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Multiplicity and Unity of Being in Aristotle
Author(s): Enrico Berti

Source: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 101 (2001), pp. 185-207
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IX*-MULTIPLICITY AND UNITY OF
BEING IN ARISTOTLE
byEnricoBerti
ABSTRACT I. In analyticphilosophy, so-called'univocalism'is theprevailing

interpretation of the meaningof termssuch as 'being'or 'existence',i.e. the
thesisthatthesetermshave onlyone meaning(see Russell,White,Quine,van
Inwagen).Butsomeanalytical philosophers, inspiredbyAristotle,maintainthat
'being'has manysenses(Austin,Ryle).II. Aristotledevelopsan argument in
favourof thislast thesis,observingthat'being'and 'one' cannotbe a single
genus,becausetheyare predicatedof theirdifferences (Metaph.B 3). III. But
'being'forAristotle has also a unity,i.e. 'focalmeaning',whichcoincideswith
substance(Metaph.F 2), and substance has notonlyan ontological but
priority,
also a logicalpriority,
in respectto theotherbeings,as was shownbyG. E. L.
Owen.IV. This'focalmeaning'cannotbe identified withprimary substance,i.e.
withthe unmovablemover,as some interpreters pretend,becausethislatter
has onlyan ontological, not a logical,priority in respectto theworld.V. The
impossibilityofthisinterpretationresultsfromAristotle's ofan essence
rejection
and a substanceof being(Metaph.B 4), i.e. therejectionofwhattheChristian
philosophers calledesseipsumsubsistens.
I
Being andexistence
in contemporary
'analytical In
ontology'.
the historyof analyticphilosophytheprevailinginterpret-
ationof themeaningof termssuchas 'being'or 'existence'was
so-called'univocalism',i.e. the thesisthattheyhave only one
meaning,as was shownin a clearexpositionby MortonWhite
morethanfortyyearsago.' The authorindicatedtheoriginsof
sucha positioninJohnStuartMill,and attributed themostclear
formulation ofit to BertrandRussell,thoughadmitting thatthe
latterinitiallyheld a positionwhichcould be called 'duovocal-
ism',accordingto whichthe existenceof physicalobjectsand
theexistenceof universals(e.g. of numbers)wereaffirmed with
differentmeanings, equivalentto beingin spaceand
respectively
timeand beingnotinspaceand time.Lateron Russelldiscovered
*Meetingof the AristotelianSociety,held in Senate House, Universityof London,

on Monday, 19thFebruary,2001 at 4.15 p.m.
1. See White,Towarda Reunionin Philosophy, CambridgeMass. 1956,pp. 60-80.
186 ENRICO BERTI
that these different meaningscould be reduced to only one. He

discoveredthat affirming the existenceof anythingis equivalent
to sayingthat it is something,wherebeing somethingis a genus
of whichbeing in space and timeand beingnot in space and time
are the species.
SummarizingRussell's position,White wrote:
We can therefore say that thereis a correspondingly general
expression, namely'Thereis at leastone',whichwe can putbefore
the phrase'physicalobject' and beforethe word 'universal'.In
both of the resultingsentences,'There is at least one physical
object'and 'Thereis at leastone universal',thephrase'thereis at
leastone' is usedin thesamesense,and thisis reflected in thefact
thatwe can use logicalnotationand symbolize thesetwosentences
as follows:'(3x) (x is a physicalobject)'and '(]x) (x is a univer-
sal)'. Now ... thesymbol'(3x)', read in Englishas 'thereis an x
suchthat',is used in thesamewayin bothcases.
White acknowledgedthat a thirdposition is possible. He called
it 'multivocalism'.The champion of thisposition is GilbertRyle,
according to whom
It may be truethatthereexistsa cathedralin Oxford,a three-
enginedbomber,and a squarenumberbetween9 and 25. But the
naive passage to the conclusionthatthereare threeexistents, a
building,a brandof aircraftand a numbersoon leads to trouble.
The sensesof 'exists'in whichthethreesubjectsare said to exist
are different
and theirlogicalbehavioursare different.2
To illustrateRyle's position White quoted anotherfamous pass-
age, thistimedrawn fromhis major work, The Conceptof Mind:
It is perfectly
properto say,in one logicaltoneofvoice,thatthere
existmindsand to say,in anotherlogicaltoneofvoice,thatthere
existbodies. But theseexpressions do not indicatetwo different
speciesofexistence... Theyindicatetwodifferent sensesof 'exist',
somewhatas 'rising'has different sensesin 'the tide is rising',
'hopesare rising'and 'theaverageage of deathis rising'.A man
wouldbe thoughtto makea poorjoke who said thatthreethings
are now rising,namelythe tide,hopes and the averageage of
death.It wouldbejustas good or bad a joke to saythatthereexist
primenumbers and Wednesdays and publicopinionand navies;or
thatthereexistbothmindsand bodies.3
2. Ryle,PhilosophicalArguments,
Oxford1945,pp. 15-16.
3. Ryle, The Conceptof Mind,London 1949,p. 23.
MULTIPLICITY AND UNITY OF BEING IN ARISTOTLE 187
Accordingto White,Ryle could dispensewithmultivocalism.All

the existentialstatementsmentionedby Ryle can be translated
into '(3x) (x is ...)', and these translationsfreeus fromthe need
to assert the existenceof thingslike relationships,possibilities
and attributes,and save us fromhaving to say that the phrase
'exists' applies to some 'entities'in one sense and to others in
another 'sense'.
Today's champion of univocalismis surelyW.V.O. Quine. In
Wordand Objecthe wrote:
Thereare philosophers who stoutlymaintainthat'exists'said of
numbers, classes,and thelikeand 'exists'said of materialobjects
are twousagesofan ambiguousterm'exists'.Whatmainlybaffles
me is thestoutnessof theirmaintenance. Whatcan theypossibly
countas evidence?4
Resting on the refutationof Ryle made by White, Quine could
conclude:
In our canonicalnotationof quantification, then,we findthe
oflaw and order.Insofaras we adhereto thisnotation,
restoration
the objectswe are to be understoodto admitare preciselythe
objectswhichwe reckonto theuniverseof valuesoverwhichthe
boundvariablesof quantification are to be consideredto range.
Suchis simplytheintended senseofthequantifiers '(x)' and '(3x)':
'everyobjectx is suchthat','thereis an objectx suchthat'.The
areencapsulations
quantifiers ofthesespeciallyselected,unequivo-
callyreferential
idiomsof ordinary language.5
Also, in Ontological
relativity
and OtherEssaysQuine wrote:
Are theretwo sensesof existence? Onlyin a derivativeway. For
us commonmenwho believein bodies and primenumbers,the
statements 'thereis a rabbitin theyard'and 'thereareprimenum-
bersbetween10 and 20' are freefromdouble-talk. Quantification
does themjustice... It has beenfairlycommonin philosophy early
and lateto distinguish betweenbeing,as thebroadestconcept,and
existence,as narrower.This is no distinction of mine; I mean
'exists'to coverall thereis, and suchof courseis theforceof the
quantifier.6
4. Quine, Wordand Object,CambridgeMass. 1960,p. 131.

5. Ibid.,p. 242.
6. Quine, OntologicalRelativity
and OtherEssays,New York 1969,pp. 99-100.
188 ENRICO BERTI
Froma pointof viewwhichhe definesas 'broadlyQuinean',

a representative of so-called'AnalyticalOntology',Petervan
Inwagen,recently arguedinfavourofthefollowing theses:'Being
is univocal';'The singlesenseofbeingor existence is adequately
capturedby the existentialquantifier of formallogic.'7These
thesesare defended bymeansoftheobservation thatexistence is
closelytiedto number, because'to saythatunicornsdo notexist
is to say something verymuchlike sayingthatthe numberof
unicornsis 0', while'to say thathorsesexistis to say thatthe
numberof horsesis 1 or more'.On thebasis of thisobservation
van Inwagencan concludethat'the univocacyof numberand
the intimateconnectionbetweennumberand existenceshould
convinceus thatthereis at leastverygood reasonto thinkthat
existenceis univocal'.
Whatimpressed me,as an old frequenter ofAristotle's
philos-
ophy,was thethesisthatBeingis univocal,whichvan Inwagen
too, likeWhite,formulates in oppositionto Ryle,a philosopher
who neverconcealedhis Aristotelian inspiration.Accordingto
van Inwagen,'Rylehas madeno case forthethesisthatexistence
is equivocal.'And he adds-but it is notclearwhether referring
to Ryleor in general-'I knowno argument forthisthesisthat
is even faintlyplausible.'This enableshim to say: 'We must
therefore concludethatexistence is univocal.'
In fact,Rylewas not theonlyphilosopher who admitteddif-
ferent sensesof being.BeforehimJohnL. Austin,thefirstwho
introducedAristotleinto analyticalOxfordphilosophy, in his
famousarticleentitled'The meaningof a word'(1940),claimed
that 'exist'is used paronymously, i.e. witha 'primarynuclear
sense' and othersensesdependenton it,just like 'healthy'in
Aristotle.8In Sense and Sensibiliahe wrote:
'Real' [thetranslation
oftheGreekon,i.e. 'being']is nota normal
wordat all,buthighlyexceptional;exceptional in thisrespectthat,
unlike'yellow'or 'horse' or 'walk', it does not have one single
specifiable,always-the-same
meaning. (EvenAristotle saw through
thisidea.) Nordoesithavea largenumberofdifferent meanings
it is notambiguous,even'systematically'.9
7. Inwagen,'Meta-Ontology',Erkenntnis, 48, 1998,pp. 233-250.

8. Austin,PhilosophicalPapers,2nd edn., Oxford1970,p. 71.
9. Austin,Sense and Sensibilia,Oxford1962,p. 64. Italicsin the text.
The doctrine thatbeing,and perhapsalso existence, areat least

notunivocal,ifnotequivocal,is distinctiveofAristotle. He refers
to it severaltimes,10in themostpartof whichhe neverbrings
any argument in defenceof thisdoctrine.By so doing,Aristotle
givestheimpression ofconsidering thedoctrine perfectlyevident,
thoughhe was clearlypersuadedof beingthe firstphilosopher
who discoveredthis truth.In the whole CorpusAristotelicum
thereis-as faras I know-only one passage whereAristotle
makesan attemptto provethatbeingis not univocal.This is
Metaphysics B 3, 998b22-27.Thisis an astonishing situation,but
just for this reason the passage is worthyof some attention,
greaterthanthatwhichis usuallyreserved to it evenbyAristot-
le's interpreters.
II
Themeanings ofbeinginAristotle. As is wellknown,Book B of
Aristotle'sMetaphysics devotedto the discussionof
is entirely
theaporiai,i.e. of themaindifficulties, The
of firstphilosophy.
seventhof theseaporiaiconcernsthePlatonicdoctrinethatthe
mostuniversalgenera,i.e. Being(to on) and One (to hen),are the
firstprinciplesof all things.Aristotlecriticizesit by observing
that'it is not possibleforeitherOne or Beingto be a genusof
things'(992b22)." We will examineAristotle'sreasonsforthis
thesislateron. For themomentI wouldlike to pointout that
notonlyBeing,whichincludes,as we willsee,existence, butalso
One,i.e. thenotionto whichexistence is reducedin theQuinean
tendency, are notunivocal,becausetheyare nota singlegenus.
We mightwonderwhy Being and One cannot be a single
genus.Aristotle providesus witha reasonforthisin Metaph.B3,
998b23-24:'It is necessary bothforthedifferences ofeach genus
to be and foreach of themto be one.' It is evidentthattheverb
'to be' is used in thissentencewithan existential meaning.This
is,in fact,theonlymeaningof'to be' whichcan be predicated of
all things,and therefore also ofthedifferencesbetweenthespecies
of a genus,as Aristotlemakes clear a couple of lines before
10. Aristotle,MetaphysicsF 2, 1003a33;E 4, 1028a5; Z 1, 1028alO; N 2, 1089a7.

11. Translationby A. Madigan (Aristotle'sMetaphysics,Books B and K 1-2, Oxford
1999) withsome modifications.
190 ENRICO BERTI
(998b21).When we say, for instance,that 'man is a rational

animal',we mean thatman is an animalwitha difference, i.e.
withtheproperty expressed bytheword'rational'.Now we may
say thatthisproperty is, in thesensethatit exists,and thatit is
one, in thesensethatit has a unityand can be countedas one
difference amongothers.Perhaps-but I am not sureof this-
by takingtogether beingand beingone as predicatedof thedif-
ferences, Aristotlesupposesthattheyhave the same existential
meaning.If thisis true,we couldsaythathe is usingtheverb'to
be', i.e. 'to exist',exactlyinthesamesenseindicatedbytheQuin-
ean tendency, i.e. in thesenseof beingat leastan instanceof a
class. But thisverbis notunivocalforAristotle: not onlycan it
be predicatedof each genus,but also of thedifferences of each
genusof things.
Immediately after,Aristotleexplainsto us whya termpredi-
catedof thedifferences of each genuscannotbe a singlegenus:
eitherforthespeciesof thegenusto be predicated
It is impossible
of theirown differences or forthe genusto be predicatedapart
fromitsspecies(998b24-26).
The firstpointis irrelevant
to whatAristotle is proving.Nobody
claimsthatBeingand One are species,and probablyit is made
forthesake ofcompleteness.12The secondpointmustbe under-
stoodin thesensethatit is impossibleforthegenusto be predi-
catedof itsown differences, admit.'3It is not
as all interpreters
clearwhat'apartfromits species'meansand no commentator,
as far as I know,explainsit. Presumablyit means that it is
impossible forthegenusto be predicated ofitsdifferences'in the
absenceof its species',14or 'insteadof beingpredicatedof its
species'.We know,in fact,thateverygenuscan be predicated of
itsspecies.Butwhyis itimpossible forthegenusto be predicated
of itsowndifferences?
As all interpretersadmit,theanswerto thisquestionis given
in Top. VI 6, 144a32-b3:
12. Aristotle'sMetaphysics,a revisedtext with introductionand commentaryby

W. D. Ross, Oxford1953,I, p. 235.
13. This resultsalso fromtheRevisedOxfordTranslation('it is not possibleforthe
genusto be predicatedof the differentiae').
14. This is the translationby C. Shields, Orderin Multiplicity:Homonymyin the
Philosophyof Aristotle,Oxford1999,pp. 247-248.
It seemsthatthegenusis predicated,notofthedifferentia,
butof
theobjectsof whichthedifferentia Animal(e.g.) is
is predicated.
predicatedofmanand ox and otherterrestrialanimals,notof the
differentia whichwe predicateof thespecies.15
itself,
The differentia whichwe predicate,togetherwith the genus
'animal',of the species'man' in orderto giveits definition, is
'rational'.Aristotleclaims that the genus 'animal' cannot be
predicatedof the differentia'rational',i.e. thatit is impossible
to say that'rationalis an animal'.This is impossiblefortwo
reasons:
For if animalis to be predicatedof each of itsdifferentiae,
then
manyanimals(polla zoia) willbe predicated ofthespecies;forthe
differentiaeare predicatedof thespecies.Moreover,thedifferen-
iftheyare animals;for
tiaewillbe all eitherspeciesor individuals,
everyanimalis eithera speciesor an individual.
The firstargumentis not immediately clear.In particular,it is
not clearwhatis meantby 'manyanimalswillbe predicatedof
the species',and whyAristotleconsidersthisimpossible.16 The
interpretation I would like to proposegoes as follows.If the
genus'animal' could be predicatedof its difference 'rational',
thenrationalwouldbe an animal,notbecauseitwouldbe ident-
ifiedwithanimal,but becauseit wouldbe a particular instanti-
ationofthegenus'animal'.In thiscase,thegenus'animal'would
enterinto the definition of 'rational',and 'rational'would be
definedas animalwithanotherparticulardifference.17 Now, as
thegenusand thedifference mustbe bothpredicated ofthespec-
ies 'man',two 'animals'wouldbe predicatedof thisspecies,i.e.
thegenus'animal'and thedifference 'animal',or-as Aristotle
himselfsays-'many animals'(polla zo6ia).The animalswould
be as manyas thedifferences ofwhichthegenus'animal'can be
predicated.Butin thiswayonlygenera,and no difference, would
15. RevisedOxfordTranslation.
16. See thedifferentinterpretationsin T. Waitz (AristotelisOrganongraece,Leipzig
1844-1846, II, p. 500), W. D. Ross (Aristotle'sMetaphysics,I, p. 235), J. Tricot
(Aristote,Organon.V: Les Topiques,Paris 1950, ad loc.), A. Zadro (Aristotele,I
Topici,Napoli 1974,p. 485), C. Shields(op. cit.,pp. 252-253), Madigan (op. cit.,pp.
74-75).
17. This case would produce,followinga book not yetpublishedby S. Menn on The
Aimand theArgument of Aristotle'sMetaphysics,whichhe kindlysentme,a sortof
absurd regressto the infinite.
192 ENRICO BERTI
be predicatedof thespecies.Therewouldremainnothingwhich
could distinguish thespeciesof thegenusfromone another.In
otherwords,if thegenuscould be predicatedof thedifference,
thedifference wouldbecomeitselfa speciesand would lose its
function of distinguishingone speciesfromtheotherspeciesof
thegenus.
Even in the case in which'animal' would be predicatedof
'rational'withoutbeingits genus,but simplyas an accidentof
it, it would be predicatedalso of 'man', i.e. of the speciesof
whichthe difference is predicated,in virtueof the logicalrule
accordingto whichthepredicateof a predicateis a predicateof
the subject(notanotae,notarei). In any case, Aristotle'sargu-
mentsultimately reston thedoctrineofthedefinition ofa species
by its genusand its differentia,wherethegenusexpresseswhat
everyspecieshas in commonwiththe otherspecieswithinthe
same genus,and the difference expresseswhat distinguishes a
speciesfromthe otherspeciesof the same genus.If the genus
couldbe predicated of thedifference,eitheras itsgenusor as an
accident,thenthe definition would onlyindicatethe common
aspectsof thespecies,losingwhatenablesit to distinguish them
fromone another.If Aristotle'sarguments are valid,as I have
triedto show,we can concludethathis attemptto demonstrate
thatbeingis notunivocalis successful.
Metaph.B makesit clear thatthe non-univocity holds both
forbeingconceivedas existence and forbeingconceivedas unity.
The 'univocacyof number',invokedby van Inwagen,does not
hold amongobjectsbelongingto different genera,as is thecase
withbeings.We cannot,in fact,counttheobjectscontainedin a
room if theybelong to different genera.We can count,for
instance,persons,tables,chairs,books. In theAristotelian lan-
guagetheyareall substances. Butwe cannotcount,together with
them,the coloursof the tables,the weightof the books, the
actionsor thefeelings ofthepersons,thoughwe mustadmitthat
anyof thesethingsdoes existand is at leastone instantiation of
itsclass.In particular,Aristotle
said that'to be one ... is specially
to be the firstmeasureof a kind',18and that 'the measureis
alwayshomogeneouswiththe thingmeasured:the measureof
spatialmagnitudes is a spatialmagnitude, and in particular that
18. Aristot.Metaph.I 1, 1052b16-18.
thatofarticulated
thatofbreadtha breadth,
oflengthis a length,
soundsan articulatesound,thatofweighta weight,thatofunits
a unity'.19This doctrinewas endorsedby modernanalytical
philosophers suchas P. T. Geach,M. Dummettand C. Wright,
and it was attributedby themto one of the foundersof this
G. Frege.20
tradition,
III
The unityof beingin Aristotle. But theriskof univocity is not
yet completely eliminated.
As we are goingto see,evenin admit-
tingthemultiplicity of themeaningsof being,thereis stillthe
possibilityof conceivingone of thesemeaningsas theessenceof
being,whichforAristotlewouldbe equivalentto admitting the
univocity of being.At thebeginning of Metaph.F, afterstating
that'thereis a sciencethatinvestigatesbeingas being',Aristotle
adds that'thereare manysensesin whicha thingmaybe said
"to be", but theyare relatedto one thing(pros hen),i.e. one
definitekindof thing,and are not homonymous'. In orderto
thiscase, he adducestwoexamples:
illustrate
Everything whichis healthyis relatedto health,one thingin the
sensethatitpreserves health,anotherin thesensethatitproduces
health,anotherin thesensethatitis a symptom ofhealth,another
becauseit is capableof it.And thatwhichis medicalis relativeto
themedicalart,one thingin thesensethatit possessesit,another
in thesensethatit is naturally adaptedto it,anotherin thesense
thatit is a functionof themedicalart.
This happensalso about being,whereeverything thatis said to
be eitheris a substance(ousia) or is relativeto substance:
Some thingsare said to be because theyare substances,others
becausetheyare affections of substance,othersbecausetheyare
processestowardssubstances,or destructions or privationsor
or productive
qualitiesofsubstance, ofsubstance,
or generative or
of thingsthatare relativeto substance,or negationsof some of
thesethingsor of substanceitself(1003a33-blO).
19. Ibid., 1053a24-27.

20. Geach, Referenceand Generality.An Examinationof someMedievaland Modern
Theories,Ithaca 1980,p. 63; Dummett,Frege.PhilosophyofLanguage,London 1981,
p. 547; Wright,Frege's Conceptionof Numbersas Objects,Aberdeen1983,p. 3.
194 ENRICO BERTI
This situationwas consideredby Austinas a case of 'par-

onymity'. Paronymity is describedin Cat. 1 as different from
bothhomonymy, whichimpliesan identicalnamewithdifferent
connotations, and synonymy, whichimpliesan identicalname
withidenticalconnotations.'Paronymity-affirms Aristotle-
belongsto thingsthathave different names,but derivedfrom
one ofthem,e.g.whenthegrammarian getshisnamefromgram-
mar,or thebravegetshisnamefrombravery'(Cat. 1, 1a12-15).
This is not exactlythecase of 'being',or 'healthy',or 'medical'.
In fact,thesenamesremainalwaysthesame. However,Austin
consideredthemultiplicity of meaningsof a word,whichare all
relativeto one of them,a particularformof paronymity. He
describeditas thesituationinwhich'a wordmaypossessconno-
tationswhich are partlyidenticaland partlydifferent'. He
explainedthisfactas follows:
Whenwe speak of a 'healthyexercise'theworld'healthy'has a
connotationwhichis onlypartlythesameas thatwhichit has in
thephrase'a healthybody':a healthyexerciseis an exercisewhich
producesor preserveshealthiness in bodies. Hence healthinessa,
whenpredicated of an exercise,
means'productive or preservative
, i.e. ofhealthiness
ofhealthinessb in thesensein whichit is predi-
catedofbodies.Thus'healthinessb' and 'healthinessa'
haveconno-
tationswhichare partlyidenticaland partlydifferent.21
Speakingofthewordagathon,i.e. 'good',Austinargued:'Some-
timesit meansx, sometimes"productive, etc., of x" etc.; and
clearlyitis onlythe"nuclear"meaningof"x", whichis common
to both,withwhichtheyare concerned.'22 In his articleon 'The
meaningof a word', speakingof the word 'healthy',Austin
wrote:'In thiscase thereis whatwe maycall a primary nuclear
sense of "healthy":the sensein which"healthy"is used of a
healthybody: I call thisnuclearbecause it is "containedas a
part"intheothertwosenseswhichmaybe setoutas "productive
of healthybodies" and "resulting froma healthybody".' The
samesituationholds-said Austin also fortheword'exist',i.e.
being.23Now, it seemsto me that,iftheAristotelian doctrineof
21. Austin, Agathonand eudaimoniain the Ethics of Aristotle',in Philosophical

Papers,pp. 1-31, esp. p. 27.
22. Ibid,pp. 27-28.
23. Austin,'The meaningof a word',in PhilosophicalPapers,p. 71.
a multiplicityof meaningsrelativeto one meaningwereinter-

pretedin this way, i.e. if substance(ousia) was taken as the
nuclearmeaning, 'containedas a part'in all theothermeanings,
and 'common'to all of them,as suggested by Austin,substance
wouldbecomethegenusofbeingand theothermeaningswould
be onlyspecifications ofthisgenus.Theywouldspecify thegenus
withoutmodifying it. The genusis in factthecommonpartof
the definition,and it is specifiedby the suitabledifferences.If
therefore the definitions of differentmeaningshave a part in
common,and thispartis alwaysthe same,thispartwould be
necessarilythegenus.Moreover,giventhatthegenusis partof
theessence,substance,conceivedas a genus,wouldbe nothing
but an essence,theessenceof being,or a partof theessenceof
being.
But theexamplesgivenby Aristotledo not suggestthisidea.
The differentmeaningsof 'healthy'standin different relationsto
health.Apparently, therelationsAristotleis thinkingofarethose
of production, preservation and manifestation of health.They
are properto thingssuch as a healthymedicine,a healthycli-
mate,a healthycomplexion, whichdo not belongto the same
genusand do not have the same essence.We cannotsay that
healthis theessenceof thehealthymedicine,or thehealthycli-
mate,or thehealthycomplexion. We mustsay thathealthis the
productof thehealthymedicine,or thethingpreservedby the
healthyclimate,or finallythe thingmanifested by the healthy
complexion.In all thesecases thereis surelya relationbetween
thesinglehealthythingand health.This relationis nevertheless
differentin each case. The differenthealthythingscannotthere-
forebe consideredas meremodifications, or qualifications,
of
health.This is also thecase withbeing,at leastin myopinion.
Everymeaningof being,i.e. everycategoryof being,substance,
quality,quantity,relation,time,place, etc.,standsin a certain
relationto substanceand is said to be in virtueof thisrelation.
But substanceis not the essenceof quality,quantity,relation,
time,place,etc.Nor are theselattermeremodifications, or quali-
ofsubstancein thesensethattheywouldbe substances
fications,
withsomeaccidentalqualifications: theyareotherkindsofbeing,
differentfromsubstance,thoughdependenton it.
In the EudemianEthics,illustrating the different kinds of
friendship,Aristotle himselfexplainsthattheyare all relativeto
196 ENRICO BERTI
one,whichis primary, just as in thecase of theword'medical',

and adds: 'Everywhere, then,we seek for the primary.But
becausetheuniversalis primary, theyalso take theprimaryto
be universal, and thisis an error'(Eth.Eud. VII 2, 1236a22-25).
The targetof his criticism are thePlatonists,who took thepri-
maryas a universal, i.e. a commonaspect,a commonpredicate,
likethegenus.Accordingto Aristotle, thisis a mistake:thepri-
marymeaningof friendship is not thegenusof whichtheother
meaningsare thespecies.'The primary is-Aristotlesays-that
of whichthenotionis presentin us' (en hemin),not 'in thedefi-
nitionof all' (en pasin), as many interpreters believe.24This
meansthattheprimaryis onlya termof reference, i.e. thatto
whichtheothersstandin relation(pros), and it is commonto
all just forthisreason,and not becauseit is a universalin con-
formity withwhich(kata) theothersare said.
Interpreters do notcompletely agreewithone anotheron this
point.In a famousarticleentitled'Aristotleand theAmbiguity
of Ambiguity', Hintikkadistinguishes threecases: the case in
whichthemultipleapplicationsof a termhave totallydifferent
definitions (homonymy), the case in whichthe multipleappli-
cationsof a termhave totallyidenticaldefinitions (synonymy),
and finally thecase in whichthemultipleapplicationsof a term
have definitions whichare partlyidenticaland partlydifferent.
Accordingto Hintikka,thislast case is thatof being.This is
describedby Aristotlesometimesby the relationof its appli-
cationsto one centralpoint(pros hen),and sometimes by the
affirmation thattheirdefinitions are derivablefromeach other
'by addingto and takingaway'.25
Thereis a passageof Metaph.Z 4 whichillustrates thelatter
situation, and whichHintikkaquotesin supportofhisinterpret-
ation.It reads:
Essence(to ti en einai)willbelong,just as the'what'(to ti estin)
does,primarily and in thesimplesenseto substance,and in a sec-
ondarywayto theothercategoriesalso-not essencesimply, but
the essenceof a qualityor of a quantity.For it mustbe either
24. This is the textof all the manuscripts,

whileen pasin is a correctionmade by
Bonitz.
25. Hintikka,'Aristotleand theAmbiguityof Ambiguity', Inquiry,2, 1959,pp. 137-
151,esp. 142.
homonymously thatwe say thattheyare, or by makingqualifi-

cationsor abstractions kai aphairountas)
(prostithentas (in theway
in whichwhatis notknownmaybe said to be known)-thetruth
being(to ge orthon)thatwe use thewordneitherhomonymously
nor in the same sense,butjust as we applythe word 'medical'
whenthereis a referenceto one and thesamething,notmeaning
one and thesame thing,nor yetspeakinghomonymously; fora
patientand an operationand an instrument are called medical
neitherhomonymously norin virtueof one thing,butwithrefer-
enceto one thing(pros hen)(1030a29-b3).
In thispassageit is not clearwhether theuse of theverbto be
'by makingqualifications or abstractions'coincidesor not with
theuse of thisverbwithreference to one and thesamething.In
thefirst case,themeaningofbeingin theothercategories(qual-
ity,quantity,etc.) would be the resultof a qualification of the
meaningthatbeinghas whenit is used forsubstance.Substance
wouldbe thepurestinstanceof being,i.e. itsessence,and what
is associatedwiththeothercategories wouldbe substancewithor
withoutsomefurther In thesecondcase,substance
qualification.
wouldbe onlythetermof reference fortheothercategories, i.e.
the thingto whichtheystandin relation,withoutbeingtheir
essence.It seemsto me thatAristotledoes not identify thetwo
uses of being.The exampleAristotleadduces to illustrate'by
makingqualifications or abstractions',i.e. 'the way in which
whatis not knownmay be said to be known',coincideswith
whatis mentionedsome linesbefore,i.e. withthe case of the
people who say thatthatwhichis not is (1030a25-26).Now,
Aristotlehimselfqualifiesthesepeople as speaking'in a mere
verbalway'(logiko's),and contrasts them-I suppose-with'the
truth'(to ge orthon),whichconsistsin usingthe word neither
homonymously nor in thesame sense,butjust as we applythe
word'medical'.26
A further clarificationof Aristotle'sdoctrineof being was
offered by G. E. L. Owenin hispaperentitled'Logic and meta-
physicsin some earlierworksof Aristotle'.He introducedthe
26. This interpretationwas in part suggestedto me by Paolo Fait in a seminaron

Aristotleheld in Padua in April 2000. It is presentalso in Notes on Book Zeta of
Aristotle'sMetaphysics,ed. by M. Burnyeatand others,Oxford1979. In favourof
theidentificationof thetwouses is clearlyorientedthecommentary of M. Frede and
G. Patzig,Aristoteles'MetaphysikZ', Text, Ubersetzung and Kommentar, Munchen
1988,II, pp. 70-71.
198 ENRICO BERTI
expression'focalmeaning'to describethefirstof themeanings

of a wordsaid in manysenses,butall relativeto one of them.27
This is muchbetterthan'nuclearmeaning':it does not presup-
pose thatthefirstmeaningis a partof theothers,but indicates
thatit is onlythefocus,i.e. thetermof reference, of theothers.
Nevertheless, theway Owen describesfocalmeaningturnsout
to be fairlyclose to what was alreadysuggestedby Austin.
Accordingto Owen, in fact,a senseof a word is primary'in
thatitsdefinition reappearsas a component in each oftheother
definitions'.He speaks of a 'reductivetranslation'about the
relationbetweenthedefinition of substanceand thedefinitions
of theothercategories, explainingthat'all thesensesofon must
be definedin termsof ousia,substance'.28 Finally,he makesit
clearthatthisis therelationof 'logicalpriority', i.e. priorityin
logosor definition. All theseexpressionscouldbe appliedalso to
thegenus,whichis also containedin thedefinition ofthespecies,
and therefore is logicallypriorin respectto it.
Logicalpriority as wellas naturalpriority, or priority inbeing,
is ascribedto substancein Metaph.Z 1. HereAristotle saysthat
substanceis prior'in notion'(toi logoi)to theothercategories,
because'in thedefinition ofeachtermthenotionofthesubstance
mustbe present'(1028a35-36).Giventhat,as we knowthatsub-
stanceis priorto the othercategoriesnot as thegenusin con-
formity withwhich(kata) theyare said, but as theprincipleto
whichtheystandin relation(pros),29thelogicalpriority of sub-
stancemustbe interpreted in a particularway,whichdoes not
resultfromOwen'sinterpretation. Eventhenatural,or ontologi-
cal, priorityof substancein respectto theothercategoriesmust
be differentfromthatofthegenusin respectto thespecies.This
latteris presumably the ontologicalpriority admittedby Plato
(cf.Metaph.A 11, 1019al-6),butit is explicitly distinguished by
27. Owen, 'Logic and metaphysicsin some earlierworksof Aristotle',in I. During

and Owen (eds.), Aristotleand Plato in themid-fourthcentury, Goteborg-Stockholm-
Uppsala 1960, pp. 162-190, repr.in Owen, Logic, science,and dialectic:Collected
papers in Greekphilosophy, Ithaca, N.Y. 1986,pp. 180-199.
28. Ibid., p. 184 and n. 16. The 'reductionist'tendencyof these expressionswas
stronglycriticisedby W. Leszl, Logic and metaphysics in Aristotle,Padova 1970. It
was also correctedby Owen himselfin his laterarticles.
29. Substanceis called a 'principle'(arches)in Metaph.F 2, 1003 b 6, and the things
said 'in conformity withone' (kath'hen)are distinguished fromthe thingssaid 'in
relation(pros) to one nature'at 1003bl2-14.
Aristotlefromthepriority of substancein respectto the other

categories(ibid).
The claimofMetaph.Z 1 thatsubstanceis notonlythatwhich
is 'primarily'(to protos on), but also that whichis 'simply'
(hapl6s)ratherthanbeingsomething (ou ti on) (1028a30),might
appearto pose a problemforthisinterpretation. The expression
'whichis simply', as opposedto 'beingsomething', mightsuggest
thatsubstanceis purebeing,withoutqualifications, perhapspure
existence, i.e. the essenceof being,or the essenceof existence.
This interpretation was advancedin theGermantranslation of
Frede and Patzig:'Das, was primarSeiendesund nichtnurin
bestimmter Hinsicht,sondernuneingeschrankt Seiendes,die
ousia ist.'On thebasisofthistranslation, in fact,substanceturns
out to be 'unlimitedbeing',whichseemsto be the beingfor
essence,theessenceitselfof being.
IV
Beingandprimary substance. Thisinterpretation is suggested also
by anothercontribution of Patzig and Frede, concerningthe
relationbetweensubstancein generaland theprimarykindof
substance,i.e. unmovablesubstance.In an articleconcerning the
relationshipbetweenontologyand theologyin Aristotle's Meta-
physics,
Guinther Patzig,apparently ignoring thecontributions of
Austinand Owen,employedparonymity not onlyto explainthe
dependence of theothercategorieson substance, i.e. theunityof
ontology,butalso to explainthedependence ofthevariouskinds
of substanceon unmovablesubstance.30 For Patzig,not onlyis
beingused in manysenses,all referred to one of them,i.e. to
substance,butalso substanceis used in manysenses.Substance
may mean threekindsof things,the movableand corruptible
substance(thesublunarbodies),movableand incorruptible sub-
stance(the heavenlybodies),and finallyunmovablesubstance
(themoversof the spheres).This last substanceis thecause of
theothers,and it is 'first'and a 'principle'withregardto them.
Therefore,on thebasisoftherulestatedbyAristotle at Metaph.
F 2, 1003bl6-17 ('Everywhere sciencedeals chieflywiththat
30. Patzig,'Theologieund Ontologiein der Metaphysikdes Aristoteles',Kant-Stud-

ien,52, 1960-1961,pp. 185-205.
200 ENRICO BERTI
whichis primary, and on whichtheotherthingsdepend,and in

virtueofwhichtheygettheirnames'),thescienceofsubstanceis
primarily the scienceof thissubstance.This is the reasonwhy
Aristotlecalls it theology.But, as the scienceof substance,in
virtueof theparonymy of beingqua being,is also thescienceof
being,theologywouldcoincidewithontology,and it wouldbe
'universalin thisway,becauseit is first'(Metaph.E 1, 1026a30-
31).
Patzig foundedthisinterpretation on manypassages where
Aristotleactuallysaysthatunmovablesubstanceis a 'principle'
(Metaph.A 7, 1072bll-14: arche)and is 'first'(Metaph.A 8,
1073a30:pro6t).The first mover-saysPatzig-is theparonymic
principleof all thesubstances, 'thesubstanceof thesubstances'.
Firstphilosophyis firstnot becauseit comesbeforethe others
(on the contrary, it comes last). Nor is it firstbecause of the
dignityof its object.Firstphilosophyis firstbecause it is the
scienceof firstsubstance.In thiswaywe can explainthedouble
characterization offirstphilosophy as ontologyand as theology.
This resultsin a uniqueand consequential processof thinking,
whichgoesfrombooksA-E to book A of theMetaphysics, even
if in books Z-e, whichforPatzig are posterior,paronymy is
replacedby analogy.31
The same interpretation has been recentlyendorsed,and
further developed,by MichaelFrede.32In lightof thearticleof
Owen,Fredeno longerspeaksofparonymity butof'focalmean-
ing'. He showsno hesitationin affirming thatsubstanceis the
focal meaningof being,and thatunmovablesubstanceis the
focalmeaningof substance,and therefore of beingas a whole.
In hisinterpretation unmovablesubstance,i.e. divinesubstance,
wouldbe theparticular wayofbeing,'in termsofwhichall other
waysofbeinghaveto be explained'.Unmovablesubstancewould
be nothingbut the focalway (or sense) of being.Apparently,
Fredeextendstheuse of thenotionof focalmeaningas it was
definedby Owen,thatis to say as implying logicalas well as
ontological(or natural)priority. He makesuse of thisnotion
31. In theEnglishtranslationof his article,publishedin J.Barnes,M. Schofieldand

R. Sorabji,Articleson Aristotle,
vol. III, London 1973,pp. 33-49, Patzigcorrectshis
interpretation,
distinguishing paronymyfrom'focalmeaning'and foundingtheunity
of metaphysicsonlyon thelatter.
32. Frede,Essays in AncientPhilosophy, Minneapolis1987,pp. 81-95.
to describeboththe relationbetweensubstanceand the other

categories andtherelationbetweenunmovablesubstanceand the
otherkindsof substance.The expression'in termsof which'
seemsin factto be used to describethesituationin whicha cer-
tainnotionis containedin another,i.e. preciselya situationof
logicalpriority.
Frede is aware that in Aristotle'stextsthis thesisis not
explicitlystated.Nevertheless he thinksthatit is impliedin what
Aristotleaffirms about sensiblesubstancein book Z of Meta-
physics.Here,as it is wellknown,Aristotle identifies'substantial
form'-theexpressionis used by Frede-with 'firstsubstance',
i.e. withthe substance'in termsof whichthe substantiality of
the sensiblesubstanceshas to be explained'.Now, unmovable
substancesare nothingbut substantialformsseparatedfrom
matter;theyhave therefore the same typeof substantiality as
belongsto substantialforms.Theyare prior,as substances,to
sensibleones,and 'we shallachievea fullunderstanding of the
substantialityof sensiblesubstancesonlywhenwe have under-
stood the substantiality of non-sensible substances'.The con-
clusionthatFrede proposes,on the basis of a passage where
Aristotlesaysthatsimpleand actualsubstance,i.e. God, is the
firstintelligible
object(Metaph.A 7, 1072a26),is that'ultimately
nothingis intelligibleunlessitis understood in itsdependence on
God'. In thelightof thisit is clearthatFredeis readyto accept
thatGod is not only ontologically but also logicallypriorto
otherbeings.
Thisis confirmed byhispresentation oftheentireAristotelian
ontologyin termsof a 'scale of perfection' in whichthe lower
formsof beingsomehowimitatehigherformsof being:on the
one hand,animalsprocreatein orderto imitatetheeternity of
the heavens,and by so doingto secureeternity fortheirown
species;on the other,the heavenseternallyrotatein orderto
imitate,as theycan, the unchanging natureof the unmovable
mover.Unmovablemovers-continuesFrede-are 'beingsin a
paradigmatic way,in thattheyare perfectly real',and thesepar-
ate substancesare 'paradigmatic as substances'becausetheyhave
thenecessary qualificationsforsubstantiality, whichareto be the
last subjectof predicationand also to be separate.In thisway
generalmetaphysics has as itscorethestudyofthewayofbeing
of thedivinesubstances, and ultimately coincideswiththeology.
202 ENRICO BERTI
It seemsto me thatthisis a PlatonicratherthanAristotelian

conceptionofbeing,or in anycase itis theresultofan interpret-
ationofAristotle in a Platonizing or evenNeoplatonizing vein.33
The relationof imitationthatit establishesamongthevarious
ways of beingis in factthe same as the relationwhichPlato
admitsbetweenIdeas and sensiblethings.Thiscan be supported
onlybysomeAristotelian texts,beingin contrastwithothers.It
is truethatAristotle considersprocreation as an imitation ofthe
eternity of theheavens(De Gen. Corr.11 10, 336b32-337a7;De
an. II 4, 415a26-b2).But Aristotleneversays thatthecircular
motionof theheavensis an imitationof theimmobility of the
unmovablemover.Thisis onlyan interpretation of histhought,
whose Platonizing character was already denounced by
Theophrastus, who attributed theconceptionof heaven'sdesire
as imitationof theunmovablemoverto 'peoplewho admitthe
One and thenumbers', i.e. thePlatonists.34Aristotle,on thecon-
trary,sharplycriticizesthe exemplaristic, i.e. 'paradigmatic',
causalityof thoseseparatesubstanceswhichare PlatonicIdeas,
and therefore also theirutilityforunderstanding sensiblesub-
stances,affirming forinstancethatthecause of Achillesis not
theuniversal man,whodoes notexist,butPeleus,i.e. hisefficient
cause,and 'of you,yourfather'(Metaph.A 5, 1071a21-22).
Frede'sinterpretation, forits tendencyto considerthecaus-
alityof unmovablesubstancesin termsnot onlyof ontological
butalso oflogicalpriority, ultimatelydependson analyticalphil-
osophy,thatis to sayon theanalysisofontologicalrelationsonly
in termsof logico-linguistical relations,whosemodelis Owen's
analysisof'focalmeaning'.At leastin thiscase thereis a singular
convergence withPlatonism.The resultsofFrede'sinterpretation
are exactlythesame as thoseobtained,50 yearsago, by a well
knownThomistinterpreter of Aristotle's
Metaphysics, FatherJ.
Owens,a pupilof E. Gilsonin thePontifical Institute of Medi-
aeval Studiesin Toronto,who belongedto thatstreamwhich
emphasizesthePlatonicand Neoplatonicelementsof Thomism.
In hisbook of 1951,on TheDoctrineofBeingin theAristotelian
Metaphysics, Owensclaimedthatbetweensensibleand separate
33. This has been noted also by an Italian scholarwho sharesthe interpretationof
Frede,P. Donini, La Metafisicadi Aristotele.Introduzionealla lettura,Firenze1995,
p. 101.
34. Theophrastus,Metaph.7, 5a25-27.
substancethereis thesame relationofproshenlegesthaiwhich

existsbetweentheothercategoriesand substance,and thatthis
latter(calledbyhim'entity'), in itsprimary instance,is theform,
whichcan be theformof a compoundor a pure,i.e. separate,
form.35 Owenstoo,likemostPlatonizing considered
interpreters,
thecausalityof theunmovablemoveras an exemplaristic caus-
ality,affirmingthattheheavensmovecircularly in orderto imi-
tatetheimmobility of theunmovablemover.36
Whatis doubtfulin theinterpretation proposedbyPatzigand
Frede,at leastto mymind,is thatunmovablesubstanceis logi-
callypriorto the otherkindsof substance.I do not see how
the definitionof movablesubstancecan containthe notionof
unmovablesubstance.Thereis onlyone passagewhichcouldgo
in thisdirection.In Metaph.A 7, 1072a27-32,Aristotleaffirms
that'theprimary (ta prota)objectsofdesireand thoughtare the
same',and thattheyare 'thesubstancewhichis simpleand exists
actually'.This substance Aristotleadds-like all thetermsof
thepositiveseries,is intelligible
byitself(noetekath'haute?n).This
surelymeansthatthenotionof unmovablesubstancedoes not
containothernotions,i.e. thatit belongsto the thingsbetter
knownbynature,notforus, becauseit is thefarthest fromper-
ception.Does thisimplythatthenotionofunmovablesubstance
is containedin thedefinition oftheothersubstances? The notion
of form,or thenotionof actuality, is certainly
containedin the
definitionofall theothersubstances. Fromthiswe are neverthe-
lessnotentitled to concludethatthedefinition of separateform,
or pureactuality, is containedin thedefinition of theothersub-
stances.It does not seemto me thatthesenotionsare without
qualification,as Frede claims. Separatenessand purityare
important qualifications,whichwe discoveronlyat the end of
our philosophicalresearch,thatis to say afterhavingdemon-
stratedtheexistence of theunmovablemover.
I can shareFrede'sclaimthat'nothingis intelligible unlessit
is understoodin itsdependenceon God', but onlyifby depen-
dencewe mean ontological,not logical,dependence, and onto-
logicalin thesenseof causal dependence, notin thesenseofthe
35. Owens, The DoctrineofBeingin theAristotelian Metaphysics, Toronto 1978,pp.
395, 457.
36. Cf. also Owens, 'The Relation of God to the World in the Metaphysics',in P.
Aubenque (ed.), Etudessur la Metaphysiqued'Aristote,Paris 1978,pp. 207-228.
204 ENRICO BERTI
Platonicdependenceofthespecieson thegenus.I can also share

theaffirmationthatGod is thebeing'in termsofwhichall other
ways of beinghave to be explained',but onlyif 'in termsof
which'means'in dependenceon which',and thedependencein
sense.I cannotsharethe
questionis ontologicalin thespecified
claim thatGod is being'in a paradigmatic way'. In factI do
notbelievethatAristotle admitsa relationofexemplarity, i.e. of
imitation,betweenGod and theothersubstances. This seemsto
me to belongto thePlatonictraditionratherthanto Aristotle.
WhatI wantto emphasizeis that,forAristotle, to be 'first'does
notmeannecessarily to be a model,a perfectexemplar, thehigh-
estdegree,thepurestinstance,butit can also meana principle,
or cause,or movingcause.
V
Aristotle'srejection ofan essenceanda substance ofbeing.If pri-
marysubstancewerethepurestinstanceofbeing,itwouldbe the
essenceof being.In otherwords,thereshouldbe a substance
whoseessencewouldbe beingitself.This is theconceptof God
as Esse ipsumsubsistens, whichis presentin all the religious
interpretations of Greekphilosophy, i.e. in theJewishtheology
ofPhiloofAlexandria, in theMuslimtheologyofAvicenna,and
in theChristiantheologyof ThomasAquinas.37In general,the
supporters ofthisconception do notpayenoughattention to the
factthatAristotle notonlyknewthisconception, butascribedit
to Plato and criticizedit byarguments whichare closelyconnec-
ted to his doctrineof themultiplicity of themeaningsof being.
His criticism of thisconceptionis onceagaincontainedin Book
B of theMetaphysics, whichis consideredby all interpreters as
an aporetic,or dialecticalbook,and presumably forthisreason
is nottakenseriously.38
In theeleventh aporiaofbook B, whichis said to be 'themost
difficultof all evento studyand themostnecessaryforknowl-
edge of the truth',Aristotleasks 'whetherbeingand one are
37. I cannot here documentthis affirmation, for whichI referto W. Beierwaltes,
PlatonismusundIdealismus,Frankfurt a. M. 1972.
38. More than twentyyearsago I wrotean articleon this subject,which,though
publishedin an importantmiscellanea,remainedwithoutreplies:cf. Berti,'Le pro-
blemede la substantialitede l'etreet de l'un dans la Metaphysique',
in P. Aubenque
(ed.), Etudessur la Metaphysiqued'Aristote,pp. 89-130.
reallythe substancesof beings(ousiai tononton),and whether

each of them,withoutbeingsomethingelse, is being or one
respectively,or whether itis necessary to inquirewhatbeingand
one reallyare,supposingthatanothernatureunderliesthemas
a subject'(100la4-8). He attributes the firstopinionto some
philosophers, and thesecondto others.As supporters ofthefirst
opinionhe namesPlato and thePythagoreans, whosedoctrines
are describedas follows:'Plato and thePythagoreans thinkthat
neitherbeingnorone is something different, butthatthisis what
theirnatureis, supposingthatits ousia is to be one and being'
(100la9-12). In Aristotle'slanguageousia meansnot only'sub-
stance'but also 'essence',and thislast meaningshouldbe pre-
ferredwhen the termis followedby the genitive(ousia of
something). Butifso, we mustconcludethat,forAristotle, Plato
and thePythagoreans conceivedofbeingand one as substances,
whoseessencewas respectively to be beingand to be one.
Aristotle'scriticism of thesecondopinion,whichhe ascribes
to Empedocles,ultimately restson arguments whichhave sense
onlyfroman Academic,i.e. Platonic,pointof view.Afterthis
criticism, Aristotlegoes back to the firstopinion,whichhe
reformulates in thefollowing way:'If thereexistssomeone itself
(auto hen) and being,thenone and beingare necessarily their
substance(ousia). For nothingdifferent is predicatedof them
universally,but rathertheythemselves' (100la27-29). Aristotle
normallyuses the pronoun'itself'(auto) to designatePlatonic
Forms.39In the following line he appliesit also to being(auto
on). Also in thelightof thisit seemsthathe is thinking of Plato
ratherthanthePythagoreans, and thathe is ascribingto Plato a
doctrinewhichconsidersBeingitself, i.e. theFormofbeing,and
One itself,i.e. the Form of one (it is not clear whetherthey
coincideor not),as thesubstances, i.e. theformalcauses,of all
beings.Thiscorresponds partially to thedoctrineoftheOne and
theindefinite Dyad as principles of all things,ascribedto Plato
in book A of theMetaphysics.
What is most interesting is the criticismwhich Aristotle
addressesto thisdoctrine:
But on theotherhand,ifthereis to be somebeingitself(autoon)
and one itself(auto hen),thereis much aporia about how anything
39. Cf.Madigan'scommentary
to Metaph.B alreadyquoted,p. 111.
206 ENRICO BERTI
different willexistalongsidethem:I mean,howbeingswillbe more

thanone. For thatwhichis different frombeingis not.So, in line
withthe argumentof Parmenides, the necessaryconsequenceis
thatall beingsareone and thatthisis being(to on).Buteitherway
it is difficult
(100la29-bl).
Notice thatthe sentence'thatwhichis different frombeingis
not' is justifiedonly'in linewiththeargument of Parmenides',
i.e. onlyifwe admitthatbeinghas onlyone meaning,thedoc-
trinethatAristotle usuallyascribesto Parmenides.40 Ross thinks
thathereAristotleis notjustifiedin ascribingto Plato thePar-
menideannotionofbeing,forthisreason:'For Parmenides it [to
on] means"whatis", i.e. theuniverse; forthePlatonistsitmeans
"being",i.e. theattribute of existence.It is thisabstractionthat
theymake a substance,and thereis nothingin thisto prevent
theirrecognizing othersubstances.'41
But Aristotle's interpretationof Plato's notionof beingis not
withoutreasons.Elsewherehe saysthatthePlatonistsadmitted
twoprinciples, i.e. theOne and theindefinite Dyad, because
they frame the difficulty in an old-fashionedway (aporesai
archaik6s),fortheythought thatall thingsthatarewouldbe one-
viz. Beingitself(auto to on), if one did notjoin issuewithand
refuted thesayingof Parmenides: 'For neverwillthisbe proved,
thatthingsthatare not are.' Theythoughtit necessaryto prove
thatthatwhichis notis; forthus-of thatwhichis and something
else could the thingsthatare be composed,if theyare many
(Metaph.N 2, 1089al-6).
Apparently, thePlatoniststhoughtthat,ifwe do notadmittwo
principles,i.e. the One and the Dyad, whichare equivalentto
Beingand Not-being, we are not able to accountforthemulti-
plicityof things.The reasonforthisis thatParmenidesas well
as the Platonistsconceivedbeingas havingonlyone meaning.
The objectionthatAristotleimmediately addressesto themis
that'beinghas manysenses'(1089a7). But if beinghas many
senses,thereis no need of anotherprincipleopposedto it, i.e.
not-being, to accountforthemultiplicity of things.
40. Cf. Madigan, ibid.,p. 113. Apparently,theAristotelian

criticismof theexistence
of a being itselfis shared by J. Owens, 'The Contentof Existence',in M. Munitz
(ed.), Logic and Ontology,New York 1973,pp. 21-35.
41. Ross, op. cit.,I, p. 245.
Plato conceivedbeingas havingonlyone meaningbecausehe

conceivedit as a genus,thatis to say as an universalpredicate
expressing onlywhatis commonto all things,i.e. onlya single
aspectof things.This was, in fact,theconditionforconceiving
it as a separateForm,i.e. Idea. And thiswas also thecondition
forconceivingbeingand one as theessenceof a substance,i.e.
beingitself(ipsumessesubsistens) and one itself(ipsumunumsub-
sistens).In conclusion,if primarysubstanceis the essenceof
being,beingmust be understoodunivocally.If beinghas an
essence,it is thisessence.It cannotbe manyessences.But thisis
impossible; becausewe see manythings, and theirdifferences
are
existingand each of themis one. This is thecore of Aristotle's
criticism of Plato as it is expoundedin Metaph.B 4. This criti-
cismultimately restson the argumentofferedin Metaph.B 3,
and theviewthatBeingand One cannotbe genera.
DepartmentofPhilosophy
University
ofPadua
I 35139Padova (Italy)

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Multiplicity and Unity of Being in Aristotle

Author(s): Enrico Berti

ABSTRACT I. In analyticphilosophy, so-called'univocalism'is theprevailing

*Meetingof the AristotelianSociety,held in Senate House, Universityof London,

that these different meaningscould be reduced to only one. He

Accordingto White,Ryle could dispensewithmultivocalism.All

4. Quine, Wordand Object,CambridgeMass. 1960,p. 131.

Froma pointof viewwhichhe definesas 'broadlyQuinean',

7. Inwagen,'Meta-Ontology',Erkenntnis, 48, 1998,pp. 233-250.

The doctrine thatbeing,and perhapsalso existence, areat least

10. Aristotle,MetaphysicsF 2, 1003a33;E 4, 1028a5; Z 1, 1028alO; N 2, 1089a7.

(998b21).When we say, for instance,that 'man is a rational

12. Aristotle'sMetaphysics,a revisedtext with introductionand commentaryby

18. Aristot.Metaph.I 1, 1052b16-18.

19. Ibid., 1053a24-27.

This situationwas consideredby Austinas a case of 'par-

21. Austin, Agathonand eudaimoniain the Ethics of Aristotle',in Philosophical

a multiplicityof meaningsrelativeto one meaningwereinter-

one,whichis primary, just as in thecase of theword'medical',

24. This is the textof all the manuscripts,

homonymously thatwe say thattheyare, or by makingqualifi-

26. This interpretationwas in part suggestedto me by Paolo Fait in a seminaron

expression'focalmeaning'to describethefirstof themeanings

27. Owen, 'Logic and metaphysicsin some earlierworksof Aristotle',in I. During

Aristotlefromthepriority of substancein respectto the other

30. Patzig,'Theologieund Ontologiein der Metaphysikdes Aristoteles',Kant-Stud-

whichis primary, and on whichtheotherthingsdepend,and in

31. In theEnglishtranslationof his article,publishedin J.Barnes,M. Schofieldand

to describeboththe relationbetweensubstanceand the other

It seemsto me thatthisis a PlatonicratherthanAristotelian

substancethereis thesame relationofproshenlegesthaiwhich

Platonicdependenceofthespecieson thegenus.I can also share

reallythe substancesof beings(ousiai tononton),and whether

different willexistalongsidethem:I mean,howbeingswillbe more

40. Cf. Madigan, ibid.,p. 113. Apparently,theAristotelian

Plato conceivedbeingas havingonlyone meaningbecausehe

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