Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Case 17: Sps Gonzales vs. Marmaine Realty Corp*

PERTINENT PROVISION/S OF THE LAW

Section 1, Rule 43. This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards,
judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.
Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange
Commission, Office of the President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of
Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National
Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6657, Government Service Insurance
System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural Invention Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy
Commission, Board of Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary arbitrators authorized by law.

Section 3, Rule 43. An appeal under this Rule may be taken to the Court of Appeals within the period and in the manner herein
provided, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.

Section 14, Rule 13. In an action affecting the title or the right of possession of real property, the plaintiff and the defendant,
when affirmative relief is claimed in his answer, may record in the office of the registry of deeds of the province in which the property
is situated notice of the pendency of the action. Said notice shall contain the names of the parties and the object of the action or
defense, and a description of the property in that province affected thereby. Only from the time of filing such notice for record shall a
purchaser, or encumbrancer of the property affected thereby, be deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the action, and
only of its pendency against the parties designated by their real names.

The notice of lis pendens hereinabove mentioned may be cancelled only upon order of the court, after proper showing that the notice
is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the rights of the party who caused it
to be recorded.

SHORT SUMMARY/BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

The petitioner spouses filed a Tenancy Case before the DARAB. PARAD later dismiss the case for lack of merit. The
spouses appealed to the DARAB but the latter affirmed PARAD's decision. The spouses moved to reconsider the same but denied.
The DARAB Decision then became final and executory and an Entry of Judgment was issued.

In view of this, Marmaine Realty moved for the Cancellation of Notice of Lis Pendens. Spouses moved for reconsideration,
which was denied and so compelling the spouses to file a Petition for Review under Rule 43 before the CA. The CA dismissed for
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, pointing out that the proper remedy from the PARAD's denial of the MR is an appeal to
the DARAB and not a Petition for Review under Rule 43.

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; EXCEPTION.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial system. The thrust of the rule is that
courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas
of their respective competence. The rationale for this doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser expenses and provides for the speedier
resolution of controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed.

In view of this doctrine, jurisprudence instructs that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the courts, it is a pre-
condition that he avail himself of all administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery
can be resorted to by giving the administrative officer every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then
such remedy must be exhausted first before the court's power of judicial review can be sought. The premature resort to the court is
fatal to one's cause of action.

Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel, the case may be dismissed for lack of cause of action.

However, it must be clarified that the aforementioned doctrine is not absolute as it is subject to certain exceptions; one of
which is when the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice.

Said question at best could be resolved tentatively by the administrative authorities. The final decision on the matter rests not
with them but with the courts of justice. Exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply, because nothing of an administrative
nature is to be or can be done. The issue does not require technical knowledge and experience but one that would involve the
interpretation and application of law.

In the case at bar, Sps. Gonzales correctly pointed out that the issue they raised before the CA, i.e., the propriety of the
cancellation of the Notice of Lis Pendens, falls within the aforesaid exception as the same is a purely legal question, considering that
the resolution of the same would not involve an examination of the probative value presented by the litigants and must rest solely on
what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.
LIS PENDENS; DEFINITION; TWO-FOLD EFFECT.

"Lis pendens," which literally means pending suit, refers tothe jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires over a
property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of the action, and until final judgment.

The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect: (a) to keep the subject matter of the litigation within the power of
the court until the entry of the final judgment to prevent the defeat of the final judgment by successive alienations; and (b) to bind a
purchaser, bona fide or not, of the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the court will promulgate subsequently.

CANCELLATION OF NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS; WHEN.

Under Section 14, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled "after proper showing that the
notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be
recorded." In the same vein, case law likewise instructs that a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled in situations where: (a) there are
exceptional circumstances imputable to the party who caused the annotation; ( b) the litigation was unduly prolonged to the prejudice
of the other party because of several continuances procured by petitioner; (c) the case which is the basis for the lis pendens notation
was dismissed for non-prosequitur on the part of the plaintiff; or (d) judgment was rendered against the party who caused such
annotation.

In the case at bar, records show that the notice of lis pendens that Sps. Gonzales caused to be annotated on Marmaine's
certificates of title stemmed from the Tenancy Case filed by the former against the latter. Since the Tenancy Case had already been
decided against Sps. Gonzales with finality, it is but proper that the PARAD order the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens subject
of this case. In this relation, the PARAD correctly ruled that its cancellation of the aformentioned notice of lis pendens only pertains to
the Tenancy Case and, thus, would not affect any other case involving the same parties, such as Civil Case No. RY2K-052 pending
before the Regional Trial Court of Rosario, Batangas, Branch 87.

Case 18: Diocese of Bacolod vs. Comelec

Facts: On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of
Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral
within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012
or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience
Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The
electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH
Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted
against it form “Team Buhay.”

Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the
tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were
not candidates for that election.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as the case was not brought first
before the COMELEC En Banc or any if its divisions.

Held: No. The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not proper in this case. Despite the alleged
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that the controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the “prerequisite
that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch or in this case, organ of government before a court may
come into the picture.”

Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their medium, had understandable relevance especially during the
elections. COMELEC’s letter threatening the filing of the election offense against petitioners is already an actionable infringement of
this right. The impending threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’ speech.

In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the
violation of their freedom of speech.

Exception:

Case 19: Philippines vs. Lacap*

FACTS  Case is a petition for certoriari, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed, with
modifications, ruling by the RTC granting the complaint for Specific Performance and damages filed by
Lacap against RP
 Dist. Eng. Of Pampanga issued an invitation to bid dated Jan 27, 1992 where Lacap and two other
contractors were pre-qualified
 Being the lowest bidder, Lacap won the bid for concreting of a certain baranggay, and thereafter undertook
 the works and purchased materials and labor in connection with
 On Oct 29, 1992, Office of the Dist. Eng conducted final investigation of end product and fount it 100%
completed according to specs. Lacap thereafter sought the payment of the DPWH
 DPWH withheld payment on the grounds that the CoA disapproved final release of funds due to Lacap’s
license as contractor having expired
 Dist. Eng sought the opinion of DPWH legal. Legal then responded to Dist. Eng that the Contractors
License Law (RA 4566) does not provide that a contract entered into by a contractor after expiry of license
is void and that there is no law that expressly prohibits or declares void such a contract
 DPWH Legal Dept, through Dir III Cesar Mejia, issued First Indorsement on July 20 1994 recommending
that payment be made to Lacap. Despite such recommendation, no payment was issued
 On July 3, 1995, respondent filed the complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against petitioner
before the RTC.14
 On September 14, 1995, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion to
Dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of action and that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the nature of the action since respondent did not appeal to the COA the decision of the
District Auditor to disapprove the claim.
 Following the submission of respondent’s Opposition to Motion to Dismiss,the RTC issued an Order dated
March 11, 1996 denying the Motion to Dismiss. The OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration18 but it was
likewise denied by the RTC in its Order dated May 23, 1996.
 On August 5, 1996, the OSG filed its Answer invoking the defenses of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies and the doctrine of non-suability of the State
 Following trial, the RTC rendered on February 19, 1997 a decision ordering DPWH to pay Lacap for the
contract of the project, 12% interest from demand until fully paid, and the costs of the suit
 CA affirmed the decision but lowered interest to 6%
ISSUE WON a contractor with an expired license is entitled to be paid for completed projects
RULING A contractor with an expired license is entitled payment for completed projects, but does not exonerate him from
corresponding fines thereof. Section 35 of R.A. No. 4566 explicitly provides:
“SEC. 35. Penalties. Any contractor who, for a price, commission, fee or wage, submits or attempts to submit a
bid to construct, or contracts to or undertakes to construct, or assumes charge in a supervisory capacity of a
construction work within the purview of this Act, without first securing a license to engage in the business of
contracting in this country; or who shall present or file the license certificate of another, give false evidence of
any kind to the Board, or any member thereof in obtaining a certificate or license, impersonate another, or use
an expired or revoked certificate or license, shall be deemed guilty of misdemeanor, and shall, upon conviction,
be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than five hundred pesos but not more than five thousand pesos. The "plain
meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction is that if the statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity,
it must be given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation. The wordings of R.A. No. 4566 are clear.
It does not declare, expressly or impliedly, as void contracts entered into by a contractor whose license had
already expired. Nonetheless, such contractor is liable for payment of the fine prescribed therein. Thus,
respondent should be paid for the projects he completed. Such payment, however, is without prejudice to the
payment of the fine prescribed under the law.

Case 20: Vigilar vs Aquino

FACTS: Respondent was invited to bid for a dike project in Pampanga. Respondent eventually won the bid, and finished constructing
the dike. However, petitioners, government officials of DPWH, refused to pay petitioner the contract price. Petitioners refuse because
the contract is void for violation of PD 1445, for absence of an appropriation. Respondent brought suit in the RTC, which petitioners
sought to dismiss, raising the non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. The lower court ruled for the validity of the contract ando
rdered payment for the project. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the lower court and declared the contract
invalid. However, the CA ordered the Commission on Audit to determine the value of the services rendered by respondent, and
compensate him based on quantum meruit.

Issue: Whether or not the case should have been dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies

Held: The rule for exhaustion of all administrative remedies admits of several exceptions. Some of these obtains in the case at hand.
The further delay of respondent compensation will work injustice against him, as the government and public has derived benefit from
the dike constructed for almost two decades already. Remanding the case to an administrative agency would further prejudice
respondent. In addition, the issue at hand is the validity of the contract, which is purely a question of law. As such, only the courts may
address the issue directly.

It does not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties. There is a question of law when the
doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and not as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts. Said
question at best could be resolved only tentatively by the administrative authorities. The final decision on the matter rests not with
them but with the courts of justice. Exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply, because nothing of an administrative nature
is to be or can be done. The issue does not require technical knowledge and experience but one that would involve the interpretation
and application of law.
Doctrine of Primary Administrative Jurisdiction

Case 21: Commissioner of Customs vs. Navarro

FACTS: The stress, and rightly so, by the Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of Customs in their exhaustive and scholarly
petition for certiorari was on the jurisdictional issue. It sought to nullify and set aside in order of respondent Judge Pedro C. Navarro
issuing a writ of preliminary injunction as prayed for by private respondents Juanito S. Flores and Asiatic Incorporated the importers
of 1,350 cartons of fresh fruits, restraining petitioners from proceeding with the auction sale of such perishable goods. Classified as
non-essential consumer commodities, they were banned by Central Bank Circulars Nos. 289, 294 and 295 as prohibited importation or
importation contrary to law and thus made subject to forfeiture proceedings by petitioner Collector of Customs pursuant to the
relevant sections of the Tariff and Customs Code.

Petitioners pointed out that seizure and forfeiture proceedings, which, as held in a number of decisions, was a matter falling within the
exclusive competence of the customs authorities.
SC required respondents to file an answer and at the same time issuing a writ of preliminary injunction as prayed for by petitioners to
prevent the challenged order of respondent Judge from being implemented. Instead of preparing an answer, they just submitted a
manifestation stating that “after an intensive and serious study of the merit of the case, the respondents have decided to abandon its
interest in the case.” The rationale behind such a move was ostensibly the desire to avoid additional expenses, in view of the fact that
“the shipments, being perishable, have already deteriorated.”

ISSUE: Who has jurisdiction over the confiscated goods?

HELD: Customs.
That such jurisdiction of the customs authorities is exclusive was made clear in Pacis v. Averia. This Court, speaking through Justice
J. P. Bengzon, realistically observed: “This original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, when exercised in an action for
recovery of personal property which is a subject of a forfeiture proceeding in the Bureau of Customs, tends to encroach upon, and to
render futile, the jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs in seizure and forfeiture proceedings.” The court “should yield to the
jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs.” Such a ruling, as pointed out by Justice Zaldivar in Auyong Hian v. Court of Tax Appeals,
promulgated less than a year later, could be traced to Government v. Gale, 26 a 1913 decision, where there was a recognition in the
opinion of Justice Carson that a Collector of Customs when sitting in forfeiture proceedings constitutes a tribunal upon which the law
expressly confers jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions touching the forfeiture and further disposition of the subject matter
of such proceedings.

The controlling principle was set forth anew in Ponce Enrile v. Vinuya, 28 decided in 1971. Thus: “The prevailing doctrine is that the
exclusive jurisdiction in seizure and forfeiture cases vested in the Collector of Customs precludes a court of first instance from
assuming cognizance over such a matter.”
‘It is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported goods, for the purposes of
enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the goods are actually in its possession or control, even if no warrant of seizure or
detention had previously been issued by the Collector of Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings.

In the present case, the Bureau of Customs actually seized the goods in question on November 4, 1966, and so from that date the
Bureau of Customs acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of the enforcement of the tariff and customs laws, to the
exclusion of the regular courts. Much less then would the CFI of Manila have jurisdiction over the goods in question after the
Collector of Customs had issued the warrant of seizure and detention on January 12, 1967. And so, it cannot be said, as respondents
contend, that the issuance of said warrant was only an attempt to divest the respondent Judge of jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the case. The court presided by respondent Judge did not acquire jurisdiction over the goods in question when the petition for
mandamus was filed before it, and so there was no need of divesting it of jurisdiction. Not having acquired jurisdiction over the goods,
it follows that the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to issue the questioned order of March 7, 1967 releasing said
goods.

Case 22: Industrial Enterprises Inc. Vs. Ca

Facts:

· Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal operating contract by the Bureau of Energy Development (BED), for the
exploration of two coal blocks in Eastern Samar. IEI asked the Ministry of Energy for another to contract for the additional three
coal blocks.

· IEI was advised that there is another coal operator, Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation (MMIC). IEI and MMIC
signed a Memorandum of Agreement on which IEI will assign all its rights and interests to MMIC.

· IEI filed for rescission of the memorandum plus damages against the MMIC and the Ministry of Energy Geronimo Velasco
before the RTC of Makati, alleging that MMIC started operating in the coal blocks prior to finalization of the memorandum. IEI
prayed for that the rights for the operation be granted back.

· Philippine National Bank (PNB) pleaded as co-defendant because they have mortgages in favor of MMIC. It was dismissed
· Oddly enough, Mr. Jesus Cabarrus is President of both IEI and MMIC.

· RTC ordered the rescission of the memorandum and for the reinstatement of the contract in favor of IEI.

· CA reversed the ruling of the RTC, stating that RTC has no jurisdiction over the matter.

Issue: W/ON RTC has jurisdiction?

Held: No. While the action filed by IEI sought the rescission of what appears to be an ordinary civil contract cognizable by a civil
court, the fact is that the Memorandum of Agreement sought to be rescinded is derived from a coal-operating contract and is
inextricably tied up with the right to develop coal-bearing lands and the determination of whether or not the reversion of the coal
operating contract over the subject coal blocks to IEI would be in line with the integrated national program for coal-development and
with the objective of rationalizing the country's over-all coal-supply-demand balance, IEI's cause of action was not merely the
rescission of a contract but the reversion or return to it of the operation of the coal blocks. Thus it was that in its Decision ordering the
rescission of the Agreement, the Trial Court, inter alia, declared the continued efficacy of the coal-operating contract in IEI's favor
and directed the BED to give due course to IEI's application for three (3) IEI more coal blocks. These are matters properly falling
within the domain of the BED.

In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in many cases involving matters that
demand the special competence of administrative agencies. It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a
particular case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination
requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate
questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by
the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. It applies
"where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution
of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body, in such case
the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view"

Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case since the question of what coal areas should be exploited and
developed and which entity should be granted coal operating contracts over said areas involves a technical determination by the BED
as the administrative agency in possession of the specialized expertise to act on the matter. The Trial Court does not have the
competence to decide matters concerning activities relative to the exploration, exploitation, development and extraction of mineral
resources like coal. These issues preclude an initial judicial determination. It behooves the courts to stand aside even when apparently
they have statutory power to proceed in recognition of the primary jurisdiction of an administrative agency.

Case 23: Roxas and Co., Inc. Vs. CA

FACTS:

 This case involves three (3) haciendas in Nasugbu, Batangas owned by petitioner and the validity of the acquisition of these
haciendas by the government under Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
 Petitioner Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas, namely, Haciendas Palico,
Banilad and Caylaway, all located in the Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas. Hacienda Palico is 1,024 hectares in area.
 On July 27, 1987, the Congress of the Philippines formally convened and took over legislative power from the President. 2
This Congress passed Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988. The Act was
signed by the President on June 10, 1988 and took effect on June 15, 1988.
 Before the law's effectivity, on May 6, 1988, petitioner filed with respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell Hacienda
Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under compulsory
acquisition by respondent DAR in accordance with the CARL. Hacienda Palico
 On September 29, 1989, respondent DAR, through respondent Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Nasugbu,
Batangas, sent a notice entitled "Invitation to Parties" to petitioner. The Invitation was addressed to "Jaime Pimentel, Hda.
Administrator, Hda. Palico." Therein, the MARO invited petitioner to a conference on October 6, 1989 at the DAR office in
Nasugbu to discuss the results of the DAR investigation of Hacienda Palico, which was "scheduled for compulsory
acquisition this year under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program."
 On December 12, 1989, respondent DAR through then Department Secretary Miriam D. Santiago sent a "Notice of
Acquisition" to petitioner. The Notice was addressed as follows:

ISSUE(S):

1. W/N this Court can take cognizance of this petition despite petitioner's failure to exhaust administrative remedies;
2. assuming the haciendas may be reclassified from agricultural to nonagricultural, W/N this court has the power to rule on this
issue.

HELD:

1. YES.
As a general rule, before a party may be allowed to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts of justice, he is expected to have exhausted all
means of administrative redress. This is not absolute, however. There are instances when judicial action may be resorted to
immediately. Among these exceptions are:

1. when the question raised is purely legal;

2. when the administrative body is in estoppel;
3. when the act complained of is patently illegal;
4. when there is urgent need for judicial intervention;
5. when the respondent acted in disregard of due process;
6. when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied or assumed
approval of the latter;
7. when irreparable damage will be suffered;
8. when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
9. when strong public interest is involved;
10. when the subject of the controversy is private land; and
11. in quo warranto proceedings.

Petitioner rightly sought immediate redress in the courts. There was a violation of its rights and to require it to exhaust administrative
remedies before the DAR itself was not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy.

Respondent DAR issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA's) to farmer beneficiaries over portions of petitioner's land
without just compensation to petitioner. A Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) is evidence of ownership of land by a
beneficiary under R.A. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. Before this may be awarded to a farmer beneficiary,
the land must first be acquired by the State from the landowner and ownership transferred to the former. The transfer of possession
and ownership of the land to the government are conditioned upon the receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or
deposit by the DAR of the compensation with an accessible bank. Until then, title remains with the landowner. There was no receipt
by petitioner of any compensation for any of the lands acquired by the government.

The kind of compensation to be paid the landowner is also specific. The law provides that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or
"LBP bonds." Respondent DAR's opening of trust account deposits in petitioner' s name with the Land Bank of the Philippines does
not constitute payment under the law. Trust account deposits are not cash or LBP bonds. The replacement of the trust account with
cash or LBP bonds did not ipso facto cure the lack of compensation; for essentially, the determination of this compensation was
marred by lack of due process. In fact, in the entire acquisition proceedings, respondent DAR disregarded the basic requirements of
administrative due process. Under these circumstances, the issuance of the CLOA's to farmer beneficiaries necessitated immediate
judicial action on the part of the petitioner.

2. NO. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself authority to resolve a controversy the
jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. Respondent DAR is in a better
position to resolve petitioner's application for conversion, being primarily the agency possessing the necessary expertise on the
matter. The power to determine whether Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway are nonagricultural, hence, exempt from the
coverage of the CARL lies with the DAR, not with this Court.

Case 24: Basiana Mining vs. Secretary of DENR*

Case 25: Aquilino Pimintel vs. Senate Committee of the Whole

FACTS: On 8 October 2008, Senator Madrigal introduced P.S. Resolution 706, which directed the Senate Ethics Committee to
investigate the alleged double insertion of P200 million by Senator Manny Villar into the C5 Extension Project. After the election of
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile as Senate President, the Ethics Committee was reorganized, but the Minority failed to name its
representatives to the Committee, prompting a delay in the investigation. Thereafter, the Senate adopted the Rules of the Ethics
Committee.

In another privilege speech, Senator Villar stated he will answer the accusations before the Senate, and not with the Ethics Committee.
Senator Lacson, then chairperson of the Ethics Committee, then moved that the responsibility of the Ethics Committee be transferred
to the Senate as a Committee of the Whole, which was approved by the majority. In the hearings of such Committee, petitioners
objected to the application of the Rules of the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole. They also questioned the
quorum, and proposed amendments to the Rules. Senator Pimentel raised the issue on the need to publish the rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole.

ISSUE: Is the petition premature for failure to observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction or prior resort?

HELD: The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply to this case. The issues presented here do not require the expertise,
specialized skills and knowledge of respondent for their resolution. On the contrary, the issues here are purely legal questions which
are within the competence and jurisdiction of the Court.

Proximate Cause

WHAT IS “PROXIMATE CAUSE”?

Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred.

And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as
an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result
therefrom.

De Bataclan vs Medina

Facts: Pass-midnight in September 1952, Juan Bataclan rode a bus owned by Mariano Medina from Cavite to Pasay. While on its way, the driver of the bus was driving
fast and when he applied the brakes it cause the bus to be overturned. The driver, the conductor, and some passengers were able to free themselves from the bus
except Bataclan and 3 others. The passengers called the help of the villagers and as it was dark, the villagers brought torch with them. The driver and the conductor
failed to warn the would-be helpers of the fact that gasoline has spilled from the overturned bus so a huge fire ensued which engulfed the bus thereby killing the 4
passengers trapped inside. It was also found later in trial that the tires of the bus were old.

ISSUE: Whether or not the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan et al was their burning by reason of the torches which ignited the gasoline.

HELD: No. The proximate cause was the overturning of the bus which was caused by the negligence of the driver because he was speeding and also he was already
advised by Medina to change the tires yet he did not. Such negligence resulted to the overturning of the bus. The torches carried by the would-be helpers are not to
be blamed. It is just but natural for the villagers to respond to the call for help from the passengers and since it is a rural area which did not have flashlights, torches
are the natural source of lighting. Further, the smell of gas could have been all over the place yet the driver and the conductor failed to provide warning about said
fact to the villagers.

MANILA ELECTRIC CO. vs. REMOQUILLO, et als.

Facts: Efren Magno went to repair a ¨media agua¨ of the house pf his brother-in-law. Whilw making the repair, a galvanized iron roofing which was holding came into
contact with the electric wire of the petitioner Manila Electric Co. strung parallel to the edge of the ¨media agua¨ and 2 1/2 feet from it. He was electrocuted and died
as a result thereof. In an action for damages brought by the heirs of Magno against manila Electric Co. the CA awarded damages to the heirs of Magno and that the
company was at fault and guilty of negligence because although the electric wire had been installed long before the construction of the house the electric company
did not exercise due diligence. Hence, this petition.

Issue: WON Manila Electric Co., is gulity of negligence.

Ruling : Decision of the CA reversed.

Ratio: A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occassion
by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of
the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occassion.

Calalas v CA (Torts)

FACTS:
At 10 o'clock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a college freshman majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman
University, took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga was given
by the conductor an "extension seat," a wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle.

On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As she was seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the
outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. As
a result, Sunga was injured.

On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging violation of the contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence
required of him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

1. RTC – Dumaguete – rendered judgment against Salva holding that the driver of the Isuzu truck was responsible It took cognizance of another case (Civil Case No.
3490), filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, in which Branch 37 of the same court held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the
damage to his jeepney.

2. CA – reversed the RTC, awarding damages instead to Sunga as plaintiff in an action for breach of contract of carriage since the cause of action was based on such
and not quasi delict. Hence, current petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether (per ruling in Civil Case) negligence of Verena was the proximate cause of the accident negates his liability and that to rule otherwise would be to make the
common carrier an insurer of the safety of its passengers In relation thereto, does the principle of res judicata apply?

RULING:
No.
The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioner's jeepney. On the other
hand, the issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage.

Quasi-delict / culpa aquiliana / culpa extra contractual

1. Has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor

2. negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the action

3. doctrine of proximate cause is applicable

(device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party, obligation is created by law itself)

Breach of contract / culpa contractual

1. premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation

2. action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor (here, the common carrier) failed to transport his passenger
safely to his destination

3. not available; it is the parties themselves who create the obligation and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created

In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently
unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier
the burden of proof.

Hence, Vicente Calalas (operator) is liable since he did not exercise utmost diligence. 
1. Jeepney was not properly parked;

2. Overloading of passengers. 

Fernando vs CA

FACTS:

 November 7, 1975: Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao Public Market filed a requisition request with the Chief of Property of the City Treasurer's
Office for the re-emptying of the septic tank in Agdao wherein Bascon won

 November 22, 1975: bidder Bertulano with four other companions namely Joselito Garcia, William Liagoso, Alberto Fernando and Jose Fajardo, Jr. were
found dead inside the septic tank. 

 The bodies were removed by a fireman.

 The body of Joselito Garcia, was taken out by his uncle, Danilo Garcia and taken to the Regional Hospital but he expired there. 

 The City Engineer's office investigated the case and learned they entered the septic tank without clearance from it nor with the knowledge and consent of
the market master. 

 Since the septic tank was found to be almost empty, they were presumed to be the ones who did the re-emptying.
  Dr. Juan Abear of the City Health Office found them to have died from "asphyxia" - diminution of oxygen supply in the body and intake of toxic gas

 November 26, 1975: Bascon signed the purchase order 

 RTC: Dismissed the case

 CA: Reversed - law intended to protect the plight of the poor and the needy, the ignorant and the indigent

ISSUE: W/N Davao city is negligent and its negligence is the proximate cause therefore can be liable for damages

HELD: NO. CA affirmed.

 test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case:

 Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used
in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence

standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet pater familias of the Roman law

 Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was
sufficiently probable warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its consequences

 The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of
human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case

 Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the suggestion born of this provision, is always necessary before negligence can be
held to exist

 Distinction must be made between the accident and the injury

 Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover

 Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the amount that the defendant responsible
for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence

 Toilets and septic tanks are not nuisances per se as defined in Article 694 of the New Civil Code which would necessitate warning signs for the protection
of the public

 While the construction of these public facilities demands utmost compliance with safety and sanitary requirements, the putting up of warning
signs is not one of those requirements

 accident such as toxic gas leakage from the septic tank is unlikely to happen unless one removes its covers

 Considering the nature of the task of emptying a septic tank especially one which has not been cleaned for years, an ordinarily prudent person should
undoubtedly be aware of the attendant risks. The victims are no exception; more so with Mr. Bertulano, an old hand in this kind of service, who is
presumed to know the hazards of the job. His failure, therefore, and that of his men to take precautionary measures for their safety was the proximate
cause of the accident.

 proximate and immediate cause of the death of the victims was due to their own negligence. Consequently, the petitioners cannot demand damages from
the public respondent.