G.R. No.

111141 March 6, 1998 287 SCRA 102

MARIO Z. TITONG, petitioner, 
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (4th Division), VICTORICO LAURIO and ANGELES LAURIO, respondents.

FACTS:
The case originated from an action for quieting of  title  over  a  20, 000  hectares  parcel  of land filed by Mario Titong. 
Petitioner alleges that he is the owner of an unregistered parcel of land with an area of 3.2800 hectares.
He claims that private respondents, with their hired laborers, forcibly entered a portion of the land containing an area of
approximately two (2) hectares; and began plowing the same under pretext of ownership.
Private respondents denied this allegation, and averred that the disputed property formed part of the 5.5-hectare
agricultural land which they had purchased from their predecessor-in-interest, Pablo Espinosa on August 10, 1981.
The land was adjudged by the lower court in favor of private respondents, and Angeles Laurio, Aas the true and lawful
owners of the disputed land.
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. On motion for reconsideration, the same was denied for lack of merit. petitioner
comes to us for a favorable reversal. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:
1. Whether or not a claim of ownership by a mere possession for more than twenty (20) years is meritorious.
2. Whether or not the instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding involved constitutes a cloud upon
the petitioners' interest or title in and to said property.

As a general rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive upon this Court. Such
factual findings shall not be disturbed normally unless the same are palpably unsupported by the evidence on record or
the judgment itself is based on a misapprehension of facts. 
Upon an examination of the records, the Court finds no evident reason to depart from the general rule.
Petitioner's claim that he acquired ownership over the disputed land through possession for more than twenty (20)
years is likewise unmeritorious. While Art. 1134 of the Civil Code provides that "ownership and other real rights over
immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years," this provision of law must
be read in conjunction with Art. 1117 of the same Code. This article states that ". . . ordinary acquisitive prescription of
things requires possession in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law." Hence, a prescriptive title to real
estate is not acquired by mere possession thereof under claim of ownership for a period of ten years unless such
possession was acquired con justo tilulo y buena fe (with color of title and good faith). 
Petitioners have not satisfactorily met the requirements of good faith and just title. As aptly observed by the
trial court, the plaintiff's admitted acts of converting boundary line (Bugsayon River) into a ricefield and thereafter
claiming ownership thereof were acts constituting deprivation of the rights of others and therefore "tantamount to bad
faith." To allow petitioner to benefit from his own wrong would run counter to the maxim ex dolo malo non oritur
actio (no man can allowed to found a claim upon his own wrongdoing).
Petitioner's alleged possession in 1962 up to September 1983 when private respondents entered the property in
question spanned twenty-one (21) years. This period of time is short of the thirty-year requirement mandated by Art.
1137.
Petitioner basically anchors his claim over the property on the survey plan prepared upon his request, the tax
declaration in his name, the commissioner's report on the relocation survey, and the survey plan. Respondent court
correctly held that these documents do not conclusively demonstrate petitioner's title over Lot Nos. 3918-A and 3606.
A survey under a proprietary title is not a conveyance. It is an instrument sui generis in the nature of a partition;
Therefore, a survey, not being a conveyance, is not a mode of acquiring ownership.
Furthermore, the plan was not verified and approved by the Bureau of Lands in accordance with Sec. 28, paragraph 5 of
Act No. 2259, the Cadastral Act, as amended by Sec. 1862 of Act No. 2711. A survey plan not verified and approved by
said Bureau is nothing more than a private writing, the due execution and authenticity of which must be proven in
accordance with Sec. 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Similarly, petitioner's tax declaration issued under his name is not even persuasive evidence of his claimed
ownership over the land in dispute. A tax declaration, by itself, is not considered conclusive evidence of ownership. It is
merely an indicium of a claim of ownership. Tax Declaration No. 8717 states that petitioner's property has an area of
3.2800 hectares while the totality of his claim according to the commissioned geodetic engineer's survey amounts to
4.1385 hectares. There is therefore a notable discrepancy of 8,585 square meters. On the other hand, private
respondent's claimed property, as borne out by Tax Declaration No. 12738, totals 5.5 hectares, a more proximate
equivalent of the 5.2433-hectare property as shown by the commissioner's report.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED and the questioned Decision of the
Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. This Decision is immediately executory. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Kapunan and Purisima, JJ., concur.
HEIRS OF MANINGDING VS CA

Facts:

Heirs of Maningding and Bauzon claim that they own the disputed lots in common and pro-indiviso.
Bauzon aver that their father Roque was the owner of the lots by virtue of a deed of donation.

According to the Maningdings, Roque repudiated the co-ownership over the sugarland in 1965 and
adjudicated it to himself and Maningding renounced and quitclaimed their shares over the riceland in
favour of Roque. Roque transferred the Riceland to his son, Luis and the sugarland to his daughter,
Eriberta, both evidenced by deeds of sale.

Heirs of Maningding allegedly discovered the transfers made by Roque Bauzon in favor of his children
only in 1986. Consequently, the heirs sought the partition of the properties as well as the accounting of
the produce but were unsuccessful.

Bauzon’s contentions:

*the Affidavit of Quitclaim and Renunciation over the riceland was executed not only by Juan
Maningding and Maria Maningding but also by Segunda Maningding.

* denied having executed the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication with regard to the sugarland.

* had been in open, continuous, notorious, adverse and actual possession of the subject properties.

Issue:

WON Rogue Bauzon acquired ownership over the subject properties by acquisitive prescription.

Ruling:

YES.

Rogue Bauzon acquired ownership over the subject properties by acquisitive prescription.
Prescription, in general, is a mode of acquiring (or losing) ownership and other real rights through the
lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the possession
should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse. Acquisitive
prescription is either ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in
good faith and with just title for ten (10) years. In extraordinary prescription ownership and other real
rights over immovable property are acquired through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for
thirty (30) years, without need of title or of good faith.

The disputed lots are unregistered lands, both parcels being covered only by tax declarations formerly
in the name of Ramon Bauzon and now transferred to Luis and Eriberta Bauzon. While tax declarations
and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership, yet, when coupled with proof of actual
possession, as in the instant case, tax declarations and receipts are strong evidence of ownership.

In the instant case, Roque Bauzon possessed the subject parcels of land in the concept of owner by
virtue of the donation propter nuptias. The possession was public as it was Roque Bauzon who
personally tilled and cultivated the lots. The acts of reaping the benefits of ownership were manifest
and visible to all. These acts were made more pronounced and public considering that the parcels of
land are located in a municipality wherein ownership and possession are particularly and normally
known to the community. Roque peacefully possessed the properties as he was never ousted
therefrom nor prevented from enjoying their fruits. His possession was uninterrupted and in good
faith because of his well- founded belief that the donation propter nuptias was properly executed and
the grantors were legally allowed to convey their respective shares in his favor. He likewise
appropriated to himself the whole produce of the parcels of land to the exclusion of all others.
Prescription, as a rule, does not run in favor of a co-heir or co-owner as long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. 11 Co- owners cannot acquire by prescription the share of the
other co-owners, absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership. In order that title may prescribe in
favor of one of the co-owners, it must be clearly shown that he has repudiated the claims of the
others, and that they were apprised of his claim of adverse and exclusive ownership, before the
prescriptive period would begin to run. Mere refusal to accede to a partition, without specifying the
grounds for such refusal, cannot be considered as notice to the other co-owners of the occupant's
claim of title in himself in repudiation of the co-ownership. The evidence relative to the possession, as
a fact upon which the alleged prescription is based, must be clear, complete and conclusive in order to
establish said prescription without any shadow of doubt; and when upon trial it is not shown that the
possession of the claimant has been adverse and exclusive and opposed to the rights of the others,
the case is not one of ownership, and partition will lie. 12

Therefore while prescription among co-owners cannot take place when the acts of ownership
exercised are vague and uncertain, such prescription arises and produces all its effects when the acts
of ownership do not evince any doubt as to the ouster of the rights of the other co-owners. As
disclosed by the records, Roque Bauzon and his heirs possessed the property from 1948 to 1986 to the
exclusion of petitioners who were never given their shares of the fruits of the properties, for which
reason they demanded an accounting of the produce and the conveyance to them of their shares.
Unfortunately they slept on their rights and allowed almost thirty-six (36) years to lapse before
attempting to assert their right. Perforce, they must suffer the consequence of their inaction
SOLIS V. BARROSO (53 PHIL 912)

TOPIC: Article 1773

FACTS:

The spouses Juan Lambino and Maria A. Barroso made a donation of propter nuptias of the lands
described in the complaint in favor of their son Alejo Lambino and Fortunata Solis in a private
document in consideration of the marriage which the latter were about to enter into. One of the
conditions of this donation is that in case of the death of one of the donees, one-half of these lands
thus donated would revert to the donors while the surviving donee would retain the other half. Alejo
Lambino and Fortunata Solis were married and immediately thereafter the donors delivered the
possession of the donated lands to them. However, donee Alejo Lambino died and in the same year
donor Juan Lambino also died. After the latter's death, Juan’s wife recovered possession of the
donated lands.

The surviving donee Fortunata Solis filed the action, which is the subject matter of this appeal,
against the surviving donors and heirs of the deceased donor Juan Lambino, with their respective
husbands, demanding of the defendants the execution of the proper deed of donation according to
law. The court rendered judgment based upon Article 1279 of the Civil Code in favor of plaintiff.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not Article 1279 of the Civil Code is applicable

RULING:

NO, Article 1279 of the Civil Code, relating to contracts, is not applicable to the present case. The
case at bar is a donation propter nuptias which is not valid and did not create any right, since it was
not made in a public instrument. Article 633 provides that in order that a donation of real property may
be valid, it must be made in a public instrument. This is the article applicable to donation propter
nuptias in so far as its formal validity is concerned. Hence, Article 1279 of the Civil Code which the
lower court applied is not applicable thereto. The last named article provides that, should the law
require the execution of an instrument or any other special form in order to make the obligations of a
contract effective, the contracting parties may compel each other to comply with such formality from
the moment that consent has been given, and the other requirements for the validity of the contract
exist. Suffice it to state that this article refers to contracts and is inapplicable to the donation in
question which must be governed by the rules on donations. It may further be noted, at first sight, that
this article presupposes the existence of a valid contract and cannot possibly refer to the form
required in order to make it valid, which it already has, but rather to that required simply to make it
effective, and for this reason, it would, at all events, be inapplicable to the donation in question,
wherein the form is required precisely to make it valid.

Moreover, in donations propter nuptias, the marriage is really a consideration, but not in the sense of
being necessary to give birth to the obligation. This may be clearly inferred from Article 1333, which
makes the fact that the marriage did not take place a cause for the revocation of such donations, thus
taking it for granted that there may be a valid donation propter nuptias, even without marriage, since
that which has not existed cannot be revoked. And such a valid donation would be forever valid, even
if the marriage never took place, if the proper action for revocation were not instituted, or if it were
instituted after the lapse of the statutory period of prescription. This is, so because the marriage in a
donation propter nuptias is rather a resolutory condition which, as such, presupposes the existence of
the obligation which may be resolved or revoked, and it is not a condition necessary for the birth of
the obligation.