Honasan vs. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the Dept.

of
Justice, et. al., G.R. # 159747, Apr. 13, 2004

Lessons Applicable: Rule on Interpretative Regulations (persons), Powers of the Ombudsman

(consti), concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and the DOJ to conduct preliminary
investigation (consti)

Law Applicable: Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, Art. 2 Civil Code

Facts:
- August 4, 2003: CIDG-PNP/P Director Edguardo Matillano  filed an affidavit-complaint with
the Department of Justice (DOJ) which contains the following in part:
 July 27, 2003: crime of coup d’ etat  was committed by military personnel who occupied
Oakwood and Senator Gregorio “Gringo” Honasan, II
 On or about 11 p.m. June 4,2003: A meeting was held and presided by Senator Honasan in
a house located in San Juan, Metro Manila
 Early morning of July 27, 2003: Capt. Gerardo Gambala, in behalf of the military rebels
occupying Oakwood, made a public statement aired on national television, stating their
withdrawal of support to the chain of command of the AFP and the Government of
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Willing to risk their lives to achieve the National
Recovery Agenda (NRA) of Senator Honasan which they believe is the only program that
would solve the ills of society.

- Sworn statement of AFP Major Perfecto Ragil stated that:

o June 4, 2003 about 11 pm: Senator Gregorio “Gringo” Honasan arrived with Capt.
Turinga to hold the NRP meeting where they concluded the use of force, violence and
armed struggle to achieve the vision of NRP where a junta will be constituted which will
run the new government. They had a blood compact and that he only participated due
to the threat made by Senator Honasan when he said “Kung kaya nating pumatay sa
ating mga kalaban, kaya din nating pumatay sa mga kasamahang magtataksil.”
o July 27, 2003: He saw on TV that Lieutenant Antonio Trillanes, Captain Gerardo
Gambala, Captain Alejano and some others who were present during the NRP meeting
he attended, having a press conference about their occupation of the Oakwood Hotel.
He saw that the letter "I" on the arm bands and the banner is the same letter "I" in the
banner is the same as their blood compact wound.  
- August 27, 2003: Senator Honasan appeared with counsel at the DOJ to file a a Motion for
Clarification questioning DOJ's jurisdiction over the case since the imputed acts were
committed in relation to his public office  by a group of public officials with Salary Grade 31
which should be handled by the Office of the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan
- Senator Honasan then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against
the DOJ Panel and its members, CIDG-PNP-P/Director Eduardo Matillano and Ombudsman
Simeon V. Marcelo, attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ Panel in
issuing the aforequoted Order of September 10, 2003 directing him to file his respective
counter-affidavits and controverting evidence on the ground that the DOJ has no jurisdiction
to conduct the preliminary investigation

Issues:
1. Whether in regards to Ombudsman-DOJ Circular no. 95-001, the office of the
Ombudsman should deputize the prosecutors of the DOJ to conduct the preliminary
investigation.
2. Whether the Ombudsman-DOJ Joint Circular no. 95-001 is ineffective on the
ground that it was not published
 3. Whether the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation
because the petitioner is a public officer with salary grade 31 (Grade 27 or Higher)
thereby falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandigan Bayan.

Held: Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit

1.      No. 
 Ombudsman cases involving criminal offenses may be subdivided into two classes, to
wit: (1) those cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and (2) those falling under the jurisdiction
of the regular courts. The difference between the two, aside from the category of the courts
wherein they are filed, is on the authority to investigate as distinguished from the authority
to prosecute
 The power to investigate or conduct a preliminary investigation on any Ombudsman
case may be exercised by an investigator or prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, or
by any Provincial or City Prosecutor or their assistance, either in their regular capacities or
as deputized Ombudsman prosecutors.
 circular supports the view of the respondent Ombudsman that it is just an internal
agreement between the Ombudsman and the DOJ
 The Constitution, The Ombudsman Act of 1989, Administrative order no. 8 of the office
of the Ombudsman. The prevailing jurisprudence and under the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, All recognize and uphold the concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and
the DOJ to conduct preliminary investigation on charges filed against public officers and
employees. 
 The DOJ Panel need not be authorized nor deputized by the Ombudsman to conduct
the preliminary investigation for complaints filed with it because the DOJ's authority to act
as the principal law agency of the government and investigate the commission of crimes
under the Revised Penal Code is derived from the Revised Administrative Code which had
been held in the Natividad case13 as not being contrary to the Constitution. Thus, there is
not even a need to delegate the conduct of the preliminary investigation to an agency which
has the jurisdiction to do so in the first place. However, the Ombudsman may assert its
primary jurisdiction at any stage of the investigation.

2.      No. 
- In the case of People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640 (1954). The only circulars and regulations
which prescribe a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective.
- In the case of Taňada V. Tuvera, 146 Scra 453 (1986), The Honorable Court rules that:
o Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is regulating only
the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published.
Neither is publication required of the so called letters of instructions issued by the
administrative superiors concerning the rules on guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in performance of their duties.
 OMB-DOJ Joint Circulars no. 95-001 is merely an internal circular between the DOJ
and the office of the Ombudsman, Outlining authority and responsibilities among
prosecutors of the DOJ and of the office of the Ombudsman in the conduct of preliminary
investigation. It does not regulate the conduct of persons or the public, in general.

3.      No. Whether or not the offense is within exclusive jurisdiction or not will not resolve the
present petition so as not to pre-empt the result of the investigation conducted by the DOJ
Panel.

Gatbonton vs. NLRC, et. al., G.R. # 146779, Jan. 23, 2006

Lessons Applicable: Publication must be in full, Preventive suspension, damages

 Laws Applicable: Art. 2 Civil Code, Section 8, Rule XXIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code

FACTS:

-  November 1998: A civil engineering student of respondent Mapua Institute of Technology (MIT)
filed a letter-complaint against Renato S. Gatbonton,  an associate professor of the Faculty of
Civil Engineering for unfair/unjust grading system, sexual harassment and conduct
unbecoming of an academician. 
- Pending investigating, MIT, through its committee on Decorum and Investigation placed him
under a 30-day preventive suspension effective January 11, 1999. 
- The committee believed that his continued stay during the investigation will affect his
performance as a faculty member, as well as the student’s learning and that the suspension
will allow petitioner to “prepare himself for the investigation and will prevent his influence to
other members of the community. 
- He filed a complaint with the NLRC for illegal suspension, damages and attorney’s fees
- He questioned the validity of the administrative proceedings with the RTC in a petition for
certiorari but was terminated since MIT agreed to publish in the school organ the rules and
regulations implementing Republic Act No. 7877 (R.A. No. 7877) and disregard the previous
administrative proceedings
- Labor Arbiter: 30-day preventive suspension is illegal and directed MIT to pay his wages during
the said period
- NLRC: set aside the Labor Arbiter’s decision
- CA on special civil action for certiorari: affirming the NLRC

Issues:

1. Whether Mapua’s Rules and Regulations is effective as of January 11, 1999 when
it was published only on February 23, 1999 (persons)
2. W/N there is a valid justification for the 30-day preventive suspension under the Labor
Code (labor)
3. Whether damages should be awarded 

Held:
- Petition is partially granted. CA, NLRC set aside and Labors Arbiter reinstated

1.      NO
- R.A. No. 7877 imposed the duty on educational or training institutions to "promulgate rules
and regulations in consultation with and jointly approved by the employees or students or
trainees, through their duly designated representatives, prescribing the procedures for the
investigation of sexual harassment cases and the administrative sanctions therefor
- Taňada vs. Tuvera: 
o all statutes, including those of local application and private laws shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity is fixed by the legislative.(especially penal laws)
o Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated
by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative
rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement
existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
- publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public
of the contents of the laws
- Mapua Rules is one of those issuances that should be published for its effectivity, since its
purpose is to enforce and implement R.A. No. 7877, which is a law of general application 
- Mapua Rules Section 3 Rule IV (Administrative Provisions) states that it shall take effect 15
days after publication by the committee. 

2.      NO.
- Preventive suspension is a disciplinary measure for the protection of the company’s property
pending investigation of any alleged malfeasance or misfeasance committed by the employee.
The employer may place the worker concerned under preventive suspension if his continued
employment poses a serious and imminent threat to the life or property of the employer or of
his co-workers. However, when it is determined that there is no sufficient basis to justify an
employee’s preventive suspension, the latter is entitled to the payment of salaries during the
time of preventive suspension
- Section 8, Rule XXIII, Book V of the Ominibus Rules, there is no valid justification 
o does not show that evidence of petitioner’s guilt is strong and that the school head is
morally convinced that petitioner’s continued stay during the period of investigation
constitutes a distraction to the normal operations of the institution; or that petitioner
poses a risk or danger to the life or property of the other members of the educational
community

3.      No. 
- While petitioner’s preventive suspension may have been unjustified, this does not
automatically mean that he is entitled to moral or other damages
o No showing of bad faith or in a wanton or fraudulent manner in preventively
suspending petitioner

Marcos vs. Judge Fernando Vil. Pamintuan, A.M. # RTJ-07-2062, Jan. 18, 2011

Lessons Applicable: Ignorance of the Law

FACTS:
·         Judge Reyes in an order on May 30, 1996 dismissed Civil Case No. 3383-R due to forum
shopping and ordered that that the Buddha statuette in the custody of this Court be
immediately released to the children of the late Rogelio Roxas in trust for the estate of the late
Rogelio Roxas
·         RTC: Denied the separate motions for reconsideration by the parties
·         Judge Pamintuan in an order dated May 9, 2006 set the case for hearing on June 29, 2006
purportedly to formally and finally release the Golden Buddha to its rightful owner.
o    Marcos was one of the subpoenaed parties, being a person with interest in the case
o    Buddha Statuette or Buddha replica is awarded to the estate of Rogelio Roxas.  However, the
Buddha Statuette or Buddha replica shall be under custodia legis until the final settlement of
the estate of the late Rogelio Roxas, or upon the appointment of his estate’s administrator
o    Also ruled that the Golden Buddha in its custody is a fake one
·         November 15, 2006: Marcos filed a complaint-affidavit charging Judge Pamintuan with
Gross Ignorance of the Law for reversing motu proprio the final and executory order of then
Acting Presiding Judge Antonio Reyes in Civil Case No. 3383-R, entitled “Albert D. Umali, in his
capacity as the exclusive administrator and as President of the Treasure Hunters Association of
the Philippines v. Jose D. Roxas, et al.
o    Pamintuan Commented that Marcos should have filed a motion for reconsideration instead of
filing an administrative complaint.
o    Marcos, in her Reply-Affidavit, cited Section 1 of Rule 37 which provides that only the
aggrieved party may file a motion for reconsideration within the period for taking an appeal
·         Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that Judge Pamintuan be dismissed
from the service with the additional penalty of forfeiture of all his retirement benefits and
disqualification from re-employment in the government service, including government owned or
controlled corporations, for Gross Ignorance of the Law and for violation of Canon 4 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct.
o    A final judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to
correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law.  Should judgment of lower courts – which may
normally be subject to review by higher tribunals – become final and executory before, or
without exhaustion of all recourse of appeal, they too become inviolable, impervious to
modification.  
·         Judge Pamintuan was placed under preventive suspension pending resolution of the
administrative case to stop him from committing further damage to the judiciary. 
·         Judge Pamintuan moved for reconsideration and eventually filed a Motion for Early
Resolution of Motion for Reconsideration and to Submit the Case for Decision.
·         Judge Pamintuan then sent a letter requesting for his backpay and benefits covering the
period of his preventive suspension - denied for being premature and for lack of merit

ISSUE: W/N Judge Pamintuan is guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law

HELD:  
- Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 3, is DISMISSED from the
service
- Judge Pamintuan should have realized that the trial court did not rule on that point that the
Golden Buddha is fake in its May 30, 1996 Order (even in its September 2, 1996 Order) 
- Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct:
o SECTION 6.  Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief,
association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct
themselves in such manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the
impartiality and independence of the judiciary.
- The doctrine of immutability and inalterability of a final judgment has a two-fold purpose, to
wit: 
1. to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make
orderly the discharge of judicial business
2. to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is
precisely why courts exist.
- Notably, this is NOT Judge Pamintuan’s first and sole administrative case.  Judge Pamintuan
was charged with Gross Ignorance of the Law, Gross Violation of the Constitutional Rights of
the Accused, Arrogance and Violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and was suspended for
1 year. Having been previously warned and punished for various infractions, Judge Pamintuan
now deserves the ultimate administrative penalty − dismissal from service

People vs. Quiachon, G.R. # 170236, Aug. 31, 2006

Facts:
On or about May 12, 2001, the appellant Robert Quiachon have sexual intercourse with
Rowena Quiachon, his daughter, 8-year old, and a deaf-mute minor, against her will and
consent. The Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 159 finds the appellant guilty of a
crime of qualified rape and sentenced on September 9, 2003, to suffer a maximum penalty of
death. However, in view of the enactment of R.A. No. 9346 on June 24, 2006; prohibiting the
imposition of death penalty. The penalty to be meted on the appellant is reclusion perpetua in
accordance with Sec. 2 of the said Act.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant may be given retroactive effect on his sentence?

RULLING:
R.A. No. 9346 is applicable of the case pursuant to the principle in Criminal Law, "favorabilia
sunt amplianda adiosa retrigenda" that Penal Laws which are favorable to the accused are
given retroactive effect, under Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code and thus provided that he is
not a habitual criminal, as defiend in Rule 5 of Article 62 of the same code, although at the
time of the publication of such law, a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is
serving the same. In this case the appellant Roberto Quiachon is found to be not a habitual
criminal, thus making R.A. No. 9346 applicable to him. In the decision of Court of Appeals
dated August 25, 2005 was modified and the penalty imposed to Roberto Quiachon which is
death penalty was reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to R.A. No. 9346

Jarillo vs. People, G.R. # 164435, June 29, 2010

- On November 1979, the petitioner, being previously married in 1974, and without the
said marriage having been legally dissolved, contracted a second marriage. The RTC
found petitioner guilty of bigamy in 2001. In 2003, judgment was promulgated
declaring petitioner’s 1974 marriage null and void ab initio on the ground of petitioner
spouse’s psychological incapacity. In her motion for reconsideration, petitioner invoked
said declaration of nullity as a ground for the reversal of her conviction.
- Petitioner’s conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in
the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the
previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was
already consummated. Under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable,
shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.
- Without a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, it is presumed to be
subsisting. Any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that the
guilty party entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage.
Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal
charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question.

FACTS:
- On November 1979, the accused Victoria S. Jarillo,being previously united in lawful
marriage with Rafael M. Alocillo in 1974, and without the said marriage having
been legally dissolved, contracted a second marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy
which marriage was only discovered in 1999.
- On the same year, Emmanuel Uy (2nd husband) filed against the appellant a civil case
for annulment of marriage before the RTC. Parenthetically, Jarillo filed for declaration of
nullity of their marriage against Alocillo in 2000.
- For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her marriage to Alocillo was null and void
because Alocillo was allegedly still married to a certain Loretta Tillman at the time of
the celebration of their marriage; (2) her marriages to both Alocillo and Uy were null
and void for lack of a valid marriage license; and (3) the action had prescribed, since
Uy knew about her marriage to Alocillo as far back as 1978. Notwithstanding her
defenses, the RTC found Jarillo guilty for the crime of bigamy in 2001 and was
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of six years to ten years of prision mayor.
- On appeal to the CA, petitioner’s conviction was affirmed. It held that petitioner
committed bigamy when she contracted marriage with Emmanuel Santos Uy because,
at that time, her marriage to Rafael Alocillo had not yet been declared null and void by
the court. This being so, the presumption is, her previous marriage to Alocillo was still
existing at the time of her marriage to Uy. The CA also struck down, for lack of
sufficient evidence, petitioner’s contentions that her marriages were celebrated without
a marriage license, and that Uy had notice of her previous marriage as far back as
1978.
- In the meantime, the RTC rendered a decision in 2003, declaring petitioner’s 1974
marriage to Alocillo null and void ab initio on the ground of Alocillo’s psychological
incapacity. Said decision became final and executory. In her motion for reconsideration,
 petitioner invoked said declaration of nullity as a ground for the reversal of
her conviction.
ISSUE: 
W/N CA committed a reversible error in affirming the conviction of Jarillo for the crime of
bigamy despite the supervening proof that her marriage to Alocillo had been declared void.

HELD: 
- No. Jarillo’s conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent
judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid
defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second marriage
without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of
bigamy was already consummated. Under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or
voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.
- The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to [private
complainant] had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt
in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to
prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is
contracted.
- Without a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, it is presumed to be
subsisting.
o Any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that the guilty
party entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage.
o Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the
criminal charge.
o It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question.

Atty. Ferrer vs. Spouses Diaz, et. al., G.R. # 165300, Apr. 23, 2010

FACTS:
- Allegedly, the Diazes, as represented by their daughter Comandante obtained from him
a loan of P1,118,228.00. The loan was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage Contract by
way of second mortgage over Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) and a Promissory Note
payable within six months or up to November 7, 1999. Comandante also issued to
petitioner post-dated checks to secure payment of said loan.
- Petitioner further claimed that prior to this or on May 29, 1998, Comandante, for a
valuable consideration of P600,000.00, which amount formed part of the above
mentioned secured loan, executed in his favor an instrument entitled Waiver of
Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided), and which
property is titled and registered in the name of my parents Alfredo T. Diaz and Imelda
G. Diaz, as evidenced by a Transfer Certificate of Title. On the basis of said waiver,
petitioner executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim which he caused to be annotated at
the back of the TCT.
- The Diazes, however, reneged on their obligation as the checks issued by Comandante
were dishonored upon presentment. Despite repeated demands, said respondents still
failed and refused to settle the loan. Thus, petitioner filed on September 29, 1999 a
Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money Secured by Real Estate Mortgage Contract
against the Diazes and Comandante. At the Pangans’ end, they alleged that they
acquired the subject property by purchase in good faith and for a consideration of
P3,000,000.00 on November 11, 1999 from the Diazes through the latter’s daughter
Comandante. However, on December 21, 1999, they were surprised upon being
informed by petitioner that the subject land had been mortgaged to him by the Diazes.
As affirmative defense, the Pangans asserted that the annotation of petitioner’s adverse
claim on TCT No. RT-6604 cannot impair their rights as new owners of the subject
 property. They claimed that the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real
Property (Still Undivided) upon which petitioner’s adverse claim is anchored cannot be
the source of any right or interest over the property considering that it is null and void
under paragraph 2 of Article 1347 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
WON a waiver of hereditary rights in favor of another executed by a future heir while the
parents are still living valid;

RULING:
- Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil Code, no contract may be
entered into upon a future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law.
o For the inheritance to be considered “future”, the succession must not have
been opened at the time of the contract.
o A contract may be classified as a contract upon future inheritance, prohibited
under the second paragraph of Article 1347, where the following requisites
concur:
 (1) That the succession has not yet been opened.
 (2) That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and,
 (3) That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a
right
which is purely hereditary in nature.[38]
- In this case, there is no question that at the time of execution of Comandante’s Waiver
of Hereditary Rights and Interest over a Real Property (Still Undivided), succession to
either of her parent’s properties has not yet been opened since both of them are still
living.
- With respect to the other two requisites, both are likewise present considering that the
property subject matter of Comandante’s waiver concededly forms part of the properties
that she expect to inherit from her parents upon their death and, such expectancy of a
right, as shown by the facts, is undoubtedly purely hereditary in nature.
- From the foregoing, it is clear that Comandante and petitioner entered into a contract
involving the former’s future inheritance as embodied in the Waiver of Hereditary Rights
and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by her in petitioner’s favor.
- The Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still
Undivided) executed by Comandante in favor of petitioner as not valid and that
same cannot be the source of any right or create any obligation between them for
being violative of the second paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil Code.