TAMONDONG, ROMMEL D.

SUCCESSION

Doctrine: While respondent has in his favor deeds of sale over the eight parcels of
land, these deeds were not registered; thus, title remained in the name of the owner
and seller
Case Title: Gina Endaya v. Ernesto Villaos
G.R. No. 202426 (2016) (J. Del Castillo)
Facts:
Endaya and the other heirs of Atilano Villaos filed before the RTC of Palawan
City a complaint for declaration of nullity of deeds of sale, recovery of titles and
accounting of income of the Palawan Village Hotel against respondent Ernesto
Villaos. The complaint stated that the purported sale that affected the lots, were
spurious because the same were not signed by the deceased, Atilano. Only thumb
marks were placed on the deeds of sale. Moreover, petitioner further contended that
Atilano was at a hospital in Quezon City when the deeds of sale were notarized.
Respondent then filed an ejectment case against the petitioners with the MTCC,
after the latter refused to vacate the premises of the lots in question.
The MTCC ruled in favor of the respondent, holding that an action questioning
the ownership of a property does not bar the filing of an ejectment case. The RTC
affirmed the same, but deleted the attorney’s fees. The CA also affirmed the ruling of
the lower courts, holding that respondent’s notarized deeds of sale enjoys the
presumption of regularity.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner has a better right against the respondent over
the subject property.
Ruling:
Yes. While respondent has in his favor deeds of sale over the eight parcels of
land, these deeds were not registered; thus, title remained in the name of the owner
and seller Atilano. When he died, title passed to petitioner, who is his illegitimate
child. This relationship does not appear to be contested by respondent - in these
proceedings, at least. Under Article 777 of the Civil Code, "the rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." Thus,
applying the principle enunciated in the above-cited cases, petitioner and her coheirs
should have been favored on the question of possession, being heirs who
succeeded the registered owner of the properties in dispute. Clearly, the MTCC,
RTC, and CA erred in ruling in favor of respondent.

Doctrine: One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does not inherit from
the latter and cannot become a co-owner of the decedent's property. Consequently,
he cannot effect a repudiation of the co-ownership of the estate that was formed
among the decedent's heirs.
Case Title: Antipolo Ining v. Leonardo Vega
G.R. No. 174727 (2013) (J. Del Castillo)
Facts:
Leon Roldan (Leon), married to Rafaela Menez (Rafaela), is the owner of a
3,120-square meter parcel of land (subject property) in Kalibo, Aklan. Leon and
Rafaela died without issue. Leon was survived by his siblings Romana Roldan
(Romana) and Gregoria Roldan Ining (Gregoria), who are now both deceased.
Sibling #1: Romana was survived by her daughter Anunciacion Vega and grandson,
herein respondent Leonardo R. Vega (Leonardo) (also both deceased). Leonardo in
turn is survived by his wife Lourdes and children Restonilo I. Vega, Crispulo M.
Vega, Milbuena Vega-Restituto and Lenard Vega, the substituted respondents.
Gregoria, on the other hand, was survived by her six children. In short, herein
petitioners, except for Ramon Tresvalles (Tresvalles) and Roberto Tajonera
(Tajonera), are Gregoria’s grandchildren or spouses thereof (Gregoria’s heirs).
Tresvalles and Tajonera are transferees of the said property.
In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half of subject property belonged to him as
Romana’s surviving heir, Leonardo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Kalibo, Aklan Civil Case No. 5275 for partition, recovery of ownership and
possession, with damages, against Gregoria’s heirs.
In their Answer with counterclaim, Gregoria’s heirs (through son Antipolo) claimed
that Leonardo had no cause of action against them; that they have become the sole
owners of the subject property through Lucimo Sr. who acquired the same in good
faith by sale from Juan Enriquez (Enriquez), who in turn acquired the same from
Leon, and Leonardo was aware of this fact.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has the right of ownership of the properties in
question.
Ruling:
No. Since Leon died without issue, his heirs are his siblings, Romana and
Gregoria, who thus inherited the property in equal shares. In turn, Romana's and
Gregoria's heirs the parties herein became entitled to the property upon the sisters'
passing. Under Article 777 of the Civil Code, the rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of death. Thus, having succeeded to the property as
heirs of Gregoria and Romana, petitioners and respondents became co-owners
thereof. As co-owners, they may use the property owned in common, provided they
do so in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as
not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from
using it according to their rights. [37] They have the full ownership of their parts and of
the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and may alienate, assign or mortgage
them, and even substitute another person in their enjoyment, except when personal
rights are involved.[38] Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the
thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned. [39] Finally, no prescription
shall run in favor of one of the co-heirs against the others so long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. [40]

Doctrine: The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the scope of the court's
inquiry is limited to questions on the extrinsic validity of the will; the probate court will
only determine the will's formal validity and due execution. [8] However, this rule is not
inflexible and absolute.[9] It is not beyond the probate court's jurisdiction to pass upon
the intrinsic validity of the will when so warranted by exceptional circumstances.
[10]
 When practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be
passed upon even before it is probated, the probate court should meet the issue.
Case Title: Iris Morales v. Ana Maria Olondriz
G.R. No. 198994 (2016) (J. Brion)
Facts:
Alfonso Olondriz (decedent) died in 2003. He was survived by his spouse,
and his sons and daughters. The surviving heirs, believing that the decedent died
intestate, filed for partition of the properties and the appointment of a special
administrator to the properties. Alfonso Olondriz was then appointed as such.
In the same year, petitioner Iris Morales filed a separate petition with the RTC
alleging that the decedent left a will and prayed for the probate of the same and her
appointment as special administratrix. The said will omitted one of the heirs,
Francisco Olondriz. The respondent heirs then moved to dismiss the probate
proceedings, since Francisco was preterited from the will. The RTC, over the course
of the proceedings, observed that: (1) that Morales expressly admitted that Francisco
Javier Maria Bautista Olondriz is an heir of the decedent; (2) that Francisco was
clearly omitted from the will; and (3) that based on the evidentiary hearings,
Francisco was clearly preterited. Thus, the RTC reinstated Alfonso Jr. as
administrator of the estate and ordered the case to proceed in intestacy. The CA
affirmed the ruling of the RTC, hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the will may be probated.
Ruling:
No. The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the scope of the court's inquiry is
limited to questions on the extrinsic validity of the will; the probate court will only
determine the will's formal validity and due execution. [8] However, this rule is not
inflexible and absolute.[9] It is not beyond the probate court's jurisdiction to pass upon
the intrinsic validity of the will when so warranted by exceptional circumstances.
[10]
 When practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be
passed upon even before it is probated, the probate court should meet the issue. [11]

The decedent's will does not contain specific legacies or devices and Francisco's
preterition annulled the institution of heirs. The annulment effectively caused
the total abrogation of the will, resulting in total intestacy of the inheritance. [12] The
decedent's will, no matter how valid it may appear extrinsically, is null and void. The
conduct of separate proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity of its testamentary
provisions would be superfluous. Thus, we cannot attribute error - much less grave
abuse of discretion - on the RTC for ordering the case to proceed intestate.
Doctrine: It is incumbent upon those who oppose the probate of a will to clearly
establish that the decedent was not of sound and disposing mind at the time of the
execution of said will. Otherwise, the state is duty-bound to give full effect to the
wishes of the testator to distribute his estate in the manner provided in his will so
long as it is legally tenable.
Case Title: Antonio Baltazar, et. al., v. Lorenzo Laxa
G.R. No. 174489 (2012) (J. Del Castillo)
Facts: Paciencia was a 78 y/o spinster who was childless and without any brothers
and sisters when she made her last notarial will and testament in the Pampango
dialect. She bequeathed all her properties to respondent Laxa and his wife Corazon
and their children. Palencia resided in the US and the will remained with Judge
Limpin, where the same was executed.
4 years after the death of Palencia, Lorenzo initiated the probate proceedings
of the will of the decedent. In the same year, petitioner opposed the same, averring
that the properties belonged to Nicomeda, his predecessor-in-interest. Hence, the
decedent has no right to bequeath them to Lorenzo Laxa. The petitioners also
alleged that the deceased was forgetful, making her unfit to execute such will.
RTC denied probate of the will, concluding that Palencia no longer possessed
the sufficient reason or strength to have testamentary capacity. However, the CA
reversed the decision, holding that being forgetful does not make a person mentally
unfit.
Issue:
Whether or not Lorenzo Laxa, et. al, have the right to inherit the properties
bequeathed by the deceased.
Ruling:

Yes. Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in
full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken,
unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause.

It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the
nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the
character of the testamentary act.

In this case, apart from the testimony of Rosie pertaining to Paciencia’s

forgetfulness, there is no substantial evidence, medical or otherwise, that would
show that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the Will. On
the other hand, we find more worthy of credence Dra. Limpin’s testimony as to the
soundness of mind of Paciencia when the latter went to Judge Limpin’s house and
voluntarily executed the Will. "The testimony of subscribing witnesses to a Will
concerning the testator’s mental condition is entitled to great weight where they are
truthful and intelligent." 69 More importantly, a testator is presumed to be of sound
mind at the time of the execution of the Will and the burden to prove otherwise lies
on the oppositor.

Doctrine: Obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the
decedent.

Case Title: Rabadilla vs. C.A.

G.R. No. 113725 (2000) (J. Purisima)

Facts:

In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja

Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny
S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of parcel of land. The Codicil provides that
Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies, every year to give Maria
Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, (75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar and (25) piculs of
Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza dies.

Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died. Private respondent brought a complaint, to enforce

the provisions of subject Codicil. The RTC concluded that the action was
prematurely filed, due to no cause of action yet. However, the CA reversed the
same, and ordered that the delivery of the sugar be facilitated.

Issue:
 Whether or not the obligations of Jorge Rabadilla under the Codicil are
inherited by his heirs.

Ruling:

Yes. Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the
property, rights and obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death.
Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Rabadilla had by virtue of subject codicil were
transmitted to his heirs, at the time of his death. Likewise, the obligations imposed on
the codicil on the deceased were also transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his
death.

Doctrine: Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its

purposes being to determine the legitime and the free portion. If there is no
compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be safeguarded.

Case Title: Arellano v. Pascual

G.R. No. 189776 (2010) (J. Carpio Morales)

Facts:

Angel Pascual died without any children or spouse in 1999, leaving as heirs
his siblings, petitioner Arellano which was represented by her daughters, and
Francisco and Miguel Pascual as respondents.
In a petition for Judicial Settlement of Intestate and Issuance of Letters of
Administration, respondents alleged that a parcel of land in Makati was donated by
the deceased to the petitioner, thus may be considered as an advanced legitime of
petitioner. The probate court (RTC) granted the petition, and went on to hold that the
said property is subject to collation, citing Art. 1061 of the NCC. The CA also
affirmed the same, except for the shares of stock not included in the inventory.
Issue:

Whether or not the property donated by the decedent is subject to collation.

Ruling:

No. The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory
heirs in so far as is possible, and to determine the free portion, after finding the
legitime, so that inofficious donations may be reduced.
Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being to
determine the legitime and the free portion. If there is no compulsory heir, there is no
legitime to be safeguarded.
The records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary, or
concurring compulsory heirs. He was only survived by his siblings, who are his
collateral relatives and, therefore, are not entitled to any legitime - that part of the
testator's property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for
compulsory heirs.

Doctrine: Reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of
a reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line from which
the property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives
of the inheriting ascendant.

Case Title: Mendoza v. Delos Santos

G.R. No. 176422 (2013) (J. Reyes)

Facts:
Petitioners are grandchildren of Placido Mendoza. Part of Placido and
Dominga’s properties is subsequently adjudicated to Exequiel, their son. After
Exequiel’s death, it passed on to his spouse Leonor and only daughter, Gregoria.
After Leonor’s death, her share went to Gregoria. The latter died intestate and
without issue. Petitioners claimed that after Gregoria’s death, respondent, who is
Leonor’s sister, adjudicated unto herself all these properties as the sole surviving
heir of Leonor and Gregoria. Hence, petitioners claim that the properties should have
been reserved by respondent in their behalf and must now revert back to them,
applying Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal.

Issue:
Whether or not the property is subject to reserve troncal.
Ruling:
No. Based on the circumstances of the present case, Article 891 on reserva
troncal is not applicable. Article 891 provides that the person obliged to reserve the
property should be an ascendant (also known as the reservor/reservista) of the
descendant/prepositus. Julia, however, is not Gregoria’s ascendant; rather, she is
Gregoria’s collateral relative. Gregoria’s ascendants are her parents, Exequiel and
Leonor, her grandparents, great-grandparents and so on. Moreover, petitioners
cannot be considered reservees/reservatarios as they are not relatives within the
third degree of Gregoria from whom the properties came. Petitioners are Gregoria’s
fourth degree relatives, being her first cousins. First cousins of the prepositus are
fourth degree relatives and are not reservees or reservatarios.

Doctrine: An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestate from the legitimate
children and relatives of the father or mother.

Case Title: Jesusa Arado v. Anacleto Alcoran

G.R. No. 163362 (2015) (J. Bersamin)

Facts:

Raymundo Alcoran was married to Joaquina Arado, and their marriage

produced a son named Nicolas Alcoran. In turn, Nicolas married Florencia, but their
union had no offspring. Nicolas had an extramarital affair with Francisca Sarita, who
gave birth to respondent Anacleto Alcoran on July 13, 1951 during the subsistence
of Nicolas’ marriage to Florencia.
Raymundo died leaving properties to Nicolas and his wife. Nicolas died
subsequently leaving the properties to his illegitimate son. Joaquina died shortly
thereafter with a will. Anacleto claims entitlement to the properties as the heir of
Nicolas and by virtue of the will executed by Joaquina.

Issue:
 Whether or not an illegitimate child has the right to inherit.
Ruling:
No. an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother, as provided for under Article 992 of the
Civil Code; in the same manner, such children or relatives shall not inherit from the
illegitimate child. As certified in Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the right of
representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in the
inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. Anacleto could not inherit from the estate of
Joaquina by virtue of the latter’s last will and testament. Article 838 of the Civil Code
dictates that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless the same is
proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. In Gallanosa v. Arcangel
that in order that a will may take effect, “it has to be probated, legalized or allowed in
the proper testamentary proceeding. The probate of the will is mandatory.”

Doctrine: The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children and
legitimate children by the same parent, even though there is unquestionably a tie of
blood between them.

Case Title: In the matter of Intestate Estates of Delgado v. De Damian

G.R. No. 155733 (2006) (J. Corona)

Facts:
Eugenio del Prado is a legitimate brother of Anastacio del Prado, who died
single and intestate. Anastacio cohabited with Aurea Santos (who was legally
married) without the benefit of matrimony and they begot a son named Jesus del
Prado whom Anastacio admitted as his son in Jesus’ birth certificate. At the time of
Anastacio’s death, a parcel of land in his name was adjudicated to Jesus del Prado.
Eugenio then filed a complaint before CFI to annul the deed executed by Aurea
adjudicating to her son a parcel of land left by Anastacio alleging that he (Eugenio)
was deprived of his rightful share in the estate of his brother. The lower court
dismissed the petition, and upon appeal to CA, the appellate court certified the case
to Supreme Court that such involved purely legal questions.
Issue:
Whether or not Eugenio has a better right against Jesus.
Ruling:
Yes. Since Anastacio del Prado died in 1958, the new Civil Code applies
(Article 2263). Illegitimate children other than natural are entitled to successional
rights (Article 287). Where, as in this case, the deceased died intestate, without
legitimate descendants or ascendants, then his illegitimate child shall succeed to his
entire estate (Article 988), to the exclusion of appellant who is only a collateral
relative.
Doctrine: There is no statutory requirement to state in the will itself that the testator
knew the language or dialect used in the will.
Case Title: Caponong-Noble v. Abaja
G.R. No. 147145 (2005) (J. Carpio)
Facts:
This is a case of the probate of the will of Alipio Abada. Thereafter, the
probate of the will of Paula Toray was also filed with the court. The oppositors in the
will of Abada nand Toray are their nephews and nieces. The ground for opposition is
that decedent left no will or if there is a will it was executed not in consonance with
the law. Belinda Caponong-Noble was assigned as the administratix of the estate of
Abada by the trial court. Thereafter, Abellar was appointed administratix of Toray’s
property. The RTC ruled only on , whether the will of Abada has an attestation
clause as required by law. The RTC-Kabankalan further held that the failure of the
oppositors to raise any other matter forecloses all other issues. Unsatisfied with the
decision Caponong-Noble appealed.
Issue:
Whether or not Abada’s attestation clause is valid.
Ruling:
Yes. There is no statutory requirement to state in the will itself that the testator
knew the language or dialect used in the will. This is a matter that a party may
establish by proof aliunde. Caponong-Noble further argues that Alipio, in his
testimony, has failed, among others, to show that Abada knew or understood the
contents of the will and the Spanish language used in the will. However, Alipio
testified that Abada used to gather Spanish-speaking people in their place. In these
gatherings, Abada and his companions would talk in the Spanish language. This
sufficiently proves that Abada speaks the Spanish language. An attestation clause is
made for the purpose of preserving, in permanent form, a record of the facts
attending the execution of the will, so that in case of failure of the memory of the
subscribing witnesses, or other casualty, they may still be proved. (Thompson on
Wills, 2d ed., sec. 132.)

A will, therefore, should not be rejected where its attestation clause serves the
purpose of the law. We rule to apply the liberal construction in the probate of
Abada’s will. Abada’s will clearly shows four signatures: that of Abada and of three
other persons. It is reasonable to conclude that there are three witnesses to the will.
The question on the number of the witnesses is answered by an examination of the
will itself and without the need for presentation of evidence aliunde.