G.R. No.

111141 March 6, 1998 287 SCRA 102

MARIO Z. TITONG, petitioner, 
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (4th Division), VICTORICO LAURIO and ANGELES LAURIO, respondents.

FACTS:
The case originated from an action for quieting of  title  over  a  20, 000  hectares  parcel  of land filed by Mario Titong. 
Petitioner alleges that he is the owner of an unregistered parcel of land with an area of 3.2800 hectares.
He claims that private respondents, with their hired laborers, forcibly entered a portion of the land containing an area of
approximately two (2) hectares; and began plowing the same under pretext of ownership.
Private respondents denied this allegation, and averred that the disputed property formed part of the 5.5-hectare
agricultural land which they had purchased from their predecessor-in-interest, Pablo Espinosa on August 10, 1981.
The land was adjudged by the lower court in favor of private respondents, and Angeles Laurio, Aas the true and lawful
owners of the disputed land.
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. On motion for reconsideration, the same was denied for lack of merit. petitioner
comes to us for a favorable reversal. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:
1. Whether or not a claim of ownership by a mere possession for more than twenty (20) years is meritorious.
2. Whether or not the instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding involved constitutes a cloud upon
the petitioners' interest or title in and to said property.

As a general rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive upon this Court. Such
factual findings shall not be disturbed normally unless the same are palpably unsupported by the evidence on record or
the judgment itself is based on a misapprehension of facts. 
Upon an examination of the records, the Court finds no evident reason to depart from the general rule.
Petitioner's claim that he acquired ownership over the disputed land through possession for more than twenty (20)
years is likewise unmeritorious. While Art. 1134 of the Civil Code provides that "ownership and other real rights over
immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years," this provision of law must
be read in conjunction with Art. 1117 of the same Code. This article states that ". . . ordinary acquisitive prescription of
things requires possession in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law." Hence, a prescriptive title to real
estate is not acquired by mere possession thereof under claim of ownership for a period of ten years unless such
possession was acquired con justo tilulo y buena fe (with color of title and good faith). 
Petitioners have not satisfactorily met the requirements of good faith and just title. As aptly observed by the
trial court, the plaintiff's admitted acts of converting boundary line (Bugsayon River) into a ricefield and thereafter
claiming ownership thereof were acts constituting deprivation of the rights of others and therefore "tantamount to bad
faith." To allow petitioner to benefit from his own wrong would run counter to the maxim ex dolo malo non oritur
actio (no man can allowed to found a claim upon his own wrongdoing).
Petitioner's alleged possession in 1962 up to September 1983 when private respondents entered the property in
question spanned twenty-one (21) years. This period of time is short of the thirty-year requirement mandated by Art.
1137.
Petitioner basically anchors his claim over the property on the survey plan prepared upon his request, the tax
declaration in his name, the commissioner's report on the relocation survey, and the survey plan. Respondent court
correctly held that these documents do not conclusively demonstrate petitioner's title over Lot Nos. 3918-A and 3606.
A survey under a proprietary title is not a conveyance. It is an instrument sui generis in the nature of a partition;
Therefore, a survey, not being a conveyance, is not a mode of acquiring ownership.
Furthermore, the plan was not verified and approved by the Bureau of Lands in accordance with Sec. 28, paragraph 5 of
Act No. 2259, the Cadastral Act, as amended by Sec. 1862 of Act No. 2711. A survey plan not verified and approved by
said Bureau is nothing more than a private writing, the due execution and authenticity of which must be proven in
accordance with Sec. 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Similarly, petitioner's tax declaration issued under his name is not even persuasive evidence of his claimed
ownership over the land in dispute. A tax declaration, by itself, is not considered conclusive evidence of ownership. It is
merely an indicium of a claim of ownership. Tax Declaration No. 8717 states that petitioner's property has an area of
3.2800 hectares while the totality of his claim according to the commissioned geodetic engineer's survey amounts to
4.1385 hectares. There is therefore a notable discrepancy of 8,585 square meters. On the other hand, private
respondent's claimed property, as borne out by Tax Declaration No. 12738, totals 5.5 hectares, a more proximate
equivalent of the 5.2433-hectare property as shown by the commissioner's report.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED and the questioned Decision of the
Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. This Decision is immediately executory. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Kapunan and Purisima, JJ., concur.
HEIRS OF MANINGDING VS CA

Facts:

Heirs of Maningding and Bauzon claim that they own the disputed lots in common and pro-indiviso.
Bauzon aver that their father Roque was the owner of the lots by virtue of a deed of donation.

According to the Maningdings, Roque repudiated the co-ownership over the sugarland in 1965 and
adjudicated it to himself and Maningding renounced and quitclaimed their shares over the riceland in
favour of Roque. Roque transferred the Riceland to his son, Luis and the sugarland to his daughter,
Eriberta, both evidenced by deeds of sale.

Heirs of Maningding allegedly discovered the transfers made by Roque Bauzon in favor of his children
only in 1986. Consequently, the heirs sought the partition of the properties as well as the accounting of
the produce but were unsuccessful.

Bauzon’s contentions:

*the Affidavit of Quitclaim and Renunciation over the riceland was executed not only by Juan
Maningding and Maria Maningding but also by Segunda Maningding.

* denied having executed the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication with regard to the sugarland.

* had been in open, continuous, notorious, adverse and actual possession of the subject properties.

Issue:

WON Rogue Bauzon acquired ownership over the subject properties by acquisitive prescription.

Ruling:

YES.

Rogue Bauzon acquired ownership over the subject properties by acquisitive prescription.
Prescription, in general, is a mode of acquiring (or losing) ownership and other real rights through the
lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the possession
should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse. Acquisitive
prescription is either ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in
good faith and with just title for ten (10) years. In extraordinary prescription ownership and other real
rights over immovable property are acquired through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for
thirty (30) years, without need of title or of good faith.

The disputed lots are unregistered lands, both parcels being covered only by tax declarations formerly
in the name of Ramon Bauzon and now transferred to Luis and Eriberta Bauzon. While tax declarations
and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership, yet, when coupled with proof of actual
possession, as in the instant case, tax declarations and receipts are strong evidence of ownership.

In the instant case, Roque Bauzon possessed the subject parcels of land in the concept of owner by
virtue of the donation propter nuptias. The possession was public as it was Roque Bauzon who
personally tilled and cultivated the lots. The acts of reaping the benefits of ownership were manifest
and visible to all. These acts were made more pronounced and public considering that the parcels of
land are located in a municipality wherein ownership and possession are particularly and normally
known to the community. Roque peacefully possessed the properties as he was never ousted
therefrom nor prevented from enjoying their fruits. His possession was uninterrupted and in good
faith because of his well- founded belief that the donation propter nuptias was properly executed and
the grantors were legally allowed to convey their respective shares in his favor. He likewise
appropriated to himself the whole produce of the parcels of land to the exclusion of all others.
Prescription, as a rule, does not run in favor of a co-heir or co-owner as long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. 11 Co- owners cannot acquire by prescription the share of the
other co-owners, absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership. In order that title may prescribe in
favor of one of the co-owners, it must be clearly shown that he has repudiated the claims of the
others, and that they were apprised of his claim of adverse and exclusive ownership, before the
prescriptive period would begin to run. Mere refusal to accede to a partition, without specifying the
grounds for such refusal, cannot be considered as notice to the other co-owners of the occupant's
claim of title in himself in repudiation of the co-ownership. The evidence relative to the possession, as
a fact upon which the alleged prescription is based, must be clear, complete and conclusive in order to
establish said prescription without any shadow of doubt; and when upon trial it is not shown that the
possession of the claimant has been adverse and exclusive and opposed to the rights of the others,
the case is not one of ownership, and partition will lie. 12

Therefore while prescription among co-owners cannot take place when the acts of ownership
exercised are vague and uncertain, such prescription arises and produces all its effects when the acts
of ownership do not evince any doubt as to the ouster of the rights of the other co-owners. As
disclosed by the records, Roque Bauzon and his heirs possessed the property from 1948 to 1986 to the
exclusion of petitioners who were never given their shares of the fruits of the properties, for which
reason they demanded an accounting of the produce and the conveyance to them of their shares.
Unfortunately they slept on their rights and allowed almost thirty-six (36) years to lapse before
attempting to assert their right. Perforce, they must suffer the consequence of their inaction
SOLIS V. BARROSO (53 PHIL 912)

TOPIC: Article 1773

FACTS:

The spouses Juan Lambino and Maria A. Barroso made a donation of propter nuptias of the lands
described in the complaint in favor of their son Alejo Lambino and Fortunata Solis in a private
document in consideration of the marriage which the latter were about to enter into. One of the
conditions of this donation is that in case of the death of one of the donees, one-half of these lands
thus donated would revert to the donors while the surviving donee would retain the other half. Alejo
Lambino and Fortunata Solis were married and immediately thereafter the donors delivered the
possession of the donated lands to them. However, donee Alejo Lambino died and in the same year
donor Juan Lambino also died. After the latter's death, Juan’s wife recovered possession of the
donated lands.

The surviving donee Fortunata Solis filed the action, which is the subject matter of this appeal,
against the surviving donors and heirs of the deceased donor Juan Lambino, with their respective
husbands, demanding of the defendants the execution of the proper deed of donation according to
law. The court rendered judgment based upon Article 1279 of the Civil Code in favor of plaintiff.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not Article 1279 of the Civil Code is applicable

RULING:

NO, Article 1279 of the Civil Code, relating to contracts, is not applicable to the present case. The
case at bar is a donation propter nuptias which is not valid and did not create any right, since it was
not made in a public instrument. Article 633 provides that in order that a donation of real property may
be valid, it must be made in a public instrument. This is the article applicable to donation propter
nuptias in so far as its formal validity is concerned. Hence, Article 1279 of the Civil Code which the
lower court applied is not applicable thereto. The last named article provides that, should the law
require the execution of an instrument or any other special form in order to make the obligations of a
contract effective, the contracting parties may compel each other to comply with such formality from
the moment that consent has been given, and the other requirements for the validity of the contract
exist. Suffice it to state that this article refers to contracts and is inapplicable to the donation in
question which must be governed by the rules on donations. It may further be noted, at first sight, that
this article presupposes the existence of a valid contract and cannot possibly refer to the form
required in order to make it valid, which it already has, but rather to that required simply to make it
effective, and for this reason, it would, at all events, be inapplicable to the donation in question,
wherein the form is required precisely to make it valid.

Moreover, in donations propter nuptias, the marriage is really a consideration, but not in the sense of
being necessary to give birth to the obligation. This may be clearly inferred from Article 1333, which
makes the fact that the marriage did not take place a cause for the revocation of such donations, thus
taking it for granted that there may be a valid donation propter nuptias, even without marriage, since
that which has not existed cannot be revoked. And such a valid donation would be forever valid, even
if the marriage never took place, if the proper action for revocation were not instituted, or if it were
instituted after the lapse of the statutory period of prescription. This is, so because the marriage in a
donation propter nuptias is rather a resolutory condition which, as such, presupposes the existence of
the obligation which may be resolved or revoked, and it is not a condition necessary for the birth of
the obligation.
 SPOUSES SERAFIN SI AND ANITA BONODE SI, petitioners,vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES JOSE ARMADA and REMEDIOS ALMANZOR
G.R. No. 122047 October 12, 2000
QUISUMBING, J.:

Facts:

Spouses Armada transferred their property to the names of their three sons namely,
Crisotomo, Jose and Severo. Crisostomo through Cresencia executed a deed of sale in favor Anita
Si.

Spouses Jose Armada (other brother) filed a complaint to annul the sale on the ground that
there was no written notice of such sale whereas the deed stated that “the co-owners are not
interested in buying the land”. Further, there was misrepresentation on the citizenship of Cresencia is
a Filipino citizen.

Petitioners claimed that there was really no co-ownership since the parents executed three
deeds of sale assigning specific properties to the brothers. Since there is no-ownership it follows that
there is no right to redemption. Petitioners pointed out that it was only because the brothers failed to
submit a subdivision plan which is the reason why there is only one certificate of title.

Lower court dismissed the petition. CA reversed and said that co-ownership still exists and that
the land was undivided. Petitioners filed a motion for new trial on the basis that there was annotation
at the back of the original TCT due to the sale in favor of the brothers. CA denied because the
reglementary period had lapsed and the decision has become final and executory.

Issue: Can private respondents be considered as co-owners and exercise the right of redemption?

Held: No. Under Art. 484 of the Civil Code, there is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an
undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. There is no co-ownership when the different
portions owned by different people are already concretely determined and separately identifiable,
even if not yet technically described.

In the case at hand, the portion sold to defendant spouses Si by defendants Crisostomo
Armada and Cresenciana Armada was concretely determined and identifiable. The fact that the three
portions are embraced in one certificate of title does not make said portions less determinable or
identifiable or distinguishable. Hence, no right of redemption among co-owners exists.
 TOMAS CLAUDIO MEMORIAL COLLEGE, INC.vs. COURT OF APPEALS and HON.
ALEJANDRO S. MARQUEZet. al
G.R. No. 124262; October 12, 1999
QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS:
On December 13, 1993, Alejandro Marquez et. al, filed an action for Partition. They alleged that
their predecessor-in-interest, Juan De Castro, died intestate in 1993 and they are his only surviving
and legitimate heirs. They also alleged that their father owned a parcel of land designated as Lot No.
3010 located at Barrio San Juan, Morong, Rizal, with an area of two thousand two hundred sixty nine
(2,269) square meters more or less. They further claim that in 1979, without their knowledge and
consent, said lot was sold by their brother Mariano to petitioner. The sale was made possible when
Mariano represented himself as the sole heir to the property. It is the contention of private
respondents that the sale made by Mariano affected only his undivided share to the lot in question but
not the shares of the other co-owners equivalent to four fifths (4/5) of the property.Petitioner filed a
motion to dismiss contending, as its special defense, lack of jurisdiction and prescription and/or
laches. 
ISSUE:Whether an action for partition is barred by prescription
RULING:
No. An action for partition cannot be barred by prescription. Pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil
Code, no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Such co-owner may demand at
anytime the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned. In  Budlong vs.
Bondoc,this Court has interpreted said provision of law to mean that the action for partition is
imprescriptible. It cannot be barred by prescription.  Article 494 of the Civil Code explicitly declares:
No prescription shall lie in favor of a co-owner or co-heirs as long as he expressly or impliedly
recognizes the co-ownership.
 VERONA PADA-KILARIO and RICARDO KILARIO, petitioners,  vs. COURT OFAPPEALS and
SILVERIO PADA, respondents.

G.R. No. 134329  January 19, 2000

DE LEON, JR., J.

FACTS:
One Jacinto Pada died intestate. His estate included a parcel of land of residential and coconut
land. During the lifetime of Jacinto Pada, his half-brother, Feliciano Pada, obtained permission from
him to build a house on the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581. When Feliciano died, his son,
Pastor, continued living in the house together with his eight children. Petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario,
one of Pastor’s children, has been living in that house since 1960.

Sometime in May, 1951, the heirs of Jacinto Pada entered into an extra-judicial partition of his
estate. On November 17, 1993, Maria Pada to sell the co-ownership right of his father, Marciano.
Private respondent, who is the first cousin of Maria, was the buyer. Thereafter, private respondent
demanded that petitioner spouses vacate the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 so his family
can utilize the said area. They went through a series of meetings with the barangay officials
concerned for the purpose of amicable settlement, but all earnest efforts toward that end, failed.

On July 24, 1995, the heirs of Amador Pada, executed a Deed of Donation transferring to

petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario, their respective shares as co-owners. On February 12, 1996,
petitioner spouses filed their Answer averring that the northern portion had already been donated to
them. They contended that the extra-judicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada executed in 1951
was invalid and ineffectual since no special power of attorney was executed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are builders and possessors in good faith

HELD:
No. Considering that petitioners were in possession of the subject property by sheer
tolerance of its owners, they knew that their occupation of the premises may be terminated any time.
Persons who occupy the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any contract
between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that they will vacate the same upon
demand, failing in which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them. Thus,
they cannot be considered possessors nor builders in good faith.

It is well-settled that both Article 448 and Article546 of the New Civil Code which allow full
reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made,
apply only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the
owner thereof. Verily, persons whose occupation of a realty is by sheer tolerance of its owners are
not possessors in good faith. Neither did the promise of Concordia, Esperanza and AngelitoPada that
they were going to donate the premises to petitioners convert them into builders in good faith for at
the time the improvements were built on the premises, such promise was not yet fulfilled,  i.e., it was a
mere expectancy of ownership that may or may not be realized. More importantly, even as that
promise was fulfilled, the donation is void for Concordia, Esperanza and AngelitoPada were not the
owners ofCadastral Lot No. 5581. As such, petitioners cannot be said to be entitled to the value of the
improvements that they built on the said lot.
Spouses Alexander Cruz and Adelaida Cruz vs. Eleuterio Leis, Raymundo Leis, Anastacio L. Lagdano, Loreta L. Cayonda
and the Honorable Court Of Appeals

G.R. No. 125233, March 9, 2000

Kapunan, J.

Facts:

Adriano Leis and Gertrudes Isidro were married in1923. In 1955, Gertrudes acquired from the then Department
of Agriculture and Natural Resources (DANR), a parcel of land with an area of 100 sq. m. situated in Marikina, Rizal. The
Deed of Sale, Gertrudes was described as a widow. Hence, a TCT was issued in her name, which described her as a
widow.

In 1973, Adriano died intestate. In 1985, Gertrudes obtained a P15,000 loan from petitioners Spouses Alexander
and Adelaida Cruz at 5% interest. The loan was secured by a mortgage over the Rizal property. Gertrudes however,
failed to pay the loan on the due date.

Unable to pay her obligation, Gertrudes in 1986 executed 2 contracts in favor of Alexander Cruz. The first was a
Kasunduan, which the parties conceded was a pacto de retro sale, granting Gertrudes 1 year within which to repurchase
the property. The was a Kasunduan ng Tuwirang Bilihan, a Deed of Absolute Sale covering the same property for the
price of P39,083, the same amount stipulated in the Kasunduan. For failure of Gertrudes to repurchase the property,
ownership thereof was consolidated in the name of Alexander Cruz. In 1987, A TCT was issued in his name, canceling the
TCT in the name of Gertrudes.

In 1987 Gertrudes died. Thereafter, her heirs, herein private respondents, Eleuterio Leis, Raymundo Leis,
Anastacio L. Lagdano, Loreta L. Cayonda (Leis Et Al.) received demands from Spouses Cruz to vacate the premises as they
were already new owners of the property.

In response, Leis et al. filed an action seeking the nullification of the contracts of sale executed by their mother
Gertrudes in favor of petitioner Alexander, as well as the TCT subsequently issued in the name of the latter. They
claimed that the contracts were vitiated by fraud as Gertrudes was illiterate and already 80 years old at the time of the
execution of the contracts. They also contended that the price for the land was insufficient as it was sold lower than its
fair market value. They added that the property subject of the sale was conjugal and, consequently, its sale without the
knowledge and consent of private respondents was in derogation of their rights as heirs.

The trial court rendered a decision in favor of Leis et al. It concluded that the land was conjugal property thus
Gertrudes could only sell to spouses Cruz her one-half share in the property. However, it also ruled that there was no
fraud in the execution of the contract but nullified the same because the spouses Cruz failed to comply with certain
procedural requirements in its registration. The same decision was affirmed when the case was appealed with the Court
of Appeals.

Hence, the spouses Cruz filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court. They alleged that the property was
not conjugal but was owned exclusively by Gertrudes as described in the TCT. They also averred that assuming the
property was conjugal, the same became exclusive since Gertrudes mortgaged the same property but redeemed the
same in 1983.

Issue:

Was the property was exclusively owned by Gertrudes since she redeemed the property over the exclusion of
her co-owners?

Held:

No. The redemption of the land by Getrudes did not terminate the co-ownership nor give her title to the entire
land subject of the co-ownership.

The right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with respect to his share alone. Although Gertrudes
redeemed the property in its entirety, shouldering the expenses therefor, that did not make her the owner of all of it. In
other words, it did not put to end the existing state of co-ownership. Under Art. 493, a co-owner such as Gertrudes
could only dispose of her share in the property owned in common.

However, being that neither Gertrudes nor her co-owners, Leis et al. were able to redeem the same within the
one-year period stipulated in the Kasunduan, ownership then remained with the spouses Cruz. The essence of a pacto
de retro sale is that title and ownership of the property sold are immediately vested in the vendee a retro, subject to the
resolutory condition of repurchase by the vendor a retro within the stipulated period. Failure thus of the vendor a retro
to perform said resolutory condition vests upon the vendee by operation of law absolute title and ownership over the
property sold.