Accepted Manuscript

Title: Quantitative Risk Analysis of Fire and Explosion on the

Top-Side LNG-Liquefaction Process of LNG-FPSO

Author: Seungkyu Dan Chang Jun Lee Jeongpil Park Dongil

Shin En Sup Yoon

PII: S0957-5820(14)00057-3
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1016/j.psep.2014.04.011
Reference: PSEP 438

To appear in: Process Safety and Environment Protection

Received date: 1-10-2013

Revised date: 16-4-2014
Accepted date: 23-4-2014

Please cite this article as: Dan, S., Lee, C.J., Park, J., Shin, D., Yoon,
E.S.,Quantitative Risk Analysis of Fire and Explosion on the Top-Side LNG-
Liquefaction Process of LNG-FPSO, Process Safety and Environment Protection
(2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.psep.2014.04.011

This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication.
As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript.
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Highlights
▶ We suggested a simplified procedure of QRA for the top-side process of off-
shore platforms.
▶ We conducted the proposed QRA for the LNG-liquefaction process of
LNG-FPSO.
▶ From the results, we showed additional protection is not required under

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ALARP criteria.
▶ For safer design and operation, we recommended the selection of IPL to
meet the SIL 3.

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Quantitative Risk Analysis of Fire and Explosion on the Top-Side
LNG-Liquefaction Process of LNG-FPSO

Seungkyu Dana,c, Chang Jun Leed, Jeongpil Parkb, Dongil Shinb *, En Sup Yoona,c

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a
School of Chemical and Biological Engineering, Seoul National University, 1 Gwanak-ro, Gwanak-gu, Seoul

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151-742, Korea
b
Department of Chemical Engineering, Myongji University, 116 Myongji-ro, Cheoin-gu, Yongin, Gyeonggido
449-728, Korea

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c
Automation and Systems Research Institute, Seoul National University, 1 Gwanak-ro, Gwanak-gu, Seoul 151-
742, Korea
d
Department of Safety Engineering, Pukyong National University, 100 Yongdang-dong, Nam-gu, Busan 608-739,
Korea

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*Corresponding Author
Dongil Shin: dongil@mju.ac.kr

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†
Corresponding author: dongil@mju.ac.kr
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Quantitative Risk Analysis of Fire and Explosion on the Top-Side
LNG-Liquefaction Process of LNG-FPSO

Seungkyu Dana,c, Chang Jun Leed, Jeongpil Parkb, Dongil Shinb †, En Sup Yoona,c

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a
School of Chemical and Biological Engineering, Seoul National University, 1 Gwanak-ro, Gwanak-gu, Seoul

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151-742, Korea
b
Department of Chemical Engineering, Myongji University, 116 Myongji-ro, Cheoin-gu, Yongin, Gyeonggido
449-728, Korea

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c
Automation and Systems Research Institute, Seoul National University, 1 Gwanak-ro, Gwanak-gu, Seoul 151-
742, Korea
d
Department of Safety Engineering, Pukyong National University, 100 Yongdang-dong, Nam-gu, Busan 608-739,
Korea

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Abstract
Since the massive use and production of fuel oil and natural gas, the excavating locations of buried energy-

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carrying material are moving further away from onshore, eventually requiring floating production systems like
Floating Production, Storage and Offloading (FPSO). Among those platforms, LNG-FPSO will play a leading
role to satisfy the global demands for the natural gas in near future; the LNG-FPSO system is designed to deal
with all the LNG processing activities, near the gas field. However, even a single disaster on an offshore plant
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would put the whole business into danger. In this research, the risk of fire and explosion in the LNG-FPSO is
assessed by quantitative risk analysis, including frequency and consequence analyses, focusing on the LNG
liquefaction process (DMR cycle). The consequence analysis is modeled by using a popular analysis tool
PHAST. To assess the risk of this system, 5 release model scenarios are set for the LNG and refrigerant leakages
from valves, selected as the most probable scenarios causing fire and explosion. From the results, it is found that
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the introduction of additional protection methods to reduce the effect of fire and explosion under ALARP
criteria is not required, and two cases of the selection of independent protection layers are recommended to meet
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the SIL level of failure rate for safer design and operation in the offshore environment.

Keywords: LNG-FPSO; Quantitative risk analysis; Safety integrity level; Fire and explosion
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1. Introduction
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With the pursuit of the prosperity of human beings, ever-increasing amounts of energy are used all over the
world. Among various forms of energy, fuel oil and natural gas have been preferred sources since the 20th
century. With the necessity to move the focus of developing the energy-buried locations of these natural
resources to offshore, from onshore, floating production systems have recently seen more popularity for
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industries. The FPSO, which is one of the promising technologies, can play a critical role, including offshore
drilling, pretreatment, and transportation. Especially, LNG-FPSO has been developed to cover all part of the
LNG-producing processes on the offshore gas field. Table 1 shows the main components of the gas and oil
produced by LNG-FPSO. Depending on the number of carbons, the natural gas is determined into LNG, LPG,
condensate, and oil.

[Table 1 locates here…]

[Figure 1 locates here…]

[Figure 2 locates here…]

Figures 1 and 2 are typical block diagrams of the LNG liquefaction plant of inland and as the top-side of
LNG-FPSO, respectively (Hwang et al., 2009). The overall processing procedures of an LNG plant are as
follows:

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 (1) The raw natural gas extracted from the well or other supply is treated to separate gas and condensates,
depending on the producing field. Then, lighter hydrocarbons, such as methane, ethane, propane and
butane, which are components of LNG and LPG, are compressed and pre-treated to be sent to the
liquefaction part.

(2) Impurities, such as carbon dioxide which forms hydrates, and hydrogen sulfide, which is corrosive and
toxic, are removed from the lighter hydrocarbon through acid gas removal column.

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(3) After removal of acid gases, natural gas goes to absorber and regeneration column to remove water,

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which would form ice, and mercury that would damage equipment and pipes.

(4) Natural gas after the removal of impurities is condensed to LNG through liquefaction system, processed

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via compression and expansion cycles, using equipment such as heat exchanger, expansion valve,
compressor, etc.

[Figure 3 locates here…]

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Typically, LNG plants for onshore and offshore have almost the same structure. However, the required safety
levels could be different. Compared with onshore LNG plant, LNG-FPSO is a compact structure and has the
limitation in space (see Figure 3). In addition, it is very important to safely handle or manage the flammable gas,

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main sources of causing accidents of fire and explosion. Ever since the Piper Alpha accident, it is well known
that these accidents can bring great damages to all of the facilities as well as human operators on the offshore
platform. To prevent accidents, the risk factors of fire and explosion in LNG-FPSO has to be thoroughly
evaluated and managed properly. However, previous researches of floating-facilities have been conducted with
the focus on the consideration of structure and general guidelines of risk assessment (Brandsæter, 2002; Pula et
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al., 2005; Suardin et al., 2009; Vinnem et al., 2003). Thus, the quantitative risk assessment, including reliable
data, is valuable for the further confirmation of risk and the acceptable reduction of hazard.

In this research, the risk based on quantitative risk analysis (QRA), including frequency and consequence
analyses, is assessed. Because QRA of the LNG-liquefaction on the top-side of LNG FPSO is not performed
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before, results of this study can be reflected later to produce the improved design of the layout of the top-side. In
the next section, the basic backgrounds of analysis method are reviewed. Section 3 describes the accident
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scenarios for QRA. Sections 4 and 5 give results and concluding remarks.
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2. Proposed Procedure of Risk Analysis for LNG-FPSO

The quantitative risk analysis is usually not finished by a single step and includes a recycle loop, as shown in
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Figure 4. However, the top-side of an offshore process is designed by mostly basing on already-confirmed cases
of onshore processes, and the process equipments of similar kind being used in onshore plants are easily adopted
in the offshore processes. Since the basic safety of the offshore process might has been already verified in
onshore plants, this research suggests a simplified procedure of conventional QRA by skipping the recycle loop.
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It would be reasonable conducting the modified QRA and SIL, without recycle loop, for the frequency reduction
of accident in case of the offshore plant.

2.1. Procedure of Quantitative Risk Analysis

QRA is a method to perform the systematic analysis of the risk from hazardous activities. It provides the
information of decision making and helps operators to recognize the significance of existing risks (Center for
Chemical Process Safety, 1999). QRA also gives the guidance to designers or operators for guaranteeing the
safety requirements (Crowl and Louvar, 2002). Figure 4 shows the risk analysis procedure used in this research,
compared to the conventional QRA.

[Figure 4 locates here…]

In this research, the most probable accidental scenarios are assumed based on the review and analysis of
historical documents. And the consequence analysis is conducted by PHASTTM, which is one of the most
popular tools in the field of QRA. Firstly, possible accidents are assumed and their effects of fire and explosion
are calculated in terms of radiation and overpressure (Koo et al., 2009). Next, the frequency analysis is
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performed by the analysis of historical data. Throughout the combination of consequence and frequency
analyses, the risk is calculated for assessment.

2.2. Safety Integrity Level (SIL)

SIL is the requirements of confidence level to assure the accomplishment of the qualified safety
characteristics of a system. It contributes to reducing the dangerous failure rate or tolerable hazard rate. SIL is
determined by a set of quantitative factors (e.g., failure rate, failure frequency reduction factor, etc.) in
combination with qualitative factors such as selection of process equipment and safety life cycle management

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(Dowell III, 1998; Ko and Kim, 2005). According to the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS), SIL can

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be classified by four levels (Mkhida, 2013; Center for Chemical Process Safety, 1999), and the three levels
relevant to this research are as follows:

(1) SIL 1: Safety Instrumented Functions (SIF) are normally implemented with a single sensor, a single

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Safety Instrumented System (SIS) logic solver, and a single final control element.

(2) SIL 2: SIFs are typically fully redundant from the sensor through the logic solver to the final control

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element.

(3) SIL 3: SIFs are typically fully redundant from the sensor through the logic solver to the final control
element and require careful design and frequent proof tests to achieve low probability of failure-on-

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demand figures.

Table 2 summarizes the correlation between SIL and the probability of failure-on-demand (PFD) used in this
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study. More details of SIL can be found in Dowell III (1998). Even though many companies have a limited
number of SIL 3 SIFs due to the high cost normally associated with this architecture, CCPS recommends the
SIL 3. Considering the harsh operational environment of FPSO, this research focuses on recommending
selections of IPL for the satisfaction of SIL 3. To mitigate the frequency of accidents, independent protection
layer (IPL) is selected, according to the criteria of PFD, to determine the required SIL (Gulland, 2004).
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[Table 2 locates here…]

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3. Selection of Accident Scenarios for Quantitative Risk Analysis

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LNG is a flammable gas which causes fire and explosion in specific conditions, and the accidents can take
place anywhere (Dan et al, 2011). Since the accident scenarios are important and determine the quality of the
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QRA to be conducted, the accident scenarios are first built considering the previous cases of accidents of LNG
liquefaction system in onshore as well as the design information of the LNG-FPSO process of this study.

3.1. Notable LNG Accidents in the Liquefaction Process

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A valve failure in the LNG facilities had occurred in Algeria, in 1977. A worker was dead due to low
temperature of LNG. With no ignition, however, there was no more serious disaster like fire or explosion
(California State Lands Commission, 2007). An explosion at a steam boiler that is part of the LNG plant
occurred in Algeria, Skikda, in 2004. The results of the accident was death of 27 people and injuries of 72
people, in addition to the destruction of the LNG plant and damage to the outside of the plant’s boundaries
(Darley, 2004). Thus, these kind of risk related to the flammable gas have to be properly assessed when the safe
design is considered. Some appropriate design and technique of accident prevention are very helpful methods
with less time, effort, and cost (Han et al., 2013).

3.2. Accident Scenario Development for the LNG-FPSO

In many parts of the top-side of LNG-FPSO, the liquefaction process is the most capital-intensive part which
is equivalent to 70% of the total top-side cost and 32% of the whole LNG-FPSO cost. Most operating conditions
of the process are in high pressure and temperature, and the resulting risk of fire and explosion is very high.
Once an accident occurs, it affects not only facilities but also living quarters, including accommodation for
offshore personnel, the temporary refuge, control rooms, offices and dining, and recreation lounges.

Page 5 of 31
 [Figure 5 locates here…]

To estimate the effect of the explosion and fire, the risk assessment is carried out based on the dual mixed
refrigerant (DMR) cycle, among many liquefaction systems. The DMR cycle is to be utilized in the LNG
liquefaction system to be adopted in the LNG-FPSO under consideration of this research. Figure 5 shows a
schematic diagram of the DMR cycle. This system has two cycles and consists of two sea water coolers, three
compressors, four heat exchangers, five expansion valves instead of expanders, and two phase separators.
Precooling refrigerant, composed of methane, ethane, propane and butane, passes precooling, liquefaction, and

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super-cooling steps. It is cooled by the main refrigerant mixture, composed of nitrogen, methane, ethane, and

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propane, in the liquefaction/super-cooling step as well as by the natural gas in the precooling step. Then the
natural gas is cooled by the main refrigerant, producing LNG in the liquefaction and super-cooling step. The
precooling refrigerant drops the temperature of natural gas, main refrigerant, and itself circulated inside the
precooler cold box. The main refrigerant also liquefies and super cools the natural gas passing through the cold

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box (Venkatarathnam, 2008; Hwang et al., 2013).

The accident scenario of this case study is adapted from a previous research related to the optimization of

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process condition of DMR cycle to be installed in the LNG-FPSO. First of all, the leakage points are assumed at
five expansion valves which have the most probable failure rate in the liquefaction process in general. And the
size of the leakage is selected with three different hole sizes (5, 50, 100 mm), to confirm the effect varying with
the leak size. For these accident scenarios, immediate ignition may result in a jet fire while delayed ignition
would result in a flash fire and explosion. Because leaked liquid is immediately turned into gas, a pool fire is not

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considered in this research (Dan et al., 2013; Spouge, 1999). Table 3 shows the process condition and
composition of the materials inside each expansion valve being used in the DMR cycle.

[Table 3 locates here…]

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The effect of explosion, in general, is more dependent on the amount of flammable gas and concentration than
the case of fire. Since not all of released gas is participated in explosion or fire, the effects of weather, like wind
speed or atmospheric stability, are important factors to decide the amount of diluted flammable mass before
ignition (Woodward, 1998). The duration is set as 10 minutes for explosion in this case study. Table 4 shows
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the effect of wind speed on the sea, classified in 13 categories according to the Beaufort scale, and this
classification is applicable as weather condition for risk assessment at offshore platforms in the same manner
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(Huler, 2004). In previous research, the wind speed at offshore environment under 1.5 m/s is occupying less
than 3 percent of the whole sea conditions (HSE, 2004). Thus, our assumption for this scenario of wind speed is
set as 1.5 m/s which would correspond to the worst-case scenario, producing the concentration of flammable gas
causing the maximum dangerous condition for fire or explosion. In case of higher wind speed, the diffusion
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range of flammable gas can be wider than low wind speed. The assumption of low wind speed is also reasonable
to maintain the concentration of flammable gas in the range of explosion limit for late ignition cases (Vinnem,
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2014; Crowl and Louvar, 2002). The worst-case scenario of atmospheric stability is selected and applied with F
level according to the Pasquill stability (very stable condition). It becomes hard to spread to the surrounding
because of less dispersion.

[Table 4 locates here…]

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4. Results and Discussion

4.1. Consequence Analysis
This research focused on the most probable three types of accidents on the topside, such as jet fire, explosion
and flash fire. Figures 6-8 show the consequence analysis results for 5mm, 50mm and 100mm hole studies of
Cases 1-3, simulated by PHAST 6.5. In case of jet fire, horizontal and vertical axes indicate the radiation level
and distance of downwind direction, respectively. In cases of explosion and flash fire, horizontal and vertical
axes mean the distance of downwind and crosswind direction, respectively. The contour lines of explosion are
the overpressure circles of 1 bar, 0.3 bar and 0.1 bar, and the smallest circle of 1 bar appears near to the center.
The contour lines of flash fire are concentration of diluted flammable gas, and the small circle is low flammable
limit line to occur the flash fire. The numerical results of all case studies are summarized to calculate the risk of
this facility, in Table 5.

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 The fatalities, which are the degree of damage to human, were applied based on the following criteria. The
radiation effect of the fire is classified with two criteria which are 37.5 kW/m2 and 12.5 kW/m2. These values
indicate 100% fatality and 50% fatality, respectively. Also, the overpressure from the explosion is classified
with three criteria which are 1 bar, 0.3 bar and 0.1 bar. These values indicate 100% fatality, 50% fatality and
10% fatality, respectively (Center for Chemical Process Safety, 1999).

The effects for accident scenarios become more dangerous when the failure leakage has larger hole size. In
case of small leakage size (5 mm), with the assumption of 10-min release, the results of the accident are too

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small to affect other facilities or a person, because most leaked liquid is turned to gas and immediately diluted

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with air. In case of large amount of release (100 mm leak), the results affect all of the top-side of vessel. These
effects of the accidents can be reduced by setting up protection measures such as protection wall, water curtain,
etc. The effect in reducing the risk is indicated in Section 4.5.

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[Table 5 locates here…]

[Figure 6 locates here…]

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[Figure 7 locates here…]

[Figure 8 locates here…]

4.2. Frequency Analysis

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Frequency analysis was conducted by the Event Tree Analysis (ETA), to calculate the possibilities of
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accidents occurring from the expansion valve leakage. The generic failure data was referred from E&P Forum
and OGP data (E&P Forum, 1992; OGP, 2010) to estimate the failure frequency in the DMR cycle of the
liquefaction system.

[Figure 9 locates here…]

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ETA has been conducted by applying three events (see Figure 9). First event is immediate ignition which can
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generate jet fire, and the ignition probability was applied considering the phase and release rate of the
flammable material. Second event is delayed ignition in case the immediate ignition was not occurred. The
classified accidents are closely related to the time of ignition, as shown in the first and second events. The
duration of the delays to the ignition affect to the type and magnitude of accident. In case of delayed ignition,
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we assumed that the release time would be sufficient enough to form the mass of flammable gas for the worst
case of accident, such as VCE or flash fire. The probability of delayed ignition was applied with the same way
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of immediate ignition but not using the same data. The ignition probability is related to the concentration of
flammable material in the air and ignition time, but the exact time of ignition is hard to speculate in real cases of
accidents.
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Third event is associated with the surrounding area where the gas release and dispersion happens, divided as
congested or confined space, with 50% probability assigned to each. This simple, equal assignment on the space
type has been assumed because the detailed design of the top-side is not yet available and the occupancy ratio of
each space type is hard to be calculated. Delayed ignition combined with the congested and confined area can
give the result of flash fire and explosion, respectively. As the detailed layout of the space is not yet available at
this early stage of design, we could not run the CFD-based simulation which would estimate the dilution effect
more precisely. In this way, the effect of dilution has been reflected on the type of space (confined or congested)
where the dilution occurs and the corresponding type of accident happens. And the assumed valve leakage was
small, medium, and large-size holes. Table 6 shows the outcome frequency of accidents for each scenario.

[Table 6 locates here…]

In Table 6, initial failure frequency means the failure rate of equipment. In other words, it is the probability
of release of flammable material. The outcome frequency means the probability of the resulting accident coming
from the ETA that is calculated from the failure frequency multiplied by the ignition probability.

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 The fatality was applied to the frequency analysis: when the fatality is 100 %, the outcome frequency is
multiplied by 1. In the same way, 50 % and 10 % fatalities would be applied depending on the consequence
levels, discussed in the previous section, to the results of frequency analysis to calculate the risk of LNG-FPSO.
The outcome frequency obtained was in the range from 4.465E-06 (the lowest frequency data) to 3.810E-05 (the
highest frequency data) according to the process condition. The fatalities are adapted to the frequency data in the
same manner of results of consequence analysis. The failure frequency of each case is utilized to determine the
demanded SIL according to the classification in Table 2.

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4.3. Risk Contour of the Accidents

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From the analysis, the risk contour is described to confirm the risk distribution by the fire and explosion
accidents of LNG liquefaction system on the top-side of LNG-FPSO. Figure 10 shows the risk contour and
distribution resulting from the consequence and frequency analyses and fatalities, obtained through the
quantitative risk analysis.

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Based on the distribution of risk contour map, the individual risk is summarized as Table 7. The maximum
individual risk is 5.473E-04 at the expansion valve of Case 1, and the minimum individual risk is zero about 500

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m, which is around the bow part, from the Case 1 point (reaching no effects from the accident of liquefaction
system). Average individual risks of each case are organized around 5 m from the ignition point surrounding the
expansion valve. These individual risks are under the tolerable criteria to person, generally accepted in case of
existing installed systems or facilities (Yoo et al., 2009).

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[Figure 10 locates here…]

[Table 7 locates here…]

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4.4. Recommendation of Safety Integrity Level
To meet the criteria of SIL level, failure frequency has to be reduced by adopting a set of safety instrumented
systems (SIS). Originally, selecting IPL for meeting the SIL requires confirming the existing SIS like controller,
sensor, alarm, etc. However, this study assumed that the basic IPLs are not yet installed and these controller and
IPLs have to be prepared later for safe operation. The reason of the aforementioned assumption is lack of the
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released information and design about the LNG-FPSO to the research community. More critical analysis about
the SIS and SIL would need exact control system and piping and instrument diagram (P&ID).
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In this research, the method to decrease failure rate was suggested to satisfy the SIL level 3 which is
recommended for process plants by the Center for Chemical Process Safety. Table 8 shows the failure rate of
each case about 5 mm leakage which has bigger rate than the 50 mm and 100 mm cases. All failure rates are
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relevant to SIL level 2, and an IPL satisfying the SIL level 3 is required.
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[Table 8 locates here…]

The accidents always have prognostic signs such as degraded performance of an equipment or near-miss.
Thus, the detection methods are one of good measures to protect accidents or loss of production. In case of this
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scenario, sensing or alarm monitoring is recommended to detect pressure change or check flow rates before and
after at each valve, because all cases are related to the pressure of expansion valve. These alarms and sensors are
helpful to decrease the ignition probability by detecting the drop of pressure, released gas or other symptoms.

4.5. Discussion about the Results of Assessment

The consequence and frequency analyses as quantitative risk analysis were conducted to analyze the risk of
fire and explosion out of the release from valves. The results of quantitative risk analysis of DMR cycle for
LNG liquefaction process show tolerable value in terms of individual risk affecting around the process. In case
of frequency analysis, the highest failure rate is 5.797E-03, and the sum of outcome frequency which can take
place fire and explosion is 8.56E-04. This value shows no significant difference with 6.721E-04 that is a sum of
result from the risk analysis of fire and explosion related with release in an existing LNG carrier (Vanem et al.,
2008).

The results of this research need to be expanded to include the actual effects or frequency of accidents
reflecting the offshore environment, such as the motion of vessel and the difficulty in corrosion tests. The exact
failure rate and parts count related to the actual LNG liquefaction process of the coming LNG-FPSO should be

Page 8 of 31
adapted to the analysis for more robust frequency analysis. The current result still brings us insight to assess the
applicability of liquefaction process to the offshore platform.

The effect to nearby equipments causing domino effects is also very important issue in congested systems like
LNG-FPSO (Bernechea et al., 2013). Some protection methods preventing propagation of accidents could be
determined by considering the results of consequence analysis of this research. For example, an installation of
water curtain around the facilities can result in the reduction of at least 35 % up to 57 % of the fire effect from
close-by equipment under certain condition (Buchlin, 2005). The efficiency of these protection methods should

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be confirmed and verified before selection and installation, by better using other advanced assessment methods

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based on CFD, considering distribution of release, overpressure, and heat radiation precisely. In case of
consequence analysis, the results from CFD-based estimation are considered as more accurate in confirming the
probable distribution of flammable materials.

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5. Conclusion

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Even though the general procedure of risk assessment for offshore platforms, for the confirmation of the risk
and acquisition of information, has been available, the previous research results have been limited to structural
assessment and mechanical analysis, mostly focused on the hull-side. Therefore, to prevent worst effect from
fire and explosion, which are the most disastrous events on the top-side, quantitative risk assessment result, even

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in preliminary stages, can be utilized for the design reflecting offshore environment. In this research, the
quantitative risk analysis of the liquefaction system of LNG-FPSO was assessed, with emphasis on the
fire/explosion consequence in the top-side of the floating platform. From the consequence and frequency
analysis of the DMR cycle to be used in the liquefaction process, it was confirmed that the jet fire, explosion,
and flash fire would be possible accidents from the most probable release scenario, the release at expansion
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valves. From the quantitative risk assessment, the maximum individual risk was 5.473E-04, which is tolerable
under the ALARP risk criteria. The results of the frequency analysis corresponded to the SIL 2, meaning that the
SIL level is in a safe state, and candidates for independent protection layer was recommended for satisfying the
enhanced risk criteria like SIL 3, enabling safer design or operation in the harsh offshore environment. Because
the liquefaction process and other systems on a floating platform is compact and vulnerable to severe operating
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environments than the similar process on land, consideration of the sloshing effect from ship motion might give
us a better estimate of accident frequency and consequence than the result obtained from the used model.
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Acknowledgement
This work has been supported by the Energy Efficiency & Resources Program of the Korea Institute of Energy
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Technology Evaluation and Planning (KETEP) Grant funded by the Korea Government Ministry of Trade,
Industry & Energy (No. 2011T100200023).
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Han, K., Kim, Y. H., Jang, N., Kim, H., Shin, D., Yoon, E. S., 2013. Risk Index Approach for the Optimal
Layout of Chemical Processes Minimizing Risk to Humans. Ind. Eng. Chem. Res., 52(22), 7274-7281.
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Poetry. Crown
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Nineteenth International Offshore and Polar Engineering Conference.

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3rd Ed. Springer, London.
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offshore installations in the operational phase, in: ESREL 2003, Maastricht, The Netherlands.
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the Consequence Analysis of LNG Spills. Proceedings of the 1st Annual Gas Processing Symposium.
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Condition of Dual Mixed Refrigerant Cycle of LNG FPSO Topside Liquefaction Process. Journal of the
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(SIS). Process Saf. Environ. Prot., http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.psep.2013.01.001
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Venkatarathnam, G., 2008. Cryogenic Mixed Refrigerant Process. Springer-Verlga, New York.
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 t
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Figure 1. Schematic diagram of a typical LNG plant

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Figure 2. Schematic diagram of an LNG plant on the top-side of the LNG-FPSO (adapted from Hwang et al., 2009)
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Figure 3. Main modules to be installed on the top-side of the LNG-FPSO

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Figure 4. Procedure of quantitative risk analysis along with the activities performed for LNG-FPSO (adapted from Center
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for Chemical Process Safety, 1999)

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Figure 5. LNG liquefaction system (dual mixed refrigerant cycle) (adapted from Lee et al., 2012)
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(a) Jet fire

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(b) Explosion
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(c) Flash fire

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Figure 6. The consequence analysis results for 5mm-hole studies of Case 1 simulated by PHASTTM

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 t
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(a) Jet fire

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(b) Explosion
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(c) Flash fire

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Figure 7. The consequence analysis results for 50mm-hole studies of Case 2 simulated by PHASTTM

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 t
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(a) Jet fire

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(b) Explosion
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(c) Flash fire

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Figure 8. The consequence analysis results for 100mm-hole studies of Case 3 simulated by PHASTTM

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Figure 9. Event tree analysis for the accident on the top-side of LNG-FPSO
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Figure 10. Risk contour assessed by consequence and frequency analyses

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Table 1. Main components of each gas and oil
Categorization Component Boiling point range

C1: CH4 -161.4 ℃

LNG
C2: CH3CH3 -89.0 ℃

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C3: CH3CH2CH3 -42.07 ℃

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LPG
C4: CH3(CH2)2CH3 -0.5 ℃
C5: CH3(CH2)3CH3 36.07 ℃

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Condensate
C6: CH3(CH2)4CH3 69 ℃
Oil C7 and above More than 79 ℃

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Table 2. Probability of failure on demand corresponding to the safety integrity level
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD)
SIL 4 ≤ 10−5 to < 10−4
SIL 3 ≤ 10−4 to < 10−3
SIL 2 ≤ 10−3 to < 10−2

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SIL 1 ≤ 10−2 to < 10−1

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Table 3. Release scenarios for 5 model-cases
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5
Cause Valve Valve Valve Valve Valve
leakage leakage leakage leakage leakage
Pressure (bar) 19.2 19.2 48.6 48.6 65
Temperature (K) 273.1 240 144.7 113 113

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Flow rate (mol/s) 0.546 0.366 0.71 0.29 0.748

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Nitrogen 0 0 0.03 0.174 0.04
Methane 0 0 0.322 0.659 0.875
Stream
Ethane 0.2202 0.2202 0.363 0.137 0.055

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Mass
fraction Propane 0.6530 0.6530 0.285 0.03 0.021
n-Butane 0.1268 0.1268 0 0 0.005
i-Butane 0 0 0 0 0.003

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i-Pentane 0 0 0 0 0.001
Discharge phase Liquid Liquid Liquid Liquid Liquid
Hole diameters (mm) 5, 50, 100 5, 50, 100 5, 50, 100 5, 50, 100 5, 50, 100

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Table 4. Beaufort scale according to the wind speed (adapted from Huler, 2004 and Halstensen and Nordtun,
2009)
Beaufort Wind Probability distribution of
Description Sea conditions
number speed sea conditions
0 Calm < 0.3 m/s Flat
0.3 - 1.5
1 Light air Ripples without crests
m/s
1.6 – 3.4 40 %

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2 Light breeze Small wavelets
m/s

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3.5 – 5.4
3 Gentle breeze Large wavelets
m/s
5.5 – 7.9
4 Moderate breeze Small waves with breading crests

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m/s
8.0 – 10.7
5 Fresh breeze Moderate waves of some length 50-55 %
m/s
10.8 – 13.8

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6 Strong breeze Long waves begin to form
m/s
13.9 – 17.1
7 High wind Sea heaps up
m/s
17.2 – 20.7 Moderately high waves with

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8 Gale, fresh gale
m/s breaking crests forming spindrift
20.8 – 24.4 High waves whose crests
9 Strong gale
m/s sometimes roll over 5-10 %
Storm, whole 24.5 – 28.4 Very high waves with
10
gale m/s overhanging crests
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28.5 – 32.6
11 Violent storm Exceptionally high waves
m/s
12 Hurricane force >= 32.7 m/s Huge waves
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Table 5. The results of consequence analysis
Case Type of Distance to the corresponding level of hazard (m)
Hole size
No. accident 37.5 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 1 bar 0.3 bar 0.1 bar LFL
Jet fire - 10.25 - - - -
Small
(5mm) Explosion - - 1 3 4 -

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Flash fire - - - - - 8

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Jet fire 66.5 92.4 - - - -
Medium
1
(50mm) Explosion - - 15 51 67 -
Flash fire - - - - - 148

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Jet fire 123.5 172 - - - -
Large
(100mm) Explosion - - 30 160 167 -
Flash fire - - - - - 297

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Jet fire - 10.5 - - - -
Small
(5mm) Explosion - - 2 5 6.5 -
Flash fire - - - - - 13.5
Jet fire 74 97 - - - -

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Medium
2
(50mm) Explosion - - 5 19 22 -
Flash fire - - - - - 288
Jet fire 135 183 - - - -
Large
(100mm) Explosion - - 12 37 38 -
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Flash fire - - - - - 495
Jet fire - 12.5 - - - -
Small
(5mm) Explosion - - 3 5.5 6.8 -
Flash fire - - - - - 14.7
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Jet fire 81 111.5 - - - -

Medium
3
(50mm) Explosion - - 10 30 95 -
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Flash fire - - - - - 217

Jet fire 152.5 210 - - - -
Large
(100mm) Explosion - - 35 200 202 -
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Flash fire - - - - - 410

Jet fire - 12.3 - - - -
Small
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(5mm) Explosion - - 2 4 6 -
Flash fire - - - - - 12.5
Jet fire 72 100 - - - -
Medium
4
(50mm) Explosion - - 20 60 80 -
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Flash fire - - - - - 178

Jet fire 145 197 - - - -
Large
(100mm) Explosion - - 40 250 260 -
Flash fire - - - - - 344
Jet fire - 13.2 - - - -
Small
(5mm) Explosion - - 2 5.1 6.5 -
Flash fire - - - - - 15
Jet fire 85 118 - - - -
Medium
5
(50mm) Explosion - - 25 77 98 -
Flash fire - - - - - 224
Jet fire 160 220 - - - -
Large
(100mm) Explosion - - 37 220 245 -
Flash fire - - - - - 364

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Table 6. The results of frequency analysis
Assigned probability
Case Failure Type of Ignition Outcome
Hole size Immediate Delayed Congestion/ Probability
No. frequency accident Frequency
ignition ignition Confined
Jet fire 0.0035 0.0035 2.029E-05
Small

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5.797E-03 Explosion 0.9965 0.01 0.5 4.983E-03 2.888E-05
(5mm)

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Flash fire 0.9965 0.01 0.5 4.983E-03 2.888E-05
Jet fire 0.0105 0.0105 2.336E-05
Medium
1 2.225E-03 Explosion 0.9895 0.03 0.5 1.484E-02 3.303E-05
(50mm)

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Flash fire 0.9895 0.03 0.5 1.484E-02 3.303E-05
Jet fire 0.028 0.028 2.520E-05
Large
9.000E-04 Explosion 0.972 0.08 0.5 3.888E-02 3.499E-05
(100mm)

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Flash fire 0.972 0.08 0.5 3.888E-02 3.499E-05
Jet fire 0.0035 0.0035 1.413E-05
Small
4.037E-03 Explosion 0.9965 0.01 0.5 4.983E-03 2.011E-05
(5mm)
Flash fire 0.9965 0.01 0.5 4.983E-03 2.011E-05

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Jet fire 0.0105 0.0105 1.496E-05
Medium
2 1.425E-03 Explosion 0.9895 0.03 0.5 1.484E-02 2.115E-05
(50mm)
Flash fire 0.9895 0.03 0.5 1.484E-02 2.115E-05
Jet fire 0.028 0.028 1.400E-05
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Large
5.000E-04 Explosion 0.972 0.08 0.5 3.888E-02 1.944E-05
(100mm)
Flash fire 0.972 0.08 0.5 3.888E-02 1.944E-05
Jet fire 0.0035 0.0035 1.896E-05
Small
5.418E-03 Explosion 0.9965 0.01 0.5 4.983E-03 2.700E-05
(5mm)
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Flash fire 0.9965 0.01 0.5 4.983E-03 2.700E-05

Jet fire 0.0105 0.0105 2.284E-05
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Medium
3 2.175E-03 Explosion 0.9895 0.03 0.5 1.484E-02 3.229E-05
(50mm)
Flash fire 0.9895 0.03 0.5 1.484E-02 3.229E-05
Jet fire 0.028 0.028 2.744E-05
Large
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9.800E-04 Explosion 0.972 0.08 0.5 3.888E-02 3.810E-05

(100mm)
Flash fire 0.972 0.08 0.5 3.888E-02 3.810E-05
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Jet fire 0.0035 0.0035 4.823E-06

Small
1.378E-03 Explosion 0.9965 0.01 0.5 4.983E-03 6.866E-06
(5mm)
Flash fire 0.9965 0.01 0.5 4.983E-03 6.866E-06
Jet fire 0.0105 0.0105 4.465E-06
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Medium
4 4.252E-04 Explosion 0.9895 0.03 0.5 1.484E-02 6.311E-06
(50mm)
Flash fire 0.9895 0.03 0.5 1.484E-02 6.311E-06
Jet fire 0.028 0.028 5.600E-06
Large
2.000E-04 Explosion 0.972 0.08 0.5 3.888E-02 7.776E-06
(100mm)
Flash fire 0.972 0.08 0.5 3.888E-02 7.776E-06
5 Jet fire 0.0035 0.0035 6.783E-06
Small
1.938E-03 Explosion 0.9965 0.01 0.5 4.983E-03 9.656E-06
(5mm)
Flash fire 0.9965 0.01 0.5 4.983E-03 9.656E-06
Jet fire 0.0105 0.0105 8.140E-06
Medium
7.752E-04 Explosion 0.9895 0.03 0.5 1.484E-02 1.151E-05
(50mm)
Flash fire 0.9895 0.03 0.5 1.484E-02 1.151E-05
Large 4.800E-04 Jet fire 0.028 0.028 1.344E-05
(100mm) Explosion 0.972 0.08 0.5 3.888E-02 1.866E-05

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 Flash fire 0.972 0.08 0.5 3.888E-02 1.866E-05

Table 7. The individual risk (IR) from the assessment for Cases 1-5

Type of IR IR Value
Maximum Individual Risk 5.473E-04
Minimum Individual Risk 0

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Average Individual Risk of Case 1 around 5 m 5.222E-04

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Average Individual Risk of Case 2 around 5 m 5.058E-04
Average Individual Risk of Case 3 around 5 m 5.274E-04
Average Individual Risk of Case 4 around 5 m 4.708E-04

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Average Individual Risk of Case 5 around 5 m 4.569E-04

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Table 8. Failure rate of each case for the 5 mm-hole leakage
Case No. Failure frequency
1 5.797E-03
2 4.037E-03
3 5.418E-03
4 1.378E-03

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5 1.938E-03

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