Judicial Ethics Cases (Set 1)

J u d i c i a l E t h i c s – C a s e s S e t 1 P a g e |1
C o m p i l e d a n d a r r a n g e d b y V i n B a u t i s t a
CANON 1
A.M. No. RTJ-00-1583 November 15, 2000
PASTOR O. RICAFRANCA, JR., complainant,

vs.
JUDGE LILIA C. LOPEZ, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:
Complainant Pastor O. Ricafranca, Jr. filed this administrative complaint against respondent Judge Lilia C. Lopez for
violation of Rule 1.02, Canon 1 and Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which read:
"Rule 1.02.--A judge should administer justice impartially and without delay.
Rule 3.05.--A judge shall dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within the required periods."
Complainant was the accused in Criminal Case No. 93-3796 tried before Branch 109, Regional Trial Court of Pasay City
presided by respondent judge. He alleged that the case was submitted for decision in February 1994, but it was set for
promulgation of judgment only on September 3, 1999. The scheduled promulgation, however, was reset to October 15, 1999
due to the absence of respondent judge. During the promulgation, respondent judge read only the dispositive portion of the
decision convicting complainant of attempted homicide and thereafter asked complainant's counsel if he was appealing the
decision. Respondent judge required complainant to post a bond after his counsel manifested that they would appeal the
judgment of conviction. Before leaving the courtroom, complainant's counsel asked for a copy of the decision but respondent
judge told them that they would be furnished with a copy later as there was something to add to the decision. On October 18
and 19, 1999, complainant's wife, Yolanda Ricafranca went to the office of respondent judge to obtain a copy of the
decision, to no avail. On October 22, 1999, complainant filed with the trial court a notice of appeal although it stated that they
have not yet received a copy of the decision. It was only on October 26, 1999 that the trial court mailed a copy of the
decision to complainant's counsel.
Commenting on the complaint, respondent judge narrated that during the time referred to in the complaint, she was suffering
from a serious ailment and at the same time, she was also heavily burdened with family, as well as other official
responsibilities. She stated:
"That on or about those dates, the undersigned was in and out of the hospital for the removal of a mass on both
(sic) her uterus and in fact was scheduled for operation several times and was rolled in and out of the operating
table (sic) five (5) times only to be brought out of the operating room upon advice of her cardiologist because of
extremely high blood pressure.
Likewise, on or about said times, she lost both her parents and had to take care of her handicapped sister (a
retardate) and a brother (who is suffering from nervous breakdown and always lost his way) and the undersigned
single-handedly has to look for him least (sic) he dies of hunger and exposure to the elements, thus even
aggravating further her health condition.
Additionally, she was designated as one of the Special Criminal Courts and lately as the only Family Court
continuously hearing cases mornings and afternoons not to mention her administrative duties as a former executive
judge and representing courts in other official functions.
Further, all the records of this case has been forwarded to the Court of Appeals and her schedule prevented her
from borrowing or going over the records of the instant case."
Upon evaluation of the complaint and respondent judge's comment, the Office of the Court Administrator found respondent
judge guilty of the charge and recommended that a fine of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) be imposed upon her.
In our resolution dated August 28, 2000, this case was docketed as a regular administrative matter and the parties were
required to manifest if they are willing to submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings filed.
Complainant filed his manifestation dated September 18, 2000 stating that he is willing to submit the case for resolution
based on the pleadings.
Respondent, on the other hand, filed her compliance with the resolution of August 28, 2000 and therein denied all the
allegations in the complaint and claimed that the complaint at bar was only meant to harass her. She nonetheless stated that
she "defers to the wisdom of this Honorable Court in the disposition of the instant administrative complaint."1
We observe that although respondent judge denied the charges in her compliance with the resolution of August 28, 2000,
she never controverted the same in her comment to the complaint and instead offered an explanation for the delay in the
disposition of Criminal Case No. 93-3796. Her failure to controvert the allegations in the complaint amounts to an admission
of these allegations. Respondent's admission renders unnecessary the holding of a formal investigation in this case.
We find the respondent administratively liable for excessive delay in deciding Criminal Case No. 93-3796. The records show
that the case was submitted for decision on February 16, 1994 after the accused has made his offer of evidence and the trial
court has acted thereon.2 Respondent had three (3) months from said date within which to decide the case in accordance
with Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.3 However, the case was only decided five (5) years later, on October
15, 1999.4
The Court has always impressed upon all members of the judiciary the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously on
the principle that justice delayed is justice denied. 5 The Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to administer justice
impartially and without delay.6 They must dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within the required
periods.7 Failure of a judge to decide a case within the prescribed period is inexcusable and constitutes gross inefficiency
warranting a disciplinary sanction.8
We note that this is not the first time that an administrative case was filed against respondent judge for delay in deciding a
case pending before her sala. In 1997, in the case of Dizon vs. Lopez,9 the Court reprimanded respondent judge for a similar
offense. Nonetheless, we also note, as in the case of Dizon, that there were factors beyond the control of respondent that
prevented her from giving her full attention to her official duties and responsibilities at the time. Aside from the fact that she
was afflicted with a grave illness, she also had to take care of her sister and brother who were both suffering some disability.
Although these do not justify her failure, they nonetheless serve to mitigate her culpability. In the light of these
circumstances, we hold that the imposition of a fine of five thousand pesos upon respondent judge is just and reasonable.10
IN VIEW WHEREOF, a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) is hereby imposed on respondent judge, with
warning that the commission of similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Kapunan, J., took no part in view of relationship with a party.
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A.M. No. MTJ-94-921 March 5, 1996
DR. AMPARO A. LACHICA, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE ROLANDO A. FLORDELIZA, MCTC, Jose Abad Santos-Sarangani, Davao del Sur, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:p
In the instant case, this Court once again deals with the standard of behavior and decorum expected of magistrates of the
law.
In an affidavit-Complaint 1 dated October 7, 1993, Dr. Amparo A. Lachica, the Municipal Health Officer of Jose Abad Santos,
Davao del Sur, charged the respondent, Judge Rolando A. Flordeliza of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Jose Abad
Santos-Sarangani, Davao del Sur, with abuse of judicial position and intimidation, for allegedly compelling her to sign a
death certificate even though she was not the attending physician.
Due to the conflicting averments in the Complaint-Affidavit, respondent's Comment/Discussion and complainant's Reply to
Comment, along with their respective annexes consisting of affidavits of witnesses, this Court, thru its First Division, issued a
Resolution on May 11, 1994 referring the case to Judge Magno C. Cruz 2 for investigation, report, and recommendation. The
latter submitted his Report and Recommendation 3 dated July 24, 1995, based on the documentary evidence and
submissions of the parties, consistent with the summary mode of procedure they had earlier agreed to adopt in order to
facilitate the speedy disposition of this case.
The Antecedent Facts
Since the findings of fact as contained in said Report and Recommendation are substantiated by the evidence on record, the
same are herein adopted, to wit:
That on the morning of 12 August 1993, while complainant was at the Tomasa Lachica District Hospital,
Dina Masaglang and Norma Puton were referred to her for the signing of the Death Certificate of Hilario
Kiawan. Knowing the importance of a death certificate and considering that the deceased was not her
patient and that she has no personal knowledge of the cause of his death, she refused to sign the certificate
and told them that the attending physician in General Santos City should sign the same. Complainant
politely explained her reasons for refusing but the two women insisted that complainant sign it because
General Santos is very far and the Municipal Judge will no longer be around after the Fiesta. Despite their
repeated insistence, complainant did not sign the Certificate.
Later in the afternoon, the two women returned to the hospital, handed over to complainant the death
certificate and arrogantly demanded "Pirmahan mo daw sabi ni Judge Flordeliza." Again, complainant
refused.
Complainant did not pay much attention. to the aforesaid incidents, thinking that the two women were
engaged in name-dropping. However, later in the evening, during the Municipal Employees Night Party,
Judge Flordeliza, through the Municipal Assessor, invited Dr. Lachica to sit next to him. When she was
seated, Judge Flordeliza, who was drunk, told her in an angry manner: "Bakit hindi mo pinirmahan ang
Death Certificate?" Complainant tried to explain her reasons but no to avail. After exchanges of words,
respondent threatened complainant that he will file an administrative case against her if she will refuse to
sign the death certificate.
Complainant further avers that on 13 August 1993, on her way to the Health Center, she again met Dina
Masaglang and Norma Puton and without saying anything, the latter handed to her the Death Certificate.
She (complainant) again refused and advised the two women to let the attending physician of General
Santos sign the Certificate.
Respondent, in his comment, dated 13 December 1993, denied all the accusations against him and
narrated his version of the story. He avers that he did not order said two women to force complainant to
sign the death Certificate; that he has no interest in the case; that the two women are not his relatives nor
even casual friends; that during the Municipal Employees Night Party, he could not have been drunk when
he talked with complainant because the conversation took place shortly after his arrival (accompanied by
P02 Tayong) and the drinks were served only after the end of the program; that the incident took place after
he was offered to join the table occupied by Mayor Jeol [sic] Lachica and his group: that upon seeing Dr.
Lachica, respondent invited her for a conversation which she accepted; that in a casual conversation, in
good faith and without malice, he inquired casually why complainant refused to sign the certificate when it
should be signed in Jose Abad Santos where the deceased died; that after the conversation and before
rejoining her group, complainant requested respondent to inform the two ladies to see her at the Health
Center the following day.
Respondent claims that the allegations of Dr. Lachica are contrary to human experience. It is not usual for a
stranger like him to coerce, intimidate and threaten complainant in the presence of her influential relatives
like Mayor Joel Lachica, Municipal Kagawad David Lachica, Jr., and Dr. Ignacio Matbagan.
To substantiate respondent's allegations, he submitted Affidavits of Lolita Pardiños, Interpreter, Norma

Puton, P02 Nestor Branzuela, Domingo Ambaan, Jr., and P02 C. Tayong.
In her reply, complainant denied the allegations of respondent and reiterated her charges against him,
saying that respondent lied when he said that they talked at a table with Mayor Lachica. Mayor Lachica
attested (Annex "A" Rollo, p. 29) that he was not with them at their table during the incident; that if Judge
Flordeliza has really no interest in the case, he would not have summoned complainant to his table and
lectured her on the importance of the death certificate.
In rebuttal, complainant submitted a copy of at the "Daily Disposition of Troops of Jose Abad Santos Police
Station" (Annex "B" of the reply) to show that P02 Tayong was not with the group of the Judge, thus, he
could not have witnessed the incident. She likewise submitted an Affidavit of David Lachica who was with
Judge Flordeliza in a drinking spree hours before the party. (Rollo, p. 35).
The Issue: Credibility
The investigating judge summed up the issue posed for resolution as being a factual question of whether respondent-judge
is guilty as charged of abuse of judicial position and intimidation amounting to violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. He
added, "The resolution of this issue hinges mainly on credibility."
The investigating judge made the following evaluation of the evidence on record: 4
The original affidavit complaint of Dr. Amparo Lachica, as well as, her Comment to the Reply of the
respondent-judge to said affidavit, cannot be taken lightly. On the other hand, the comment to the affidavit-
complaint by the respondent-judge is replete with denials of his alleged act of coercing and intimidating said
lady physician for refusing to sign a Death Certificate of a deceased person involved in a case pending in
his Court. The counter-affidavits of the respondent's witnesses, more particularly, those witnesses who
were allegedly present during the incident were all belied by the affidavits executed by persons who are not
expected to fabricate the same for purposes of lending credence to the complaint of the complainant-
physician.
One of them was the incumbent Mayor of Jose Abad Santos, Davao del Sur, Hon. Joel Lachica, who
appears to be related to both the complainant and the respondent. Likewise, the affidavit of P02 Louie C.
Tayong (Exhibit "5"), has been belied by the excerpts of the Daily Disposition of Troops of the Jose Abad
Santos Police Station, to show that said alleged witness to the incident could not have been present during
said date.
It is worthy to note that no counter-affidavit has been submitted by the respondent-judge as regards Exhibit
"I" and sub-markings, which show a photograph taken during the pre-fiesta celebration at Jose Abad
Santos, Davao del Sur, on August 13, 1993, the date of the incident, showing the respondent-judge with a
group of persons who were drinking beer, and with said respondent-Judge clearly inebriated.
Even without going over each and every affidavits (sic) and counter-affidavits (sic) filed by both parties, it is
very evident that the imputation of misconduct by the respondent-Judge have (sic) been proven by
substantial evidence which is the quantum of proof required in administrative cases. Granting that the
respondent-Judge has not intimidated or coerced the complainant in issuing a Certificate of Death
precipitating the filing of this Complaint, we cannot see our way clear why said respondent-Judge should be
interested in such trivial matter which could be well attended to by the Prosecutor in the case where said
Certificate is a subject of inquiry. A judge is not supposed to be an active combatant in court
proceedings and must leave it to the parties themselves to secure their evidence and argue their respective
positions on any matter without his participation. It should be recognized that the Judge's role is to decide
and not to litigate. (Emphasis supplied)
Summing up, the Investigating Judge made the following recommendation:
CONFORMABLY WITH THE FOREGOING, the undersigned Investigator respectfully recommends to hold
respondent JUDGE ROLANDO A. FLORDELIZA administratively liable for Violation of Canons 1 and 2 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct and impose on him a fine of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS, with a
stern warning that a repitition (sic) of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
The Court's Ruling
As noted by the Investigating Judge, this is yet another occasion for reminding members of the bench to conduct themselves
beyond reproach, not only in the discharge of their official duties, but in their private lives as well.
Canons 1 and 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provide as follows:
Canon 1. A judge should uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary.
xxx xxx xxx
Canon 2. A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.
On the other hand, item 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics reads:
3. Avoidance of Appearance of Impropriety.
A judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behaviour,
not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be
beyond reproach.
From all the foregoing, as well as the evidence on record, this Court is convinced that the charge of misconduct against the
respondent judge has been established by substantial evidence, which is the quantum of proof required in administrative
cases. 5 His undue interest in having complainant sign the Death Certificate is highly questionable, to say the least. Further,
his inebriated demeanor and incoherent behavior during the festivities, as attested to by a witness 6, is reprehensible in a
judge and should be subjected to disciplinary action. As previously held by this Court:
The undue surrender of respondent Judge to the proddings of his self-defined pleasure failed him in his duty to conduct himself within
the confines of propriety and to behave in a manner shorn of reproach. When he yieled to the strength of the "spirit", losing judicial
composure and acting like an uninhibited drunkard in the streets and public places, he not only stripped himself of his dignity as a man
but disrobed the court of the respect of the people it serves. Such act demeans his judicial office and elicits suspicion of his capacity to
discharge justice. The apprehension may lie where such suspicion may be stretched too far by the people themselves and may unduly
include the whole judicial machinery. And that would lay the way for the people to weaken, if not lose, their faith in the administration of
justice. 7
A similar pronouncement was made in the case of Arcenio vs. Pagorogon 8:
. . . as we have often stated, "(a)lthough every office in the government service is a public trust, no position
exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the
Judiciary. A magistrate of the law must comport himself at all times in such manner that his conduct, official
or other wise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of
integrity and justice" (Dia-Anonuevo vs. Bercasio, 68 SCRA 81, 89 [1975]).
WHEREFORE, in view of the above considerations, respondent Judge ROLANDO A. FLORDELIZA is hereby HELD
ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE for violation of Canons 1 and 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as well as item 3 of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics and is hereby FINED in the amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS, with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this decision
be spread on the records of the respondent judge.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
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A.M. No. MTJ-94-998 February 9, 1996
JUDGE SEGUNDO B. PAZ, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE ANTONIO V. TIONG, respondent.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
The instant administrative case was initiated by Judge Segundo B. Paz, Presiding Judge of Branch 54 of the Regional Trial
Court, of the First Judicial Region stationed in Alaminos, Pangasinan, when he sent the following letter dated August 18,
1994, to the Court Administrator:
August 18, 1994
THE HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO

COURT ADMINISTRATOR
SUPREME COURT
MANILA.
Sir:
The undersigned, who is the Presiding Judge of Branch 54 of the Regional Trial Court in Alaminos, Pangasinan,
respectfully informed your good office about the action of Honorable Antonio V. Tiong, the Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court of Bolinao, Pangasinan, in connection with a case which is pending before the sala of the
undersigned.
Criminal Case No. 2859-A which is for Aggravated Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunitions wherein the
accused is Ernesto Tugade, was raffled to the sala of the undersigned. A Motion for Bail was filed on August 10,
1994 and the same was set for hearing on August 16, 1994. At the hearing, no abjection was made to the Motion by
the Government Prosecutor. The undersigned granted the said motion for bail and set the amount of P50,000.00 as
his bond. A copy of the said Order is hereto attached as Annex A.
The same afternoon, the wife of the accused presented a bailbond of the accused and an Order of Release issued
by Judge Tiong. The bailbond of Ernesto Tugade and the Order of Release are hereto attached as Annexes B and
C.
Upon examination of the bond papers and the Order of Release submitted to the undersigned, the dates thereon is
August 15, 1994 or a day before hearing of the Motion for Bail. In other words, even before the Motion for Bail was
resolved, Judge Tiong has already issued an Order for the release of the accused.
Moreover, when the undersigned showed Annexes B and C to the Executive Judge, Hon. Vivencio A. Bantugan of
Branch 55 of this Court, the latter stated that Judge Tiong filed a one day leave for August l5, 1994 and that the
leave was favorably endorsed to your office by Judge Bantugan on the same date.
In view of the foregoing, the undersigned respectfully brings this matter to your attention for whatever action your
office deems fit to undertake.
Thank you very much..

(p. 2, Rollo.)
Required to comment, respondent averred:.
That the days prior to August 15, 1994, the undersigned experienced gastro abdominal pain and aching of both his
lower ribs;
That on the 15th day of August 1994, despite the pain and aching, reported to the Court in the early office hour in
the morning in view of the desire of the undersigned to attend to some paper works for and over view of the Court
cases set for hearing for the day, Criminal Case No. 762, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Domingo Caacbay
and Civil Case No. 782, entitled Spouses Edeluisa P. Peralta, et al. vs. Braulio Jacalan, et al., both set in the
afternoon Court Calendar, xerox copies hereto attached as Annexes "A" and "B", respectively;
That notwithstanding the increasing pain and aching, undersigned managed to withstand and at this juncture, a
person representing to act in behalf of accused Ernesto Tugade, for bail purposes, in criminal case no. 2859-A, for
Aggravated Illegal Possession of Firearms before the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan, appeared
before this Court with information of the grant of right to bail of by the accused by the Regional Trial Court carrying a
blank bailbond form and some pertinent papers relative thereto;
That as an Office Standing Operating Procedure (SOP), undersigned the instructed the person to consult and refer
the matter to Clerk of Court of this office for verification and for proper affixation of their initial as an indication of the
completeness of the corresponding pertinent papers and documents of the said bailbond, some few samples of the
abundant Orders of Release bearing their initials of personnel of this office as evidence of the Standing Operating
Procedure long been existing, are submitted by the undersigned for ready perusal and consideration, xerox copies
hereto attached as Annexes, "C", "D" & "E", respectively;
That undersigned was disturbed by the intermittent pain and aching, but forced himself to ignore it, on the belief that
it will subside, as in the previous days after taking palliative pills;
That it was the time when the above mentioned person returned inside the Court's chamber with the prepared Order
of the Release bearing the corresponding initial by one of the personnel of this Court, and as, above stated is safe
indication of the completeness of the required supporting pertinent papers, the undersigned nonetheless went on to
examine the documents and the bailbond while in the state of laboring in pain and aching of the ribs, xerox copy of
the initiated Order of Released hereto attached as Annex "F";
That to the vivid recollection of the undersigned, there was at the time, a purported order issued by the Regional
Trial Court, Alaminos, Pangasinan, granting the accused Ernesto Tugade the right to bail, a bond fixed by the said
Court in the amount of P50,000.00, otherwise the undersigned have not acted on the matter in the absence of that
basic important essential requirement, affidavit of Romulo C. Villareal hereto attached as Annex "G";
That a bond in the amount of P50,000.00 as set in the Order of the Regional Trial Court, a property bailbond was on
the basis thereof accordingly accomplished, duly initialed, so that have there been indeed no Order, the
undersigned has no basis as to how much was the bond of the accused Ernesto Tugade, which was really the
amount fixed by the Regional Trial Court, xerox copy hereto attached as Annex "H";
That viewed from the circumstance above-stated no room for doubt was entertained by the undersigned, but to find
legality and propriety for the issuance of the said Order of Release of the accused Ernesto Tugade, hence the
signing;
That after the undersigned have signed the bailbond and the Order of Release of to be exact at 11:30 o'clock in the
morning of the same day of August 15, 1994, the pain and aching turned worst, severe and continuous, and it was
upon the brotherly advice of Atty. Efren Peralta who was then in the Court house, to appear in the hearing of his two
cases, for the undersigned to file sick leave of absence for immediate medical check up and treatment, thus
explaining the circumstance of having signed the Order of Release although on sick leave of absence on said day,
that it was performed before undersigned finally decided to go an sick leave when the pains and aching was beyond
the point of human endurance following the cancellation of the hearing of the two scheduled cases, affidavit of Atty.
Efren Peralta, Sick Leave of Absence and Order of cancellation of hearing hereto attached as Annexes "I", "J" & "K",
respectively;
That undersigned immediately proceeded to the nearest resident physician of Bolinao, Pangasinan, in the person of
Doctor Miguel R. de Perio, who is now abroad up to the present in the United States of America, for medical check-
up and treatment;
That the records of the undersigned can readily attest to the fact that on subsequent dates after August 15, 1994,
several sick leaves of absence were further file by him due to his lingering ailment, who was finally constrained to
undergo executive medical check-up and as recommended to be by means of ultrasound and nine X-ray shots, and
as concrete proof and evidence thereof, are xerox copies of the result of the medical check-up, hereto attached as
Annexes "L" and "M", respectively;
That after consultation with the records of the case at the Regional Trial Court, Alaminos, Pangasinan, it consisted
of forty seven (47) folios and it appears that the said order of release issued by the undersigned did not form part of
the official records of the case, neither has it been utilized in the release of the accused nor serve any purpose
whatsoever in connection with the case, xerox copy hereto attached is Annex "N";
That the undersigned acted favorably on the bailbond and Order of Release only after finding the supporting
pertinent documents complete especially and Order of the Regional Trial Court, Alaminos, Pangasinan, granting the
right to bail of the accused Ernesto Tugade, such fault duly corroborated by Atty. Efren P. Peralta and Romulo C.
Villareal, in their affidavits already marked as Annexes "G" and "I", which were nevertheless did not form part of the
officials Records of the case, affidavit of undersigned hereto attached as Annex "O";
(pp. 16-21, Rollo.)
A reading of Judge Tiong's comment clearly shows that there is no factual issue involved. He admits that on August 15,
1994 he signed the bailbond and the Order of Release of Ernesto Tugade, the accused in Criminal Case No. 2859-A,
pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, Alaminos, Pangasinan and presided over by Judge Paz.
Respondent had absolutely no authority to approve the bailbond and issue the order of release. He totally ignored or
disregarded Section 14 of Rule 114, which reads:
Sec. 14. Bail, where filed. (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court where the case is pending, or, in
the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with another branch of the same court within the province or city.
If the accused is arrested in a province, city or municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may be filed
also with any regional trial court of said place, or, if no judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge,
municipal trial judge or municipal circuit trial judge therein.
As afore-stated, Criminal Case No. 2859-A was pending before Branch 54 of the Regional Trial Court stationed in Alaminos,
Pangasinan, and only said Regional Trial Court may approve the bailbond and issue the order of release. The record is
devoid of any showing that no RTC judge was available to act on the bailbond. Neither does the record show that the
accused was arrested in another province, city, or municipality. Respondent judge, therefore, had no reason or authority to
act as he did.
The defense interposed by respondent that "it appears that the said Order of Release issued by the undersigned did not
form part of the official records of the case, neither has it been utilized in the release of the accused nor served any purpose
whatsoever in connection with the case" is unavailing. It is immaterial whether or not the order of release issued by him was
used by the accused in obtaining his release. Respondent judge is charged with approving the bailbond and issuing the
order of release.
His further defense that at the time he approved the bail bond he had a "vivid recollection" of an order of the Regional Trial
Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan, "granting the accused Ernesto Tugade the right to bail, a bond fixed by the said court in the
amount of P50,000.00" is obviously a figment of his imagination. According to Judge Paz, a motion for bail was filed on
August 10, 1994 and set for hearing on August 16, 1994. However, respondent approved the bail bond and issued the order
of release on August 15, 1994, or one day before the motion for bail was heard by judge Paz.
Respondent's other excuse that he was on leave of absence on August 15, 1994, is likewise immaterial. As a matter of fact,
it would make matters worse for him if he were on leave of absence on August 15, 1994 for then he would have absolutely
no authority to discharge the duties or exercise the powers of a judge.
A judge's conduct should be above reproach, and in the discharge of his judicial duties he should be conscientious,
studious, thorough, courteous, patient, punctual, just, impartial . . . (paragraph 31, Code of Judicial Ethics). It is patent that
respondent Judge Tiong was remiss in observing the conduct expected of a member of the judiciary. He failed to exert such
conscientiousness, studiousness, and thoroughness expected and demanded of a judge.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Antonio V. Tiong is hereby found guilty of abuse of authority and ordered to pay a fine in
the amount of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Francisco and Panganiban, JJ. concur.
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APOLINARIO MUÑEZ, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE CIRIACO ARIÑO, MCTC, San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an administrative complaint 1 against respondent Judge Ciriaco C. Ariño of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San
Francisco, Agusan del Sur for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment as defined and penalized under Article 204 of the
Revised Penal Code. The complaint was originally filed with the Office of the Ombudsman which, after dismissing the case
for lack of probable cause for filing in court, nevertheless referred the case to this Court "for possible administrative action
against respondent."
It appears that on December 26, 1989, Mayor Irisari of Loreto, Agusan del Sur summoned to his office herein complainant
Apolinario S. Muñez for conference respecting a land dispute which Muñez had with one Tirso Amado. As complainant failed
to attend the conference, Mayor Irisari issued a warrant of arrest against him on December 27, 1989. 2
The warrant was served on complainant by CFC Redelio Caballes and Cpl. Rolando Limayan and by virtue of it complainant
was brought before Mayor Irisari, although no investigation was later conducted.
Complainant filed a complaint 3 against Mayor Irisari for grave misconduct and usurpation of judicial function with the Office
of the Ombudsman as well as administrative complaint 4 for violation of the Constitution, misconduct in office and abuse of
authority with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur.
After preliminary investigation, the investigating officer of the Office of the Ombudsman filed a case 5 for usurpation of judicial
function against Mayor Asuero Irisari in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Loreto, Agusan del Sur. Originally raffled to the
judge of that court, the criminal case was later assigned to respondent Judge Ciriaco Ariño on account of the inhibition of the
first judge.
Accused Irisari moved to quash the information on the ground that the acts complained of did not constitute a crime under
the law. He contended that under § 143(3) of the former Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337), mayors were
authorized to issue warrants of arrest. 6
On July 28, 1992, respondent Judge Ariño denied the motion to quash on the ground that the power of mayors to issue
warrants of arrest had ceased to exist as of February 2, 1987 when the Constitution took effect.
J u d i c i a l E t h i c s – C a s e s S e t 1 P a g e | 10
For its part the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, acting on the administrative complaint against the mayor, found him guilty of
misconduct in office and abuse of authority and accordingly ordered him suspended for eight (8) months without pay. On
appeal, however, the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) reversed on the ground that what the mayor had
issued to the complainant, although denominated "Warrant of Arrest," was actually just an invitation or a summons.
On September 21, 1992, Mayor Irisari filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of denial of respondent judge, invoking
the resolution of the DILG.
In an order dated February 15, 1993, respondent Judge Ariño reconsidered his previous order and dismissed the case.
Respondent said in his order:
The accused, in his Motion for Reconsideration, asserts that since the question about the warrant of arrest
issued against Apolinario Muñez has been resolved in an administrative proceedings as not the warrant of
arrest contemplated by law, it would follow then that this case now before this Court against the accused be
dismissed. The Court finds that the subject matter in this case and that in the administrative complaint arose
from one and the same incident and it involved the same parties.
Courts are not bound by the findings of administrative agencies like the DILG as in this case if such findings
are tainted with unfairness and there is arbitrary action or palpable serious error.
. . . The Court believes that the resolution by the administrative agency in DLG-AC-60-91 is not tainted with
unfairness and arbitrariness neither it shows arbitrary action or palpable and serious error, therefore, it must
be respected (Mangubat vs. de Castro, G.R. 33892; July 28, 1988; Blue Bar Coconut Philippines vs.
Tantuico, Jr., et al., G.R. 47051, July 29, 1988, Cuerdo vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. 84592, October 27,
1988).
Upon receipt of this order, complainant Muñez sent two letters dated July 5 and 12, 1933 to the Presidential Anti-Crime
Commission charging respondent Judge Ciriaco C. Ariño with knowingly rendering an unjust judgment for dismissing the
case against Mayor Irisari. The matter was indorsed to the Office of the Ombudsman which, as already stated, referred it to
this Court for possible disciplinary action against respondent judge. 7
We agree with the Office of the Ombudsman that while respondent judge may have acted in good faith, he should
nevertheless be administratively held liable.
The acts alleged in the information constitute a crime. Under Art. 241 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of usurpation of
judicial authority involves the following elements: (1) that the offender is an officer of the executive branch of the
government; and (2) that he assumes judicial powers, or obstructs the execution of any order or decision rendered by any
judge within his jurisdiction. These elements were alleged in the information. Mayor Irisari was an officer of the executive
branch.
It is not true that what he had issued against the complainant was not a warrant of arrest. It was. In plain terms it stated:
Republic of the Philippines

PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL SUR
MUNICIPALITY OF LORETO
Office of the Mayor
WARRANT OF ARREST
TO: ANY OFFICE OF THE LAW

This Municipality
G R E E T I N G S:
You are hereby requested/ordered to effect the arrest of Apolinario Muñez of Poblacion, Loreto, Agusan del Sur, for his refusal to
acknowledge the Summons dated December 26, 1989, and bring him before the Office of the Municipal Mayor to answer an
inquiry/investigation in connection with the complaint of one Tirso Amado held pending before this Office.
FOR COMPLIANCE.
For and in the absence of the Municipal Circuit Judge
Any one reading the warrant could not have been mistaken that it was a warrant for the arrest of the complainant Apolinario
Muñez. As a matter of fact Mayor Irisari justified his order on the basis of § 143(3) of the former Local Government Code
(Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) which expressly provided that in cases where the mayor may conduct preliminary investigation,
the mayor shall, upon probable cause after examination of witnesses, have the authority to order the arrest of the accused."
This provision had, however, been repealed by Art. III, § 2 of the 1987 Constitution, as this Court held in Ponsica
v. Ignalaga, 8 in which it was explained:
No longer does the mayor have at this time the power to conduct preliminary investigations, much less
issue orders of arrest. Section 143 of the Local Government Code, conferring this power on the mayor has
been abrogated, rendered functus officio by the 1987 Constitution which took effect on February 2, 1987,
the date of its ratification by the Filipino people. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution pertinently
provides that "no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to
be seized." The constitutional proscription has thereby been manifested that thenceforth, the function of
determining probable cause and issuing, on the basis thereof, warrants of arrest or search warrants, may be
validly exercised only by judges, this being evidenced by the elimination in the present Constitution of the
phrase, "such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law" found in the counterpart provision of
said 1973 Constitution — who, aside from judges, might conduct preliminary investigation and issue
warrants of arrest or search warrants.
That there was no pending criminal case against the complainant did not make the order against him any less an order of
arrest, contrary to the opinion of DILG.
On the other hand, the issuance of the warrant when there was before him no criminal case, but only a land dispute as it is
now being made to appear, only made it worse for the mayor, for it would then appear that he assumed a judicial function
which even a judge could not have done. All the more, therefore, respondent judge should not have dismissed the criminal
case against the mayor.
It cannot be pretended that Mayor Irisari merely intended to invite or summon Muñez to his office because he had precisely
done this the day before he issued the warrant of arrest, and he ordered the arrest of complainant because the latter had
refused to appear before him. The summons issued by Mayor Irisari shows clearly that he understood the difference
between a summons and a warrant of arrest. The summons read:
Republic of the Philippines

PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL SUR
MUNICIPALITY OF LORETO
Office of the Mayor
SUMMON
TO: Mr. Apolinario Muñez

Loreto, Agusan del Sur
G R E E T I N G S:
You are hereby demanded to appear before the Office of the Municipal Mayor on 27 December 1989 at around 9:30 A.M. then and
there to answer in an inquiry/investigation in connection with a certain complaint of Mr. Tirso Amado lodged in this office.
PLEASE FAIL NOT under the penalty of the law.
Loreto, Agusan del Sur, Philippines.

(Sgd) ASUERO S. IRISARI

Municipal Mayor
Indeed, respondent had previously denied the motion to dismiss which the accused Mayor Irisari had filed on the ground that
the authority (B.P. Blg. 337, § 143[3]) invoked by him as basis for his warrant of arrest had been abrogated by the
Constitution. He subsequently reversed himself on the ground that the decision of the DILG, finding Mayor Irisari not guilty,
"must be respected." He said, "Courts are not bound by findings of administrative agencies like the DILG as in this case if
such findings are tainted with unfairness and there is arbitrary action or palpable serious error." Since the DILG decision was
not so tainted, "therefore, it must be respected."
Respondent Judge Ciriaco Ariño should have known that the case of Mayor Irisari was not before him on review from the
decision of an administrative agency and, therefore, there was no basis for applying the rule on substantiality of evidence.
What was before him was a criminal case and he should have considered solely the facts alleged in the information in
resolving the motion to dismiss of the accused. At the very least, he showed poor judgment and gross ignorance of basic
legal principles, for which he should be reminded of what this Court said in Libarios v. Dabalos: 9
In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge done in his judicial capacity are not
subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts may be erroneous. But, while judges should not be
disciplined for inefficiency on account merely of occasional mistakes or errors of judgment, yet, it is highly
imperative that they should be conversant with basic legal principles.
In every case, a judge should endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law unswayed by partisan or personal
interests, public opinion or fear of criticism. . . . A judge owes it to the public and the administration of justice to know the law he is
supposed to apply to a given controversy. He is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and
procedural rules. There will be faith in the administration of justice only if there be a belief on the part of litigants that the occupants of
the bench cannot justly be accused of a deficiency in their grasp of legal principles. 10
But there is more than just gross ignorance of legal principles shown here. Although he denies it, what the respondent judge
appears to have actually done in this case was to rely on the opinion of the DILG which found the mayor not guilty of serious
misconduct in office on the ground that he had not really issued a warrant of arrest against the complainant but only an
invitation or a summons. To justify his reliance on the opinion of the DILG, respondent judge invoked the rule in
administrative law that the findings of facts of administrative agencies when supported by substantial evidence, are binding
on the courts in the absence of a showing of fraud, imposition or dishonesty. We have already stated why that is grossly
erroneous. What we are here concerned is that by relying on the opinion of the DILG, disregarding a previous ruling he had
made which was in accordance with law, respondent judge showed lack of capacity for independent judgment.
WHEREFORE, a FINE of P5,000.00 is imposed on respondent Judge Ciriaco Ariño. He is enjoined to exercise greater care
and diligence in the performance of his duties as a judge and warned that a repetition of the similar offense will be dealt with
more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado and Puno, JJ., concur

CANON 2
A.M. No. RTJ-06-1974 July 26, 2007

(formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 05-2226-RTJ)
CARMEN P. EDAÑO, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE FATIMA G. ASDALA, RTC Br. 87, Quezon City, and STENOGRAPHER MYRLA DEL PILAR NICANDRO, RTC Br. 217, Quezon City, Respondents.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This administrative complaint was initiated by a handwritten complaint to the Supreme Court, through Assistant Court
Administrator Antonio H. Dujua dated March 28, 2005, by the complainant Carmen P. Edaño charging Judge Fatima G.
Asdala, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 87, of grave abuse of discretion and authority, and of conduct
unbecoming of a judge. A complaint was also lodged against Myrla Nicandro, a stenographer detailed in the same RTC
branch, for usurpation of authority, grave misconduct and unauthorized solicitations. Upon receipt of the complaint, we
referred it to Court of Appeals (CA) Associate Justice Mariano C. del Castillo for investigation in order to ascertain the
veracity of the complainant’s accusations and grievances.1
The complaint stemmed from a civil case for Support with a prayer for Support Pendente Lite 2 filed by the complainant on
behalf of her two minor children, Carlo and Jay-ar, against George Butler, who denies paternity of the children. Then pairing
judge, Teodoro A. Bay, issued an Order dated November 12, 1999, directing defendant Butler to provide support pendente
lite in the amount of P5,000 per month to be "delivered to the mother (the complainant herein) within the first five (5) days of
each month."3 A writ of execution was subsequently issued which included the garnishing of rental payments for the
apartments in Cubao, Quezon City, which are being managed by defendant Butler. It was at this juncture that respondent
Judge Asdala took cognizance of the case.
Due to the failure of defendant Butler to comply with the November 12, 1999 Order of the trial court, despite several
reprimands and orders to implement, complainant Edaño moved to cite defendant Butler in contempt. On November 23,
2004, respondent Judge Asdala found defendant Butler guilty of indirect contempt and sentenced him to four (4) months
imprisonment and a P30,000.00 fine. Subsequently a Bench Warrant was issued against defendant Butler.4
On January 25, 2005, after privately meeting with defendant Butler in her chambers, respondent Judge Asdala issued the
following ex-parte Order:
Following his knowledge of Bench Warrant against him, defendant George Butler, personally appeared before the Presiding
Judge and pleaded that the contempt fine imposed against him be reduced to P5,000.00 and that the Bench Warrant be
recalled.
The matter will be taken under advisement.
SO ORDERED.5
The following ex-parte Order was also issued by respondent Judge Asdala:
In the highest interest of justice, the October 7, 2004 and November 26, 2004 6 Order finding the defendant guilty of indirect
contempt is hereby reconsidered. As such, the fine is reduced to P5,000.00 and the corresponding order of imprisonment is
set aside.
SO ORDERED.7
On February 1, 2005, defendant Butler paid the P5,000.00 fine.8 On March 22, 2005, respondent Judge Asdala dismissed
complainant Edaño’s suit on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 9 The case is now pending before the CA after the
appellate court ordered the trial court to give due course to the complainant’s notice of appeal.
In the complainant’s letter-complaint, she laments the fact that without notice, much less consent, respondent Judge Asdala
met privately with defendant Butler in her chambers to discuss the finding of indirect contempt against the latter without any
hearing or minutes of the proceedings and without her or her counsel’s participation. As a result of the said private meeting,
the fine was reduced from P30,000 to P5,000, the order of imprisonment was deleted, and the Bench Warrant was recalled.
The complainant likewise alleges that respondent Judge Asdala forced her to file a complaint for neglect of duty against her
own counsel, Atty. Rowena Alejandria, with the Public Attorneys’ Office (PAO), as respondent Judge Asdala had a grudge
against Atty. Alejandria. She likewise claims that she was given P1,000 by respondent Judge Asdala for her silence. The
complainant also faults respondent Judge Asdala for ordering the support pendente lite to be deposited with the Office of the
Clerk of Court instead of being directly given to the complainant and for applying the money thus deposited to the payment
of the P5,000 fine instead of being given to the complainant. Further, she questions the dismissal of the civil case for support
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, alleging that the basis of the findings is the testimony of Butler which was already
stricken off the record as of January 28, 2001.
As against respondent Myrla Nicandro, the complainant alleges that the former subtracted certain amounts from
the P10,000 deposited by defendant Butler’s daughter, Cristy, before turning over the money to her. Allegedly, the amounts
subtracted were given to the respondents. The complainant likewise questions respondent Nicandro’s discharge of the
functions of Officer-in-Charge (OIC)/ Acting Branch Clerk of Court when the Supreme Court, through the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), did not approve her designation as such.
In her defense, respondent Judge Asdala avers that the recall of the bench warrant and the reduction of the fine are matters
of judicial discretion. She insists that, after the representation of Mr. Butler of his financial inability to pay the original fine, the
amendment to her previous orders was more in keeping with justice and fairness. Respondent Judge Asdala likewise denies
the charges that she instigated a complaint against Atty. Alejandria. She points to the fact that the complainant herself wrote
a letter of apology dated November 19, 2004 to Atty. Alejandria withdrawing her complaint and retracting the statements
made therein. As for the designation of respondent Nicandro as OIC for administrative services in Branch 87, respondent
Judge Asdala avers that the same was with the knowledge of the Executive Judge of Quezon City; and that as presiding
judge of Branch 87, she has the discretion and the authority to appoint whoever has her trust and confidence. With regard to
the decision to dismiss the civil case for support, respondent Judge Asdala maintains that the proper remedy is to elevate
the matter to the appellate court and not to file an administrative case against her.
Respondent Nicandro, for her part, denies misrepresenting herself as OIC. She avers that she was acting under the
designation made by respondent Judge Asdala, with the knowledge of the Executive Judge. As for the other accusations
made by the complainant, respondent Nicandro insists that the same are blatant lies. She denies soliciting money from the
complainant, and avers that it was in fact the complainant who would frequently go to Branch 87 and borrow money from the
court personnel who, out of pity, would oblige to lend her small amounts from time to time. She maintains that at the time the
complainant claimed the P10,000 deposited by Butler, respondent Nicandro reminded her of her debts to a number of court
personnel – P400 to process server Lito de la Cruz, P100 to Sheriff Victor Yaneza, and P100 to court stenographer Elenita
Ribaya. Respondent Nicandro allegedly reminded the complainant that she owed respondent Judge Asdala P500 which the
latter gave as payment for Sheriff’s fee. The payment, however, was no longer accepted by the respondent judge who,
instead, directed respondent Nicandro to use the same to buy snacks for the court staff. The same was corroborated by
respondent Judge Asdala.
As stated in the Investigation Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Justice, the act of a judge done within his
judicial discretion, such as the reduction of fine for indirect contempt, should not be subject to disciplinary action. In the
instant complaint, however, the exercise of discretion by the respondent is not impugned. Rather, it is the conduct of
respondent Judge Asdala in meeting with defendant Butler without notice or knowledge, much less the presence, of the
complainant or her representative that is assailed. The meeting was not an innocuous one for it resulted in the cancellation
of the bench warrant, the revocation of the order of imprisonment and the significant reduction in the amount of fine
from P30,000.00 to P5,000.00. Respondent Judge Asdala does not deny the private meeting, much less explain its
circumstances. As rightly observed by the Investigating Justice, the private meeting was improper, to say the least. It
deprived the complainant of her right to be heard on matters affecting her vital interests. The secret meeting cannot but
invite suspicion, for no minutes or stenographic notes of the meeting have been presented, if any existed. Respondent judge
cannot feign ignorance of the fact that our courts are courts of record.
As the visible representation of the law and justice, judges, such as the respondent, are expected to conduct themselves in
a manner that would enhance the respect and confidence of the people in the judicial system.10The New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary11 mandates that judges must not only maintain their independence, integrity and
impartiality; but they must also avoid any appearance of impropriety or partiality, which may erode the people’s faith in the
judiciary. Integrity and impartiality, as well as the appearance thereof, are deemed essential not just in the proper discharge
of judicial office, but also to the personal demeanor of judges. 12 This standard applies not only to the decision itself, but also
to the process by which the decision is made. Section 1, Canon 2, specifically mandates judges to "ensure that not only is
their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of reasonable observers." Clearly, it is of vital
importance not only that independence, integrity and impartiality have been observed by judges and reflected in their
decisions, but that these must also appear to have been so observed in the eyes of the people, so as to avoid any erosion of
faith in the justice system.13 Thus, judges must be circumspect in their actions in order to avoid doubt and suspicion in the
dispensation of justice. To further emphasize its importance, Section 2, Canon 2 states:
Sec. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not
merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
As early as June 6, 2003, OCA Circular No. 70-2003 has directed judges as follows:
In view of the increasing number of reports reaching the Office of the Court Administrator that judges have been meeting
with party litigants inside their chambers, judges are hereby cautioned to avoid in-chambers sessions without the other party
and his counsel present, and to observe prudence at all times in their conduct to the end that they only act impartially and
with propriety but are also perceived to be impartial and proper.14
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to "the decision itself but also to the
process by which the decision is made."15 As such, judges must ensure that their "conduct, both in and out of the court,
maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of
the judiciary."16 In the same vein, the Code of Judicial Conduct behooves all judges to avoid impropriety and the appearance
of impropriety in all their activities, as such is essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge in order to maintain
the trust and respect of the people in the judiciary.17
In the case at bar, respondent Judge Asdala’s actions as above discussed put into question the impartiality, independence,
and integrity of the process by which the questioned amended orders were reached. Her actions miserably fell short in the
discharge of her duty as an officer of the court and as a living embodiment of law and justice.
Further, respondent Judge Asdala, in insisting on the designation of respondent Nicandro as OIC, blithely and willfully
disregarded the Memorandum of this Court, through the OCA, which approved the designation of Amy Soneja alone -- and
not in conjunction with respondent Nicandro -- as OIC.18 While the presiding judge, such as respondent Judge Asdala, can
recommend and endorse persons to a particular position, this recommendation has to be approved by this Court. Again, the
respondent judge ought to know that the Constitution grants this Court administrative supervision over all the courts and
personnel thereof. In the case at bar, despite the Court’s approval of Amy Soneja’s designation, the respondent judge
allowed, if not insisted on, the continued discharge of the duties of OIC by respondent Nicandro. Respondent Judge Asdala
even had the gall to insist that as presiding judge she has the authority and discretion to designate "anyone who works
under her, as long as that person enjoys her trust and confidence."19 Coming from a judge, such arrogance, if not ignorance,
is inexcusable. The memorandum from the OCA regarding the designation of court personnel is no less an order from this
Court. Court officials and personnel, particularly judges, are expected to comply with the same. Respondent judge’s gross
insubordination cannot be countenanced. 1avvphi1
This is not the first time that respondent Judge Asdala has been disciplined and penalized by this Court. She has been
found guilty of various administrative complaints in at least four (4) other occasions.20 In 1999, in Dumlao, Jr. v.
Asdala,21 respondent Judge Asdala was admonished for partiality. A year later, in Bowman v. Asdala,22 she was
fined P2,000.00 for grave abuse of discretion in nine (9) cases when she deliberately withheld and did not attach a copy of
her order of inhibition which resulted in the non-transmittal of the records of the criminal cases. In 2005, in Manansala III v.
Asdala,23 she was likewise ordered to pay a fine of P40,000.00, the highest fine that may be imposed for serious offenses
committed by judges and justices,24 for gross misconduct after she interfered with a case of a German national who was then
detained at the police station awaiting inquest investigation. In the said case, respondent Judge Asdala requested the
German national’s release from custody and asked for the amicable settlement of the case against the latter. Compounding
her transgressions, respondent Judge Asdala likewise ordered her court’s sheriff to engage the assistance of policemen in
order to retrieve the German national’s car so that it may be turned over to her custody. Just last year, in 2006, in Request of
Judge Fatima Gonzales-Asdala, RTC-Branch 87, Quezon City, for Extension of the Period to Decide Civil Case No. Q-02-
46950 & 14 Others,25 this Court once again imposed a fine of P11,000.00 on respondent judge for her repeated and
unjustifiable failure to render decisions within the prescribed period. Each penalty imposed on her in the said cases came
with a stern warning that the subsequent commission of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Respondent Judge Asdala has time and time again blatantly disregarded this stream of warnings. Such repeated infractions
and heedless transgressions can no longer be countenanced by this Court. As we have repeatedly stressed, "there is no
place in the judiciary for those who cannot meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity."26
Be that as it may, the accusation that respondent Judge Asdala instigated the complainant to file a complaint against Atty.
Alejandria must be dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence. Similarly, we agree with the Investigating Justice that the
dismissal of the civil case for support cannot be a ground for administrative complaint as the matter is on appeal with the CA
and appeal is the appropriate remedy of the aggrieved party.
Respondent Nicandro, on her part, has been accused of usurping the functions of OIC. While she acted on the strength of 1avv phi1
the memorandum of respondent Judge Asdala designating her as such, it is undeniable that she is aware of the
memorandum of this Court, through the OCA, approving Amy Soneja’s designation as OIC/Branch Clerk of Court.
Respondent Nicandro’s continued exercise of the functions of OIC after the disapproval of her designation is a clear
defiance of the instruction of this Court.
As to the charge of unauthorized solicitation, it is clear that respondent Nicandro, at the very least, acted as "collection
agent" of the office staff with regard to the alleged amounts owed by complainant. Such action on the part of respondent
Nicandro lacks the propriety and proper decorum expected of a court personnel. This is not the first time that this Court had
censured respondent Nicandro’s behavior in dealing with party litigants. Early this year, on February 12, 2007, she was fined
for gross insubordination for her willful failure and indifference to the orders of this Court despite having been found in
contempt for her refusal to comply with the said orders. She was also reprimanded for willful failure to pay a just debt despite
repeated demands from the complainant therein.27Such infractions are conduct highly prejudicial to the best interest of the
service.
This Court has repeatedly stressed its unbending policy not to tolerate or condone any act or omission that falls short of the
exacting norms of public office, especially on those expected to preserve the image of the judiciary. Again, this Court will not
shirk from its responsibility of weeding out those who stain the integrity and dignity of the judiciary.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Respondent Judge Fatima G. Asdala is found GUILTY of gross insubordination and gross misconduct unbefitting
a member of the judiciary and is accordingly DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all salaries, benefits and
leave credits to which she may be entitled.
2. Respondent Myrla Nicandro is found GUILTY of insubordination in assuming the position and discharging the
functions of OIC/ Branch Clerk of Court without and in defiance of proper authority and is accordingly SUSPENDED
from the service for a period of sixty (60) days, without pay, commencing on the day immediately following her
receipt of a copy of this Decision, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely. The period of suspension shall not be chargeable against her leave credits. Respondent Nicandro is
likewise ordered to immediately cease and desist from discharging the functions of OIC/Branch Clerk of Court and
from representing herself as such.
Respondent Nicandro is likewise REPRIMANDED for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and ordered to
abstain from transacting with party litigants other than for official purposes.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
A.M. No. RTJ-98-1400 February 1, 1999

CARLOS DIONISIO, complainant,

vs.
HON. ZOSIMO V. ESCANO, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
In a letter-complaint 1 dated October 8, 1997, herein complainant Carlos Dionisio charged herein respondent Judge Zosimo
Escano with allegedly using court facilities (bulletin board) in advertising for attractive waitresses and personable waiters and
cooks for possible employment in their restaurant business. In addition, respondent judge is also said to have caused the
construction of an extension office along the corridor called "Office of Negotiable Cases" after respondent Judge acquitted a
certain Hung. 2
Meanwhile, in an October 19, 1997 Manila Bulletin issue, the advertisement 3 of Fontana Café & Restaurant appeared
accepting applications for attractive waitresses and female vocalists which reads:
URGENTLY NEEDED
Attractive Waitresses
Female Vocalists
Bartenders-Male/Female
***********
Fontana Café & Restaurant
Dampa, Ninoy Aquino Avenue
Parañaque, Metro Manila
or
RTC, Branch 259
Parañaque Municipal Hall
Tel. 825-57-32/826-00-11 loc. 226
Taking note of this advertisement, a staff member of ABS-CBN's public service show "Hoy Gising!" disguised as an
applicant was sent to conduct a videotaped investigation on the veracity of the advertisement. The incidents of the
investigation were aired live on televesion in their regular program. This tape was also made part of the complaint submitted
to the Office of the Court Administrator. The aforesaid staff member was able to ferret out the following admissions from
respondent Judge Escano inside his chamber at RTC, Branch 259, Parañaque Municipal Hall where he conducted the
interview:
As to the ownership of the said establishment, respondent admitted: "Ako ang may-ari. Ako mismo ang
owner."
As to the nature of the business establishment, respondent Judge has this to say: "Ngayon, ang concept
nitong pubhouse, lalo itong lugar ko, itong pangalan ay Fontana Café, ang ano ay we will be catering to
classes A and B." He further added: "Yung mga lalake target natin, may come on tayo diyan."
Respondent Judge even continued to say: "I will be requiring yung mga waitress, yung medyo naka-mini or
depende sa mga uniporme. Tapos yung medyo paseksi din dito (respondent was making gestures on the
upper part of his body, obviously referring to just above the breast). Yung konti lang naman, yung medyo
paduda, alam mo na, I hope you are getting me, yung medyo nakaano nang konti yon."
He further elucidates: "May mga customers tayo na mga DOM. Medyo hahawak-hawak sa kamay." For
singers, he explained, "Pagkanta mo ron, hindi yung nakaganyan ka, kwan ka. Magsuot ka ng medyo
makatawag pansin sa mga lalaki Siempre lalake, mga crowd natin lalaki. Kung umikot makikita pati panty,
pati ano. Paseksihan na yon, eh. That's the Entertainment World Today."
When respondent Judge was asked to give his comment on the news report against him, he admitted the contents of the
interview but clarified that the business establishment is merely a restaurant, a sort of watering hole for some friends.
In answer to the complaint filed by Carlos Dionisio, respondent Judge explained that after his wife was issued a Certificate of
Registration of Business from the Department of Trade and Industry 4 and before the construction of the restaurant was
about to be finished, his wife requested his assistance for the hiring of its personnel. He thought that, considering the
difficulty of locating their residence which is about three (3) kilometers from the main gate of Better Living Subdivision, it
would be convenient for him to conduct the screening of the applicants in his office. With this arrangement, respondent
Judge posted the notice at the Court bulletin board without realizing that it may later on create in the minds of some people
the perception that he was misusing the court facilities. However, when the said matter was brought to his attention,
respondent Judge immediately ordered the removal of said posters.
On the allegation of an Office of "Negotiable Cases," respondent Judge clarified that the structure was constructed by the
Municipal Government of Parañaque to utilize the open space in front of Branch 259. The said office now serves as
stockroom and as office for the Clerk of Court, Legal Researcher, Interpreter, the Sheriff and all other male personnel of the
court who used to work inside the courtroom.
As regards the complainant's allusion to the case of People vs. Xiao Jia Hung, et al., respondent Judge pointed out that the
acquittal of the accused was anchored mainly on the absolute absence of hard evidence and proof worthy to overturn the
presumption of innocence.
On March 3, 1998, respondent Judge supplemented the aforesaid Answer contending therein that he has been fair and just
in rendering his decisions as a special criminal court Judge. To manifest such impartiality, he attached his performance
record for the year 1997 with comparative data 5 from other branches of the RTC, Parañaque, photocopies of his decisions
in People vs. Richard Ong, et. al. 6 and People vs. Xiao Jia Hung, et. al. 7
Subsequently, this administrative matter was referred to the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation
on January 19, 1998 8 which was later on assigned to Justice Minerva P. Gonza-Reyes.
During the investigation, Justice Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes was able to establish, inter alia, that the respondent Judge
posted the advertisement for "attractive waitresses and personable waiters" for the restaurant in the court bulletin board for
more than a week, even two weeks; that he removed the notices when his attention was celled by some lawyers; that he
was able to interview about five applicants; that the suggestions he made to the applicants during the screening regarding
the wearing of dresses with short skirts and low necklines which were recorded on videotape by the personnel of the "Hoy
Gising!" program were true; and that the establishment was originally intended as a "pub" or drinking place, but is now
operated as a cafe.
Based on the foregoing findings, the Investigating Justice submitted her report and recommendation, the pertinent portion of
which reads:
. . ., the plea of Judge Escano that he merely wanted to help his wife to establish a legitimate business to
help augment his judge's income, the apologies tendered to the Supreme Court and his peers in the
judiciary for any embarrassment (he) might have caused the institution, and the fact that the infraction was
committed for a short time, as he promptly desisted when his attention was called, may mitigate the penalty
which is hereby recommended to be a fine of P15,000.00.
With respect to the charge that Judge Escano is maintaining an Office of Negotiable Cases, which he
denied, the same is not substantiated and is recommended for dismissal.
Respectfully submitted. 9
Time and again we have adhered to the rule that one who occupies an exalted position in the administration of justice must
pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon him, for his private as well as his official conduct must at all times be free from
the appearance of impropriety. 10 Because appearance is as important as reality in the performance of judicial functions, like
Ceasar's wife, a judge must not only be pure but beyond suspicion. 11 It is with this exacting standard, not only of decency
but also of morality, that we have consistently avowed to promote confidence in the Judiciary. And this Court will not hesitate
to wield its disciplinary power to those erring personnel under its supervision.
The Code of Judicial Ethics provides in so far as pertinent:
Canon II
Rule 2.00 — A Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.
Canon V
Rule 5.02. — A Judge should refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to reflect adversely on
the court's impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of judicial activities, or increase involvement
with lawyers or persons likely to come before the court. A judge should so manage investments and other
financial interests to minimize the number of cases giving grounds for disqualification, and if necessary,
divest such investments and interests. Divestment shall be made within one year from the effectivity of this
Code or from appointment, as the case may be.
Rule 5.03. — Subject to the provisions of the preceding rule, a judge may hold and manage investments but
should not serve as a officer, director, advisor, or employee of any business except as director, or non-legal
consultant of a family business.
Judge Zosimo Escano has behaved in a manner unbecoming of his judicial robe, betrayed the people's high expectations,
and diminished the esteem in which they hold the judiciary in general. It is of no import that respondent Judge's act of using
the court's facilities be motivated by a good cause, no matter how honorable. The moment such act deviates from purposes
not directly related to the functioning and operation for which the courts of justice has been established, it must be
immediately rectified. In Bautista vs. Costelo, Jr., 12 we have held that "the prohibition against the use of halls of justice for
purposes other than that for which they have been built extends to their immediate vicinity including their grounds.
Otherwise, if the prohibition is not thus construed, acts tending to degrade courts would go unpunished on the pretext that
they are not committed 'within the Halls of Justice'."
The excuse advanced by respondent Judge that in order for the prospective applicants not to have difficulty of locating their
residence it would be more convenient if the screening was made inside his court, is a reason lacking in circumspection
and delicadeza. It over-extends his authority as judge by failing to avoid situations that make him suspect to committing
immorality. For judges are enjoined to avoid not just impropriety in their conduct but even the mere appearance of
impropriety. This is true not only in the performance of their judicial duties but in all their activities, including their private
lives. Judges must conduct themselves in such a manner that they give no ground for reproach. 13 For no position exacts a
greater demand or moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary. 14
And as correctly pointed by the Investigating Justice, the acts of posting advertisements for the restaurant personnel on the
court bulletin board, using his court address to receive the applications, and of screening applicants in his court constitute
involvement in private business and improper use of office facilities for the promotion of the family business in violation of the
Code of Judicial Ethics. The restriction enshrined under Rules 5.02 and 5.03 of the Code of Judicial Ethics on judges with
regard to their own business interests is based on the possible interference which may be created by these business
involvements in the exercise of their judicial duties which may tend to corrode the respect and dignity of the courts as the
bastion of justice. Judges must not allow themselves to be distracted from the performance of their judicial tasks by other
lawful enterprises. 15 It has been a time honored rule that judges and all court employees should endeavor to maintain at all
times the confidence and high respect accorded to those who wield the gavel of justice. 16
As to the other charge that respondent Judge has caused the construction of an extension office known as the "Office of
Negotiable Cases" after he acquitted a certain Hung, we have carefully reviewed the records of this case and find no
evidence to substantiate that such office exists. In the absence of proof necessary to have a contrary holding, we find no
reason to disbelieve the contention of respondent Judge that the extension office was constructed by the Municipal
Government of Parañaque as a stockroom and as office for some court personnel. The complainant in this case admittedly
being "incognito" for fear of placing his source of livelihood at peril, has failed to fully support such claim. The Rules, even in
an administrative case, demand that, if the respondent judge should be disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver
offense, the evidence against him should be competent and should be derived from direct knowledge. 17 For before any
member of the judiciary could be faulted, it should be only after due investigation and after presentation of competent
evidence, especially since the charge is penal in character. 18
Furthermore, we likewise find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusion of the respondent Judge in Criminal
Case No. 96-62 entitled "People vs. Jia Hung, et al.". The Court understands the frustration that litigants and lawyers alike,
would at times encounter in procedural bureaucracy, but imperative justice requires proper observance of indiputable
technicalities precisely designed to ensure its proper dispensation. 19 For if a party is prejudiced by the orders of a judge, his
remedy lies with the proper court for the proper judicial action and not with the Office of the Court Administrator by means of
an administrative complaint. Divergence of opinion between a trial judge and a party's counsel as to admissibility of evidence
is not proof of bias and partiality. 20
While concededly, the Investigating Justice considered certain mitigating circumstances in favor of the respondent Judge in
imposing the fine of P15,000.00 for his misconduct, this Court, however, is of the opinion that such penalty is not
commensurate to the disgraceful actuation of respondent Judge. The gravity of the charge against the respondent Judge
merits a more severe penalty of suspension. For as officers of the court, judges are duty bound to scrupulously adhere and
hold sacred the tenets of their profession and they must be reminded, lest they have already conveniently forgotten, that a
certificate of service is not merely a means to one's paycheck. 21 A judge should not only possess proficiency in law, but
should likewise possess moral integrity for the people look up to him as a virtuous and upright man. 22
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Judge Zosimo Escano is hereby meted the penalty of SUSPENSION from
service for six (6) months which shall start upon receipt of notice hereof WITH WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Martinez, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo and Buena, JJ., concur.
Gonzaga-Reyes, J., took no part.
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A.M. No. RTJ-02-1697 October 15, 2003
EUGENIO K. CHAN, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE JOSE S. MAJADUCON, Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 23, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
These are complaints for non-feasance, impropriety, partiality, and inefficiency filed against respondent Jose S. Majaducon,
former1 Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, General Santos City.
The Facts
In an undated letter, a "concerned citizen" charged respondent Judge Jose S. Majaducon ("respondent judge") with "not
wearing [a] black robe during court sessions" and with being habitually tardy.2
In another complaint, dated 3 November 2000, complainant Eugenio K. Chan ("complainant") charged respondent judge
with committing "acts of improprieties [and] irregularities." Complainant alleged that respondent judge —
1. xxx starts his hearings at 10:00 o’clock in the morning and 2:30-3:00 o’clock in the afternoon.
2. xxx does not wear his robe despite the requirement of the Supreme Court xxx;
3. xxx entertains lawyer[s] in his sala despite the absence of the opposing lawyer[s];
4. xxx continued to hear cases despite obvious appearance of impartiality [sic]. He insist [sic] to hear the case
despite the fact that her [sic] daughter being [sic] involved in the defendant bank;
5. xxx was already reprimanded by the Honorable Supreme Court and he is a subject of adverse write ups in the
newspapers;
6. xxx does not prepare or study the cases. He reads the cases during the hearing time.3
The Court required respondent judge to submit his Comment on the complaints. In his Indorsement dated 5 February 2001,
respondent judge controverts the allegations against him as follows:
1. On his refusal to wear the judicial robe during court sessions. Respondent judge states that upon his doctor’s
advice, he stopped wearing the judge’s robe during court sessions because doing so allegedly triggers and
aggravates his hypertension. He promised to resume wearing the robe once his blood pressure had stabilized.
2. On conducting hearings behind schedule. Respondent judge admits that he takes breaks from court sessions at
10 a.m. and 3:30 p.m. to take merienda or attend to personal needs. However, respondent judge claims that he
starts the hearings in his court on time and that his sessions sometimes even last for more than eight hours in a
day. According to respondent judge, if ever his hearings started late, it was either because he had to attend to other
equally pressing matters such as signing/revising Orders/Resolutions or because the litigants and/or their counsels
were late.
3. On entertaining counsels/litigants in his chambers. Respondent admits entertaining litigants and their counsels
with pending cases in his sala as his "chamber’s two doors are always open." He claims, however, that he never
discusses with his visitors the merits of their cases and that he has never been "influenced" by them.
4. On "studying" cases during hearings. Respondent judge explains that while he does consult the records of cases
during hearings, it is only to verify contested matters. He states that this is necessary, as he cannot memorize all the
details of cases, especially the voluminous ones that he had inherited from the previous judge.
Respondent judge claims that complainant, who had sought his inhibition from a case,4 may have wanted to get back at him
(respondent judge) for his refusal to inhibit himself. Respondent judge also suspects that complainant’s counsel, a certain
Atty. Fontanilla, is the "concerned citizen" who filed the anonymous complaint against him. 5
On 30 January 2001, complainant withdrew his complaint against respondent judge, stating that he had "realized that
[respondent judge] is only rightly doing his job."6
On 16 May 2001, respondent judge informed the Court that since February 2001, he had resumed wearing the judicial robe
as his blood pressure had stabilized.7
In his Memorandum of 27 February 2003, respondent judge reiterated the reasons for his earlier refusal to wear the judicial
robe during court sessions.
The OCA’s Report and Recommendation
In its Report of 11 March 2002 ("Report"), the Office of the Court Administrator ("OCA") found respondent judge liable for
violation of Administrative Circular No. 25 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. However, the OCA recommends
the dismissal of the other charges against respondent judge for lack of merit. The OCA recommends that respondent judge
be fined P5,000. The Report reads:
Complainant herein accuses respondent Judge of starting the hearings late at 10:00 o’clock in the morning and 2:30-3:00
o’clock in the afternoon. In his comment, respondent Judge denies the same contending that he conducts hearings [for] four
(4) hours, mornings and afternoons. In view of the absence of proof in support of the accusation against him, respondent
Judge enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty.
As regards the non-wearing of a black robe during trials, respondent Judge should be reminded of Administrative Circular
No. 25 dated 9 June 19[8]9 Re: Use of Black Robes by Trial Judges xxx.
Based on the aforecited circular, trial judges are enjoined to wear the black robe during court sessions. In the instant case,
prudence dictates that respondent Judge should have informed the [C]ourt, through the Office of the Court Administrator, of
his health problems and requested exemption from said circular. Admittedly, he took it upon himself to dispense with the
wearing of a black robe due to hypertension. Although his reason may be considered in his favor, it could not entirely
exculpate him from administrative responsibility for clear violation of the circular.
As to the charge that respondent entertains lawyers in his sala despite [the] absence of the opposing lawyer, respondent
candidly admits the same by saying that for purposes of transparency he allows lawyers and litigants to freely enter his
chambers to ask about their cases without however discussing the merits thereof. This is [a] highly xxx improper practice. In-
chambers sessions without the presence of the other party and his counsel must be avoided (Capuno vs. Jaramillo, 243
SCRA 213). The prohibition is to maintain impartiality. Judges should not only be impartial but should appear impartial
(Fernandez vs. Presbitero, 79 SCRA 60). The court should administer justice free from suspicion of bias and prejudice;
otherwise, parties-litigants might lose confidence in the judiciary and destroy its nobleness and decorum (Nestle Phils., Inc.
vs. Sanchez, 154 SCRA 542).
The charge that respondent continues to hear cases despite obvious appearance of partiality must fail as complainant failed
to specify the cases being alluded to and in what manner respondent appeared to be partial.
Finally, as to the charge that respondent does not prepare for or study the cases and merely reads the cases during trial, we
find his explanation thereon satisfactory because referral to court records are at times unavoidable.
In sum, respondent is found to have violated Circular No. 25 xxx, but the fact that he had been suffering from hypertension
shall be taken in his favor. He is also found to have violated Rule 1.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct for his act of allowing
in-chamber sessions without the presence of the other party and his counsel. 8
The Ruling of the Court
Except for the recommended penalty, the Court finds the Report well taken.
On Respondent Judge’s Refusal to Wear the Mandated Judicial Robe
Circular No. 25 dated 9 June 1989, ("Circular No. 25") provides:
Pursuant to Sections 5 and 6, Article [VIII] of the Constitution and in order to heighten public
consciousness on the solemnity of judicial proceedings, it is hereby directed that beginning Tuesday,
August 1, 1989, all Presiding Judges of all Trial Courts shall wear black robes during sessions of their
respective Courts.
Respondent judge admits violating Circular No. 25. Nevertheless, he seeks exculpation from
administrative liability for his non-compliance because of his illness. Respondent judge’s plea is futile.
The wearing of robes by judges during official proceedings, which harks back to the 14th century, 9 is not
an idle ceremony. Such practice serves the dual purpose of "heighten[ing] public consciousness on the
solemnity of judicial proceedings," as Circular No. 25 states, and of impressing upon the judge the
exacting obligations of his office. As well put by an eminent jurist of another jurisdiction:
[J]udges [are] xxx clothed in robes, not only, that they who witness the administration of justice should be
properly advised that the function performed is one different from, and higher, than that which a man
discharges as a citizen in the ordinary walks of life; but also, in order to impress the judge himself with the
constant consciousness that he is a high priest in the temple of justice and is surrounded with obligations
of a sacred character that he cannot escape and that require his utmost care, attention and self-
suppression.10
Consequently, a judge must take care not only to remain true to the high ideals of competence and
integrity his robe represents, but also that he wears one in the first place.
While circumstances, such as the medical condition claimed by respondent judge, may exempt one from
complying with Circular No. 25, he must first secure the Court’s permission for such exemption. He cannot
simply excuse himself, like respondent judge, from complying with the requirement. Neither does the fact
that respondent judge, if he is to be believed, has resumed wearing the robe exculpate him from liability.
Such does not alter the fact that at the time the complaints in the present case were filed, respondent
judge was openly violating Circular No. 25. Respondent judge’s medical condition and his subsequent
compliance serve only to mitigate his liability.
On Respondent Judge’s Practice of Entertaining Lawyers and Litigants with Pending Cases in his Sala
The Code of Judicial Conduct ("Code") provides:
Rule 1.01. — A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence.
CANON 2 — A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY

IN ALL ACTIVITIES.
Rule 2.01. — A judge should behave at all times so as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary.
The Court cannot emphasize enough the pivotal role lower court judges play in the promotion of the
people’s faith in the judiciary. Unlike the appellate court justices, they are the so-called "front-liners" who
give human face to the judicial branch at the "grassroots" level in their interaction with litigants and those
who do business with the courts.11 The admonition in Canon 2 that judges must not only "avoid impropriety
[but also] the appearance of impropriety" is more sternly applied to them. 12 It is in this light that the Court
frowns upon the holding by trial court judges of in-chamber meetings with litigants or their counsels
without the presence of the adverse party.13
Instead of taking heed of this ethical prohibition, respondent judge readily admitted transgressing it.
Worse, he reveals his ignorance of the prohibition’s purpose by claiming that his in-chamber dealings are
above-board as nothing illegal or improper transpires during those meetings. Respondent judge should
have realized that his very conduct of entertaining litigants and their counsels in his chamber without the
presence of the adverse party or his counsel constitutes an impropriety. While judges are not expected to
shun the world, neither are they supposed to make themselves freely accessible under such
circumstances as to invite suspicions of impropriety if not bias. Respondent judge should have borne in
mind — and all those in the bench who are similarly disposed as him are reminded — that:
[N]o position is more demanding as regards xxx uprightness of any individual than a seat on the Bench
xxx. Occupying as he does an exalted position in the administration of justice, a judge must pay a high
price for the honor bestowed upon him. Thus, the judge must comport himself at all times in such a
manner that his conduct, xxx can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as
the epitome of integrity and justice. In insulating the Bench from unwarranted criticism, thus preserving
our democratic way of life, it is essential that judges, like Caesar’s wife, should be above suspicion.14
On the Other Charges Against Respondent Judge
The Court subscribes to the OCA’s finding that complainant failed to substantiate the other charges
against respondent judge. Mere allegation that respondent judge was habitually tardy or had shown
partiality in a case, without more, does not suffice to hold respondent judge administratively liable. On the
other hand, there is nothing improper in consulting case records during hearings to clarify contested
matters. It is usual for judges to do so, especially for lower court judges who, in addition to their heavy
caseloads, have to conduct marathon hearings and thus need to consult the records of each case more
frequently.
On the Appropriate Penalty to be Imposed Against Respondent Judge
The OCA recommends that respondent judge be fined P5,000. However, in Gallo v. Judge Cordero,15 the
Court imposed a fine of P10,000 on a judge for impropriety in meeting with a litigant in his office and for
other irregular conduct. Under the circumstances, the Court deems it appropriate to impose similarly a fine
of P10,000 on respondent judge.
Neither complainant’s desistance nor respondent judge’s retirement precludes the Court from holding
respondent judge liable and imposing on him the penalty of P10,000 fine. A complainant’s desistance
from an administrative complaint against a member of the bench will not, by itself, warrant the dismissal of
the case.16 This is especially true in the instances where, as in the present case, the respondent judge
admits some if not all of the material allegations in the complaint.17 Similarly, the Court is not ousted of its
jurisdiction over an administrative case by the mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased to
be in office during the pendency of his case.18
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Jose S. Majaducon, former Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 23, General Santos City guilty of violating Circular No. 25 dated 9 June 1989, Rules 1.01 and 2.01
and Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Respondent Jose S. Majaducon is ordered to pay a fine
of P10,000, the same to be deducted from whatever retirement benefits he is entitled.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, J., on leave.
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A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 March 31, 2006

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR., Respondent.
x--------------x
A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC March 31, 2006
Re: RESOLUTION DATED 11 MAY 1999 OF JUDGE FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR.
x--------------x
A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 March 31, 2006

(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 99-812-RTJ)
LUZ ARRIEGO, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
"Equity does not demand that its suitors shall have led blameless lives." Justice Brandeis, Loughran v. Loughran 1
THE CASES
The First Case: A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 (Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.)
It was in 1995 that Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr. first applied for judgeship. A pre-requisite psychological evaluation on him
then by the Supreme Court Clinic Services (SC Clinic) revealed "(e)vidence of ego disintegration" and "developing psychotic
process." Judge Floro later voluntarily withdrew his application. In June 1998, when he applied anew, the required
psychological evaluation exposed problems with self-esteem, mood swings, confusion, social/interpersonal deficits, paranoid
ideations, suspiciousness, and perceptual distortions. Both 1995 and 1998 reports concluded that Atty. Floro was unfit to be
a judge.
Because of his impressive academic background, however, the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) allowed Atty. Floro to seek a
second opinion from private practitioners. The second opinion appeared favorable thus paving the way to Atty. Floro’s
appointment as Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge of Branch 73, Malabon City, on 4 November 1998.
Upon Judge Floro’s personal request, an audit on his sala was conducted by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
from 2 to 3 March 1999.2
After conducting the audit, the audit team, led by Atty. Mary Jane Dacarra-Buenaventura, reported its findings to erstwhile
Court Administrator, Alfredo L. Benipayo, who submitted his own report/memorandum 3 to then Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. dated 13 July 1999 recommending, among other things, that his report be considered as an administrative
complaint against Judge Floro and that Judge Floro be subjected to an appropriate psychological or mental examination.
Court Administrator Benipayo recommended as well that Judge Floro be placed under preventive suspension for the
duration of the investigation against him.
In a Resolution4 dated 20 July 1999, the Court en banc adopted the recommendations of the OCA, docketing the complaint
as A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460, in view of the commission of the following acts or omissions as reported by the audit team:
(a) The act of circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory statements regarding qualifications and for
announcing in open court during court session his qualification in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02, Canons of Judicial
Conduct;
(b) For allowing the use of his chambers as sleeping quarters;

(c) For rendering resolutions without written orders in violation of Rule 36, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Procedures;
(d) For his alleged partiality in criminal cases where he declares that he is pro-accused which is contrary to Canon
2, Rule 2.01, Canons of Judicial Conduct;
(e) For appearing and signing pleadings in Civil Case No. 46-M-98 pending before Regional Trial Court, Branch 83,
Malolos, Bulacan in violation of Canon 5, Rule 5.07, Canons of Judicial Conduct which prohibits a judge from
engaging in the private practice of law;
(f) For appearing in personal cases without prior authority from the Supreme Court and without filing the
corresponding applications for leaves of absence on the scheduled dates of hearing;
(g) For proceeding with the hearing on the Motion for Release on Recognizance filed by the accused without the
presence of the trial prosecutor and propounding questions in the form of examination of the custodian of the
accused;
(h) For using/taking advantage of his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385-
MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading the private
complainant and the accused to sign the settlement even without the presence of the trial prosecutor;
(i) For motu proprio and over the strong objection of the trial prosecutor, ordering the mental and physical
examination of the accused based on the ground that the accused is "mahina ang pick-up";
(j) For issuing an Order on 8 March 1999 which varies from that which he issued in open court in Criminal Case No.
20385-MN, for frustrated homicide;
(k) For violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 Code of Judicial Conduct when he openly criticized the Rules of Court and
the Philippine justice system;
(l) For the use of highly improper and intemperate language during court proceedings;
(m) For violation of Circular No. 135 dated 1 July 1987.
Per the same resolution of the Court, the matter was referred to Retired Court of Appeals Justice Pedro Ramirez (consultant,
OCA) for investigation, report and recommendation within 60 days from receipt. Judge Floro was directed to comment within
ten days from receipt of the resolution and to subject himself to an appropriate psychological or mental examination to be
conducted "by the proper office of the Supreme Court or any duly authorized medical and/or mental institution." In the same
breath, the Court resolved to place Judge Floro under preventive suspension "for the duration of the investigation of the
administrative charges against him." He was barely eight months into his position.
On 20 August 1999, Judge Floro submitted a Verified Comment where he set forth both affirmative and negative
defenses6 while he filed his "Answer/Compliance" on 26 August 1999.
On 3 March 2000, Judge Floro moved for the provisional/final dismissal of his case for failure to prosecute. 7However, on 21
March 2000, he presented himself as his first witness in the hearing conducted by Justice Ramirez.8 Subsequently, on 7 July
2000, Judge Floro filed a "Petition for Inhibition/Disqualification" against Justice Ramirez as investigator 9 which was denied
by Justice Ramirez in an Order dated 11 July 2000. 10 Judge Floro’s motion for reconsideration 11 suffered the same
fate. 12 On 27 July 2000, Judge Floro submitted the question of Justice Ramirez’s inhibition/disqualification to this
Court. 13 On 8 August 2000, the Court ruled against the inhibition of Justice Ramirez. 13
On 11 September 2000, the OCA, after having been ordered by the Court to comment on Judge Floro’s motion to
dismiss, 15 recommended that the same should be denied.
Judge Floro presented his last witness on 6 March 2001. 16 The day after, Justice Ramirez came out with a "Partial Report"
recommending the dismissal of Judge Floro from office "by reason of insanity which renders him incapable and unfit to
perform the duties and functions of Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Malabon, Metro
Manila, Branch 73." 17
In the meantime, throughout the investigation of the 13 charges against him and even after Justice Ramirez came out with
his report and recommendation on 7 March 2001, Judge Floro had been indiscriminately filing cases against those he
perceived to have connived to boot him out of office.
A list of the cases Judge Floro filed in the wake of his 20 July 1999 preventive suspension follows:
1. OCA IPI No. 00-07-OCA – against Atty. Mary Jane Dacarra-Buenaventura, Team Leader, Judicial Audit Team,
Office of the Court Administrator 18
2. OCA IPI No. 00-933-RTJ – against Judge Benjamin Aquino, Jr., Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, Malabon City 19
3. AC No. 5286 – against Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo and Judge Benjamin Aquino, Jr.20
4. AC No. CBD-00-740 – against Thelma C. Bahia, Court Management Office, Atty. Mary Jane Dacarra-
Buenaventura, Atty. II, Court Management Office, both of the Office of the Court Administrator and Atty. Esmeralda
G. Dizon, Branch Clerk of Court, Branch 73, Malabon21
5. AC No. 6282 (CPL No. C-02-0278) – against former Court Administrator Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo and (Ret.)
Justice Pedro A. Ramirez, Consultant, Office of the Court Administrator22
6. A.M. No. 03-8-03-0 – against (Ret.) Justice Pedro A. Ramirez23
7. A.C. No. 6050 – against (Ret.) Justice Pedro A. Ramirez24
On 1 February 2006, Judge Floro moved that the cases he filed, now totaling seven, be dismissed. 25 On 14 February 2006,
the Court granted the motion to dismiss.26
The Second Case: A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988(Luz Arriego v. Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.)
This charge is likewise the subject matter of charge "h" in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460: "(f)or using/taking advantage of his moral
ascendancy to settle and eventually dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of settling
the civil aspect of the case, by persuading the private complainant and the accused to sign the settlement even without the
presence of the trial prosecutor." The complainant Luz Arriego is the mother of the private complainant in Criminal Case No.
20385-MN.
On 28 June 2001, Arriego testified, while court stenographer Jocelyn Japitenga testified on 16 July 2001. On 31 July 2001,
Arriego filed her Formal Offer of Evidence which was opposed by Judge Floro on 21 August 2001. On 5 September 2001,
Judge Floro testified on his behalf while Atty. Galang testified against him on 4 October 2001. On 16 October 2001, Judge
Floro filed a Memorandum in this case.27
The Third Case: A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re: Resolution Dated 11 May 1999 of Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.)
As can be gathered from the title, this case concerns a resolution issued by Judge Floro on 11 May 1999 in Special
Proceeding Case No. 315-MN "In Re: Petition To Be Admitted A Citizen Of The Philippines, Mary Ng Nei, Petitioner." The
resolution disposed of the motions for voluntary inhibition of Judge Floro and the reconsideration of the order denying the
petition for naturalization filed by petitioner in that case, Mary Ng Nei.
This resolution found its way to the OCA through a letter written by Atty. David S. Narvasa, the petitioner’s counsel.28 The
OCA, through Court Administrator Benipayo, made the following evaluation:
In the subject resolution, Judge Floro, Jr. denied the motion for inhibition and declared it as null and void. However,
he ordered the raffling of the case anew (not re-raffle due to inhibition) so that the petitioner, Mary Ng Nei, will have
a chance to have the case be assigned to other judges through an impartial raffle.
When Judge Floro, Jr. denied the motion for inhibition, he should have continued hearing and taking cognizance of
the case. It is improper for him to order the raffle of the case "anew" as this violates Administrative Circular No. 1
(Implementation of Sec. 12, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution) dated January 28, 1988 which provides to wit:
"8. Raffle of Cases:
xxxx
8.3 Special raffles should not be permitted except on verified application of the interested party who seeks issuance
of a provisional remedy and only upon a finding by the Executive Judge that unless the special raffle is conducted,
irreparable damage shall be suffered by the applicant. The special raffle shall be conducted by at least two judges in
a multiple-sala station.
x x x x"
Based on the foregoing, a judge may not motu proprio order the special raffle of a case since such is only allowed upon a
verified application of the interested party seeking a provisional remedy and only upon the Executive Judge’s finding that if a
special raffle is not conducted, the applicant will suffer irreparable damage. Therefore, Judge Floro, Jr.’s order is contrary to
the above-mentioned Administrative Circular.
Moreover, it is highly inappropriate for Judge Floro, Jr. to even mention in his resolution that Justice Regino C. Hermosisima,
Jr. is his benefactor in his nomination for judgeship. It is not unusual to hear a judge who speaks highly of a "padrino" (who
helped him get his position). Such remark even if made as an expression of deep gratitude makes the judge guilty of
creating a dubious impression about his integrity and independence. Such flaunting and expression of feelings must be
suppressed by the judges concerned. A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial
conduct or judgment (Canon 2, Rule 2.03, Code of Judicial Conduct).
The merits of the denial of the motion for inhibition and the ruling on the motion for reconsideration are judicial matters which
this Office has no authority to review. The remedy is judicial, not administrative.29
The OCA thus recommended that Judge Floro comment on (a) his act of ordering the raffle of the case in violation of
Administrative Circular No. 1; and (b) his remark on page 5 of the subject resolution that "Justice Hermosisima, Jr. x x x
helped undersigned so much, in the JBC, regarding his nomination x x x."
In a Resolution dated 17 August 1999, the Court en banc adopted the recommendations of the OCA. 30 Judge Floro, through
his counsel, filed his Comment on 22 October 199931 which was noted by this Court on 7 December 1999. On 11 January
2000, Judge Floro filed a Formal Offer of Evidence which this Court, in a resolution dated 25 January 2000, referred to
Justice Ramirez for inclusion in his report and recommendation.
For the record, the OCA is yet to come up with its report and recommendation in this case as well as in the second case
(i.e., A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988). Thus, in a resolution dated 14 February 2006, the Court directed Judge Floro as well as the
other parties in these two cases to inform the Court whether or not they are willing to submit A.M. RTJ-06-1988 and A.M. No.
99-7-273-RTC for decision on the basis of the pleadings filed and the evidence so far submitted by them or to have the
decision in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 decided ahead of the two. On 20 February 2006, the OCA, thru Court Administrator
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., manifested its willingness to submit A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC for resolution based on the pleadings
and the evidence submitted therein. Complainant Luz Arriego in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 likewise informed this Court, in a
Letter dated 28 February 2006, her willingness to submit her case for decision based on the pleadings already submitted
and on the evidence previously offered and marked. On the other hand, on 3 March 2006, Judge Floro manifested his
preference to have A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 decided ahead of A.M. RTJ-06-1988 and A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC.
In the interest of orderly administration of justice, considering that these are consolidated cases, we resolve to render as well
a consolidated decision.
But first, the ground rules: Much has been said across all fronts regarding Judge Floro’s alleged mental illness and its effects
on his duties as Judge of a Regional Trial Court. For our part, figuring out whether Judge Floro is indeed psychologically
impaired and/or disabled as concluded by the investigator appointed by this Court is frankly beyond our sphere of
competence, involving as it does a purely medical issue; hence, we will have to depend on the findings of the mental health
professionals who interviewed/analyzed Judge Floro. Our job is simply to wade through the evidence, filter out the irrelevant
and the irreverent in order to determine once and for all if Judge Floro is indeed guilty of the charges against him. If the
evidence makes out a case against Judge Floro, the next issue is to determine the appropriate penalty to be imposed.
Finally, we will have to determine whether Judge Floro acted with an evil mind or because of a psychological or mental
incapacity. Upon the resolution of this question hinges the applicability of equity.
As an aside, it bears pointing out that some of the charges ("c" and "g", "h" and "j", "e" and "f") will be jointly discussed as
they had likewise been jointly discussed by the OCA. These charges involve common facts and to treat them separately will
be superfluous.
DISCUSSION
As alleged and as proven, the 13 specified charges do not warrant the supreme penalty of dismissal against Judge Floro
(a) Re: Charge of circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory statements regarding qualifications AND for announcing
in open court during court session his qualifications in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02, Canons of Judicial Conduct
As narrated by the audit team, Judge Floro was circulating calling cards bearing his name as the Presiding Judge of RTC,
Branch 73, Malabon City, and indicating therein that he is a "bar exams topnotcher (87.55%)" and with "full second honors"
from the Ateneo de Manila University, A.B. and LL.B.32 The audit team likewise reported that: "(b)efore the start of court
session, Judge Floro is introduced as a private law practitioner, a graduate of Ateneo de Manila University with second
honors, and a bar topnotcher during the 1983 Bar Examinations with an average score of 87.55%. Afterwards, a reading of
the Holy Bible, particularly the Book of Revelation according to Saint John, was made. The people in the courtroom were
given the opportunity to ask Judge Floro questions on the matter read. No questions were asked; hence the session
commenced."33
Judge Floro argues that, per commentary of Justice Ruperto G. Martin, 34 "the use of professional cards containing the name
of the lawyer, his title, his office and residence is not improper" and that the word "title" should be broad enough to include a
Judge’s legal standing in the bar, his honors duly earned or even his Law School. Moreover, other lawyers do include in their
calling cards their former/present titles/positions like President of the Jaycees, Rotary Club, etc., so where then does one
draw the line? Finally, Judge Floro argues that his cards were not being circulated but were given merely as tokens to close
friends or by reciprocity to other callers considering that common sense dictates that he is not allowed by law to seek other
professional employment.
As to the charge that he had been announcing in open court his qualifications, Judge Floro counters that it was his branch
clerk of court, Atty. Esmeralda Galang-Dizon, who suggested that during his initial court session, she would briefly announce
his appointment with an introduction of his school, honors, bar rating and law practice. Naively, Judge Floro agreed as the
introduction was done only during the first week of his assumption into office.
Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct says in no uncertain terms that "a judge should not seek publicity for
personal vainglory." A parallel proscription, this time for lawyers in general, is found in Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility: "a lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-
laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services." This means that lawyers and judges
alike, being limited by the exacting standards of their profession, cannot debase the same by acting as if ordinary merchants
hawking their wares. As succinctly put by a leading authority in legal and judicial ethics, "(i)f lawyers are prohibited from x x x
using or permitting the use of any undignified or self-laudatory statement regarding their qualifications or legal services (Rule
3.01, Code of Professional Responsibility), with more reasons should judges be prohibited from seeking publicity for vanity
or self-glorification. Judges are not actors or actresses or politicians, who thrive by publicity." 35
The question, therefore, is: By including self-laudatory details in his professional card, did Judge Floro violate Canon 2, Rule
2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct?
In Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc., 36 we explained that the use of an ordinary and simple professional card by lawyers is permitted
and that the card "may contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address,
telephone number and special branch of law practiced." In herein case, Judge Floro’s calling cards cannot be considered as
simple and ordinary. By including therein the honors he received from his law school with a claim of being a bar topnotcher,
Judge Floro breached the norms of simplicity and modesty required of judges.
Judge Floro insists, however, that he never circulated his cards as these were just given by him as tokens and/or only to a
few who requested the same. 37 The investigation by Justice Ramirez into the matter reveals otherwise. An eye-witness from
the OCA categorically stated that Judge Floro circulated these cards. 38 Worse, Judge Floro’s very own witness, a researcher
from an adjoining branch, testified that Judge Floro gave her one of these cards. 39
As this charge involves a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, it should be measured against Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC being more favorable to respondent Judge Floro. Rule 140, before its
amendment, automatically classified violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct as serious charges. As amended, a violation
of the Code of Judicial Conduct may amount to gross misconduct, which is a serious charge, or it may amount to simple
misconduct, which is a less serious charge or it may simply be a case of vulgar and/or unbecoming conduct which is a light
charge.
"Misconduct" is defined as wrong or improper conduct while "gross" connotes something "out of all measure; beyond
allowance; not to be excused; flagrant; shameful." 40 For serious misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained of should be
corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law or a persistent disregard of well-known legal rules. 41
With the foregoing as yardstick, we find the act of Judge Floro in circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory
statements constitutive of simple misconduct in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as it appears
that Judge Floro was not motivated by any corrupt motive but, from what we can see from the evidence, a persistent and
unquenchable thirst for recognition. Concededly, the need for recognition is an all too human flaw and judges do not cease
to be human upon donning the judicial robe. Considering, however, the proscription against judges seeking publicity for
personal vainglory, they are held to a higher standard as they must act within the confines of the code they swore to
observe.
As to the charge that Judge Floro, through his branch clerk of court, had been announcing in open court his qualifications,
we find that this is likewise violative of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as it smacks of unnecessary
publicity. Judges should not use the courtroom as platform for announcing their qualifications especially to an audience of
lawyers and litigants who very well might interpret such publicity as a sign of insecurity. Verily, the public looks upon judges
as the bastion of justice – confident, competent and true. And to discover that this is not so, as the judge appears so unsure
of his capabilities that he has to court the litigants and their lawyers’ approval, definitely erodes public confidence in the
judiciary.
As it is not disputed, however, that these announcements went on for only a week, Judge Floro is guilty of simple
misconduct only.
(b)Re: Charge of allowing the use of his chambers as sleeping quarters
The audit team observed that "inside Judge Floro’s chamber[s], there is a folding bed with cushion located at the right corner
of the room. A man, who was later identified as Judge Floro’s driver, was sleeping. However, upon seeing the audit team,
the driver immediately went out of the room." 42
Judge Floro contends that this charge is without legal or factual basis. The man the audit team saw "sleeping" on his folding
bed, J. Torralba, was Judge Floro’s aide or "alalay" whom he allows to rest from time to time (in between periods and
especially during court sessions) for humanitarian reasons. J. Torralba was not sleeping during that time that the audit team
was in Branch 73 as he immediately left when he saw the members thereof.
This charge must fail as there is nothing inherently improper or deplorable in Judge Floro having allowed another person to
use his folding bed for short periods of time during office hours and while there is no one else in the room. The situation
would have been different if there had been any allegation of misuse or abuse of government funds and/or facilities such as
in the case of Presado v. Genova 43 wherein Judge Genova was found guilty of serious misconduct and conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service when he and his family used his chambers as residential quarters, with the provincial
government paying for the electrical bills.
Be that as it may, it does not augur well for a new judge to allow such familiarity from his aide as this becomes fodder for
gossip as what had apparently happened in this case. Judge Floro should have been aware of and attuned to the
sensibilities of his staff who were understandably uncomfortable with the uncommon arrangement of a judge allowing his
aide easy access to his folding bed.
(c) Re: Charge of rendering resolutions without written orders in violation of Rule 36, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Procedure
(g) Re: Charge of proceeding with the hearing on the Motion for Release on Recognizance filed by the accused without the
presence of the trial prosecutor and propounding questions in the form of examination of the custodian of the accused
The memorandum report reads:
c. It was reported by the staff of Branch 73 that regardless of the absence of the trial prosecutor, Judge Floro, Jr. still
proceeded with the hearing of the following matters:
(c-1) "Motion for Release on Recognizance" filed by the accused, in Criminal Cases Nos. 20384, 20371, 20246 and 20442
entitled "People vs. Luisito Beltran", "People vs. Emma Alvarez, et al.", "People vs. Rowena Camino", and "People vs. John
Richie Villaluz", respectively. In the hearing of these motions, Judge Floro, Jr. propounded questions (in a form of direct
examination) to the custodian of the accused without the accused being sworn by the administering officer. (Note: initially,
Judge Floro, Jr. ordered the Branch Clerk of Court Dizon to place the accused under oath prior to the start of his questions.
However, COC Dizon refused). The hearing on the aforesaid motions is an offshoot of a previous hearing wherein the
accused had pleaded guilty to a lesser offense. After the reading of the sentence, Judge Floro, Jr. would automatically
inform the accused that they are qualified to apply for probation. In fact, Judge Floro, Jr. would even instruct his staff to draft
the application in behalf of the accused so that a motion for release on recognizance will immediately be heard and be
consequently granted. As appearing in the minutes of the hearing (attached herewith as Annexes "3" to "6"), the custodians
of the accused are either a barangay kagawad, barangay tanod or a member of the lupong tagapamayapa. Likewise, no
written order granting the motion for release on recognizance is being issued by Judge Floro, Jr. since according to him
neither rules nor circular mandates the issuance of a written order. Instead, after granting the motion, Judge Floro, Jr. just
requires the parties to sign the minutes of the session. Photocopies of the minutes dated March 4, 1999 in Criminal Cases
Nos. 20384-MN; 20373-MN; and 20371-MN are hereto attached as Annexes "3" to "5".
On March 11, 1999, in Criminal Cases Nos. 20426-MN and 20442-MN, Judge Floro, Jr. granted a similar motion without
issuing a written order. Copies of the minutes are hereto attached as annexes "6" to "7." 44
In his Verified Comment, Judge Floro argues that he never violated any rule of procedure with respect to the cases
mentioned by the Audit Team, asserting that –
Contrary to the stance of the TEAM, Sec. 1 of Rule 36, Rules of Court refers only to final and not interlocutory orders. Only
final orders and judgments are promulgated, rendered and entered.
xxxx
Applying the foregoing well-settled doctrines of law to the case at bar, herein respondent faithfully complied with the
requirements of Sec. 7 of P.D. 968 as amended, regarding the applications for release on recognizance, thus:
a. The application for release on recognizance, although captioned as MOTION FOR RELEASE ON
RECOGNIZANCE, is primarily governed by Sec. 7 of P.D. 968, a Special Law on Probation.
b. Any Application for Release on Recognizance, is given due course/taken cognizance of by respondent, if on its
face, the same bears the rubber stamp mark/receipt by the Office of the City/Public Prosecutor.
c. The consistent practice both in RTC, METRO MANILA (all courts), especially in RTC, MALABON, and in Malolos,
Bulacan (where respondent practiced from 1985-1998 – almost 14 years), [and especially the practice of former
Judge A. V. Cabigao, Br. 73, RTC, Malabon, Metro Manila], is to interview the custodian, in the chambers, regarding
his being a responsible member of the community where the accused reside/resides; the questions propounded are
in the form of direct and even cross examination questions.
d. The accused is not required to be placed on the witness stand, since there is no such requirement. All that is
required, is to inform the accused regarding some matters of probation (optional) such as whether he was
sentenced previously by a Court, whether or not he has had previous cases, etc.
e. Even if RTC Judges in Malabon do not conduct Court hearings on application for release on recognizance,
respondent, for caution in most of the applications, included the interview/hearing on the applications for release on
recognizance, during criminal trial dates, where a fiscal/trial prosecutor is available; at other times, the hearing is
held in the chambers.45
The explanation given by Judge Floro betrays his liability for ignorance of the rules on probation under Presidential Decree
No. 968 (Probation Law), as amended. Contrary to his remonstrations, the release of an accused on recognizance entails
more than a cursory interview of the custodian and the applicant. Under the Probation Law, 46 and as we explained in Poso v.
Judge Mijares,47 it is incumbent upon the Judge hearing the application to ascertain first that the applicant is not a
"disqualified offender" as "(p)utting the discharge of the accused on hold would have allowed [the judge] more time to pass
upon the request for provisional liberty."
Moreover, from Judge Floro’s explanations, it would seem that he completely did away with the requirement for an
investigation report by the probation officer. Under the Probation Law, the accused’s temporary liberty is warranted only
during the period for awaiting the submission of the investigation report on the application for probation and the resolution
thereon.48 As we explained in Poso v. Judge Mijares49 :
It must be stressed that the statutory sequence of actions, i.e., order to conduct case study prior to action on application for
release on recognizance, was prescribed precisely to underscore the interim character of the provisional liberty envisioned
under the Probation Law. Stated differently, the temporary liberty of an applicant for probation is effective no longer than the
period for awaiting the submission of the investigation report and the resolution of the petition, which the law mandates as
no more than sixty (60) days to finish the case study and report and a maximum of fifteen (15) days from receipt of the report
for the trial judge to resolve the application for probation. By allowing the temporary liberty of the accused even before the
order to submit the case study and report, respondent Judge unceremoniously extended the pro tem discharge of the
accused to the detriment of the prosecution and the private complainants. (Emphasis supplied)
As to the argument of Judge Floro that his Orders for the release of an accused on recognizance need not be in writing as
these are duly reflected in the transcript of stenographic notes, we refer to Echaus v. Court of Appeals 50 wherein we held that
"no judgment, or order whether final or interlocutory, has juridical existence until and unless it is set down in writing, signed
and promulgated, i.e., delivered by the Judge to the Clerk of Court for filing, release to the parties and implementation."
Obviously, then, Judge Floro was remiss in his duties as judge when he did not reduce into writing his orders for the release
on recognizance of the accused in Criminal Cases No. 20384, 20371, 202426 and 20442 entitled, "People v. Luisito
Beltran," "People v. Emma Alvarez, et al.," "People v. Rowena Camino," and "People v. John Richie Villaluz." 51 From his
explanation that such written orders are not necessary, we can surmise that Judge Floro’s failure was not due to
inadvertence or negligence on his part but to ignorance of a procedural rule.
In fine, we perceive three fundamental errors in Judge Floro’s handling of probation cases. First, he ordered the release on
recognizance of the accused without the presence of the prosecutor thus depriving the latter of any opportunity to oppose
said release. Second, Judge Floro ordered the release without first requiring the probation officer to render a case study and
investigation report on the accused. Finally, the order granting the release of the accused on recognizance was not reduced
into writing.
It would seem from the foregoing that the release of the accused on recognizance, as well as his eventual probation, was
already a done deal even before the hearing on his application as Judge Floro took up the cudgels for the accused by
instructing his staff to draft the application for probation. This, Judge Floro did not deny. Thus, we agree in the observation of
the audit team that Judge Floro, as a matter of policy, had been approving applications for release on recognizance hastily
and without observing the requirements of the law for said purpose. Verily, we having nothing against courts leaning
backward in favor of the accused; in fact, this is a salutary endeavor, but only when the situation so warrants. In herein case,
however, we cannot countenance what Judge Floro did as "the unsolicited fervor to release the accused significantly
deprived the prosecution and the private complainants of their right to due process." 52
Judge Floro’s insistence that orders made in open court need not be reduced in writing constitutes gross ignorance of the
law. Likewise, his failure to follow the basic rules on probation, constitutes gross ignorance of the law. 53
Verily, one of the fundamental obligations of a judge is to understand the law fully and uphold it conscientiously. 54When the
law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to know and simply apply it for anything less is constitutive of gross
ignorance of the law. 55 True, not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good faith, does
not warrant administrative sanctions. 56 To hold otherwise "would be nothing short of harassing judges to take the fantastic
and impossible oath of rendering infallible judgments." 57 This rule, however, admits of an exception as "good faith in
situations of fallible discretion inheres only within the parameters of tolerable judgment and does not apply where the issues
are so simple and the applicable legal principle evident and as to be beyond permissible margins of error." 58 Thus, even if a
judge acted in good faith but his ignorance is so gross, he should be held administratively liable. 59
(d) RE: Charge of partiality in criminal cases where he declared that he is pro-accused which is contrary to Canon 2, Rule
2.01, Canons of Judicial Conduct
The audit team reported that Judge Floro relayed to the members thereof that in criminal cases, he is always "pro-accused"
particularly concerning detention prisoners and bonded accused who have to continually pay for the premiums on their
bonds during the pendency of their cases.
Judge Floro denies the foregoing charge. He claims that what he did impart upon Atty. Buenaventura was the need for the
OCA to remedy his predicament of having 40 detention prisoners and other bonded accused whose cases could not be tried
due to the lack of a permanent prosecutor assigned to his sala. He narrated as well to Atty. Buenaventura the sufferings of
detention prisoners languishing in the Malabon/Navotas jail whose cases had not been tried during the vacancy of his sala
from February 1997 to 5 November 1998. At any rate, Judge Floro submits that there is no single evidence or proof
submitted by any litigant or private complainant that he sided with the accused.
Atty. Dizon, Judge Floro’s Clerk of Court, on the other hand, categorically stated under oath that Judge Floro, during a staff
meeting, admitted to her and the staff of Branch 73 and in the presence of his Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) lawyer that he
is pro-accused for the reason that he commiserated with them especially those under detention as he, himself, had been
accused by his brother and sister-in-law of so many unfounded offenses. 60
Between the two versions, the testimony of Atty. Dizon is more credible especially since it is corroborated by independent
evidence, 61 e.g., Judge Floro’s unwarranted eagerness in approving application for release on recognizance as previously
discussed.
Canon 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states: "A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence
in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." This means that a judge whose duty is to apply the law and dispense justice
"should not only be impartial, independent and honest but should be believed and perceived to be impartial, independent
and honest" as well. 62 Like Caesar’s wife, a judge must not only be pure but above suspicion. 63 Judge Floro, by
broadcasting to his staff and the PAO lawyer that he is pro-accused, opened himself up to suspicion regarding his
impartiality. Prudence and judicial restraint dictate that a judge should reserve personal views and predilections to himself so
as not to stir up suspicions of bias and unfairness. Irresponsible speech or improper conduct of a judge erodes public
confidence in the judiciary. 64 "His language, both written and spoken, must be guarded and measured, lest the best of
intentions be misconstrued." 65
On a more fundamental level, what is required of judges is objectivity if an independent judiciary is to be realized. And by
professing his bias for the accused, Judge Floro is guilty of unbecoming conduct as his capacity for objectivity is put in
serious doubt, necessarily eroding the public’s trust in his ability to render justice. As we held in Castillo v. Juan 66 :
In every litigation, x x x, the manner and attitude of a trial judge are crucial to everyone concerned, the offended party, no
less than the accused. It is not for him to indulge or even to give the appearance of catering to the at-times human failing of
yielding to first impressions. He is to refrain from reaching hasty conclusions or prejudging matters. It would be deplorable if
he lays himself open to the suspicion of reacting to feelings rather than to facts, of being imprisoned in the net of his own
sympathies and predilections. It must be obvious to the parties as well as the public that he follows the traditional mode of
adjudication requiring that he hear both sides with patience and understanding to keep the risk of reaching an unjust
decision at a minimum. It is not necessary that he should possess marked proficiency in law, but it is essential that he is to
hold the balance true. What is equally important is that he should avoid any conduct that casts doubt on his impartiality.
What has been said is not merely a matter of judicial ethics. It is impressed with constitutional significance.
(h) Re: Charge of using/taking advantage of his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually dismiss Criminal Case No.
20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading the private complainant
and the accused to sign the settlement even without the presence of the trial prosecutor.
(j) Re: Charge of issuing an Order on 8 March 1999 which varies from that which he issued in open court in Criminal Case
No. 20385-MN, for frustrated homicide.
The memorandum report states:
During the arraignment and pre-trial of Criminal Case No. 20385-MN entitled: "People vs. Nenita Salvador", Judge Floro, Jr.,
in the absence of the public prosecutor and considering that the private complainant was not being represented by a private
prosecutor, used his moral ascendancy and influence to convince the private complainant to settle and eventually cause the
dismissal of the case in the guise of settling its civil aspect by making the private complainants and the accused sign the
settlement. (Copy of the signed stenographic notes is hereto attached as Annex "8").
xxxx
In an Order dated March 8, 1999 in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, for frustrated homicide, Judge Floro, Jr. put on record the
"manifestations" of the private complainant and the accused relative to their willingness to settle the civil aspect of the case.
In the same order, Judge Floro, Jr. reserved his ruling on the said settlement until after the public prosecutor has given his
comment. However, per report of the court employees in Branch 73, the aforesaid order was actually a revised one or a
deviation from the original order given in open court. Actually, the said criminal case was already settled even without the
presence of the public prosecutor. The settlement was in the nature of absolving not only the civil liability of the accused but
the criminal liability as well. It was further reported that the private complainants signed the compromise agreement due to
the insistence or persuasion of Judge Floro, Jr. The audit team was furnished a copy of the stenographic notes (unsigned
draft order) and the revised order (signed). Copies of the stenographic notes and the revised order are hereto attached as
Annexes "8", "13", and "14". (Note: the stenographic notes were signed by the parties to the case).
In the meantime, the mother of the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, Luz Arriego, filed an administrative
case against Judge Floro docketed as A.M. OCA-I.P.I. No. 99-812-RTJ. In her Affidavit Complaint 67dated 9 August 1999,
she alleged that on 8 March 1999, Judge Floro forced them to settle her daughter’s case against the accused therein
despite the absence of the trial prosecutor. When the parties could not agree on the amount to be paid by the accused for
the medical expenses incurred by complaining witness, they requested respondent that they be given time to study the
matter and consult a lawyer to which Judge Floro replied that the case be settled immediately, uttering, "ngayon na! ngayon
na!" Moreover, Judge Floro allegedly made them believe that the counter-charges filed by the accused against the
complaining witness would likewise be dismissed, so they agreed to settle the case. However, the written Order issued by
respondent Judge did not reflect the agreement entered into by the parties in open court.
Judge Floro takes exception to the foregoing OCA report and the complaint filed by Mrs. Arriego, maintaining that the
hearing on said case was not only in accordance with the Rules of Court but was also beneficial to the litigants concerned as
they openly manifested their willingness to patch up their differences in the spirit of reconciliation. Then, considering that the
parties suggested that they would file the necessary pleadings in due course, Judge Floro waited for such pleadings before
the TSN-dictated Order could be reduced to writing. Meanwhile, in the course of a conversation between Judge Floro and
Court Administrator Benipayo, the latter opined that under Section 27 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, an offer of
compromise in criminal cases is tantamount to an admission of guilt except in some cases. With this in mind, the 8 March
1999 Order of the hearing on even date was superseded by the revised written Order likewise dated 8 March 1999.
Judge Floro asserts that contrary to Atty. Buenaventura’s stance that he has no power to revise an Order, courts have
plenary power to recall and amend or revise any orally dictated order in substance and in form even motu proprio.
The rule on the matter finds expression in Echaus v. Court of Appeals 68 wherein we declared:
x x x [N]o judgment, or order whether final or interlocutory, has juridical existence until and unless it is set down in writing,
signed and promulgated, i.e., delivered by the Judge to the Clerk of Court for filing, release to the parties and
implementation, and that indeed, even after promulgation, it does not bind the parties until and unless notice thereof is duly
served on them by any of the modes prescribed by law. This is so even if the order or judgment has in fact been orally
pronounced in the presence of the parties, or a draft thereof drawn up and signed and/or copy thereof somehow read or
acquired by any party. In truth, even after promulgation (i.e., filing with the clerk of court), and even after service on the
parties of notice of an order or judgment, the Court rendering it indisputably has plenary power to recall and amend or revise
it in substance or form on motion of any party or even motu proprio, provided that in the case of a final order or judgment,
the same has not attained finality. (Emphasis supplied)
In herein case, what was involved was an interlocutory order made in open court – ostensibly a judicial approval of a
compromise agreement – which was amended or revised by removing the stamp of judicial approval, the written order
merely stating that Judge Floro was reserving its ruling regarding the manifestations of the parties to enter into a
compromise agreement after the public prosecutor shall have submitted its comments thereto. 69
Considering then that it was well within the discretion of Judge Floro to revise his oral order per the Echaus ruling and
factoring in his explanation for resorting to such an amendment, we find no basis for the charge of dishonesty (under
paragraph "j" of the complaint).
Anent the charge that Judge Floro used his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385-MN
(for frustrated homicide) in the guise of settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading the private complainant and the
accused to sign the settlement even without the presence of the trial prosecutor, the same must likewise fail for lack of basis.
The controversial settlement never came to pass. It was not judicially approved as reflected in the revised Order of 8 March
1999, thus, Mrs. Arriego actually had no cause for complaint. She cannot, on one hand, complain that the written order did
not reflect the agreement reached during the hearing and, on the other hand, claim that this agreement was reached under
duress at the instance of Judge Floro.
(i) For motu proprio and over the strong objection of the trial prosecutor, ordering the mental and physical examination of the
accused based on the ground that the accused is "mahina ang pick-up"
The audit team reported that in an Order dated 8 February 1999 in Criminal Case No. 20347-MN, Judge Floro "motu proprio
ordered the physical and mental examination of the accused by any physician, over the strong objection of the trial
prosecutor, on the ground that the accused is "mahina ang pick-up." 70
In refutation, Judge Floro argues --
In the case at bar, respondent/Court carefully observed the demeanor of the accused NESTOR ESCARLAN and noted the
manifestations of his counsel de oficio, Atty. E. Gallevo, PAO lawyer, and the comment/objections of the trial prosecutor,
Prosecutor J. Diaz, thus:
a. Atty. Gallevo manifested to the Court that the accused opted to enter a plea of not guilty;
b. But upon query of the Court, the accused approached the bench and he appeared trembling and stammering;
c. Atty. Gallevo, upon questions by respondent, readily admitted that accused is "nauutal", has difficulty of
reasoning, of speaking, and very nervous;
d. Atty. Gallevo also manifested that the accused often changed his mind regarding the plea, from not guilty to guilty
and to not guilty, and so forth;
e. Considering the grave situation, Atty. Gallevo, upon citation by the Court/respondent of the pertinent provisions of
the Rules, namely Rule 28 (Mental Examination of Persons), Sec. 12 of Rule 116, and Sec. 5(g) of Rule 135, Rules
of Court (plenary powers to issue orders to conform to justice), manifested orally that the accused is "mahina ang
pick-up";
f. Hence, respondent exercised his sound discretion in issuing the ORDER OF MENTAL EXAMINATION.
The MENTAL examination ORDER finds legal support, since it is well-settled that "the court may order a physical or
MENTAL examination of a party where his physical or mental condition is material to the issues involved." (27 C.J.S. p. 119,
cf. MARTIN, p. 107, id.). 71
PAO lawyer Erwin Joy B. Gallevo took the witness stand for Judge Floro. He testified that he moved for the suspension of
the arraignment of the accused Nestor Escarlan Escancilla in order to assess his mental fitness for trial. 72 As reflected in the
Order for suspension, however, and as admitted by Judge Floro himself in his Comment, Atty. Gallevo merely manifested
that accused is "mahina ang pick-up."
Be that as it may, we cannot fault Judge Floro for suspending the arraignment motu proprio and "over the strong objection of
the trial prosecutor." It must be remembered that the scheduled arraignment took place in February 1999 when the
applicable rule was still Section 12(a) of Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reads:
SEC. 12. Suspension of arraignment. – The arraignment shall be suspended, if at the time thereof:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him unable to fully
understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental
examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose.
The above-cited rule does not require that the suspension be made pursuant to a motion filed by the accused unlike Section
11(a), Rule 116 of the present 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure which decrees that the suspension be made "upon motion
by the proper party." 73 Thus, it was well within the discretion of Judge Floro to order the suspension of the arraignment motu
proprio based on his own assessment of the situation. In fact, jurisprudence imposes upon the Judge the duty to suspend
the proceedings if it is found that the accused, even with the aid of counsel, cannot make a proper defense. 74 As we
underscored in People v. Alcalde 75 :
Settled is the rule that when a judge is informed or discovers that an accused is apparently in a present condition of insanity
or imbecility, it is within his discretion to investigate the matter. If it be found that by reason of such affliction the accused
could not, with the aid of counsel, make a proper defense, it is the duty of the court to suspend the proceedings and commit
the accused to a proper place of detention until his faculties are recovered. x x x.
xxxx
The constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him under the Bill of Rights carries
with it the correlative obligation to effectively convey to the accused the information to enable him to effectively prepare for
his defense. At the bottom is the issue of fair trial. While not every aberration of the mind or exhibition of mental deficiency
on the part of the accused is sufficient to justify suspension of the proceedings, the trial court must be fully satisfied that the
accused would have a fair trial with the assistance the law secures or gives. x x x.
Whether or not Judge Floro was indeed correct in his assessment of the accused’s mental fitness for trial is already beside
the point. If ever he erred, he erred in the side of caution which, under the circumstances of the case, is not an actionable
wrong.
(e)Re: Charge of appearing and signing pleadings in Civil Case No. 46-M-98 pending before Regional Trial Court, Branch
83, Malolos, Bulacan in violation of Canon 5, Rule 5.07, Code of Judicial Conduct which prohibits a judge from engaging in
the private practice of law
(f)Re: Charge of appearing in personal cases without prior authority from the Supreme Court and without filing the
corresponding applications for leaves of absence on the scheduled dates of hearing
In support of the above charges, the memorandum report states:
i.Judge Floro, Jr. informed the audit team that he has personal cases pending before the lower courts in Bulacan. He
admitted that Atty. Bordador, the counsel of record in some of these cases, is just signing the pleadings for him while he
(Judge Floro, Jr.) acts as collaborating counsel. When attending the hearing of the cases, Judge Floro, Jr. admitted that he
does not file an application for leave of absence.
Based on the reports gathered by the audit team, Judge Floro, Jr. has a pending civil case in the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan and a criminal case in Municipal Trial Court, Meycauayan, Bulacan. It is reported that in these cases, he is
appearing and filing pleadings in his capacity as party and counsel for himself and even indicating in the pleadings that he is
the Presiding Judge of Branch 73, RTC, Malabon.
Upon verification by the audit team, it was found out that Judge Floro, Jr. indeed has a pending case before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan docketed as Civil Case No. 46-M-98, entitled: "In Re: In the Matter of the Petition
for Habeas Corpus of Robert V. Floro, Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr., Petitioner - versus – Jesie V. Floro and Benjamin V.
Floro". In this case Judge Floro, Jr. filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of Entry of Judgment with Manifestation and/or
Judicial Admission" wherein he signed as the petitioner and at the same time indicated that he is the presiding judge of RTC,
Branch 73, Malabon, Metro Manila. Court stenographer Marissa Garcia, RTC, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan confirmed this
information. Judge Floro, Jr. even attached a copy of his oath taking and his picture together with President Joseph Estrada
to the aforesaid pleading. Photocopy of the said Motion is hereto attached as Annex "9".
Judge Floro, Jr. has a pending request with the Court Management Office, Office of the Court Administrator, to appear as
counsel or collaborating counsel in several civil cases (except the above-mentioned case) pending before lower courts. 76
Well ensconced is the rule that judges are prohibited from engaging in the private practice of law. Section 35, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court unequivocally states that: "No judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the Office of
the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as member of the bar or give professional advice to client." Canon 5,
Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, on the other hand, provides that: "A judge shall not engage in the private practice
of law."
Judge Floro vehemently denies the foregoing charge claiming that he hired lawyers to attend to his personal cases. 77
A scrutiny of the voluminous records in this case does not reveal any concrete proof of Judge Floro having appeared as
counsel in his personal cases after he had already been appointed Judge except that he prepared a pleading ("Ex Parte
Motion For Issuance of Entry of Judgment With Manifestation and/or Judicial Admission") jointly with his counsel of record in
connection with a habeas corpus case he filed against his brothers for the custody of their "mild, mentally-retarded" brother.
He explained, however, that he prepared the said pleading in the heat of anger as he could not accept the judgment of
dismissal in that case.78 He likewise explained that the pleading was signed by him alone due to inadvertence and that he
had rectified the same by filing an Amended Manifestation with Affidavit of Merit. 79 Finally, during the hearing of this case,
Judge Floro argued that he filed the subject pleading as petitioner and not as counsel. 80
The proscription against the private practice of law by judges is based on sound public policy, thus:
[T]he rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of an attorney-at-law are inherently incompatible with the high
official functions, duties, powers, discretion and privileges of a judge. It also aims to ensure that judges give their full time
and attention to their judicial duties, prevent them from extending special favors to their own private interests and assure the
public of their impartiality in the performance of their functions. These objectives are dictated by a sense of moral decency
and desire to promote the public interest. 81
Based on the above rationale, it becomes quite evident that what is envisioned by "private practice" is more than an isolated
court appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or
customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer. 82 In herein case, save for the "Motion for Entry of Judgment," it does
not appear from the records that Judge Floro filed other pleadings or appeared in any other court proceedings in connection
with his personal cases. It is safe to conclude, therefore, that Judge Floro’s act of filing the motion for entry of judgment is
but an isolated case and does not in any wise constitute private practice of law. Moreover, we cannot ignore the fact that
Judge Floro is obviously not lawyering for any person in this case as he himself is the petitioner.
Be that as it may, though Judge Floro might not be guilty of unauthorized practice of law as defined, he is guilty of
unbecoming conduct for signing a pleading wherein he indicated that he is the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 73, Malabon
City and for appending to the pleading a copy of his oath with a picture of his oath-taking. The only logical explanation we
can reach for such acts is that Judge Floro was obviously trying to influence or put pressure on a fellow judge by
emphasizing that he himself is a judge and is thus in the right. 83 Verily, Canon 2, Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
mandates that a "judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before
another court or administrative agency." By doing what he did, Judge Floro, to say the least, put a fellow judge in a very
awkward position.
As to charge (f), the OCA has failed to substantiate its claim that Judge Floro has been attending the hearing of his personal
cases without filing for leave of absence. As Judge Floro vehemently protests the charge as untrue, it was incumbent upon
the OCA to prove its case. Time and again we have held that although administrative proceedings are not strictly bound by
formal rules on evidence, the liberality of procedure in administrative actions is still subject to limitations imposed by the
fundamental requirement of due process. 84
(k) Re: Charge of openly criticizing the Rules of Court and the Philippine justice system
(l) Re: Charge of use of highly improper and intemperate language during court proceedings
The memorandum report reads:
In the course of the judicial audit, the audit team was able to observe the way Judge Floro, Jr. conducts court proceedings.
With the assistance of the court staff, the team was able to obtain a tape-recorded proceeding conducted by Judge Floro, Jr.
Attached is the transcript of the proceedings (Annex "15"). The tape record of the court proceedings is also submitted along
with this report as Exhibit "A".
xxxx
The case for hearing that day was Civil Case No. 1256 MM. A certain Atty. Abelarde was appearing for the plaintiff while
Atty. Emmanuel Basa was appearing for the defendant. During the hearing, it seems that the counsels for both parties were
guiding Judge Floro, Jr. on how to proceed with the trial.
There was one instance when Judge Floro, Jr. criticized the Rules of Court, to wit:
"Judge Floro, Jr.: Kasi nga ang may plano nito ay ang Rules of Court, hindi nila maayos ang Rules of Court natin, hindi
realistic kinopya lang sa law of California on Civil Procedure; pagdating dito eh … dahil sa kanila maraming
nagkakaproblema, masyadong maraming … eh ako wala akong pinagkopyahan yan … but ginawa ko lang yon … Sabi ko si
Judge nagko-complain kasi, sabi ko nga pagka ang lawyer hindi alam yan talo na sa akin … except … na hindi papayag …
kasi marami diyang …"
In another proceeding conducted on a different day, Judge Floro, Jr., instead of holding trial, discussed, in open court, the
case involving his brother. He even condemned the Philippine justice system and manifested his disgust on the unfairness of
the system. Thus, he said:
"Sabi ko paano ko matatagpuan ang katarungan dito sa korteng eto bulok ang hustisya. Ang kapatid ko napakayaman, ako
walang pera."
He continued:
"Yung kapatid ko. Hindi ko makuha kundi makita ko lang. Bawal kasi; yung kapatid ko retarded, bawal. In memory of my
brother, Robert Floro. So, ngayon nag-file ako. Sabi ni Judge Agloro senermonan pa ako, ganun … ganun … Sabi ko paano
ko makikita ang katarungan. Tapos ngayon ang nangyari di Judge na ako, hindi ko pa nakita ang kapatid ko. Di ngayon, ang
ginawa ko na-dismiss na yung case, hindi ko inano kasi wala akong nakikitang katarungan dahil ang kapatid ko ay
napakaraming pera. Alam ko naman kung ang isang court eh parehas o may kiling eh. Yung abogado niya malakas na
malakas doon. Sana hindi naka-record eto (laughs) baka ako ma-contempt dito." 85
Judge Floro denies the foregoing accusations, emphatically arguing that these are all hearsay fabrications supplied by his
Clerk of Court, Atty. Dizon, and by disgruntled RTC personnel due to ill or ulterior motives (i.e., to allegedly cover-up their
consistent tardiness, habitual absenteeism and gross neglect of duties which were all unearthed by Judge Floro).
As to the tape recording of an alleged court hearing wherein he criticized the Philippine judicial system, Judge Floro
contends that this recording was done clandestinely by his staff in violation of the Anti-Wire Tapping Law (Republic Act No.
4200) and, to suit their plans, they twisted the facts by cutting portions thereof. They also made it appear that the
conversation took place in a court proceeding when, in fact, this was inside his chambers.
During the investigation, it was established that the two tapes in question were submitted to the OCA sans the "yellow notes"
and the official transcribed copy thereof. 86 This means that the transcribed copy that was submitted by the audit team as
Annex "15" is but an unofficial copy and does not, by itself, prove that what was being recorded was a court proceeding. This
being the case, the two tapes, without concrete proof that they were taken officially during a court proceeding, cannot be
used against Judge Floro as the unauthorized recording of a private conversation is inadmissible under Rep. Act No. 4200. 87
Without the tape and transcribed copies of the contents thereof, we are thus left with only Judge Floro’s word against that of
Atty. Dizon, his Clerk of Court who testified under oath as to Judge Floro’s alleged propensity to criticize the judiciary and to
use intemperate language. Resolving these particular charges would therefore depend upon which party is more credible.
Atty. Dizon stated on the witness stand that:
Q: Is Judge Floro guilty of Violation of Canon 1 Rule 1.01 Code of Judicial Conduct when he openly criticized the Rules of
Court and the Philippine Justice System?
A: Yes. Judge Floro has mentioned to each and everyone of us in branch 73 the alleged "kabulukan ng hustisya". Time and
again he said the Rules of Court is of no use. He said that since theory and the practice of law are very different, the Rules
of Court does not always apply to different cases. Not only the justice system did he criticize but likewise Judges and
Justices. He told us . . . and I quote "D’yan sa Malolos sangkatutak ang corrupt na Judges . . . Sa Court of Appeals
P25,000.00 ang pinakamababang lagayan diyan."
To our mind, how can a Judge like him openly criticize the very institution he is now serving? Where is his respect to the
court, to the bar and to the bench? How can he uphold courts as temples of justice if he himself did not believe in the justice
system?
xxxx
Q What can you say about charge letter "L" which reads for the use of highly improper and intemperate language during
court proceedings?
A Judge Floro, if in the presence of all his staff, during the presence of me, the Court Interpreter, the Legal Researcher,
maybe a Clerk, he always discuss matters regarding practitioners in our court. There is one time one Atty. Feliciano a lady
lawyer, he said, "Luka-luka, talaga yang babaing yan" and then he would call even not during court session, but during office
hours our Court Interpreter "malandi, luka-luka, may fruit of the sun". So, it did not surprise us one time when during a pre-
trial conference in a Civil Case, for Civil Case No. 25-86-MN "Lopez v. Reyes and Mercado", he uttered offensive language
against his fellow judge. Take the transcription of this court proceeding is already adapted by the Court Administrator. It was
the content of the tape he sent the Court Administrator. Actually, for consultation and advise after hearing what Judge Floro
discussed in open Court, before all of us, the court staff present in the hearing and before the lawyer and the defendants in
the case, we were in quandary whether or not to attach in the record the stenographic notes or even the actual transcription
of the proceedings because it contained offensive languages against the justice system, against a certain judge, against a
certain Clerk of Court named Jude Assanda, against people he is disgusted with. In fact, instead of discussing the merit of
the case or the possibility of the amicable settlement between the parties, he integrated this kind of discussion. So, as a
Clerk of Court, I may not use my discretion whether or not to advise the stenographer to indeed present the same or attach
the same in the record because it contained offensive languages highly improper and intemperate languages like for
example, "putang ina", words like "ako ang anghel ng kamatayan, etcetera, etcetera". 88
The denials of Judge Floro are insufficient to discredit the straightforward and candid declarations of Atty. Dizon especially in
the light of confirming proofs from Judge Floro himself.
The Court finds the version of Atty. Dizon more credible because subject utterances are consistent with Judge Floro’s claims
of intellectual superiority for having graduated with several honors from the Ateneo School of Law and having placed 13th in
the bar examinations. Moreover, his utterances against the judicial system on account of his perception of injustice in the
disposition of his brother’s case are not far removed from his reactions to what he perceived were injustices committed
against him by the OCA and by the persons who were either in charge of the cases against him or had some sort of
participation therein. Consequently, although there is no direct proof that Judge Floro said what he is claimed to have said,
nonetheless, evidence that he sees himself as intellectually superior as well as evidence of his habit of crying foul when
things do not go his way, show that it is more likely that he actually criticized the Rules of Court and the judicial system and
is thus guilty of unbecoming conduct. Verily, in administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is
substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 89 In
this case, there is ample and competent proof of violation on Judge Floro’s part.
(m) Re: Charge of violating Circular No. 13-87 dated 1 July 1987
The memorandum report stated that Judge Floro –
[D]eviat[ed] from the regular course of trial when he discusses matters involving his personal life and beliefs. Canon 3, Rule
3.03 provides that "[a] judge shall maintain order and proper decorum in the court." A disorderly judge generates disorderly
work. An indecorous judge invites indecorous reactions. Hence, the need to maintain order and proper decorum in court.
When the judge respects himself, others will respect him too. When he is orderly, others will follow suit. Proceedings in court
must be conducted formally and solemnly. The atmosphere must be characterized with honor and dignity befitting the
seriousness and importance of a judicial trial called to ascertain the truth. Anything which tends to detract from this
atmosphere must be avoided. And the judge is supposed to be in control and is therefore responsible for any detraction
therefrom.
Circular No. 13 (Guidelines in the Administration of Justice) dated July 1, 1987 provides that trial of cases should be
conducted efficiently and expeditiously. Judges should plan the course and direction of trials so that waste of time is
avoided.
Moreover, a judge should avoid being queer in his behavior, appearance and movements. He must always keep in mind that
he is the visible representative of the law. Judge Floro, Jr.’s claims that he is endowed with psychic powers, that he can
inflict pain and sickness to people, that he is the angel of death and that he has unseen "little friends" are manifestations of
his psychological instability and therefore casts doubt on his capacity to carry out the functions and responsibilities of a
judge. Hence, it is best to subject Judge Floro, Jr. once again to psychiatric or mental examination to ascertain his fitness to
remain in the judiciary. 90
Circular No. 13-87, by itself, does not define nor punish an offense but, as its title would suggest, it merely sets the
guidelines in the administration of justice following the ratification of the 1987 Constitution.
The arguments forwarded by the OCA, however, best exemplify the fact that the 13 charges are inextricably linked to the
charge of mental/psychological illness which allegedly renders Judge Floro unfit to continue discharging the functions of his
office. This being the case, we will consider the allegation that Judge Floro proclaims himself to be endowed with psychic
powers, that he can inflict pain and sickness to people, that he is the angel of death and that he has unseen "little friends" in
determining the transcendental issue of his mental/psychological fitness to remain in office.
But before we even go into that, we must determine the appropriate penalty to be imposed for the seven of the 13 charges
discussed above. To recapitulate, we have found Judge Floro guilty, in one way or another, of seven of the 13 charges
against him. Thus:
1) Charge "a" - simple misconduct
2) Charges "c" and "g" – gross ignorance of the law
3) Charge "d" – unbecoming conduct
4) Charge "e" – unbecoming conduct
5) Charges "k" and "l" – unbecoming conduct
Gross ignorance of the law or procedure is a serious charge. Under Rule 140 as amended, a judge guilty of a serious charge
may be dismissed from the service, suspended from office without salary and other benefits for more than three but not
exceeding six months or fined in the amount of P 20,000.00 but not exceeding P 40,000.00 depending on the circumstances
of the case. In herein case, considering that Judge Floro had barely warmed his seat when he was slammed with these
charges, his relative inexperience is to be taken in his favor. And, considering further that there is no allegation or proof that
he acted in bad faith or with corrupt motives, we hold that a fine is the appropriate penalty. The fine is to be imposed in the
maximum, i.e. P 40,000.00, as we will treat the findings of simple misconduct and unbecoming conduct as aggravating
circumstances. 91
Judge Floro must be relieved of his position as Judge of RTC Malabon Branch due to a medically disabling condition of the
mind that renders him unfit to discharge the functions of his office
As we have explained, the common thread which binds the 13 seemingly unrelated accusations in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 is
the charge of mental illness against Judge Floro embodied in the requirement for him to undergo an appropriate mental or
psychological examination and which necessitated his suspension pending investigation. This charge of mental illness, if
true, renders him unfit to perform the functions of his office notwithstanding the fact that, in disposing of the 13 charges,
there had been no finding of dismissal from the service against Judge Floro.
The Supreme Court Clinic first had occasion to interview Judge Floro when the latter applied for judgeship (which application
he later voluntarily withdrew) way back in September 1995. The psychological report, as prepared by Cecilia C. Villegas,
M.D. (Director III, Chief SC Clinic Services) and Melinda C. Grio (Psychologist), stated in part:
PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION:
There are evidences of developing psychotic process at present.
REMARKS:
Atty. Floro was observed to be restless and very anxious during the interview. He was argumentative and over solicitous of
questions asked, giving the impressions of marked suspiciousness. He centered on his academic excellence, an Ateneo de
Manila graduate of the College of Law, rated top 13th place in the bar examination. He emphasized his obsessive and
compulsive method of studying, at least 15 hours per day regardless of whether it was school days or vacation time. Vying
for honors all the time and graduated Law as second honor, he calls this self-discipline and self-organization. He expressed
dissatisfaction of his achievements, tend to be a perfectionist and cannot accept failures. To emphasize his ultra bright mind
and analytical system, he related that, for the past 3 to 5 years, he has been experiencing "Psychic vision" every morning
and that the biggest secret of the universe are the "unseen things." He can predict future events because of "power in
psychic phenomenon" as when his bar results was to be released, he saw lights in the sky "no. 13-1," and he got the 13th
place. He has been practicing "parapsychology" – seeing plenty of "dwendes" around him.
He can talk on and on of bizarre ideas, that tends (sic) to be irrelevant.

Intellectually, he has high assets, however, evidence of ego disintegration are prominent findings, both in the interview
(conscious) and psychological test results. (unconscious level). 92
Approximately three years later, in June 1998, Judge Floro again presented himself to the Supreme Court Clinic when he
applied anew for judgeship, this time of RTC Malabon. Psychologist Beatriz O. Cruz and Celeste P. Vista, M.D. (Psychiatrist
and Medical Officer IV) did the interview and evaluation. Dr. Vista observed:
Atty. Floro has an impressive academic achievements (sic), and he takes pride in this. During the interview, he was quite
reluctant to reveal information about his family background and would rather talk about his work and academic
achievements. However, he failed to integrate his knowledge into a cohesive unit which he can utilize to cope with the
various tasks that he undertakes. This renders him confused and ambivalent with a tendency to vacillate with decision-
making. He also has a low self-esteem and prone to mood swings with the slightest provocation.
From the interview, there seems to have been no drastic change in his personality and level of functioning as a lawyer in
private practice. However, he showed a pervasive pattern of social and interpersonal deficits. He has poor social skills and
showed discomfort with close social contacts. Paranoid ideations, suspiciousness of others’ motives as well as perceptual
distortions were evident during the interview.
Atty. Floro’s current intelligence function is along the mild mental retardation (68) which is below the expected cognitive
efficiency of a judge. Despite his impressive academic background and achievements, he has lapses in judgment and may
have problems with decision-making. His character traits such as suspiciousness and seclusiveness and preoccupation with
paranormal and psychic phenomena though not detrimental to his role as a lawyer, may cloud his judgment, and hamper his
primary role as a judge in dispensing justice. Furthermore, he is at present not intellectually and emotionally equipped to
hurdle the responsibilities of a judge and he may decompensate when exposed to anxiety-provoking and stress-laden
situation. 93
It would seem that the JBC disregarded the above-quoted report as it allowed Judge Floro to seek a second opinion from
private practitioners. A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460, however, resurrected the issue of his mental and psychological capacity to
preside over a regional trial court. Thus, the Resolution of 20 July 1999 specifically ordered Judge Floro to submit to
"appropriate psychological or mental examination."
On 1 February 2000, per recommendation of Justice Ramirez, 94 the Court clarified that the "appropriate psychological or
mental examination" being adverted to in the Resolution of 20 July 1999 is to be conducted by the SC Clinic. The Court
thereby directed Judge Floro to "submit himself to the SC Clinic for psychological or mental examination, within ten (10)
days from notice." 95 Judge Floro sought reconsideration which was denied by the Court on 22 February 2000. 96
The order to submit to the appropriate psychological examination by the SC Clinic was reiterated by the Court on 17 October
2000 with the admonition that Judge Floro’s failure to do so would result in appropriate disciplinary sanctions. 97
On 24 October 2000, Judge Floro sought reconsideration of the 17 October 2000 Resolution with a conjunctive special
motion for him to undergo psychiatric examination by any duly authorized medical and/or mental institution. 98 This was
denied by the Court on 14 November 2000. 99
On 10 November 2000, Judge Floro moved, among other things, for the inhibition or disqualification of Supreme Court Clinic
doctors 100 and psychologist 101 with a manifestation that he filed cases against them for revocation of licenses before the
Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC), the Philippine Medical Association (PMA) and the PAP 102 for alleged gross
incompetence and dishonorable conduct under Sec. 24 of Rep. Act No. 2382/1959 Medical Act/Code of Medical Ethics. 103
On 16 November 2000, Justice Ramirez, with the approval of Court Administrator Benipayo, moved that Judge Floro be
sanctioned for obvious contempt in refusing to comply with the 1 February 2000 and 17 October 2000 resolutions. According
to Justice Ramirez, Judge Floro’s filing of administrative cases with the PRC against Dr. Mendoza, et al., is an indication of
the latter’s intention to disregard and disobey the legal orders of the Court. 104The Court en banc agreed in the report of
Justice Ramirez, thus Judge Floro was ordered to submit to psychological and mental examination within 10 days from
receipt, otherwise, he "shall be ordered arrested and detained at the jail of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) x x
x." 105
Judge Floro finally complied with the directive on 13 and 15 December 2000. 106 He likewise sought the services of a private
practitioner, Dr. Eduardo T. Maaba, who came out with his own evaluation of Judge Floro on 3 January 2001. 107
Thus, Judge Floro trooped to the Supreme Court Clinic for the third time in December 2000, this time in connection with A.M.
No. RTJ-99-1460. Francianina G. Sanchez, Clinical Psychologist and Chief Judicial Staff Officer reported that "(o)ver all data
strongly suggest a delusional disorder with movement in the paranoid direction." Dr. Celeste Vista, for her part, stated that:
Based on the clinical data gathered, it appears that Judge Floro is basically a cautious, and suspicious individual with a
compulsion to analyze and observe motives in his milieu. Despite his status, cognitive assets and impressive educational
background, his current functioning is gauged along the LOW AVERAGE intelligence.
He can function and apply his skills in everyday and routine situations. However, his test protocol is characterized by
disabling indicators. There is impairment in reality testing which is an indicator of a psychotic process. He is unable to make
an objective assessment and judgment of his milieu. Hence, he is apt to misconstrue signals from his environment resulting
to perceptual distortions, disturbed associations, and lapses in judgment. Such that, cultural beliefs in dwarfs, psychic and
paranormal phenomena and divine gifts of healing have become incorporated in a delusional (false and unshakable beliefs)
system, that it has interfered and tainted his occupational and social functioning. Hence, he is found to be unfit in performing
his court duties as a judge. 108
Pursuant to the aforecited December 2000 interview of Judge Floro, Supreme Court Senior Chief Staff Officer Rosa J.
Mendoza, M.D., reported to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in March 2001 that –
The findings of mental and psychological incapacity is thus substantially supported by evidence. Based on the three[3]
psychological tests and evaluation of the two[2] psychiatrists, the undersigned has no other recourse but to recommend that
Judge Florentino Floro be declared unfit to discharge his duties as a Judge, effective immediately.
Not one to take this last recommendation sitting down, Judge Floro submitted earlier psychological evaluations conducted by
several mental health professionals which were all favorable to him. The first three evaluations were in connection with his
application as RTC Judge of Malabon City in 1998 brought about by him having "failed" the examination given by the
Supreme Court Clinic. The report dated 04 September 1998 by staff psychologist, Rowena A. Reyes as noted by clinical
Psychologist, Ma. Teresa Gustilo-Villasor of the Metropolitan Psychological Corporation (MPC), states in part:
I. INTELLECTUAL/COGNITIVE CHARACTERISTICS
SUMMARY OF INTELLECTUAL/COGNITIVE CHARACTERISTICS
1. FFJ can draw from above average intellectual resources to cope with everyday demands. He is able to
handle both concrete and abstract requirements of tasks. Alert to details, he has a logical approach in
evaluating the relationship between things and ideas.
2. He thrives in predictable and structured situations, where he can consider solid facts to arrived (sic)at
concrete, tangible outcomes. Task-oriented, he can organize procedures and details so as to get things
done correctly and on schedule. He uses conventional standards to determine personal progress. Set in his
views, he may not readily accept others’ ideas and contributions especially if these oppose his own.
3. A serious and thorough approach to his commitments is expected of FFJ. Generally, he prefers to control
his emotions and does not let this get in the way of his judgment and decisions.
II. EMOTIONAL/INTERPERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS
FFJ is motivated by the need to be recognized and respected for his undertakings. Achievement-oriented, he sets
high personal standards and tends to judge himself and others according to these standards. When things do not
develop along desired lines, he may become restless and impatient. Nevertheless, he is careful of his social stature
and can be expected to comply with conventional social demands. 109
Testifying as one of Judge Floro’s witnesses, Rowena A. Reyes opined on cross-examination that "psychologically
speaking," Judge Floro was not fit to be a judge. Thus:
JUDGE AQUINO:
Q: Now, that we are telling you that Judge Floro based on his testimony here and on every available records of the
proceedings, has been claiming that he [is] possessed with Psychic Powers and he did not tell you that in the interview.
Would you consider his failure to tell you about his Psychic Powers to be a fatal [flaw]?
xxxx
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Very grave one, because it will affect the psychological outlook of the patient?
A: Yes, Sir.
xxxx
Q: I tell you now, Judge Floro has been claiming in [these] proceedings and you were here when we were cross-examining
Mr. Licaoco and you heard that we mentioned in the course of our cross-examination. Would you consider his failure to tell
you about his power of by location to be a fatal [flaw] and your assessment of his psychological outlook?
xxxx
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Fatal [flaw]?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Did Judge Floro tell you also in the course of the interview that he is capable of being in a trance?
A: He did not.
Q: So, he did not tell you that while in a trance he could type letters?
A: He did not.
xxxx
Q: And reality oriented and a reality oriented person is one who will not be pronouncing or making pronouncement
concerning his psychic powers. Is this not correct?
xxxx
A: Yes sir.
Q: A reality oriented person is also one who will not claim that he is capable of having trances in the course of his private
activities and even in the course of the performance of his official duty as a Judge. Will you not agree with that?
A: I agree with you, Sir.

Q: And if he will do so, he will not be actually a reality oriented person. Meaning tatagalugin ko na po nakukuha naman "na
ako ay psychic, na ako ay pwedeng ipower ng by location, na kaya kong mag trance. Gumawa pa ng iba’t iba pang bagay at
the same time." Yan ay hindi compatible sa pagiging reality oriented?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And a person who is not reality oriented is not fit to sit as a Judge.
xxxx
Q: I will add the phrase Psychologically speaking.
xxxx
A: Yes, Sir. 110
Another psychiatrist, Pacita Ramos-Salceda, M.D., Senior Consultant Psychiatrist of the Makati Medical Center, stated in
her report dated 3 September 1998 that at the time of the interview Judge Floro –
[W]as enthusiastic and confident. He is well informed about current issues, able to discuss a wide variety of topics
intelligently without hesitation. His thinking is lucid, rational, logical and reality based. He is well oriented, intelligent,
emotionally stable, with very good judgment. There is no previous history of any psychological disturbances. 111
This was followed by the evaluation of Eduardo L. Jurilla, M.D., dated September 1998, who stated in his report that –
Atty. Floro is an asthenic, medium height, fairly groomed, be-spectacled person with graying hair. When interviewed he was
somewhat anxious, elaborative and at times approximate in his answers. He was alert, oriented, conscious, cooperative and
articulate in Pilipino and English. He denied any perceptual disturbances. Stream of thought was logical and goal-directed.
There was pressure of speech with tendency to be argumentative or defensive but there were no flight of ideas, thought
blocking, looseness of associations or neologisms. Delusions were not elicited. Affect was broad and appropriate but mood
was anxious. There were no abnormal involuntary movements or tics. Impulse control is good. Cognition is intact. Judgment,
insight, and other test for higher cortical functions did not reveal abnormal results.
Comments: The over-all results of this psychiatric evaluation of Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr. do not contradict his nomination
and appointment to the post he is seeking. 112
On the witness stand, however, and testifying as Judge Floro’s witness, Dr. Jurilla clarified that the interview had its
limitations 113 and he might have missed out certain information left out by his patient. 114 The following exchange is thus
instructive:
JUDGE AQUINO: x x x. Did Judge Floro tell you in the interview that he has little unseen, unheard friends known as
duwendes?
DR. JURILLA: He did not.
xxxx
Q: Did you interview Judge Floro or did he [volunteer] to you information about his claim to be the number five psychic in the
country?
xxxx
A: No, Your Honor.

Q: He did not tell you also that he is gifted also with this so called, psychic phenomena?
A: He did not.
xxxx
Q: He did not tell you also that in [traveling] from one place to another, at least four (4) kilometers apart, he used to ride on a
big white or whatever it is, horse?
A: Not during our interview.
xxxx
A: It is possible like any other psychiatrist or mental health doctor you might have missed some information or it is possible
that our clients or patients might not [have] told us everything.
Q: And if your clients or patients did not tell you things such as those that Judge Floro did not admittedly tell you in the
course of the interview, your opinion of the patient would be altered a little?
xxxx
A: The answer has something to do whether my evaluation may be altered. Yes, Your Honor in the absence of any
corroborative contradiction.
Q: More so, if the presence of confirming events that transpired after the interview, would that be correct?
A: The interview has its limitations.
Q: Let us say, what Judge Floro did [not] tell you during the interview are confirmed by events that transpired after the
interview, would you not say you have more reason to have your evaluation altered?
A: Yes.
Q: Especially so if you will now know that after that interview Judge Floro has been proclaiming himself as the number five
psychic in the country [where] no one has called him as a psychic at all?
xxxx
Q: Would it be really more altered?
A: I would say so.
xxxx
Q: Returning to the confirming proofs, meaning after the interview, which are confirmations of what Judge Floro did not tell
you during the interview, would your finding of [J]udge Floro be drastically altered if he will tell you that he is capable or
possessed of the power of bilocation?
xxxx
A: I would probably try to for a diagnosis.
Q: Which may make a drastic alteration of your evaluation of Judge Floro’s mental and psychological x x x?
A: My diagnosis I will be seeking for an abnormal condition.
Q: When you said abnormal something would have made you suspect that there was abnormality in the person of Judge
Floro?
A: Given the data.
Q: We will give you the data or additional information. Would you also have your evaluation favorable to Judge Floro
drastically altered if I tell you that based on record Judge Floro has claimed that while in a trance he is capable of typing a
letter?
xxxx
A: If there is data toward that effect prior to September 1998, probably drastically altered. 115
Lastly, Judge Floro presented the psychiatric evaluation of Eduardo T. Maaba, M.D., 116 dated 3 January 2001, the relevant
portions of which state:
Affect was adequate and no mood incongruity was observed. Content of thought did not reveal delusional thought. He was
proud of his achievements in line with his profession and expressed his frustration and dissatisfaction with the way his
colleagues are handling his pending administrative cases. He was observed to be reality-oriented and was not suffering from
hallucinations or abnormal perceptual distortions. Orientation, with respect to time, place and person, was unimpaired.
Judgment and decision-making capacity were adequately functioning.
xxxx
An open-ended clinical interview was conducted at our clinic on December 26, 2000. He talked about his family and
academic achievements. He claimed to possess a divine gift for prophecy and a gift of healing. He also talked about a
"covenant" made during a dream between him and 3 dwarf friends named Luis, Armand and Angel. He reported that the first
part of his ministry is to cast illness and/or disease and the second part is to heal and alleviate sufferings/pain from disease.
A series of psychological test was administered to Judge Floro on December 28, 2000. The battery of test consisted of the
following: (1) Otis-Lennon Mental Ability Test (2) SRA Language Test (3) Purdue Non-Language Test (4) Sack’s Sentence
Completion Test and (5) Draw A Person Test. Test results and evaluation showed an individual with an Above Average
Intelligence. Projective data, showed an obsessive-compulsive person who is meticulous to details and strive for perfection
in tasks assigned to him. He is reality-oriented and is deemed capable of making day-to-day decisions in his personal as
well as professional decisions. Confusion with regard to sexual identification, was further observed.
Based on the clinical observation and the results of the psychological tests, respondent Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr., was
found to be a highly intelligent person who is reality-oriented and is not suffering from any major psychotic disorder. He is not
deluded nor hallucinated and is capable of utilizing his superior intellect in making sound decisions. His belief in supernatural
abilities is culture-bound and needs further studies/work-ups.
On cross-examination by Judge Aquino, however, Dr. Maaba also stated that Judge Floro was unfit to be a judge.117 The
relevant exchanges between Dr. Maaba and Judge Aquino are hereunder reproduced:
JUDGE AQUINO: And would you say that something is wrong with a judge who shall claim that he is possessed with power
of [bi-location]?
xxxx
DR. MAABA: A reality-oriented individual would not claim to be in two (2) places at one time.
Q: And that something must be wrong?

A: Yes.
Q: Okay. Would you say that something is wrong also with a judge claiming in the course of his testimony and in this very
case that while [he] was so testifying there is another spirit, another person, another character unseen who is with him at the
same time or in tagalog "sumapi sa kanya".
xxxx
A: The observation that Judge Floro had unseen companion "sumapi" to me is unbelievable.
Q: Unbelievable. And anyone claiming it might be suffering from some delusion?
xxxx
A: It could be and it could not be considered as perceptual distortion, your Honor.
Q: No, Delusion.
A: Delusions, no, but Hallucinations, maybe yes.
Q: Ah, Hallucination, and which maybe worse?
A: Both are on the same footing.
Q: Okay. Would you say that the person declaring in a proceeding as a witness about hallucinatory matters would turn out to
be fit to become a judge?
xxxx
A. If these delusions or hallucinations are part and parcel of a major psychiatric disorder like schizophrenia or an organic
mental disorder, this individual suffering from hallucinations or delusions is unfit to sit as a judge, however, there is, this
symptom might also exi[s]t in a non-psychotic illness and the hallucinations and delusions could be transient and short in
duration.
Q: But of doubtful capacity to sit as a judge?
A: Yes, doubtful capacity.
Q: Now, trance is something covered by the field of which you are practicing with psychiatry.
A: Yes.
Q: Would you consider a person claiming in the course of a judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative proceedings particularly
in the course of his testimony that while he was doing so, he was under trance normal.
xxxx
A: Let me explain the phenomenon of trance it is usually considered in the Philippines as part of a culture bound syndrome
and it could also be an indication … Basically the phenomenon of trance are often seen in cases of organic mental disorder.
It is also common in culture bound syndrome and the effect of person is usually loss of concentration in a particular settings
or situations so that a person or a judge hearing a case in court would [lose] concentration and would not be able to follow
up testimony of witnesses as well as arguments given by the counsel for the defense and also for the prosecution, so I
would say that there is this difficulty in manners of attention span and concentration if that person sitting as a judge
experience trance as in the case of Judge Floro, this trance is manifested by flashing of lights and he might not be able to
rationalize or to control expressions or as well as physical when he is in a trance.
Q: Have you heard of a judge claiming that in the course of a proceeding, he was in a trance?
A: No, I have not encountered any.
Q: And if you hear one and will be shown records of one maybe such claim you will call that person not a normal person.
A: Maybe weird.
Q: I will now show to you portions of the stenographic notes of the proceedings in these cases held on October 10, 2000,
afternoon session, page 30 we start with the question of Atty. Dizon. "Atty. Dizon: Mr. witness, can you tell us? Are you in
trance at this very precise moment? JUDGE FLORO, JR.: "Nakalakip sila". I call it a trance, but I distinguished not the trance
that you see the – nag-sa-Sto., Nino, naninigas. That’s a trance that is created by the so called… Because Fr. Jaime
Bulatao, multi awarded Jesuit priest, considered that as mind projection. He is correct in a sense that those nagta-trance na
yan, naninigas, the mind projection or the hypnosis do come, and there is a change in the psychological aspect of the
person. But in my case I never was changed physically or mentally. Only the lights and heat will penetrate that person.
ATTY. DIZON: That will do. So at this very moment, Mr. witness, "meron kayong kalakip ngayon?"" "Ngayong oras na ito?"
JUDGE FLORO: Yes, they are here. Atty. DIZON: Where are they? Judge Floro, Jr.: They cannot be seen but… ATTY.
DIZON: No, can you see them?" To point to us where are they in this room?", Now that you have read and seen this portion
wherein Judge Floro himself admitted that in the course of his testimony in these cases he was in a trance, would you still
consider him at least insofar as this claim of his to be a normal person?
A: No.
Q: No, okay, so he is not normal. Now, Judge Floro in these proceedings also and I will show to you the transcript of
stenographic notes later have claimed that he had, always had and still had a so–called counter part, his other side, other
self, what can you say to that claim, would that be the claim of a normal, mental sound person?
A: No.
Q: And one who is not normal and mentally sound is of course not fit to sit as judge?
xxxx
A: Yes. 118
Based on the foregoing, the OCA, thru Justice Ramirez, reported that:
Upon the testimony of his own witnesses, Drs. Eduardo T. Maaba, Ma. Nieves Celeste and Eduardo L. Jurilla, respondent
Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. is unfit because of insanity to remain in office as Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 73.
It is weird for respondent Judge to state in one of his pleadings in this case that President Estrada would not finish his term
as President. It is unusual and queer of him to state in his calling card that he is a graduate of Ateneo de Manila, second
honors, bar topnotcher with a grade of 87.55% and include in his address the name Colonel Reynaldo Cabauatan who was
involved in a coup d’etat attempt. So is it strange of him to make use of his alleged psychic powers in writing decisions in the
cases assigned to his court. It is improper and grandiose of him to express superiority over other judges in the course of
hearings he is conducting and for him to say that he is very successful over many other applicants for the position he has
been appointed. It is abnormal for a Judge to distribute self-serving propaganda. One who distributes such self-serving
propaganda is odd, queer, amusing, irresponsible and abnormal. A judge suffering from delusion or hallucination is unfit to
be one. So is he who gets into a trance while presiding at the hearing of a case in court. One need not be a doctor of
medicine, a psychiatrist and a psychologist to determine and conclude that a person in such circumstances is mentally unfit
or insane and should not be allowed to continue discharging the duties and functions of a judge. The life, liberty and property
of the litigants in the court presided by such judge are in his hands. Hence, it is imperative that he is free from doubt as to
his mental capacity and condition to continue discharging the functions of his office.
RECOMMENDATION
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that by reason of insanity which renders him incapable and unfit to perform
the duties and functions of Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Malabon, Metro Manila,
Branch 73, respondent Florentino V. Floro, Jr. be REMOVED and DISMISSED from such office. 119
We are in agreement with the OCA that Judge Floro cannot remain as RTC Judge because of the findings of mental
impairment that renders him unfit to perform the functions of his office. We hasten to add, however, that neither the OCA nor
this Court is qualified to conclude that Judge Floro is "insane" as, in fact, the psychologists and psychiatrists on his case
have never said so.
When Justice Ramirez recommended that Judge Floro be dismissed from the service due to "insanity," he was apparently
using the term in its loose sense. Insanity is a general layman’s term, a catch–all word referring to various mental disorders.
Psychosis is perhaps the appropriate medical term 120 as this is the one used by Drs. Vista and Villegas of the Supreme
Court Clinic. It is of note that the 1995, 1998 and 2000 psychological evaluations all reported signs and symptoms of
psychosis.
Courts exist to promote justice; thus aiding to secure the contentment and happiness of the people. 121 An honorable,
competent and independent judiciary exists to administer justice in order to promote the stability of government, and the
well-being of the people. 122 Carrying much of the weight in this daunting task of administering justice are our front liners, the
judges who preside over courts of law and in whose hands are entrusted the destinies of individuals and institutions. As it
has been said, courts will only succeed in their tasks if the judges presiding over them are truly honorable men, competent
and independent. 123
There is no indication that Judge Floro is anything but an honorable man. And, in fact, in our disposition of the 13 charges
against him, we have not found him guilty of gross misconduct or acts or corruption. However, the findings of psychosis by
the mental health professionals assigned to his case indicate gross deficiency in competence and independence.
Moreover, Judge Floro himself admitted that he believes in "psychic visions," of foreseeing the future because of his power
in "psychic phenomenon." He believes in "duwendes" and of a covenant with his "dwarf friends Luis, Armand and Angel." He
believes that he can write while on trance and that he had been seen by several people to have been in two places at the
same time. He has likened himself to the "angel of death" who can inflict pains on people, especially upon those he
perceived as corrupt officials of the RTCs of Malabon. He took to wearing blue robes during court sessions, switching only to
black on Fridays. His own witness testified that Judge Floro explained that he wore black from head to foot on Fridays to
recharge his psychic powers. Finally, Judge Floro conducted healing sessions in his chambers during his break time. All
these things validate the findings of the Supreme Court Clinic about Judge Floro’s uncommon beliefs and that such beliefs
have spilled over to action.
Lest we be misconstrued, we do not denigrate such belief system. However, such beliefs, especially since Judge Floro acted
on them, are so at odds with the critical and impartial thinking required of a judge under our judicial system.
Psychic phenomena, even assuming such exist, have no place in a judiciary duty bound to apply only positive law and, in its
absence, equitable rules and principles in resolving controversies. Thus, Judge Floro’s reference to psychic phenomena in
the decision he rendered in the case of People v. Francisco, Jr. 124 sticks out like a sore thumb. In said decision, Judge Floro
discredited the testimony of the prosecution’s principal witness by concluding that the testimony was a "fairytale" or a
"fantastic story." 125 He then went to state that "psychic phenomena" was destined to cooperate with the stenographer who
transcribed the testimony of the witness. The pertinent portion of Judge Floro’s decision is quoted hereunder:
3. The testimony of the prosecution’s PRINCIPAL witness (sole eyewitness of the incident) NORMANDY is INCREDIBLE, is
full of inconsistencies (major and not regarding minor points), ergo, the court concludes that due to several indicia of
fraud/perjury (flagrant/palpable deception of the Court), his testimony is not worthy of belief, assuming ex-gratia argumenti,
that the same may be admissible, and his Court narrative is hereby declared a FAIRY TALE or a FANTASTIC STORY of a
crime scene that is acceptable only for SCREEN/cinematic viewing. The following details, are proof of the foregoing
conclusion:
a.) NORMANDY swore that he, Ponciano Ineria and Raul Ineria were "sinalubong" by Lando/accused on June 21,
1987 at 2:30 a.m. at alley Wesleyan/Tangos, Navotas, and that he saw the "nagpambuno" between Raul and Ando,
and that HE SAW P. INERIA dead, but HE WAS NO LONGER THERE, but he still saw the "nagpambuno"; MORE
IMPORTANTLY, he SWORE that HE NOTICED the ACCUSED P. Francisco THE FOLLOWING DAY;
b.) The foregoing verily demonstrate his 11th HOUR CONCOCTION (Big Lie, having been asked to submit false
testimony); for how could have he witnessed the stabbing by accused when he NOTICED him the following day?
(TSN dated May 2, 1995, pp. 1-2); assuming arguendo that the TSN was incorrect due to typographical error, or
maybe the Court Stenographer III Eloisa B. Domingo might have been SLEEPING during the testimony, so that the
word DAY should have been corrected to another word SUITABLE to Normandy’s FAIRY TALE, still, the Court had
synthesized the entire NARRATIVE of Normandy, but the Court found no reason that the seeming error ‘DAY’
should be corrected; the Court’s sole/remaining conclusion is that EVEN the STENOGRAPHIC NOTES cooperated
by PSYCHIC PHENOMENA perhaps of FOR SURE, in having BEEN DESTINED to be FATEFULLY INSCRIBED
WITH THE WORDS FOLLOWING DAY (line 3, p. 3 TSN, id.) 126 (Emphasis supplied)
In State Prosecutors v. Muro 127 we held that –
What is required on the part of judges is objectivity. An independent judiciary does not mean that judges can resolve specific
disputes entirely as they please. There are both implicit and explicit limits on the way judges perform their role. Implicit limits
include accepted legal values and the explicit limits are substantive and procedural rules of law. 128
The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant, roaming
at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to
yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion informed by tradition,
methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinate to the "primordial necessity of order in the social life." 129
Judge Floro does not meet such requirement of objectivity and his competence for judicial tasks leaves much to be desired.
As reported by the Supreme Court Clinic:
Despite his impressive academic background and achievements, he has lapses in judgment and may have problems with
decision-making. His character traits such as suspiciousness and seclusiveness and preoccupation with paranormal and
psychic phenomena though not detrimental to his role as a lawyer, may cloud his judgment, and hamper his primary role as
a judge in dispensing justice. x x x 130
Judge Floro’s belief system, as well as his actuations in the eight months that he served as RTC judge, indubitably shows
his inability to function with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
Verily, Judge Floro holds an exalted position in our system of government. Thus:
Long before a man dons the judicial robes, he has accepted and identified himself with large components of the judge’s role.
Especially if he has aspired to a judge’s status, he is likely to have conducted himself, more or less unconsciously, in the
fashion of one who is said to have "the judicial temperament." He is likely to have displayed the kinds of behavior that the
judge’s role demands. A large proportion of his experiences on the bench develop and reinforce such conformity, moreover.
The ritualistic elements of investiture and of court procedure, the honorific forms of address, and even the imposing
appearance of some court buildings serve to emphasize the demands upon his behavior. Even the most unscrupulous
former ambulance chaser who owes his position to a thoroughly corrupt political organization must conform at least in part to
the behaviors expected of him as a judge.131
The expectations concerning judicial behavior are more than those expected of other public officials. Judges are seen as
guardians of the law and they must thus identify themselves with the law to an even greater degree than legislators or
executives. 132
As it has been said, "[j]udges administer justice judicially, i.e., not according to some abstract ideas of right and justice, but
according to the rules laid down by society in its Code of Laws to which it gives its sanctions. The function of the judge is
primarily adjudication. This is not a mechanical craft but the exercise of a creative art, whether we call it legislative or not,
which requires great ability and objectivity." 133 We, thus, quote Justice Frankfurter, in speaking of the functions of the
Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States:
To practice the requisite detachment and to achieve sufficient objectivity no doubt demands of judges the habit of self-
discipline and self-criticism, incertitude that one’s own views are incontestable and alert tolerance toward views not shared.
But these are precisely the presuppositions of our judicial process. They are precisely the qualities society has a right to
expect from those entrusted with … judicial power.
xxxx
The judicial judgment … must move within the limits of accepted notions of justice and is not to be based upon the
idiosyncrasies of a merely personal judgment. 134
In fine, Judge Floro lacks the judicial temperament and the fundamental requirements of competence and objectivity
expected of all judges. He cannot thus be allowed to continue as judge for to do so might result in a serious challenge to the
existence of a critical and impartial judiciary.
Equitable considerations entitle Judge Floro backwages and other economic benefits for a period of three (3) years.
In retrospect, we are forced to say that Judge Floro should not have joined the judiciary as RTC judge. However, we have
assiduously reviewed the history of this case and we cannot hold anyone legally responsible for such major and unfortunate
faux pas.
Judge Floro did not breach any rule of procedure relative to his application for judgeship. He went through the entire gamut
of tests and interviews and he was nominated by the JBC on the strength of his scholastic achievements. As to having failed
the psychological examinations given by the SC Clinic, it must be pointed out that this was disregarded by the JBC upon
Judge Floro’s submission of psychiatric evaluations conducted by mental health professionals from the private sector and
which were favorable to him. Nowhere is it alleged that Judge Floro acted less than honorably in procuring these
evaluations.
The JBC in 1999 had all the discretion to refer Judge Floro to a private clinic for a second opinion of his mental and
psychological fitness. In performing its functions, the JBC had been guided primarily by the Constitution which prescribes
that members of the Judiciary must be, in addition to other requirements, persons of proven competence, integrity, probity
and independence. 135 It was only on 18 October 2000 when it promulgated JBC-009, the "Rules of the Judicial and Bar
Council," that the JBC put down in writing guidelines or criteria it had previously used in ascertaining "if one seeking such
office meets the minimum constitutional qualifications and possesses qualities of mind and heart expected of the
Judiciary." 136 Rule 6 thereof states:
SECTION 1. Good health. – Good physical health and sound mental/psychological and emotional condition of the applicant
play a critical role in his capacity and capability to perform the delicate task of administering justice. x x x
SEC. 2. Psychological/psychiatric tests. – The applicant shall submit to psychological/psychiatric tests to be conducted by
the Supreme Court Medical Clinic or by a psychologist and/or psychiatrist duly accredited by the Council.
It would seem that as things stood then, the JBC could very well rely on the evaluation of a private psychologist or
psychiatrist not accredited by the JBC. Thus, the JBC cannot be faulted for accepting the psychological evaluations of
mental health professionals not affiliated with the Supreme Court Clinic.
It goes without saying that Judge Floro’s appointment as RTC judge is fait accompli. What awaits us now is the seemingly
overwhelming task of finding the PROPER, JUST AND EQUITABLE solution to Judge Floro’s almost seven years of
suspension in the light of the fact that the penalty imposed herein does not merit a suspension of seven years.
Verily, the Supreme Court is vested with the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts. 137 The Constitution limits this power through the admonition that such rules "shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights." 138
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court outlines the procedure to be followed in administrative cases against judges. Glaringly, Rule
140 does not detail the steps to be taken in cases when the judge is preventively suspended pending investigation. This is
the state of things even after its amendment by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC which took effect on 1 October 2001.
The Supreme Court’s power to suspend a judge, however, is inherent in its power of administrative supervision over all
courts and the personnel thereof. 139 This power -- consistent with the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts -- is hemmed in only by the Constitution which prescribes that an adjective law cannot,
among other things, diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.
The resolution of 20 July 1999 which put Judge Floro under preventive suspension resolved to:
(1) DIRECT Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. to answer the foregoing charges against him within ten (10) days from notice; (2)
REFER this case to Retired Justice Pedro Ramirez, Consultant, Office of the Court Administrator for investigation, report
and recommendation, within sixty (60) days from receipt of the records thereof; (3) SUBJECT Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.
for appropriate psychological or mental examination to be conducted by the proper office of the Supreme Court or any duly
authorized medical and/or mental institution.
Moreover, the Court RESOLVED to place Judge Florentino Floro, effective immediately under PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION
for the duration of the investigation of the administrative charges against him. 140
As can be gleaned from the above-quoted resolution, Judge Floro’s suspension, albeit indefinite, was for the duration of the
investigation of the 13 charges against him which the Court pegged at 60 days from the time of receipt by the investigator of
the records of the case. Rule 140, as amended, now states that "(t)he investigating Justice or Judge shall terminate the
investigation within ninety (90) days from the date of its commencement or within such extension as the Supreme Court may
grant" 141 and, "(w)ithin thirty (30) days from the termination of the investigation, the investigating Justice or Judge shall
submit to the Supreme Court a report containing findings of fact and recommendation." 142
From the foregoing, the rule now is that a Judge can be preventively suspended not only for the entire period of his
investigation which would be 90 days (unless extended by the Supreme Court) but also for the 30 days that it would take the
investigating judge or justice to come up with his report. Moreover, the Court may preventively suspend a judge until such
time that a final decision is reached in the administrative case against him or her. 143This is because –
[U]nlike ordinary civil service officials and employees, judges who are charged with a serious offense warranting preventive
suspension are not automatically reinstated upon expiration of the ninety (90)-day period, as mandated above. The Court
may preventively suspend a judge until a final decision is reached in the administrative case especially where there is a
strong likelihood of his guilt or complicity in the offense charged. Indeed, the measure is intended to shield the public from
any further damage or wrongdoing that may be caused by the continued assumption of office by the erring judge. It is also
intended to protect the courts’ image as temples of justice where litigants are heard, rights and conflicts settled and justice
solemnly dispensed.
This is a necessary consequence that a judge must bear for the privilege of occupying an exalted position. Among civil
servants, a judge is indeed in a class all its own. After all, in the vast government bureaucracy, judges are beacon lights
looked upon as the embodiment of all what is right, just and proper, the ultimate weapons against justice and oppression. 144
In the case of Judge Floro, he is under preventive suspension up to the present because of the serious charge of mental
unfitness aggravated by the fact that the actual investigation into his cases dragged on for a much longer period than 90
days. And the reasons for the delay, for the most part, can be directly ascribed to Judge Floro himself. From the records, it
would seem that not only did Judge Floro move for several re-settings of the hearings of his cases; he likewise dragged his
feet with respect to the order to submit himself to the appropriate psychological/mental examination. Worse, what started out
as single case against him ballooned into 10 cases which were consolidated into one due to common questions of fact and
law. 145 All in all, Judge Floro filed seven cases against those he perceived had connived to remove and/or suspend him from
office, the last of which he filed on 19 May 2003 against Justice Ramirez. 146
Be that as it may, EQUITY demands that we exercise utmost compassion in this case considering that the rules on
preventive suspension of judges, not having been expressly included in the Rules of Court, are amorphous at best. We have
ruled similarly in the case of Judge Philbert Iturralde, thus:
Be that as it may, we cannot in conscience hold that a judge who was placed under preventive suspension pending
investigation is not entitled to the payment of back salaries, allowances and other economic benefits for the entire duration
of the preventive suspension. The inequity of the doctrine as applied to judges is clearly apparent, given the peculiar
circumstance in which a judge finds himself preventively suspended by the Court "until further orders".
In this case, Judge Iturralde was preventively suspended for 13½ months, during which period he was not paid his salaries,
allowances and other benefits. Except for a teaching job that the Court permitted him to undertake pending resolution of the
administrative case, Judge Iturralde had no other source of income. He thus incurred several loans to provide for his family’s
basic needs.
It would thus be unjust to deprive Judge Iturralde of his back salaries, allowances and other economic benefits for the entire
period that he was preventively suspended. As we have said in Gloria v. Court of Appeals, preventive suspension pending
investigation is not a penalty but only a measure intended to enable the disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered
formal investigation. We held that ninety (90) days is ample time to conclude the investigation of an administrative case.
Beyond ninety (90) days, the preventive suspension is no longer justified. Hence, for purposes of determining the extent of
back salaries, allowances and other benefits that a judge may receive during the period of his preventive suspension, we
hold that the ninety-day maximum period set in Gloria v. Court of Appeals, should likewise be applied.
Concededly, there may be instances when an investigation would extend beyond ninety (90) days and such may not be
entirely unjustified. Nevertheless, we believe that in such a situation, it would be unfair to withhold his salaries and other
economic benefits for the entire duration of the preventive suspension, moreso if the delay in the resolution of the case was
not due to his fault. Upon being found innocent of the administrative charge, his preventive suspension exceeding the
ninety-day (90) period actually becomes without basis and would indeed be nothing short of punitive. It must be emphasized
that his subsequent acquittal completely removed the cause for his preventive suspension in the first place. Necessarily,
therefore, we must rectify its effects on just and equitable grounds. 147
Taking off from the case of Judge Iturralde, we hold that Judge Floro is likewise entitled to the payment of back salaries,
allowances and other economic benefits being at the receiving end of a rule peculiar to judges who find themselves
preventively suspended by the Court "until further orders" or, as this case, "for the duration of the investigation." Judge
Iturralde’s suspension of 13 ½ months even pales in comparison to Judge Floro’s suspension of 81 months, more or less.
During this entire excruciating period of waiting, Judge Floro could not practice his profession, thus putting him solely at the
mercy of his brother’s largesse. And, though he was given donations by those who came to him for healing, obviously, these
could not compensate for his loss of income as Judge.
Unlike the case of Judge Iturralde, however, wherein we held that the period of suspension exceeding 90 days should be the
basis for the payment of back salaries, we hold that, as a matter of equity, Judge Floro is entitled to back salaries,
allowances and other economic benefits for a period corresponding to three of his almost seven years suspension. We
cannot apply the ruling in Gloria that any suspension served beyond 90 days must be compensated as we would be, in
effect, rewarding Judge Floro’s propensity to delay the resolution of his case through the indiscriminate filing of
administrative cases against those he perceived connived to oust him out of office. In Judge Iturralde’s case, the
investigation was not delayed through any fault of his. More importantly, Judge Iturralde was ultimately held innocent, thus,
using by analogy Gloria v. Court of Appeals, his suspension in excess of 90 days was already in the nature of a penalty
which cannot be countenanced precisely because, being innocent, he cannot be penalized. Judge Floro, on the other hand,
and as already discussed, contributed to the delay in the investigation of his cases. Moreover, unlike Judge Iturralde, Judge
Floro has not been adjudged innocent of all the 13 charges against him.
These facts, however, as we have already discussed, do not put Judge Floro beyond the reach of equity. To paraphrase
Justice Brandeis, equity does not demand that its suitors are free of blame. As we are wont to say:
Equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and do complete justice where courts of law, through the
inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are incompetent
so to do. Equity regards the spirit of and not the letter, the intent and not the form, the substance rather than the
circumstance, as it is variously expressed by different courts. 148
In fine, notwithstanding the fact that Judge Floro is much to blame for the delay in the resolution of his case, equitable
considerations constrain us to award him back salaries, allowances and other economic benefits for a period corresponding
to three years. This is because Judge Floro’s separation from the service is not a penalty as we ordinarily understand the
word to mean. It is imposed instead upon Judge Floro out of necessity due to a medically disabling condition of the mind
which renders him unfit, at least at present, to continue discharging the functions of his office.
The period of three years seems to us the most equitable under the circumstances. As discussed, if we were to give him
more than three years of back salaries, etc., then it would seem that we are rewarding him for his role in delaying the
resolution of these cases (as well as the seven cases he filed which were only dismissed on 14 February 2006 at his own
bidding). On the other hand, if we were to peg the period at less than three years then the same would only be a pittance
compared to the seven years suspension he had to live through with Damocles’ sword hanging over his head and with his
hands bound as he could not practice his profession.
Judge Floro’s separation from the service moots the case against him docketed as A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re: Resolution
Dated 11 May 1999 Of Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 (Luz Arriego v. Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.),
on the other hand, is dismissed for lack of merit.
A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC
It cannot be gainsaid that Judge Floro’s separation from the service renders moot the complaint in A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC.
As it is, even the most favorable of resolutions in this case will not cause a ripple on the Court’s decision to separate Judge
Floro from the service. Thus, this charge is dismissed for being moot and academic.
A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988
Considering that this case is a replica of charge "h" in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 and considering that charge "h" is without
basis, this particular complaint filed by Luz Arriego must necessarily be dismissed for lack of merit.
Judge Floro’s separation from the service does not carry with it forfeiture of all or part of his accrued benefits nor
disqualification from appointment to any other public office including government-owned or controlled corporations.
As Judge Floro’s separation from the service cannot be considered a penalty, such separation does not carry with it the
forfeiture of all or part of his accrued benefits nor disqualification from appointment to any other public office including
government-owned or controlled corporations.
In fact, the psychological and psychiatric reports, considered as the bedrock of the finding of mental impairment against
Judge Floro, cannot be used to disqualify him from re-entering government service for positions that do not require him to
dispense justice. The reports contain statements/findings in Judge Floro’s favor that the Court cannot overlook in all fairness
as they deserve equal consideration. They mention Judge Floro’s assets and strengths and capacity for functionality, with
minor modification of work environment. Thus:
a. High intellectual assets as a result of "self-discipline and self- organization." 149
b. "(I)mpressive academic achievements" with "no drastic change in his personality and level of functioning as a
lawyer in private practice." 150
c. "(C)haracter traits of suspiciousness, seclusiveness, pre-occupation with paranormal and psychic phenomena …
not detrimental to his role as a lawyer." 151
d. "Everyday situations can be comprehended and dealt with in moderate proficiency …. His concern for the details
that make up a total field represents his attempts at being systematic and cautious." 152
e. "(E)quipped with analytical power." 153
Consequently, while Judge Floro may be dysfunctional as a judge because of the sensitive nature of said position, he may
still be successful in other areas of endeavor.
Putting all of the above in perspective, it could very well be that Judge Floro’s current administrative and medical problems
are not totally of his making. He was duly appointed to judgeship and his mental problems, for now, appear to render him
unfit with the delicate task of dispensing justice not because of any acts of corruption and debasement on his part but clearly
due to a medically disabling condition.
Finally, if Judge Floro’s mental impairment is secondary to genetics 154 and/or adverse environmental factors (and,
unfortunately, such essential information is not available), we cannot condemn people for their faulty genes and/or adverse
environment – factors they have no control over.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:
1) FINE Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. in the total amount of FORTY THOUSAND (P40,000.00) PESOS for seven of
the 13 charges against him in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460;
2) RELIEVE Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. of his functions as Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Malabon
City and consider him SEPARATED from the service due to a medically disabling condition of the mind that renders
him unfit to discharge the functions of his office, effective immediately;
3) As a matter of equity, AWARD Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. back salaries, allowances and other economic
benefits corresponding to three (3) years;
4) DISMISS the charge in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 (Luz Arriego v. Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) for LACK OF
MERIT; and
5) DISMISS the charge in A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re: Resolution Dated 11 May 1999 Of Judge Florentino V.
Floro, Jr.) for MOOTNESS.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
CANON 3
A.M. No. MTJ-88-184 October 13, 1989
CALI A. IMPAO, DANIEL M. ESPERAT and NENA E. HERRERA, petitioners,

vs.
JUDGE JACOSALEM D. MAKILALA, respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-88-217 October 13, 1989
ROSAMAR V. MAREGMEN, ELLEN G. VILIARUEL and GINA D. NATIVIDAD, petitioners,

vs.
A.M. No. MTJ-88-221 October 13, 1989
EMPLOYEES OF THE MTC, MAGANOY AND MCTC OF AMPATUAN-SULTAN SA BARONGIS, PROVINCE OF MAGUINDANAO petitioners,
vs.
Rosamar V. Maregmen for petitioners in AM-MTJ-88-217.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:p
Judge Jacosalem D. Makilala, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Maganoy, Maguindanao and
Designated Acting Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Ampatuan-Sultan Sa Barongis, Maguindanao was
charged in three separate complaints by the employees of the above mentioned courts with gross misconduct, falsification,
abuse of authority and neglect and irregularity in the performance of duties. The three letter-complaints were designated as
Administrative Matter Nos. MTJ-88- 184, MTJ-88-217 and MTJ-88-221.
Complainants alleged that from September 1985 up to the last week of April 1988, Judge Makilala held office every Monday
at his residence in Maganoy and the rest of the week stayed at his residence in Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat. Respondent
judge allegedly refused to hold office at the newly constructed municipal building where a suitable space for a court was
furnished by the municipal government of Maganoy. It is alleged that whenever hearings are held in his residence,
respondent judge would always appear in sleeveless shirt and slippers while the party-litigants and their counsels were in
business attire.
While respondent judge required his staff to strictly observe the Civil Service Rules on office attendance, he allegedly had no
qualms in filling up his daily time record as if he rendered full service when in fact he was always absent because of his
illness and when he was not absent, he only stayed in court for a short period [Affidavit of Ellen Villaruel and Gina Natividad,
Annex "D", Adm. Matter No. MTJ-88-217].
The complainants also charged respondent judge with unduly favoring two court personnel-Josue Calzado, Process Server
of Maganoy Municipal Court, and Jose Subaldo, Process Server of Ampatuan Sultan Sa Barongis Municipal Circuit Court —
because they were allegedly used by respondent judge in his house as driver-mechanic, house guard or errand-boy.
Calzado and Subaldo were given high performance ratings by respondent while all the other employees were given failing
marks.
Complainants averred that Judge Makilala found pleasure in scolding them in front of other people, uttering insulting words
like "mga baboy kayong mga Kristiyano," [Affidavit of Rosamar Maregmen, Annex "C-3", Adm. Matter No. MTJ-88-184.] On
one occasion, Judge Makilala allegedly told visiting soldiers to choose from among his female staff members whom they
wanted to rape. He also told the male court employees not to waste their time and to start having sexual intercourse with the
female employees from Ampatuan [Joint Affidavit of Daniel Esperat and Cali Impao Annex "G", Adm. Matter No. MTJ-88-
217]. At one time respondent judge threatened his female staff members that if he could not dismiss them, he will have them
ambushed on their way home to Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat. The employees were so alarmed by this threat that they
reported the matter to the Office of the Provincial Commander of Maganoy.
Complainants also alleged that Judge Makilala punched Daniel Esperat, Court Aide of the MTC of Maganoy, because the
latter failed to deliver the entire volume of nipa ordered by respondent for the roof of his house. After punching Esperat,
respondent judge allegedly went inside his house to get his gun and threatened to kill Esperat. Esperat then ran away and
later went to the provincial hospital for treatment. A medical certificate issued by Dr. Teogenes F. Baluma, which was
attached to the letter-complaint of Esperat, shows that he suffered a "swelling contusion" on the right side of the abdomen.
Respondent judge is also charged with having accepted a bribe from an accused in a criminal case. Datu Cali Impao, Court
Interpreter of the MTC of Maganoy, narrated that during the hearing of the case entitled People v. Mario
Labrador, respondent Judge Makilala gave a sign to the accused to follow him (respondent) inside his chambers. When they
emerged from the chambers, Judge Makilala immediately ordered the dismissal of the case. Later, respondent proudly
announced to his staff that he got four hundred pesos (P400.00) from Labrador which will be used in purchasing the office
supplies needed by the court [Affidavit of Datu Cali Impao, Annex "C", Adm. Matter No. MTJ-88-184].
To support the foregoing allegations, complainants submitted affidavits from the employees concerned. They also submitted
the affidavits of Datu Gambay A. Upam, a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Maganoy, and Olandigan A. Sulaik, the
Municipal Secretary of Maganoy, who both corroborated the claim of the complainants that Judge Makilala seldom reported
in the municipal court in Maganoy [Annexes "D" and "D-1", Adm. Matter No. MTJ- 88-184]. Also attached to the complaints
as annexes were copies of a "diary" kept by Nena Herrera, Stenographic Reporter of the MTC of Maganoy, containing a
record of the behavior of respondent judge from April 1988 up to the time he was suspended, including the insulting
utterances he made and the time of his arrival in and departure from the municipal court. The diary was signed not only by
Nena Herrera but also by the other court employees.
On August 22, 1988, the court employees under respondent Judge Makilala went on mass leave to show their protest
against respondent judge's behavior towards them.
On September 13, 1988 the Court issued a resolution referring Adm. Matter No. MTJ-88-221 to Judge Ismael C. Bagundang
of the Regional Trial Court of Maganoy, Maguindanao for investigation, report and recommendation, and ordering the
suspension of respondent judge pending the investigation of the charges against him. Subsequently, the Court issued a
resolution dated September 22, 1988 ordering the consolidation of Adm. Matter No. MTJ-88-184 and Adm. Matter No. MTJ-
88-217 with Adm. Matter No. MTJ-88-221 earlier referred by the Court to Judge Bagundang in the September 13, 1988
resolution. The Court reiterated the order of suspension of Judge Makilala and required respondent judge to file a
consolidated comment within ten (10) days from notice.
In his consolidated comment, respondent judge denied the charges against him and claimed that the allegations were
fabricated by the complainants to get back at him for his strict enforcement of the Civil Service Law.
On the use of his residence as the MTC of Maganoy from 1974- 1984, respondent explained that it was with the approval of
the municipal government because at that time there was no municipal building and the municipal government had to rent
private buildings and houses for its use as its offices. He claimed that in 1984 he refused to transfer to the new municipal
building because the municipal government had not fixed the space allotted for the municipal court. However, from 1985 up
to the present, the municipal court and office have always been in its permanent space in the Maganoy Municipal Building.
As to his alleged absences and short stay in court, respondent insisted that this was due to the lightness of his caseload,
and that the records will show that he has no pending or unfinished work [Ibid., p. 4].
Lastly, respondent asked the Court to reconsider his suspension pending the investigation of the charges against him
considering his old age and his long service without any previous record of serious official misconduct [Ibid., p. 5]. A counter-
complaint against the court personnel was also filed by respondent judge for alleged violation of Civil Service Rules and
Regulations, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and dishonesty and immorality.
The initial investigation of the case was conducted on October 17, 1988, during which respondent judge manifested that he
will file a motion to inhibit the investigating judge due to partiality. On November 17,1988 respondent filed his motion to
inhibit Judge Bagundang but the latter denied the same. Respondent then filed the motion with this Court but it was likewise
denied by this Court in a resolution dated December 12,1988.
Meanwhile, on the scheduled hearing on December 5, 1988, respondent's motion for postponement on the ground of Judge
Makilala's illness was granted by the investigating judge but with a warning that henceforth the hearings will continue even
without the presence of the respondent. The hearing was resumed on January 16,1989, but neither the respondent nor his
counsel were present. No explanation was given for the absence of respondent and his counsel, hence the hearing
proceeded as scheduled and was terminated on January 19,1989.
On January 30,1989 Investigating Judge Ismael C. Bagundang submitted to this Court a report, with the following findings:
. . . there is reasonable ground to believe that Judge Makilala really abused his authority against his staff,
the utterances made by him that he will have his staff be raped (sic), calling the staff "mga baboy kayong
mga kristiyano" which utterances have been duly blottered in the Office of the Provincial Commander of
Maganoy, the seeming biased attitude of Judge Makilala by giving failure rating for the majority of the staff
while giving high performance rating to Jose Calzado and Jose Subaldo, is clear indication that he really
harrassed (sic) his staff. The boxing of Daniel Esperat because [he] failed to deliver on that particular day
the nipa intended for the roofing of his private house, is an act unbecoming for (sic) him as a Judge. The
threatening remarks that he have (sic) uttered on several occasions against the staff of Maganoy and
Ampatuan-Sultan sa Barongis, uttered almost daily is a clear sign that he really harrassed (sic) the
employees. The entry that he made in his daily time record from 1987 to 1988, that he reports to the office
Monday thru Friday when in truth and in fact he only goes to Maganoy every Monday and stays most of his
time in Tacurong residence and when cases were filed, the cases has (sic) to be brought to his residence at
Tacurong for his signature, is a clear indication that he has falsified his daily time record and is a violation
not only of the Civil Service Law but also with (sic) the Revised Penal Code. The taking of money from Mr.
Labrador for the sum of P400.00 under the guise of donation for the purchase of supplies for the use of the
court, is a clear violation of the provision of the law regarding bribery [Report of the Investigating Judge, p.
5].
Judge Bagundang recommended that respondent judge be separated from the service and that all his retirement benefits be
forfeited in favor of the government [Report of the Investigating Judge, p. 6].
After a careful review of the records of the case, the Court finds that the findings and conclusions contained in the report of
Investigating Judge Bagundang are supported by the evidence on record. The Court agrees with the investigating judge that
the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the complainants convincingly established the charges against the
respondent. The Court finds nothing in the records which would warrant the reversal of the investigating judge's findings and
conclusion.
In his Comment on the Resolution of the Hearing Officer filed with this Court on May 12,1989, respondent judge assailed the
findings of Judge Bagundang on the ground of "gross denial of due process" because his counsel was not given the
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses who testified against him [Comment on the Resolution of the Hearing Officer, p.
4].
It is readily apparent from the records of the case that the above contention is manifestly devoid of merit. Respondent and
his counsel were present during the hearings on November 17 and 18,1988 [TSN, November 17, 1988, pp. 2-3; TSN,
November 18, 1988, pp. 2-3]. Respondent's counsel cross-examined witnesses Nena Herrera and Daniel Esperat during the
November 18, 1988 hearing [TSN, November 18, 1988, pp. 3-37]. As to the other five witnesses, namely,Cali Impao, Noemi
Socias, Belen Pasaforte, Ellen Villaruel and Rosamar Maregmen, the failure of respondent's counsel to cross-examine them
was entirely the fault of respondent and his counsel. They failed to heed the warning of the investigating judge that the
hearings on January 16 to 20 would continue even without the presence of respondent. Despite due notice both respondent
and his counsel did not appear in the scheduled hearings nor did they explain the reason therefore. By their unexplained
absence, respondent and his counsel effectively waived respondent's right to cross-examine the other witnesses.
Judge Makilala contends that "when the sickly, old respondent failed to appear in the investigation, proof must be shown [by
the investigating judge] ... of such efforts of giving [respondent the] opportunity to be present." It is further contended by
respondent that since his two counsel "are both residents of Cotabato City with telephone connection in their respective
homes," the investigating judge could have "easily contacted [them] to find out why they failed to be present on the
scheduled investigation." [Ibid., p. 4.]
The above contentions sadly reflect ignorance of the requirements of due process. As a lawyer and a municipal judge for a
number of years, respondent should know that it is not incumbent upon the investigating judge to call up respondent's
counsel to inquire into the reason for their non-appearance in the scheduled hearings. Nor is it for the investigating judge to
prove that he gave respondent "an opportunity to be present." It is the duty of the respondent's counsel to be present during
the hearings and to inform the court of the reason for their absence.
Disagreeing with the investigating judge's recommendation, Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo Suarez recommended
that Judge Makilala be instead considered resigned from the service as of the time he was suspended with full payment of
retirement benefits. The Deputy Court Administrator is of the opinion that the penalty of dismissal with forfeiture of retirement
benefits is too harsh considering that Judge Makilala is "already in the twilight years of his career as a judge" and is now
"sickly and in need of medical check-ups and constant medication" [Memorandum of Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo
L. Suarez, p. 10].
The Court is not unmindful of the fact that respondent Judge Makilala is suffering from a lingering illness. Respondent
himself alleges in his Comment on the Resolution of the Hearing Officer that he cannot travel long distances nor do any job
requiring physical exertion because the nature of his illness, known as polycythemia vera,requires that his blood be drained
periodically. However, the seriousness of respondent's illness cannot justify his failure to perform his duties nor does it
excuse him from the consequences of his misconduct and abuse of authority. If indeed respondent found it difficult to
discharge the functions of a municipal judge, then he should have retired voluntarily instead of clinging to his office at the
expense of the litigants, his staff and the general public. Considering the number and the serious nature of offenses
committed by respondent judge, the Court believes that the penalty of dismissal with forfeiture of retirement benefits should
be imposed upon him.
It is an important judicial norm that a judge's private as well as official conduct must at all times be free from the appearance
of impropriety [Luque v. Kayanan, G.R. No. L-26826, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 165; See Section 3, Canons of Judicial
Ethics]. As held by this Court in the case of De la Paz v. Inutan, Adm. Matter No. 201 MJ, June 30,1975, 64 SCRA 540:
. . .The judge is the visible representation of the law and, more importantly, of justice. From him, the people
draw their will and awareness to obey the law. They see in him an intermediary of justice between two
conflicting interests, specially in the station of municipal judges, like respondent Judge, who have that close
and direct contact with the people before anybody else in the judiciary. Thus, for the judge to return that
regard, he must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for the others to follow ...
The behavior of respondent judge complained of and proven in this case, i.e., his acceptance of a bribe, his holding office
and conducting hearings at his residence, his falsification of his daily time record, his failure to observe proper decorum in
conducting court proceedings, his intemperate language and threats against the personnel of his courts, and his use of
physical violence against Daniel Esperat, among others, shows beyond doubt his unfitness to occupy the position of a
municipal judge. Respondent judge violated the established norms for judicial behavior, and the best interest of the judiciary
demands that respondent be dismissed from the service.
WHERERORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Jacosalem D. Makilala guilty of serious misconduct and abuse of authority
and is hereby DISMISSED from the service. Any retirement benefits due him are hereby ordered FORFEITED to the
government.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera,Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento,Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.
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A.M. No. RTJ-07-2045 January 19, 2010
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE HARUN B. ISMAEL, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
On April 25 to May 14, 2005, a judicial audit was conducted in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pagadian, Zamboanga del
Sur, Branch 22, presided over by respondent Judge Harun B. Ismael.
The judicial audit resulted in the issuance of a memorandum dated June 9, 2005 by the Office of Court Administrator
(OCA)1 directing respondent to explain his failure to decide and act on current and inherited cases, as well as to resolve
incidents in various cases pending before him, within the reglementary period provided by law.2 Respondent was likewise
directed to inform the OCA if cases already submitted for decision or resolution had in fact been decided or resolved within
the reglementary period.3
Consequently, respondent was ordered to immediately cease hearing cases in his sala and confine himself to deciding or
resolving cases submitted for decision or resolution. In respondent’s stead, Judge Edilberto G. Absin was directed to handle
active cases, other than cases submitted for decision, until respondent could comply with the directives or until he retired.
The OCA likewise directed Atty. Insor A. Pantaran to explain the results of the audit, as was required of respondent. Atty.
Pantaran was the clerk of court of the RTC of Pagadian, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 22 during respondent’s tenure. Atty.
Pantaran complied with the June 9, 2005 memorandum in a letter dated May 19, 2006.4
In its memorandum dated February 26, 2007,5 the OCA noted that respondent failed to fully comply with its directives in the
June 9, 2005 memorandum. Neither did he ask for extensions of time within which to comply with the subject directives.
On examination of Atty. Pantaran’s May 19, 2006 letter/compliance, the OCA found that respondent had partially complied
with the directives of the June 9, 2005 memorandum, having already decided or resolved some of the cases he was directed
to act on. Nonetheless, the OCA established that respondent committed gross inefficiency when he unduly delayed actions
in a huge number of cases. The OCA recommended that respondent be finedP20,000. Furthermore, the OCA recommended
that Judge Absin be directed to decide and resolve the cases pending in respondent’s sala. The OCA likewise directed the
designation of Judge Loreto C. Quinto6 as assisting judge.
The factual findings of the OCA are well-taken. However, we vary the penalty imposed in the light of the circumstances of
the case.
It is settled that failure to decide or resolve cases within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency 7and is not
excusable. It is a less serious charge8 and is punishable by either suspension from office without salaries and benefits for not
less than one month but not more than three months, or a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000.9 1avv phi1
The New Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a judge shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved
decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness. 10 Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code11admonishes all judges to
dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases12 within the period specified in Section 15 (1) and (2), Article VIII
of the Constitution.13
We emphasize that the administration of justice is a joint responsibility of the judge and the lawyer. 14 As aptly held
in Salvador v. Judge Limsiaco:15
A judge’s foremost consideration is the administration of justice. Thus, he should follow the time limit set for deciding cases.
xxx Failure to comply within the mandated period constitutes a serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties to a
speedy disposition of their cases. It also undermines the people’s faith and confidence in the judiciary, lowers its standards
and brings it to disrepute. Decision making, among other duties, is the most important duty of a member of the bench.
(citations omitted)
Pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC,16 this administrative case against respondent shall also be considered as a disciplinary
proceeding against him as a member of the bar.17 Violation of the basic tenets of judicial conduct embodied in the New Code
of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and the Code of Judicial Conduct constitutes a breach of Canons 118 and
1219 as well as Rules 1.0320 and 12.0421 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Harun B. Ismael is hereby found GUILTY of gross inefficiency and violation of Section 5,
Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary for which he is FINED in the amount of P20,000.
Respondent is likewise found GUILTY of violation of Canons 1 and 12 as well as Rules 1.03, 10.03 and 12.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for which he is FINED in the amount of P10,000.
Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal records of respondent in the Office of Administrative Services, the
Office of the Court Administrator and the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2127 September 25, 2008

(Formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 07-2697-RTJ)
CITA BORROMEO-GARCIA, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE ERNESTO P. PAGAYATAN, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, San Jose Occidental Mindoro, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Cita Borromeo-Garcia (complainant) filed a Complaint before the Court dated June 14, 2007 charging Judge Ernesto P.
Pagayatan (respondent), Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro with
falsification, partiality, dishonesty, gross incompetence, evident bad faith, immorality and grave misconduct.
Complainant avers: Respondent committed falsification when, serving as Register of Deeds (RD) of San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro, he cooperated with Soledad Ulayao (Ulayao) and Soledad Ortega Olano (Olano) in transferring 165 titles from the
name of her father's mistress Blandina Garcia (Blandina) to her father Salvador S. Borromeo, Sr. (Borromeo, Sr.), even
though respondent was fully aware that the signature appearing thereon was falsified. As payment for their services,
Borromeo, Sr. gave Ulayao, Olano and respondent, 20 of the 165 titles which Ulayao kept until a judge from another branch,
pursuant to another case, ordered to have said titles kept in custodia legis.1
Complainant further claims that: respondent was guilty of falsification and perjury when he granted the petition of her half-
brother, Salvador G. Borromeo, Jr. (Borromeo, Jr.) for the issuance of owner's duplicate copies of 62 Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCTs) knowing that Borromeo, Jr., illegitimate son of Borromeo, Sr. with Blandina, was not the owner of the same;
respondent hastily ruled for a commissioner's hearing, decided for the issuance of new owner's certificates of titles, without
requiring the production of certified true copies of all the titles being petitioned or requiring the Officer in Charge (OIC)
Registrar to produce the book of titles; respondent also keeps a mistress, Elsa Aguirre (Elsa), Borromeo, Jr.'s former wife,
which could explain the swift decision in favor of Borromeo, Jr.; Elsa wielded power in the RTC, as acting clerk of court and
sheriff, even though she is not a lawyer; Elsa together with Asst. Prosecutor Luduvico Salcedo, also acted as respondent's
bagman.2
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) referred the Complaint to respondent for his Comment in a 1st Indorsement
dated June 29, 2007.3
In his Comment4 dated July 30, 2007, respondent denied the charges against him, claiming the same to be unfounded,
hearsay and malicious. He avers that: he does not know complainant and that the latter is not a resident of San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro; at the time the first falsification allegedly took place, respondent was an Asst. Provincial Prosecutor who
acted as an Ex-Officio Registrar of Deeds, putting in extra hours to perform his added assignment; the documents allegedly
falsified were "sales" leading to the registration and transfer of TCTs from Blandina to Borromeo, Sr.; he affixed his
signatures to the TCTs after all pertinent documents were evaluated by Land Examiner Ulayao and were found to be
complete and in order; if indeed signatures were falsified, respondent had nothing to do with the falsification or had any
knowledge of the same; respondent never conspired with Olano and Ulayao and there was no agreement for them to split
the 20 titles among themselves; as to the second charge of falsification, he rendered the decision on the petition of
Borromeo, Jr. after due notice and hearing and all jurisdictional requirements were complied with; contrary to complainant's
assertion, certified true copies of the 62 TCTs to be reconstituted were attached to the petition; Borromeo, Jr. also submitted
a certification from the RD stating that the original copies of the TCTs were intact in said office; there was also no opposition
during the hearing, hence, it was subject to an ex-parte hearing before the Clerk of Court as commissioner; he did not
declare Borromeo, Jr. to be the owner of the properties but merely quoted Borromeo, Jr.'s testimony; moreover, the
reconstituted titles are still in the name of Borromeo, Sr.; the allegation that Elsa is his mistress is false; whatever dealings
he has with Elsa, who is the Acting Clerk of Court of the RTC, is strictly related to their respective official duties; it is also not
true that Elsa and Prosecutor Salcedo are respondent's bagmen; in all his years as prosecutor and later as judge,
respondent never asked anyone to be his bagman and neither has he resolved or decided any case for any consideration;
he has no unexplained or hidden wealth and is living a simple and modest life.5
Upon recommendation of the OCA, the Court in the Resolution dated January 23, 2008 referred the instant case to
Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr. of the Court of Appeals (CA), Manila, for investigation, report and recommendation.6
Hearings were conducted and in his Report dated July 31, 2008, Investigating Justice Reyes found that complainant failed to
substantiate her allegations. As stated in his Report:
x x x [T]he investigating justice finds that aside from bare assertion complainant failed to present any evidence to
substantiate her charges. She even admitted during her testimony that she had no direct knowledge of the facts constituting
her allegations but that she derived her knowledge from other persons, that is, she had no direct knowledge of the facts
constituting the alleged irregularities.
xxxx
As to the charges of immorality and grave misconduct which stemmed from the alleged illicit affair of respondent judge with
Ms. Aguirre, the undersigned finds that complainant's own testimony showed that she based her allegation on what
someone else had told her.
xxxx
The charges of partiality, dishonesty, and gross incompetence are all tied up to the petition for re-issuance of owner's
duplicate certificate of titles filed by Salvador, Jr. From the same petition arose the allegation of falsification. Complainant
claimed that respondent judge was partial, dishonest and had acted in bad faith because he granted Salvador, Jr.'s petition
knowing that he was not the registered owner. She also claimed that this decision showed that respondent judge was
grossly incompetent because the decision was not supported by facts and the law. By the same token she claimed that
respondent judge was guilty of falsification.
xxxx
[Based on Sec. 109 of Pres. Dec. No. 1529] it is clear that not only the registered owner but any person in interest may file a
petition for re-issuance of the owner's duplicate title. In the present case, petitioner Salvador, Jr. is admittedly the illegitimate
son of the deceased Salvador, Sr. and as such is an heir. As explained by respondent judge he believed that an heir has the
right to file the petition. Other than the fact that the case was granted, complainant failed to adduce any concrete evidence of
partiality, dishonesty or bad faith on the part of the respondent judge. It should be remembered that good faith is always
presumed and complainant's bare testimony failed to rebut this presumption.
As to the charge of falsification, complainant herself admitted that the misrepresentation was done by Salvador, Jr. and not
by the respondent judge. He cannot, therefore, by any stretch of imagination be held responsible for such falsification.
The only remaining charge against respondent judge is the falsification regarding the twenty (20) TCTs held by Ms. Ulayao
and now in custodia legis in Branch 45 of the RTC of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Again, the undersigned finds that aside
from complainant's bare testimony that she was informed by Ms. Ulayao of the falsification she utterly failed to present any
evidence to buttress her assertion. She does not even have a copy of the alleged forged deed of sale allegedly used to
transfer said titles in the name of Salvador, Sr.7
While Justice Reyes found the complaint to be without merit, he still found respondent liable however for failing to prevent
any appearance of impartiality on his part. Justice Reyes held in his report:
x x x the investigating justice finds it necessary to deal on another matter which the respondent judge himself testified on.
The reception of evidence for Spec. Proc. No. R-936 was performed by Ms. Aguirre. Although the fact that Ms. Aguirre was
the former wife of the petitioner, this fact alone should be considered unprocedural. However, what the investigating justice
finds disturbing is that Ms. Aguirre was not the OIC Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 46 but rather she was the OIC Clerk of
Court. Respondent judge explained that his OIC Branch Clerk of Court Asuncion Pabellano was busy, hence, unable to
conduct the ex-parte reception of evidence. Under the circumstances what respondent judge should have done was to
dispense with the ex-parte reception of evidence and to conduct the hearing himself instead of appointing the OIC Clerk of
Court. This would have avoided any appearance of partiality. However, the undersigned does not find this infraction grave
enough to warrant a severe penalty. Considering that respondent had already filed his application for optional retirement and
only to stress that all judges should at all times be circumspect especially in their official functions, the investigating justice
deems it appropriate to recommend the imposition of a fine of P5,000.00 on respondent judge.8
Justice Reyes then recommended that:
x x x the complaint against respondent Judge Ernesto P. Pagayatan be DISMISSED. However, in view of the finding that
Judge Pagayatan failed to prevent any appearance of impartiality on his part, it is recommended that he be FINED in the
amount of P5,000.00.9
The Court agrees with the report of the Investigating Justice but finds that the recommended fine should be modified.
Administrative complaints leveled against judges must always be examined with a discriminating eye for its consequential
effects are, by their nature, highly penal, such that respondents stand to face the sanction of dismissal and/or
disbarment.10 While the Court will not shirk from its responsibility of imposing discipline upon its magistrates, neither will it
hesitate to shield them from unfounded suits that disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice.11 When
the complainant relies on mere conjectures and suppositions and fails to substantiate her claim, such as in the case at bar,
the administrative complaint against the judge must be dismissed for lack of merit.12
In this case, complainant charged respondent with two acts of falsification. First, for allegedly authorizing the transfer of titles
from the name of Blandina to that of Borromeo, Sr. based on forged signatures, when respondent was still Register of Deeds
of Occidental Mindoro; and second, for granting Borromeo, Jr.'s petition for issuance of owner's duplicate copy of 62 TCTs,
knowing that Borromeo, Jr. was not the owner thereof. She also charged respondent with having an illicit relationship with
Elsa, Acting Clerk of Court and ex-wife of Borromeo, Jr., allowing her to exert influence over the decisions of the court, and
for keeping Elsa and Prosecutor Salcedo as respondent's 'bagmen.'
Complainant however was not able present proof of her allegations. As to the first charge of falsification, she claims that it
was Ulayao, former OIC Registrar of Deeds of Occidental Mindoro, who told her about the circumstances surrounding the
transfer of titles from the name of Blandina to that of Borromeo, Sr. and the supposed agreement among Borromeo, Sr.,
Ulayao, Olano and respondent regarding the said transfer.13 Ulayao however died on July 31, 200714 and could neither
refute nor corroborate complainant's story. When asked by the Investigating Justice, complainant also could not present
copies of the alleged falsified deeds of sale which, according to her, were the basis for the issuance of the titles in favor of
Borromeo, Sr.15
Anent the second charge of falsification, complainant claims that respondent granted Borromeo, Jr.'s petition even though
he knew that Borromeo, Jr. was not the owner of the subject properties. She agreed however, before the Investigating
Justice, that respondent's decision in S.P. No. R-936 did not order that new owner's copies of the 62 titles be registered in
the name of Borromeo, Jr., and that the same were in fact still in the name of Borromeo, Sr.16
As to the charge that respondent was having an immoral relationship with Elsa, complainant admits that she has no
personal knowledge about the same, and that her basis for alleging such offense is the "fact" that it is known to everyone in
San Jose, Occidental Mindoro.17 Complainant failed to present any witness, however, to support her charge of
immorality.18 She also failed to present any evidence to substantiate her charge that Prosecutor Salcedo and Elsa were
receiving money as "bagmen" of respondent.
The Court cannot give credence to charges based on mere suspicion and speculation. 19 It is settled that in administrative
proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations in her complaint with substantial evidence, and in
the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption is that respondent has regularly performed his duties.20 Indeed, in
the absence of cogent proof, bare allegations of misconduct cannot prevail over the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions.21As the charges herein being hurled by complainant against respondent are grave in
nature, in order for him to be disciplined therefor, the evidence against him should be competent and derived from direct
knowledge.22 With the failure of complainant to substantiate her claims, the complaint against respondent should be
dismissed for lack of merit.
The dismissal of the charges of complainant against respondent, notwithstanding, respondent should still be disciplined for
failure to avoid the appearance of partiality, which offense the Investigating Justice correctly appreciated.
When asked during the investigation why Elsa, who is the ex-wife of the petitioner therein, Borromeo, Jr., was designated to
receive evidence ex-parte in SP No. R-936, when she was not the acting Branch Clerk of Court, but the acting Clerk of Court
of the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC), respondent only answered that it had been their practice to refer ex-
parte proceedings to the acting clerk of court of the OCC and not to the acting branch clerk of court, because such
proceedings were simple; and the branch clerk of court had too much work, while those in the OCC had lesser
load.23 Respondent also said that he didn't see any conflict with the fact that Elsa was the ex-wife of petitioner in S.P. No. R-
936, Borromeo, Jr.24
The Court has held that a judge must at all times not only be impartial, but maintain the appearance of impartiality. Thus, it is
provided in Canons 3 and 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Judiciary, which took effect on June 1, 2004, that:
CANON 3
IMPARTIALITY
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the decision itself but also to the
process by which the decision is made.
xxxx
Sec. 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the
public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge.
Section 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
For indeed, the appearance of bias or prejudice can be as damaging to public confidence and the administration of justice as
actual bias or prejudice.25
Lower court judges, such as respondent, play a pivotal role in the promotion of the people's faith in the judiciary. They are
front-liners who give human face to the judicial branch at the grassroots level in their interaction with litigants and those who
do business with the courts. Thus, the admonition that judges must avoid not only impropriety but also the appearance of
impropriety is more sternly applied to them.26
Respondent was previously imposed a fine of P5,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law in Domingo v. Pagayatan.27 In the
present case, the Court finds that for his failure to avoid the appearance of impropriety, a penalty of P10,000.00 is
proper.28 Such fine is to be deducted from his retirement benefits which have been withheld pursuant to the Court's
Resolution in A.M. No. 12967-Ret. entitled Re: Application for Optional Retirement under R.A. 910, as amended by R.A.
5095 and P.D. 1438, of Hon. Ernesto P. Pagayatan, RTC, Br. 46, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, dated July 7, 2008 which
approved respondent's application for optional retirement under Republic Act No. 910, as amended by Republic Act No.
5095 and Presidential Decree No. 1438 effective at the close of office hours of December 31, 2007 with the proviso that the
payment of his retirement benefits shall be held in abeyance pending final resolution of the administrative complaint in AM
No. RTJ-07-2089, AM No. RTJ-07-2058, OCA IPI No. 07-2697-RTJ, 07-2698-RTJ and 08-2482-RTJ. The Court, in the same
resolution, also granted Judge Pagayatan's request for payment of his terminal leave pay subject to the availability of funds
and the usual clearance requirements.
WHEREFORE, the charges filed by Cita Borromeo-Garcia are hereby DISMISSED for lack of competent evidence.
However, the Court finds Judge Ernesto P. Pagayatan, former Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, San
Jose, Occidental Mindoro, GUILTY of violating Canon 3, Section 2 and Canon 4, Section 1 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Judiciary for which he isFINED in the amount of P10,000.00 to be deducted from his retirement benefits
which have been withheld pursuant to the Court's Resolution in A.M. No. 12967-Ret. entitled Re: Application for Optional
Retirement under R.A. 910, as amended by R.A. 5095 and P.D. 1438, of Hon. Ernesto P. Pagayatan, RTC, Br. 46, San
Jose, Occidental Mindoro, dated July 7, 2008.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
A.M. No. MTJ-06-1636 March 12, 2007

[Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-1662-MTJ]
JULIO B. VERZOSA, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE MANUEL E. CONTRERAS, Municipal Trial Court, Ocampo, Camarines Sur, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a Verified Complaint1 dated December 30, 2004 of Julio B. Verzosa (complainant) charging Judge Manuel E.
Contreras (respondent), Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Ocampo, Camarines Sur with Grave Abuse of Authority, Grave
Misconduct (Harassment and Oppression), and Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, relative to Criminal Case No.
2071, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Rodrigo E. Candelaria."
Complainant alleges: he is a forest ranger of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Protected Area
Office. On April 14, 2004, while conducting surveillance on treasure hunting activities in Mt. Isarog Natural Park, Ocampo,
Camarines Sur, he and his co-forest rangers discovered an open pit left in damaged condition, allegedly in violation of
Republic Act No. 7586. They likewise found and confiscated in favor of the Government two metal chains used to overturn
huge stones in the treasure hunting site. He found out later that the alleged treasure hunters were led by a certain Jose
Credo (Credo) a.k.a. "Labaw" and Basilio Sumalde (Sumalde) a.k.a. "Moren". The Executive Director of the DENR Region V
Office thereafter ordered the complainant to continue monitoring the said treasure hunting site. Because of his involvement
in the treasure hunting activities and on the basis of the testimony of Credo, he was implicated as an accessory in Criminal
Case No. 2071 against Rodrigo Candelaria (Candelaria), et al. for robbery. The said case arose from the alleged information
relayed by respondent to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Officers of Ocampo, Camarines Sur in the morning of April 18,
2004, which led to the arrest of the principal accused. Respondent did not inhibit himself from conducting the preliminary
investigation despite his proven bias against all of the accused, in apparent violation of the guiding principles of Judicial
Ethics and Responsibilities. Complainant was not among the persons on board the truck when the same was apprehended
by members of the PNP on April 18, 2004. On the basis of the affidavit executed by Credo, respondent hastily issued an
order for complainant's arrest. After the information reducing the charge from robbery to simple theft was filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32, Pili, Camarines Sur, Judge Nilo Malanyaon, in an Order dated September 13, 2004
dismissed the case due to lack of probable cause. Respondent is the mastermind behind the treasure hunting activities in
Ocampo, Camarines Sur and the robbery case for which complainant was implicated as an accessory was a way of
harassing anybody who opposes the activities.
In his Comment,2 respondent contends: on the latter part of March 2004, he went on mountain hiking at Mt. Isarog with the
Tinablanan River as his destination. While at Mt. Isarog, he received an information that Candelaria, known confidant of the
personnel of the DENR and by the CARE Philippines, was looting by dismantling the tower antennae of the Philippine Long
Distance and Telephone Company (PLDT) used as a relay station but already inoperational. The PLDT Tower is already a
government property and declared by the provincial government as a tourist attraction and destination being strategically
located at the towering heights of Mt. Isarog. The activity of looting the steel trusses and bars of the PLDT Tower had been
going on since January 2004. He directed the police of Ocampo, Camarines Sur to investigate the looting of the steel
trusses and bars of the PLDT Tower. The second time that he went on mountain hiking at Tinablanan River on April 18,
2004, he was again informed that the steel trusses and bars of the PLDT Tower were already being loaded in a truck bound
for the junkshop in Naga City. With the use of a binocular, he was able to personally confirm the report. He immediately
called the PNP Regional Intelligence Group and in a checkpoint set up by the police, the truck was apprehended with
Candelaria and several men aboard. On April 19, 2004, the OIC-Chief of Police of Ocampo, Camarines Sur filed a criminal
complaint for robbery before the MTC of Ocampo, Camarines Sur docketed as Criminal Case No. 2071 for preliminary
investigation. Upon conclusion of the preliminary investigation and finding probable cause against the accused for robbery,
respondent forwarded the records to the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur for appropriate action. However, the
provincial prosecutor modified the charge of robbery to theft, and the corresponding information was filed with the RTC,
Branch 32, Pili, Camarines Sur, docketed as Criminal Case No. P-3647, presided by Judge Malanyaon. The latter, finding no
probable cause, dismissed the case against complainant and likewise ordered the arresting officer to adduce additional
evidence against the remaining accused for determination of judicial probable cause. Having failed to do so, Judge
Malanyaon dismissed Criminal Case No. P-3647. Persons motivated with ill-will against him were just making a failed and
porous connection to the alleged treasure hunting activity. If respondent was subsequently seen at Zone 2, Del Rosario,
Ocampo, Camarines Sur after the apprehension of those involved in the looting at the PLDT Tower, it was because he was
then conducting the preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. 2071 having inquisitorial authority to extend his
investigation on the area. The complainant's surmise that he is the mastermind of the alleged treasure hunting of the group
of Sumalde was based on the alleged information relayed to complainant by Myrna Dacer, Daisy Moran, Salvacion
Candelaria, Analiza Candelaria, and Mary Ann Candelaria. Complainant imputed bias against him when he did not inhibit
from conducting the preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. 2071 despite prior knowledge of the looting at the PLDT
Tower. Prior knowledge of the commission of a crime is not a mandatory ground for a first level court judge to recuse himself
from conducting preliminary investigation. It was just incidental that he caused the apprehension of the truck loaded with
stolen trusses and bars of the PLDT Tower. Preliminary investigation is a quasi-judicial function of an MTC judge. The
matter of issuance of a warrant of arrest is discretionary and judicial in nature which is authorized under the rules. If ever
complainant perceived that irregularities attended the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him, he has all available judicial
remedies, such as filing a motion to quash warrant of arrest, habeas corpus proceedings, or certiorari, but none was availed
of by complainant despite being represented and assisted by a retained counsel. Under the Rules, the
result/recommendation of the investigating judge during the preliminary investigation is subject to review or appropriate
action by the provincial prosecutor. The finding of probable cause against the accused in Criminal Case No. 2071 was
sustained by the provincial prosecutor of Camarines Sur upon review, although the recommended charge of robbery was
modified to theft. The dismissal by Judge Malanyaon of the information for theft finding that no probable cause exists should
not militate or be taken against him. He discharged his duties as investigating judge regularly with faithful adherence to the
law and the rules, and he acted in good faith and without malice in his conduct of the preliminary investigation.
The Sangguniang Bayan of Ocampo, Camarines Sur, rendered a committee report stating that an ocular inspection had
been conducted on the alleged site of treasure hunting and they were able to confirm that it was indeed a fishpond loaded
with so many growing fish and not a site of treasure hunting.
In the Agenda Report,3 the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) submitted its evaluation and recommendation, to wit:
EVALUATION:
xxxx
The complainant, in branding the respondent Judge as the mastermind of the alleged treasure hunting activities in Ocampo,
Camarines Sur, relied heavily on the narrations of and affidavits executed by Myrna Dacer, Daisy Moran, Salvacion
Candelaria, Analiza and Mary Ann Candelaria. Clearly, these narrations/affidavits are not based on the complainant's own
personal knowledge but rather on the personal knowledge of the said persons. The same are, thus, considered hearsay
because their probative force depends, in whole or in part, on the competency and credibility of some persons other tha[n]
the complainant. (Estrada vs. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, April 3, 2001). For being hearsay, the same are insufficient
and inconclusive to determine the participation of the respondent Judge in the alleged treasure hunting activities in Ocampo,
Camarines Sur. In this light, the complainant failed to submit substantial evidence to support his imputation that the
respondent Judge is the mastermind behind the treasure hunting activities in Ocampo, Camarines Sur.
With respect to the issuance of warrant of arrest, such issue is judicial and may be best resolved through judicial
adjudication. As correctly pointed out by the respondent Judge, if there are irregularities in the issuance of warrant against
the complainant, the latter has all available judicial remedies, such as filing a motion to quash, an action for habeas corpus,
or a special civil action for certiorari. However, the complainant chose not to avail of any judicial remedy.
To merit disciplinary sanction, the error or mistake committed by a judge should be patent, gross, malicious, deliberate, or
done in bad faith and absent a clear showing that the judge has acted errantly; the issue becomes judicial in character and
would not properly warrant the imposition of administrative punishment (Godinez vs. Alano, 303 SCRA 259).
At any rate, the respondent Judge followed the letter of the law, specifically Rule 112, Section 6, paragraph b,when, prior to
the issuance of warrant of arrest against the complainant, he personally conducted preliminary examination in the form of
searching questions and answers on witness Jose Credo and upon finding probable cause and the necessity to place the
complainant under custody in order [not] to frustrate the ends of justice.
Anent the respondent Judge's failure to inhibit himself in conducting the preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. 2071,
he violated Rule 3.12 of the Code of Judicial Conduct (now Canon 3, Section 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct) for
taking part in a proceeding where he has personal knowledge of the disputed evidentiary facts. Respondent Judge admitted
having prior knowledge of the looting and dismantling of the PLDT Tower in Ocampo, Camarines Sur. As a matter of fact, he
was able to visually confirm the said activities which he later relayed to the local PNP and led to the arrest of the principal
accused in the said case. [The] Judge still conducted the preliminary investigation.
It should be noted, however, that while no motion for inhibition of respondent judge was filed by the complainant during the
preliminary investigation stage of the case, this does not mean that respondent can freely act on the same despite the
lingering doubt created in the minds of the parties that he would not be impartial in his judgment.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other
than those mentioned above. While the first paragraph of Article 137 provides for the specific grounds for disqualification and
gives the judicial officer no discretion to sit in a case, the second paragraph leaves the matter of inhibition to the sound
discretion of the judge (People vs. Serrano, 203 SCRA 17).
It does not explicitly enumerate the specific grounds for inhibition but provides a broad policy-oriented ground for
disqualification of judges for just and valid reasons other than those enumerated in the first paragraph (Geotina vs.
Gonzales, 41 SCRA 66).
The judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case for just and valid reasons
(Parayno vs. Meneses, 231 SCRA 807) other than those mentioned in Rule 137, Section 1. The ultimate test in determining
the validity of the court's inhibition is whether or not the petitioner is deprived of fair and impartial trial (Associacion de
Agricultures de Talisay-Silay, Inc. vs. Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., 88 SCRA 294) and the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge.
RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Court are our recommendations that:
1. The instant matter be re-docketed as a regular administrative case;
2. Judge Manuel E. Contreras, Municipal Trial Court of Ocampo, Camarines Sur be admonished for violation of
Canon 3, Section 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct with a warning that repetition of the same or similar offense
in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
On September 5, 2006 and September 26, 2006, complainant and respondent manifested their willingness to submit the
case for decision/ resolution based on the pleadings filed, respectively.
We agree with the findings of the OCA except that respondent should be reprimanded instead of being merely admonished.
Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.4
The issue of whether a judge should voluntarily inhibit himself is addressed to his sound discretion pursuant to paragraph 2
of Section 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court, which provides that a judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify
himself from sitting in a case, for a just or valid reason other than those mentioned in the first paragraph.5
However, respondent failed to consider the proscription under Rule
3.12(a) of Canon 3, Code of Judicial Conduct, to wit:
Rule 3.12. - A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
These cases include, among others, proceedings where:
(a) the judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.
In Oktubre v. Velasco,6 citing Perez v. Suller,7 we held that the rule on disqualification of judges under Rule 3.12 and Section
1, Rule 137 -
[S]tems from the principle that no judge should preside in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and
independent. A Judge should not handle a case in which he might be perceived to be susceptible to bias and partiality. The
rule is intended to preserve the people’s faith and confidence in the courts of justice.8
True, a judge should possess proficiency in law so that he can competently construe and enforce the law. However, it is
more important that he should act and behave in such a manner that the parties before him have confidence in his
impartiality. Indeed, even conduct that gives rise to the mere appearance of partiality is proscribed.9
Records reveal that respondent had prior knowledge of the looting and dismantling at the PLDT Tower in Ocampo,
Camarines Sur and he was instrumental in the apprehension of the robbers. Respondent should have been aware of the
impropriety of conducting the preliminary investigation considering that Rule 3.12(a), Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct enjoins a judge from taking part in proceedings where the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
Respondent ignored said rule, warranting disciplinary sanction from this Court.
Respondent's averment that prior knowledge of the commission of a crime is not a mandatory ground for the first level court
judge to recuse himself from conducting preliminary investigation, holds no water. As a judge, respondent must keep himself
abreast with the law. He should have known that it is well entrenched in the Code of Judicial Conduct, prevailing at that time,
that personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding disqualifies him from taking part in such
proceeding as the same would necessarily spawn a perception that he is bias and impartial. It is of no moment that the
finding of probable cause was sustained by the provincial prosecutor. What is of paramount importance is the perceived bias
and impartiality by the complainant against respondent in his conduct of the preliminary investigation due to respondent's
prior knowledge of the looting at the PLDT Tower, respondent being instrumental in the apprehension of the robbers.
Although respondent should have inhibited himself from conducting the preliminary investigation, it did not render as void the
act of respondent in issuing a warrant of arrest. He acted within the bounds of the then existing Section 6(b), Rule 112 10 of
the Rules of Court which provides, inter alia, that without waiting for the conclusion of the investigation, the judge may issue
a warrant of arrest if he finds after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form
of searching questions and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent
under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
The OCA rightly observed that respondent followed the letter of the existing Rule, when, prior to the issuance of warrant of
arrest against complainant, respondent personally conducted preliminary examination in the form of searching questions and
answers on witness Credo. The purpose of issuing the warrant of arrest was to place the respondents under immediate
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.11 Whether it is necessary to place the accused in custody is left to the
judge’s sound judgment.12
Moreover, the OCA correctly sustained respondent’s claim that if ever complainant perceived that irregularities attended the
issuance of warrant of arrest against him, he has all available judicial remedies, 13 such as filing a motion to quash warrant of
arrest, habeas corpus proceedings, or certiorari, but none was availed of by complainant.
In Lumbos v. Baliguat,14 we held that as a matter of policy, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to
disciplinary action. He cannot be subjected to liability - civil, criminal, or administrative - for any of his official acts, no matter
how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith.15 To hold, otherwise, would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one
called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. 16 An
inquiry into the administrative liability of a judge may be resorted to only after the available remedies have been exhausted
and decided with finality.17 For until there is a final declaration by the appellate court that the challenged order or judgment is
manifestly erroneous, there will be no basis to conclude whether respondent is administratively liable.18 The Court has to be
shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma
of being biased and partial.19 Thus, not every error or mistake that a judge commits in the performance of his duties renders
him liable, unless he is shown to have acted in bad faith or with deliberate intent to do an injustice.20Good faith and absence
of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge x x x can find refuge.21
Anent the allegation that respondent is the mastermind behind the treasure hunting activities in Ocampo, Camarines Sur, we
find the allegation to be devoid of merit.
In Español v. Mupas,22 we held that in administrative proceedings, complainants have the burden of proving by substantial
evidence the allegations in their complaints. Thus, when the complainant relies mainly on second-hand information to prove
the charges against the respondent, the complaint is reduced into a bare indictment or mere speculation. 23 The Court cannot
give credence to charges based on mere suspicion or speculation. In this case, complainant failed to discharge that burden.
As aptly observed by the OCA, complainant has no personal knowledge of the treasure hunting by respondent as he relied
only on the information relayed to him by the relatives of the accused Candelaria in the robbery case.
Furthermore, we find that the affidavits of Myrna Dacer, Daisy Moran, Salvacion Candelaria, Analiza Candelaria, and Mary
Ann Candelaria relate to the incident surrounding the arrest of Dante Dacer, one of the accused in the robbery case. The
police blotter which is not even a certified true copy is an alleged threat made by respondent against Mary Ann Candelaria.
Nowhere in the said documents do we find that respondent was being tagged as the mastermind of the treasure hunting.
Taken all together, these documents have no prima facie evidentiary value as to warrant further investigation on the matter.
In Mataga v. Rosete,24 we held that any administrative complaint leveled against a judge must always be examined with a
discriminating eye, for its consequential effects are by their nature highly penal, such that the respondent judge stands to
face the sanction of dismissal or disbarment. Mere imputation of judicial misconduct in the absence of sufficient proof to
sustain the same will never be countenanced. 25 If a judge should be disciplined for misconduct, the evidence against him
should be competent.26
In fine, we find that respondent is merely guilty of violating the Code of Judicial Conduct in not recusing himself from
conducting preliminary investigation.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Manuel E. Contreras, MTC, Ocampo, Camarines Sur guilty of violation of Rule
3.12(a), Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and is REPRIMANDED with warning that a repetition of the same or
similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice
CANON 4
A.M. No. RTJ-05-1920 April 26, 2006

[Formerly OCA IPI No. 01-1141-RTJ]
CONCERNED TRIAL LAWYERS OF MANILA, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE LORENZO B. VENERACION, Regional Trial Court, Manila, Brach 47, Respondent.
x-------------------------x
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1432 April 26, 2006

vs.
JUDGE LORENZO B. VENERACION, Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 47, Respondent.
x-------------------------x
A.M. No. RTJ-01-1623 April 26, 2006

[Formerly A.M. No. 01-2-46-RTC]

vs.
JUDGE LORENZO B. VENERACION, and Branch Clerk of Court ROGELIO M. LINATOC, Respondent.
x-------------------------x
OCA I.P.I No. 02-1418-RTJ April 26, 2006
ANGELINE Y. CUEVILLAS, VIRGILIO TINAPAN, ADELA A. ACEBO and HERMINIO A. ASTORGA, Complainants,
vs.
JUDGE LORENZO B. VENERACION, ATTY. ROGELIO M. LINATOC, and TERESITA C. VASQUEZ, Presiding Judge, Branch Clerk of Court and Court Stenographer, respectively, all of RTC,
Branch 47, Manila, Respondents.
x-------------------------x
A.M. No. 10425-Ret. April 26, 2006
Re: Application for Optional Retirement under RA 910 of Jude Lorenzo B. Veneracion.
x-------------------------x
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
Before us are consolidated administrative cases against retired Judge Lorenzo B. Veneracion, then presiding judge of
Branch 47, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.[5]
In A.M. No. RTJ-05-1920, a letter[6] dated February 8, 1999 was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) by the Ombudsman.[7] It contained allegations of misconduct and tardiness against respondent Judge Veneracion by
the Concerned Trial Lawyers of Manila[8].
Complainants assailed the apparent reluctance of Judge Veneracion to grant petitions for the declaration of nullity of
marriage despite their alleged merit. Instead, he would lecture litigants in open court that the declaration of nullity of
marriage was not the proper remedy. Lawyers were often embarrassed by his emphasis on legal technicalities allegedly
designed to prevent them from presenting evidence in favor of their clients. Complainants were often harassed whenever
respondent would force them to read and interpret verses from the Bible. There were occasions when he would castigate
them for their failure to give the interpretation he wanted. The fact that a number of cases for declaration of nullity of
marriage assigned to respondent judge’s sala were later withdrawn allegedly proved complainants’ claim.
Complainants further assailed respondent judge’s habitual tardiness which caused the delay in the disposition of
cases assigned to him.
In a 1st Indorsement[9] dated September 20, 1999, the anonymous letter-complaint was referred by the OCA to
Executive Judge Rebecca de Guia Salvador of the Manila RTC for discreet investigation. Judge Salvador required Judge
Veneracion to comment on the complaint. She believed that a discreet investigation was unnecessary since it was well-
known that respondent judge encouraged litigants, particularly in cases of nullity of marriage, to read verses from the
Bible. She likewise verified if there were cases withdrawn from respondent’s sala. She found out that 27 cases for
declaration of nullity of marriage were indeed withdrawn, all of which were handled by a certain Atty. Rizalino Simbillo.[10]
In his comment[11] dated October 21, 1999, Judge Veneracion vehemently denied the allegation that he was against
the granting of petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage despite their merit. He alleged that from the time he was
designated as presiding judge of Branch 47, RTC Manila, not more than two such cases filed in his sala were dismissed for
lack of merit.
He denied the allegation that he harassed parties during hearings. On the contrary, the letters[12]he received from
previous litigants showed how much they appreciated the way he shared the words of the Lord with them and how this
practice greatly improved their lives.
Judge Veneracion maintained that the person who sent the letter-complaint did not represent the concerned trial
lawyers of Manila. He only represented himself. The docket books of his sala revealed that only Atty. Simbillo had
consistently withdrawn cases for declaration of nullity of marriage every time these were raffled to his sala. [13] Atty. Simbillo
had once been enjoined by respondent judge to amend his petition for annulment of marriage to his wife. [14] Apparently, this
was not well taken by the said lawyer as the latter had since then moved for the withdrawal of similar petitions before his
sala.
In A. M. No. RTJ-01-1623, a report[15] on the judicial audit and physical inventory of cases conducted in Branch 47,
Manila RTC, from June 19 to 26, 2000, challenged the efficiency of respondent Judge Veneracion and his Clerk of Court,
Rogelio M. Linatoc[16].
As summarized by Deputy Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock in his memorandum[17] datedSeptember 5, 2002,
the audit report showed:
1) Regional Trial Court, Branch [47], Manila has not been submitting the required monthly report of
cases. The latest monthly report submitted by said Branch [was] for the month of February 2000;
2) Out of the 60 cases submitted for decision (7 criminal and 53 civil), 41 cases (6 criminal and 35 civil)
were beyond the [90-day] reglementary period, although there were draft decisions in several of these cases.
These cases were submitted for decision upon certification from the Branch Clerk of Court that all
stenographic notes have been transcribed;
3) Out of the 41 cases undecided beyond the 90-day period, 7 were appealed and 33 cases were fully tried by
Judge Veneracion and submitted before him for decision;
4) There were cases with motions or incidents pending resolution for an unreasonable length of time, although
there [were] draft orders in most of them;
5) There were 14 criminal cases and 28 civil cases found with no further action or proceeding or with no further
setting of trial for a considerable length of time;
6) There were two (2) records of cases, Crim. Cases Nos. 95-144694 and 95-144695 [Falsification of Public
Documents], found in Branch 45, which were supposedly transmitted to the [Office of the Clerk of Court]
RTC Pasay City pursuant to the order issued by respondent judge dated March 14, 1996[;]
7) In three (3) criminal cases, Nos. 00-18138, 00-182163 and 00-181414, no warrants of arrest were issued
since the filing of the information; and in two (2) criminal cases, Nos. 98-169423 and 99-174851, no setting
for arraignment despite the arrest of the accused and posting of bail bond;
8) In Civil Cases Nos. 00-96423, 00-96254, 00-97156, 00-97298, 99-95304, 99-95126, 00-97329, 00-97176,
no action was taken on the complaint such as issuance of summons to defendants since the filing thereof;
while in Civil Cases Nos. 99-95466, appealed on 31 October 1999, and 99-96749 appealed on 13 March
2000, no action was likewise taken; and in Civil Cases Nos. 99-93433, 00-96666, 00-96744, the same
were not set for pre-trial despite receipt of the defendant’s answer;
9) The record of an appealed case, Civil Case No. 95-74880, [unlawful detainer], which was decided on 14
December 1995 was ordered by respondent Judge Veneracion returned to the court of origin for execution
only on June 21, 2000, after the lapse of almost five (5) years;
10) There were cases which have not been acted upon for failure of the parties to comply with the order
requiring compliance;
11) There were 44 civil cases with pending summonses which can be archived pursuant to Adm. Order No. 7-A-
92 since six (6) months have [lapsed] without the summons being served [to the defendants] thru no fault
of the plaintiff; and there were 192 out of the 321 criminal cases with warrants of arrest issued, which can
be archived because accused [have not been] apprehended for more than six (6) months from date of
issuance of the warrants, some of which were issued as early as 1996;
12) There were cases dismissed for alleged failure of the plaintiff or petitioner to pursue the case despite the fact
that the court has not taken any action on the complaint or petition since the filing thereof several years
ago; that is, no summonses were issued or that the cases were not set for trial;
13) There were cases where alleged summonses were issued but were returned unserved, which were
dismissed without prejudice, instead of archiving the same pursuant to Adm. Circular No. 7-A-92;
14) The entries in the separate criminal and docket books were not updated; the Semestral Docket Inventory
Reports were erroneous because the 1st and 2nd semester of 1999 inventory included only cases filed in
1999 but not those filed in the previous years yet still pending trial and/or for decision; and the cases found
to be submitted for decision for several years already were not reflected in the monthly report of February
2000.
In respondent judge’s explanation[18], he averred that Branch 47 was one of the five branches in the Manila RTC
originally designated to handle and try family relations cases. It was also designated as a special tax court in Manila as well
as a special criminal court to handle heinous crimes and drug cases.
When the Family Code was amended, all cases involving youth offenders pending before the Metropolitan Trial Courts
of Manila were transferred to the special Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts in Manila, which included Branch 47.
Despite these special assignments and designations, additional personnel were not assigned to Branch 47. The
docket clerks had a hard time managing the records, some of which may have been misfiled due to lack of space and filing
cabinets.
On March 4, 1993, he suffered a mild stroke which affected his handwriting. He could no longer take notes on the
proceedings/testimonies in court. He had to rely on the stenographic notes for the preparation of his resolutions and
decisions. Hence, until the branch clerk of court certified that the stenographic notes had been transcribed, cases were not
deemed submitted for decision.
Respondent judge declared that he had already dictated his decisions in several cases reported unresolved but the
stenographers had not yet transcribed them. Some of the reported cases[19] were not Branch 47’s but were assigned to
other branches. There were also cases included in the report of pending cases which had already been decided. Other
cases already had drafts but were not yet signed.
Respondent judge did not deny that he read verses from the Bible during hearings of annulment, adoption and
criminal cases. This was meant to share the word of God with those who came before his court and who were in a quandary
about their purpose in life. He only wished to remind litigants in these cases that God had given them a manual to serve as
a guide in conducting their lives. In his comment, he begged us to allow him to avail of optional retirement in case we found
that his actuation violated his responsibilities as a judge.
Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct[20] provides:
SECTION 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and
assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such manner as to preserve the
dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary. (emphasis ours)
In this canon, judges are given the freedom to express their beliefs as long as it does not interfere with their judicial
functions. Respondent judge’s practice of reading verses from the Bible during hearings was an exercise of his religious
freedom. We would have preferred that he refrained from such practice. Nevertheless, we hesitate to castigate him lest we
trample on this right.
As DCA Lock stressed in his memorandum[21] dated September 5, 2002:
xxx The respondent judge’s act of reading verses from the [Bible] and relating them to petitioner’s
lives may well be considered merely as a guide for petitioners in declaration of nullity cases. It could not be
said that by reason of the respondent’s act of reading verses from the [Bible], he frowns upon cases of
such nature. As argued, from the time the respondent was designated as presiding judge of [Branch 47], there
were no more than one or two such nullity cases, which were dismissed for lack of merit. xxx (emphasis ours)
The position which a judge holds opens him to much criticism and cynicism. He cannot please everyone who has
business in his court. In this case, both Executive Judge de Guia and DCA Lock found that the complainant in this case was
not the purported association of trial lawyers of Manila but only a certain Atty. Simbillo. Apparently, Atty. Simbillo was
displeased when he was asked by respondent judge if he read the Bible. He was embarrassed and from then on, he
withdrew all his annulment cases whenever they were raffled to respondent judge’s sala.
Contrary to complainant’s various allegations of harassment, we find that respondent judge observed Section 1 of
Canon 5:
SECTION 1. Judges shall be aware of, and understand, diversity in society and differences arising from
various sources, including but not limited to race, color, sex, religion, national origin, caste, disability, age, marital
status, sexual orientation, social and economic status and other like causes. (emphasis ours)
The letters from a number of litigants, attached to the records of this case, belie the claim that respondent judge
inappropriately expressed his beliefs and convictions to the point of harassing or embarrassing litigants and counsels in his
court. We cannot ignore the sincere words of appreciation in the numerous letters that have been sent to respondent judge,
all alluding to his practice of reading verses from the Bible. The outpouring of kind words cannot be mere
exaggeration. They were sincerely extended by persons previously lost but who had since found their way in life through
respondent judge’s guidance.
Aside from that, there was no compulsion involved whenever respondent judge questioned litigants as to whether
they read the Bible or not. He did not impose his religious convictions on them but merely suggested the benefits of reading
the Bible.
Surely, this practice alone was not sufficient to hold respondent judge guilty of misconduct. His judicial functions,
duties and responsibilities were not impaired by his religious beliefs and convictions.
Nevertheless, this is a most opportune time to remind judges that their actions in court should always be seen by
the public as guided by the law and not by thier personal or religious beliefs. This is the only way to prevent the public from
seeing a display of religiosity as an encroachment on or an interference with our system of justice.
As to respondent judge’s alleged tardiness, complainant failed to adduce evidence in support thereof. We cannot
therefore impute the delay in the disposition of his cases to his unconfirmed tardiness. Besides, respondent judge
adequately explained the reasons for the delay in A.M. No. RTJ-01-1623.
With respect to the charge of gross inefficiency, we find that respondent judge failed to decide certain cases within
the three-month period mandated by Section 15(1)[22], Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Time and again, we have emphasized that a judge should dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide
cases within the prescribed periods.[23] Any delay in the disposition of cases undermines the people’s faith and confidence
in the judiciary.
It is for this reason that Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct[24] mandates that:
Judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and
with reasonable promptness.
No less than the 1987 Constitution requires that cases at the trial court level be resolved within three months from
the date they are submitted for decision. Undue delay cannot be countenanced at a time when the clogging of the court
dockets is still the bane of the judiciary.[25] Failure to decide/resolve cases within the period prescribed by law constitutes
gross inefficiency which is a ground for an administrative sanction against the defaulting judge.[26]
The Code of Judicial Conduct further provides:
RULE 3.09. – A judge should organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient
dispatch of business and require at all times the observance of high standards of public service and fidelity.
The fact that no additional personnel were assigned to Branch 47 despite its additional assignments does not justify
misfiling of case records. A judge ought to know the cases submitted to him for decision or resolution. Respondent judge
was expected to keep his own record of cases so that he could act thereon without undue delay. He ought to have devised
an efficient recording and filing system in his court so that no disorderliness could affect the flow of cases and their speedy
disposition. Proper and efficient court management was his responsibility. He was the one directly responsible for the
proper discharge of his official functions.[27]
DCA Lock was correct when he mentioned in his memorandum[28] that:

While serious illness may justify the inability of the respondent judge to perform his official duties and
functions, nevertheless, it is incumbent upon him to request the Honorable Court, thru this Office for additional time
within which to decide/resolve cases which he could not seasonably act upon. Further, a heavy caseload may
excuse the respondent judge’s failure to decide/resolve cases within the reglementary period, but not his failure to
request for extension of time within which to decide/resolve the same. xxx
It is not uncommon for this Court, upon proper application and in meritorious cases, to grant judges of lower courts
additional time to decide cases beyond the three-month period. All that a judge should do, in cases of great difficulty, is to
request an extension of time. To this, the Court has, almost invariably, been sympathetic.[29] Respondent judge fell short of
expectations in this regard.
Although Judge Veneracion retired from the service on September 23, 2000,[30] his retirement did not render these
administrative complaints moot and academic. In the Office of the Court Administrator v. Fernandez,[31] we held:
Cessation from office of respondent judge because of death or retirement does not warrant the dismissal of
the administrative complaint filed against him while he was still in the service or render the said administrative case
moot and academic. The jurisdiction that was this Court’s at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was
not lost by mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased in office during the pendency of his
case. Indeed, the retirement of a judge or any judicial officer from the service does not preclude the finding of any
administrative liability to which he shall still be answerable.
Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court classifies as a less serious charge the undue delay in rendering a decision
or order, or in transmitting the records of a case.[32] The penalty for such infraction is suspension from office for not less than
one nor more than three months or a fine of more thanP10,000 but not exceeding P20,000.[33]
Considering that respondent judge has already retired after suffering a stroke, we impose upon him a fine
of P11,000, to be deducted from the amount withheld from his retirement benefits.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(1) DISMISSING for lack of merit the charge of misconduct and tardiness against Judge Lorenzo B. Veneracion in
A.M. No. RTJ-05-1920; and
2) Finding Judge Lorenzo B. Veneracion LIABLE for gross inefficiency in A.M. No. RTJ-01-1623 for which he is
hereby FINED P11,000 to be deducted from the amount withheld from his retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
A.M. No. MTJ-03-1499 October 6, 2008

[Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1310-MTJ]
CELFRED P. FLORES, petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE RODOLFO B. GARCIA, respondent.
x-----------------------x
A.M. No. P-03-1752 October 6, 2008

[Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 03-1595-P]
JUDGE RODOLFO B. GARCIA, petitioner,

vs.
CELFRED P. FLORES, UTILITY WORKER, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, CALATRAVA, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
The case at bar consolidates two administrative cases filed by Judge Rodolfo B. Garcia and Utility Worker Celfred P. Flores,
both of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Calatrava-Toboso, Negros Occidental, against each other.
The first case, Administrative Matter No. MTJ-03-1499, is a verified Letter-Complaint1 filed on 30 September 2002 by Flores
against Judge Garcia for oppression, grave misconduct, and violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Code of
Judicial Ethics. The second case, Administrative Matter No. P-03-1752, is a counter-charge for falsification 2 filed by Judge
Garcia against Flores on 12 March 2003.
Flores complained of two incidents in the first case. The first incident took place in the afternoon of 22 July 2002 in front of
the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) in San Carlos City, Negros Occidental. Flores alleged that Judge Garcia
boxed and hit him on the face and threatened to shoot him. The second incident took place on 24 July 2002 inside the
courtroom of Judge Garcia. Respondent judge allegedly pointed a finger at Flores, ordered him to get out of the courtroom
and hit him at the back part of his head as he was about to leave the courtroom in the presence of court personnel and
litigants. Flores also alleged that Judge Garcia shouted saying that he could have shot him had he brought his revolver with
him that day.
Flores attached to his Letter-Complaint the affidavits of Reynaldo A. Abunda, Jr., a security guard of RCBC, and Reynaldo
Barren, Clerk of Court of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Calatrava-Toboso, Negros Occidental. Abunda corroborated the
statements of Flores regarding the incident of 22 July 20023 while Barren corroborated the claims of Flores on the incident of
24 July 2002. Flores also attached the Extract Police Report 4 dated 31 July 2002 from the Police Blotter of the San Carlos
City Police Station which recorded the physical injuries he sustained on 22 July 2002. He likewise attached the Extract Copy
of Police Blotter5 from the Calatrava Municipal Police Station which recorded the 24 July 2002 incident.
In his Comment6 dated 30 November 2002, Judge Garcia denied having boxed Flores. He alleged that he merely lifted his
fist against Flores to express his anger over the latter's alleged immoral advances on his then already senile 78-year old
wife. He averred that Flores filed the Letter-Complaint in order to cover up the latter's lewd designs on his wife and to pre-
empt his filing of a falsification case. Judge Garcia also submitted an Affidavit of Retraction7 of Abunda, one of Flores'
witnesses, and assailed the credibility of Barren, Flores' other witness. Barren is allegedly a liar and a falsifier who, in the
past, had misappropriated the court's fiduciary bank deposit "due to extreme necessity and several downfalls in life." 8 Barren
was allegedly on Absence Without Leave and had not cleared his monetary liabilities despite several directives from the
office. Judge Garcia also presented a Joint Affidavit9 executed by five members of his staff stating that the allegation of
Flores that Judge Garcia boxed him was false and exaggerated. Finally, Judge Garcia argued that Flores should have
attached a medical certificate to prove that he was indeed injured or hurt by him.
On the counter-charge for falsification, Judge Garcia alleged that Flores falsified his Affidavit in his Letter-Complaint when he
alleged that Judge Garcia boxed him in San Carlos City, Negros Occidental on 22 July 2002. Judge Garcia pointed out that
the Daily Time Record10 of Flores on 22 July 2002 shows that he was in the court from 12:40 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. of that day.
Judge Garcia also accused Flores of falsifying the Affidavit of Abunda who later on executed an Affidavit of Retraction.
Abunda allegedly signed the Affidavit without knowing that there was a statement to the effect that Judge Garcia boxed
Flores.
Flores, in his Answer,11 accused Judge Garcia of forum shopping since the latter had already filed a similar complaint 12 on 13
February 2003 against him before the Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas. He further pointed out that Judge Garcia
himself had admitted in his Comment that the first incident took place in the afternoon of 22 July 2002 near the LBC office in
San Carlos City. Flores also downplays Abunda's Affidavit of Retraction and stresses that the original Affidavit was sworn to
before the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor and thus enjoys the presumption of regularity. With regard to the Joint Affidavit
executed by five staff members from the same court, Flores questioned the truthfulness of their statements as they were
then under the supervision of Judge Garcia. Lastly, Flores considered the issue on his failure to present a medical certificate
to substantiate his claim of having suffered physical injuries as hollow and argumentative.
The Court, in a Resolution13 dated 20 October 2003, consolidated both cases and referred them to then Executive Judge
Roberto S. Javellana of the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City for investigation, report and recommendation. Judge
Javellana, however, inhibited himself from hearing the cases upon the Motion for Inhibition14 filed by Judge Garcia on the
ground of impartiality. Thus, in another Resolution15 of the Court dated 14 June 2004, the cases were referred to Executive
Judge Pepito B. Gellada of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City who later requested the recall of his designation. On 22
August 2005, the Court issued another Resolution16 referring the cases to Executive Judge Roberto S. Chiongson of the
Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City.
Judge Chiongson, in his Report and Recommendation17 dated 1 December 2005, recommended that both cases be
dismissed. He found that the complaint for falsification against Flores was not well-founded. He stated that part of the job of
Flores as a utility worker is to do official errands for Judge Garcia. Thus, if he was in San Carlos City on 22 July 2002 and
wrote in his Daily Time Record that he reported for work on the same day, such did not constitute falsification as he
accompanied Judge Garcia on official business. With regard to the case filed against Judge Garcia, Judge Chiongson did
not find the complaint to be serious as it did not involve graft and corruption. The investigating judge also recommended the
dismissal of the case against Judge Garcia in view of the Affidavit of Retraction executed by Flores and the retirement of
Judge Garcia from the service.
The Court, through its Second Division, noted the receipt of Judge Chiongson's Report and Recommendation in a
Resolution18 dated 5 April 2006 and referred the consolidated cases to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation,
report and recommendation.
On 12 October 2006, the Office of the Court Administrator submitted the following recommendations in its
Memorandum, viz.:
1. That Judge Rodolfo B. Garcia (Retired), Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Calatrava-Toboso, Negros Occidental, be
found GUILTY of gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct [Sec. 8(3), Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court];
2. That Judge Garcia be FINED in the amount of [P]20,500, the amount of which shall be taken from the [P]80,000
withheld by the Court in its Resolution dated June 8, 2004 in A.M. OCA IPI No. 03-1403-MTJ; and[,]
3. That the administrative case, docketed as A.M. No. P-03-1752, against Celfred P. Flores, Utility Worker, same
court, for falsification of his daily time records (sic), be DISMISSED.19
On 23 July 2007, the Court required the parties to manifest if they are willing to submit the case for decision on the basis of
the pleadings filed. The parties submitted a Joint Manifestation20 on 11 October 2007 praying that the Court dismiss both
cases and consider them closed and terminated in view of their subsequent reconciliation.
The Court issued a Resolution21 on 28 November 2007 referring the Joint Manifestation to the Office of the Court
Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation. In a Memorandum dated 16 June 2008, the Office of the Court
Administrator submitted the following recommendations, viz.:
1. the Joint Manifestation dated 11 October 2007 of Ret. Judge Rodolfo B. Garcia and Mr. Celfred P. Flores, filed in
compliance with the Resolution dated 23 July 2007, praying for the dismissal of their respective cases against each
other and/or for the Court to consider the same as closed and terminated, be DENIEDfor utter lack of merit; [and,]
2. the recommendations in our October 12, 2006 Memorandum be taken into consideration in resolving the instant
consolidated cases.22
The subsequent reconciliation of the parties to an administrative proceeding does not strip the court of its jurisdiction to hear
the administrative case until its resolution. Atonement, in administrative cases, merely obliterates the personal injury of the
parties and does not extend to erase the offense that may have been committed against the public service. As succinctly put
by the Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator:
xxx [T]he withdrawal of an administrative complaint or subsequent desistance by the complainant does not free the
respondent from liability as the purpose of an administrative proceeding is to protect the public service, based on
the time-honored principle that a public office i[s] a public trust. The withdrawal of the complaint or the execution of
an affidavit of desistance does not automatically result in the dismissal of the administrative case. It will not divest
the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction to investigate the matters alleged in the complaint. Thus, the joint manifestation
filed by the parties praying that the charges and counter-charges be dismissed should be denied. xxx To condition
administrative actions upon the will of every complainant who may, for one reason or another, condone a detestable
act is to strip the Court of its supervisory power to discipline erring members of the judiciary. Disciplinary
proceedings of this nature involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are
undertaken and prosecuted solely for public welfare, i.e.[,] to maintain the faith and confidence of the people in the
government and its agencies and instrumentalities.23
As gleaned from the Pre-Trial Order,24 Judge Garcia admitted at the pre-trial conference to having confronted Flores on his
alleged immoral advances on Mrs. Garcia. He admitted uttering the following to Flores: "Fred, you're only here, what are you
doing here? If only I have a gun I will shoot you. It's better for you to elope." He also admitted pointing a finger at Flores as
he ordered him to get out of the office and told him in the presence of the court personnel: "If only I have brought with me my
revolver, I should have shot him."
Judge Garcia had acted in wanton disregard of the exacting standards of conduct attached to his position as a magistrate.
Judicial office circumscribes the personal conduct of a judge and imposes a number of restrictions thereon which he must
pay for accepting and occupying an exalted position in the administration of justice. 25 His personal behavior, not only upon
the bench but also in everyday life, should be above reproach and free from the appearance of impropriety. The Code of
Judicial Ethics dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary,
must behave with propriety at all times. Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly
accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen. He should personify judicial
integrity and exemplify honest public service.26Thus, when Judge Garcia acted without exercising civility, self-restraint,
prudence and sobriety even - if at all - he was indeed provoked, he did so in violation of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct, 27 viz.:
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct
themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
An act that violates the Code of Judicial Conduct constitutes gross misconduct which is considered a serious charge under
Section 8(3) of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
SEC. 8. Serious charges. - Serious charges include:
1. Bribery, direct or indirect;
2. Dishonesty and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law (R.A. No. 3019);
3. Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct;28
4. Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order as determined by a competent court in an appropriate

proceeding;
5. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
6. Willful failure to pay a just debt;
7. Borrowing money or property from lawyers and litigants in a case pending before the court;
8. Immorality;
9. Gross ignorance of the law or procedure;
10. Partisan political activities; and
11. Alcoholism and/or vicious habits.
Under Section 11 of the same Rule, a serious charge metes out either of the following penalties, viz.:
SEC. 11. Sanctions. - A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be
imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification
from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months;
or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
The Office of the Court Administrator has correctly noted that there are attendant mitigating circumstances in the case at
bar. These include Judge Garcia's retirement, twenty years of service in the judiciary, old age, subsequent reconciliation with
Flores and that the cases do not involve graft and corruption. However, these mitigating circumstances are offset by
previous administrative sanctions of a fine of P5,000.00 in MTJ-00-1282 for misconduct, oppression and abuse of authority,
and reprimand in MTJ-88-208 for gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of authority.
Prescinding from the foregoing, we uphold the imposition of a fine of P20,500.00 as recommended by the Office of the Court
Administrator. The amount shall be deducted from the P80,000.00 which has been previously withheld from Judge Garcia's
retirement benefits pursuant to the Court's Resolution dated 8 June 2004 in A.M. OCA IPI No. 03-1403-MTJ.29
The case for falsification against Flores is dismissed for lack of merit. Flores' statement in his Daily Time Record that he
reported for work on 22 July 2002 did not constitute falsification. If he was not within the office premises from 12:40 p.m. to
5:30 p.m. as alleged by Judge Garcia, it was because he was on official business in San Carlos City, Negros Occidental as
he was acting as Judge Garcia's driver. The other charge against Flores regarding the falsification of the Affidavit of Abunda
is likewise dismissed for lack of evidence to prove the same.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, retired Judge Rodolfo B. Garcia of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Calatrava-Toboso, Negros
Occidental is found GUILTY of gross misconduct constituting a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct under Section 8(3)
of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. The Court hereby imposes upon Judge Garcia a FINE of Twenty Thousand Five Hundred
Pesos (P20,500.00) to be deducted from the amount of P80,000.00 which was previously withheld by the Court from his
retirement benefits pursuant to the Court's Resolution dated 8 June 2004 in A.M. OCA IPI No. 03-1403-MTJ. The
administrative charge for falsification filed against Celfred P. Flores, also of the same court, is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2055 December 17, 2009
HEIRS OF THE LATE REV. FR. JOSE O. ASPIRAS, Complainants,

vs.
JUDGE CLIFTON U. GANAY, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 31, AGOO, LA UNION, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
The instant administrative case stemmed from an unsigned letter-complaint1 dated June 6, 2005, filed by the heirs of the late
Reverend Father Jose O. Aspiras addressed to the Court Administrator, requesting that an investigation be conducted by
the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) on the alleged abuse of authority of respondent Judge Clifton U. Ganay,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, Agoo, La Union in connection with Special Proceeding Case No. A-1026,
entitled "In the Matter of the Guardianship of Rev. Fr. Jose O. Aspiras."
In the letter, the heirs of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras state the following:
That the judge in the above mentioned case has been abusing his authority as observed by the Heirs of the late Rev. Fr.
Jose O. Aspiras as he previously ordered to withdraw the amount of P50,000.00 in his favor from the bank account of the
late Rev. Fr. Jose O. Aspiras on December 17, 2004 for him to purchase law books. As per his order, he alleged that, ‘In the
spirit of this Yuletide season and considering the efforts of the Judge of this Court, the guardians in the above entitled case
deemed it best to give him fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) worth of law books to aid him in his work as a judge.’ The truth
of the matter is that this has been the idea of Judge Ganay, himself, and was never consented by the guardians. For your
reference, attached is a photocopy of this order.
There are still other orders issued by Judge Ganay ordering the bank to release certain amounts from the bank account of
the late Rev. Fr. Jose O. Aspiras in his favor without the written consent of the guardians. Unfortunately, photocopies of
these orders cannot be attached for your reference as no copies of these orders were sent to the guardians. The copies can
be found in the records of the case being kept by the said court.
The OCA conducted a surprise investigation and examination of the records of SP Case No. A-1026 from August 30 to
September 2, 2005. The investigating team selected pertinent documents relative to the anonymous complaint in order to
verify the irregularities allegedly committed by respondent Judge Ganay.
From the documents gathered, the investigating team found that the Order 2 dated December 17, 2004 was indeed issued by
respondent Judge Ganay. For the money received from the said order, respondent Judge Ganay even issued an
Acknowledgement Receipt3 dated December 22, 2004. The team also discovered that on several occasions, respondent
Judge Ganay issued numerous orders4 directing the manager of the Philippine National Bank (PNB), Agoo, La Union
Branch, to draw checks from the account of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras amounting to several thousands of pesos in the name
of the Officer-in-Charge/Branch Clerk of Court Precilla Olympia P. Eslao (OIC-Clerk of Court Eslao) for the purpose of
purchasing cellular phone prepaid cards. The said cards were received by respondent Judge Ganay and OIC-Clerk of Court
Eslao as evidenced by acknowledgement receipts5 signed by them on several dates.
The investigating team also discovered two other orders6 issued by respondent Judge Ganay directing the manager of PNB,
Agoo, La Union Branch to draw from the account of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras checks in the amount of forty thousand pesos
(P40,000.00) each for the purpose of purchasing three (3) cellular phones. Thereafter, OIC-Clerk of Court Eslao submitted a
Report on Expenses7 dated March 1, 2005 enumerating in detail how the money was spent for buying three (3) cellular
phones.
In a Resolution8 dated January 17, 2006, this Court resolved to:
(a) DIRECT Judge Clifton S. Ganay and Officer-in-Charge/Branch Clerk of Court Precilla Olympia P. Eslao, both of RTC,
Branch 31, Agoo, La Union, to submit their respective comments on the letter-complaint dated June 6, 2005 of the Heirs of
the Late Rev. Fr. Jose O. Aspiras and the report dated September 22, 2005 of Attys. Reynan M. Dollison and Kenneth P.
Fulton, Legal Office, OCA, and to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against them, both within ten (10)
days from notice hereof;
(b) AUTHORIZE the Office of the Court Administrator to secure the complete records of Special Proceeding Case No. A-
1026, entitled In the Matter of the Guardianship of Rev. Fr. Jose O. Aspiras; and
(c) DIRECT Executive Judge Samuel R. Martires, RTC, Branch 32, Agoo, La Union, to safekeep immediately the case
records of Special Proceeding Case No. A-1026, consisting of three (3) volumes, and thereafter, surrender the same to a
duly authorized representative of the Office of the Court Administrator.
Respondent Judge Ganay sent a letter9 dated March 3, 2006 to the Clerk of Court stating that he had yet to receive a copy
of the letter-complaint dated June 6, 2005 of the heirs of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras against him and the report dated
September 22, 2005 made by the OCA lawyers who conducted a surprise inspection and examination of the records of
Special Proceeding Case No. A-1026. He further stated that he should be given a medal for effecting a speedy settlement of
the estate of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras among his heirs. Respondent Judge Ganay maintained that all his actions merely
implemented the orders of the two (2) property guardians of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras.
Respondent Judge Ganay, together with OIC-Clerk of Court Eslao, subsequently filed a Motion to Furnish Copies dated
March 13, 2006 reiterating his earlier manifestation that he had not yet received copies of the documents that he was
directed to comment on through the Resolution dated January 17, 2006. Respondent Judge Ganay again moved that they
be furnished copies of the said documents so that they could properly and intelligently comment thereon.
And again on March 22, 2006, respondent Judge Ganay filed a Manifestation 10 dated March 21, 2006, submitting an
Advance Comment11 dated March 21, 2006, despite the fact that he had not yet received copies of the documents that he
was directed to comment on. According to respondent Judge Ganay, he was submitting his Advance Comment "to show to
the Supreme Court that its foot soldier of Branch 31, RTC, AGOO, La Union deserves a MEDAL, not a disciplinary action."
In his Advance Comment dated March 21, 2006, respondent Judge Ganay explained that the cellular phones were
purchased upon the orders of the two (2) property guardians of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras. He further explained that the
communication devices were for the fast networking of information for the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras who was then the ward of the
court. Respondent Judge Ganay also narrated that the property guardians persistently asked him to take a vacation in the
United States, which he declined. According to him, they kept on asking him what they could do to help the court. He, in
reply, mentioned that lawbooks would enhance the appearance of his office and make it look scholarly and presentable.
They then appropriated fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos for the purchase of books.
Respondent Judge Ganay expounded on the system of checks and balances that he devised for the handling of the late
Rev. Fr. Aspiras’ funds, thus:
I am just the implementor of the orders of the guardians. In the case of the property guardians, I only implement if the order
is unanimous, i.e., if both property guardians assent.
Why? Because in order to safeguard Reverend Aspiras[’] wealth, one property guardian not taking advantage of the other, it
was arranged that I would be the implementor of their orders. And so if the guardian over the ward’s person says that the
ward should have a wheelchair and the property guardians say okay, I issue an order directed to the bank manager where
the ward’s moneys are to release the stated amount (after a choice of wheel-chair was made by the guardian over the
ward’s person). The bank issues a check and have it delivered to the OIC-Branch Clerk of Court, from which the guardian
over the person retrieves. That way there will be nolamangan, no gulangan between the two (2) property guardians
belonging to opposite camps.
In a Resolution12 dated April 18, 2006, this Court granted respondent Judge Ganay’s motion that he be furnished with copies
of the letter-complaint dated June 6, 2005 and the report dated September 22, 2005.
In another Manifestation13 dated May 16, 2006, respondent Judge Ganay again stated that he and OIC-Clerk of Court Eslao
had not yet received copies of the documents they were required to comment on. This prompted the Court to issue another
Resolution14 dated July 11, 2006, directing the Office of the Clerk of Court to furnish respondent Judge Ganay and OIC-Clerk
of Court Eslao copies of the said documents.
OIC Clerk of Court Eslao submitted her Comment15 dated August 22, 2006 and explained, thus:
The prepaid cell cards were purchased upon the knowledge and approval of the property guardians.
There were 7 cellphones which were regularly fed with prepaid cell cards. These were automatic expenses on a regular
basis. The regularity was every 2 months because the lifetime of a prepaid card is 60 days. Hence, the amount of regular
expenses for prepaid cards was something like P21,000.00 annually. For 2 years, the regular amount was something like
P42,000.00.
The 3 cellphones mentioned in the Memorandum (November 2004) were the replacement cellphones of the 3 guardians.
My position as OIC-Branch Clerk of Court functioned as the clearinghouse so that there could be monitoring of the activities
regarding the ward in this special proceeding.
There was nothing irregular in all these purchases because they were upon the written orders of Judge Ganay, who, in turn,
was himself requested-ordered by the property guardians.
BESIDES, the parties had long ago buried the hatchet as of August 22, 2005 even before the 2 OCA lawyers came to this
Court (August 31, 2005).
This is a case of a false alarm.
Respondent Judge Ganay again submitted an Extended Comment16 dated August 22, 2006 and narrated the peculiar
circumstances in connection with Special Proceeding Case No. A-1026, entitled "In the Matter of the Guardianship of Rev.
Fr. Jose O. Aspiras," to wit:
When Father Aspiras suffered a stroke sometime in September of 2001, paralyzing a portion of his body, his sister Gloria
Aspiras Mamaril filed a petition for guardianship asking the Court that she be appointed guardian primarily because she is a
sister. This was opposed by Helen Grace Canlas, a daughter of Alejandro Aspiras (brother of Father Aspiras). After several
hearings that established the legal incompetency of Father Aspiras, the heirs including those with stakes to protect
(numbering more than 25 in all) agreed that the personal guardian should be, as she was appointed by the Court eventually,
HELEN GRACE CANLAS. The property guardians who were appointed were the living brother and sister of Father Aspiras,
namely Gloria Aspiras Mamaril and Alejandro Aspiras. Both Gloria Aspiras Mamaril and Alejandro Aspiras are retired public
servants, Gloria, being a retired DEPed elementary school teacher while Alejandro, a retired Navy man. After 2 years or so
as one of the property guardians, because he could no longer come up to the third floor where Branch 31 RTC holds office,
Alejandro Aspiras begged off, to be substituted by one of his learned daughters, Professor Mercedita A. Mabutas. She was
appointed later in lieu of her father. She is a Professor of Don Mariano Marcos Memorial State University (DMMMSU) based
in AGOO, La Union.
Normally, a ward of a Court has only one guardian. But the ward of this Court, Father Jose Aspiras, had three (3) guardians.
This is because I had to accommodate both warring camps to avert a continuing war that would not redound to the benefit of
the ward of the Court.
xxx
It was agreed that no withdrawals from the bank account of Father Aspiras shall be allowed without a written order from me.
In order that not one of the 3 guardians could act independently of the other, a system was developed whereby the judge
(and that’s me) only could order the manager of the bank to issue a check in such amount that will cover and answer for a
certain need (see, also pages 8-9, ADVANCE COMMENT, March 21, 2006).
In other words, I and I alone, by agreement with the guardians, held the key to the bank vault.
While I held the key to the bank, the property guardians were the ones who could request-order me to instruct the manager
of the bank to draw or issue a check.
xxx
Contrary to what the writer of that Letter-Complaint dated June 6, 2005, every order for the withdrawal of moneys have been
all highly REGULAR. There was nothing that was irregular.
That’s why after the heirs have chosen to peacefully settle among themselves in the last week of July 2005, I was prevailed
upon by the heirs to stay a little longer so that I can make orders to the bank manager for the eventual, which was a
certainty, distribution of the moneys for the heirs. On August 22, 2005, after the filing of the inventory of properties by the
property guardians, on the same date (August 22, 2005), the heirs executed an EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND
ARRANGEMENT OF ESTATE, which wrote finis to the squabble among the heirs and the sub-heirs. Eventually their shares
in money were distributed. I was hailed as a hero, savior, Santa Claus, godfather. Some of the heirs adopted me a member
of their family. All of them gave balatos one way or another all due to the fast distribution of their shares. Those who came
from Australia, Tarlac and outlying areas beyond the Province of La Union were most grateful.
Respondent Judge Ganay also addressed the allegation that he and his cohorts were attempting to "withdraw at least the
amount of about FOUR MILLION FOUR HUNDRED PESOS (P4,400.00.00)" (sic) from the bank account of the late Rev. Fr.
Aspiras. According to him, he could do it since he held the key to the bank, but he could not and would not do it for the
following reasons:
xxx First, I fear God and the Supreme Court. Second, I was not raised that way by my poor but dignified parents
(mother: retired DEPed public school principal; father: deceased, municipal employee). Third, I am satisfied with my present
earning. Fourth, I have no need for that kind of sum. Fifth, I have a name to protect, being the recipient of many awards.
And sixth, I am an automatic applicant to the Court of Appeals by virtue of R.A. 6713.
In a Resolution17 dated August 29, 2006, this Court referred the instant case to the OCA for evaluation, report and
recommendation.
In its Report18 dated March 12, 2007, the OCA rejected the explanations of respondent Judge Ganay and found him guilty of
violating Sections 13 and 14 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. The OCA
recommended the following actions:
RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Court are our recommendations that:
a) the instant administrative case be REDOCKETED;
b) Judge Clifton U. Ganay, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, Agoo, La Union, be FINED the
amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00);
c) Likewise, OIC-Clerk of Court Precilla Olympia P[.] Eslao, be FINED the amount of Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00); [and]
d) The records of Special Proceeding Case No. A-1026, consisting of three (3) volumes, under the custody of the
Office of the Court Administrator, (per resolution dated January 17, 2006) shall be returned back to the Regional
Trial Court of Branch 31, Agoo, La Union.
After a judicious review of the record of this administrative matter, we find that respondent Judge Ganay has indeed violated
Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, of Canon 4 of the New Code of Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.19 The
aforesaid provisions on Propriety state:
SEC. 13. Judges and members of their families shall neither ask for, nor accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to
anything done or to be done or omitted to be done by him or her in connection with the performance of judicial duties.
SEC. 14. Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff or others subject to their influence, direction or authority, to ask for, or
accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done in connection with
their duties or functions.
SEC. 15. Subject to law and to any legal requirements of public disclosure, judges may receive a token gift, award or benefit
as appropriate to the occasion on which it is made provided that such gift, award or benefit might not reasonably be
perceived as intended to influence the judge in the performance of judicial duties or otherwise give rise to an appearance of
partiality.
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge. Lower court
judges, such as respondent Judge Ganay, play an important role in the promotion of the people's faith in the judiciary. They
are front-liners who give human face to the judicial branch at the grassroots level in their interaction with litigants and those
who do business with the courts. Thus, the admonition that judges must avoid not only impropriety but also the appearance
of impropriety is more sternly applied to them.20
In Dulay v. Lelina, Jr.,21 the Court held:
Although every office in the government is a public trust, no position exacts greater demand on moral righteousness and
uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary. A magistrate of law must comport himself at all times in such manner
that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public. The New Code of Judicial Conduct
for the Philippine Judiciary prescribes that judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is
perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer. Thus, judges are to avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all their activities. Likewise, they are mandated not to allow family, social or other relationships to influence
judicial conduct or judgment, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to
influence the judge. The Code clearly prohibits judges or members of their families from asking for or accepting, any gift,
bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done by him or her in connection with the
performance of judicial duties.
Respondent Judge Ganay clearly fell short of the exacting standards set by the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary. His acts of receiving lawbooks worth fifty thousand pesos, cellular phones and monthly cellular phone
prepaid cards from the property guardians of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras, who was then the ward of the court, constitute
impropriety which the Court cannot allow. Respondent Judge Ganay’s act of issuing Orders directing the manager of the
PNB, La Union Branch to draw checks amounting to thousands of pesos from the account of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras
creates the impression of impropriety and subjects the court to suspicion of irregularities in the conduct of the proceedings.
This Court finds unsatisfactory the explanations propounded by respondent Judge Ganay for his actuations in connection
with Special Proceeding Case No. A-1026. He tried justifying his act of receiving cellular phones and monthly cellular phone
prepaid cards from the property guardians of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras as necessary for the networking of information about
the ward of the court. He likewise rationalized his acceptance of the lawbooks worth fifty thousand pesos from the property
guardians as his way of showing them that he "appreciate[d] their show of appreciation of [his] judicial work for the ward and
to all other cases." Respondent Judge Ganay explained that he did not want the property guardians "to feel resentful
(‘tampo’), frustrated or shamed (‘mapahiya’) if [he] would refuse their generosity." 1avvphi1
This Court has always stressed that a judge should avoid impropriety and even the appearance of impropriety in all
activities, and that he should perform his duties honestly and with impartiality and diligence. Also, a judge should so behave
at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. 22Since respondent Judge Ganay
occupied an exalted position in the administration of justice, he should pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon him;
and his official, as well as his private, conduct must at all times be free from the appearance of impropriety23.
As held in Edaño v. Asdala:24
As the visible representation of the law and justice, judges, such as the respondent, are expected to conduct themselves in
a manner that would enhance the respect and confidence of the people in the judicial system. The New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges must not only maintain their independence, integrity and
impartiality; but they must also avoid any appearance of impropriety or partiality, which may erode the people’s faith in the
judiciary. Integrity and impartiality, as well as the appearance thereof, are deemed essential not just in the proper discharge
of judicial office, but also to the personal demeanor of judges. This standard applies not only to the decision itself, but also to
the process by which the decision is made. Section 1, Canon 2, specifically mandates judges to ‘ensure that not only is their
conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of reasonable observers.’ Clearly, it is of vital
importance not only that independence, integrity and impartiality have been observed by judges and reflected in their
decisions, but that these must also appear to have been so observed in the eyes of the people, so as to avoid any erosion of
faith in the justice system. Thus, judges must be circumspect in their actions in order to avoid doubt and suspicion in the
dispensation of justice. xxx
With regard to the recommendation of the OCA to impose a fine of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos on OIC-Clerk of Court
Eslao, this Court finds the same to be without basis. In her Comment dated August 22, 2006, OIC-Clerk of Court Eslao
sufficiently explained that she merely followed the official orders of respondent Judge Ganay in issuing the Acknowledgment
Receipts for the prepaid cards for the cellular phones. Moreover, nowhere in the OCA Report dated March 12, 2007 is a
discussion regarding OIC-Clerk of Court Eslao’s participation in the alleged irregularities in Special Proceeding Case No. A-
1026.
WHEREFORE, for violating Sections 13, 14 and 15 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary, respondent Judge Clifton U. Ganay is FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) with a stern
warning that a repetition of similar infractions shall be dealt with more severely.
Let the records of Special Proceeding Case No. A-1026, consisting of three (3) volumes, under the custody of the Office of
the Court Administrator (per resolution dated January 17, 2006), be returned to Branch 31 of the Regional Trial Court of
Agoo, La Union.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
G.R. No. RTJ-95-1308 April 12, 2000
EVELYN AGPALASIN, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE EMERITO M. AGCAOILI, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This treats of the administrative case against Judge Emerito Agcaoili of Branch 9 of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri,
Cagayan.
The antecedents of this case are summarized by the Investigating Justice as follows:
Respondent filed a complaint-affidavit dated September 4, 1992 for estafa at the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Aparri against complainant for allegedly shortchanging him of 200 nipa shingles from [the] 5,500
he had purchased from her on May 8, 1991 which he fully paid on May 21, 1991.
Answering the estafa charge against her, complainant filed her Counter-affidavit wherein she not only
denied the same but also charged respondent with the following offenses:
(a) falsification under Article 172, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code
for allegedly making an untruthful statement in the affidavit-complaint
which became the basis for the charge of estafa in the aforestated criminal
case;
(b) incriminating an innocent person under Article 363 of the same code
for allegedly maliciously accusing complainant of estafa; and
(c) violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) for
ordering or allowing a man with a pending criminal case before him
([whom] he eventually acquitted) to receive, transport and pay for the fare
of the 5,500 shingles of nipa ordered by him from complainant and for
allegedly constructing illegally a poultry within the compound of Cagayan
State University which is a government property.
A copy of complainant's said counter-affidavit to the estafa charge was sent by her to the Cagayan
Provincial Prosecutor's Office with the request that a preliminary investigation of her charges against
respondent be conducted.
A three-man panel of deputized Ombudsman Prosecutors was designated to conduct an investigation of

complainant's charges. After initially investigating the charges, the three members of the panel inhibited
themselves from further proceeding with the investigation, giving as reason therefor the fact that one of their
colleagues at the Cagayan Provincial Prosecutor's Office, Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Apolinario Carrao,
had filed administrative charges against respondent at the Supreme Court.
The Cagayan Provincial Prosecutor's Office thus referred the complaint to the Office of the Ombudsman for
the conduct of the preliminary investigation.
After investigation, the Office of the Ombudsman found that a determination of whether or not the affidavit-
complaint of herein respondent in the estafa case is falsified was still premature and thus held in abeyance
any action on the criminal aspect of the case against him until after the termination of the estafa case. It,
however, referred the record of the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for appropriate
administrative
action.1
In a Resolution, dated June 26, 1996,2 the Court referred the case to Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales of the Court of
Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation. Respondent Judge is charged with:
(a) ordering or allowing the accused in Criminal Case No. 09-594 to receive,
transport and pay the fare for 5,500 nipa shingles for respondent Judge's benefit
and subsequently acquitting the accused therein; and
(b) illegally constructing a poultry within the compound of the Cagayan State
University, a government property located at Carig, Tuguegarao, Cagayan.3
The Court received Justice Carpio-Morales' Report on May 21, 1998. Justice Carpio-Morales summarized the evidence for
both the complainant and respondent Judge, thus:
EVIDENCE FOR COMPLAINANT
xxx xxx xxx
In early May 1991, while complainant was tending her business selling nipa shingles at a landing site near
Branch 9 of RTC Aparri, Cagayan, a male employee of respondent approached her informing her that
respondent wanted to purchase nipa shingles from her to be used in the construction of respondent's
poultry house inside the Cagayan State University (CSU) in Carig, Tuguegarao, Cagayan. She thereupon
went to the CSU to estimate the number of shingles needed for the poultry house. She then conveyed to
respondent that 5,500 shingles were needed and respondent approved it and agreed to buy them at a
discounted price of P70.00 per hundred [shingles] payable upon segregation, freight on board Aparri,
Cagayan.
Complainant and her salesman/helper Vicente Umengan (Umengan) thus segregated 5,500 nipa shingles
in the presence of respondent's male representative.
On May 10, 1991, respondent, through RTC Branch 9 stenographer Violeta Bigayan (Violeta), gave two
P500.00 bills or a total of P1,000.00 as advance payment to complainant's employee Umengan,
complainant not being then around.
On May 11, 1991, a Saturday, complainant together with Umengan went to respondent's chambers to
collect the balance of the purchase price and [to] advise him to pick up the nipa shingles as the owner of the
compound where they were temporarily stacked-up was already complaining. [Inside] respondent's
chambers, complainant was introduced by respondent to Sixto Bumatay (Bumatay) who was then facing
trial for robbery along with five others before respondent's court, and to Bumatay's counsel Atty. Juan
Antonio (Atty. Antonio). Complainant was then instructed to deliver the nipa shingles to either of the two
men with the advice that Bumatay would take charge of the payment of the balance of the purchase price.
In the morning of May 13, 1991, upon her return from Pangasinan, complainant called for an FC Liner
minibus and loaded the nipa shingles in the presence of Bumatay. While the loading was in progress, Atty.
Antonio and Umengan arrived. Atty. Antonio, however, left before the loading was finished as Bumatay
assured him that he would take care of everything. After the loading was finished, Bumatay handed to
complainant P385.00 representing the freight charges of the nipa shingles which she in turn gave to the
driver of the bus. Complainant then asked about the balance of the purchase price, and Bumatay replied
that respondent himself would pay it upon delivery of the nipa shingles at the CSU compound in
Tuguegarao.
In view of that development, complainant instructed her secretary Arsenia Casilian (Arsenia) to personally
deliver the nipa shingles at the CSU compound at Tuguegarao and collect the balance of the purchase
price amounting to P2,850.00 from respondent.
Upon arriving at the CSU compound, the nipa shingles were unloaded in the presence of respondent and a
man who assisted in the unloading. Respondent then issued a Metrobank (Tuguegarao Branch) check for
P2,850.00 to Arsenia who gave it to complainant upon returning to Aparri. The check, however, when
presented for payment, was dishonored due to insufficiency of funds, and on redeposit, it was just the same
dishonored for the same reason.
On May 21, 1991, complainant went to respondent's office to inform him of the dishonor of the check
(Respondent admitted that this check was dishonored). . . . . Respondent immediately issued another
check, Land Bank. (Tuguegarao Branch) Check No. 1743842, for the same amount. On the same occasion,
respondent ordered additional 2,300 nipa shingles . . . at P90.00 per hundred from complainant partial
advance payment for which he issued another Metrobank (Aparri Branch) check in the amount of
P1,600.00.
In the morning of May 25, 1991, complainant shipped from Aparri, Cagayan 8,500 nipa shingles to
Tuguegarao, Cagayan via a Malamug Trans bus with instruction to its driver, Benedict Cosme Malamug
(Malamug), to unload 2,300 thereof at the poultry house of respondent inside the CSU compound and to
collect from respondent the corresponding fare and the balance of the purchase price of the nipa shingles.
After several days, an employee of respondent went to complainant and asked her why she had not yet
delivered the second order of 2,300 nipa shingles. This drew complainant to confront Malamug who told her
that the nipa shingles were not unloaded at the CSU compound as nobody there wanted to receive the
same and pay for the corresponding fare, hence, the entire batch of 8,500 nips shingles was unloaded at
the yard of one Freddie Llanto. Complainant thus caused the immediate delivery of the 2,300 nipa shingles
to respondent.
More than one month after the delivery of the 5,500 shingles or on June 25, 1991, complainant was
summoned by respondent to his chambers where he berated her for shortchanging him, so he alleged, of
200 nipa shingles out of the said order of 5,500. Jolted, complainant tried to explain her side but respondent
did not [give] her a chance and bragged that he could easily put her in jail. Certain that she did not defraud
respondent, complainant challenged him to sue her in court.
It occurred to complainant to inquire about the second shipment for 2,300 shingles from Malamug who
explained that the caretaker of the poultry house of respondent could not pay for the freight charges and the
balance of the purchase price therefor, hence, he unloaded only 1,600 shingles and retained the rest.
In the meantime, respondent rendered a decision in Criminal Case No. 09-594 dated August 9, 1991
acquitting Bumatay and his co-accused upon a finding that their guilt was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
Almost four (4) months from the date of delivery of the 5,500 shingles ordered by respondent or on
September 10, 1991, respondent filed a case for estafa against complainant before the MTC of Aparri,
Cagayan arising from the alleged shortchanging of 200 shingles.
In a decision dated June 16, 1993, the MTC of Aparri acquitted complainant of estafa.
EVIDENCE FOR RESPONDENT:
RESPONDENT'S testimony goes:
Anent the first charge, the same is not true for it is his policy as a judge not to ask any favor from anybody
as he knows that it would have to be repaid with another favor.
Anent the alleged meeting at his chambers on May 11, 1991 during which he introduced Bumatay and Atty.
Antonio to complainant and told her that Bumatay or Atty. Antonio would pay for the fare of the 5,500 nipa
shingles, the same is not also true as it has been his policy since his appointment in 1990 not to allow the
entry of, summon or talk with any litigant or his lawyer inside his chambers without the presence of the other
party. Besides, May 11, 1991 fell on a Saturday and was Aparri's town fiesta and he could not have been in
his office on that day as he goes to his residence which is "not far from Aparri" every weekend.
Moreover, he never had any conversation with complainant except during that only instance when he
demanded from her the delivery of the 200 nipa shingles which occurred only sometime "after May 11,
1991, or May 13 or May 15".
He did not know about the participation of Bumatay and/or Atty. Antonio in the shipping of the nipa shingles
to Tuguegarao although he later came to know about Atty. Antonio's participation when he asked
stenographer Violeta several days after May 13, 1991 what happened to the nipa shingles to which she
informed that it was Atty. Antonio who paid in advance for the freight charges therefor. Thus informed, he
immediately issued a Pay to Cash Metrobank (Aparri Branch) check in the amount of P530.00 and handed
it to Violeta for delivery to Atty. Antonio representing reimbursement of the freight charges, which amount
was arrived at by him by estimating the freight charges to be at ten (P.10) centavos per shingles (TSN July
16, 1996, p. 24).
His acquittal of Bumatay in the robbery case was due to the prosecution's failure to prove the guilt of
Bumatay beyond reasonable doubt and not as insinuated in the complaint.
Anent the second charge, there is nothing wrong in the construction of the poultry house inside the
compound of the CSU as the same is covered by a Memorandum of Agreement (Exhibit "4") executed by
and between his wife, Mrs. Norma Agcaoili, and CSU's President, Dr. Armando B. Cortes, which agreement
was duly ratified by the University's Board of Regents.
To corroborate part of his testimony, respondent presented stenographer Violeta, Atty. Juan Antonio, retired
Judge Felipe Tumakder, and Dominador Tamayao whose respective testimonies follow after their names.
VIOLETA BIGAYAN-TORIDA, Court Stenographer III of Branch 9, RTC Aparri, Cagayan:
On May 13, 1991, while she was at the nipa shingles landing site following the directive of respondent for
her to look for a vehicle to ship the nipa shingles bought by Mrs. Agcaoili at Aparri to their poultry house in
Tuguegarao, she saw Atty. Antonio whose help for the purpose she sought. Atty. Antonio at once told her
that he knew of a booking agent who could provide her with the transportation and assured her that he
would take charge of the shipment. With that assurance, she left the matter to Atty. Antonio. She was not
able to tell respondent, however, about the help extended her by Atty. Antonio as respondent had not yet
arrived that day. After several days, Atty. Antonio advised her that the nipa shingles were already shipped
to Tuguegarao and that he had already paid for the freight charges amounting to P530.00.
She later told respondent about the shipping of the nipa shingles by Atty. Antonio and respondent issued
her a Pay to Cash Metrobank check bearing the aforesaid amount which she gave to Atty. Antonio.
She never saw Bumatay, Atty. Antonio or the complainant in the company of respondent on May 8, 11 and
13, 1991. Complainant could not have met respondent, Bumatay and Atty. Antonio at respondent's
chambers on May 11, 1991 as there was no one who held office that day, it being a Saturday and Aparri's
town fiesta.
On cross examination, she admitted that Atty. Antonio told her that it was his client, Sixto Bumatay, who
shipped the nipa shingles to Tuguegarao but that she was unable to tell the same to respondentup to the
time she was testifying (Bumatay in an affidavit dated September 24, 1992 . . . admitted having supervised
the loading of the 5,500 nipa shingles, in his capacity as Booking Agent of the FC Liner, and of paying for
the freight thereof at P7.00 per 100 pieces or a total of P385.00).
ATTY. JUAN ANTONIO, a private practitioner and Sixto Bumatay's counsel in the robbery case:
He was not present when the 5,500 nipa shingles were being loaded on board the FC Liner bus on May 13,
1991. On that particular day, he attended the morning session held at Branch 9 of the RTC Aparri presided
by respondent which started at 8:30 o'clock [sic]. He left Branch 9 at about 10:30 o'clock [sic] that same
morning and proceeded to Branch 7 which is about 150 to 200 meters away.
On his way to Branch 7, he saw Violeta, whom he knew to be Branch 9's stenographer, by the road fronting
the nipa landing site. Surprised to see her there as the session in Branch 9 was still going on, he asked her
why she was there to which she replied that she was waiting for a bus to load nipa shingles bound for
Tuguegarao.
Motivated by his desire to help her, he advised Violeta that she could not expect a bus to pass by that spot
where she was as buses were prohibited from entering commercial streets unless specifically called for by
prospective customers. He thereupon told her that if she wished, he would instruct his client, Sixto
Bumatay, who is a booking agent of FC Liner, to instruct a bus driver to pick-up the nipa shingles from the
place and also to advance the freight charges therefor which she could reimburse later. Violeta heeded his
suggestion.
He then dropped by Bumatay's place and instructed him to have an FC Liner bus pick-up Violeta's cargo
and to advance the corresponding freight therefor which she would later reimburse.
After about six or eight days later (TSN June 28, 1996, p. 179) when he was in Branch 9 of the Aparri RTC,
he saw Violeta who handed to him a check representing the reimbursement of the freight charges which
Bumatay advanced, the amount written on the face of which he could no longer remember. And he did not
inspect the check to see against which bank it was drawn or who drew it for he presumed that it was
Violeta's whom he likewise presumed owned the nipa shingles.
It was only when he went to court on or before May 20, 1991 that he was told that a certain lady
(complainant) was complaining to the judge about the payment of the subject nipa shingles that he learned
that respondent owned the same.
JUDGE FELIPE TUMAKDER (RET.), former judge of the RTC of Aparri, Cagayan.
He notarized the Memorandum of Agreement executed by and between respondent's wife, Mrs. Norma
Agcaoili, and CSU represented by its president, Dr. Armando Cortes, which document was already
prepared when presented to him by the parties thereto on a certain date which he could no longer
remember.
Admitting that he certified to the fact that a photocopy of the memorandum (Exhibit "4", p. 154, Rollo) was a
reproduction of the original, he could not, however, declare that such photocopy was indeed a faithful
reproduction of the original as he could not locate his notarial records and the original copy of respondent
was never shown to him when he signed the certification in issuing which he merely relied in good faith on
his clerk who prepared it.
DOMINADOR O. TAMAYAO, Director of Extension of CSU, who testified in lieu of Dr. Armando Cortes-
signatory to the memorandum of agreement who was unavailable at the time he was called to testify on
June 27 and 28, 1996:
He has personal knowledge about the lease agreement between the university as represented by Dr.
Cortes and Mrs. Agcaoili, he being a member of the technical committee which studied the technical aspect
of the project subject thereof. He admitted, however, that he had no participation in the execution of the
documents relating thereto which were subject of the subpoena duces tecum as he was not the custodian
thereof.
REBUTTAL EVIDENCE
ARSENIA CASILIAN, complainant's secretary:
On May 13, 1991, she was sent by complainant to Tuguegarao via an FC Liner bus to deliver the 5,500
nipa shingles at CSU compound in Tuguegarao and to collect the balance of the purchase price in the
amount of P2,850.00 from respondent.
After delivering all the 5,500 . . . nipa shingles in the presence of respondent at the CSU compound,
respondent handed to her a Metrobank check in the amount of P2,850.00 which she in turn gave to
complainant upon her return to Aparri.
During the loading of the nipa shingles, she was with Atty. Antonio, Sixto Bumatay, Vicente Umengan and
complainant at the nipa landing site and she saw Bumatay pay for the freight charges of the nipa shingles. 4
The Court has pored over the records of this case and finds the foregoing summary of the evidence to be consistent
therewith. The Court also agrees with the following assessment of the Investigating Justice:
I. On the first charge:
There is no evidence on record that respondent acquitted Sixto Bumatay in the robbery case by reason of
the favor he extended towards the respondent.
The undersigned is convinced, however, that respondent directed or allowed Sixto Bumatay and Atty.
Antonio to take charge of the shipping of the nipa shingles he purchased from complainant and to let
Bumatay pay for the freight thereof.
Respondent and his witnesses' version do not inspire credence.
Respondent's witness Violeta Bigayan is a trusted employee. She was, by the defense['s] account, the one
sent by respondent to arrange for the shipping of the 5,500 nipa shingles to Tuguegarao, to pay to
complainant, thru Vicente Umengan, the advance payment of P1,000.00 therefor, and to deliver the alleged
reimbursement check to Atty. Antonio. At the time Violeta took the witness stand on July 16, 1996, she was
still a court stenographer at respondent's sala, hence, still under the latter's moral ascendancy. For these
reasons, her likelihood of telling the truth becomes seriously suspect.
Atty. Antonio's objectivity, on the other hand, is betrayed by his close association with respondent. At the
time complainant was instructed by respondent at the latter's office to deliver the nipa shingles to either
Atty. Antonio or Bumatay on May 11, 1991, the two were present. Atty. Antonio at one point during the
pendency of this case at the Office of the Ombudsman even served as respondent's counsel (vide: Exhibit
"14", Rollo, pp. 211-212) which likely accounts for his bias towards respondent.
Atty. Antonio's testimony that he presumed that the shingles belonged to Violeta contradicted the latter's
claim that she told him to ask at the nipa landing site about the nipa shingles "bought by Mrs. Agcaoili".
Besides, Atty. Antonio's claim that he did not bother to ask Violeta regarding the ownership of the nipa
shingles and that he never bothered to check or peruse the Metrobank check given by her is not in
accordance with the ordinary course of things and human experience.
Violeta's claim that she was sent by respondent to look for a bus to ship the nipa shingles without him giving
her money to pay for the freight thereof, that she without respondent's knowledge asked Atty. Antonio to
facilitate the transportation of the said nipa shingles without her bothering to tell Atty. Antonio from whom he
would secure the nipa shingles and to whom and to which area in Tuguegarao they would be delivered, and
that she only learned after several days that the nipa shingles were already transported are incredible. How
could Atty. Antonio have known from whom, among the vendors operating in the nipa landing site, to
secure/claim the 5,500 nipa shingles and to whom he would deliver them in Tuguegarao if Violeta did not
advise him about it [?] And if it were really true that Violeta was asked by respondent to look for a vehicle to
ship the shingles, it is incredible that she would not immediately verify whether or not they were actually
shipped by Atty. Antonio or Bumatay. For if respondent had asked her whether or not she complied with his
order, what concrete answer would she give?
In fine, the testimonies of the above-named witnesses for respondent are not credible.
Violeta and Atty. Antonio's testimonies thus discredited, respondent is left with his own testimony to rely on
to rebut complainant's accusations.
Respondent's testimony, however, like the testimonies of his said two witnesses, does not pursuade.
His feigned ignorance of Bumatay's and Atty. Antonio's participation in the loading of the nipa shingles and
in the payment of the freight charges therefor cannot prevail over the positive assertion of complainant that
he himself told her on May 11, 1991 to deliver the nipa shingles to either Bumatay or Atty. Antonio.
Complainant's testimony about her having [been] instructed by respondent on May 11, 1991 to deliver the
shingles to either Bumatay or Atty. Antonio is being questioned by respondent as being in contradiction with
what she stated in her counter-affidavit-complaint-affidavit (Exhibit "A").
The contradiction between complainant's assertion during her testimony at the witness stand and her
statement in her counter-affidavit is more apparent than real. The instruction for Umengan to deliver the
nipa shingles to either Bumatay or Atty. Antonio was given by an employee of the court (Violeta)on May
10, 1991 following Violeta's delivery to Umengan of the advance payment of P1,000.00. Theinstruction of
respondent to complainant for her to deliver the nipa shingles to either of the duo was given a day
after, i.e., on May 11, 1991. There was thus no contradiction. What is thus apparent is that the instruction
given by respondent to complainant on May 11, 1991 was just a reiteration or confirmation of the instruction
given on May 10, 1991 by respondent's stenographer Violeta to complainant's employee Umengan.
That May 11, 1991 was a Saturday and Aparri's town fiesta does not render complainant's testimony
worthless and unreliable. On the contrary, it would even strengthen her claim, for were we to believe
respondent's claim that he never receives litigants or their lawyers inside his chambers, it is very likely that
the meeting took place on that non-working day to avoid people around, who might be knowledgeable about
the pendency of Bumatay's case in his sala, seeing respondent in the company of Bumatay and Atty.
Antonio. Impropriety is known to be usually done in secret. Besides it is not unlikely that respondent was in
Aparri to attend the town fiesta.
What renders respondent's claim of ignorance about Atty. Antonio's participation even more incredible is his
claim that he came to know of the alleged participation of Atty. Antonio in the shipping of his nipa shingles
only "several days" after the May 13, 1991 when he asked Violeta what happened to them. Such claim
defies logic and reason. Under normal circumstances, an ordinary person prudent enough to take ordinary
care of his business or any concerns or interests would not allow a day [to] pass without wanting to know
what happened to an undertaking — like shipping of 5,500 nipa shingles — he entrusts to a subordinate.
As a judge, respondent is presumed to know that it is unlawful and improper to receive any kind of favor
from litigants or their counsel in whatever form it may be given. Yet, on being allegedly informed of the
shipping by Atty. Antonio of the shingles and of his advancing of the freight charges, he did not ask Violeta
why . . . . He just readily issued an alleged reimbursement check.
A careful scrutiny of the alleged reimbursement check (Exhibit "10") dated June 4, 1991 and purportedly
deposited for payment on June 11, 1991, however, convinces the undersigned that the issuance of the
same was an afterthought intended to exculpate respondent. Why was the check made payable to "cash"
and not to the order of Atty. Antonio who, per information of Violeta, paid for the freight[?] Why was P530.00
written on the face of the check if, by respondent's own estimate, the freight charge is P.10 per shingle and,
therefore, the total amount should be P550.00? Since Bumatay claims to have paid only P385.00, why the
acceptance and presentation of the check for payment? And why should Atty. Antonio's signature appear
on the Pay to Cash check when Bumatay could encash it himself and needed no guarantor for the
purpose[?] Such is only reflective of the panic attendant to the exposure of respondent's receipt of favor
from a litigant. Finally, if as Atty. Antonio claimed he was handed the reimbursement check "six or [eight]
days" after May 13, 1991 when the shingles were shipped to Tuguegarao or at the latest on May 21, 1991,
was respondent so financially strapped that he had to postdate to June 4, 1991 the P530.00 check?
II. On the second charge:
Respondent's defense is that the use of the lot located inside the CSU compound in Tuguegarao where he
constructed his poultry house is covered by a memorandum of agreement-contract of lease executed by his
wife and Dr. Cortes duly approved by the Board of Regents of CSU.
The persons presented by respondent supposedly to identify and authenticate the documents bearing on
the lease turned out to be unreliable. Notary public Judge Tumakder who issued a certification that the
memorandum of agreement was a true copy (Exhibit "4", p. 154, Rollo) admitted never seeing the original or
copy thereof when he made the certification as his own file copy was missing and the file copy of either the
CSU or Mrs. Agcaoili was never presented to him when he issued the certification. On the other hand, Mr.
Tamayao of CSU admitted that he had no hand in the execution of the photocopied documents he brought
with him as he is not the official custodian thereof.
Respondent of course' later produced an alleged carbon original of the memorandum of agreement (Exhibit
"12-j") leasing a portion of the CSU property for a period of ten (10) years commencing on April 1, 1991,
which document appears to have been notarized on July 1, 1991 and, per certification of therein signatory
CSU President Dr. Cortes, ratified by the Board of Regents on October 14, 1991. As reflected in the
undersigned's comment during the investigation, however, (TSN July 16, 1996, p. 12), and in complainant's
counsel's cross-examination of respondent, the said document-Exhibit "12-j" contains handwritten entries in
different ink — colored ballpens, original and over carbon paper typewritten entries, and corrections/super-
impositions over snow-fake [sic] portions.
But even assuming that the document covering the alleged lease is genuine, it would appear that at the
time the construction of the poultry house started in May 1991 when the nipa shingles were delivered, the
use of the lot on which it was being constructed was not yet covered by a valid and binding contract. For the
Memorandum of Agreement between CSU and his wife was executed only on July 11, 1991 and was
allegedly ratified by the CSU Board of Regents only on October 14, 1991.5
On the basis of the foregoing, the Investigating Justice recommends that, as regards the first charge, respondent Judge be
dismissed for gross misconduct.
Prescinding from the above disquisitions, the undersigned finds that respondent's proven act of having
ordered or allowed Sixto Bumatay, an accused in a robbery case pending in his sala, to transport and pay
for freight charges of 5,500 nipa shingles, constitutes gross misconduct.
Respondent thus failed to live up to the norm that a judge should so behave at all times as to promote
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary (Rule 2.01, Canon 2, Code of Judicial
[C]onduct). He openly transgressed the rule that a judge (or any immediate member of the family) shall not
accept a gift, bequest, favor or loan from anyone except as may be allowed by law (Rule 5.04, Canon 5,
Code of Judicial Conduct).
A magistrate must comport himself at all times in such a manner that his conduct, official and otherwise,
can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and
justice (In re: Judge Benjamin H. Virrey, 202 SCRA 628, 634 [1991]). He, as it has often be[en] said, is like
Ceasar's wife, and like her, he must be above suspicion and beyond reproach (In re: Judge Benjamin H.
Virrey, Ibid.).6
The recommendation is well taken.
The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and
independence.7 He should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary,8 and avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.9 His personal behavior, not only while in
the performance of official duties but also outside the court, must be beyond reproach, for he is, as he so aptly is perceived
to be, the visible personification of law and of justice. 10
Regrettably, respondent Judge has failed to live up to these standards. His act of allowing a litigant in his sala to pay for the
freight of his personal acquisitions constitutes a blatant violation of Rule 5.04, Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
prohibiting judges from accepting a gift, bequest, favor or loan from anyone except as may be allowed by law. Judge
Agcaoili thereby degraded the administration of justice, mocked the dignity of his office, and cast doubt on the independence
and integrity of the entire judiciary.
That the accused who indulged respondent Judge's corrupt tendencies was subsequently acquitted further gives rise to
suspicions that the judge was influenced by the favors the accused extended to him. It gives the impression that the judge
was swayed by factors other than the evidence on record, that he arrived at the decision of acquittal other than by his own
independent judgment.
A judge should, in pending or prospective litigation before him, be scrupulously careful to avoid such action as may
reasonably tend to waken the suspicion that his social or business relations or friendships constitute an element in
determining his judicial course. 11 He must not only render a just, correct and impartial decision but should do so in such a
manner as to be free from any suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality and integrity. 12 A decision which correctly applies the
law and jurisprudence will nevertheless be subject to questions of impropriety when rendered by a magistrate or tribunal
believed to be less than impartial and honest. 13
As regards the allegedly illegal construction of a poultry house in the premises of the Cagayan State University, the Court,
however, like the Investigating Justice, is inclined to give respondent Judge the benefit of the doubt in view of the lease
agreement subsequently executed between the University and respondent's wife. In any event, the second charge has been
rendered moot by the penalty of dismissal this Court is about to impose upon respondent for the first charge.
Indeed, this is not the only instance that respondent Judge has committed a transgression of judicial ethics. InChan
vs. Agcaoili, 14 this Court found respondent guilty of simple negligence resulting in non-compliance with Canon 2, Rule 2.01
of the Code of Judicial Conduct. In said case, Judge Agcaoili failed to issue a warrant of arrest against an accused who had
jumped bail. His omission merited from this Court a reprimand and a warning that a repetition of similar acts or omissions in
the future will be dealt with more severely.
In Cortes vs. Agcaoili, 15 this Court found respondent guilty of three infractions.
First, respondent Judge was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law when he ordered the release of confiscated forest
products to a person who had derived his title from another who had no license, permit or authority to possess the same, in
utter disregard of the provisions of Section 78 of the Revised Forestry Code.
Second, respondent Judge was found guilty of improper grant of bail. He issued an order granting bail without a recital of
any evidence presented by the prosecution, making such order defective in form and substance. Moreover, the grant of bail
was unjustified since no document was submitted to support the submission that the accused was ill and suffered brain
injuries.
Third, the Court ruled that respondent Judge was guilty of fraternizing with litigants in violation of Canon 2 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct.
For these infractions, the Court imposed upon respondent Judge a fine of P20,000.00 for ignorance of the law and another
P20,000.00 for the improper grant of bail. Respondent was also suspended for ten days, since it was his second infraction of
the rules on bail, the first being in Chan v. Agcaoili. 16 The Judge was, likewise, reprimanded for Fraternizing with litigants.
Finally, the Court warned respondent that a repetition of the foregoing or similar transgressions shall be penalized much
more severely.
Thus, respondent Judge has habitually flouted judicial ethics and betrayed judicial standards. By his own actions and
omissions, he has shown he does not deserve the honor of his office. On this occasion, therefore, the Court metes upon
respondent the severest of administrative penalties. He is, hereby, stripped of his robes.
WHEREFORE, Judge Emerito M. Agcaoili is hereby DISMISSED from the service for gross misconduct. The Court hereby
orders the FORFEITURE of all retirement benefits to which he may be entitled with prejudice to REEMPLOYMENT in the
government service, including government-owned or controlled agencies or corporations. This is WITHOUT PREJUDICE to
any other action that may be properly taken against him for possible violation of, among other laws, the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019, as amended).
SO ORDERED. 1âwphi1. nêt
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., no part. Did not take part.
Vitug, J., on official leave.

CANON 5
A.M. No. RTJ-95-1330 January 30, 1996
AZUCENA CINCO TABAO AND JESUSA CINCO ACOSTA, complainants,

vs.
JUDGE ENRIQUE C. ASIS, Regional Trial Court, Br. 10, Abuyog, Leyte, respondent.
RESOLUTION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a complaint filed by the sisters Azucena Cinco Tabao and Jesusa Cinco Acosta against Judge Enrique C. Asis
charging him with (a) gross irregularity in the performance of his duties as MTCC Judge of Tacloban City, Br. 1; (b) violation
of Supreme Court circulars and regulations; and (c) abuse of authority and conduct unbecoming of a judge.1
Complainants charge that while acting as MTCC Judge of Tacloban City respondent notarized a Special Power of Attorney
purportedly executed in behalf of their aunt Mariquita M. Cinco-Jocson, now deceased. The Special Power of Attorney
enabled another aunt, Cirila Cinco-Caintic, sister of Mariquita M. Cinco-Jocson, to sell Lot 19-D situated in Quezon City and
registered in her name under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 21184 for P1,000,000.00 who at the time of the sale was
confined at St. Paul's Hospital, Tacloban City.
In his comment, respondent Judge admitted that he notarized the Special Power of Attorney but only "as a gesture of
christian charity and brotherly love for people in need"2 considering that the proceeds of the sale would be used to defray the
medical expenses of Mariquita M. Cinco-Jocson. Respondent further alleged that he did not receive payment therefor.
However, an examination of the Special Power of Attorney3 and the Affidavit of Consciousness4 executed respectively by
Mariquita M. Cinco and Dr. Belen Chiquillo Diamante, Internist-Cardiologist, negates respondent's professed "christian
charity and brotherly love for people in need" since those documents were already notarized on 3 June 1992 by Notary
Public Flaviano V. Caintic while respondent notarized them on 23 July 1992. Clearly, therefore, there was no need for
respondent to further notarize the documents. What for, it may be asked. Respondent Judge should know, if he does not,
that a notarized document executed by a party alone — and not by two (2) or more parties executing the document in
different places — does not need to be notarized twice. But why these two (2) documents were notarized by respondent
judge after they were notarized by Notary Public Flaviano V. Caintic one (1) month and twenty (20) days after they were first
notarized by Caintic puzzles us no end, and only respondent can explain this satisfactorily but which he did not. We can only
surmise his reasons, but none of which, unfortunately, we can justify. Why he had to do it taxes credulity and defies logic
and reason. Consequently, Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo P. Abesamis recommends that respondent Judge Enrique
C. Asis be fined in an amount equivalent to his one (1) month salary, and notes without action the prayer for annulment of
the assailed Special Power of Attorney as it does not fall within the purview of this proceeding.
Section 35, Rule 138, of the Revised Rules of Court as well as Canon 5, Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides
that no judge or other official or employee of the superior courts shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or
give professional advice to clients. Specifically, Sec. 35 of Rule 138 was promulgated pursuant to the constitutional power of
the Court to regulate the practice of law. It is based on sound reasons of public policy, for there is no question that the rights,
duties, privileges and functions of the office of an attorney-at-law are so inherently incompatible with the high official
functions, duties, powers, discretions and privileges of a judge of the Regional Trial Court. This rule makes it obligatory upon
the judicial officers concerned to give their full time and attention to their judicial duties, prevent them from extending special
favors for their own private interests and assure the public of impartiality in the performance of their functions. These
objectives are dictated by a sense of moral decency and the desire to promote public interest.5
Moreover, Sec. N, Chapter VIII, of the Manual for Clerks of Court provides that officers authorized to administer oaths, with
the exception of notaries public, municipal judges and clerks of court, are not obliged to administer oaths or execute
certificates save in matters of official business; and with the exception of notaries public, the officer performing the service in
those matters shall charge no fee, unless specifically authorized by law. 6 In short, municipal judges can administer oaths or
execute certificates only on matters related to their official functions. Thus they cannot notarize private documents such as
the Special Power of Attorney and the Affidavit of Consciousness involved in the case before us.
As found by Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo P. Abesamis, respondent Judge not only notarized documents executed
by private individuals concerning private interests but even acted as private counsel "to safeguard the interest of Ms.
Mariquita M. Cinco-Jocson" upon request of Cirila Cinco Caintic.7 That he acted in the spirit of "christian charity" is not a valid
excuse for acting as private counsel and notary public, and that complainants were motivated with vengeance and personal
gain is immaterial.
Municipal judges may not engage in notarial work except as notaries public ex-officio, in which case they may only notarize
documents connected with the exercise of their official functions. They may not, as such notaries publicex-officio, undertake
the preparation and acknowledgement of private documents, contracts and other acts of conveyance, which bear no relation
to the performance of their functions as judges, except in far-flung municipalities which have neither lawyers nor notaries
public, in which case, MTC and MCTC judges assigned to those municipalities or circuits may, in their capacity as notaries
public ex-officio, perform any act within the competence of a regular notary public provided that (a) all notarial fees charged
be for the account of the Government and turned over to the municipal treasurer, and (b) a certification be made in the
notarized documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary public in such municipality or circuit.8 Incidentally, the City
of Tacloban abounds with notaries public, so that respondent Judge cannot qualify as an exception.
ACCORDINGLY, as recommended, respondent JUDGE ENRIQUE C. ASIS is found administratively liable as charged and
is consequently FINED TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) with a warning that the commission of the same or similar
act will warrant a more severe sanction.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Vitug, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
A.M. No. RTJ-89-406 July 18, 1991
ENRIQUETA GARGAR DE JULIO, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE BENJAMIN A.G. VEGA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:p
Enriqueta Gargar de Julio filed a complaint on June 15, 1989 charging Judge Benjamin A.G. Vega (formerly of the City Court
of Olongapo City, now of the Regional Trial Court in Manila) with conduct unbecoming a judge ("hindi karapat-dapat gawain
ng isang na nanunungkulan huwes, na nagbibigay ng walang pagtitiwala at deskumpiyansa sa mamamayan"). (p. 1, Rollo.)
The records show that in 1977 Judge Benjamin Vega and his wife, Carmelita Vega, leased for a monthly rental of P500, the
complainant's building at No. 2706-A Rizal Avenue, Olongapo City, where they operated a bake shop and hot pandesal
business on the premises. The lessees used to pay the rent regularly but defaulted beginning July 16, 1977. The owner
made verbal demands for payment but the lessees did not heed them. On November 25, 1977, a demand letter was sent by
the complainant, through counsel, to the lessees. As the Vegas failed to comply with the lessors' demands, the latter filed an
ejectment complaint on January 23, 1978 in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, Olongapo City (Civil Case No.
1690, entitled: "Enrique A. Gargar and Juan de Julio, plaintiffs vs. Carmelita Vega, joined by her husband, Benjamin Vega,
defendants").
Answering the ejectment complaint, the defendants alleged that no rents were due after July 15, 1977 for they stopped the
operation of their bake shop on that date after Judge Vega was promoted to the Court of First Instance of Palawan.
The trial lasted ten (10) years on account of Judge Vega's dilatory tactics compounded by his over-extended testimony (he
took the witness stand seven times) while a succession of four different judges took turns presiding over the court. Judgment
was rendered by Municipal Judge Emet B. Manalo on February 18, 1987, the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the sum of Two
Thousand Five Hundred (P2,5000.00) Pesos representing payment of rentals for five (5) months at the rate
of P500.00 a month, from December 5, 1977 (the date when plaintiffs' demand letter was received by the
defendants) up to April 5, 1978 the date more or less when the defendants actually vacated the leased
premises, plus interest computed at legal rate reckoned from the dates they became due, plus attorney's
fee in the amount of P500.00. (p. 12, MTC, Judgment.)
The amount due on the judgment, including legal rate of interest (over a period of ten years) and attorney's fees, was only
P4,500, but respondent would not give his lessors the satisfaction of recovering what was due them. He appealed the
decision to the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City which affirmed it. From the Regional Trial Court, he took the case to
the Court of Appeals which dismissed his petition for review.
Even after the judgment had become final, its execution was delayed because Judge Vega questioned the computation of
the amount due (P4,500). When the writ of execution was presented to him in his office at Malolos, Bulacan (from Palawan,
he was transferred to the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan), he advised the sheriff to serve it at his house in Quezon
City. Neither the original nor the alias writ of execution was satisfied. It was only after the complainant filed this
administrative case against him on June 15, 1989 that Judge Vega paid through the Assistant Clerk of Court on July 21,
1989 the sum of P4,500 on the judgment in Civil Case No. 1690 (Annex 1).
The facts of this case limn an unflattering picture of a judge who, by abuse of his legal expertise and through dilatory
maneuvers, managed to evade and delay the payment of a just debt.
Willful failure to pay a just debt is a serious offense under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by the resolution of
this Court dated July 25, 1974. The amount involved (P4,500) is not big. He could easily have paid it, but it appears that he
was bent on frustrating the complainant's best efforts to obtain satisfaction of her lawful claim, apparently for no other reason
than to annoy and oppress her for having haled him and his wife into court. While an ejectment case is supposed to be
summary in nature, respondent Judge, through dilatory tactics, stretched the trial over a period of ten (10) years, and
dragged the case all the way from the municipal court to the Court of Appeals. After the decision had become final, he
delayed payment for two more years. He came across only after the complainant, in exasperation, had filed this
administrative charge against him.
There is no doubt in the mind of this Court that respondent judge's conduct toward the complainant was oppressive and
unbecoming a member of the judiciary. He used his position and his legal knowledge to welsh on just debt and to harrass his
creditor. His example erodes public faith in the capacity of courts to administer justice. He violated Rule 2.01, Canon 2 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct which requires that "a judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Benjamin A.G. Vega guilty of oppressive conduct and willful delay in
paying a just debt (Section 5, Rule 140, Rules of Court as amended). He is ordered to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000) and is hereby warned that a repetition of this misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Gancayco, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur with the majority opinion in its finding that respondent Judge Benjamin A.G. Vega is guilty of oppressive conduct (in
promoting his own personal interest) and of wilful delay in paying a just debt. However, I disagree as to the penalty it
imposes on the respondent. I believe that the conduct of respondent Judge, a public official tasked with upholding the law,
but who used his legal knowledge and expertise to delay and avoid the payment of a relatively measly sum of Four
Thousand Five Hundred and Fifty Pesos (P4,550,00) which, in the first place, was his just debt, to the prejudice of another,
is a dastardly act which deserves the extreme penalty of expulsion or dismissal from the Bench, not just a mere fine of
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).
The Judiciary is one of the three (3) main pillars of our government. It is the last bastion where one seeking justice should
find fulfillment. Its members must possess courage, character and conviction in order to inspire public confidence in the
courts. In the words of former Chief Justice Paras in Ocampo vs. Secretary of Justice, 1 "there is no surer guarantee of
judicial independence than the God-given character and fitness of those appointed to the Bench."
The office of a judge is a public office and, as such, it is, as the Constitution in no uncertain terms speaks, a public trust. This
is more than a moral adjuration. It is a legal imperative. 2
Mr. Justice Malcolm identified good judges with "men who have a mastery of the principles of law, who discharge their duties
in accordance with law, who are permitted to perform the duties of the office undeterred by outside influence, and who are
independent self-respecting human units in a judicial system equal and coordinate to the two other departments of
government." 3
Judge Vega's conduct, as described in the majority opinion, is, to say the least, reprehensible for he used his legal
knowledge to unduly perpetuate his selfish material interest. He lost all awareness that "a judge must be the first to abide by
the law and weave an example for others to follow. He should be studiously careful to avoid even the slightest infraction of
the law." 4 "A magistrate of the law must comport himself at all times in such a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise,
can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice." 5 Respondent
judge, by his oppressive conduct, has clearly demonstrated his unfitness to dispense justice without fear or favor, as he
would not hesitate to cause injury to others to promote his own misplaced personal interest.
Our Judiciary has undergone two (2) reorganizations, namely: the first, under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 in 1980, and the
second, by force of "people power" in 1986. These reorganizations had one underlying purpose, i.e., to weed out the bad
from the good, so that what might emerge is a Judiciary truly deserving to be called the last bulwark of democracy.
There should be no reason — or is there? — for yet another reorganization to weed out the unfit and undeserving. In this
case, we are faced with a judge who had the audacity to use the very same legal tools intended to serve the ends of justice,
to create injustice. He should not be able to get away with just a fine or what may be likened to a mere slap on the hand. He
deserves to be expelled from such an exalted position, for to let him remain will greatly undermine the dignity and credibility
of the Judiciary. The felt necessities of time, to borrow a phrase from Holmes, dictate that there should be no more delay for
if no step be taken and at the earliest opportunity, it will not be too much to say that the people's faith in the administration of
justice could be shaken. 6
I vote for respondent Judge's dismissal from the Judiciary.
Melencio-Herrera, Feliciano and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
I concur with the majority opinion in its finding that respondent Judge Benjamin A.G. Vega is guilty of oppressive conduct (in
promoting his own personal interest) and of wilful delay in paying a just debt. However, I disagree as to the penalty it
imposes on the respondent. I believe that the conduct of respondent Judge, a public official tasked with upholding the law,
but who used his legal knowledge and expertise to delay and avoid the payment of a relatively measly sum of Four
Thousand Five Hundred and Fifty Pesos (P4,550,00) which, in the first place, was his just debt, to the prejudice of another,
is a dastardly act which deserves the extreme penalty of expulsion or dismissal from the Bench, not just a mere fine of
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).
The Judiciary is one of the three (3) main pillars of our government. It is the last bastion where one seeking justice should
find fulfillment. Its members must possess courage, character and conviction in order to inspire public confidence in the
courts. In the words of former Chief Justice Paras in Ocampo vs. Secretary of Justice, 1 "there is no surer guarantee of
judicial independence than the God-given character and fitness of those appointed to the Bench."
The office of a judge is a public office and, as such, it is, as the Constitution in no uncertain terms speaks, a public trust. This
is more than a moral adjuration. It is a legal imperative. 2
Mr. Justice Malcolm identified good judges with "men who have a mastery of the principles of law, who discharge their duties
in accordance with law, who are permitted to perform the duties of the office undeterred by outside influence, and who are
independent self-respecting human units in a judicial system equal and coordinate to the two other departments of
government." 3
Judge Vega's conduct, as described in the majority opinion, is, to say the least, reprehensible for he used his legal
knowledge to unduly perpetuate his selfish material interest. He lost all awareness that "a judge must be the first to abide by
the law and weave an example for others to follow. He should be studiously careful to avoid even the slightest infraction of
the law." 4 "A magistrate of the law must comport himself at all times in such a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise,
can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice." 5 Respondent
judge, by his oppressive conduct, has clearly demonstrated his unfitness to dispense justice without fear or favor, as he
would not hesitate to cause injury to others to promote his own misplaced personal interest.
Our Judiciary has undergone two (2) reorganizations, namely: the first, under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 in 1980, and the
second, by force of "people power" in 1986. These reorganizations had one underlying purpose, i.e., to weed out the bad
from the good, so that what might emerge is a Judiciary truly deserving to be called the last bulwark of democracy.
There should be no reason — or is there? — for yet another reorganization to weed out the unfit and undeserving. In this
case, we are faced with a judge who had the audacity to use the very same legal tools intended to serve the ends of justice,
to create injustice. He should not be able to get away with just a fine or what may be likened to a mere slap on the hand. He
deserves to be expelled from such an exalted position, for to let him remain will greatly undermine the dignity and credibility
of the Judiciary. The felt necessities of time, to borrow a phrase from Holmes, dictate that there should be no more delay for
if no step be taken and at the earliest opportunity, it will not be too much to say that the people's faith in the administration of
justice could be shaken. 6
I vote for respondent Judge's dismissal from the Judiciary.
Melencio-Herrera, Feliciano and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
A.M. No. 88-7-1861-RTC October 5, 1988
IN RE: DESIGNATION OF JUDGE RODOLFO U. MANZANO AS MEMBER OF THE ILOCOS NORTE PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE.
PADILLA, J.:
On 4 July 1988, Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, Executive Judge, RTC, Bangui, Ilocos Norte, Branch 19, sent this Court a letter
which reads:
Hon. Marcelo Fernan

Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of the Philippines
Manila
Thru channels: Hon. Leo Medialdea

Court Administrator
Supreme Court of the Philippines
Sir:
By Executive Order RF6-04 issued on June 21, 1988 by the Honorable Provincial Governor of Ilocos Norte,
Hon. Rodolfo C. Farinas, I was designated as a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on
Justice created pursuant to Presidential Executive Order No. 856 of 12 December 1986, as amended by
Executive Order No. 326 of June 1, 1988. In consonance with Executive Order RF6-04, the Honorable
Provincial Governor of Ilocos Norte issued my appointment as a member of the Committee. For your ready
reference, I am enclosing herewith machine copies of Executive Order RF6-04 and the appointment.
Before I may accept the appointment and enter in the discharge of the powers and duties of the position as
member of the Ilocos (Norte) Provincial Committee on Justice, may I have the honor to request for the
issuance by the Honorable Supreme Court of a Resolution, as follows:
(1) Authorizing me to accept the appointment and to as assume and discharge the powers
and duties attached to the said position;
(2) Considering my membership in the Committee as neither violative of the Independence

of the Judiciary nor a violation of Section 12, Article VIII, or of the second paragraph of
Section .7, Article IX (B), both of the Constitution, and will not in any way amount to an
abandonment of my present position as Executive Judge of Branch XIX, Regional Trial
Court, First Judicial Region, and as a member of the Judiciary; and
(3) Consider my membership in the said Committee as part of the primary functions of an
Executive Judge.
May I please be favored soon by your action on this request.
Very respectfully yours,
(Sgd) RODOLFO U. MANZANO

Judge
An examination of Executive Order No. 856, as amended, reveals that Provincial/City Committees on Justice are created to
insure the speedy disposition of cases of detainees, particularly those involving the poor and indigent ones, thus alleviating
jail congestion and improving local jail conditions. Among the functions of the Committee are—
3.3 Receive complaints against any apprehending officer, jail warden, final or judge who may be found to
have committed abuses in the discharge of his duties and refer the same to proper authority for appropriate
action;
3.5 Recommend revision of any law or regulation which is believed prejudicial to the proper administration
of criminal justice.
It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform administrative functions. Administrative functions are
those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for; their own welfare and the
promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the
administrative agency by the organic law of its existence (Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services Inc., vs.
Tapucar, SP-07599-R, 29 September 1978, Blacks Law Dictionary).
Furthermore, under Executive Order No. 326 amending Executive Order No. 856, it is provided that—
Section 6. Supervision.—The Provincial/City Committees on Justice shall be under the supervision of the
Secretary of justice Quarterly accomplishment reports shall be submitted to the Office of the Secretary of
Justice.
Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts established by law shag not be designated to
any agency performing quasi- judicial or administrative functions (Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution).
Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice, which discharges a
administrative functions, will be in violation of the Constitution, the Court is constrained to deny his request.
Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in his concurring opinion in the case of Garcia vs. Macaraig (39 SCRA 106) ably
sets forth:
2. While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be enforced with pedantic rigor, the
practical demands of government precluding its doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a member of the
judiciary being required to assume a position or perform a duty non-judicial in character. That is implicit in
the principle. Otherwise there is a plain departure from its command. The essence of the trust reposed in
him is to decide. Only a higher court, as was emphasized by Justice Barredo, can pass on his actuation. He
is not a subordinate of an executive or legislative official, however eminent. It is indispensable that there be
no exception to the rigidity of such a norm if he is, as expected, to be confined to the task of adjudication.
Fidelity to his sworn responsibility no less than the maintenance of respect for the judiciary can be satisfied
with nothing less.
This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of monastic insensibility or unbecoming
indifference to Province/City Committee on Justice. As incumbent RTC Judges, they form part of the structure of
government. Their integrity and performance in the adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity of such structure. As
public officials, they are trustees of an orderly society. Even as non-members of Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC
judges should render assistance to said Committees to help promote the laudable purposes for which they exist, but only
when such assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial duties.
ACCORDINGLY, the aforesaid request of Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of the judiciary to any agency performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions (Section 12, Article VIII, Constitution.).
Insofar as the term "quasi-judicial" is concerned, it has a fairly clear meaning and Judges can confidently refrain from
participating in the work of any administrative agency which adjudicates disputes and controversies involving the rights of
parties within its jurisdiction. The issue involved in this case is where to draw the line insofar as administrative functions are
concerned.
"Administrative functions" as used in Section 12 refers to the executive machinery of government and the performance by
that machinery of governmental acts. It refers to the management actions, determinations, and orders of executive officials
as they administer the laws and try to make government effective. There is an element of positive action, of supervision or
control.
Applying the definition given in the opinion of the majority which reads:
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of
individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy
of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence
(Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services Inc. v. Tapucar, S.P-07599-R, 29 September 1978,
Black's Law Dictionary. )
we can readily see that membership in the Provincial or City Committee on Justice would not involve any regulation or
control over the conduct and affairs of individuals. Neither will the Committee on Justice promulgate rules and regulations
nor exercise any quasi-legislative functions. Its work is purely advisory. I do not see anything wrong in a member of the
judiciary joining any study group which concentrates on the administration of justice as long as the group merely deliberates
on problems involving the speedy disposition of cases particularly those involving the poor and needy litigants or detainees,
pools the expertise and experiences of the members, and limits itself to recommendations which may be adopted or rejected
by those who have the power to legislate or administer the particular function involved in their implementation.
We who are Judges cannot operate in a vacuum or in a tight little world of our own. The administration of justice cannot be
pigeonholed into neat compartments with Judges, Fiscals, Police, Wardens, and various other officials concerned erecting
water-tight barriers against one another and limiting our interaction to timidly peeping over these unnecessary and
impractical barriers into one another's work, all the while blaming the Constitution for such a quixotic and unreal
interpretation. As intimated in the majority opinion, we should not be monastically insensible or indifferent to projects or
movements cogitating on possible solutions to our common problems of justice and afterwards forwarding their findings to
the people, public or private, where these findings would do the most good.
The majority opinion suggests the giving of assistance by Judges to the work of the Committees on Justice. Assistance is a
vague term. Can Judges be designated as observers? Advisers? Consultants? Is it the act of being "designated" which is
proscribed by the Constitution or is it participation in the prohibited functions? If judges cannot become members, why
should they be allowed or even encouraged to assist these Committees The line drawn by the majority is vague and
unrealistic.
The constitutional provision is intended to shield Judges from participating in activities which may compromise their
independence or hamper their work. Studying problems involving the administration of justice and arriving at purely
recommendatory solutions do not in any way involve the encroachment of. the judiciary into executive or legislative functions
or into matters which are none of its concerns. Much less is it an encroachment of the other departments into judicial affairs.
As the visible representation of the law and of justice in his community, the Judge should not shy away from public activities
which do not interfere with the prompt and proper performance of his office, but which, in fact, enhance his effectiveness as
a Judge. He cannot stop mingling in civic intercourse or shut himself into solitary seclusion. The Committees on Justice will
also be immensely benefited by the presence of Judges in the study groups. The work of the Committees is quite important.
Let it not be said that the Judges the officials most concerned with justice have hesitated to join in such a worthy undertaking
because of a strained interpretation of their functions.
It is well for this Court to be generally cautious, conservative or restrictive when it interprets provisions of the Constitution or
statutes vesting us with powers or delimit the exercise of our jurisdiction and functions. However, we should not overdo it.
The basic principles of constitutional interpretation apply as well to the provisions which define or circumscribe our powers
and functions as they do to the provisions governing the other dependents of government. The Court should not adopt a
strained construction which impairs its own efficiency to meet the responsibilities brought about by the changing times and
conditions of society. The familiar quotation is apt in this case—constitutional provisions are interpreted by the spirit which
vivifies and not by the letter which killeth.
I, therefore, dissent from the majority opinion and vote to allow Judge Rodolfo U.
Fernan C.J., Narvasa and Griño-Aquino, JJ., join in Gutierrez dissent.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
I hesitate to give such a restrictive and impractical interpretation to Section 12, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, and thus
join the dissent of Justice Gutierrez, Jr.
What I believe is contemplated by the Constitutional prohibition is designation, for example, to such quasi-judicial bodies as
the SEC, or administrative agencies like the BIR. Those are full-time positions involving running the affairs of government,
which will interfere with the discharge of judicial functions or totally remove a Judge/Justice from the performance of his
regular functions.
The Committee on Justice cannot be likened to such an administrative agency of government. It is a study group with
recommendatory functions. In fact, membership by members of the Bench in said committee is called for by reason of the
primary functions of their position.
The matter of supervision by the Secretary of Justice provided for under E.O. No. 326 amending E.O. No. 856, need not be
a cause for concern. That supervision is confined to Committee work and will by no means extend to the performance of
judicial functions per se.
Manzano to become a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of the judiciary to any agency performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions (Section 12, Article VIII, Constitution.).
Insofar as the term "quasi-judicial" is concerned, it has a fairly clear meaning and Judges can confidently refrain from
participating in the work of any administrative agency which adjudicates disputes and controversies involving the rights of
parties within its jurisdiction. The issue involved in this case is where to draw the line insofar as administrative functions are
concerned.
"Administrative functions" as used in Section 12 refers to the executive machinery of government and the performance by
that machinery of governmental acts. It refers to the management actions, determinations, and orders of executive officials
as they administer the laws and try to make government effective. There is an element of positive action, of supervision or
control.
Applying the definition given in the opinion of the majority which reads:
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of
individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy
of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence
(Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services Inc. v. Tapucar, S.P-07599-R, 29 September 1978,
Black's Law Dictionary. )
we can readily see that membership in the Provincial or City Committee on Justice would not involve any regulation or
control over the conduct and affairs of individuals. Neither will the Committee on Justice promulgate rules and regulations
nor exercise any quasi-legislative functions. Its work is purely advisory. I do not see anything wrong in a member of the
judiciary joining any study group which concentrates on the administration of justice as long as the group merely deliberates
on problems involving the speedy disposition of cases particularly those involving the poor and needy litigants or detainees,
pools the expertise and experiences of the members, and limits itself to recommendations which may be adopted or rejected
by those who have the power to legislate or administer the particular function involved in their implementation.
We who are Judges cannot operate in a vacuum or in a tight little world of our own. The administration of justice cannot be
pigeonholed into neat compartments with Judges, Fiscals, Police, Wardens, and various other officials concerned erecting
water-tight barriers against one another and limiting our interaction to timidly peeping over these unnecessary and
impractical barriers into one another's work, all the while blaming the Constitution for such a quixotic and unreal
interpretation. As intimated in the majority opinion, we should not be monastically insensible or indifferent to projects or
movements cogitating on possible solutions to our common problems of justice and afterwards forwarding their findings to
the people, public or private, where these findings would do the most good.
The majority opinion suggests the giving of assistance by Judges to the work of the Committees on Justice. Assistance is a
vague term. Can Judges be designated as observers? Advisers? Consultants? Is it the act of being "designated" which is
proscribed by the Constitution or is it participation in the prohibited functions? If judges cannot become members, why
should they be allowed or even encouraged to assist these Committees The line drawn by the majority is vague and
unrealistic.
The constitutional provision is intended to shield Judges from participating in activities which may compromise their
independence or hamper their work. Studying problems involving the administration of justice and arriving at purely
recommendatory solutions do not in any way involve the encroachment of. the judiciary into executive or legislative functions
or into matters which are none of its concerns. Much less is it an encroachment of the other departments into judicial affairs.
As the visible representation of the law and of justice in his community, the Judge should not shy away from public activities
which do not interfere with the prompt and proper performance of his office, but which, in fact, enhance his effectiveness as
a Judge. He cannot stop mingling in civic intercourse or shut himself into solitary seclusion. The Committees on Justice will
also be immensely benefited by the presence of Judges in the study groups. The work of the Committees is quite important.
Let it not be said that the Judges the officials most concerned with justice have hesitated to join in such a worthy undertaking
because of a strained interpretation of their functions.
It is well for this Court to be generally cautious, conservative or restrictive when it interprets provisions of the Constitution or
statutes vesting us with powers or delimit the exercise of our jurisdiction and functions. However, we should not overdo it.
The basic principles of constitutional interpretation apply as well to the provisions which define or circumscribe our powers
and functions as they do to the provisions governing the other dependents of government. The Court should not adopt a
strained construction which impairs its own efficiency to meet the responsibilities brought about by the changing times and
conditions of society. The familiar quotation is apt in this case—constitutional provisions are interpreted by the spirit which
vivifies and not by the letter which killeth.
I, therefore, dissent from the majority opinion and vote to allow Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano to become a member of the
Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice.
Fernan C.J., Narvasa and Griño-Aquino, JJ., join in Gutierrez dissent.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
I hesitate to give such a restrictive and impractical interpretation to Section 12, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, and thus
join the dissent of Justice Gutierrez, Jr.
What I believe is contemplated by the Constitutional prohibition is designation, for example, to such quasi-judicial bodies as
the SEC, or administrative agencies like the BIR. Those are full-time positions involving running the affairs of government,
which will interfere with the discharge of judicial functions or totally remove a Judge/Justice from the performance of his
regular functions.
The Committee on Justice cannot be likened to such an administrative agency of government. It is a study group with
recommendatory functions. In fact, membership by members of the Bench in said committee is called for by reason of the
primary functions of their position.
The matter of supervision by the Secretary of Justice provided for under E.O. No. 326 amending E.O. No. 856, need not be
a cause for concern. That supervision is confined to Committee work and will by no means extend to the performance of
judicial functions per se.
Canon 6

(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 05-1763-MTJ)
DANILO DAVID S. MARIANO, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE JOSE P. NACIONAL, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This concerns an administrative complaint stemming from an action for ejectment1 docketed as Civil Case No. 12334.2 In the
course of the ejectment proceedings, respondent Judge Jose P. Nacional issued a pre-trial order dated September 3, 2004
requiring the parties to file their respective position papers and affidavits of witnesses on September 30, 2004. The parties
complied with the September 3, 2004 order.
Subsequently, respondent issued an order dated December 28, 20043 requiring the parties to submit their respective
"memorand[a] in the form of a court decision." The parties likewise complied with this order. The case was eventually
decided by respondent on February 14, 2005.
Complainant avers that the issuance of the December 28, 2004 order violated the prohibition on memoranda by the Revised
Rules on Summary Procedure (RRSP). Complainant likewise posits that respondent violated the Rules when he decided the
case only on February 14, 2005 or 136 days from the date required by law.4
In view of respondent’s acts, complainant filed this administrative complaint for gross inefficiency, gross ignorance of the
law, dereliction of duty and violation of judicial conduct.
In his comment, respondent admitted that he had exceeded the maximum period allowed under the RRSP. He offered the
following excuses: (1) the quality of his decision had priority over compliance with the reglementary period; (2) his caseload
was heavy and (3) the documents of the case were voluminous. He also justified his December 28, 2004 order by stating
that the case was "not an ordinary one."5
Respondent added that this administrative complaint was filed only because the judgment was against complainant.
In its evaluation, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found that respondent violated basic procedure and the code of
judicial conduct.6 It also found that respondent had been previously admonished for gross ignorance of the law, dereliction of
duty, partiality, oppression and incompetence in Prado v. Judge Nacional.7
The OCA recommended that respondent be held liable for violation of judicial conduct and gross ignorance of the law or
procedure. It proposed that respondent be fined P20,000 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act
would be dealt with more severely.
The findings of the OCA are well-taken but we do not agree with the recommended penalty.
Without doubt, Civil Case No. 12334 was a case of unlawful detainer covered by the RRSP. 8 Section 5 of the RRSP
explicitly provides that only complaints, compulsory counterclaims and cross-claims pleaded in the answer, as well as the
answers to these pleadings, are allowed. The RRSP also expressly prohibits the filing of a memorandum. 9 The same
prohibition is contained in Section 13, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court (ROC).
The urgency of restoring social order is the paramount consideration in settling unlawful detainer and forcible entry cases.
To aid the judiciary in proceeding with these cases, the RRSP was promulgated with the following rationale:10
[T]he adoption of the Rule on Summary Procedure is part of the commitment of the judiciary to enforce the constitutional
right of litigants to a speedy disposition of their cases. It was promulgated [to] achiev[e] "an expeditious and inexpensive
determination of cases." Any member of the judiciary who causes the delay sought to be prevented by the Rule is
sanctionable.
The necessity of promptly resolving unlawful detainer and forcible entry cases is made more imperative by the express legal
provisions on periods of rendition of judgments. Specifically, Section 11, Rule 70 of the ROC provides that the court shall
render judgment within 30 days after receipt of the
affidavits and position papers, or expiration of the period for filing the same. The RRSP provides for the same period.
Corollarily, Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct 11 admonishes all judges to dispose of the court’s business
promptly and decide cases12 within the period specified in Section 15 (1) and (2), Article VIII of the Constitution. 13 This is
supplemented by Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary 14 requiring judges to
perform all judicial duties efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.
We cannot accept the justifications advanced by respondent. Doing so will undermine the wisdom behind procedural rules
and diminish respect for the law. We reiterate that a judge (by himself) cannot choose to prolong the period for deciding
cases beyond that authorized by law.15 If a judge needs more time to decide a case, he should formally request this Court for
an extension of the deadline.
The rules of procedure are clear and unambiguous, leaving no room for interpretation. We have held in numerous cases
1avv phi1.zw+
that the failure to apply elementary rules of procedure constitutes gross ignorance of the law and procedure.16 Neither good
faith nor lack of malice will exonerate respondent because, as previously noted, the rules violated were basic procedural
rules. All that was needed for respondent to do was to apply them.17Unfortunately, he chose not to.
It is settled that one who accepts the exalted position of a judge owes the public and the court the ability to be proficient in
the law and the duty to maintain professional competence at all times. 18 Competence and diligence are prerequisites to the
due performance of judicial office.19
We note that aside from Prado v. Judge Nacional20 for which respondent was admonished in 2001, he was also indicted for
conduct unbecoming of a judge in Abesa v. Judge Nacional.21
Respondent argues that his 24 years in the judiciary should be considered in his favor. We disagree. Length of service, as a
factor in determining the imposable penalty in administrative cases, is a double-edged sword. While it can sometimes help
mitigate the penalty, it can also justify a more serious sanction.22 Whatever it is, a judge’s long years of service on the bench
are no excuse for ignorance of procedural rules.23
As to the penalty that should be properly meted out to respondent, A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC governs. 24 Gross ignorance of the
law and procedure is classified as a serious charge.25 And for his violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, the evidence
shows that he only committed simple misconduct, a less serious charge.26
Pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC,27 this administrative case against respondent is also considered a disciplinary proceeding
against him as a member of the bar.28 Violation of the basic tenets of judicial conduct embodied in the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and the Code of Judicial Conduct constitutes a breach of Canons 1 29 and 1230 as well as
Rules 1.0331 and 12.0432 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Respondent also transgressed Rule 10.0333 of the
CPR when he violated the provisions of the RRSP and the ROC.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Jose P. Nacional is hereby found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and procedure
for which he is FINED P40,000. He is also found GUILTY of violation of Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
and Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary for which he is FINED P20,000.
Respondent is furthermore found GUILTY of violation of Canons 1 and 12 as well as Rules 1.03, 10.03 and 12.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility for which he is FINED P10,000.
He is hereby ordered to remit payment of the fines within ten (10) days from receipt of this resolution.
Respondent is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall warrant an even more severe
penalty.
Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal records of respondent in the Office of Administrative Services,
Office of the Court Administrator and the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
A.M. No. RTJ-06-2017 June 19, 2008
LT. GEN. ALFONSO P. DAGUDAG (Ret.), complainant,

vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO G.W. PADERANGA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Cagayan de Oro City, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM, J.:
This is a complaint for gross ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming a judge filed by retired Lt. Gen. Alfonso P.
Dagudag (Gen. Dagudag), Head of Task Force Sagip Kalikasan, against Judge Maximo G. W. Paderanga (Judge
Paderanga), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Cagayan de Oro City.
On or about 30 January 2005, the Region VII Philippine National Police Regional Maritime Group (PNPRMG) received
information that MV General Ricarte of NMC Container Lines, Inc. was shipping container vans containing illegal forest
products from Cagayan de Oro to Cebu. The shipments were falsely declared as cassava meal and corn grains to avoid
inspection by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).1
On 30 and 31 January 2005, a team composed of representatives from the PNPRMG, DENR, and the Philippine Coast
Guard inspected the container vans at a port in Mandaue City, Cebu. The team discovered the undocumented forest
products and the names of the shippers and consignees:
Container Van No. Shipper Consignee

NCLU – 2000492-22GI Polaris Chua Polaris Chua
IEAU – 2521845-2210 Polaris Chua Polaris Chua
NOLU – 2000682-22GI Rowena Balangot Rowena Balangot
INBU – 3125757-BB2210 Rowena Balangot Rowena Balangot
NCLU – 20001591-22GI Jovan Gomez Jovan Gomez
GSTU – 339074-US2210 Jovan Gomez Jovan Gomez
CRXU – 2167567 Raffy Enriquez Raffy Enriquez
NCLU – 2001570-22GI Raffy Enriquez Raffy Enriquez
The crew of MV General Ricarte failed to produce the certificate of origin forms and other pertinent transport documents
covering the forest products, as required by DENR Administrative Order No. 07-94. Gen. Dagudag alleged that, since
nobody claimed the forest products within a reasonable period of time, the DENR considered them as abandoned and, on
31 January 2005, the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Richard N.
Abella, issued a seizure receipt to NMC Container Lines, Inc.2
On 1 February 2005, Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) OIC Loreto A. Rivac (Rivac) sent a
notice to NMC Container Lines, Inc. asking for explanation why the government should not confiscate the forest products. 3 In
an affidavit4 dated 9 February 2005, NMC Container Lines, Inc.’s Branch Manager Alex Conrad M. Seno stated that he did
not see any reason why the government should not confiscate the forest products and that NMC Container Lines, Inc. had
no knowledge of the actual content of the container vans.
On 2, 9, and 15 February 2005, DENR Forest Protection Officer Lucio S. Canete, Jr. posted notices on the CENRO and
PENRO bulletin boards and at the NMC Container Lines, Inc. building informing the unknown owner about the administrative
adjudication scheduled on 18 February 2005 at the Cebu City CENRO. Nobody appeared during the adjudication.5 In a
resolution6 dated 10 March 2005, Rivac, acting as adjudication officer, recommended to DENR Regional Executive Director
Clarence L. Baguilat that the forest products be confiscated in favor of the government.
In a complaint7 dated 16 March 2005 and filed before Judge Paderanga, a certain Roger C. Edma (Edma) prayed that a writ
of replevin be issued ordering the defendants DENR, CENRO, Gen. Dagudag, and others to deliver the forest products to
him and that judgment be rendered ordering the defendants to pay him moral damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation
expenses. On 29 March 2005, Judge Paderanga issued a writ of replevin8 ordering Sheriff Reynaldo L. Salceda to take
possession of the forest products.
In a motion to quash the writ of replevin,9 the defendants DENR, CENRO, and Gen. Dagudag prayed that the writ of replevin
be set aside: (1) Edma’s bond was insufficient; (2) the forest products were falsely declared as cassava meal and corn
grains; (3) Edma was not a party-in-interest; (4) the forest products were not covered by any legal document; (5) nobody
claimed the forest products within a reasonable period of time; (6) the forest products were already considered abandoned;
(7) the forest products were lawfully seized under the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines; (8) replevin was not proper;
(9) courts could not take cognizance of cases pending before the DENR; (10) Edma failed to exhaust administrative
remedies; and (11) the DENR was the agency responsible for the enforcement of forestry laws. In a motion to dismiss ad
cautelam10 dated 12 April 2005, the defendants prayed that the complaint for replevin and damages be dismissed: (1) the
real defendant is the Republic of the Philippines; (2) Edma failed to exhaust administrative remedies; (3) the State cannot be
sued without its consent; and (4) Edma failed to allege that he is the owner or is entitled to the possession of the forest
products.
In an order11 dated 14 April 2005, Judge Paderanga denied the motion to quash the writ of replevin for lack of merit.
Gen. Dagudag filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) an affidavit-complaint12 dated 8 July 2005 charging
Judge Paderanga with gross ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming a judge. Gen. Dagudag stated that:
During the x x x hearing, [Judge Paderanga] showed manifest partiality in favor of x x x Edma. DENR’s counsel was
lambasted, cajoled and intimidated by [Judge Paderanga] using words such as "SHUT UP" and "THAT’S
BALONEY."
xxxx
Edma in the replevin case cannot seek to recover the wood shipment from the DENR since he had not sought
administrative remedies available to him. The prudent thing for [Judge Paderanga] to have done was to dismiss the
replevin suit outright.
xxxx
[Judge Paderanga’s] act[s] of taking cognizance of the x x x replevin suit, issuing the writ of replevin and the
subsequent denial of the motion to quash clearly demonstrates [sic] ignorance of the law.
In its 1st Indorsement13 dated 1 August 2005, the OCA directed Judge Paderanga to comment on the affidavit-complaint. In
his comment14 dated 6 September 2005, Judge Paderanga stated that he exercised judicial discretion in issuing the writ of
replevin and that he could not delve into the issues raised by Gen. Dagudag because they were related to a case pending
before him.
In its Report15 dated 10 July 2006, the OCA found that Judge Paderanga (1) violated the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies; (2) violated the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; and (3) used inappropriate language in court. The
OCA recommended that the case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter; that Judge Paderanga be held liable for
gross ignorance of the law and for violation of Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary;16 and that he be fined P30,000.
In its Resolution17 dated 16 August 2006, the Court re-docketed the case as a regular administrative matter and required the
parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for decision based on the pleadings already filed. Judge
Paderanga manifested his willingness to submit the case for decision based on the pleadings already filed. 18 Since Gen.
Dagudag did not file any manifestation, the Court considered him to have waived his compliance with the 16 August 2006
Resolution.19
The Court finds Judge Paderanga liable for gross ignorance of the law and for conduct unbecoming a judge.
The DENR is the agency responsible for the enforcement of forestry laws. Section 4 of Executive Order No. 192 states that
the DENR shall be the primary agency responsible for the conservation, management, development, and proper use of the
country’s natural resources.
Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, states that possessing forest products
without the required legal documents is punishable. Section 68-A states that the DENR Secretary or his duly authorized
representatives may order the confiscation of any forest product illegally cut, gathered, removed, possessed, or abandoned.
In the instant case, the forest products were possessed by NMC Container Lines, Inc. without the required legal documents
and were abandoned by the unknown owner. Consequently, the DENR seized the forest products.
Judge Paderanga should have dismissed the replevin suit outright for three reasons. First, under the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies. In Factoran, Jr.
v. Court of Appeals,20 the Court held that:
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons of law, comity and
convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies have first been
resorted to and the proper authorities have been given an appropriate opportunity to act and correct their
alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum. (Emphasis ours)
In Dy v. Court of Appeals,21 the Court held that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies before he can resort to the
courts. In Paat v. Court of Appeals,22 the Court held that:
This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of
the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes
afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such
remedy should be exhausted first before court’s judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of
court’s intervention is fatal to one’s cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the
case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action. (Emphasis ours)
In the instant case, Edma did not resort to, or avail of, any administrative remedy. He went straight to court and filed a
complaint for replevin and damages. Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, states that (1) all actions and
decisions of the Bureau of Forest Development Director are subject to review by the DENR Secretary; (2) the decisions of
the DENR Secretary are appealable to the President; and (3) courts cannot review the decisions of the DENR Secretary
except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition. In Dy,23 the Court held that all actions seeking to recover
forest products in the custody of the DENR shall be directed to that agency — not the courts. In Paat,24 the Court held that:
Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of the private respondents’ failure to
exhaust administrative remedies should have been the proper course of action by the lower court instead of
assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the writ [of replevin]. Exhaustion of the
remedies in the administrative forum, being a condition precedent prior to one’s recourse to the courts and more
importantly, being an element of private respondents’ right of action, is too significant to be waylaid by the lower
court.
xxxx
Moreover, the suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool to question the orders of confiscation
and forfeiture issued by the DENR in pursuance to the authority given under P.D. 705, as amended. Section 8 of
the said law is explicit that actions taken by the
Director of the Bureau of Forest Development concerning the enforcement of the provisions of the said law are
subject to review by the Secretary of DENR and that courts may not review the decisions of the Secretary
except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition. (Emphasis ours)
Second, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative
agencies of special competence. The DENR is the agency responsible for the enforcement of forestry laws. The complaint
for replevin itself stated that members of DENR’s Task Force Sagip Kalikasan took over the forest products and brought
them to the DENR Community Environment and Natural Resources Office. This should have alerted Judge Paderanga that
the DENR had custody of the forest products, that administrative proceedings may have been commenced, and that the
replevin suit had to be dismissed outright. In Tabao v. Judge Lilagan25 — a case with a similar set of facts as the instant case
— the Court held that:
The complaint for replevin itself states that the shipment x x x [was] seized by the NBI for verification of supporting
documents. It also states that the NBI turned over the seized items to the DENR "for official disposition and
appropriate action." x x x To our mind, these allegations [should] have been sufficient to alert respondent
judge that the DENR has custody of the seized items and that administrative proceedings may have already
been commenced concerning the shipment. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take
cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies of special competence. x x x The prudent thing
for respondent judge to have done was to dismiss the replevin suit outright. (Emphasis ours)
In Paat,26 the Court held that:
[T]he enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection, development and management of
forest lands fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources. By the very nature of its function, the DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by
judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial
court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes an unjustified encroachment
into the domain of the administrative agency’s prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not
warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is
initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. (Emphasis ours)
Third, the forest products are already in custodia legis and thus cannot be the subject of replevin. There was a violation of
the Revised Forestry Code and the DENR seized the forest products in accordance with law. In Calub v. Court of
Appeals,27 the Court held that properties lawfully seized by the DENR cannot be the subject of replevin:
Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was in accordance with law, in our
view the [properties seized] were validly deemed in custodia legis. [They] could not be subject to an action
for replevin. For it is property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and considered in the custody of the law, and
not otherwise. (Emphasis ours)
Judge Paderanga’s acts of taking cognizance of the replevin suit and of issuing the writ of replevin constitute gross
ignorance of the law. In Tabao,28 the Court held that:
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative of
special competence. x x x [T]he plaintiff in the replevin suit who [sought] to recover the shipment from the
DENR had not exhausted the administrative remedies available to him. The prudent thing for respondent
judge to have done was to dismiss the replevin suit outright.
Under Section 78-A of the Revised Forestry Code, the DENR secretary or his authorized representatives may order
the confiscation of forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned.
xxxx
Respondent judge’s act of taking cognizance of the x x x replevin suit clearly demonstrates ignorance of the
law. x x x [J]udges are expected to keep abreast of all laws and prevailing jurisprudence. Judges are duty bound to
have more than just a cursory acquaintance with laws and jurisprudence. Failure to follow basic legal commands
constitutes gross ignorance of the law from which no one may be excused, not even a judge. (Emphasis
ours)
Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states that competence is a prerequisite to the due
performance of judicial office. Section 3 of Canon 6 states that judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance
their knowledge necessary for the proper performance of judicial duties. Judges should keep themselves abreast with legal
developments and show acquaintance with laws.29
The rule that courts cannot prematurely take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies is basic. There
was no reason for Judge Paderanga to make an exception to this rule. The forest products were in the custody of the DENR
and Edma had not availed of any administrative remedy. Judge Paderanga should have dismissed the replevin suit outright.
In Español v. Toledo-Mupas,30 the Court held that:
Being among the judicial front-liners who have direct contact with the litigants, a wanton display of utter lack of
familiarity with the rules by the judge inevitably erodes the confidence of the public in the competence of our courts
to render justice. It subjects the judiciary to embarrassment. Worse, it could raise the specter of corruption.
When the gross inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law, or a principle in
the discharge of his or her duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the exalted position and title
he or she holds, or the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial
authority.
The OCA found Judge Paderanga liable for using inappropriate language in court: "We x x x find respondent’s intemperate
use of "Shut up!" and "Baloney!" well nigh inappropriate in court proceedings. The utterances are uncalled for."31
Indeed, the 14 and 22 April 2005 transcripts of stenographic notes show that Judge Paderanga was impatient, discourteous,
and undignified in court:
Atty. Luego: Your Honor, we want to have this motion because that is...
Judge Paderanga: I am asking you why did you not make any rejoinder[?]
xxxx
Atty. Luego: I apologize, Your Honor. We are ready to...
Judge Paderanga: Ready to what? Proceed.
Atty. Luego: Yes, Your Honor. We filed this motion to quash replevin, Your Honor, on the grounds, first and
foremost, it is our contention, Your Honor, with all due respect of [sic] this Honorable Court, that the writ of replevin
dated March 29, 2005 was improper, Your Honor, for the reasons that the lumber, subject matter of this case, were
apprehended in accordance with...
Judge Paderanga: Where is your proof that it was apprehended? Where is your proof? Is that apprehension proven
by a seizure receipt? Where is your seizure receipt?
Atty. Luego: Under the rules...
Judge Paderanga: Where is your seizure receipt? You read your rules. What does [sic] the rules say? Where in your
rules does it say that it does not need any seizure receipt? You look at your rules. You point out the rules. You take
out your rules and then you point out. Do you have the rules?
xxxx
Atty. Luego: Your Honor, there was no seizure receipt, but during the apprehension, Your Honor, there was no
claimant.
Judge Paderanga: Answer me. Is there a seizure receipt?
Atty. Luego: But during the apprehension, Your Honor, no owner has [sic] appeared.
xxxx
Atty. Luego: According to [the] rules, Your Honor, if there is no...
Judge Paderanga: Whom are you seizing it from? To [sic] whom are you taking it from?
Atty. Luego: From the shipping company, Your Honor.
xxxx
Atty. Luego: Your Honor please, the shipping company denied the ownership of that lumber.
xxxx
Atty. Luego: But the shipping company, Your Honor,...
Judge Paderanga: Shut up. That’s baloney. You are seizing it from nobody. Then how can you seize it from the
shipping company. Are you not? You are a lawyer. Who is in possession of the property? The shipping company.
Why did you not issue [a] seizure receipt to the shipping company?
Atty. Luego: But the... May I continue, Your Honor?
xxxx
Judge Paderanga: Stop talking about the shipping company. Still you did not issue a seizure receipt here. Well, I’m
telling you you should have issued [a] seizure receipt to the shipping company.
xxxx
Judge Paderanga: You are a lawyer. You should know how to write pleadings. You write the pleadings the way it
should be, not the way you think it should be.
Atty. Luego: I’m sorry, Your Honor.
Judge Paderanga: You are an officer of the court. You should be careful with your language. You say that I am
wrong. It’s you who are [sic] wrong because you do not read the law.
xxxx
Judge Paderanga: Then you read the law. How dare you say that the Court is wrong.
xxxx
Judge Paderanga: Are you not representing [the DENR]?
Atty. Luego: Yes, in this case, Your Honor.
Judge Paderanga: Then you are representing them. They are your clients. What kind of a lawyer are you?32
xxxx
Atty. Tiamson: Specifically it was stated in the [Factoran] versus Court of Appeals [case] that the Court should not
interfere, Your Honor.
Judge Paderanga: No.
xxxx
Judge Paderanga: The problem with you people is you do not use your heads.
Atty. Tiamson: We use our heads, your Honor.
xxxx
Atty. Tiamson: Your Honor, we would like to put on record that we use our heads, your Honor.33 (Emphasis ours)
Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states that judges shall be patient,
dignified, and courteous in relation to lawyers. Rule 3.04, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that judges should
be patient and courteous to lawyers, especially the inexperienced. They should avoid the attitude that the litigants are made
for the courts, instead of the courts for the litigants.
Judicial decorum requires judges to be temperate in their language at all times. They must refrain from inflammatory,
excessively rhetoric, or vile language.34 They should (1) be dignified in demeanor and refined in speech; (2) exhibit that
temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint; and (3) be considerate, courteous, and civil to all persons who come to
their court.35 In Juan de la Cruz v. Carretas,36 the Court held that:
A judge who is inconsiderate, discourteous or uncivil to lawyers x x x who appear in his sala commits an impropriety
and fails in his duty to reaffirm the people’s faith in the judiciary. He also violates Section 6, Canon 6 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.
xxxx
It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer x x x. The act betrays lack of patience, prudence and restraint.
Thus, a judge must at all times be temperate in his language. He must choose his words x x x with utmost care and
sufficient control. The wise and just man is esteemed for his discernment. Pleasing speech increases his
persuasiveness.
Equanimity and judiciousness should be the constant marks of a dispenser of justice. A judge should always keep
his passion guarded. He can never allow it to run loose and overcome his reason. He descends to the level of a
sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant when he utters harsh words x x x. As a result, he degrades the judicial
office and erodes public confidence in the judiciary.
Judge Paderanga’s refusal to consider the motion to quash the writ of replevin, repeated interruption of the lawyers, and
utterance of "shut up," "that’s baloney," "how dare you say that the court is wrong," "what kind of a lawyer are you?," and
"the problem with you people is you do not use your heads" are undignified and very unbecoming a judge. In Office of the
Court Administrator v. Paderanga,37 the Court already reprimanded Judge Paderanga for repeatedly saying "shut up," being
arrogant, and declaring that he had "absolute power" in court. He has not changed.
Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies gross ignorance of the law as a serious offense. It is punishable by (1)
dismissal from the service, forfeiture of benefits, and disqualification from reinstatement to any public office; (2) suspension
from office without salary and other benefits for more than three months but not exceeding six months; or (3) a fine of more
than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000.38 Section 10 of Rule 140 classifies conduct unbecoming a judge as a light offense.
It is punishable by (1) a fine of not less than P1,000 but not exceeding P10,000; (2) censure; (3) reprimand; or (4)
admonition with warning.39
The Court notes that this is Judge Paderanga’s third offense. In Office of the Court Administrator v. Paderanga,40the Court
held him liable for grave abuse of authority and simple misconduct for unceremoniously citing a lawyer in contempt while
declaring himself as having "absolute power" and for repeatedly telling a lawyer to "shut up." InBeltran, Jr. v.
Paderanga,41 the Court held him liable for undue delay in rendering an order for the delay of nine months in resolving an
amended formal offer of exhibits. In both cases, the Court sternly warned Judge Paderanga that the commission of another
offense shall be dealt with more severely. The instant case and the two cases decided against him demonstrate Judge
Paderanga’s arrogance, incorrigibility, and unfitness to become a judge.
Judge Paderanga has two other administrative cases pending against him — one 42 for gross ignorance of the law, knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment, and grave abuse of authority, and the other43 for gross misconduct, grave abuse of authority,
and gross ignorance of the law.
The Court will not hesitate to impose the ultimate penalty on those who have fallen short of their accountabilities. It will not
tolerate any conduct that violates the norms of public accountability and diminishes the faith of the people in the judicial
system.44
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Maximo G.W. Paderanga, Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Cagayan de Oro
City, GUILTY of GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW and UNBECOMING CONDUCT. Accordingly, the
CourtDISMISSES him from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with
prejudice to reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2043 September 5, 2007
JUAN DE LA CRUZ (CONCERNED CITIZEN OF LEGAZPI CITY), complainant,

vs.
JUDGE RUBEN B. CARRETAS, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Branch 9,respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This administrative case stems from an anonymous complaint by "Juan de la Cruz," a concerned citizen of Legazpi City,
against respondent Judge Ruben B. Carretas, presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Legazpi City, Branch 9.
The letter-complaint1 read:
The Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court

and The Honorable Court Administrator
Supreme Court, Manila
Sir and Madam,
Kami po ay sumulat sa inyo dahil po sa reklamo sa masamang ugali at asal ni Judge Ruben Car[r]etas ng RTC,
Branch 9, Legazpi City.
Siya po ay isang mayabang na Judge at mahilig mang insulto sa pamamagitan ng side comments sa mga testigo,
abogado at fiscal, parang siya na lang ang may alam sa batas. Bilang Judge siya na po ang nagdirect, at cross-
examine sa mga testigo.
Dahil sa kanyang ginagawa napapahiya ang mga testigo, abogado at fiscal sa harap ng publiko. Nawawala din po
ang respeto ng publiko sa justice system.
Kami po ay umaasa at nanalangin sa madaliang aksyon ng inyong opisina para malutas ang problemang ito.
Salamat at mabuhay po kayong lahat.
Ang gumagalang,
(Sgd. Juan de la Cruz)

Concern[ed] citizen of Legazpi [City]
In his comment,2 respondent judge surmised that the complaint was initiated by a lawyer whose petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage was not granted. He denied the accusation and claimed that he had not insulted anyone. He then
narrated that, in his first few months in office, he experienced the following exasperating and somewhat amusing incidents: a
lawyer insisting on further examining a witness he had already subjected to re-cross examination; a prosecutor proceeding
with the presentation of evidence when the accused had not yet been arraigned; a lawyer appearing for an absent
counsel de parte and manifesting that he was appearing "in corroboration" with the latter; lawyers appearing without
observing the proper dress code; a lawyer offering the testimony of his witness "to collaborate" the testimony of another
witness; a lawyer manifesting that he was ready for trial but turning out to be unprepared with his documentary evidence,
prompting the court to call a recess; a case for unjust vexation committed against a minor being raffled to his sala when the
records showed that the victim was waylaid, boxed and dragged to a forested area where the accused touched her private
part and mashed her breasts; a case being filed for kidnapping and serious illegal detention only despite the fact that the girl
was raped while in captivity. Respondent judge stated that he never encountered these mistakes "in all his years of law
practice in Manila." Thus, he was shocked because he thought that these things "happened only in anecdotes."
Respondent judge observed that due to their familiarity with each other, lawyers appearing in his sala hardly objected even
to obviously objectionable questions. In such instances, he called the attention of counsels because, to his mind, they were
making a "moro-moro"3 out of the proceedings.
Respondent judge also stated that, while he may have used harsh word sometimes, they were made out of exasperation
and with the intention merely to right the wrong committed in his presence, not to insult anyone. Nonetheless, he apologized
to those who may have been offended by his remarks.
In connection with the complaint, Judge Romeo S. Dañas, executive judge of the RTC of Legazpi City, conducted a discreet
investigation.4 He interviewed lawyers who appeared in the sala of respondent judge. He requested them to submit their
respective written comments on the decorum of respondent judge when holding trial. Among these comments were the
following:
1. Atty. Mariano B. Baranda, Jr.

Respondent judge should avoid making embarrassing, insulting and abrasive remarks. He should also limit
himself to asking clarificatory questions.5
2. Atty. Expedito P. Nebres
If not in open court respondent judge is kind, courteous and respectful. However, in open court he is
arrogant and boastful. He has a bad habit in making embarrassing or insulting remarks when presiding over
cases. Most of the time, he was the one conducting direct and cross-examination of witnesses. He used to
scold, harass and embarrass witnesses, litigants, lawyers, prosecutors and PAO6 lawyers for just a slight
mistake in procedure.7
3. Atty. Alexis C. Albao
In the course of presentation of evidence for his client, he was insulted and subjected to sarcastic remarks
by respondent judge, not once but for several occasions. This traumatized him and made him avoid reading
the transcript of stenographic notes of the said hearing until now. In one occasion, respondent judge
proceeded to cut short the proceedings. When he manifested that he would cross-examine the defendant,
respondent judge stood from his seat and in a sarcastic manner looked backward manifesting that he was
not interested or not listening to the cross-examination. Thus, he was discouraged from proceeding with his
cross-examination. Most of the time, respondent judge would unduly intervene in the presentation of
evidence and asked more questions than counsel. Respondent judge showed apathy to those who were
subjected to his insults. He insisted that others submit to his way of doing things. He showed inflexibility to
minor mistakes.8
4. Atty. Ricardo V. de Jesus
While he was in the process of conducting direct examination, respondent judge instructed him to ask
questions which respondent judge thought to be material. When he was through with his direct examination,
respondent judge asked him in open court how long he had been in private practice. He replied that he had
been practicing for only a period of one and a half (1½) years. Respondent judge then told him to prepare
supposed direct questions and expected answers. He felt embarrassed.9
On October 6, 2005, the members of the Provincial Prosecution Office of Albay held a meeting to discuss the matter of
assigning a public prosecutor to the sala of respondent judge. During the meeting, the prosecutors raised their concern
about the behavior of respondent judge. Provincial prosecutor Benigno L. Tolosa furnished Judge Dañas with a copy of the
minutes of the meeting.10 The relevant portions of the minutes11 were:
II. DISCUSSION
• The Provincial Prosecutor informed the group about the purpose of the meeting. He said that the
prosecutor assigned in RTC Branch 9, Prosecutor Maria Miranda-Gojar will soon be transferring to the
Office of the Regional State Prosecutor. He asked suggestions from the group on how to go about the
matter of assigning a prosecutor in Branch 9 considering that all prosecutors have their own court
assignment and considering further that the Presiding Judge of said Branch has a behavioral and attitudinal
problem.
• Considering that the matter to be discussed involves the problem with the Presiding Judge, the
Provincial Prosecutor requested those prosecutors [present] to share their experiences in the court with the
Presiding Judge.
• Prosecutor [Eduardo B.] Quinzon remarked that the judge has a sudden burst of temper and wild
moods, insulting and humiliating lawyers in front of their clients even in the presence of other people.
• Prosecutor Gojar added that the Presiding Judge has a volatile temper and is fond of insulting and
humiliating witnesses and also lawyers. She also said that during arraignment or trial of cases, he would
even call her attention and would insult the prosecutor who made the Information and Resolution of the
case and even the Chief who approved the same.
• Prosecutor [Maria Teresa A.] Mahiwo added that she observed one hearing [where] the Presiding
Judge [scolded] the two private lawyers who [were] much older than him. She said that being assigned in
Branch 9 will not be good for the health of any prosecutor.
III. RECOMMENDATION/AGREEMENT
• Prosecutor [Elmer M.] Lanuzo opined that because the judge is temperamental, he should be given
a fiscal who is not temperamental.
• It was resolved by the group that no prosecutor will be assigned at RTC Branch 9 considering that
all prosecutors have their own court assignment.
• It was also agreed that the Presiding Judge can request from the Department of Justice a
prosecutor who would attend to the cases in his sala.12
Judge Dañas also received a letter13 from city prosecutor Palmarin E. Rubio of Legazpi City. City prosecutor Rubio stated
that the prosecutor assigned to the sala of respondent judge did not want to comment on the conduct of respondent judge.
He suggested that members of an audit team from this Court be made to observe the proceedings in Branch 9 to "see and
feel the tension[-]charged atmosphere in the sala once the trial started."14
To his report, Judge Dañas attached copies of the comments of the lawyers he interviewed, the letter of provincial
prosecutor Tolosa enclosing the minutes of the meeting of the public prosecutors in Albay and the letter of city prosecutor
Rubio.15 He concluded that the charges against respondent judge were true. However, he refrained from recommending any
definite action against him and left the matter to the sound discretion of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA).16
In its report,17 the OCA adopted the findings of Judge Dañas and made the following recommendation:
RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Court is our recommendation
that respondent Judge Ruben B. Carretas of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Legazpi City be ADVISED to
observe proper judicial decorum and to conscientiously abide by the mandates of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
and the Canons of Judicial Ethics in the exercise of his official functions.18
We disagree. Respondent judge deserves more than mere "advice."
Respondent judge should be reminded of Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2 and Section 1, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary:19
CANON 2
INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential not only in the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of
judges.
SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in view of
a reasonable observer.
SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice
must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
xxx xxx xxx
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
A judge should possess the virtue of gravitas. He should be learned in the law, dignified in demeanor, refined in speech and
virtuous in character. Besides having the requisite learning in the law, he must exhibit that hallmark judicial temperament of
utmost sobriety and self-restraint.20 In this connection, he should be considerate, courteous and civil to all persons who come
to his court.21 A judge who is inconsiderate, discourteous or uncivil to lawyers, litigants or witnesses who appear in his sala
commits an impropriety and fails in his duty to reaffirm the people’s faith in the judiciary. He also violates Section 6, Canon 6
of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary which provides:
SEC. 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and
courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official
capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to their
influence, direction or control.22 (emphasis supplied)
It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer, 23 litigant or witness. The act betrays lack of patience, prudence and
restraint.24 Thus, a judge must at all times be temperate in his language. 25 He must choose his words, written or spoken, with
utmost care and sufficient control. The wise and just man is esteemed for his discernment. Pleasing speech increases his
persuasiveness.26
Equanimity and judiciousness should be the constant marks of a dispenser of justice. 27 A judge should always keep his
passion guarded. He can never allow it to run loose and overcome his reason. He descends to the level of a sharp-tongued,
ill-mannered petty tyrant when he utters harsh words, snide remarks or sarcastic comments. As a result, he degrades the
judicial office and erodes public confidence in the judiciary.
Against this backdrop, respondent judge indeed appears arrogant and boastful not only in the eyes of the anonymous
complainant but also to the lawyers who practice in his sala. He revealed a hint of arrogance in his comment when he
professed exasperation over minor procedural mistakes28 or even negligible lapses (such as the confusion in the use of
"collaborate" and "corroborate"). He also displayed a condescending attitude toward lawyers in the provinces when he
implied that they were "inferior" to lawyers from Manila. As a judge, he should ensure that his conduct is always above
reproach and perceived to be so by a reasonable observer. He must never show conceit or even an appearance thereof, or
any kind of impropriety.
The dispensation of justice is a joint responsibility of the judge and the lawyer. 29 A sense of shared responsibility which is a
crucial factor in the administration of justice is expected of them. 30 They should co-exist in a spirit of cooperation and mutual
respect, not animosity and derision. Respondent judge antagonized the lawyers (private practitioners, public attorneys and
public prosecutors alike) appearing in his sala by his perceived arrogance and insulting remarks. Consequently, he impaired
the administration of justice.
Respondent judge unduly intervened in the presentation of evidence. He asked more questions than counsel and conducted
direct and cross-examination of witnesses. In so doing, he contravened Rule 3.06 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and
Canon 14 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics:31
RULE 3.06 – While a judge may, to promote justice, prevent waste of time or clear up some obscurity, properly
intervene in the presentation of evidence during the trial, it should be borne in mind that undue interference may
prevent the proper presentation of the cause or the ascertainment of truth.
—∞——∞——∞—
14. Interference in conduct of trial
While a judge may properly intervene in a trial of a case to promote expedition and prevent
unnecessary waste of time, or to clear up some obscurity, nevertheless, he should bear in mind
that his undue interference, impatience, or participation in the examination of witnesses, or a
severe attitude on his part toward witnesses, especially those who are excited or terrified by the
unusual circumstances of trial, may tend to prevent the proper presentation of the cause, or the
ascertainment of the truth in respect thereto.
Conversation between the judge and counsel in court is often necessary, but the judge should be
studious to avoid controversies which are apt to obscure the merits of the dispute between litigants
and lead to its unjust disposition. In addressing counsel, litigants or witnesses, he should avoid a
controversial tone.
He should avoid interruptions of counsel in their arguments except to clarify his mind as to their
positions, and he should not be tempted to an unnecessary display of learning or a premature
judgment.
A judge may properly intervene in the presentation of evidence to expedite and prevent unnecessary waste of time and
clarify obscure and incomplete details in the course of the testimony of the witness or thereafter.32 Questions designed to
clarify points and to elicit additional relevant evidence are not improper.33 But the judge should limit himself to asking
clarificatory questions and the power should be sparingly and judiciously used. The rule is that the court should stay out of it
as much as possible, neither interfering nor intervening in the conduct of the trial.34A judge must always maintain cold
neutrality and impartiality for he is a magistrate, not an advocate.35
In fine, the over-all conduct of respondent judge has been unbecoming of a magistrate. It is classified as a light charge 36 for
which a fine of not less than P1,000 but not exceeding P10,000 may be imposed.37
Pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC,38 this administrative case against respondent judge shall also be considered as a
disciplinary proceeding against him as a member of the bar.
Violation of the fundamental tenets of judicial conduct embodied in the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary, the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Canons of Judicial Ethics constitutes a breach of Canons 139 and 1140 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Certainly, a judge who falls short of the ethics of the judicial office tends to diminish the
people’s respect for the law and legal processes. He also fails to observe and maintain the esteem due to the courts and to
judicial officers.
Respondent judge also transgressed Canon 841 and Rule 8.0142 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he
humiliated, insulted or embarrassed lawyers appearing in his sala. Instead of establishing a cordial and collaborative
atmosphere with lawyers, respondent judge alienated them and effectively disregarded their significant role in the
administration of justice.
Accordingly, respondent Judge Ruben B. Carretas is hereby found GUILTY of conduct unbecoming of a judge. In particular,
he violated Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2, Section 1, Canon 4 and Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for
the Philippine Judiciary, Rule 3.06 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Canon 14 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. He
is FINED in the amount of P7,500.
Respondent Judge Ruben B. Carretas is also hereby found GUILTY of violating Canons 1, 8 and 11 and Rule 8.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility for which he is FINED in the amount of P7,500.
Judge Carretas is further STERNLY WARNED that the commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt
with more severely.
Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal records of respondent judge.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, Garcia, JJ., concur.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2059 August 10, 2007

(Formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 06-2419-RTJ)
AUGUSTO C. CAESAR, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE ROMEO M. GOMEZ, Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Maasin City, Southern Leyte,Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Augusto C. Caesar (Caesar) filed the instant administrative complaint against Judge Romeo M. Gomez of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Maasin, Southern Leyte, Branch 25, seeking his dismissal from the service for alleged grave misconduct and
gross ignorance of the law.
Caesar was the private complainant in a criminal case for estafa filed against Norman Victor M. Ordiz (Ordiz) with the RTC
of Maasin, Southern Leyte, docketed as Criminal Case No. 04-02-2578 and raffled to Branch 25 presided by the respondent
judge.
The criminal information against Ordiz was filed in March 2004, but several months passed before he was arraigned. The
delay in the arraignment was due to several motions for postponement filed by the accused, which were all granted by the
respondent judge. The pre-trial conference was finally conducted on January 31, 2005, and the case was then set for the
prosecution’s presentation of evidence. 1
Before the scheduled date of trial, Ordiz allegedly negotiated to settle the civil aspect of the case and promised to return
Caesar’s Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) and pay Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for attorney’s fees and
other expenses. Ordiz, however, did not fulfill his promise. A rumor circulated that instead of paying Caesar P250,000.00,
Ordiz gave respondent judge P200,000.00 on the promise that the latter will dismiss the case.2
On April 11, 2005, Ordiz filed a Motion to Dismiss,3 asserting that he did not commit estafa. He claimed that there was
novation in the original relations between him and Caesar.
Caesar opposed Ordiz’s motion, arguing that the motion was in reality a motion to quash which, under Section 1, Rule 117
of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, should be filed before arraignment. The filing of the motion after the pre-trial conference
is, thus, irregular. Likewise, the grounds relied upon in the motion to dismiss are not among the grounds set forth in Section
3, Rule 117, and are but defenses which Ordiz must prove during the trial. Therefore, they cannot be made a basis for the
quashal of the information. Lastly, he argued that novation does not extinguish criminal liability.4
On July 18, 2005, Judge Gomez granted the Motion to Dismiss. 5 In dismissing the case, he ratiocinated that when Caesar
backed out of the agreement and demanded the return of the advance payment in the amount ofP790,000.00, the original
agreement to sell was novated and converted into an ordinary creditor-debtor relationship. The acceptance of the partial
return is sufficient proof of novation and has effectively rescinded their original transaction, thus, preventing the incipience of
criminal liability for estafa. Respondent judge also added that Ordiz could not be held criminally liable under Article 316(1) of
the Revised Penal Code (1) because the agreement he signed was not a contract of sale, but only an agreement to sell.
Furthermore, the agreement provides that title to the property shall be delivered to the vendee only upon full payment of the
purchase price which Caesar failed to do. Clearly, the non-delivery of the property sold was due to Caesar’s fault. As such,
there is no basis for Caesar to claim that he suffered damage under the contract or by reason of the non-delivery.
Caesar filed a Motion for Reconsideration and For Inhibition,6 but Judge Gomez denied the same.7 Respondent judge ruled
that the arguments raised by Caesar had been sufficiently explained in the Order sought to be reconsidered. He also denied
the motion for inhibition holding that divergence of opinion between counsel and the judge is not a proper ground for
inhibition. According to him, opinions framed in the course of judicial proceedings, as long as they are based on the
evidence presented, do not prove bias or prejudice.
Caesar claims that Judge Gomez employed slanted logic to justify his premeditated corrupt objective to favor Ordiz,
disregarding, in the process, the prohibition in Rule 117 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The dismissal of the criminal
case by respondent judge prior to the presentation of the evidence by the prosecution is a travesty of justice.8
In his Comment,9 respondent judge denied the charges against him. On the charge of grave misconduct, he explained that
the motions for postponements filed by the accused were all meritorious and so he granted the same. Respondent judge
also denied the charge of bribery against him, asserting that:
[I]t has no basis except the thin air circulating around, as if private complainant only sniffed the air and say, "huh pay off".
But how could private complainant sniff the thin air in the Halls of Justice in Maasin City when he went there only when his
case was scheduled for hearing? And when the Order of dismissal was issued he was maybe already in the United States?
Granting without admitting that such rumors existed, who originated the same? How reliable is his knowledge about it? How
true is it? To the simple mind of the undersigned this charge is only a product of the fertile imagination of private complainant
over his despair in a losing case. And for the information of private complainant[,] no such rumors circulated in the
Bulwagan, for who is stupid enough to pay P200,000 to a judge for an alleged payable amount of only P250,000 and for a
criminal case that is easily dismissible? This only bolsters the claim of accused that of the P790,000 returnable amount to
private complainant, per previous agreement, P640,000 has already been paid or returned.10
On the charge of gross ignorance of the law, respondent judge maintained that he did not disregard the basic procedural
rules. He reasoned that:
(1) The motion to dismiss was still given due course when at the time it was filed the accused was already arraigned, pre-
trial had already been held, the case was already set for the reception of the prosecution’s evidence and the accused
already committed to private complainant and counsel to return the amount ofP200,000 and to reimburse the amount
of P50,000 as attorney’s fees.
This reasoning of private complainant is quite inaccurate because a motion to dismiss is not like a motion to quash which
must be filed normally before arraignment. A motion to dismiss in criminal cases is usually filed on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence. Sometimes this is termed as demurrer to evidence. The motion to dismiss as understood in this
connection may be filed after the pre-trial or after the presentation of the prosecution’s evidence if it can be clearly seen that
from the evidence presented the crime was not actually committed or that they are not sufficient to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt.
In criminal cases, after the pre-trial, the evidence admitted and the facts stipulated became immutably established, so that
they need not be proved in the trial. So that in [the] pre-trial there is already presentation of evidence. And after the pre-trial
based on the evidence admitted and the facts stipulated, a motion to dismiss may be filed if it becomes clear that the offense
charge was not really committed.
Now in [the] instant case, during the pre-trial, the following evidence and facts were admitted and stipulated.
1) Contract/Agreement Exh. "A", (Annex "G") between accused and private complainant that a certain portion of agricultural
land including the improvements existing thereon located at Flordeliz Machoron, Southern Leyte, denominated as Lot No. 70
containing an area of 3,000 sq. meters will be sold to the vendee in the amount ofP1,200,000 and will be paid in three (3)
installment payments.
That the first installment payment will be paid to the vendee upon execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale of a portion of land
in the amount of P400,000;
That the second installment payment will be paid four months after the payment of the first installment plan;
That the third or last installment payment will only be paid to the vendor upon execution and turn-over of the Original
Certificate of Title to the vendee.
That the title of the said property shall remain in the name of the vendor.
A perusal of the foregoing instrument Exhibit "A" (Annex "G") would indeed reveal that it is not a Deed of Sale, rather it is
only an agreement to sell. And private complainant was not yet obligated to make any partial payment to the accused
because, per said agreement, the first payment of P400,000 shall be paid only upon the execution of the Deed of Absolute
Sale. On the other hand[,] the accused is not yet under obligation to deliver the land because no sale has yet been
perfected, or that the last installment has not yet been paid. That being so, the accused is not yet under obligation to own
the property because the obligation to deliver the same has not yet accrued.
2) That of the P790,000 received by the accused from the private complainant as partial payment of the subject
lot, P640,000 has been returned per their agreement, the first amount returned was P140,000 and the second amount
was P500,000 paid by defense counsel Atty. Nicasio Nueve to private Prosecutor Atty. Francisco Escaño.
Because of the documentary evidence admitted and [the] facts stipulated during the pre-trial hereto attached as Annex "H",
the accused filed a motion to dismiss x x x .11
Caesar filed his Reply to Comment,12 reiterating the allegations in his complaint-affidavit.
In its Report and Recommendation, the Office of Court Administrator (OCA) found that:
[T]he charge of bribery against the respondent judge should be dismissed as complainant failed to present any evidence to
prove that respondent judge received from the accused the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) in
exchange of the dismissal of the criminal case.
However, the complaint for gross ignorance of the law is meritorious. Respondent judge tried to evade administrative liability
by claiming that he dismissed the criminal case pursuant to Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court x x x.
However, the rule on demurrer to evidence is inapplicable in the case as the prosecution has not yet rested its case at the
time the motion to dismiss was filed. The rule is very clear that a criminal complaint may be dismissed due to insufficiency of
evidence only after the prosecution has rested its case. In the subject case, trial had not even commenced when respondent
judge dismissed the criminal complaint.
Moreover, respondent judge dismissed the criminal complaint on its merit and not due to insufficiency of evidence of the
prosecution. He categorically stated in his order dismissing the complaint that "the original agreement/contract to sell was
novated and/or rescinded by agreement of the parties, so estafa did not attach". Nowhere in the decision was it stated that
the case was being dismissed for insufficiency of evidence of the prosecution.
That demurrer to evidence may be given due course only after the prosecution has already rested its case is a basic rule of
procedure that every member of the judiciary ought to know. Judges are called upon to exhibit more than just cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. Basic rules must be at the palms of their hands as they are expected to
maintain professional competence at all times. Their failure to observe the basic laws and rules are not only inexcusable but
renders them susceptible to administrative sanction. Where the law involved, as in this case, is simple and elementary, lack
of conversance therewith constitutes gross ignorance of the law.13
The Court agrees with the OCA.
Caesar charges the respondent judge with grave misconduct, claiming that the latter received P200,000.00 as consideration
for the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 04-02-2578. But as explained by the OCA, the charge lacks substantiation.
Undeniably, the alleged "pay-off" was only "a rumor that circulated in the halls of justice of Maasin City."14
For a judge to be rendered culpable in any administrative proceeding, there should be a clear and sufficient evidence of his
misconduct.15 In this case, Caesar failed to substantiate his allegation of bribery. Accordingly, we find no cause to controvert
the findings of the OCA absolving the respondent judge from the charge of grave misconduct.
In addition, Caesar condemns the respondent judge for rashly dismissing Criminal Case No. 04-02-2578. He claims that the
dismissal of the estafa case against Ordiz was erroneous and constitutes gross ignorance of the law. The respondent judge,
on the other hand, maintains that he did not disregard any procedural rule in granting the motion to dismiss. As justification,
he declares that Ordiz’s Motion to Dismiss is akin to a demurrer to evidence, which may be filed after the pre-trial or after the
prosecution has rested its case, if the evidence presented shows that the crime was not actually committed or is insufficient
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, if on the basis of the stipulations made at the pre-trial conference it was
established that the accused did not commit the crime charged, a motion to dismiss may be filed and granted, as in this
case.
This explanation deserves scant consideration.
Admittedly, there is no material difference between the Motion to Dismiss filed by Ordiz before the RTC and a demurrer to
evidence.
Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure sets out the procedure for demurrer to evidence:
Section 23. Demurrer to evidence. – After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the action on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer
to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court.
If the court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense.
When the demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the accused waives the right to present evidence and submits
the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution.
The motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence shall specifically state its grounds and shall be filed within a non-
extendible period of five (5) days after the prosecution rests its case. The prosecution may oppose the motion within a non-
extendible period of five (5) days from receipt.
If leave of court is granted, the accused shall file the demurrer to evidence within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days
from notice. The prosecution may oppose the demurrer to evidence within a similar period from its receipt.
The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by
appeal or by certiorari before judgment.
In this case, the prosecution had yet to present its evidence at the time the Motion to Dismiss was filed. A demurrer to
evidence is, therefore, inappropriate in Criminal Case No. 04-02-2578.
The rule is that when the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance
of the law.16 By giving due course to and granting Ordiz’s Motion to Dismiss, respondent judge exhibited gross ignorance of
the law. It may very well be that respondent judge knew the procedural rule in question. What renders him liable is that he
acted as if he did not.
Respondent judge chose to exonerate Ordiz based on his defense that he did not commit estafa. He ruled that Ordiz is not
liable under Article 316(1) of the Revised Penal Code because the agreement he signed is merely an agreement to sell, not
a contract of sale, and thus, he is not under obligation to own the property at the time of the execution of the agreement.
Such reasoning is specious.
The information against Ordiz reads:
That on or about the 24th day of February 2003, in the City of Maasin, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to defraud, by means of deceit and false pretenses, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud Augusto C. Cesar (sic), as follows, to wit: the accused under false
pretenses which he made to said Augusto C. Cesar (sic) to the effect that he was the owner of a parcel of land, situated in
Flordeliz, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, consisting of 3,000 square meters, and was willing to sell said land for 1.2 million
pesos, which pretenses and representations he well knew were false and fraudulent, and were only made to induce the said
Augusto C. Cesar (sic) to accept and conclude the sale, as in fact, the said Augusto Cesar (sic) paid, gave and delivered a
total amount of P790,000.00 as partial payment; and after the true owner thereof was revealed, the said accused only
returned the amount of P140,000.00, and withheld the balance of P650,000.00, and while in possession of said amount,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted said P650,000.00, to his own personal use
and benefit; and that despite repeated demands made by the herein complainant Augusto C. Cesar (sic), to account the said
amount, accused failed and refused to do so, to the damage and prejudice of said Augusto Cesar (sic) in the said amount of
Php650,000.00.17
From the information, it is clear that Ordiz was not charged under Article 316, but for violating Article 315(2)(a) of the
Revised Penal Code which provides as one of the modes of committing estafa:
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
The gravamen of the felony is an intent to deceive, or fraudulent intent. Intent, being a state of the mind, may be proved by
words or by the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the transaction, subject of the case, independent of and
distinct from the non-compliance with the promise or representation of the accused.18
Ordiz never denied that he did not own the property at the time of the execution of the agreement. Deceit is demonstrated in
the false pretense by which Ordiz deluded Caesar into believing that he owned a property in Flordeliz Machoron, Southern
Leyte, and that he (Ordiz) had the capacity to sell it. Through this hoax, he was able to convince Caesar to surrender his
money to him. Surprisingly, respondent judge closed his eyes to this obvious ruse.
What is more nettlesome is respondent judge’s holding that there was novation or rescission of contract that prevented the
onset of criminal liability for estafa. Jurisprudence is replete with cases19 that the criminal liability for estafa already
committed is not affected by the subsequent novation of the contract, for it is a public offense which must be prosecuted and
punished by the State on its own motion even if complete reparation had been made for the damage suffered by the
offended party.20 Although totally inapplicable to the matter of criminal liability, the claim of novation by reason of the partial
return of the money defrauded was swallowed by the respondent judge hook, line, and sinker to absolve Ordiz from liability.
The Court recognizes that not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and, if committed in good faith, does not
warrant administrative sanction. But this is true only in cases within the parameters of tolerable misjudgment. Where,
however, the procedure is so simple and the facts so evident as to be beyond permissible margins of error, to still err
thereon amounts to ignorance of the law.21
In this case, respondent judge displayed a deplorable deficiency in his grasp of the basic principles governing demurrer to
evidence or dismissal of criminal action for insufficiency of evidence. Also, he showed his utter lack of knowledge and
understanding of the effect of novation and partial restitution of the amount defrauded in estafa cases. As mentioned, when
the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.22
A judge is called upon to exhibit more than a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. It is imperative that
1avvphi1
he be conversant with basic legal principles. Canon 4 of the Canon of Judicial Ethics requires that a judge must be
conversant with the principles of law; and Canon 18 mandates that he should administer his office with due regard to the
integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depositary of arbitrary power, but a judge under the
sanction of law. The Code of Judicial Conduct also enjoins judges to "be faithful to the law and maintain professional
competence."
Indeed, respondent judge owes it to the public and the legal profession to know the law he is supposed to apply to a given
controversy. In order to render substantial justice and to maintain public confidence in the legal system, judges are expected
to keep abreast of all laws and prevailing jurisprudence, consistent with the standard that magistrates must be the
embodiments of competence, integrity and independence. Thus, it has been held that when the judge's inefficiency springs
from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either
too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds, or he is too vicious that the oversight or omission was
deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority.23 When the law is sufficiently basic, as what is involved
in the present case, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it; anything less than that would be gross ignorance of the
law.24
Under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court on the Discipline of Justices and Judges, gross ignorance of the
law is classified as a serious charge punishable by either dismissal from the service, suspension from office or a fine of more
than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.25
We believe that an imposition of P40,000.00 fine upon respondent judge is in order.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Romeo M. Gomez is hereby found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law, and is ordered
to pay a FINE of FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00) upon notice.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

Judicial Ethics Cases (Set 1)

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J u d i c i a l E t h i c s – C a s e s S e t 1 P a g e |1

A.M. No. RTJ-00-1583 November 15, 2000

PASTOR O. RICAFRANCA, JR., complainant,

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Kapunan, J., took no part in view of relationship with a party.

A.M. No. MTJ-94-921 March 5, 1996

DR. AMPARO A. LACHICA, complainant,

The Antecedent Facts

To substantiate respondent's allegations, he submitted Affidavits of Lolita Pardiños, Interpreter, Norma

The Issue: Credibility

Summing up, the Investigating Judge made the following recommendation:

The Court's Ruling

Canons 1 and 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provide as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

On the other hand, item 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics reads:

3. Avoidance of Appearance of Impropriety.

A similar pronouncement was made in the case of Arcenio vs. Pagorogon 8:

Narvasa, Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.

A.M. No. MTJ-94-998 February 9, 1996

JUDGE SEGUNDO B. PAZ, complainant,

August 18, 1994

THE HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO

Thank you very much..

Required to comment, respondent averred:.

(pp. 16-21, Rollo.)

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Francisco and Panganiban, JJ. concur.

A.M. No. MTJ-94-985 February 21, 1995

APOLINARIO MUÑEZ, complainant,

Republic of the Philippines

TO: ANY OFFICE OF THE LAW

For and in the absence of the Municipal Circuit Judge

Republic of the Philippines

TO: Mr. Apolinario Muñez

PLEASE FAIL NOT under the penalty of the law.

Loreto, Agusan del Sur, Philippines.

(Sgd) ASUERO S. IRISARI

Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado and Puno, JJ., concur

A.M. No. RTJ-06-1974 July 26, 2007

CARMEN P. EDAÑO, Complainant,

The matter will be taken under advisement.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, judgment is hereby rendered:

A.M. No. RTJ-98-1400 February 1, 1999

CARLOS DIONISIO, complainant,

Fontana Café & Restaurant

Dampa, Ninoy Aquino Avenue

Parañaque, Metro Manila

RTC, Branch 259

Parañaque Municipal Hall

Tel. 825-57-32/826-00-11 loc. 226

The Code of Judicial Ethics provides in so far as pertinent:

Gonzaga-Reyes, J., took no part.

A.M. No. RTJ-02-1697 October 15, 2003

EUGENIO K. CHAN, complainant,

The OCA’s Report and Recommendation

The Ruling of the Court

On Respondent Judge’s Refusal to Wear the Mandated Judicial Robe

Circular No. 25 dated 9 June 1989, ("Circular No. 25") provides:

The Code of Judicial Conduct ("Code") provides:

CANON 2 — A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY

On the Other Charges Against Respondent Judge

On the Appropriate Penalty to be Imposed Against Respondent Judge

Ynares-Santiago, J., on leave.