.
I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.

I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this separate
opinion.

Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

TEEHANKEE, J.,  concurring:

I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The
Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal application to all
similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has
consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be
informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its
violation,1 citing the settled principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is
bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and
the people officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revised
Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil
Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and official
repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.

Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which are silent as
to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable.
The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different
effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published
pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code
itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such
publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity
and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify
and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the Official
Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law
itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by the Civil
Code for its proper dissemination.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be
published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date of effectivity is
mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the
Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned
in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights
or shall destroy vested rights.

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike
some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws
to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the
Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official
Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their
effectivity date.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided  " Two things may be said of this
provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect.
Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its
effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published
elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.

Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their effectivity, laws
must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the Uniform
Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of
the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of
the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette,
among them, "important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines"
and "all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It
is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only
"important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the Official
Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the
same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638,
cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when and
how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role.

In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no
person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar
as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.

Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:

I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such publication being in
the Official Gazette.

DE LA FUENTE, J.,  concurring:

I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or general
applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J.,  concurring (with qualification):

There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of Justice
Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of
publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and effect.

I shall explain why.

1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if made to apply
adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act having the force
and effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From
the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It
does not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute,
presidential decree or any other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and effect.
To so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the
interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in
the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is
true that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to
my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to
be impressed with binding force or effectivity.

2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets
forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does
not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It
may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can
be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process
clause is not that precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the
majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be
bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that
such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. 2

3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government "must be
ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere
futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus
essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be
sure once published therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still
for me that does not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive
acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted
themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of publication
in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous transactions based on such "Presidential
Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to
hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is
made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil
cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of
arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued under the police
power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There must still
be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In
traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application. That is as far as it
goes.

4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication is
essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in agreement with
the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly
recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication
in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is
itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a
constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally
provide for a different rule.

5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential decrees
and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal character.
That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences.
I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.

I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this separate
opinion.

Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

TEEHANKEE, J.,  concurring:

I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The
Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal application to all
similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has
consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be
informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its
violation,1 citing the settled principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is
bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and
the people officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.

Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revised
Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil
Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and official
repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.

Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which are silent as
to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable.
The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different
effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published
pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code
itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such
publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity
and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify
and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the Official
Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law
itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by the Civil
Code for its proper dissemination.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be
published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date of effectivity is
mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the
Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned
in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights
or shall destroy vested rights.

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike
some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws
to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the
Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official
Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their
effectivity date.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided  " Two things may be said of this
provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect.
Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its
effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published
elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their effectivity, laws
must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the Uniform
Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of
the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of
the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette,
among them, "important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines"
and "all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It
is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only
"important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the Official
Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the
same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638,
cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when and
how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role.

In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no
person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar
as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.

Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:

I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such publication being in
the Official Gazette.

DE LA FUENTE, J.,  concurring:

I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or general
applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.

[G.R. No. L-63915. December 29, 1986.]

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR

BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), Petitioners, v. HON. JUAN C.
TUVERA. in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his
capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET
AL., Respondents.

SYLLABUS
FERNAN, J., concurring:
1. CIVIL LAW; EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS; ARTICLE 2, CIVIL CODE; PUBLICATION OF
LAWS MADE TO ENSURE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND TO INFORMATION.
— The categorical statement by this Court on the need for publication before any law be made effective seeks
to prevent abuses on the part if the lawmakers and, at the time, ensure to the people their constitutional right to
due process and to information on matter of public concern.

RESOLUTION

CRUZ, J.:

Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure or a number of presidential decrees
which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The government argued that while publication
was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves
declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this case on
April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the
dispositive portion as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish to the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding
force and effect."

The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for reconsideration/clarification of that decision. 1
Specifically, they ask the following questions:

1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability" ?

2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not?

3. What is meant by "publication" ?

4. Where is the publication to be made?

5. When is the publication to be made?

Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general
applicability and those which are not; that publication means complete publication; and that the publication
must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette. 2

In the Comment 3 required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motion was a request for an
advisory opinion and should therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits, that the clause "unless it is otherwise
provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative;
that publication, when necessary, did not have to be made in the Official Gazette; and that in any case the
subject decision was concurred in only by three justices and consequently not binding. This elicited a Reply 4
refuting these arguments. Came next the February Revolution and the Court required the new Solicitor General
to file a Rejoinder in view of the supervening events, under Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of Court.
Responding, he submitted that issuances intended only for the interval administration of a government agency
or for particular persons did not have to be published; that publication when necessary must be in full and in the
Official Gazette; and that, however, the decision under reconsideration was not binding because it was not
supported by eight members of this Court. 5

The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:

"ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication."

After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original petition and on
the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion, and so hold, that the clause "unless it is otherwise
provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any
event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon
approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-
day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his
separate concurrence in the original decision, 6 is the Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen
days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule did not
apply because it was "otherwise provided."

It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason
is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that
are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could validly provide that a law shall become effective
immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period
after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and they would
be so not because of a failure to comply with it but simply because they did not know of its existence.
Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal
measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before
they can begin to operate.

We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of course presupposes
that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at all. It is no less important
to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially, the legislative enactments of
the government.

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all
laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law
granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant
naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does
not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of
the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In
fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation
or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it
might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date
is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise
of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly
conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to
enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called
letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by
their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the
national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be
published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him from
certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are
meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to
enforce.

However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare on the
case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a government agency on
the assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal
ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code.

We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public
of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the
presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date
of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This
is not even substantial compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act
for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and interest, was "published" by the
Marcos administration. 7 The evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.

Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were categorically for publication in the
Official Gazette 8 and that six others felt that publication could be made elsewhere as long as the people were
sufficiently informed. 9 One reserved his vote 10 and another merely acknowledged the need for due
publication without indicating where it should be made, 11 It is therefore necessary for the present membership
of this Court to arrive at a clear consensus on this matter and to lay down a binding decision supported by the
necessary vote.

There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official Gazette, considering
its erratic releases and limited readership. Undoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation could better perform
the function of communicating the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider
readership, and come out regularly. The trouble, though, is that this kind of publication is not the one required
or authorized by existing law. As far as we know, no amendment has been made of Article 2 of the Civil Code.
The Solicitor General has not pointed to such a law, and we have no information that it exists. If it does, it
obviously has not yet been published.

At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if we find it
impractical. That is not our function. That function belongs to the legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and
apply the law as conceived and approved by the political departments of the government in accordance with the
prescribed procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code,
the publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their
effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after a different period provided by the legislature.
We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible, to give effect to the
law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that possibility, of course, although not suggested by the parties that
a law could be rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to cause its
publication as required. This is a matter, however, that we do not need to examine at this time.

Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is a request for an advisory opinion is
untenable, to say the least, and deserves no further comment.

The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once again an open society, with all
the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and available always to public cognizance. This has to be
so if our country is to remain democratic, with sovereignty residing in the people and all government authority
emanating from them.

Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority to review the work of their
delegates and to ratify or reject it according to their lights, through their freedom of expression and their right of
suffrage. This they cannot do if the acts of the legislature are concealed.

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark,
deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their
existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper
notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless the naked
blade is drawn.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their approval, or as
soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen
days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the
Civil Code.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr ., and Paras, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

FERNAN, J., concurring:
While concurring in the Court’s opinion penned by my distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, I
would like to add a few observations. Even as a Member of the defunct Batasang Pambansa, I took a strong
stand against the insidious manner by which the previous dispensation had promulgated and made effective
thousands of decrees, executive orders, letters of instructions, etc. Never has the law-making power which
traditionally belongs to the legislature been used and abused to satisfy the whims and caprices of a one-man
legislative mill as it happened in the past regime. Thus, in those days, it was not surprising to witness the sad
spectacle of two presidential decrees bearing the same number, although covering two different subject matters.
In point is the case of two presidential decrees bearing number 1686 issued on March 19, 1980, one granting
Philippine citizenship to Michael M. Keon, the then President’s nephew and the other imposing a tax on every
motor vehicle equipped with air-conditioner. This was further exacerbated by the issuance of PD No. 1686-A
also on March 19, 1980 granting Philippine citizenship to basketball players Jeffrey Moore and Dennis George
Still.
The categorical statement by this Court on the need for publication before any law may be made effective seeks
to prevent abuses on the part of the lawmakers and, at the same time, ensures to the people their constitutional
right to due process and to information on matters of public concern.
FELICIANO, J., concurring:

I agree entirely with the opinion of the court so eloquently written by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz. At the same
time, I wish to add a few statements to reflect my understanding of what the Court is saying.
A statute which by its terms provides for its coming into effect immediately upon approval thereof, is properly
interpreted as coming into effect immediately upon publication thereof in the Official Gazette as provided in
Article 2 of the Civil Code. Such statute, in other words, should not be regarded as purporting literally to come
into effect immediately upon its approval or enactment and without need of publication. For so to interpret such
statute would be to collide with the constitutional obstacle posed by the due process clause. The enforcement of
prescriptions which are both unknown to and unknowable by those subjected to the statute, has been throughout
history a common tool of tyrannical governments. Such application and enforcement constitutes at bottom a
negation of the fundamental principle of legality in the relations between a government and its people.

At the same time, it is clear that the requirement of publication of a statute in the Official Gazette, as
distinguished from any other medium such as a newspaper of general circulation, is embodied in a statutory
norm and is not a constitutional command. The statutory norm is set out in Article 2 of the Civil Code and is
supported and reinforced by Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 638 and Section 35 of the Revised
Administrative Code. A specification of the Official Gazette as the prescribed medium of publication may
therefore be changed. Article 2 of the Civil Code could, without creating a constitutional problem, be amended
by a subsequent statute providing, for instance, for publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper
of general circulation in the country. Until such an amendatory statute is in fact enacted, Article 2 of the Civil
Code must be obeyed and publication effected in the Official Gazette and not in any other medium.

[G.R. No. 14019. July 26, 1919. ]

JOSE AYSON and PEDRO IGNACIO, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF RIZAL

and THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF NAVOTAS, Defendants-Appellees.

Antonio V. Herrero for Appellants.

 Assistant Attorney-General Lacson for Appellees.

SYLLABUS

1. PUBLIC CORPORATIONS; FISHING IN PUBLIC WATERS; SECTION 2270 OF THE

ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1916, NOW SECTION 2324 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1917,
VALIDITY. — Section 2270 of the Administrative Code of 1916, now Section 2324 of the Administrative
Code of 1917, reads as follows: "Where a municipal council has not granted the exclusive privilege of fishery in
municipal waters, it may impose a license tax upon the privilege of taking fish in such waters with nets, traps, or
other fishing tackle; but no such license shall confer an exclusive right of fishery." Held: That this section is
valid.

2. ID.; ID.; ID. — The Philippine Legislature has power to change those provisions of the Civil Code and the
Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 186 6, which concern the use of public waters.

3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SUBJECT AND TITLE OF BILLS; ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1916. —

The Administrative Code of 1916 does not violate that portion of the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of
July 1, 1902, providing "that no private or local bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than
one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill," for the Administrative Code of 1916 is
neither a private nor a local bill.

4. ID.; ID.; ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1917. — The Administrative Code of 1917, having for its title, "An
Act amending the Administrative Code," does not violate that portion of the Jones Law, the Act of Congress of
August 29, 1916, providing "that no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject
and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill," for it was merely a revision of the provisions of the
Administrative Code, enacted for the purpose of adapting it to the Jones Law and the Reorganization Act.

5. ID.; ID.; ID. — It is a general rule that proper codifications and revisions of the statutes do not offend against
the constitutional provision.

DECISION

MALCOLM, J. :

The sole assignment of error on which appellants rest their case is that Section 2270 of the Administrative Code
of 1916, now Section 2324 of the Administrative Code of 1917, is invalid.
On September 17, 1916, the municipal council of Navotas Rizal, adopted its ordinance No. 13, Section 2 of
which provided that "all owners and proprietors of the industry known as fishing, with nets denominated
’cuakit’ and ’pantukos,’ before engaging in fishing in the bay of this jurisdiction within three leagues from the
shore-line of this municipality, are obliged to provide themselves with a license issued by this municipal
government, after payment of a fee of P50 annually, payable every three months." At that time, Section 2270 of
the Administrative Code of 1916 was in force. Said section, authority for the enactment of such an ordinance as
that passed by the municipal council, reads as follows:
"Where a municipal council has not granted the exclusive privilege of fishery in municipal waters, it may
impose a license tax upon the privilege of taking fish in such waters with nets, traps, or other fishing tackle; but
no such license shall confer an exclusive right of fishery."
The argument of appellants intended to demonstrate their thesis that this section is invalid is truly remarkable.
In substance, they say that since the use of the public waters has been covered by provisions of the Civil Code,
and the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, the Legislature is without power to change these provisions.
No organic law prohibits the Philippine Legislature from amending or repealing any portion of Philippine law,
especially that relied upon by appellants, appearing in Articles 344 and 425 of the Civil Code, and in the Law of
Waters. The public waters are for the use of the citizens under such restrictions as the state, pursuant to its
police power, shall see fit to impose.
Appellant further contends that Section 2270 of the Administrative Code of 1916, now Section 2324 of the
existing Administrative Code, is unconstitutional because the Administrative Code embraces more than one
subject. It would, certainly, require much more convincing argument than that now presented, for us to nullify
either the Administrative Code of 1916, or its successor of the following year, because of its noncompliance
with the organic law. As a matter of fact, the argument is absolutely untenable.
When the Administrative Code of 1916 went into effect, the Philippine Bill was controlling. Paragraph 17,
Section 5, of this Act of Congress, provided "that no private or local bill which may be enacted into law shall
embrace more than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill." But the
Administrative Code of 1916 is neither a private nor a local bill. The Administrative Code of 1917 has for its
title, "An Act amending the Administrative Code." When this code went into effect, paragraph 17, Section 3 of
the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, was controlling. This paragraph provide "that no bill which may be
enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill."
That restrictive provision of the Jones Law might be broad enough to include the Administrative Code of 1917.
Nevertheless, in this instance, it could have no disastrous effect, since it is a general rule that proper
codifications and revisions of the statutes do not offend against the constitutional provision. The Administrative
Code last in point of time was merely a revision of the previous Administrative Code enacted for the purpose of
adapting it to the Jones Law and the Reorganization Act. Finally, the very denomination "Code" is sufficient to
put one on his guard, while in an Administrative Code one should naturally expect to find provision made for
municipal government.

We hold Section 2270 of the Administrative Code of 1916, now Section 2324 of the Administrative Code of
1917, to be valid.
The judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal of September 11, 1917, denying the petition for a
preliminary injunction and absolving the defendants from the complaint without special findings as to costs, is
affirmed, with costs of this instance against the appellants. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Araullo, Street, Avanceña and Moir, JJ., concur.