Article I (National Territory)

a) Magallona vs Ermita
GR 187167
July16,2011
CARPIO, J.:
EN BANC

Facts:

On 1961, Congress passed R.A 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the PH as an archipelagic state. This
is in complying with the requirements of UNCLOS I codifying the sovereign right of States over their
“Territorial Sea” the breadth of which, however, was left undetermined. UNCLOS II was established to fill the
said void. With this, after five decades of negotiation, RA 5446 was passed correcting typo errors. In March
2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA9522 which shortened one baseline, optimized the location of
some basepoints around PH and classified KIG and Scarborough Shoal as regimes of Islands whose islands
generate their own maritime zones. Petitioners assails the constitutionality of RA9522 on the grounds that first,
RA 9522 reduces PH maritime territory and logically the reach of PH sovereign in violation of the Art. 1 of the
Constitution. Second, RA9522 opens the country’s waters to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts
undermining PH sovereignty and security contravening nuclear free policy. Lastly, treating KIG and
Scarborough Shoal as regime of islands results to loss of maritime area this prejudices the livelihood of the
fishermen.

Issue:

Whether or not RA9522 is unconstitutional

Held:

NO. UNCLOS has nothing to do with the acquisition of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating among
others sea-use rights over maritime zone. UNCLOS is the culmination of 5 decade negotiation among its
members to regulate conduct of water and submarine areas recognizing Archipelagic States such as the
Philippines. The demarcation of the baselines enables the PH does not delimit its exclusive economic zone but
in fact benefits the Philippines since it reserves solely to the PH the exploitation of all living and non-living
resources within such zone. Since Archipelagic Doctrine is applied first and starts the counting of economic
zone as supposed to starting it from the shoreline itself. Moreover, RA9522 does not violate Philippine
Sovereignty but rather it only recognizes the International Law of right of innocent passage. No state can invoke
sovereignty to prohibit innocent passage as it will violate International Law which the Philippines adhere.
Lastly, it is right to classify KIG and Scarborough Shoal as regime of islands, since applying the Archipelagic
Doctrine both islands are way outside the archipelago of the Philippines it will breach the rule that we should
follow the natural configuration of the Archipelaga. They merely followed the basepoints mapped on RA3046

Digest Author: Constantino, Jon Arvin G.

 Article II (Declaration of State Principles and Policies

a) Section 15
1. Henares Jr. v. LTFRB and DOTC
G.R. No. 158290
October 23, 2006
QUISUMBING, J.:
THIRD DIVISION

Facts:

Henares Jr. et al. challenges the Supreme Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding the LTFRB
and DOTC to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel.
They attempt to present a compelling case for judicial action against the bane of air pollution and related
environmental hazards.

They allege that particulate matters (mixtures of dust, dirt, smoke, and liquid droplets) emitted into the air from
various engine conbustions have caused detrimental effects on the overall quality of life. They particularly cite
the effects of certain fuel emissions which creates smug, acid rain, and the creation of harmful nitrates.
Moreover, fuel emissions also cause retardation and leaf bleaching in plants.

Moreover, they allege that with the continuing high demand for motor vehicles, the energy and transport sectors
are likely to remain the major sources of harmful emissions and that, based on a University of the Philippines
study, vehicular emissions in Metro Manila have resulted in the prevalence of chronic obstructive pulmonary
diseases and that pulmonary tuberculosis is highest among jeepney drivers, child vendors show a prevalence of
respiratory symptoms, and that children in Metro Manila showed more compromised pulmonary function than
their rural counterparts.

To counter the detrimental effects of PUVs, petitioners propose the use of CNG. CNG is a natural gas
comprised mostly of methane which contains small amounts of propane and butane. It is colorless, odorless, and
considered the cleanest fossil fuel for it produces much less pollutants than coal or petroleum.

Asserting their right to clean air, Henares Jr. et al contend that the bases for their petition for a writ of
mandamus to order the LTFRB to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel line in Section 16, Article II
of the 19987 Constitution, the Court’s ruling in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., and Section 4, Philippine Clean Air
Act of 1999 (RA 8749)

The Solicitor General contends that a writ of mandamus is not the correct remedy for it may be issued only to
command a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do an act that is required to be done when he or it
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which is required by law there being no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Moreover, the Solicitor General further avers that RA 8749 has nothing that prohibits the use of gasoline and
diesel by owners of motor vehicles and that such law does not even mention the existence of CNGs as
alternative fuel and that, unless the law is amended to provide CNG as alternative fuel for PUVs, the
respondents cannot propose that PUVs use CNG as alternative fuel.

It also adds that the DENR is the agency that is tasked with the implementation of RA 8749. Moreover, it is the
Department of Energy under RA 8749 that is required to set the specification for all types of fuel and fuel
related products. The function of the DOTC also is limited to implementing the emission standards for motor
vehicles.
Issue:

Whether or not a writ of mandamus should issue against LTFRB and DOTC to compel PUVs to use CNG as
alternative fuel.

Held:

In the issuance of a writ of mandamus, the petitioner must have a clear legal right to the thing
demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. The writ will not
issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or not to do or give to the applicant
anything which he is not entitled by law. The writ neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a
command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed.

A writ of mandamus commanding LTFRB and DOTC to require PUVs to use CNG is unavailing. Mandamus is
available only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. In the case at bar, there is no
law that mandates the LTFRB and DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles ot use CNG. At most LTFRB is
tasked with the granting of preferential and exclusive Certificates of Public Convenience or franchises to
operators of NGVs (natural gas vehicles) based on the results of the DOTC surveys.

Moreover, mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of government to a coordinate branch for neither is
inferior to the other. The need for future changes in both legislation and its implementation cannot be preempted
by order from this Court. Comity with and courtesy to a coequal branch dictate that sufficient time and leeway
must be given for the coequal branches to address by themselves the environmental problems raised in this
petition.

In this petition, the Court recognizes the right of the petitioners and the future generation to clean air. However,
the petitioners in this case are unable to pinpoint the law that imposes an indubitable legal duty on respondents
that will justify a grant of the writ of mandamus compelling the use of CNG for public utility vehicles. The
legislature should provide first the specific statutory remedy to the complex environmental problems provided
for by the petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.

Digest Author: Asuncion, Mar Lorenzo B.

 b) Section 16
2. Oposa v. Factoran
G.R. No. 101083
July 30, 1993
DAVIDE, Jr. J.:
EN BANC

Facts:

A class suit was filed by minors Oposa representing their generation as well as generations yet unborn
and represented by their parents against the then Secretary of the DENR Factoran Jr. praying that judgment be
rendered ordering Factoran, his agents, representatives, and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all
Timber Licensing Agreements in the country and cease and deist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or appraising new Timber Licensing Agreements alleging that they have a Constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. In a
broader sense, minors Oposa bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which they
associate with the twin concepts of “inter-generational responsibility” and “inter-generational justice” in which
the act of Factoran in allowing Timber Licensing Agreement holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests
constitute a misappropriation or impairment of natural resources of which, by reason of his functions as the
Secretary of DENR, holds in trust for the benefit of Oposa as well as succeeding generations. Factoran
thereafter filed a motion to dismiss contending that minors Oposa had no cause of action against him.

Issue:

a. Whether or not Oposa has locus standi.

b. Whether or not Oposa failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right.

Held:

a. Oposa asserts that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. Their
personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve the rhythm and harmony for the full
enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Oposa’s assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes with it the concomitant obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to
come. Not only are the petitioners herein sufficient to constitute a class suit, the parties also can for
themselves, and for others of their generation, and for the succeeding generations file a class suit
based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility.

b. Oposa also succeeded in alleging with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right, specifically, the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology which is incorporatied in the fundamental law under
Sec. 16 Article II of the 1987 Constitution. Although the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
found under the Declaration of Principles and State Polocies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does
not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights found in Article III of the
1987 Constitution. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology belongs to a different category of
rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation. As a matter of
fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from
the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is
because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting
their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and
protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for
the present generation, but also for those to come — generations which stand to inherit nothing but
parched earth incapable of sustaining life. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it
the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. Moreover, the said right implies, among
many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country’s forests because with
such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversibly disrupted.

In the case at bar, the specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION is adequate
enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. However, in so far as the
cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants the
grantees thereof as indispensable parties.

Digest Author: Asuncion, Mar Lorenzo B.

 3. Ysmael vs. The Deputy Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 79538
October 18, 1990
CORTES, J.
THIRD DIVISION

Doctrine:

The courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government
agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of
such agencies.

Facts:

Petitioner sought the reconsideration of a memorandum order issued by the Bureau of Forest
Development which cancelled its timber license agreement (TLA) in 1983, as well as the revocation of TLA No.
356 subsequently issued by the Bureau to private respondents in 1984 by sending letters to the Office of the
President and the MNR, now the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Petitioner’s
prayers were to no avail. Hence the petition in the Court, imputing grave abuse of discretion to public
respondents.

Issue:

Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent in cancelling and revoking
petitioner’s license.

Held:

The Court stressed the authority of administrative bodies to handle matters within their scope without
need of interference by the courts of law. These administrative bodies are deemed to be in better positions to
determine issues within their specialty and resolve the same. The Court cited the doctrine of res judicata which
avers that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies have upon their finality, the force and binding
effect of a final judgment. The rule of res judicata thus forbids the reopening of a matter once determined by
competent authority acting within their exclusive jurisdiction

The Court also held that the assailed orders by public respondent was in line with the latter’s duty to develop
and conserve the country’s natural resources in view of the constitutional mandate of the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. It is their duty to regulate the
issuance of licenses (TLA) as they see fit, which the court cannot interfere with. The Court further held that sans
grave abuse of discretion which may be imputed to public respondents, the court ruled that petitioner cannot
seek affirmative relief.

While there is a desire to harness natural resources to amass profit and to meet the country's immediate financial
requirements, the more essential need to ensure future generations of Filipinos of their survival in a viable
environment demands effective and circumspect action from the government to check further denudation of
whatever remains of the forest lands.

Digest Author: Baguio, Gerard Ceasar S.

 c) Section 22
1. Mateo Cariño v Insular Government
GR No. 2869
March 25, 1907
ARELLANO, C.J.:
EN BANC

Facts:

Mateo Carino is an Igorot of the Province of Benguet, where the land in question lies. For more than 50
years before the treaty of Paris, as far back as findings go, Carino and is ancestors had held the land as owners.
Along with his father and grandfather before him, Mateo’s family has been recognized as the owners by the
Igorots. Mateo is said to have derived his title from inheritance through Igorot customs. No documents of title
in favour of the Carino’s were issued by the Spanish crown, and mateo has had numerous attempts to register
the land in his name rejected. He made another petition alleging ownership under the mortgage law,
establishing a possessory title. Even though he acquired title, he could not register the land by virtue of the
Philippine Commission's Act No. 926, of 1903, which does not include the Province of Benguet among others
from its operation

Issue:

Does Carino have ownership and may he register the land under his name?

Held:

Yes Carino may register the land and is the owner, According to Spanish law a person who cannot
produce a title or deed may gain ownership by uninterrupted possession through prescription. Although the
property rights to lands in the Philippines have been transferred to the United States from the Spanish Crown,
Carino is still entitled to registration even under a new Sovereign who recognizes that fact that Carino has
ownership of the land by virtue of prescription under Spanish law. The decree of 1880 which sought to adjust
royal lands under wrongful occupation in the Philippine Islands does not apply in this case as the land was never
“royal land” or “wrongfully occupied”. It does not apply to owners who already became so through prescription
and possession of the land over time.

“Upon a consideration of the whole case we are of opinion that law and justice require that the applicant should
be granted what he seeks, and should not be deprived of what, by the practice and belief of those among whom
he lived, was his property, through a refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain.”

Digest Author: Fuentes, Vance A.

2. Cruz v NCIP
GR 135385
December 6, 2000
PER CURIAM
EN BANC
 d) Section 25

1. SJS v Atienza
GR 156052
March 7, 2007
CORONA, J.
FIRST DIVISION

Facts:

The Sanggunian Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance 8027 which was approved by Mayor
Atienza. The ordinance, in pursuant to the city’s police power reclassified areas from industrial to commercial
and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed by section 1 of the ordinance to cease and desist
from operating their business within 6 months. Among these are oil companies Caltex, Petron, and Shell. Said
companies went into a Memorandum of Understanding with Mayor Atienza to scale down the Pandacan
Terminals in exchange to continue operations. The Social Justice Society filed an action for mandamus praying
the mayor be compelled to enforce Ordinance 8027 and order the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil
companies.

Issues:

Whether or not the mayor has a mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance 8027 and order the removal of the
Pandacan Terminals.

Held:

The Local Government Code imposes upon the mayor to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the
governance of the city thus he has the duty to Ordinance 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the
Sanggunian or annulled by the Courts. It is his ministerial duty to do so and there is nothing hindering the mayor
to enforce the law as all resolutions that may affect it have long expired. The ordinance was enacted after the
September 11, 2001 attack on the twin towers of the World Trade Center. Its objective is to protect the citizens
from a terrorist attack on the Pandacan terminals. There is thus no reason why the protective measure should be
delayed.

Digest Author: Tan, Tim R.

 Article III (Bill of Rights)

a) Chavez v. PEA
GR 133250
July 9, 2002
CARPIO, J.
EN BANC

Facts:

In 1973, the Commissioner of Public Highways signed a contract with the Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila
Bay. Four years later, then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating Public Estates
Authority (PEA) and transferring said reclaimed foreshore and offshore lands of the Manila Bay.

In 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a private corporation, which
required the reclamation of the latter of hectares comprising the Freedom Islands and several portions of the
submerged areas of Manila Bay. Although it was entered without public bidding, the government soon approved
the JVA.

Petitioner, in his capacity as a taxpayer, filed a civil action contending the sale to AMARI of lands of the public
domain that is violative of the provisions of 1987 Constitution.

Issue:

Whether the stipulations in the amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of certain lands, reclaimed
and still reclaimed, violate the 1987 Constitution

Held:

Yes. The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain as enshrined in Art. XII, Sec. 3. It
allows private corporations to hold alienable lands of the public domain only through lease.

The amended JVA denotes that AMARI will acquire and own a maximum of 367.5 hectares of reclaimed land.
Under the Public Land Act, reclaimed areas are classified as alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain. Until there is a formal declaration from the government reclassifying such lands, it remains to be
alienable and disposable.

Digest Author: Dimaano, Lois Danielle P.

 b) Valmonte v Belmonte
GR 74930
February 13, 1989
CORTES, J.
EN BANC

Facts:

The controversy arose when Ricardo Valmonte wrote Feliciano Belmonte a letter requesting to be
furnished with: 1) list of names of the opposition members of Batasang Pambansa who were ablento secure a
clean loan of P2 Million each on guaranty of Mrs. Imelda Marcos; and 2) certified true copies of the documents
evidencing their loans. If they could not be secured the above documents, Valmonte requests for access to said
documents. They premise their request on the Right to Information, Art. IV, Section 6 of the Freedom
Constitution.

The Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS replied denying said request. This is in view of the confidential
relationship of the GSIS and its borrowers; that the GSIS had a duty to preserve this confidentiality; and that it
would not be proper for GSIS to breach it unless ordered by the courts.

Valmonte, joined by others filed a special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoking the
right to information, praying that the responded be directed to furnish the requested documents, and access to
public records.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners are entitled access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS

Held:

The people’s right to information is limited to matters of public concern subject to limitations as
provided by law.

In Legaspi v Civil Service Commission, public concern or public interest is defined to embrace a broad
spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because it directly affect their lives, or simply
because it arouses the interest of an ordinary citizen.

The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the administrator of various
insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Its funds assume public character therefore it is the legitimate
concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly. Moreover, the alleged borrowers were
members of Batasang Pambansa who appropriated the funds for the GSIS. The public nature of the loanable
funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought a matter of
public interest and concern.

The second requisite provides that the information should not be among those excluded by law. The respondent
failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards the documents subject of the
petition.

Respondent cannot raise the issue of right to privacy of its borrowers as said right belongs to the individual in
his private capacity, it is purely personal in nature. It can only be invoked only by the person whose privacy is
claimed to be violated. It cannot be invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS.

Respondent also assert that subject documents are private in nature and are not covered by the constitutional
right to information. Said records, according to GSIS is related to its performance of proprietary functions,
hence outside the coverage. They further contend that the loan function of GSIS is merely incidental to its
insurance function, and said transactions are not covered by the constitutional policy of full public disclosure
and right to information which is applicable only to official transactions. The Court ruled in ACCFA v
Confederation of Unions and Government Corporations and Offices, that the government whether carrying out
its sovereign attributes or running some business, discharges the same function of service to the people. The
GSIS in exercising proprietary function would not justify exclusion of transactions from coverage and scope of
right to information.

Moreover, the intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission to include government-owned and
controlled corporations and transactions entered into by them to be within the coverage of the State policy of
public disclosure is manifest from the records of the proceedings.

Petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject to
reasonable regulations as to the manner and hours of examination.

However, the right to information does not accord the right to compel custodians of official records to
prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information or matters of
public concern.

Digest Author: Camalig, Ylleane Meridee G.

 c) Legaspi v CSC
GR L-72119
May 29, 1987
CORTES, J.
EN BANC

Doctrine

The Constitution requires government agencies to provide information upon request; if they do not
want to disclose information, they carry the burden of proving that the information is not of public concern or, if
it is of public concern, that the information has been specifically exempted by law.

Facts:

Citizen Valentin Legaspi requested from the Civil Service Commission information on the civil service
eligibilities of sanitarian employees in the Health Department of Cebu City. The Commission rejected the
request, asserting that Legaspi was not entitled to the information. Legaspi instituted an action for mandamus
from the Court to require that the information be provided.

Issue:

Whether or not Legaspi can invoke his right to information and compel the CSC with his request?

Held:

The Court began by noting that both the 1973 (Art. IV, Sec. 6) and 1987 (Art. III, Sec. 7) constitutions
recognize the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. Further, they specify that
information shall be provided, subject only to limitations provided by law. While the Solicitor General
interposed a procedural objection challenging the requester’s standing in this petition for mandamus, the Court
ruled that, in this case, the people are regarded as the “real party in interest” and the requester, as a citizen
interested in the execution of the laws, did not need to show any legal or special interest in the result. Further,
government agencies have no discretion to refuse disclosure of, or access to, information of public concern
because the Constitution guarantees access to information of public concern, a recognition of the essentiality of
the free flow of ideas and information in a democracy. That is, the government agency denying information
access has the burden to show that the information is not of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the
information has been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee.

Here, the information was of a public concern because it is the legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that
government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by eligible persons, and the Civil
Service Commission failed to cite any law limiting the requester’s right to know. Thus, the Court ordered the
Civil Service Commission to provide the information.

Digest Author: Baguio, Gerard Ceasar S.

 Article X (Local Government)

a) Section 4
1. Tano v Socrates
GR 110249
August 21, 1997
DAVIDE, Jr., J.
EN BANC

Facts:

On December 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted Ordinance Number
15-92, banning the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from January 1, 1993 to
January 1, 1998. To implement said city ordinance, then Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero issued Office
Order No. 23, Series of 1993 dated January 22, 1993, authorizing necessary inspections on cargoes containing
live fish and lobster being shipped out from the Puerto Princesa Airport, Puerto Princesa Wharf or at any port
within the jurisdiction of the City to any point of destinations, either via aircraft or seacraft. On February 19,
1993, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted Resolution Number 33,
prohibiting the catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of various species of live marine
coral dwelling aquatic organisms for 5 years, in and coming from Palawan waters. Subsequently, to approve
Resolution Number 33, Ordinance Number 2, Series of 1993 was enacted and ordained by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan. The ultimate purpose of which, stated in its Section III, is to protect and conserve the marine
resources of Palawan not only for the greatest good of the majority of the present generation but with the proper
perspective and consideration of their prosperity.

Without seeking redress from the concerned local government units, prosecutors’ office and courts, petitioners
directly invoked our original jurisdiction by filing this petition on June 4, 1993. Petitioners filed this special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition directly before the Supreme Court, contending that first, the court declare
the said ordinances and resolutions as unconstitutional on the ground that the said ordinances deprived them of
the due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation
of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution; second, Office Order No.
23 contained no regulation nor condition under which the Mayors permit could be granted or denied; in other
words, the Mayor had the absolute authority to determine whether or not to issue permit; third, Ordinance No. 2
of the Province of Palawan does not distinguish whether the organisms were caught or gathered through lawful
fishing method, thus it took away the right of petitioners-fishermen to earn their livelihood in lawful ways; and
insofar as petitioners-members of Airline Shippers Association are concerned, they were unduly prevented from
pursuing their vocation and entering into contracts which are proper, necessary, and essential to carry out their
business endeavors to a successful conclusion; and lastly, as Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
is null and void, the criminal cases based thereon against petitioners Tano et al. have to be dismissed.

Issue:

Whether or not the challenged ordinances are unconstitutional.

Held:

No, the challenged ordinances are not unconstitutional. The Supreme Court held that, in light then of
the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the Local Government Code of 1991 and the
powers granted to local government units under Section 16 (the General Welfare Clause), and under Sections
149, 447 (a) (1) (vi), 458 (a) (1) (vi) and 468 (a) (1) (vi), which unquestionably involve the exercise of police
power, the validity of the questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted. The nexus between the activities barred by
Ordinance No. 15-92 of the City of Puerto Princesa and the prohibited acts provided in Ordinance No. 2, Series
of 1993 of the Province of Palawan, on one hand, and the use of sodium cyanide, on the other, is painfully
obvious. In sum, the public purpose and reasonableness of the Ordinances may not then be controverted.

Further, the petitioners’ contentions are baseless as there is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners
qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman, based on their reliance on Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution. Furthermore, their petition suffers from procedural obstacles as their direct resort to the Supreme
Court and non-observance of the hierarchy of courts must necessarily fail due to lack of cause of action.

Finally, under the general welfare clause of the LGC, local government units have the power, inter alia, to enact
ordinances to enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology. It likewise specifically vests municipalities
with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters, and impose rentals, fees or charges therefor; to
penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives, noxious or poisonous substances, electricity, muro-
ami, and other deleterious methods of fishing; and to prosecute other methods of fishing; and to prosecute any
violation of the provisions of applicable fishing laws. The same power is imposed upon the Sangguniang Bayan,
Sangguniang Panglungsod and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

Digest Author: Escanilla, Emmalyn Z.

 b) Section 15
1. Chiongbian et al. v Orbos et al.
GR 96754
June 22, 1995
MENDOZA, J.
EN BANC

Facts:

Congress passes RA 6734 known as “The Organic Act for Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao”
which called for a plebiscite to be held. Those cities and provinces voting in favour became the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao. President Corazon Aquino then reorganized the administrative regions in
Mindanao transferring Misamis Occidental of Region X to be part of Region IX, Oroquieta City, Tangub City,
and Ozamiz City of Region X to be part of Region IX, South Cotobato of Region XI to be part of Region XII,
General Santos City of Region XI to be part of Region XII, Lanao del Norte of Region XII to be part of Region
IX, Iligan and Marawi City of Region XII to be part of Region IX. The petitioners are members of Congress
representing various legislative districts claiming that no law authorizes the president to restructure the areas to
new administrative regions and that RA 6734 is unconstitutional as an undue delegation of legislative power.

Issues:

Whether or not the power to merge administrative regions is legislative or executive in character and if
Article XIX Section 13 of RA 6734 is invalid for having no standard to guide the president’s discretion.

Whether or not the power granted authorizes reorganization even of regions the provinces and cities in
which did not participate in the plebiscite or did not vote in favour.

Held:

The choice of the president to be the delegate is logical for the division of the country into regions is
intedned to facilitate not only the administration of local governments but also direction of executive
departments which the law requires to have regional offices. The power to merge is not found in the constitution
but is traditionally lodged in the president to facilitate the exercise of power of general supervision over local
governments. Power conferred on the president is similar to the power to adjust municipal bounderies or as
administrative in nature. Therefore, there is no abdication by congress of its legislative power to merge
administrative regions. The standard to guide the president is found in RA 5435 which is “to promote simplicity,
economy, and efficiency in the government to enable it to pursue programs consistent with national goals for
accelerated social and economic development and to improve the service in the transaction of the public
business.”.

While Article XIX states that provinces and cities which do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region
shall remain in the existing administrative regions, it is subject to the qualification that the president may, by
administrative determination, merge the existing regions. Non-assenting provinces and cities may be regrouped
with contiguous provinces forming other regions as the exigency of administration may require. Political
representation was not changed. Besides, the regrouping is only on paper as it is only the definition or redrawing
of lines separating administrative regions that are changed. There is no transfer of local government. Finally,
reorganization was based on relevant criteria of contiguity and geographical features, transportation and
communication facilities, cultural and language groupings, land area and population, existing regional centers
adopted by several agencies, socio-economic development programs in the regions and the number of provinces
and cities.

Digest Author: Tan, Tim R.

2. Dimaporo v COMELEC
GR 93201-04
June 26, 1990
FELICIANO, J.
EN BANC
 Article XII (National Economy)
a) Section 1
1. Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS
GR 122156
February 3, 1997
BELLOSSILLO, J.:
EN BANC

Facts:

The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) pursuant to a privatization program of the Philippe
Government decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of Manila
Hotel Corporation. The winning bidder and eventual strategic partner is to provide management expertise as
well as financial support to strengthen the performance and profitability of the Manila Hotel. In a close bidding,
only two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation which offered to buy 51
% of the MHC at P41.58 per share and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm which bid for the same number of
shares at P44.00 or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Pending declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder, Manila Prince Hotel sent a letter to GSIS
matching the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad. Apprehensive that GSIS has
disregarded the tender of the matching bid, Manila Prince Hotel came to the court on prohibition and
mandamus. The main argument of Manila Prince Hotel is that under Sec. 10(2) of Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution, Manila Hotel has become a part of the national patrimony for it has been identified with the
Filipino national and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine
heritage and culture.

The respondents contend that Sec. 10(2) of Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle
and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legisliation. Moreover,
granting that the same is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national patrimony.
Lastly, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the constitutional provision is
inapplicable for what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation and not the hotel
building nor the land upon which the building stands.

Issue:

a. Whether or not Sec. 10(2) of Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.
b. Whether or not the 51% shares of the MHC is part of the national patrimony.

Held:

a. Sec. 10(2) of Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision. It is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or
rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. In the provision aforestated, the Constitution mandates
that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. When our Constitution declares that a right exists in
certain specified circumstances, an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the
absence of any legislation on the subject. Where there is a right, there is a remedy. Even if there is no
statute specially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, sich right enforces itself by its own
inherent potency and puissance and from which all legislations must take their bearings.

b. The 51% shares of the MHC is part of the national patrimony. In its plain and ordinary meaning,
patrimony pertains to heritage. National patrimony does not only speak of natural resource of the
Philippines but also the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
Manila Hotel has become a landmark – a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. It has become the
venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history.

For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves
and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity
associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has
become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes
within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock,
so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the
hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which
the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents claim that the Filipino First
Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the
corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands

Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional provision is, as it
should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be
nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional law that all laws
and contracts must conform with the fundamental law of the land. Those which violate the Constitution
lose their reason for being.

In the case at bar, where a foreign firm submits the highest bidding concerning the grant of rights or
privileges covering the national economy and patrimony exceeding the bid of a Filipino, the Filipino
must be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity and if the Filipino matches the bid of the foreign
firm, the award should go to the Filipino to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy
provision of the 1987 Constitution. Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by
Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award
to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to
effect the sale in accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the
Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with
petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm
clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

Digest Author: Asuncion, Mar Lorenzo B.

 b) Section 2
1. Aranda v Republic
GR 172331
August 24, 2011
VILLARAMA, JR., J
FIRST DIVISION

Facts:

1. The subject of a petition for original registration before the RTC is a parcel of land situated in San
Andres, Malvar, Batangas with an area of about 9000 sqm. The petition was originally filed by ICTSI
Warehousing, Inc. (ICTSI-WI) represented by its Chairman, Enrique K. Razon, Jr.

2. The Office of the Solicitor General filled a complaint stating that the land was part of the public
domain and that the petitioners have never acquired a registrable tittle thereto.

3. In support of the application, petitioner’s sister Merlita A. Enriquez testified that in 1965 her father
Anatalio Aranda donated the subject land to his brother (petitioner), as evidenced by documents
“Pagpapatunay ng Pagkakaloob ng Lupa” which she and her siblings executed on June 7, 2000.

4. Another witness, Luis Olan, testified that his father Lucio Olan originally owned the land and that he
had known about this property since he was six (6) years old as he used to accompany his father in
going to the land. His father farmed the land and planted it first, with rice, and later corn.

5. They had open, peaceful, continuous and adverse possession of the land in the concept of owner
until his father sold the land in 1946 to Anatalio Aranda. The children of Anatalio then took over in
tilling the land, planting it with rice and corn and adding a few coconut trees. He does not have any
copy of the document of sale because his mother gave it to Anatalio.

6. RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners but the CA reversed the rulling to favor the Government.

Issues:

Was the land in question Alienable and disposable?

Held:

No, under the Regalian doctrine which is embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,
all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land.
All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Unless public
land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the
inalienable public domain. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the
land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. Petitioners Failed to prove that the land was indeed
alienable and disposable because of the inconsistency of classifications and discrepancy of dates of
classification between two documents issued by the DENR. Consequently, the status of the land applied for as
alienable and disposable was not clearly established.

Digest Author: Fuentes, Vance A.

 2. Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Factoran Jr.
GR 98332
January 6, 1995
ROMERO, J.
EN BANC

Facts:

President Corazon Aquino promulgated EO 211 which authorized the DENR secretary to negotiate and
conclude joint venture, co-production, or production-sharing agreements for the exploration, development and
utilization of mineral resources and prescribing guidelines for such agreements and those involving technical or
financial assistance by foreign owned corporations for large scale exploration, development and utilization of
minerals.

Fulgencio Factoran, the DENR secretary issued AO 57 series of 1989 and on Article 9, it orders all existing
mining leases or agreements except small scale mining leases and those pertaining to sand and gravel and quarry
resources covering an area of 20 hectares or less shall be converted into production sharing agreements. AO 82
series of 1990 Section 3 enumerates persons or entities required to submit a Letter of Intent and Mineral
Production Sharing Agreement and failure to do so causes the abandonment of mining, quarry and sand, and
gravel claims. The Miners Association of the Philippines Inc. filed a petition questioning the constitutionality of
these orders contending that such are in excess of the secretary’s rule-making power and does not conform to
EO 211.

Issue:

Whether or not the questioned Administrative Orders are constitutional.

Held:

Article XII Section 2 ordains that exploration, development and utilization of natural resources shall be
under the full control and supervision of the state. Utilization of natural resources may be undertaken by a direct
act of the state, or opt to enter into coproduction, joint venture, production-sharing agreements or enter into
agreements with foreign owned corporations. The economic policy is clear; it is geared towards a more
equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and
services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people, and an expanding productivity as the key to raising
the quality of life for all especially the underprivileged. There is no clear showing that the secretary transcended
the bounds of EO 279 as he was authorized to promulgate such supplementary rules and regulations as may be
necessary to effectively implement the provisions thereof.

Digest Author: Tan, Tim R.

 3. Heherson Alvarez v PICOP
GR 162243, 164516 & 171875
December 3, 2009
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
EN BANC

Facts:

• In 1969, the government under President Marcos entered into a contract to enter into an Integrated
Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) with Bislig Bay Lumber Company Inc, the predecessor of
PICOP. The contract has a provisio requiring compliance with the laws and the Constitution.

• The Timber License Agreement of PICOP expired in 1977 and was extended for 25 more years until
2002. Seeking further extension, PICOP filed an application with DENR to have its Timber License
Agreement (TLA) No. 43 converted into an IFMA. In the middle of the process, PICOP refused to
attend further meetings and filed a petition for Mandamus against DENR (2002) to compel the
Secretary to:

o Issue the corresponding IFMA covered by TLA No. 43

o Issue necessary permit allowing PICOP to harvest timber in said area in accordance with
warranty of the 1969 document which includes:

 Area coverage of TLA No. 43 is part of government warranty.

 PICOP has tenure on said land and exclusive right to cut and collect timber which
would end on 1977 and renewable for another 25 years, subject to compliance with
constitutional and statutory requirements as well as existing policies on timber
concessions.

• RTC rendered a decision granting PICOP’s petition. CA affirmed the decision but removed damages.
Hence, separate petitions for review before the SC.

Issues:

Whether mandamus is the proper remedy (procedural)

Whether the 1969 document is a contract within the purview of non-impairment clause

Held:

Whether mandamus is the proper remedy (procedural):

No. Writ of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary
one. DENR Administrative Order (DAO) 99-53 provides that in case of application for conversion of TLA into
IFMA, automatic conversion shall be allowed. The language does not purport to be a command. Further,
evaluation of PICOP’s compliance with the requirements, as required in DAO 99-53 necessarily involves
discretion.

Whether the 1969 document is a contract within the purview of non-impairment clause:

No, for the following reasons:

 • The warranty simply reassures PICOP of government’s commitment to uphold the terms and
conditions of its timber license and guarantees PICOP’s peaceful and adequate possession and
enjoyment of the area without changing its boundaries. It is merely a collateral undertaking which
cannot amplify PICOP’s rights under its timber license. A timber license is not a contract within the
purview of non-impairment clause. A license is merely permit and does not grant vested and
irrevocable rights.

• The Presidential Warranty cannot, in any manner, be construed as a contractual undertaking assuring
PICOP of exclusive possession and enjoyment of its concession areas. Such an interpretation would
result in the complete abdication by the State in favor of PICOP of the sovereign power to control and
supervise the exploration, development and utilization of the natural resources in the area.

• This interpretation is in harmony with the Constitution.

o PICOP seems to interpret the 1969 Presidential Warranty to mean that the warranty covers a
period of 25 years and renewable for another 25 years, and for as long as it complies with the
legal requirements it will be renewed for another 25, in effect exceeding the 50-year limitation
or in perpetuity.

o The interpretation is in violation of Sec. 2, Art XII of the Constitution which provides that
the State may enter into an agreement for the development of the timber land for a period of
25 years and renewable for not more than 25 years.

 Granting to private entities, via a contract, a permanent, irrevocable, and exclusive

possession of and right over forest lands is tantamount to granting ownership thereof.

 The provision only provides for permissible schemes. Any “contract” requiring
the State to issue TLAs and IFMAs whenever they expire clearly violates this.

 The 1969 document is set to expire on 2002 (extended from 1977). Any extension
beyond the same would violate the Constitution.

o DAO 99-53 was issued as a response to the change in the Constitution which no longer
permits Timber Licenses scheme (now limited to co-production, joint venture, or production-
sharing agreements). The provision in DAO was meant to allow the holders of Timber
Licenses to finish the period of their TLAs, but this time as IFMA. Allowing PICOP’s
interpretation will be discriminatory against new IFMAs.

o Projects in the forest and timberlands are projects of the State and cannot be purely private
endeavours. Thus the State remains in full control and supervision of such projects. PICOP
cannot limit the participation of the State especially when the latter requires Sanggunian
Consultation and Approval and certification from NCIP.

Thus, the petition by PICOP was denied.

Digest Author: Malijan, Gerani D.

c) Section 3
1. Cruz v NCIP
GR 135385
December 6, 2000
PER CURIAM
EN BANC
 2. Republic v Naguiat
GR 134209
January 4, 2006
GARCIA, J.
SECOND DIVISION

Facts:

An application for registration of 4 parcel of land located at Botolan Zambales was filed by one
Celestina Naguiat. She allegedly acquired said property from LID Corporation who in turn bought it from
Demetria Calderon, Josefna Moraga and Fausto Monje and their predecessors-in interest who have been in
possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years; and that to the best of her knowledge, said lots suffer no
mortgage or encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any person having any interest, legal or equitable, or in
possession thereof. However, the Republic filed an opposition stating that the parcels of land applied for are part
of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation.
Eventually, the application for registration was granted as a result, the Republic appealed to the Court of
Appeals who then affirmed the decision of the trial court and said that it is proven that the predecessors in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands in
question for 30 years as evidenced by tax receipts etc. thus they are entitled to Judicial Confirmation of an
Imperfect title. On the other hand, Republic argues that the CA erred in on its finding respecting the length of
respondent's occupation of the property subject of her application for registration and for not considering the
fact that she has not established that the lands in question have been declassified from forest or timber zone to
alienable and disposable property as there were no show of any positive act from the government declaring
such. Thus, the case at bar.

Issue:

Whether or not there was a valid grant of registration

Held:

No, Public forest lands or forest reserves, unless declassified and released by positive act of the
Government so that they may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, are not
capable of private appropriation. As to these assets, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
Given this postulate, the principal issue to be addressed turns on the question of whether or not the areas in
question have ceased to have the status of forest or other inalienable lands of the public domain. In the present
case, the CA assumed that the lands in question are already alienable and disposable and did not consider that
the subject land is still inalienable. Here, respondent never presented the required certification from the proper
government agency or official proclamation reclassifying the land applied for as alienable and disposable.
Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed.

Digest Author: Constantino, Jon Arvin G.

d) Section 4
1. Province of Rizal v Executive Secretary
GR 129546
December 13, 2005
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
EN BANC
 e) Section 5
1. Alcantara v Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems, et al.
GR 145838
July 20, 2001
KAPUNAN, J.
FIRST DIVISION

Doctrine:

PD No. 410, Sec. 1 - “all unappropriated agricultural lands forming part of the public domain are declared part
of the ancestral lands of the indigenous cultural groups occupying the same, and these lands are further
declared alienable and disposable, to be distributed exclusively among the members of the indigenous cultural
group concerned“

Facts:

Sometime in 1993, petitioner herein was granted Forest Land Grazing Lease Agreement No. 542 (FLGLA No.
542) by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Under said FLGLA, he was allowed to
lease Nine Hundred Twenty-Three (923) hectares of public forestland at Sitio Lanton, Barrio Apopong, General
Santos City for grazing purposes for a period of twenty-five (25) years to expire on 31 December 2018. As early
as 1990, however, private respondents herein led a letter-complaint with the Commission on Settlement of Land
Problems (COSLAP) seeking the cancellation of FLGLA No.542 and the reversion of the entire 923 hectares
to the B'laan and Maguindanao tribes. Petitioner led his Answer questioning the jurisdiction of the COSLAP
over the case, since the dispute involved a claim for recovery of ancestral land. Petitioner claimed that the case
should have been led with the DENR. The COSLAP issued a Decision ordering the cancellation of FLGLA No.
542. Petitioner appealed the same to the Court of Appeals by petition for review. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition and also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner’s forest land grazing lease agreement supercedes the B’laan tribe’s claim of ancestral.

Held:

No! The land area being claimed by the B’laan indigenous cultural community has been in the possession of and
they have been occupying and cultivating the same since time immemorial. Petitioner did not dispute this fact,
instead he challenged the Jurisdiction of the COSLAP.

It was likewise declared by the appellate court that FLGLA No. 542 granted to petitioner violated Section 1 of
Presidential Decree No. 410 which states that all unappropriated agricultural lands forming part of the public
domain are declared part of the ancestral lands of the indigenous cultural groups occupying the same, and these
lands are further declared alienable and disposable, to be distributed exclusively among the members of the
indigenous cultural group concerned.

The Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the appelate court and DENIED the peititon.

Digest Author: Laico, Adrian

 f) Section 7
1. Cheesman v IAC
GR 74833
January 21, 1991
NARVASA, J.
FIRST DIVISION

Facts:

Thomas Cheesman and Criselda Cheesman were married on December 4, 1970 but have been
separated since February 15, 1981.

In 1974, a “Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory Rights” was executed by Armando Altares conveying a
parcel of unregistered land and the house thereon in favor of Criselda Cheesman. Thomas Cheesman, although
aware of the deed, did not object to the transfer being made only to his wife. Tax declarations for the property
were thereafter issued in the name of Criselda and assumed exclusive management and administration. Thomas
Cheesman again had knowledge of such and did not protest. In 1981 Criselda Cheesman sold said property
Estellita Padilla without the knowledge of the husband.

Thomas Cheesman brought suit against his wife, Criselda and Estelita Padilla, praying for the annulment of the
sale on the ground that the transaction had been executed without his knowledge and consent. An answer was
filed alleging that (1) the property said was paraphernal, having been purchased by Criselda with funds
exclusively belonging to her ; (2) Thomas Cheesman, being an American, was disqualied to have any
interest or right of ownership in the land; and (3) Estelita Padilla was a buyer in good faith.

The action resulted in a judgment declaring the said sale void ab initio and ordered the delivery of the property
to Thomas Cheesman as administrator of Conjugal Partnership. The judgment was set aside at the instance of
Estelita Padilla. She then filed a supplemental pleading as her answer to the complaint. The parties ultimately
agreed on the rendition by the court of a summary judgment after entering into a stipulation of facts.

The Trial Court rendered a Summary Judgment declaring the sale executed by Criselda Cheesman in favor of
Estelita Padilla to be valid. The Court dismissed Thomas Cheesman’s complaint and ordered him to
immediately turn oved the property to Estelita Padilla. The Trial Court found that: 1) the evidence on record
satisfactorily overcame the presumption in Article 160 of the Civil Code and found that the property is
Criselda’s paraphernal property ; 2) that the legal presumption in Article 160 could not apply because Thomas is
an American citizen, being disqualified under the Constitution to acquire and own real properties and; 3) that
the exercise by Criselda of exclusive acts of dominion with the knowledge of her husband had led
Padilla to believe that the properties were the exclusive properties of Criselda Cheesman and on the
faith of such a belief she bought the properties from her and for value," and therefore, Thomas
Cheesman was, under Article 1473 of the Civil Code, estopped to impugn the transfer to Estelita
Padilla.

Thomas Cheesman appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court. The tribunal promulgated a drcision affirming
the lower court’s summary judgment having found no reversible error.

Thomas Cheesman appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not Thomas Cheesman’s citizenship is a bar to his action to recover the property for the conjugal
partnership
Held:

The fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land. Section 14, Article XIV of
the 1973 Constitution ordains that, "Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualied to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain." Petitioner Thomas Cheesman was, of course, charged with knowledge of this
prohibition. Thus, assuming that it was his intention that the lot in question be purchased by him and
his wife, he acquired no right whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in attempting
to acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly violated the
Constitution; the sale as to him was null and void. In any event, he had and has no capacity or
personality to question the subsequent sale of the same property by his wife on the theory that in so
doing he is merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain
such a theory would permit indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were
to be declared conjugal, this would accord to the alien husband a not insubstantial interest and right
over land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that
the Constitution does not permit him to have.

The finding that his wife had used her own money to purchase the property cannot, be reviewed and
overturned. But even if it were a fact that said wife had used conjugal funds to make the acquisition,
the considerations just set out militate, on high constitutional grounds, against his recovering and
holding the property so acquired, or any part thereof. And whether in such an event, he may recover
from his wife any share of the money used for the purchase or charge her with unauthorized
disposition or expenditure of conjugal funds is not now inquired into; that would be, in the premises, a
purely academic exercise. An equally decisive consideration is that Estelita Padilla is a purchaser in
good faith, both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court having found that Cheesman's own conduct
had led her to believe the property to be exclusive property of the latter's wife, freely disposable by
her without his consent or intervention. An innocent buyer for value, she is entitled to the protection of
the law in her purchase, particularly as against Cheesman, who would assert rights to the property
denied him by both letter and spirit of the Constitution itself.

Digest Author: Camalig, Ylleane Meridee G.

 Article XIII (Social Justice and Human Rights)

a) Section 6
1. Gavino Corpuz v Sps. Gorospe
GR 135297
June 8, 2000
PANGANIBAN, J.
THIRD DIVISION

Facts:

Thomas Cheesman and Criselda Cheesman were married on December 4, 1970 but have been
separated since February 15, 1981.

In 1974, a “Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory Rights” was executed by Armando Altares conveying a
parcel of unregistered land and the house thereon in favor of Criselda Cheesman. Thomas Cheesman, although
aware of the deed, did not object to the transfer being made only to his wife. Tax declarations for the property
were thereafter issued in the name of Criselda and assumed exclusive management and administration. Thomas
Cheesman again had knowledge of such and did not protest. In 1981 Criselda Cheesman sold said property
Estellita Padilla without the knowledge of the husband.

Thomas Cheesman brought suit against his wife, Criselda and Estelita Padilla, praying for the annulment of the
sale on the ground that the transaction had been executed without his knowledge and consent. An answer was
filed alleging that (1) the property said was paraphernal, having been purchased by Criselda with funds
exclusively belonging to her ; (2) Thomas Cheesman, being an American, was disqualied to have any
interest or right of ownership in the land; and (3) Estelita Padilla was a buyer in good faith.

The action resulted in a judgment declaring the said sale void ab initio and ordered the delivery of the property
to Thomas Cheesman as administrator of Conjugal Partnership. The judgment was set aside at the instance of
Estelita Padilla. She then filed a supplemental pleading as her answer to the complaint. The parties ultimately
agreed on the rendition by the court of a summary judgment after entering into a stipulation of facts.

The Trial Court rendered a Summary Judgment declaring the sale executed by Criselda Cheesman in favor of
Estelita Padilla to be valid. The Court dismissed Thomas Cheesman’s complaint and ordered him to
immediately turn oved the property to Estelita Padilla. The Trial Court found that: 1) the evidence on record
satisfactorily overcame the presumption in Article 160 of the Civil Code and found that the property is
Criselda’s paraphernal property ; 2) that the legal presumption in Article 160 could not apply because Thomas is
an American citizen, being disqualified under the Constitution to acquire and own real properties and; 3) that
the exercise by Criselda of exclusive acts of dominion with the knowledge of her husband had led
Padilla to believe that the properties were the exclusive properties of Criselda Cheesman and on the
faith of such a belief she bought the properties from her and for value," and therefore, Thomas
Cheesman was, under Article 1473 of the Civil Code, estopped to impugn the transfer to Estelita
Padilla.

Thomas Cheesman appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court. The tribunal promulgated a drcision affirming
the lower court’s summary judgment having found no reversible error.

Thomas Cheesman appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue
Whether or not Thomas Cheesman’s citizenship is a bar to his action to recover the property for the conjugal
partnership

Held:

The fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land. Section 14, Article XIV of
the 1973 Constitution ordains that, "Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualied to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain." Petitioner Thomas Cheesman was, of course, charged with knowledge of this
prohibition. Thus, assuming that it was his intention that the lot in question be purchased by him and
his wife, he acquired no right whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in attempting
to acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly violated the
Constitution; the sale as to him was null and void. In any event, he had and has no capacity or
personality to question the subsequent sale of the same property by his wife on the theory that in so
doing he is merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain
such a theory would permit indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were
to be declared conjugal, this would accord to the alien husband a not insubstantial interest and right
over land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that
the Constitution does not permit him to have.

The finding that his wife had used her own money to purchase the property cannot, be reviewed and
overturned. But even if it were a fact that said wife had used conjugal funds to make the acquisition,
the considerations just set out militate, on high constitutional grounds, against his recovering and
holding the property so acquired, or any part thereof. And whether in such an event, he may recover
from his wife any share of the money used for the purchase or charge her with unauthorized
disposition or expenditure of conjugal funds is not now inquired into; that would be, in the premises, a
purely academic exercise. An equally decisive consideration is that Estelita Padilla is a purchaser in
good faith, both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court having found that Cheesman's own conduct
had led her to believe the property to be exclusive property of the latter's wife, freely disposable by
her without his consent or intervention. An innocent buyer for value, she is entitled to the protection of
the law in her purchase, particularly as against Cheesman, who would assert rights to the property
denied him by both letter and spirit of the Constitution itself.

Digest Author: Fuentes, Vance A.

 b) Section 7
1. People v Maximo Maceren et al.
GR L-32166
October 18, 1977
AQUINO, J.
SECOND DIVISION

Facts:

On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and
Carlito del Rosario were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna
with having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1. It was alleged in the complaint that the five
accused in the morning of March 1, 1969 resorted to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte,
Sta. Cruz by "using their own motor banca, equipped with motor; with a generator colored green with attached
dynamo colored gray or somewhat white; and electrocuting device locally known as ‘senso' with a somewhat
webbed copper wire on the tip or other end of a bamboo pole with electric wire attachment which was attached
to the dynamo direct and with the use of these devices or equipments catches fish through electric current,
which destroy any aquatic animals within its current reach, to the detriment and prejudice of the populace"
(Criminal Case No. 5429). Upon motion of the accused, the municipal court quashed the complaint. The
prosecution appealed. The Court of First Instance of Laguna armed the order of dismissal (Civil Case No. SC-
36). The case is now before this Court on appeal by the prosecution under Republic Act No. 5440.

Issue:

Whether or not Buenaventura and co-accused are criminally liable for electro fishing.

Held:

No! The Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned
under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are
powerless to penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro
fishing, are devoid of any legal basis. The order merely implied that electro fishing was an “obnoxious” form
described under the law. At the same time, the punishment under the Fisheries Law Section 83 is different from
the punishment under Administrative Order 84. In the instant case, the regulation penalizing electro fishing is
not strictly in accordance with the Fisheries Law, under which the regulation was issued, because the law itself
does not expressly punish electro fishing.

However, at present, there is no more doubt that electro fishing is punishable under the Fisheries Law and that
it cannot be penalized merely by executive regulation because Presidential Decree No. 704, promulgated
1975, expressly punishes electro fishing in fresh water and salt water areas.

The ruling of the municipal court was affirmed and petitioners were ACQUITTED.

Digest Author: Laico, Adrian