Pakistan-Iran Relations in the

Evolving International Environment

Fatima Raza*

Abstract

Pakistan and Iran are two neighbouring countries with amicable ties
however, the true potential of their relationship still remains untapped. This
research aims to highlight the areas of convergence and divergence
between Iran and Pakistan in the backdrop of the changing international
environment. The US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action (JCPOA) has left many countries, especially Pakistan, in a limbo
chimeral security regarding its projects with Iran. This development reflects
the significance of the US factor in Pak-Iran ties. Other important factors
are the situation in Afghanistan, India’s engagement with Iran, Pak-Saudi
ties and Riyadh-Tehran rivalry. Pakistan and Iran’s relations lack depth
and mutual trust due to their respective alliances of the past. This research
observes that Iran and Pakistan, in light of new alliances and changing
regional and international politics, can revive the lost trust.

Keywords: Iran-Pakistan Relations, Bilateral Ties, International

Environment, US Factor, Afghan Factor, India Factor.

Introduction

The evolving international environment has given rise to a unique range of

challenges for the states co-existing in this anarchical global order. In the
same context, the current international system has entered a phase of
transition where the lack of effective global leadership has played a major
role in forging new alliances and fraying of old ones. The latest and most
novel challenge at hand is the ongoing Corona virus pandemic wreaking
havoc all over the world. Some believe the era of uni-polarity is over as
multiple powers are emerging to replace the hegemonic designs of a single
superpower. On the other hand, many ascribe to Samuel P. Huntington’s
ideas about uni-polarity which maintain that there has remained one
*
The author is Research Associate, Centre for Middle East and Africa (CMEA), Institute of
Strategic Studies Islamabad.

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superpower in the world but there has never been any uni-polarity in the
global political system.1 This viewpoint is also in line with Fareed
Zakariya’s ‘Post-American World’ idea where he predicts that, in the near
future, several major powers will emerge on the world stage making global
politics a ‘Post-American’ affair.2 However, this is not to say that the US
influence has diminished entirely. It only means that there are now more
than one significant stakeholders in international affairs.

On the regional level, instability has prompted countries like Iran, India,
China, Russia and Pakistan to assume a more pronounced role. Similarly, in
Syria, too, the regional countries have become active participants, besides
the United States (US), as Turkey gears up for more ground operations and
Russia controls airspace especially in the northwest Syrian region. China’s
emergence as an economic power with its increasing its engagement in
Asia, Europe, Africa and Latin America is also a sign of changing political
dynamics. This is a subtle indication power transition from its previously
acknowledged center of the US and its Western allies.

For sustenance of its economic growth, China’s grand plan of regional

outreach is based on the idea of ‘shared prosperity’ evident in the form of
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): a huge plan of investment including 68
countries connecting multiple regions. Such is the nature of shifting
geopolitical trends in the current world that just when more and more
countries are warming up to regional connectivity initiatives the US
administration under President Trump is opting out of them. The US
withdrawal from international agreements such as Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP), the Paris Climate Treaty and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA) have further destabilised the state of global politics. In this context
of evolving international environment, Pakistan and Iran emerge as two
neighbours situated in contiguous yet separate geographical regions: South
Asia and the Middle East.

Pakistan-Iran bilateral relations have its roots deeply embedded in the

religious, historical, ethnic and cultural commonalities. Their bilateral ties
have enormous potential as mentioned often by the leaders from both sides.

1
Samuel P. Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower,” Council on Foreign Relations
78, no. 2 (April 1999): 36.
2
Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World: And The Rise of the Rest (Westminster:
Penguin Books Limited, 2011), 216-300.

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However, in tangible terms, the progress to further enhance the ties has
mostly remained slow. As for example, in words of the Iranian Foreign
Minister, Javad Zarif, “Tehran sets no limitations for the expansion of ties
with Islamabad,”3 it has been reciprocated by Pakistan as well but in
practical terms the relationship needs quite a lot of work. The changing
international system demands a more nuanced approach to manage their
mutual relations so that the third-party impact can be minimised as much as
possible. There are many global and regional factors that impact Pak-Iran
bilateral ties such as: the troubling dynamics of US-Iran relations; Europe
and India’s careful balancing act between Iran and the US; and the turbulent
state of affairs in the Middle East.

Historically, the two countries enjoyed more than cordial ties as the pre-
revolution Iran was also a strong US ally at the time. Iran provided Pakistan
with resolute support in the two wars against India and was deeply shocked
by the aftermath of the 1971 war that resulted in loss of the then East
Pakistan. It is said that the Shah of Iran had listed the well-being of Pakistan
as a key term on his foreign policy agenda.4 He was quoted saying, “He
could not tolerate the (further) disintegration of Pakistan,” and that he had
also told the Indians that Iran would come to Pakistan’s aid in case of
further escalation.

What prompted the imbalance in their bilateral relationship was the

regime change of 1979 brought about by the Islamic revolution led by,
Ayatollah Khomeni. In those days, Pakistan was going through its own
phase of ‘Islamisation’ under the military dictatorship of General Zia-ul-
Haq. Perhaps, the two countries could have further enhanced relations if the
sectarian differences had not been as pronounced as they were. Pakistan,
being a Sunni majority nation, had been undergoing radicalisation at the
hands of General Zia’s orthodox religious guidelines while the revolution
had made Iran a Shi’ite Islamic republic. The sectarian rift widened between
the two that led to sectarian clashes in Pakistan during the 90s when Iran
started funding Shi’ite religious institutions in Pakistan5 while the Arab

3
Shireen Hunter, Iran’s Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era (California: ABC-
CLIO, 2010), 25-60.
4
Alex Vatanka, Iran and Pakistan: Security, Diplomacy and American Influence
(London: I.B. Tauris, 2016), 5-29.
5
Alex Vatanka, “The Guardian of Pakistan’s Shia,” Hudson Institute, June 1, 2012,
https://www.hudson.org/research/9863-the-guardian-of-pakistan-s-shia.

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countries such as Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (UAE) lent
financial support to the Sunni outfits in the country.6 The situation turned
dire as sectarian violence became quite common in the country.

However, even with the sectarian divergence, the Iran-Pakistan

diplomatic relations remained cordial. The bond of trust, however, could not
develop as the situation in Afghanistan worsened. Both Iran and Pakistan
found themselves at the opposite sides of the conflict after 1998 when the
Taliban executed Iranian diplomats in Mazar-e-Sharif.7 Before the Iranian
revolution of 1979, Iran, under the pro-Western Shah, and Pakistan had a
common enemy: the Soviet Union. However, after the revolution with
regime change in Iran and the Taliban takeover of the government in Kabul,
Tehran lent support to the Northern Alliance while Pakistan was among the
few countries in the world that recognised the Taliban government in
Afghanistan.

Remaining on opposite sides of the conflict had an adverse impact on

ties between the two countries. However, the credit to maintain cordial
relations rests with untiring diplomatic activity on both sides. In his book,
the Former Ambassador to Iran, Javid Husain, elaborates how the foreign
offices in both countries were more than willing to reduce divergences but
the security establishments showed reluctance that contributed to the mutual
distrust.8

Along with the Afghan factor, the state of US-Iran relations also
affected the Pak-Iran equation quite adversely. The Islamic revolution
estranged Iran’s relations with the US. During the Iran-Iraq war, the US had
sided with Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries against Iran. Pakistan
sided with Iran as opposed to its policy of neutrality towards the Middle
East but what damaged their relations the most was their opposite alliances

6
News Desk, “Tsunami of Money’ from Saudi Arabia Funding 24,000 Pakistan
Madrassas,” Economic Times, January 30, 2016,
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/tsunami-of-
money-from-saudi-arabia-funding-24000-pakistan-
madrassas/articleshow/50781972.cms?from=mdr
7
Nader etal., “Iran and Afghanistan: A Complicated Relationship,” In Iran’s
Influence in Afghanistan: Implications for the US Drawdown, 5-22, RAND
Corporation, 2014, www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt1287mjf.8.
8
Javid Husain, Pakistan and a World in Disorder: A Grand Strategy for the 21 st
Century (Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke, 2016), 105-200.

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in Afghanistan. Post 9/11 however, Pakistan became the frontline state to

side with the US against Taliban. This situation could have brought Iran and
the US on one page but it was right about the time when President George
W. Bush called Iran, Iraq and North Korea, ‘the axis of evil.’9 Hence, the
US factor that had once brought these two neighbours together was now
widening the gulf between them.

Meanwhile, Iran had also forged friendly ties with India, an alliance
about which Pakistan continues to have misgivings to this day. However,
the Iranian response to Pakistan’s apprehension about its relationship is
quite balanced and reassuring, at least apparently. The Iranian
representatives, when asked about it, often reply by drawing parallels
between their relations with India with that of Pakistan’s relations with
Saudi Arabia. There are several useful lessons for Pakistan in the example
of India’s relations with Iran and its strategic partnership with the US as
well. In the backdrop of asymmetrical ties between Pak-Iran relations, the
current paper discusses the two main research questions: a) What are the
current convergences and divergences in Pak-Iran relations with reference
to regional and global politics? b) What are the challenges to and prospects
for Pak-Iran relations in the changing international environment?

Convergences and Divergences in Iran-Pakistan Relations

“On paper, Iran and Pakistan are engaged in a number of efforts designed to
further political and economic integration — from membership in the
Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) to a host of bilateral
agreements on trade[and]security cooperation. There is, however, relatively
very little to show for all of this — and depth in the relationship is still
missing.”10 This observation made by Alex Vatanka is an accurate
description of the ties between these two neighbours that have deep cultural,
linguistic, religious, ethnic and historic bonds with each other.

However, successful bilateral relations especially between neighbours

are judged through indicators like sound economic ties, alignment on
political level, convergence in regional policies, bilateral visits and number

9
Daniel Heradstveit and G. Matthew Bonham, “What the Axis of Evil Metaphor
Did to Iran,” Middle East Journal 61, no. 3(Summer 2007): 430.
10
Alex Vatanka, Iran and Pakistan: Security, Diplomacy and American Influence
(London: I.B. Tauris, 2016), 5-29.

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of active agreements of bilateral and multilateral nature. Apart from these

indicators, it is also crucial that the irritants are also managed amicably.
Unfortunately, in case of Pakistan and Iran, most of these indicators are less
than satisfactory.

A Brief Appraisal of Bilateral Ties

a) Untapped Trade Potential

The bilateral trade volume between Iran and Pakistan stands at US$1.26
billion which is very low as compared to the mutually decided target of
US$5 billion. However, according to the Iranian Consul General Lahore,
Mohammad Reza Nazeri, total bilateral trade volume stands at US$6.25
billion but only US$1.26 billion is channelised through traditional means
and the rest remains informal.11 The Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA)
that was signed between the two countries in 2004 has still not been
replaced by a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Talks have been held several
times for finalising the FTA but no results have reached yet. Proper banking
channels between the two countries that could help facilitate trade have not
been established still which hinder the progress of commerce and trade.
Business communities on both sides suffer greatly due to the lack of swift
banking channels. However, there is a Joint Economic Commission in place
that holds yearly meetings alongside the chambers of commerce meetings
on both sides but, still, such major roadblocks in the way of propagation of
ties remain.

b) Border Unrest

The border between the two countries was dubbed as the ‘border of
friendship’ and has been frequently referred to as the only peaceful border
of both Iran and Pakistan. However, it is not clear how veracious is this
assumption. The border provinces of Balochistan in Pakistan and Sistan-
Baluchestan in Iran have always seen disturbances. On the Iranian side, the
population comprises mostly of ethnic Sunni Balochis who are often
disgruntled with the central Shi’ite government. On the Pakistani side, the
11
Khalid Abbas Saif, “Iranian Envoy Tells FCCI: Trade Volume of Around US$6.25bn
Exists with Pakistan Despite Pressures”, Business Recorder, December 6, 2019,
https://www.brecorder.com/2019/12/06/550875/iranian-envoy-tells-fcci-trade-
volume-of-around-625bn-exists-with-pakistan-despite-pressures/

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population, apart from being ethnically related to the people on the other
side of the border is also a marginalised minority who often remains at odds
with the central government over unfair distribution of resources mostly.
Thus, the shared border is easily exploited by the elements of discord that
have grouped together under different terrorist organisations and disrupt
peace on both sides.

While Iran may have its own complaints, according to the Pakistan’s
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there have been increased incidents of firing
and shelling from Iran into Pakistani territory in the past years.12 The
activities of Jaish al Adal, a Sunni Muslim militant outfit, which is an
offshoot of Jundullah have added to the border unrest such as their
abdication of 12 Iranian border guards from the Mirjaveh town in Iran.13
Some were recovered with Pakistan Army’s efforts while others are still
missing.14 Even more recently than that, six Pakistani soldiers were killed
when a paramilitary convoy came under fire during routine patrol in the
Kech district. Such disturbances when combined with the curious case of
Kulbushan Jadev, the Indian spy who crossed over from the Chahbahar into
Pakistani territory and carried out clandestine activities, also point to the
external factors involved in further exploiting the situation.15

Now that a brief appraisal of the bilateral ties has been given, it is time
that major converging and diverging factors from regional and international
politics be laid out so that Pak-Iran ties can be analysed in the backdrop of
the evolving international environment.

Regional and International Factors in Pakistan-Iran Relations

As mentioned before, it is a relationship that enjoys several points of

convergence but remains deprived of fulfilling their potential and for that a
12
News Desk, “Pakistan Protests Border Violations From Iran,” Dawn, July 24, 2019
https://www.dawn.com/news/1495875
13
Sunni Muslim terror outfit on the Iran-Pakistan. An offshoot of Jundullah.
https://thediplomat.com/2016/01/can-isis-gain-a-foothold-in-balochistan/
14
Ayaz Gul, “Pakistan Rescues Kidnapped Iranian Border Guards,” VOA, November
15, 2018,
https://www.voanews.com/south-central-asia/pakistan-rescues-kidnapped-iranian-
border-guards
15
Amit Ranjan, “The Case of Kulbhushan Sudhir Jadhav: Legal, Political and
Diplomatic Implications,” ISAS Insights, no. 414(May 2017), 15.

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combination of factors are responsible. A few bilateral factors have already

been discussed but external irritants or divergences are to be discussed in the
following section.

a) American Influence: Estrangement and Discord

Although the US factor played a rather unifying role in Pakistan and Iran’s
bilateral relations but that was the case before 1979. The advent of the
Islamic revolution soured Iran-US ties and pushed them to their nadir during
the hostage crisis of 79.16 Following this crisis, the ties between the US and
Iran were on a downhill trajectory and Washington, soon, developed a
strategy to isolate Iran diplomatically and economically in the international
community. When Iran’s development of the covert uranium enrichment
program came to light, it became a major security concern for Israel and the
US. This falling out between the two former allies made the US a diverging
factor in Iran-Pakistan ties.

Post 9/11, the US made Pakistan a frontline state in its war against
terrorism in Afghanistan which involved a complete shift in Pakistan’s
policy towards the Taliban. It seemed as though the Afghan factor of
division could finally be removed from Iran-Pakistan’s relations as now
both were on the same side. However, Iran being a problematic factor in the
US foreign policy due to the hostage crisis, Iranian government’s strict
posture towards the US and particularly a threat to Israel’s very existence
which is the US’ most important outpost in the Middle East, the relations
could not take a turn for the better. Despite Iran’s strong condemnation of
9/11 attack, the temperature within the US remained high and President
Bush dubbed Iran, ‘the axis of evil.’ The efforts continued to revive the US-
Iran relationship throughout President Khatami’s rule. However, the real
blow was dealt when President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad assumed office. His
strict anti-American stance sapped all hope for a diplomatic revival of
Tehran-Washington ties altogether. Thus, relations between Iran and
Pakistan also nosedived.

By choosing to be a US ally in their ‘War on Terror,’ Pakistan had

clearly chosen a side. This distanced the two neighbours and pushed Iran
more towards India with whom its relations already had been along tangible
16
Abbas Maleki and John Tirman, eds., U.S.-Iran Misperceptions: A Dialogue
(New York: Bloomsbury, 2014), 34-70.

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lines of cooperation. Alongside all these developments, the idea of Iran-

Pakistan-India gas pipeline (IPI) had also been since long conceived.
However, as years passed, apart from Pakistan’s internal political instability,
the US factor also played a major role in hindering the project.

Majorly due to lack of funds, Pakistani side has been unable to work on
the project. While talking about the US pressure, President of Islamabad
Chamber of Commerce & Industry (ICCI), Zafar Bakhtawari stated, “It was
unfortunate that due to the influence of the US, India has opted out of IPI
project while the US was also pressuring Pakistan to shun this important
project.”17 Hence, it has been no surprise that the project remains stalled to
this date. Successive Iranian governments have been patient with Pakistan’s
complacence up till now. Iranian Petroleum Minister, Bijan Zangeneh had
warned that Iran could move the arbitration court against Pakistan for
unilaterally shelving the gas pipeline project.18 The Pakistani officials used
their good graces with Iran to resolve the issue for the time being.

What has further delayed the construction of the IP project has been the
imposition of the US sanctions on Iran which had been briefly lifted after
the JCPOA. It was then when Pakistan also started negotiations with the
Chinese Petroleum Bureau to help build the pipeline on its side to be
connected to the Nawabshah-Gwadar LNG terminal project under the
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).19 However, President Trump’s
unilateral withdrawal from JCPOA and imposition of even stringent
sanctions on Iran again put Pakistan in quite a pickle. Currently, Pakistan is
building a legal case for asking the US for exemption from the sanctions to
construct the pipeline as the energy-starved areas in the country are in
desperate need of this project. However, it certainly puts a damper on the

17
News Desk, “India opted Out of IPI Project on American Pressure: ICCI,” Nation,
December 18, 2012,
https://nation.com.pk/18-Dec-2012/india-opted-out-of-ipi-project-on-american-
pressure-icci
18
Khalid Mustafa, “Shelving of IP Gas Project: Iran Threatens to take Pakistan to
the Hague,” News, February 28, 2018, https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/286409-
shelving-of-ip-gas-project-iran-threatens-to-take-pakistan-to-the-hague
19
Zafar Bhutta, “Dumped by Sharif, Gawadar-Nawabshah LNG Terminal Project
May be Revived,” Express Tribune, August 10, 2018,
https://tribune.com.pk/story/1777273/1-dumped-sharif-gwadar-nawabshah-lng-
terminal-project-may-revived/

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state of Iran-Pakistan ties to a great extent if the project still fails to see the
light of day.

There are many reasons why the US seeks to block this pipeline project
as its operation would spell a symbolic victory for Iran in the field of energy
exports. It also creates a possibility of China’s increased association with
Iran particularly with reference to Iran’s desire to participate in CPEC. If
somehow, the project was to be put under the CPEC umbrella, it would be a
practical step towards Iran-China-Pakistan’s trilateral cooperation which is
antithetic to the US interests in the region. The Indo-Pacific strategy of the
US since quite a few years has materialised to prop up India as a competitor
to China’s economic growth in the region.

b) The Afghan Ordeal: Distrust and Apprehension

Despite shared security concerns in Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan have

rarely ever agreed upon a joint course of action to address the issue. Both
Iran and Pakistan have paid the highest price from the spill over of refugees
from the Afghan conflict. Other socioeconomic problems have been drugs
and human trafficking, smuggling and increased crime rates on both sides.
Iran has faced water crisis and border management issues while Pakistan
grappled with spill over of terrorism through the porous border when
Afghan terrorists fled into the already unstable tribal areas within the
country.20 However, instead of cooperating over the shared threat, the two
found themselves supporting different groups in Afghanistan: Pakistan
supported Taliban pre-9/11 and Iran provided resolute assistance to the
Northern Alliance.

However, it is not as if there were no efforts by both to bridge the gap

that the Afghan conundrum had created. The Foreign Office officials from
both sides made numerous attempts to facilitate meetings to discuss the
Afghan problem. In 1998, after the unfortunate Mazar-e-Sharif incident
when Iranian consulate members were killed by Taliban and Iran also
blamed Pakistan for breaching its trust, the then Foreign Minister of Iran,
Kamal Kharrazi suggested shuttle diplomacy to resolve differences between
20
News Desk, “Pentagon Admits Iran’s Key Role In Restoring Calm To
Afghanistan,” Press TV, December 27, 2018,
https://www.presstv.com/detail/2018/12/27/584088/iran-afghanistan-us-pentagon-
taliban-shamkhan

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Taliban and Northern Alliance.21 In November 2001, Pakistan’s Foreign

Minister, Abdul Sattar, issued a statement from Islamabad that “the two
countries had decided to collaborate in Afghanistan’s stabilisation.”22
However, the US factor once again overshadowed Iran and Pakistan’s joint
efforts to resolve differences in Afghanistan. Also, it managed to isolate Iran
from all forums and regional initiatives to bring about peace and stability in
Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s predicament has always been its deep dependence on the US

support. For a country that has remained financially dependent on the
powers bigger than itself, the only option was to comply with pressures that
the US put on it. Pakistan ignored its relationship with Iran as its primary
concerns were to meet the US demands at home and in Afghanistan by
fighting terrorism, sacrificing precious lives and spending its own limited
resources. Iran, on the other hand, deemed it fit to move closer to India and
Russia when it faced such consistent resistance and enmity from the US.
Eventually, after the years of spending its taxpayer’s dollars and losing
precious lives in the conflict for territorial control with Taliban, the US
came under immense domestic pressure to wrap up its presence in
Afghanistan.

The question of a dignified US withdrawal came under doubt when

several reports and surveys indicated that the Taliban still controlled a
significant percentage of territory in Afghanistan. The US also believes that
Pakistan had not fully supported their cause against the Taliban and was
seeking to maintain its own influence in the region which created
differences between these two allies. Particularly after the Trump
administration announced its new Afghan strategy, it became clear to
Pakistan that the US no longer considered it an ally in Afghanistan and
encouraged India to play a more pronounced role there. Meanwhile, the
regional countries like China, Russia and Iran had also since long worried
over the instability in Afghanistan. Thus, the American negative attitude
towards Pakistan in Afghanistan has once again made the atmosphere
conducive for Iran and Pakistan work with other regional stakeholders.

21
Ellen Laipson, “Engaging Iran on Afghanistan,” Stimson Center, (Washington
D.C: Stimson Center), 2012.
22
Harsh V. Pant, “Pakistan and Iran’s Dysfunctional Relationship,” Middle East
Quarterly 16 no. 2 (Spring 2009), 50.

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As many peace brokering initiatives on the regional level are

operational, Pakistan has once again helped in the process of facilitating
US-Taliban dialogue which took place in UAE in December 2018.23
However, Iran was not asked to be a part of it, yet again and it has also
announced its own ongoing talks with Taliban factions with Afghan
government’s approval.24 Once again, an opportunity to include Iran as an
important stakeholder was squandered owing to perhaps the US pressure or
maybe due to mere complacence and lack of foresight. This again makes
Afghanistan a diverging factor in Iran-Pakistan relations as these
individually pursued peace initiatives will only lead to further fracturing of
the region than before and will impact Iran and Pakistan ties in an adverse
manner.

c) Indo-Iran Engagement: Opportunity or Challenge

The difference between Indian and Pakistani methods of policy formulation

is that of mere rhetoric and actual substance. Pakistan and Iran have several
official channels of cooperation in place but very little practical cooperation
actually takes place between the two. However, the case with Indo-Iran
engagement is that of tangible progress more than mere words. An example
is that of 2003 when Pakistan, once again, had sided with the US at the
expense of its ties with Iran while Iran and India signed the New Delhi
Declaration which contained the following words:

“The two sides recognise that their growing strategic convergence needs
to be underpinned with a strong economic relationship. Energy sector
has been identified as a strategic area of their future relationship in which
interests of India and Iran complement each other. India and Iran also
agreed to explore opportunities for cooperation in defence in agreed
areas, including training and exchange of visit.”25

23
Sayed Salahuddin, “U.S. diplomats hold talks with Taliban on ending Afghanistan
war,” The Washington Post, December 17, 2018,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-diplomats-hold-talks-with-taliban-on-
ending-afghan-war/2018/12/17/c25be5d0-01f3-11e9-9122-
82e98f91ee6f_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.0132ea352371
24
News Desk, “Afghan Taliban were in Iran for peace talks: Foreign ministry,”
Channel News Asia, December 31, 2018,
https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/world/afghan-taliban-were-in-iran-for-
peace-talks-foreign-ministry-11075556
25
Shah Alam, “Iran-Pakistan Relations: Political and Strategic Dimensions,”
Strategic Analysis 28 no. 4 (December 2004), 500.

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In fact, the two had decided, even during the time of the Shah of Iran
that their interests overlapped particularly in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR)
which has now finally been practically implemented in form of the
Chabahar port deal signed between the two in 2016. India views this as
more than an opportunity of developing better ties with not just Iran, but as
a passage to Central Asia via Afghanistan that also bypasses Pakistan. If one
is to look at this cooperation from an even wider angle, the idea of the
International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) conceived by
Russia, India and Iran connects Russia through the Central Asian states to
India and even Southeast Asian region.26 This makes Iran a major link in
this transit and energy rich corridor which completely bypasses Pakistan.
The opportunity and will for practically realising this dream exists on both
Iranian and Indian sides and this could be a matter of concern for Pakistan.

The Chabahar port project owing to its central place in development of

Afghanistan has been given a free pass by the US government by exempting
it from sanctions. This port is being propped up as a competitor to the
Gwadar port in Pakistan being developed by China under CPEC which
could also be seen as an American move to counter Chinese influence.
Iran’s close engagement with India does not only manifest itself through
this port project. Now that the Indian influence in Afghanistan has been
encouraged by the US, it also presents an ideal opportunity to both Iran and
India to align their interests in Afghanistan and could end up isolating
Pakistan fully from the peace process. It has not been beyond India to
sabotage the already fragile Pak-Afghan relationship. If Pakistan does not
engage with Iran in a comprehensive manner to counterbalance the Indian
influence in the region and Afghanistan in particular, it could end up in
regional isolation.

d) Saudi-Pakistan Fraternisation: Balancing the Relationship

Pakistan’s close ties with Saudi Arabia were strengthened during General
Zia-ul-Haq’s regime in the country when the ‘Islamisation’ era was in full
swing which shifted the balance away from Iran.27 The sectarian factor was
incorporated into the relationship, perhaps inadvertently, as 98 per cent of

26
“The North-South Transport Corridor,” Brookings,
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-north-south-transport-corridor/
27
Masood Zahid, “Dictatorship in Pakistan: A Study of the Zia Era (1977-88),”
Pakistan Journal of History & Culture, 32 no. 1(May 2011): 45.

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the Muslim population in Pakistan is Sunni. During this time, Zia-ul-Haq’s

policy of promoting Sunni Islam was aimed at infusing a spirit of Jihad to
promote the war against Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Reportedly to
counter the onset of Sunni Islamic beliefs, Iran also provided radical
religious and financial support to Shi’ite organisations in Pakistan while
many Arab countries poured in money to counter this Iranian move. The
result was destructive as it turned Pakistan into a sectarian proxy
battleground for Shia-Sunni rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia. This led
to a wave of sectarian violence that started in the late 1980s and continued
well after the 1990s.

Many steps were taken to discourage such aid from both sides to stop
Pakistan’s descent into a boiling cauldron of sectarian strife. After year
2000, this wave of sectarianism somewhat subsided but the seeds of
radicalisation had been sown that still plague the Pakistani society to this
day. Following that, the Saudi-Iran relations have remained in a downward
spiral that has prompted Pakistan to offer mediation several times as their
increased enmity could lead to the exploitation of the sectarian factor in
Pakistan but to no avail. Currently, the two sides are embroiled in two
different proxy wars in Syria and Yemen where they target each other by
remaining on opposing sides of regional and international alliances. US-
Saudi romance has also further aggravated their relations. For Pakistan, this
is a difficult aspect as it wishes to maintain good ties with both but to keep a
perfect balance is quite an uphill task.

Pakistan’s decision to stay out of the Yemen conflict and not side with
Saudi Arabia was a wise step in balancing this relationship. However,
joining the Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC),
spearheaded by Saudi Arabia excluding Iran and Syria has been a decision
that was frowned upon in Iran.28 Pakistan has clarified that being a member
of this coalition will be subject to reassurances that the IMCTC will not turn
into an anti-Iran front in the Muslim world. However, more care is needed
to deal with this relationship as Iran is an important neighbour while Saudi
Arabia’s unwavering support (financial and political) is also indispensable
to Pakistan. This factor could quite easily end up souring Pakistan’s ties
with its western neighbour.
28
Sanober Sultan, “Pakistan and the Islamic Military Coalition: Need to Balance
Interests,” South Asian Voices, March 13, 2018,
https://southasianvoices.org/islamic-military-coalition-pakistan/

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Prospects of Pak-Iran Ties

Having discussed major factors that create divergences in the Iran-Pakistan

ties, there are converging factors, too, that provide the two countries a sound
basis for cooperation. This section contains future prospects for Iran-
Pakistan relations. Some of the diverging factors described above have also
provided ample opportunities to both sides for enhanced cooperation but
certain factors bilateral, regional and international could act as points of
convergence and will chalk out future trajectories which are as follows:

a) Shared Ethnic Minorities

The border provinces of Balochistan and Sistan-Baluchistan harbour Baloch

ethnic populations on both sides that have cultural, ethnic, linguistic,
religious and even familial links with one another. This region makes for the
most important factor of convergence between the two countries as this area
is what makes them neighbours in the first place. The two countries share
about 590 miles (909 km) common frontier known as the Goldsmith Line.29
Along this line, there exist centuries-old socioeconomic and racial affinity
between the tribes that live on both sides. Capitalising on this factor would
have positive implications for Iran-Pakistan ties. Among all, the borders
shared by both Iran and Pakistan, this one is the least turbulent. Still there
are many serious security and economic concerns issuing from this border
that have the potential to damage the relationship. However, what is
important to consider here is how to utilise this point of commonality to the
best of both sides’ advantage.

Respectively, on both sides the Baloch population has grievances with

the governments for many different reasons. However, a few grievances that
must be overlapping in both Iran and Pakistan are related to socioeconomic
development. Both provinces remain relatively less developed although they
provide geo-strategically significant transit points and unlimited natural
resources to both countries. This is why both regions are also exploited
abundantly by external elements while they are prone to drug trafficking,
smuggling, illegal trade and terrorist activities. Most of Iran and Pakistan’s
trade is also unofficial due to this very reason. Hence, it is imperative that,

29
Zahid Ali Khan, “Balochistan Factor in Pak-Iran Relations: Opportunities and
Constraints,” Journal of South Asian Studies, 27 no.1 (June 2012): 130.

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without further ado, both sides realise the need to cooperate in this shared
ethnic region so that this becomes a unifying factor instead of a point of
difference. In order to do that, following mentioned recommendations must
be considered:

i. Minorities in Iran and Pakistan especially in Balochistan area need

to be made part of the mainstream socioeconomic development and
be given more adequate political representation.
ii. The issue of border markets must be practically implemented so that
the people on both sides of the border in Balochistan provinces can
delve into their local economic progress.
iii. Border security must be made a priority with hotlines established
between Balochistan Frontier Corps (FC) Inspector General and the
Sistan-Baluchestan Commander Guards, FC commanders and their
Iranian counterparts and on other levels, too.
iv. Immigration offices must be set up to facilitate legal border
crossings and to keep a check on illegal border crossings. This
would also facilitate secure passage of Pakistani pilgrims going to
the holy places in Iran.
v. In order to curb drug trafficking, a joint anti-narcotics force can be
formulated which could have both Iranian and Pakistani personnel
to put a stop to smuggling of drugs. This step would also help
uncover third party exploitation of the shared border.

b) Iran’s Participation in CPEC: China Factor

Although this proposal only remains on paper, its practical manifestations

are numerous. The China factor in Iran-Pakistan relations has been rather
subdued although its respective relations with both Iran and Pakistan are
quite friendly. China is the largest importer of Iranian crude oil in the world.
It is also among the few countries that have been granted exemptions from
the US sanctions. According to a study by the famous energy scholar,
Michael Tanchum, China will position itself to be the major recipient of
Iranian and Turkmen oil to execute the completion of the energy corridors
that are a part of the bigger One Belt, One Road (OBOR) dream.30 It
fundamentally points to the fact that owing to the energy equation between
the two of them, Iran becomes a natural ally to China. China had been
30
John W. Garver, China and Iran: Ancient Partners in a Post-Imperial World
(Washington: University of Washington Press, 2011), 56.

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trading with Iran even during the previous sanctions regime. Thus, this is an
important converging factor in Iran and Pakistan’s relationship.

Previously, Iran had expressed its desire to join CPEC which is also in
line with China’s regional connectivity initiative. Iran and China have also
been on the same side of the Afghan conflict. Pakistan must make sure that
its relationship with China is utilised to initiate a regional initiative for peace
in Afghanistan in which Iran could also be an important partner.
Afghanistan’s inclusion in CPEC has also been hinted by China which
makes this connectivity project even more effective and can eventually
strengthen Iran-Pakistan relationship even more. The IPI project had also
been proposed to be made part of CPEC by giving the construction to
Chinese companies. The proposition has not materialised due to China’s
trade spat with the US and Chinese apprehension to avoid antagonising the
US further. However, this does not mean that there cannot be more avenues
of cooperation among these three countries.

c) Nurturing Russo-Pakistan Ties: Prospects for Iran-Pakistan Relations

Russia and Pakistan’s relations have had a tough and turbulent history but,
in the recent years, their relationship has normalised and turned into a
budding friendship. In the post-CPEC period, Russia and Pakistan’s ties
have taken a turn for the better as the changing geopolitical atmosphere has
brought China and Russia closer to each other, too. Previously, during the
time of the Shah of Iran, the Soviet Union was considered an enemy due to
Iran’s close alliance with the US. However, in recent years after the Iranian
revolution, the two sides have seen eye to eye on many regional and global
political issues. However, it was particularly in Syria how the two opposed
the US strategy of militarisation and regime change and supported President
Bashar-al-Assad’s regime so that a peaceful political solution can be sorted
out. In fact, Russia, Iran and Turkey have been in several rounds of talks to
negotiate peaceful settlement of the issue between the pro-government
forces and the US-led rebel forces. Furthermore, the latest announcement by
President Trump to withdraw troops and ground support from the Syrian
Defence Forces (SDF) has given Iran, Russia and Turkey an even wider role
to play in the conflict.

Apart from that, Russia has also been sanctioned time and again by the
US just like Iran and has devised ways to go around the sanctions, Russia

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and Iran had also developed an oil-for-goods programme as a way to avoid

using dollar in their transactions. Hence, the two have been involved in
trade despite the US pressure to stop all countries from doing trade with
Iran. Now that Pakistan and Russia have warmed up to each other, this
rapprochement can also play a converging role in Pakistan-Iran ties.
Pakistan must ensure that any regional energy corridor or transit initiative
that is conceived among Iran, Russia, China, Turkey or even India is not
used to make it irrelevant. Pakistan must stress the significance of its
geostrategic location through diplomatic activity and lobbying efforts so that
it is not cut out of future regional initiatives.

Recommendations for Pakistan

In the background of multidimensional and complex Pak-Iran ties,

following recommendations have been drawn up to include all regional and
international factors that can be utilised for betterment of both countries:

a) Pakistan must take this opportunity to build a compelling legal case

for securing exemption from the US on the IP gas pipeline issue for
example which can be a beginning to a balanced way forward in all
of Pakistan’s foreign policy decisions.

b) The Afghan factor has done enough damage to the mutual trust
between Iran and Pakistan and as now the two countries support a
regional peaceful settlement to the dispute, they should work
together for peace in Afghanistan.

c) The Indian engagement with Iran must not discourage Pakistan from
strengthening ties with its western neighbour. Similarly, it should
learn from this relationship to balance its ties between Saudi Arabia
and Iran.

Conclusion

The most important pre-requisite to strengthen Iran-Pakistan ties is to sort

out bilateral issues at the domestic level. To create economic capacity at
home, to build better business community ties, to form central banking
channels between the two countries and most importantly make sure that
external factors do not impact the bilateral relationship. Any bilateral

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relationship can be impacted by regional an international politics but it is

important to keep managing the relationship in a way that it survives
adversity.

The devastating global pandemic gripping the world at the moment; has
already modified methods of cooperation among countries and Pakistan and
Iran will also need to adapt accordingly so that it does not create distance
between the two neighbours. Pakistan needs to learn from its past mistakes
and start balancing its relations with different countries in the region in a
way that they do not impact ties with its neighbours. It is also important that
a long-term policy be drafted to deal with transitions that keep happening in
regional and global politics including establishment of sound economic ties
that are absolutely essential for durability of state-to-state relations.

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