must be investigated f u r t h e r , or the theory m u s t b e altered to a c c o m -
modate the n e w k n o w l e d g e , or m u s t be discarded altogether in f a v o u r
T H E F O U N D A T I O N S OF T H E SCIENCE OF WAR
BY BREVET-COLONEL J. F . C . FULLER, D . S . O . ( O x f o r d s h i r e and
Buckinghamshire L i g h t Infantry).
i . T h e Method of Science.—2. T h e Elements of W a r — 3 . Grand Tactics.—;
4. T h e Principles of W a r . — 5 . T h e Conditions of War.—6. T h e Battle.
i. The Method of Science.
WHAT is science ? " S c i e n c e is co-ordinated k n o w l e d g e , facts a
a r r a n g e d a c c o r d i n g to their v a l u e s , " o r , to p u t the definition more
b r i e f l y still a n d to quote H u x l e y , science is " organized common-
s e n s e , " c o m m o n - s e n s e b e i n g , in t h e opinion of this really great
s c i e n t i s t a n d philosopher, t h e rarest of all the senses.
H o w d o w e attain to science ? B y collecting f a c t s — g o o d , b a d j
a n d i n d i f f e r e n t , and t h e n , b y sorting these facts into categories, we
b u i l d u p f r o m t h e m t h e o r i e s , a n d , b y p u t t i n g these theories to universal,
tests, b y degrees w e extract laws w h i c h f o r m our w o r k i n g principles,!
o u r w e i g h t s and measures of w a r .
T h e v a l u e of the scientific m e t h o d is lucidly set f o r t h in the.
f o l l o w i n g quotation w h i c h , t h o u g h w r i t t e n purely f r o m a civil
s t a n d p o i n t , is equally applicable t o t h e military s u b j e c t b e f o r e us, |
" S c i e n c e is the investigation a n d s t u d y of exact k n o w l e d g e , of
s y s t e m a t i c a n d f o r m u l a t e d k n o w l e d g e . T h e m e t h o d s a d o p t e d by
s c i e n c e are to obtain a n d r e c o r d t h e facts in connection w i t h any
s u b j e c t , t o marshal a n d classify t h e m in their proper relationship;;
a n d t h e n t o make a generalization w h i c h , in a brief b u t compre-
h e n s i v e f o r m u l a , endeavours t o a c c o u n t for the association b e t w e e .
t h e m a n d also the p h e n o m e n a of their existence. A s n e w facts are
d i s c o v e r e d , they can b e classified i n their proper relationship, a n |
i n t e r p r e t e d easily and q u i c k l y w i t h great e c o n o m y of t h o u g h t , whil
t h e p r o p e r t i e s of n e w or n e w l y d i s c o v e r e d substances a n d t h e results
o f n e w l y observed p h e n o m e n a m a y b e predicted w i t h a h i g h degree
of a c c u r a c y b y applying to t h e m t h e g e n e r a l i z a t i o n — t h e theories—r
already f o r m u l a t e d .
" B u t a f a c t w h i c h , s e e m i n g l y , d o e s not c o n f o r m to t h e theory|
of a better generalization. T h e theory is the spirit of the f a c t , and
must be in h a r m o n y w i t h it.
W : " It will b e seen that science has no hard a n d fast line b e y o n d
,\vhich w e m u s t not trespass ; the boundaries are constantly s h i f t i n g
-With each n e w d i s c o v e r y , w i t h m o r e exact or m o r e intimate investiga-
tion into p h e n o m e n a , a n d theories are discarded unhesitatingly if
ffii subsequent observations do not correspond w i t h t h e m . " *
• > War is as m u c h a science as any other h u m a n activity a n d , like
.all other sciences, it is built u p on facts of w h i c h there are an i n n u m e r -
able quantity. T o sort these is, therefore, our first task, and, as
ijiiany facts are c o m p o u n d in nature, it will first of all be necessary
Ito construct a s o r t i n g - m a c h i n e w h i c h will not only split t h e m u p
'into their c o m p o n e n t parts, b u t disentangle the simple f r o m the
¿complex. I f this can b e successfully accomplished, it will t h e n be
|||ssible for t h e s t u d e n t not only to take up a w o r k on military history
|md: analytically extract f r o m it facts, and f r o m these facts build u p
l&eories, b u t also, w h e n f a c e d b y a military p r o b l e m , to construct
'Synthetically on facts an empiric plan or solution.
Hli- 2. The Elements of War.
aiSls&a - J
l l j f l n reducing w a r to a science, the first fact w h i c h confronts us is :
<s " t\Vhat is war ? " W a r is a v e r y complicated s t r u g g l e , so c o m p l e x
a fact that its c o m p o n e n t s m u s t b e split u p l n t o T i m p l e r parts b e f o r e
'f- student can grasp its nature and answer this question. I n place
t, therefore, let us substitute a far simpler question : " W h a t is a
IIS* ? " T h e simplest possible type of fight is a duel b e t w e e n t w o
p V h a t , n o w , is t h e o b j e c t of each of these m e n ?
I p T o knock o u t the other ! "
¡How ?
S p By giving b l o w s w i t h o u t receiving them ! "
» I n these f e w w o r d s h a v e w e completely laid bare the essential
4|ture of the fight, in f a c t w e h a v e discovered the p i v o t a l p r o b l e i r i in
¡.science of w a r — t h e destruction of the e n e m y ' s s t r e n g t l y w H I c h not'
y embraces his a r m y b u t the w h o l e of his nation, a n d w h i c h con-
titiites the crucial p r o b l e m in the art of war : " h o w to kill w i t h o u t
• killed," * '
lis p r o b l e m is f u n d a m e n t a l , universal and eternal to war. Add
H',¡.Scientific Management," by Henry Atkinson ; " Engineering and Industrial
.agement," vol. ii., No. 3, p. 7 1 .
 H
to it s o m e " frills " — a f e w cook-houses, b a t m e n , parsons and; «Secondly, each element m a y b e divided into t w o m a m cate-
T h r e s h disinfectors, a n d w e have a m o d e r n a r m y ; b u t d o not letjj ories : —
us b e led astray b y these ephemeral details, let us instead abide last* (i) Man L e a d e r and led.
to t h e unshakeable f a c t — w a r is a matter of m e n , a n d the s i m p l e s t ! ' (ii) Movement .. M u s c u l a r and m e c h a n i c a l .
f o r m of w a r is t h e fight b e t w e e n t w o u n a r m e d h u m a n beings. | (iii) Weapons S h o c k and missile.
W e , therefore, start w i t h m a n , the author of all h u m a n s t r i t e . | (iv) Protection .. Static and mobile.
T o destroy his adversary he has got to m o v e t o w a r d s h i m , he has g o t |
to hit h i m , and he has g o t to prevent himself b e i n g hit, or otherwise® ^ T h i r d l y , each of these categories m a y again be s u b d i v i d e d : —
he m a y fail in c a r r y i n g o u t his object. , , • f l ( L e a d e r in t h o u g h t , e.p. Divisional com-
L e t iis analyse this action very carefully, f o r it f o r m s the basis o t | mander.
m u c h further a r g u m e n t . M (i) M a n . L e a d e r in action, Platoon leader.
I n war the elemental material is m a n ; he h i m s e l f , even if nakeclj L e d , t h e fighter, Rifleman.
and u n a r m e d , possesses p o w e r to m o v e , p o w e r to hit, and power t o j L e d , the administrator, ,, A m m u n i t i o n carrier
guard. vj|
M a n , h o w e v e r , considered per se is c o m p a r a b l e to the ether, toqg Muscular, human, „ Marching.
v a g u e an element to b e c o m e tangible, b u t , as f r o m the ether all o t h e | | M u s c u l a r , animal, „ Riding.
;(ii) M o v e m e n t .
material elements originate, so f r o m m a n originate the elements o | Mechanical, fixed, „ Road vehicle.
Wa Mechanical, flexible, „ Cross-country
W3.1T. i 5».
W h a t are these elements ? T h e y are to b e f o u n d in the duel a s j tractor.

in the battle ; t h e y are : (i) J t o m e n t ; ( i i ^ W e a p o n s ; (in) P r o a S h o c k , cutting, „ Sword.

tection. II ..Hit';. S h o c k , thrusting, „ Bayonet.
F o r ^ h e - sake of simplicity^- let u s - a d d to -these three e l e m e n t s ^ iii) W e a p o n s .
M i s s i l e , short range, ,7" Bullet.
a fourth, man himself ; then we g e t — m a n , m o v e m e n t ^ v e a p o n ^ n n d | lSSsiS^
ift M i s s i l e , l o n g range, „ Shell.
protection as the f o u r elements of w a E |
T h e above b r i e f a n a l y s i s , ! ? i s h o p e d , has p r o j e c t e d a ray of lights Static, earth, „ Trench.
into that dark d u n g e o n called warfare in w h i c h soldiers great a n d j Static, w e a p o n s , „ C o v e r i n g fire.
Protection.
small have, only t o o f r e q u e n t l y and to the m i s f o r t u n e of us all, playe ; || Mobile, armour, „ Helmet.
a tactical b l i n d - m a n ' s b u f f . W e have discovered t h e elements o g ^Mobile, f o r m a t i o n s , „ Extensions.
w a r , and n o w all t h a t w e have got to do is to analyse their properl
to discover the l a w s w h i c h govern t h e m and t h e conditions u n d e j "he above table is p u r p o s e l y very incomplete, in order to keep it
w h i c h they c o m b i n e , separate, w o r k and cease to act. M e, the categories b e i n g only divided into pairs. I t is, h o w e v e r ,
lete enough to s h o w h o w in w a r , as in every other science, t h e
I n the space available in this article, it is not possible to deal tul f
lex is evolved out of the s i m p l e . H o w complex it m a y b e c o m e
w i t h the m a i n p r o p e r t i e s of these elements, c o n s e q u e n t l y , onl||
t once, b e realized b y the military student w h e n it is p o i n t e d
sufficient detail w i l l b e included in order to enable the reader | |
l i t each of the a b o v e sixteen subdivisions could be e x t e n d e d
appreciate more f u l l y , than perhaps h e otherwise w o u l d , tfte||
.a row of books. F o r instance, " M a n as leader in t h o u g h t "
values : — . J
aces the w h o l e art of c o m m a n d ; whilst under t h e h e a d i n g ,
First, each e l e m e n t possesses t w o m a i n spheres of action | |
"ble mechanical m o v e m e n t , " m i g h t be discussed t h e w h o l e
aval, air and tank warfare. It will, therefore, b e seen, e v e n i n
(i) M a n T h e m o r a l and the physical.
ew preceding pages, w h a t a tremendously complex c o m g l o m e r a -
(ii) M o v e m e n t T h e a p p r o a c h and the attack. j |
T h e offensive and the defensiv|| c o m p o u n d facts has arisen o u t of an extremely brief analysis
(iii) W e a p o n s
T' - a o A - t h e iadiiect p ! military ether, man and the elements derived f r o m h i m .
'"1 1
 It has already been stated that each of the elements of war has
t w o main spheres of action wherein it operates; these, it is now
proposed to explain, for much depends on their exact understanding;
they, in fact, form the positive and negative poles of all military
action, and the complete eight, when combined, go to build up the
supreme act of war called " battle."
Taking movement first, we find that tactically there are two types:
protective movements and offensive movements, the first we will
denote by the term " approaches," and the second b y that o"
" attacks." In the former the one thought of the soldier is " to
prevent himself from being h i t , " and in the latter " to hit hi
e n e m y . " T h e more he can hit the less will he be hit, consequently,
indirectly though it may be, not only is the whole action protective
in character, but it becomes more and more so as the offensiv"
succeeds. From this it will be at once seen that any idea of thinking
of the offensive and the defensive phases of a war, battle or duel, as
things in themselves apart, is absurd ; for these two acts form th"
halves of the diameter of the tactical circle, the circumference o
which is the fight. T h e y are, in fact, the positive and negative pol
of the tactical magnet called battle.
If the soldier always remembers that the object of all atta
movements is to develop weapon power against the enemy, and of
approach movements to prevent the enemy from developing a simil*
power against himself, he will at once realize that when he is no
attacking—and attacking here means using weapons—he is approach
ing, even if he be sitting in a camp five hundred miles from the fron
I f he remembers this, and it is important that he should (for since th
advent of the aeroplane, warfare is no longer waged in two dimensio -
b u t in three), he will never be surprised. T h e true appreciatio
of the approach and the attack carries with it the maximum o
security and offensive power which, without infringing the principl"
of war, can never be divorced.
Of weapons there are two main types—hitting and hurlin
weapons—the first will be denoted b y the term " shock weapons,
such as the bayonet, lance and sword, and the second b y that o
" missile weapons," such as the arrow, bullet, shell or gas. A$
the object of the battle is to destroy the enemy, which is generall
accomplished by clinching with him, the infantryman's offensiy,
weapon is the bayonet, and, so long as he carries the bayonet, thil
characteristic remains true, his bullet being his defensive weapOfl
on account of its ability to secure the advance of the bayonet. Thi(§
we see that, whenever two weapons of unequal range of action ar
jployed, the one of longer range is always the defensive weapon
the one of shorter range the offensive one, and, even if three
ore weapons be used, this holds equally good for all. Thus,
ough field guns, when covering a rifle attack, are acting defensively
he rifles they are acting offensively to the heavier guns in rear of
m, though these heavy guns simultaneously are acting defensively
h to them and the rifles. It might be considered that this is a
ely academic problem, it, however, is not so ; its full appreciation
'act, forms the backbone of the attack from which the whole
'e organization, like ribs, radiates. From this appreciation may
deduced a tactical rule of the highest importance : " In all
umstances missile weapons must be employed to facilitate or to
d off the shock."
iThe soldier must not only never forget this rule, but it must so
ipletely dominate his thoughts that its application becomes
"nctive, for it forms the foundation of fire supremacy, the crucial
of the attack, the paralysing of an opponent's power to hurl so
he may be hit and for a certainty be destroyed. Every missile
ch can economically, that is effectively, be thrown, must be
wn. T h e soldier must not only think but live and act in terms
' fire supremacy," for it is his sword and his shield upon which
tactical life depends,
rotection, or the defensive, has little to do with holding positions
eating back attacks, very common conceptions of it, for it is just
uch part and parcel of every forward movement as of every
;'~g or retrograde one. It has already been pointed out how the
t defends the bayonet and the approach the attack by lessening
pities when the soldier is advancing and not actually using his
"ons in order to hit. Both these forms of protection are indirect,
is to say, they do not ward off blows, but prevent blows from
delivered, either by giving them or rendering the target
alt to hit.
esides these indirect means of protection, which include
uflage and the use of smoke clouds, several direct means have
ently been employed ; such as armour, earthworks and forti-
ons. Under this heading, to-day must also be placed the anti-
.espirator. Direct protection is such as will nullify the effect
. . . .
Oth direct and indirect protection may again be divided, as
y shown, into two categories—mobile and static protection,
armour, such as the helmet or small box respirator, being
ble, are mobile, and so also is the tank ; and earthworks and
m

96
THE ARMY QUARTERLY
fortifications, being fixed, form immobile direct protection. Again,
a field battery constitutes a static means of indirect protection,
because fire must be delivered when stationary, while similar fire
delivered from a moving tank constitutes mobile indirect protection.
Mobile protection is generally the most effective, for any change in
location necessitates a change in the enemy's tactical organization,;
and, consequently, a loss of time for destructive effect. When, as.
in a'tank or battleship, mobile direct and indirect protection can be
combined, the highest form of security is obtained ; this fact im
recent years has been all but unrealized in warfare, though a study of
the art of war in the middle ages will show that it formed the tactical
backbone of the combat between armoured knights.
T h e last and first of the four elements of war is man. Here, as;
might well be expected, we approach the complex—the moral and
physical spheres of action. Man, as civilian or soldier, is governeJ
by his nature inherited or acquired. This nature is dependent on
several factors, the most important being self-preservation upo"
which all true tactics are founded. Fear is the grim ruler of the
battlefield, and, so we find that, the instinct of self-preservation plajr
a predominant part in war urging the soldier to do one of three.
things : — * find that in modern wars between immense national armies the
(i) T o retire off the battlefield in order to escape danger. , g factor in all battle planning is not tactics but supply. So pro-
(ii) T o remain where he is in order to avoid approaching danger
(iii) T o advance, and, by clinching with his enemy, to overcom.
danger. | for any but a short period, static warfare becomes inevitable ;
Which course he may adopt depends upon his moral, that |
to say, on his " fighting spirit," which, in its turn, depends not o n |
upon the conditions which surround him in battle, but also upoffi
those which have long previously surrounded him in days of peace
T h e two main conditions which control him morally and physically
are " comfort " and " safety," which in all circumstances it is t$
duty of every officer to endeavour to provide for his men.
3. Grand Tactics.
Battle, we now see, is a great complex action springing from fo;;
simple elements—man, movement, weapons and protection whi;i
interweaving defensively, attain the end aimed at through offensr
action. This weaving together of the whole is called battle organiz
tion, it has little to do with personnel establishments which represe^
the body of an army, but everything to do with brains, the brains|
the commander who evolves the plan. Brains in this respect ma
IE F O U N D A T I O N S OF THE SCIENCE OF WAR 97
a6oked upon as a fifth element of war, very much as " spirit " was
nsidered a fifth element by the mediaeval alchemists, and on its
ding depends the grand tactical " idea " of a battle or campaign.
Grand tactics, which, in their turn, are governed by strategy,
¡but another name for " battle planning." With these branches
the science of war we will now deal.
Most military terms, due to the want of scientific thought, have,
oughout history and never more so than to-day, been continually
d consistently misapplied, and none more so than strategy, which
"" be defined as " making the most of time for war," which in other
ds, means of opportunity.* Strategy denotes the direction of
, which hinges on communications and fighting spaces. At sea,
mmunications are governed by coast lines and land ports. Thus all
. form water-valleys, the Dardanelles being a mere gully, while
ej&tlantic forms a broad plain running between two distant series
ills, Europe and Africa on the one side and North and South
erica on the' other. If the world were all earth intersected by
umerable rivers, naval strategy would approximate closely to
?tegy on land, which is woven on a network of railways, roads and
terways. These form the arterial system on which the grand
cs of an army exist and upon which its movement depends. We
ced does this become at times that all idea of fighting has to be
ordinated to sustaining, with the result that, if this condition hold
ype of war only being remobilized by an increase in communica-
or the amassing of supplies at the battle termini of existing ones,
simple means which can be evolved in order to increase, what
¿ denoted as " road capacity," that is, either the traffic down
pad or the width of the road itself, carries with it a revolution
¿tegy, and consequently in the planning of the battle and the
ation and equipment of the troops. T o battle planning we
ow return.
he elements of grand tactics are in essence very simple. If an
j j is to be defeated, by what means is his defeat to be effected ?
|prganizing and demoralizing him so that from a psychological
opogeneous group, his forces revert to a heterogeneous crowd
and simple, which state potentially exists, in spirit, amongst
ody of men however well they may be trained, organized and
He purpose of strategy is : " to bring about a tactical encounter under the
jaj^ujrable circumstances possible,"
drilled Disorganized and demoralized, that is to say, attacked in
body and soul, an enemy loses his power to fight, that is, Ins ability
to co-operate within himself.
T h i s power of disintegrating the fighting strength of an enemy
may be divided into four main grand tacticdacts : —
(i) ^ ^ n ^ . - A i r ^ n e i i r m a y h e ' i i f p r i s e d , which implies that
he is thrown o f f his balance. This is the best method of defeating
him for it is so economical, one man taking on to himself the strength,
of many. Surprise may be considered under two main headings:
surprise effected by doing something that the enemy does not expect^
and surprise effected by doing something that the enemy canno
counter ; the first may be denoted as moral, the second as material
SmP(l\)eAttrition.-An enemy may be worn down by material and
moral action ; this, though the usual method of defeating him, J
also, frequently, the most uneconomical method, for the process |
disintegration is mutually destructive. , . J-
(iii) Envelopment.—An enemy may be enveloped and so plac
at a severe disadvantage. Envelopment, whether accomplished b
converging or overlapping, presupposes a flank, a flank which may b
tactically rolled up, or, if turned, will expose, in its turn, a line |
communication which runs behind it. T h e attack by e n v e l o p ^
is a very common action in war which more often than not has led j
V1C
\Tv)' Penetration.-An enemy's front may be penetrated in ord;
directly to threaten his lines of communication, or to create a flan
or flanks to be enveloped. Normally, when once the hostile froK
is broken, the two sections are rolled up, but away from each othe
or one is held while the other is rolled u p - a n operation which,
carried out successfully, usually leads to a total disintegration ot tfi
enemy's strength.
Outside these four main grand tactical acts of battle there is Utti
to be learned in grand tactics.
4. The Principles of War.
• m J «
Earlier in this article it was pointed out that war, being a s a e n | |
was founded on facts, and that, if facts were woven together, t h e a g g j
evolved, and that, if theories were put to a universal test, the r e | | g
was the evolution of laws. ,ffi
War has its laws like all other sciences, these generally are CiMgg
the principles of war. What then are these principles? i|g
••if
question may well be asked, for, except perhaps for the word
•strategy, no other word in military writings has been so thoroughly
used and slurred o v e r * b
| I o w are we to discover these principles of war about which so
ich has been written, and about which such undiluted ignorance
bcen dlsP%ed ? T h e answer is a simple one, indeed so simple
t it appears hitherto to have defeated detection. Read nothing
^ t great battles or the doings of great captains, go to the National
fing Club and look upon war in its primitive and, therefore
P e i o r m — t h e bout between two men. This type of battle so'
a r e w o r m e d by a noted German professor, first took place on this
¿earth one or two hundred million years B.C. It does not much
| e r which for, if it can be established that the principles which
| r h e the duel hold equally good for war, we cannot help agreeing
J t h e test of their value is sufficiently universal to admit of their
ing regarded as laws.
"Vhat d o , w e see at the National Sporting Club or anv other
g ring ?
t e see one man facing another, each is desirous of knocking out
other-here we have an objective. We see one man hit at the
-apparently he is attempting to obtain his objective by an
•>e. We see the other man ward off the b l o w - h e is securing
I i n o r d e r > a moment after, to return the compliment. A little
ne of the two men strikes the other a quick blow with his left
immediately by his r i g h t - h e is concentrating all his offensive
ijagamst his antagonist. Then the other man, in place of using
US: fists to strike, feints with his left and brings in a jaw blow
M right—he is economizing his force, and by so doing has nearly
knock-out blow. Then his opponent rushes him,.driving
J t h e ropes, with a rapid side-step he escapes h i m - m o v e m e n t
dently an essential to success. A moment later he is down
jggomst has won ? Not a bit of i t ; for up he leaps and his'
1 "nt thinking him knocked out receives a terrific " welt " in
i f ® l e a r n s t h a t uprise has its value. So we look at the fight
, t d 0 we see ? W e see that the best fighter combines foot-
i nst-work, his muscles are not only working together, but
S S t t t °s f taie e ^ h .. A TTe y V ^ ' USed
^neither very n u m e r o u V n o r i n T ^ W e , v e ^ b . K ^ ? ' t h ^ ^
jhem General Altham's book entitled " The P r S e s of /
& C o m m a n d a n t Colin, in his " T r a n s f o r S n s of Wai " d°if
em, but does not name them ; finally. Marshal Foch in hie P • - r
f0Ur — • and then puts!'" c t c V ' t e l o w t h e last o n e T ' ^ ° f
 is that force of the enemy's troops or workers, the existence of
he hits from his leg as well as from his shoulder-his whole body is
'ch is essential to his preservation as an organized and independent

•ti^iSiis:
I l e i e arc u p i
** r - out i
universal and fundamenta
ate. Minor tactically it may be anything from a sap head to a
pirtress, from a rifleman to an army corps.
! On our objective depends our direction and on our direction
ThevConstitute the' l l w J o f every scientifically fought boxing mate epends our supply. T h e enemy is at A , we are at B. Does the
I d o f T v e S battle. Countless millions have partaken m ^ " e joining these two points give us our direction ? Yes and no.
battles and small combats, yet have these principles fm the ™ es, if the seven remaining principles are not adversely affected by
part, remained nameless throughout history. T o make ir moving in this direction, and if the conditions permit us doing so.
perfectly clear we will enumerate them as follows : — 0, if otherwise. We, however, cannot discard this direction off-
ist Principle T h e principle of the objective. d, even if we find that some of the principles are difficult to apply ;
2nd „ T h e principle of the offensive. ¡what we can do is to test each possible line of advance until we
3rd „ T h e principle of security. ve at the line of least resistance, bearing in mind that the principle
4th T h e principle of concentration. ¡¡the objective aims at the destruction of the enemy's fighting
T h e principle of economy of force., t.6ngth.
5 di ».
6th T h e principle of movement. Our plan of action should aim at the following : —
7 th T h e principle of surprise. To advance against the enemy's most important force (objective),
8 th „ T h e principle of co-operation. j ththe intention of destroying it (offensive), with the greatest weapon
No one of the above eight principles is of greater value th; wer (concentration), so disposed as to produce the greatest effect
ano her No plan of action can be considered perfect unless a ththe least effort (economy of force), with the least possible friction
^ harmony and none can be considered in harmony unless weigh p-operation), and the shortest possible time (movement), so that we
gains'the'conditions which govern their application Sddon^ ay-take him unawares (surprise), without undue risk to ourselves
a nerfect plan be arrived at, because the fog of war seldom, if ev id at the minimum cost (security).
c o m p l e t e l y rises. It is, however, an undoubted fact that the gene
Such is a scientific plan of battle.
£ n ; his trust in the principles of war and who trusts in h The Principle of the. Offensive.—Will the objective which we have
i e m t r ^ t g l y t U more the & of war thickens almost inevitab !|ted enable us to apply the principle of the offensive ? If it
Ignot, then the objective must be discarded for the offensive in
n i J S S S t : ? ^ - P « ' detailed analysis ofdi 'fjsithe surest road to success. If it will, then in which direction
principles o f w a r , they will only be so far explained as to enable, Slid the offensive be made ? The answer to this question depends
reader to grasp the importance of their nature. 1 ' umstances or conditions which should be looked upon as the
The Principle of the Objective.-In organized warfare he m ors of all our movements.
o i m i i f f l l t l r f t h e enemy's military strength by us, if time be against us, time in which an enemy can mass
harmonious employment of the remaining principles of war. rves to meet our offensive and so outwit us, the offensive
a^iefinite objective there can be no definite policy ^ ,S futile or dangerous ; unless possessing more men than
a nolicv or plan action cannot be co-ordinated. T h e i e are pur objective is simply to kill as many of the enemy as we can,
J o d generals in Europe," said Napoleon, « but they see too ess of cost, which is not only a violation of the principle of
things at once. I see the enemy's main force and I destroy it. y of force, but the poorest of poor generalship. A private
thinks in terms of killing men, but a general should think in
Though In war, and more and more so in modern wars |
of destroying armies. " Push of pikes " is a simple game
imposition of our will upon the enemy's government is our pcM
a S t h " aim is usually only a c c o m p l i s h e d b y a t t a m m g o u r ^ l l ed to defeating an army, which latter act requires an acuter
Jthan that of a lusty halbardier.
objective, namely, the destruction of his armed forces This obi
dom will it be possible to march straight towards the enemy's
is strategical, so far as it embraces his entire army, and grand tacti
main force and defeat it. Its whereabouts may be unknown, but;
even so, the ultimate objective—die destruction of it—remains,?:
constant. Consequently, though many acts may be required before»
the curtain of victory is finally rung down, each act must be a distinct!
progression towards the transformation scene of peace ; if this be;
not the case, then an infringement of the principle of the objective!
will take place. This must be guarded against, for each blow mus§
form a definite link in an offensive chain of blows, in which moves,:
as in chess, are seen ahead.
A general will seldom win without attacking, and he will seldom,
attack correctly unless he has chosen his objective with reference:
to the principles of war, and unless his attack is based on these
principles. Imagination is a great detective, but imagination which;
is not based on the sound foundation of reason is at best but i
capricious leader. Even genius itself, unless it be stiffened by'
powerful weapons, a high moral, discipline and training, can only bif
likened to a marksman armed with a blunderbuss—ability wastes
through insufficiency of means. Conversely, an efficient army le"
by an antiquated soldier may be compared to a machine gun in th|
hands of an arbalister.
The Principle of Security—The objective in battle being t
destroy the enemy's fighting strength, consequently that side which
can best secure itself against the blows of its antagonist will stans
the best chance of winning, for by saving its men and weapons i
will augment its offensive power. Security, therefore, is a shiel
and not a lethal weapon, and to look upon it as a weapon is to tu ;?
war upside down ; consequently, the defensive is not the stronger
form of war, but merely a prelude to the accomplishment of the tru
object of war—the destruction of the enemy by means of the offensi
augmented by defensive measures.
A s the offensive is essential to the successful attainment of th
objective, it stands to reason that security without reference to th;
offensive is no security at all, but merely delayed suicide. Eve
man needlessly employed in defensive work is a weapon wield,
less for offensive operations. In order to avoid an excessive use o,
men for purely protective duties, recourse is had to guards and out
posts, the strength of which depends on the condition of time ; th|
time it will take an enemy to cover a certain distance or the timeij
will take us to frustrate him doing so. Security may, therefore,®
frequently considered as simply a means of gaining time at th
expense of an enemy. ' J j h i s individual moral and efficiency, the quickness and
A s danger and the fear of danger are the chief moral obstacles .0
it follows that the imbuing of troops with a sense of
ecurity is one of the chief duties of a commander, for, if weapons
J;;pf equal
power, battles are won by a superiority of nerve rather
, a n of numbers. This sense of security, though it may be supple-
Iprted by earth-works or mechanical means, is chiefly based on the
Jeling of moral ascendence due to fighting efficiency and confidence
in command. T h u s a man who is a skilled marksman will experience
^greater security when lying in the open than an indifferent rifleman
"n.a trench.
Jpiven the skilled soldier, the moral ascendency resulting from
- efficiency will rapidly evaporate unless it be skilfully directed and
mployed. We ultimately, as in all undertakings, civil or military,
come back to the impulse of the moment, that is, to the brains which
Cptrol it and each individual nerve which runs through the military
Ifity. To give skilled troops to an unskilled leader is tantamount
f l o w i n g snow on hot bricks. Skill in command, therefore, is the
inundation of security, for a clumsy craftsman will soon take the
dgeoff his tools.
The basis of strategical security is the soundness of the general
,, a c t i o n > the infrequency of the change of objective or direction
and.the absence of unnecessary movement. Strategical security is
also: arrived at by placing an army in a good position to hit at the
communications and headquarters of the enemy whilst protecting
TEffijij: by so disposing a force that it may live at ease and fight
Though movement, actual or potential, is the soul of
llfjiy hself, the placing of forces
in the area of operations, so that
$f|vrery position threatens the enemy's initiative, is the spirit
agSpipuld imbue all generalship, for on it rests the security and
ensive power of an operation, a campaign or a war.
^£|iid tactical security may be defined as " the choosing of a
rable target or the refusal to offer one." Here the factors are
>se of time and space. T h e rapid massing of weapons at
decisive point whether for attack or defence ; the general
iiization of the battle, the penetration of a front, the envelopment
flank, the endurance of the fight whether by retirement or
t, these and many other actions build up that general security
1 cements the units of an army into one complete whole,
nor tactical
security embraces the entire gamut of a soldier's
jjfjpf his leader, the judgment and determination of his com-
et:' and the confidence of his comrades. On the battlefield itself
depend on seeing and not being seen, on hitting and not

being hit on moving and not being moved. The first embraces;
T o move quickly is to reduce the chance of being hit to suit tonna
I n f t o the conditions of fire and ground is s i m u l t a n e o u s ^ ;
increasing of hitting power and the reduction of the vulnerability
0i
^The Principle of Concentration.-Concentration, or the bringin|
of things or ideas7 to a point of union, p r e s u p p O ^ m o ^ n t ;
Z J L L of ideas, especially in an army, is a far more d t f f k j
operation than the movement of men ; neverthele:ss unless
strategical, tactical and administrative be concentrated, cohesion ot,
effort will not result; and, in proportion as unity o action is l a c b n |
so wiU an army's strength, moral and physical, be squandered ^
detail until a period be arrived at in which the minimum result m
b obtained from the maximum effort T h e c e n t r a idea of an arm|
is known as its " doctrine," which, to be sound, must be based on th
principles of war, and which, to be effective, must be
admit of a mutation in accordance with the
In its ultimate relationship to the human understanding this cen£
idea or " doctrine " is nothing else than common-sense, t.e.
adapted to circumstances. T h e danger of a doctrine P ^ s ^ m
is apt to ossify into a dogma and to be seized upon by
lates who lack the virility of analytic and synthetic judgment
who are only too grateful to rest assured that ho«r
inept, finds justification in a book, which, if they think at all, is ;
their opinion, written in order to exonerate them from so dam
In he pa t many armies have been destroyed by internal discor,
and some 1 a " been destroyed by the weapons of their a n t a g o ^
but the majority have perished through adhering to « ^
from their past successes, which is tantamount to f ^ ^ f
suicide through inertia of mind. Mental lassitude or the abid^
by he letter in place of the spirit of the law, which so freque*
p i s s e s for " military ability," is the dry rot not only of armies but,
kingdoms, republics and empires.
Though an army should operate according to the idea
through concentration has become part of its nature, the bra n
the commander must in no way be hampered by P y e c c j W
fixed opinions, for, whilst it is right that the soldier s h o u l d consid
himself^ invincible, it is never right that the c o m m ^ s h j
consider himself undefeatable ; contempt for an enem hnwe
badly led, has frequently led to disaster ; therefore, it is the
of the commander to concentrate on common-sense, and to
aintain his doctrine in solution so that it may easily take the mould
w h a t e v e r circumstances it may have to be cast in. Strategy
ould be based upon this doctrine of action adapted to circum-
ces, and, consequently, concentration in strategy may be defined
fniaking the most of opportunity, and also forecasting and forc-
ing the possibility of opportunity before it arises.
Strategical actions depending on means of movement, their
Hpentration materially depends on communications, and from the
twork of lines of supply is evolved grand tactical concentration
Hfe power of overcoming resistants or turning them to advantage.
riaj ¿Concentration, from the point of view of the battle itself, has for
furies been based on the maxim " of superiority of numbers at
¡¡.•.decisive point," because numbers were the coefficient of
.eapons, each man normally being a one-weapon mounting. This
ii no longer holds good as a general rule, and, in its place,
be substituted " superiority of weapons, means of protection
jinovement," particularly the first. Men, in themselves, are an
Incumbrance, and the fewer men we can employ, without detracting
m. our weapon power, the greater will be our concentration of
, for concentration has for its object the securing of an army
M l|blows just as much as the giving of them. This latter reading
e principles of concentration brings us directly to our next
eat principle, the principle of economy of force.
^
j|e Principle of Economy of Force.—Economy of force mayj^e
as the efficient use of all means, moral andmaterial^towards
g~a war. OTalTtEe prindplelfof'war it is the most difficult
ecause of its extremely close interdependence on the ever-
ng conditions of war. T o economize the moral energy of his
a.commander must not only be in spirit one of them, but must
Q
his fingers on the pulse of the fighters, what they feel he
and what they think he must think, but while they feel
feXjperience discomfort, and think in terms of disaster, though
Just understand what all these mean to the men themselves,
fKuft.in no way be obsessed by them. T o him economy of force
cans planning a battle which his men can fight, and secondly,
this plan according to the psychological changes which the
's resistance is producing on their endurance without foregoing
gjective. This does not only entail his possessing judgment,
ggsight and imagination ; his plan must never crystallize, for the
i|of the firing-line is always fluid. He must realize that a
ower of rain, a cold night, an unexpected resistance, may force
him to re-adapt his plan to a change of conditions, and, in order to
enable him to do so, the grand tactical economy of force rests with:
his reserves which form the staying power of the battle and the fuel
of all tactical movement. '5
O n the battlefield itself, to economize his own strength and t o |
force the enemy to dissipate his by means of feints and surprisals, isr
the first step towards victory. Every weapon which he can compel/
the enemy to withdraw from the point of attack is an obstacle removed*
from the eventual path of progress. Every subsidiary operation!
should be based on the objective, and effect a concentration of weapon,
power on the day of decisive action. Every subsidiary operationj
therefore, should add a definite value to victory, that is, the powe|
of producing a tactical dividend. T h u s , even in so small an operatioj
as a raid executed by twenty men, the question must first of all be
asked what will be the tactical dividend if we are successful,
5 per cent, recompense us for our action or must we aim at 10 ^
cent. ? " Is the game worth the candle ? " This is the questio
every commander must ask himself before playing at war. s
By this it does not mean that risks must never be taken ; f'
from it, it is by taking risks which are worth taking that more of
than not the greatest economies are effected and the highest inter s
secured. Audacity is nearly always,right in war, but gamblingV
nearly always wrong, and the worst form of gambling in war ^
gambling with small stakes, for an army is eventually bled white b
this process. '¡1
Economy of force is also closely related to economy of movemen
M a n y generals have attempted to win a Marathon in sprinting tim^
they have thrown in all their reserves on the first day and lost th;
wind twelve hours after the battle has begun. Such operations;
these are doomed to failure long before the first shot is ever fired||
The Principle of Movement.—If concentration of weapon pow
be compared to a projectile and economy of force to its line of fi|g
then movement may be looked upon as the propellant, and as a pr<|
pellant is not always in a state of explosive energy, so neitherjjjf
movement. Movement is the power of endowing mass \vif
momentum, it depends, therefore, largely on security, which, wl|||
coupled with offensive power, results in liberty of action. Movent^
consequently may be potential as well as dynamic, and, if an arm
be compared to a machine the power of which is supplied by a sen
of accumulators, should the object of its commander be to maintpi
movement, he can only accomplish it by a refilling of one set|
accumulators while the other is in process of being exhausted.
hotter the time taken to do so, the more difficult will the commander's
ask be ; consequently one of his main duties throughout war is to
crease the motive power of his troops which depends on two main
actors, moral and physical endurance.
| T h e power to move in war must first be considered as the general
I; to move. In battle the forward impulse comes from the leaders
^ t h e troops themselves ; they are in fact self-propelling winged
|)ectiies, and are not impelled forward by the explosive energy
command ; such energy scarcely, if ever, exists, what does exist
|irection to its impulse and the reinforcing, recharging of this
©guise, with more power by means of reserves. These reserves
jnly endow the combatants with physical energy, but with a
I sense of power and security which impels them forward
| v e n with an army of high moral—that is to say, an army which
esses the will to move " towards danger, or inversely " the will
, t 0 m o v e a w a y f r ° m danger " — i t must ultimately be the
Jical factor, the muscular endurance of the men themselves
ch will set a limit to their power of movement. This endurance
. . f V e r f e l { o r beneficently affected by all the conditions of war
^particularly by the space to be covered, the nature of the ground
ittchmate and the resistance of the enemy. In order to increase
ular movement, by conserving it as long as possible, mechanical
S. movement have for some time been employed for the
gical and administrative movements of an army, so much so
tactical movement to-day is based on locomotives and lorries
result of this is that while strategic mobility, namely, movement
instance from the enemy, has enormously increased, tactical
ement has decreased in an inverse proportion, until battles
m ' 0 n muscular movement have become practically static
ements based on broadside fire from fixed positions. In order
p o m e this difficulty, mechanical cross-country movement has
j p | e d on armies, and, whatever may be the prejudice shown
introduction, its complete replacement of muscular movement
v c a r a certainty as can be foreseen.
f A e ; tactical organization of movement the endurance of
Jgdepends on the stability of the base of operations which
& i lines of supply. This base has little to do with a fixed
M much with the organization of the troops protecting
W i t y ; these must form a mobile base of operations from
* r forces operate. Unless this be done, the foundations of
• p w i l l soon be undermined and the whole edifice of battle

The Principle of Surprise.-Lack of security, or a false interprets
t h r o u Z u t history may be considered under four genera headings
t h
( n
g S p S effect/d by unexpected or superiority of movement,
) Surprise effected by superiority or novelty of weapons.
W ) Surprise effected by superiority of means of protect on . ^as-their weapons, and not of fractions of nations represented by
v Surprise effected by superiority of tactical organization
I t takes time to gain superiority in - ^ consequ^y w
find that although minor surprises may be gained by seizing; ins
retrospects into military history will prove ; consequUy
a commander attempts to copy former b a t t ^ Z Ql
f r e G U e n t l y surprised with its eyes open, it sees things coming D J
b l i n d e d by prejudice and shackled by tradition, it does not p e r m g
t h d r (Xinsequences, which are only realized when their causes h a |
taken or are actually taking, effect. . , , J |i|p.[ffi||pwn particular degree of ignorance in strategy ; instead of one
O n the battlefield itself a general is frequently >surpri ed b y |
o w n stupidity, his lack of being able to understand condition J pBphite objective at a l l ; for the army and the nation are either
to them the principles of war. His stupidity sometimes tak|
the acute form of completely misunderstanding the endurance o f g
m e n n o t S i z i n g what they can do, he orders them to do some J
w h i c h they cannot do, and the result is chaos and loss of life. Surp|
a m o n g t r L p s , as amongst individuals, is a matter of nerves-
n e r v e ! of an army, however, are to be found not only m A e ^ v i |
and collective temperaments of the regimental officers and m , bj
also in its staff organization. Its trunk nerves are its General btt
o f f k e r s whose on^great duty is to convey the impressions . f e t j
the rank and file, to the brains of their commander If thi b e |
done, the best laid plan will fail and the result will be p a r a l y s |
action in the event of a surprise. remeiii
The Principle of Co-operation.-Co-operation is a
principle which holcls together all the otlier principles. It is c l o |
BR'I
grelated to economy of force and, therefore, to concentration, but it
(differs from both of these principles, for while mass is the concentrated
strength of the organism, and economy of force the dispersed strength
Ipvhich renders the former stable, co-operation may be described as
«t£e muscular tension which knits all the parts into one whole.
K i t h o u t co-operation an army falls to pieces. In national wars,
jlthe value of co-operation is enormously enhanced, embracing, as
|St\dpes, the whole body and soul of the nation, social, political,
fftistrial and military, in one intricate self-supporting organism,
¡must pull together, for such wars are the wars of entire nations,
K f i a t e v e r may be the size of the armies which should be looked upon
i f 'champions called armies. W e find, therefore, that for us co-operation
y j | | a r embraces the whole gamut of our imperial existence, which
»«•.means that one master-mind should control the whole national
jfgSiehinery, in order to reduce the friction which its adjustment by
hands must create. Friction is the antithesis of smooth
j i | l | p S m g , and smooth running is the thesis of success, consequently
.'¿¿'in'war co-operation is essential. T a k e , for instance, the government
|gf|a nation at war ; if there be friction in the government, there is
S e c t i o n not only throughout the nation, but throughout the army.
^'Nofman can serve G o d and M a m m o n , no man can serve two or half
S f f l S z e n masters, neither can two or half a dozen masters lead and
I|||t;;the same man. In the field it is better to have one bad general
^¡•than two good ones, for duality is the father of friction. If, in a
of, let us suppose, six members, each controlling a great
JBpSSnal department, each member strives to conduct a war according
f | l l l i i y e there will be six objectives, and, consequently, there will be
IgjajBted by six separate campaigns or six phases of one campaign,
jsuch a state of affairs arises, it is time to declare a dictatorship
>;,hand over the national welfare to one man, for dispersion of
"ce^in war is to commit suicide while temporarily insane. T h e r e
|
||i|but one main objective, and all subsidiary ones must be
-yto their utmost limit, so as to enable the concentration of
ISisite battle-power at the decisive point. O n e objective requires
ster-mind to formulate the general plan, and not half a dozen
pf-all-trades to dissipate it. J T h e master-mind must controljhe
fed all other minds must accept or be compelled to accept his
fictically, co-operation is based on battle organization, weapons,

protection and movement, skill, confidence, discipline and determina-
tion ; it is moral, physical and mechanical. This means that all
will work for the attainment of the objective, and not for themselves.
T h e weeding out of fools and knaves is, therefore, the first step in this,
accomplishment; the second is the scrapping of peace processes and;
shibboleths, and the bringing of ability to the top. Sendity of
thought is the antithesis of co-operative action. A vintage of new^
ideas is always produced in war and the vats must be sufficient and .1
the bottles strong enough to hold i t ; for new ideas, like new wine,
go through a process of fermentation, which in an army, commanded^
by an obsolete general, means the improvisation of means and methods!
which do not harmonize with the general plan. Co-operation in its;
widest sense spells not only military efficiency, but also national and?
imperial efficiency which, centred round one line of direction, impel-
all the life and fighting strength of the nadon towards victory ;;
without such a pivotal line, an army flounders but does not fight.
5. The Conditions of War.
Principles by themselves are not worth the paper on which they;
are written, they are mere words strung together in a certain order ;-
their value lies in their application, and this application depends_o|
the thousand and one cbndmonslvhich surround the elements of wai
during operations. K ¡§l®P I e t e > a 1 1 that now remains is to clothe it with flesh and muscle—
WhatTarfT"these conditions ? for, without knowing them, their,
application is manifestly impossible. Conditions are innumerable;
and ever changing, but the following are some of the most important;
namely, time, space, ground, weather, numbers, moral, communic|
tion, supply, armament, formation, obstacles and observatic|
Each of these conditions may be considered as possessing a dir
nature—a power of increasing the endurance of the attacker and|
power of increasing the resistance of the defender ; each, therefore;
may be looked upon as possessing the power of enhancing offensive
and defensive action in war. J ^ S p f f t d indirect protection, carry the man forward. Such is
A commander has three means at his disposal in order to d
with any condition in war : (i) he may avoid i t ; (ii) he may breaM
down ; (iii) he may turn it to his own advantage.
T h e third course, which masters the difficulty, is manifestly®
best, and it is the one which even a superficial study of niilitp
history will show us was employed by the great captains of waif
was in fact the keynote of their success.
HBf
HBsjr.v.'-
•¡¡¡fe -
SL 6. The Battle.
H '
P | A n attempt has so far been made to make an analysis of the study
i p f a r ; in the remainder of this article the process will be reversed,
m f r o m the various components, which analysis has separated, it is
proposed to build up synthetically the crucial act of war—the battle.
¡fifA battle is an enormously complex action consisting of a number
P|simple parts. First, we must grasp the conditions, and, by so
fflpT» ride the course. We then must take all the conditions which
^ | n o w and weigh out their values in terms of assistance and resist-
H^e to ourselves. Those we do not know, but suspect, we must
jg|n|der even more carefully than those we know, allowing for a
ggisiderable margin of error, and always giving the benefit of doubt
E f l i e enemy.
¡¡¡|Havmg collected and codified these conditions, we must next
| | f | _ t o them the principles of war. We must decide upon our
ffi^five, applying the offensive to those conditions which will
a n d s e c u r i t y t 0 t h o s e which will n o t ; thus shall we master
¡ ¡ I f t i o n s and harness them to our favour. We then think in terms
g p n c e n t r a t i o n , of economy of force, of movement and surprise,
| l P y » we weave the whole together in co-operation.
- By now our plan will have evolved almost unconsciously, and our
|BB^-.bur grand tactics.
t i l i s P o i n t w e t h i n k purely in terms of fighting, the skeleton
g l f m e n t s of war. We think in terms of men, movement, weapons
B | p r o t e c t i o n . There are the categories—the commander, the
fighter and the sustainer : what are they all going to do ?
| | | | $ i u m a n a n d animal endurance and communications ; weapons,
HfsShall we use them, how shall we combine them ? protection, by
BffigÉtéarth» fire and formation. All these give us our battle
¡ p i f e Then there is the battle itself in which the moral and physical
o f m a n c o m e into play ; the approach merges into the attack
^ Offensive and defensive powers of weapons, shielded by
¡ j P j j ^ ! s u c h i s war—a science based on sure foundations, rooted
P a s t w i t h i t s boughs and leaves moving this way and that
ffi^i^ around us according to the oonditions of the moment,
^ K o y e r n e d by the laws of existence—action and inertia.
P