De Gruyter

De Gruyter
What is the Focal Meaning of Being in Aristotle?

Author(s): Jiyuan Yu
Source: Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science, Vol. 34, No. 3 (September 2001),
pp. 205-231
Published by: De Gruyter
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Whatis theFocalMeaning
ofBeino;inAristotle?
Yu
Jiyuan
At theoutsetofhis recentlaudable Aristotle's BooksZ andH,

Metaphysics,
D. Bostockconductsa carefulanalysisofvariousfeatures oftheverb'to
be' inAristotle thatthereis a tensioninAristotle's
and articulates view
thatbeingis said in manyways.The tensionis betweenwhatBostock
calls'AccountA' and'AccountB'.According toAccountA,beingapplies
toall kindsofthings,buttoprimary substances ina primarywayand to
all otherthingsin a derivativeway. Accordingto AccountB, being
appliesto all kindsofthings,buteach applicationhas itsown distinct
sense.AccountB,butnotA, explainswhythereareas many(ultimate)
kindsofbeingas therearecategories.In contrast,AccountA,butnotB,
establishesthepriorityofsubstance.How, then,can theseaccountsbe
reconciled?Bostockcomestotheconclusionthata reconciliation is pos-
sibleandexplainstheirrelation toa
byappealing developmental scheme.
He claimsthatAccountBbelongstoan earlierstage;andonthataccount,
twothingsfromdifferent categorieswillhaveno commonelementin
and therefore
theirdefinitions, therecanbe no unifiedstudyofall the
thingsthereare.Butnow [inAccountA] he [Aristotle] hascometothe
viewthatthereis afterall a commonelementinall definitions,
namely
andthisnotablyalterstheposition.Foritmeansthatwe are
substance,
now entitledto takethebeingofsubstanceas thecentralor primary
caseofbeing,regarding all othercasesas derivative
fromthis.1
Thisconclusion
bringsus backtoG.E.L.Owen'sclassical'focalmeaning'
interpretationbeinginAristotle.
of Aristotle
claimsthatbeingis said in
manyways, but all are 'relatedto one thing'(proshen,MetaphIV,
APEIRONa journalforancientphilosophyandscience
205-232
0003-6390/2001/3403 $14.00©Academic & Publishing
Printing
206 JiyuanYu
1003a33-4), thatis,substance.In interpreting

thisdoctrine,
G.E.L.Owen
namestheproshenrelation'focalmeaning', andclaimsthatitmeansthat
all the'senses[of"being"]haveone focus,one commonelement/ or 'a
central in
sense/so that'allitssensescanbe explained termsofsubstance
and ofthesenseof"being"thatis appropriate tosubstance/According
to Owen,'focalmeaning7 is new and revolutionaryin Metaphysics
IV,
andintroduces a 'newtreatment oftoonandothercognateexpressions/2
Thisnew treatment is thoughtto consistmainlyin thefollowingtwo
theses:
(1) The'focalmeaning'treatment ofbeingcontradictsandreplaces

earlierviewintheOrganon,
Aristotle's EE andothersthatbeings
in different
differ and 'being'has variousdistinct
categories,
senses.
(2) The 'focalmeaning'treatment of beingmakesit possiblefor

to establisha universalscienceofbeingqua beingin
Aristotle
MetaphysicsIV,whichcontradicts and replaceshisearlierview
(EE 1217b25-36)thatbecausebeingsdiffer, a universalscience
is impossible.
BothOwen and Bostockclaim thatAristotlehas two incompatible

doctrines schemeis appealedtosolvethe
ofbeingand a developmental
tension.BothofthemsuggestthatforAristotle ofa single
thepossibility
of is
science being consequential to thisdevelopment. Since theterm
'focalmeaning' has gainedwide I
currency,3 hereafter
call Bostock's
Aristotle's
1 D. Bostock, Metaphysics, Z andH (Oxford:
Books Press
OxfordUniversity
1994),67
2 G.E.L.Owen,'Logicand Metaphysics in someearlierWorksof Aristotle',in I.
Duringand G.E.L.Owen,eds.,Aristotle andPlatointheMid-Fourth Century(Göte-
borg:ElandersBoktryckeri Aktiebolag 1960)163-90.
Thequotations arefrom168-9,
189.Thepositionis further explainedinOwen's'Aristotleon theSnaresofOntol-
ogy',in R. Bambrough, ed.,NewEssaysonPlatoandAristotle (London:Routledge
and KeganPaul 1965)69-75,and 'The Platonismof Aristotle', ofthe
Proceedings
British
Academy 51 (1966) 125-50.All thesepapersare collectedin Owen, Logic,
andDialectic,
Science ed. MarthaNussbaum(London:Duckworth 1986).
phrasetorender
hardlya satisfactory
3 'Focalmeaning'is,however, proshen.Itgives
thatAristotle
theimpression is talkingaboutmeaningor sense,whereasin fact
Whatis theFocalMeaningofBeingin Aristotle?207
AccountA and AccountB respectively the'focalmeaningaccount'and

the'multiplicityaccount'.
Theinfluence ofOwen'sfocalmeaninginterpretation on Aristotelian
scholarship inthepastseveraldecadescanhardlybe exaggerated. Over
theyearshis positionhas been scrutinized by differentcommentators
inimportantly differentways.Theaimofthispaperis nottoadd a new
criticismof Owen, but ratherto develop a different solutionto the
tensionwhichBostockelucidatesbetweenthemultiplicity accountand
thefocalmeaningaccount.Itis becausethistensionliesprecisely at the
heartof Owen's focalmeaninginterpretation, and because Bostock's
solutionis followingOwen'sapproach,thatI am motivated tore-exam-
ine Owen's focalmeaninginterpretation. As a result,mystudyturns
outtobe an alternative to Owen's interpretation.My firstthesisis that
thereis no radicaldevelopment involvedbetweenthesetwoaccounts
ofbeing.Theyarenotincompatible becausetheyaremakingdifferent
The
points. point thatthe multiplicityaccountmakesis thatbeingis said
inas manywaysas therearecategories, and eachofthesewaysofbeing
is autonomousin thesensethata memberin anycategoryhas a self-
containedgenus-differentia mode ofdefinition whichmakesno refer-
encetosubstance. Thepointthatthefocalmeaningaccountmakesis an
ontological one,thatis,substanceis thesubjectofotherbeings,and this
point alreadyexpressedin admittedearlyworkssuchas theCatego-
is
ries.In relationto my firstthesis,my secondthesisis thatAristotle
circumvents hisearlierobjectiontoa scienceofbeingnotbecauseofhis
change ofview on what beingis,butbecauseofhischangeofviewon
whatscienceis.
Aristotle is moreconcerned withtheontological relations

ofdifferent
beings.'Focal
connection' or'focalrelation'
might bebetter translationofproshen,especially
since
prostiis generallytranslatedas 'relation'.
I stilladopt'focalmeaning'becauseofits
currency, butwilluse theexpression proshenfromtimeto timeto minimise the
potential confusion.
208 JiyuanYu
I Owen on FocalMeaning
It mightbe helpfulto startwitha briefsummaryof Owen's main

arguments forhis thesisthatthefocalmeaningofbeingreplacesthe
multiplicityofbeingin Aristotle. proshenis 'beingrelatedto
Literally,
one' or 'towardone' and theexpressionis metaphorical. The proshen
of is in
(focalmeaning) being explained Metaphysics IV as follows:'Some
thingsare saidtobe because are
they substances, othersbecause theyare
affectionsofsubstance, othersbecausetheyarea processtowardssub-
stance,ordestruction orprivations orqualitiesofsubstance... ' (1003b6-
10).AlthoughMetaphysics IV 2 is generallyregardedas thelocusofthe
focalmeaningrelationofbeing,thetextdoes notreallysayexactlywhy
andhowthemultiplesensesoftheterm'being'arerelatedtosubstance.
As M. Ferejohn rightlypointsout,thefocalmeaninganalysisofbeing'is
presupposed but notstated inMetaphysics IV 2.'4Owenassertsbutdoes
notarguethatthisrelationship entails'onefocus,onecommonelement'.
Aimingtoclarify Owen'sposition, Ferejohn,on thebasisofan excellent
EE
discussionof 1236al8-23, explains what focal meaningis intermsof
the idea of logicalpriority (priority in definition).5
Bostockdoes not
employthe expression'focalmeaning',but he also understandsthe
primary senseofbeingas 'one commonelementin all definitions'. He
derivesthisviewfromMetaphysics VII 1,1028a34-6,whereitis explicitly
statedthatthedefinition ofsubstanceis inherent in thedefinitions of
othercategories.6
on FocalMeaningand theUnityofScience',Phronesis
'Aristotle
4 M.T.Ferejohn, 25
(1980),11
'FocalMeaning',
5 Ferejohn, n4.Thisis alsohowT.H.Irwinunderstands proshen:'Fl
is primary and thefocusbecauseotherFs includeitsdefinition in theirs'('Ho-
monymy Review
in Aristotle', ofMetaphysics 34 [1981],531,nl2). NeitherFerejohn
norIrwinaddressesthetension betweenthefocalmeaningaccountandthemulti-
accountofbeing.Ferejohn
plicity believesthatthetruth ofOwen'spositionis 'put
beyondseriousdisputebytherelatively plainstructure ofMetaphysicsTV2' ('Focal
Meaning', 117).Irwindevelops a different
interpretationofwhy a universal being
ispossibleinhisAristotle's
First (Oxford:
Principles Clarendon Press1988).I'llbriefly
comment on hispositioninnote43below.
BooksZ andH, 67-8
6 Bostock,
The associationbetweenfocalmeaningand logicalpriority is indis-

putable,althoughwe willsee thatthisassociationdoes notexhaustthe
content ofthefocalmeaningofbeing.7Forthetimebeing,ourquestion
ishowthefocalmeaningofbeing,interpreted intermsoflogicalpriority,
leads to theremovalofthedistinct sensethateachbeinghas. Owen's
claimis a strongone:
"Being"is an expression
withfocalmeaningis a claimthatstatements
aboutnon-substancescanbe reducedto- translatedinto- statements
aboutsubstances;and it seemsto be a corollaryof thistheorythat
non-substances cannothavematterorformoftheirownsincetheyare
no morethanthelogicalshadowsofsubstance.8
Butwe are nottoldby Owen how theproshenofbeingcauses other

beingsto lose theirown 'matterand form'and to be reducedto the
'logicalshadow'ofsubstance.In fact,beingremainsnota genusin the
as it is in the Organon.
Metaphysics9
ForAristotle,thingsare homonymous iftheysharethesame name
buthave differentdefinitions, and are synonymous iftheyshareboth
thesamenameandthesamedefinition (Catlal-7). makesitclearthat
He
focalmeaningis contrasted bothto homonymy and to synonymy. Al-
though Owen at one pointsuggests thatin MetaphysicsIV and VI
is 'anxiousto minimizethecontrast
Aristotle betweensynonymy and
focalmeaning',10he is carefulenoughnottocollapsefocalmeaninginto
synonymy, regarding itrather as 'thetertium However,he leaves
quid/11
7 Owen himselfrecognises thattheidea of focalmeaningand theidea of logical

are associated,buthe claimsthattheanalysisof thelogicalpriority
priority of
substance
'dependsdirectly uponrecognising of"being" ' ('Logic
thefocalmeaning
andMetaphysics',171).
8 Owen,'LogicandMetaphysics',
180
9 Metaph
III 3,998b22-7;
X 2,1053b22-3
10 Owen,'Logicand Metaphysics', 185.Aristotle does sayin oneplace(Metaph TV2,
1003bl4-15) thattheproshenis 'in a sense'(troponatina)synonymous'. One might
as is thecasewithhomonymy,
think, thereis a distinction
betweena strict
synon-
ymyanda loosesenseofsynonymy. Butthepointis notdevelopedbyAristotle. In
MetaphIV 2,1003bl4-15 he seemstobe talking inan analogicalsense.
11 Owen,'LogicandMetaphysics', 179;'Platonism', 146
210 JiyuanYu
unexplainedtheprecisedifference betweenfocalmeaningand synon-

ymy. And an
such explanationis indeeddesiredgivenhis claimthat
focalmeaningremovesthedistinct sensesofotherbeings.
Owen maintainsthathomonymy and focalmeaningare sharplyin
contrast.In fact,itis mainlyon thebasisofthisbeliefthathe assertsthat
thereis an earlierperiodin whichAristotle believesthatbeingis ho-
monymous. Consequently, thediscussionin Metaphysics IV is thought
to be new. He pointsout thatAristotle directlymentionsbeingas an
instanceofhomonymy at SE, 182bl3-27;and intheTopics, whena word
is saidinmanysenses,itis a caseofhomonymy.12 However,thecontrast
betweentheproshenandhomonymy is notas sharpas Owenbelievesit
to be. Aristotleappearsto recognizethatthereare different sortsof
He a
homonymy. distinguishescompletehomonymy in which a word
has manysenses but withnothingcommonamong them,13 froma
non-complete one in which a word has many senses,but they are related.
Thislattersense of homonymy is notincompatible withtheproshen
relation.14
Furthermore, itis equallyinconclusive tosaythatmultiplicity
is identicalwithhomonymy.15
Ifthepreciseboundarybetweenfocalmeaningand homonymy, and
thatbetweenitandsynonymy, havenotbeendrawn,theexactextension
offocalmeaninghas yetto be determined. The idea offocalmeaning
turnsoutnottobe as clearas itappears.Owenhimself is clearlyaware
167n5
13 EE 1236al8,b25-6;Metaph1060b33-4. Thistypeofhomonymy canbe exemplified
bythe word 'bank'(which completely
signifies unrelated suchas 'riverside'
things
and 'financial
institution').
14 Owenis fullyawareoftheexistence ofthedifferent usagesofhomonym, buthe
dismissesit lightlyby sayingthat'Oftenhe [Aristotle] takesno noticeof this
modificationofhomonym, treatinghomonym as thesolecomplement ofsynonymy
wheresingleexpressions areconcerned'.('TheSnaresofOntology', 73n5)Fora full
defenceofthepositionthatthereare twotypesofhomonym and a
in Aristotle
ofOwen'spositionon thisground,see WalterLeszl,Logicand
detailedcriticism
Metaphysics (Padua,Italy:Editrice
inAristotle Antenore Partsiv-v.
1970),especially
Irwinalso believesthat'focalmeaning'is an instanceof connected homonymy
('Homonymy', 523-44).Butsurprisingly,he does notquestionOwen'sthesisthat
inhisearlierperiodrecognised
Aristotle onlythatbeingsareunconnected.
15 Irwin,'Homonymy', has documented
529-30, thispoint.
thathe has notelucidatedit fully,but claimsthatAristotle

himselfis
responsiblefortheambiguity:
Aristotle
has notsolvedtheproblemofdefining focalmeaningfully
and exactlyso as to give thatidea all thephilosophicalpowerthat
he comesto claimforit: he has givenonlythenecessary, not the
conditions
sufficient, forits use. Butthere is no reasonto thinkthat
thisproblemcan havea generalanswer.Aristotle's evasionofitmay
comefromtheconviction thatanyanswerwouldbe artificial, setting
boundariesthatmustbe endlesslytoo wide or too narrowforhis
changingpurposes.16
II TopicsI 9 and Categories

4
To understand whetherthefocalmeaningofbeingreplacesthemulti-
plicityofbeing,onemightfirst ofall trytounderstand onwhatgrounds
Aristotleclaimsthatthereare as manysensesof beingsas thereare
categories.WhenAristotle lists'substance','quality','quantity','rela-
tion',and so on,itis oftennotclearwhether he is talkingaboutthemas
categories, or as extra-linguistic Indeed,
beings.17 the multiplicityof
being and the of
multiplicity categories are so closely associated that
Aristotlesimplycalls substance,quality,quantity, etc.,'categoriesof
being'.18Accordingly, if we can determine how categoriesdiffer,we
knowhowbeingsdiffer.
We are therefore led to thetwo textsin thecorpuswhichprovide
Aristotle'sfulltenmember listofcategories:Categories4,and Topics19.19
189
17 As J.L.Ackrillremarks,
'Itis carelessofhimtospeakas ifitweresubstances (and
notnamesofsubstances) thatsignify' tr.and ed.,Categories
(Ackrill, andDe Inter-
[Oxford:
pretatione OxfordUniversity Press1963],88).Bostockalso says,'One has
onlytoreada fewlinesofthis,oranyother, bookofAristotle toseethatheisutterly
carelessofourdistinctionbetweenusinga wordin thenormalway,to speakof
whatever thatwordstandsfor,andmentioning theworditself(Books Z andH,45).
18 Ai kategoriai
touontos,MetaphIX 1, 1045b28
19 Inotherplaces,thenumber is usuallyreduced,orthelistis open-endedintheform
of'so on',or'therest'.Cf.,e.g.,Metaph V 7,1017a24-7;
VII 1,28all-13.
212 JiyuanYu
Usuallythesetwotextsare viewedas presenting differentprocedures

forreachingthesame list.In bothplaces,categoriesare thoughtto be
generatedfromdifferent answersto the'Whatis it?'question,and the
maindifference betweenthemis thatin Categories
4 differentquestions
are askedabouta singlething,whilein TopicsI 9 a singlequestionis
askedaboutdifferent ButI have a different
things.20 storyto tellofthe
relationofthesetwotexts.
Letus beginwithTopicsI 9. In theTopicsscheme,theprocedurefor
arrivingat thelistofcategories
goeslikethis:
Whena manissetbefore himandhesaysthatwhatissetthere isa man
orananimal, hestates a substance;
whatitisandsignifies butwhena
white colorissetbeforehimandhesaysthatwhatissetthere iswhite
hestateswhatitis andsignifies
oris a color, a quality.... Likewise,
alsointheother cases.(103b29-35)
Aristotle thencontinues: 'eachofthesekindsofpredicates, ifeitheritbe

assertedofitself, oritsgenusbe assertedofit,signifies what something
is' (ti esti,103b36-8).Whathe is sayingseemsto be thefollowing. In
answering whatis thethingthatis showntohim,one getsa statement
such as 'This is Socrates',or 'This is white'.Then,a species-genus
hierarchy of predicateswill follow,sinceforeach of thesekindsof
predicates,'eitherit is assertedof itself,or its [speciesand] genusis
assertedofit.'Forinstance, from'Thisis Socrates',to'Socratesis a man',
and thento 'Man is an animal',and so on.In thisprocess,thepredicate
ofthelower-level predication becomesthesubjectofthehigher-level,
and the predicatesbecomemoreand morebroad in extension.The
hierarchy ends ifit reachesan ultimatepredicatewhichdoes notfall
underanyother.Iftheseriesstarts with'Socrates',theultimate predicate
is 'Substance';ifitstartswith'white',theultimate predicateis 'quality';
and so on. Eachpredicatein sucha hierarchy signifies a being,and the
ultimatepredicatewhichis a category, signifiesan ultimatetypeof
being.
To formsucha hierarchy ofpredication,thesubjectand thepredicate
mustbe in the same category.Otherwise,it is impossibleto forma
species-genus ofpredicates,
hierarchy and toreachan ultimate genus.I
79-80
and De Interpretatione,
20 Ackrill,Categories
hereafter callthistypeofpredication, inwhichbothsubject-expression

andpredicate-expression areitemsinthesamecategory, the'same-cate-
gorypredication'. Sinceeach categoryis theultimatepredicateofone
distincttypeofsame-category predication, categories aredifferent from
each otherbecause each has underneathit a different hierarchy of
same-category predication.21
Accordingto Aristotle, the'whatit is to be' (essence)of a thingis
revealedby a definition,22and thestandardformofa definition is the
genus-differentia mode.23Hence,a thing'sdistinct senseis fromitsown
definition.'White'is different
from'Socrates'becauseeachhas itsown
genus-differentia modeofdefinition. Sucha definition is expressedin
the formof same-category predication. Of the two componentsof a
definition,thegenus'is meantto indicatewhatit is, and is submitted
firstofthetermsin thedefinition.' (Top142b29)All thingswithinthe
same genusare differentiated by various differentiae,but sincetheir
genus is the same, they sharethe same generic nature. A category as a
type ofultimate genusgrants each of itssubordinate members a sense
whichall ofthemshareand whichno memberfromanyothercategory
shares.Fromherewe havean understanding ofhowcategories classify
thingsand how beings aredifferent.'What itis tobe' differsforentities
indifferent categories.24
21 TheGreekword'kategoria', fromwhichtheword'category' is fromthe

originates,
verbkatégorein ('to predicate'),and can be translated
eitheras 'predication',or
'predicate'.In contrast tothetraditionalviewthatan Aristoteliancategory is tobe
understood as a predicate,Fredeargues,onthebasisofTopics 19,thatinitstechnical
sense kategoria means 'predication'or 'kind of predication',
literally and in a
derivative sense,italso meanspredicate('Categories in Aristotle',
inhisEssaysin
Ancient Philosophy [Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press1987],32-5).My readingof
TopicsI 9 suggestshow Aristotle extendsthistermfrom'kindofpredication' to
'predicate'.
22 APoII 3,91al; 10,93b29;94all; II 3,90b3-4,
30-1;Topics15, 101b38,107a36
23 Topics, 141b25-6
139a28-31,
24 WhenAristotle says that'beingis said pollachos'
, it usuallyappliesto different
categories(cf.,MetaphIV 2,andVII 1;Physics185a21;DA 410al3;EN 1096a24).The
same sentence, however,can also applyto different memberswithinthesame
category,suchas threshold andice(botharemembers ofthesamecategory: Metaph
VIII 2, 1042b26-1043all).As a resultthesentence'beingis said pollachos, as is
well-known, containswhatG.B.Matthews callsa 'sense-kindconfusion'('Senses
214 JiyuanYu
Now letus proceedtothelistofcategories inCategories 4. Itis usually

thoughtthatthereis a singleprocedurehereto generatethe list of
categories, thatis,toaskmanyquestionsaboutthesamething.Thetext
however,does notreallypresentsucha procedure.InsteadAris-
itself,
totlesimplysays:To givea roughidea,examplesofsubstanceareman,
horse;ofquantity: four-foot, five-foot; ofqualification: white,grammati-
cal; of a relative:
double,half,larger; of where: in the Lyceum,in the
marketplace; ... ' (2a3-6).It is fromtheseexamplesthatwe are able to
inferthathe is askingmanyquestionsaboutthesamesubject,and this
samesubjectmustbe a memberwithinthecategory ofsubstance, such
as a person,or a person-like For
entity. only such a subject can at the
sametimepossessattributions suchas 'grammatical', 'in theLyceum',
'sitting',and so forth.Expressedin theformofpredication 'S is P', the
ideainCategories 4 is that'S' mustbe anitemofsubstance, while'P' could
be a member ofanycategory. I wouldliketocallthisformofpredication
the'substance-subject predication'.
Substance-subject predication is clearlydifferentfromsame-category
predication which operates in Topics I 9. Forin same-category predica-
tion(S isP),S canbe a member ofanycategory, notconfined tosubstance,
but P mustbe S's own speciesor genusin thesame category.More
important, same-category predicationand substance-subject predica-
tionarenotparallelregarding category-generation. Whereassame-cate-
gorypredication providesus withan understanding ofwhycategories
differ, substance-subject predicationindicatesthatall predicatesare
relatedto one subject,butdoes notexplainhow and whythesepredi-
catesaredifferent as categories. No reasonis offered inCategories 4 as to
and Kinds',Journal ofPhilosophy69 [1972]149-157).Thesentence canbe translated

as either(1) 'beingis saidinmanysenses', or(2) 'beingis saidinmanykinds'. They
aredifferent becausemanykindsofbeingcan sharea singlemeaningorsenseof
being.Although a detaileddiscussionis outofplacehere,I wouldliketosuggest
thattoclarify thisconfusion,we havetodistinguish thedifferentcircumstances in
whichthisphraseis used. Whenit appliesto different categories,it meansthat
'being'is saidinmany'senses',sinceitemsfromdifferent havedifferent
categories
definitions.Thesameword'being'has a different meaningindifferent categories.
On thisbasis,Aristotle cancertainlyclaimthatthereis no suchgenusas beingthat
standsaboveall categories. In contrast,
whenthesentence 'beingis saidpollachos'
is appliedtodifferent members withinthesamecategory, shouldbe translatedas
'beingissaidinmanykinds',becauseitemswithin thesamecategory sharethesame
genus.
whya categorycan classifydifferent beings.25 Whatsubstance-subject

predication itselfindicatesis thatdifferent thingsare all relatedtosub-
stance.Itdoes notindicatehow thesethingsdiffer as categories.
Followingthis,I wouldliketoproposethatCategories 4 isnotintended
toexplaincategorial difference.
Itsimply'givesa roughidea',i.e.,tolist
a fewinstancesofeachofthesecategories ratherthanexplaining what
eachofthemis.Itindicates howothercategories arerelatedtosubstance,
ratherthanwhyeach categorycountsas a category.By doingthis,it
pavesthewayforCategories 5 whichprovidesa detailedpictureofhow
different categoriesare relatedto the primarysubject.It seems that
Aristotle firstdetermines thetypesand numbersof categoriesin the
Topics I 9, and then proposesthatthesecategories are predicatedofone
andthesamesubjectinCategories 4. Itis thejoboftheTopics19 tospecify
categorial difference.
Takenthisway,TopicsI 9 and Categories 4 have different functions.
Butthereis nothing inconsistentbetweenthesetwotexts.WhileCatego-
ries4 musthave presupposedthecategorialdifference establishedin
Topics I 9, what 4
Categories indicates must already impliedin Topics
be
19. First,inTopics19,Aristotle says that the initialstepinthegeneration
ofa category is thatdifferentthings such as a coloror a relationareset
beforea personand he is askedto answer'whatis it' foreachofthem.
Yetitis clearthatcolorcannotbe shownindependently ofthesubstance
ofwhichitis thecolor,and a relation cannotbe shownindependently of
thesubstances ofwhichitis therelation. Itisunlikely thatwhenAristotle
presentshiscase in TopicsI 9, he is ignorant oftherelationofnon-sub-
stancecategories tosubstance. Whathe mustbe doingis showingwhat
25 In APrI 37,49a6-8Aristotle says thatthephrase'thisbelongsto that''mustbe

understood inas manysensesas therearedifferent categories'. some
Accordingly,
commentators arguethatsincedifferent formsof substance-subject predication,
suchas 'Socratesis white'and 'Socratesis fivefeettall',canbe paraphrased as 'X
belongsto somesubstance', we mustsupposethattheyintroduce different
cate-
gorialrelationships,andtheitemsineachdifferent category aredifferently
related
to thesubstances to whichtheybelong(Cf.,Owen,'TheSnaresofOntology', 82,
nl4;C. Kirwan, Aristotle:
Metaphysics IV,V,VI2nd.edn.,[Oxford: Oxford University
Press1993],142).Fora rejectionofthisexplanation, seeBostock (BookZ andH,46-7).
I agreewithBostock forthereasonthattosaythat'tobelongto'hasas manysenses
as categories,is notto say that'to belongto' causescategorialdifference.
On the
contrary,itseemsthatwe havetounderstand first
howcategories differbeforewe
understand why'belongto'inthesepredications has different
senses.
216 JiyuanYu
itis foreachcategorytobe, isolatedin abstract

analysis,and he leaves
howthesecategories
thejob ofexplaining arerelatedtosubstancetothe
Categories.
Second,in theTopicsI 9, Aristotle, on theone hand,claimsthateach
category signifies a 'whatitis' (tiesti,103b27-9),26and,on theother,the
firstcategory, substance,is also called'whatit is' (103b23,b27).Thus,
'whatit is' appearsto have a broadand a narrowuse. The broaduse
appliestoeverycategory, and a narroworrestricted use appliesonlyto
substanceandevenservesas a labelforsubstance. Thiscertainly implies
thatsubstancehas a privileged positionamongbeings.
The pictureof therelationbetweenTopicsI 9 and Categories 4 that
emerges from theabove if
discussion, accurate, undermines significantly
Owen's thesisthatthe focalmeaningaccountof being replacesthe
multiplicity accountofbeing.Our readingof TopicsI 9 showsthatit
explainshow categoriesdiffer, and providesa multiplicity accountof
being.Substance-subject in
predication Categories 4, on the otherhand,
showsthatall otherthingsarerelatedto substance.Comparethiswith
theexplanation oftheproshenbeinginMetaphysics IV: 'Somethingsare
saidtobe becausetheyaresubstances, othersbecausetheyareaffections
ofsubstance, othersbecausetheyare a processtowardssubstance,... '
(1003b6-10). Itshouldnotbe difficult tosee thatwhatsubstance-subject
predication indicatesis precisely proshenrelationofotherbeingsto
a
substance.27Ifthisiscorrect,we shouldbe abletosaythatintheCategories
thereis an impliedfocalmeaningaccountof being.Thus,the focal
meaningof beingintroducedin Metaphysics IV 2 is not new. It also
becomesproblematic to say thatthereis one earlierperiodin which
Aristotlebelievesthatvarioussensesofbeingarenotconnected.28
26 AlthoughI am notconvinced,
it shouldbe mentioned thatthereis a different
oftiestiin theplaceofthefirstcategory
oftheoccurrence
explanation in Frede,
Essays,36ff.
27 The proshenstructure ofbeingin MetaphysicsIV, however,containsmorethan
beings.I discussthispointinsectionV ofthisessay.
categorial
28 WhenOwenclaimsthattheproshenisa newdeviceinMetaphysics IV 1-2,heisaware
basedon varioustextualevidence.He
thathe has to meeta numberofobjections
concedesthattheproshenappearsoris impliedin EE and theTopics(bothworks
Owenbelievestobelongtotheearlierstage).However,regarding thepresenceof
theproshenintheTopics, thatAristotle
hemaintains doesnot'attachanyimportance
toit'('LogicandMetaphysics7,
174).RegardingitspresenceinEE,he insiststhatit
Furthermore, sinceTopicsI 9 and Categories 4 are complementary

ratherthanincompatible, wehavegoodreasonstodoubtthatthereisany
real tensionor incompatibility betweenthefocalmeaningaccountof
beingand themultiplicity account.Thatmeanstheintroduction ofthe
prosheninMetaphysics IV 2 cannotbe as revolutionaryas Owenclaimsit
19 shows,members
tobe.If,as Topics fromdifferent havetheir
categories
ownessence-stating definition inthegenus-differentia
mode,we cansee
whythelogicalpriority doesnotcancelthedistinctsenseofeachnon-sub-
stancecategory. Whenwe define'white',forinstance, we say'Whiteis a
color'.Theidea oflogicalpriority suggeststhateach definition
ofother
categoriescontains thatofsubstance, butthis
does notentailthat
different
beingsindifferent categories losetheirowngenus-differentiadefinition.
Ill FocalMeaningand thePriorities

ofSubstance
Earlierit was mentionedthatthefocalmeaningofbeingis not fully

discussedinMetaphysics IV 2 and appearstohavepresupposeddiscus-
sionscarriedoutelsewhere. Sincewhatitindicatesis thatallotherthings
are relatedto substance, we shouldseeka fullunderstanding ofitby
discussing the textsin which therelationbetween other categories and
substance is workedout.Followingthislineofthinking, Categoriesand
5
Metaphysics VII 1 are clearlythemost crucialtextsto helpus to under-
standwhattheproshenmeans,althoughtheexpression doesnotappear
directlyin them. Since these two textshave beenintensively discussed,
I tendonlytomaketwopointscrucially tomythesis.
relevant
Thefirst pointis thatifthetwotextsarethegroundsforestablishing
an understanding ofthefocalmeaningofbeing,theprevalentunder-
standing of thefocal meaningofbeingin termsof theidea of logical
appliesonlyto'friendship',but'hasnotseenitsapplication tosuchwhollygeneral
expressionsas "being"or"good"' (ibid.,169).However,intheCategories, although
theproshenisnotapplieddirectly totheterm'being',itisappliedtosomecategories,
forinstance,'quantity'at 5a38-blO.In thefaceofthis,Owen stillinsiststhatthis
'focalmeaning'is 'notinthatlogicalordering ofdifferent and different
categories
sensesof"being"whichliesat therootoftheargument inMetaphysics IV (ibid.,
175).ButwhatCategories 5 arguesforisprecisely
thepriority ofsubstanceoverother
Again,Oweninsiststhat'thispriority
categories. wasofan olderAcademicvintage
whichdidnotinvolvefocalmeaning'(ibid.,178).Thisis hardlyconvincing. As we
willseeshortly,thegroundforestablishing thispriorityinCategories
5 is consistent
withthatinMetaphysics VII 1 and IV 2.
218 JiyuanYu
priority seemstobe toonarrow.So faras therelation betweensubstance

and othercategoriesis concerned, Aristotle arguesin Categories 5 that
everything else - includingsecondarysubstancesas well as non-sub-
stancecategories- is subjectedto primarysubstances,and 'If the
primary substancesdid notexistitwouldbe impossibleforanyofthe
otherthingstoexist'(2b5-6;cf.2bl5-17,2b37-8).
The relationofothercategories withsubstanceis further elaborated
inMetaphysics VII I.29Othercategories, according to VII 1, cannot exist
of
independent substance, because substance 'underlies' them (1028al3-
20). The expressionof anynon-substance categorywill alwaysimply
somereference to substance(thatis,substance-subject predication). To
say that is a
something qualityimplies that it is a quality of some
substance, yetto say thata substanceis does notimplyanything about
othercategories. Accordingly, 'It is invirtue of this category that each of
theothersis. Therefore thatwhichis primarily and is simply(notis
something) mustbe substance7 (1028a30-l).
BothCategories 5 andMetaphysics VII 1 asserttheprimacy ofsubstance.
Metaphysics VII 1,however,movesfurther to specifythatthisprimacy
canbe understood inthreeways.Thefirst is that'oftheothercategories
nonecanexistseparately, butonlysubstance'(1028a34-5). Thisisusually
callednaturalpriority, although in VII 1 Aristotle strangely refers itto
thepriority 'in time'.The secondis thepriority in definition, and the
thirdis thepriority inknowledgewhichmeansthat'we knoweachthing
mostfully, whenwe knowwhatitis,e.g.,whata manis orwhatfireis,
ratherthanwhenwe knowitsquality, quantity, orwhereitis' (1028bl-3).
Sincelogicalpriority is onetypeofprimacy ofsubstance, we wonder
whytheproshenofbeingcanbe limitedtothistypeofpriority. Thereis
no signin Metaphysics VII 1 thatlogicalpriority is independent ofthe
othertwopriorities. The structure ofVII 1 showsthatitis thesethree
priorities togetherthatexplainthe primacyof substanceover other
29 MetaphysicsVII 1 dealsexclusivelywiththerelation betweensubstance and other

Thedistinction
categories. betweenprimary substance
andsecondary substance in
5 disappears,
Categories and thetieof'beingin' disappearsas well.InMetaphysics,
thetieof'said of whichis used to connectprimary and secondary substances in
5 is appliedtotherelation
Categories betweenothercategories andsubstance, as the
standarddefinitionofsubstancebecomes'thatwhichis notpredicated ofa subject,
butofwhichall elseis predicated' 1029a8-9).
(cf.,e.g.,Metaph
categories.Hence,itseemsmorereasonableto understand theproshen

ofbeingin termsofthesethreepriorities as well.Itmightbe helpfulto
recallthattheproshenrelationofbeing,althoughtranslated as 'focal
meaning',is notmainlya relationoflinguistic terms, buta relationof
extra-linguisticthings.It is truethatin describing otherproshenterms
suchas 'friendship',Aristotle emphasizestheideaoflogicalpriority. But
thereis a crucialdifference betweentheproshenofbeingand otherthe
proshenterms.For otherterms,no ontologicalrelationis involved
betweentherelataand theircentralfocus.Allmedicalthingsarerelated
to'medicine',buttheyarenotontologically dependent onit.Yetbetween
otherbeingsand theircentralfocus,substance,the key issue is an
ontological one,i.e.,withoutsubstance, nothing elsecan exist.
The secondpointis thatCategories 5 and Metaphysics VII 1 provide
hardtextualevidenceformyview thatthefocalmeaningaccountof
beingdoes notdo awaywiththedistinct senseofbeingthateachofthe
othercategorieshas. In Categories 5 Aristotledistinguishes between
essentialpredicates andaccidental predicates. Other categories canonly
be accidentalpredicatesof substancebecauseonlytheirnames(more
properly, theiradjectiveforms), butnottheirdefinitions, arepredicated
ofsubstance.We say 'Socratesis white',butnot'Socratesis a kindof
color'.Thisdistinction suggeststhata non-substantial category has its
own definition. In Metaphysics VII 1 Aristotle realizesthathis strong
argument abouttheprimacy ofsubstancemightlead peopletoquestion
thedistinctsenseofeachofotherbeings:'So onemightraisethequestion
whether"towalk"and "tobe healthy"and to "sit"signify in eachcase
that
something is, and in
similarly any other case of thissort'
(1028a20-2).
AlthoughAristotledoes not answerthe questiondirectly, he states
shortly afterthis passage that 'we know each ofthesepredicatesalso,
onlywhenwe knowwhatthe quantityor thequalityis' (1028bl-2).
Accordingly, eachnon-substance category is stillregardedas havingits
own 'what-it-is'.
IV Beings:PerSe and PerAccidens
Substanceis the subject,and otherbeingsare its attributes. In this

otherbeingsare accidentalbeingsor peraccidens
relation, beings(kata
sumbebëkos).However,Aristotleclaimsthatall categorialbeingsare
essentialbeingsorpersebeings(kathhaiito, MetaphV 7, 1017a23).How
can a non-substance being,as an accident
to substance, stillbe a perse
being? How can a beingbe botha se
per being and a peraccidens being?
220 JiyuanYu
To answerthis,we havetounderstand inwhichsensea beingis said

tobe perse,and inwhichsenseitis not.ThetermperseinAristotle turns
outtobe onewhichitself'is saidinmanyways'.InAPo14,Aristotle lists
foursensesinwhicha thingcanbe saidtobe perse.30 Ofthese,thesecond
sense(73a38-b4)is abouttheidionproperties and thefourth (73blO-16)
is abouta thing'snaturalresult.Whatinterests us herearethefirst and
thethirdsenses.
According to thefirstsense,one thingbelongsto anotherperse 'ifit
belongs to itinwhatitis- e.g.,linetotriangle andpointtoline(fortheir
substancedependson theseand theybelongin theaccountwhichsays
whattheyare)' (73a35-8).Thisis tosay,XbelongspersetoY ifitis inY's
essenceordefinition. A speciesorgenusispersetoitssub-levelmembers,
foritis intheirdefinitions. Aristotle furtherbelievesthatifX is perseY,
Y is also perseX (cf.MetaphV 18,1022a27-8).
The thirdsenseis that,'Thingswhichare notsaid ofan underlying
subjectI call thingsperse,and thosewhichare said ofan underlying
subjectI callaccidents'(73b4-10). X is perseifitis notsaid ofsomeother
subject.Accordingly, substance is theonlybeingperse,and all non-sub-
stancebeingsare 'accidental'to substance,on thegroundsthatwhile
substanceis predicated ofnothing further,'thethingsthatdo notsignify
a substancemustbe predicatedofsomeunderlying subject.'31
On thebasisofthisclassification ofthesensesofperse,itis clearthat
when Aristotlesays thereare as manycategoriesas thereare perse
beings,and thatdifferent predications signifydifferentpersebeings,he
is adoptingthefirstsense.Thissenseofperse is clearlyrelatedto the
discussionofTopicsI 9, accordingtowhicheverysame-category predi-
cationis a definitional statement, and explicateswhat a beingis. A
categoryis an ultimategenusimpliedin thedefinition of each of its
subordinate members, andholdstrueandnecessarily ofall andonlythe
members ofitstype.Itis thusa persebeing.Thissenseofperseis inline
withthemultiplicity accountofbeing.
In contrast, thethirdsenseofperse,accordingtowhichsubstanceis
theonlyperse being,whereasothercategories are accidentalbeings,is
consistent withthepicturethatsubstance-subject predication in Catego-
alsoinMetaph
30 Allofthemarecontained aboutthetermper
V 18,whichis an entry
se.
31 APo 83a32; cf.,also 83b25ff..
ries4-5 indicates.Everynon-substance categoryis predicatedof sub-

stance,whilesubstanceis notpredicated ofanything Itis inthis
further.
sensethatthecontrast betweensubstanceand non-substance categories
becomesa contrast betweenperse beingand peraccidens being,or a
contrast betweenbeingsimpliciter (haplõs)and beingsomething(ti).32
Thissenseofperseis inlinewiththefocalmeaningaccountofbeing.
Thus,ifwe putTopics19 and Categories 4 together,putsenses(1) and
(3) together,theresultis that,whilesubstanceis alwaysa persebeing,
othercategoriesare bothperse beings(in sense [1]),and peraccidens
beings(insense[3]).Thedoublerolesofnon-substances arenotincom-
patible,but are relative
to different
senses of perse.Thisfurther proves
thatthemultiplicity accountofbeingand thefocalmeaningofbeingare
notin conflict but are revealingthedifferent characteristics
ofbeing.
Together theymake clearthedouble rolesof non-substantialbeings,and
a
provide completepicture of Aristotle'stheory being.It is in the
of
combination ofthesetwoaccountsthatwe understand whytheproshen
relationofbeingis neither nor
homonymous synonymous. Beingsare
notsynonymous becauseeachbeinghasitsowngenus-differentia mode
ofdefinition,and theyarenothomonymous becauseamongthemthere
arethreetypesofpriorities ofsubstanceoverothercategories.
V FocalMeaningand Potential/
ActualBeing
So far,in ourdiscussionoftheproshenstructure ofbeing,all theitems

A carefulreadingof
thatare relatedto substanceare othercategories.
thepassageinMetaphysics IV 2, wherethestructureis illustrated,
sug-
gestssomething different.
Let us lookat again:
Therearemanysensesin whicha thingmaybe said to "be",butthey
are relatedto one centralpoint,one definite kindof thing... Some
thingsare said tobe because theyare substances,othersbecausethey
areaffections ofsubstance,othersbecausetheyarea processtowards
substance, or destructions
or privations or qualitiesof substance, or
or
productive generative of substance,or ofthings which are relative
tosubstance, ornegationsofsomeofthesethingsorofsubstance itself.
(1003a32-bl0)
32 APo 83bl8-25,90al0ff;SE 167alff;Metaph1028a29-31
222 JiyuanYu
Here,thingsthatare said to be prosheninclude,in additionto other

categories, process,generation, destruction, etc.whicharenoton thelist
oftencategories. Hence,in IV 2 theproshenstructure goesbeyondthe
relation betweennon-substance categories tosubstance.
To listchangeand motion,in additionto categories, is certainlynot
to
unique Metaphysics IV 2. In EE, 1217b28-9, for instance, afterlisting
categorial beings,Aristotle mentionsthat'some ofit consistsin being
changedand in changing'.In Metaphysics XII 5, 1070al-3,we readthat
'Allthings havethesamecauses,because,without substances, affections
and movements do notexist'.However,itis inMetaphysics IV thatthese
otheritemsaresaid tobe proshentosubstance.How do we makesense
ofthisenlargedproshenstructure ofbeing?
Earlierwe discussedthatthephrase'beingis said in manyways'
refers to (1) categorial beings,and (2) beingswithinthesamecategory.
Butthereis a thirdcasetowhichthisphrasecanbe applied.Aristotle has
a four-fold divisionofbeing:accidental, categorial, true/false,and po-
tential/actual beings.33
In thisdivision,'accidentalbeing'(also translated as 'coincident be-
ings') does not refer to the non-substance categories(which in this list
to or
belong categorialbeings, per beings). se What is put under this
headinginAristotle is confusing. InMetaphysics V 7,'thejustis artistic',
'themanis musical','theartistic is a man' and thelikeare included.It
seems thataccidentalbeingrefersto accidentalpredication, and the
accidentalcomposite.34 In Metaphysics VI 2-3,accidentalbeingis identi-
fiedwiththecontingent happening, incontrast towhathappensalways
orforthemostpart.Itis inthelattersenseofaccidental beingthatis said
nottobe theobjectofknowledgeand shouldbe dismissed.True/false
beingis briefly discussedin VI 4 (and againIX 10),and Aristotle also
dismissesiton thegroundthatitis 'someaffection ofthought', and is
notan objectiveclassofbeing(1028a2-3).
Whatis potential /actualbeing?The conceptions ofpotentiality and
actuality are discussed in Metaphysics VIII and IX. A detailed discussion
willbe outofplacehere.Forourpresentpurpose,itshouldbe sufficient
to mentionthatthebasic meaningsof potentiality and actualityare
33 MetaphV 7, VI 2, 1026a34-b3,and IX 10, 1051a33-b2

34 For a helpfuldiscussion oftheconfusingremarksin Metaphysics
V 7 on 'accidental
beings',see Bostock,BookZ and H, 48ff.
associatedwithmotion.All potentialities in
'are called potentialities
reference to one primary kind,whichis thestarting-point ofchangein
anotherthingor in thethingitselfqua other7(1046al0-ll). Similarly,
'actualityin the strictsense is thoughtto be identicalwithmotion'
(1047a31-2).Given this,we tendto believethatmotion,generation,
destruction, etc.,thatareincludedintheproshenstructure areprecisely
potential/actualbeings.
Why,then,is thepotential /actualbeingalsoproshentosubstance? In
PhysicsIII 1,we read:
Thereisnosuchthing
as motion overandabovethethings. Itisalways
withrespecttosubstanceor quantity quality placethat
to or to or to
whatchanges Butitisimpossible,
change. asweassert,
tofindanything
common tothesewhichis neither"this"norquantity
norquality nor
anyoftheother Henceneither
predicates. willmotion
andchange have
overandabovethethings
tosomething
reference mentioned; forthere
isnothingoverandabovethem. (200b32-201a3)
Accordingly, potential/actualbeingsare thepotentiality and actuality

of each of thesecategorialbeings.Potentiality and actualitymustbe
potentiality ofsomecategories
and actuality being.Potential beingand
actualbeingarenotseparateentities besidescategorial beingswhichare
thebasic structuralcomponents ofreality,but are dynamicaspectsof
eachcategorialbeing. Ifthisis thecase, withoutcategorialbeing,poten-
tial/actualbeingis notgrounded.
We have shownthatthe proshenof categorialbeing means that
substanceunderliesothercategories, althougheachofthemmaintains
sense.Without
itsdistinct substance, no othercategorial beingcanexist.
By extension,without substance, therewillbe no potentialityoractuality
ofothercategories.Without substance, therewillsurelybenosubstantial
potentialityandactuality.Movement, generation,etc.,are,likenon-sub-
stancecategories,subjectedto substance.This explainswhy poten-
beingis proshentosubstanceas well.Thisjustifies
tial/actual thatinthe
centralbooksoftheMetaphysics, Aristotle's of
study being focuseson
substanceratherthanon othercategories, focuseson substantial poten-
and actuality
tiality ratherthanpotentiality and actuality ofothercate-
gories.35The proshenrelationof potential /actualbeingto substance
35 Forfurther ofthedistinction
discussion betweencategorial
beingandpotential
/ac-
224 JiyuanYu
provesthethesisofthispaperthatthefocalmeaningaccountof
further
being an ontologicalone to theeffect
is thatsubstanceis thesubjectof
otherbeings.
VI The ScienceofBeing
In thisfinalsection,we discussOwen's othermajorclaim thatthe

introduction ofthefocalmeaninganalysisofbeingin Metaphysics IV 2
enablesAristotle toalterhisearlierviewthata universalscienceofbeing
is impossible.It is truethatAristotle offeredus twoseemingly contra-
dictory views the ofa
regarding possibility unitary science
of being.At
EE 1217b25-36 we read: 'For "being",as we have dividedit in other
works,signifies now whata thingis,now quality,now quantity, now
time,and againsomeofitconsistsinbeingchangedand inchanging...
As then"being"is notoneinall thatwe havejustmentioned, so neither
is "good";noris thereonescienceeitherof"being"orofthegood/This
passageis sharplyin contrast to theannouncement ofMetaphysicsIV 1
that'Thereis a sciencewhichinvestigates beingas beingand theattrib-
uteswhichbelongtothisinvirtueofitsownnature'(1003a23-4).
In Owen's interpretation, thesetwo views are contradictory. The
negativeattitude belongstoAristotle's earlierthoughtwhenhe was an
anti-Platonist, whereasthepositiveattitudecomesat Aristotle's later
stage which 'looks more like a revivalofsympathy withPlato'saims.'36
Owen'sreasonforclaimingthisis thatinhisearlierworksAristotle only
believesthat'being'is a (complete)homonymy withoutanysystematic
connection in itsdifferentsenses,whereasthe'focalmeaning'inMeta-
physics IV 1-2 unifiesthem intoa systematic and thus
subject-matter,
makesa universalsciencepossible.37 Now we have demonstrated that
thereis no earlierstage in whichAristotlebelievesthatbeing is a
(complete)homonymy, and thattheproshenstructure has been de-
scribedintheOrganon and otherearlierworks,thereis no tensionat all
playsinMetaphysics
tualbeingand oftherolethatthisdistinction VII-IX,see my
Two ConceptionsofHylomorphism inMetaphysics
VII-IX',Oxford inAncient
Studies
15(1997)119-145.
Philosophy
164
178
betweenthemultiplicity accountandthefocalmeaningaccountofbeing.
Hence,itis unlikelytobe thecase,as Owen claims,thatfocalmeaning
is responsible fora changeofAristotle's viewonthescienceofbeing.We
pointedout in the last sectionthatin Metaphysics IV 2 the proshen
structure ofbeingincludespotential /actualbeingas wellas categorial
being.But we also showed thatthisexpansiononlymeans thatthe
scienceofbeingquabeingcoversmorethancategorial beings,butdoes
notalterthenatureoftheproshen.
In place ofOwen's interpretation, I would liketo suggestthatAris-
totle'sdifferent attitudestowardsthescienceofbeingresultfromthe
changeofhisviewofwhatcountsas a 'science'(epistëraê). Thischange,
is an
nonetheless, expansion of the originalview rather than a replace-
ment.
In theOrganon, EE, and some otherworks,Aristotle claimsthat'a
singlescienceis one whose domainis a singlegenus' (APo 87a38;cf.
74b24-6;76all-12). Let us call it 'the single-genus' notionof science.
Accordingto thisnotion,a disciplinemustsatisfytwo conditionsin
ordertobe a 'science'.In additiontobeingconcerned withonegenus,it
mustalsobe demonstrative. Modeledonmathematics andespeciallyon
geometry, Aristotle claimsthat a science should startfrom a smallsetof
axiomaticfirstprincipleswhichare self-evident (e.g.,Top100a30-b21;
APo6b23-4),and graspedbynous('intellect', e.g.,Metaph1005b5-17; EN
1140b31-41a8; 1143a35-b3). It then proceeds to a larger set of theorems
by deduction.These two conditionsin the 'single-genus'notionof
scienceareconnected. Fordemonstration canonlybe conductedwithin
a genusandcannotpassfromonegenustoanother. 'Norcanthetheorem
ofanyonesciencebe demonstrated by means ofanother science,unless
thesetheorems arerelatedas subordinate to superior'(APo75b8-16;cf.
also 76a22;SE 172a36-8).
InMetaphysics IV 2,thestudyofbeingis alsocalled'science',although
beingis nota genus,and onlyhas a focalmeaningstructure. Thisis
clearlya departurefromthe'single-genus' notionofscience.Aristotle
justifieshispositionas follows:'Fornotonly(ougarmonon) in thecase
ofthingswhichhaveonecommonnotiondoes theinvestigation belong
to one science,butalso (aliakai)in thecase ofthingswhichare said of
onenature(prosmian... phusin)'(1003bl2-14). The'notonly... butalso'
structure in thissentencesuggeststhatthereare twocases in whicha
scienceis possible.The firsthalfof thesentenceclearlyrefersto the
'single-genus' notionof scienceof thePosterior Analytics. If all things
mustbe withina genus,thenamethatappliesto all ofthemmustbe a
synonym. ButnowAristotle is sayingthattheword'science'applies'not
226 JiyuanYu
only'to a studywhichis abouta singlegenus,'butalso' to a studythe

subject-matter ofwhichis unifiedby thefocalmeaningstructure. This
passage clearlysoundslikea defenseforcallingthestudyofbeinga
'science'.Aristotle is expandinghis conception ofscience.I calledthis
extendedpartthe'focalmeaning'notionofscience.
OnceAristotle announcestheestablishment ofthescienceofbeing,he
immediately adds a disclaimer: 'Now thisis not thesameas anyofthe
so-calledspecialsciences;fornoneoftheseothersdeals generally with
as
being being.They cutoff a of and
part being investigate theattribute of
thispart'(1003a23-5). Thestandardinterpretation ofthispassageis that
Aristotle is heredrawinga linebetweentheuniversalmetaphysics and
theparticular (natural)sciences.In myreading,therealissuehereis a
contrast betweentwodifferent notionsofscience.According tothe'sin-
gle-genus' notion of science, all sciences are or
special departmental, for
eachisconcerned witha genus(butthefirst principles ofeach science are
universal withinthatgenus).Ithasneverbeentheirjob tostudybeingin
general.To declaretheestablishment ofa scienceofbeinginMetaphysics
IV doesnotchangethestatusof'single-genus' sciences.Incomparing this
scienceofbeing withother sciences, Aristotle is actuallyemphasizing the
factthatwhereasall otherinvestigations areconcerned withone single
genus,thisstudyisnot.He isreminding hisaudiencethatthecondition of
a singlegenusisnolongernecessary. Thetwonotionsmentioned shortly
afterward, at 1003bl2-14, echothiscomparison and explainit.In fact,in
Metaphysics III Aristotlerefers the investigation he is conducting as 'the
sciencewhichwe areseeking'(995a24).Andofvariouspuzzlesabout'the
sciencewhichwe areseeking', manyareaboutthescopeandthesubject-
matter ofthisscience(995b4-27).
WhenAristotleclaimsthatthe studyof beingcan also be called
'science'accordingto the'focalmeaning'notion,he notonlyno longer
insistson therequirement thata sciencemustbe abouta genus,butalso
no longerdemandsthata sciencehas tobe demonstrative. Thestudyof
being is called 'science',but is not demonstrative. For,'thereis no
demonstration ofsubstanceand essence,butsomeotherwayofreveal-
ingit.'(VI 1,1025014-15, cf.also III 2,997a26-32; 1006a5-ll)Demonstra-
tionoccursamongmembersof thesame genus.Sincebeingsare not
withina singlegenus,thestudyofthemcannotbe demonstrative.38
reasonwhythescienceofbeingcannotbe demonstrative:
38 Irwinpointsoutanother
Now inMetaphysics IV thestudyofbeingcanbe called'science',but

notbecausethisdisciplinesatisfies thetwoconditions ofthe'single-ge-
nus'notionofscience.Accordingly, I am inclinedtothinkthatAristotle
deniesthepossibility ofa scienceofbeingin hisearlierworksbecause
he maintainsthe'single-genus' notionof sciencein Posterior Analytics
according to which a science has to be a single-genus relatedand a
demonstrative discipline.39Now,inMetaphysics IV thestudyofbeingis
called'science',notbecausethisstudysatisfies the'single-genus' notion,
but because Aristotledepartsfromthatnotion.In theMetaphysics, a
study does not have tobe about a genus and demonstrative in orderto
be called'science'.Itis theconception ofscience,notthesubject-matter
of the science,thatis at issue in Aristotle'stwo conflicting attitudes
towards thescience of being.
In ourdiscussionoftherelationbetweenTopicsI 9 and Categories 4,
we have shownthatthefocalmeaningstructure ofbeinghas already
effectivelybeenpresented intheOrganon. Followingthisview,we infer
thatthesubject-matter ofthescienceofbeingshouldhavebeenpresent
thereas well,although becauseofthe'single-genus' notionofbeing,the
study in thisareacannot be called'science'.
WhenAristotle holdsonlythe'single-genus notion'ofscienceinthe
Organon, he does not deny thatthere is a or
study discipline whichcovers
morethanonegenusordeals with inter-category issues.He onlyclaims
thatsuch a studycannotbe called 'science',and insteadhe calls it
'dialectic'.
Dialectic,according tohim,isnotconcerned witha genus,and
is notdemonstrative. Itdealswithmaterialthatis commonorrelevant,
toall thedepartmental sciencesand all fieldsofdiscourse.40 Dialectic'is
notin thisway concernedwithanydetermined setofthings, notwith
anyone genus'(APo77a32-3).
mustarguethattheaxiomsaretrue(1005a29-b2),
'Thescienceofbeing,therefore,
and notsimplytakethemforgranted; and sincetheyarefirst principles,itcannot
demonstrated them.If,then,firstphilosophyis to fulfilits task,it cannotbe
demonstrative'{First 173).
Principles,
39 Similarly,itisonthegroundthatgoodisnota genusthatAristotledeniesthatthere
is a singlescienceofgood(EN I 6,1096al9ff;
EE I 8,1217b25ff).
40 APo77a26-31; cf.alsoRh1355b8.
SE 172all-15;Topics101a36-b4;
228 JiyuanYu
Thisdescription ofdialecticsoundsverysimilartothatofthescience
ofbeingin Metaphysics IV 2. As a matteroffact,IV 2 explicitly claims
dialecticians,likephilosophers, deal withthatwhichis commonto all
things(1004bl9-20), and belongto thesamegenusas thephilosophers
(b22). Ifthe discussions in theOrganon whichdo notbelongtoanyone
genus are considered the
dialectical, concerns ofdialecticand thatofthe
scienceofbeingremarkably overlap. The science ofbeingin theMeta-
physics in
examinesbeingswhicharesaid manywaysbutareall related
to substance;yet the Topicsand the Categories have alreadyoffered
variousdiscussionsof such a structure of being,althoughthecorre-
spondingtheories intheMetaphysics aremoresophisticated. Moreover,
as the scienceof being deals withthe firstprinciplesof deduction
(1005b7),dialecticis said to be concernedwith'commonrulesin the
refutation anddeduction'(SE 170a35;Rh1358a2-32). Furthermore, as the
scienceofbeingdiscussescontrary termssuchas same and other,like
and unlike,priorand posterior, etc. (Metaph1004b30-4, 1005al5-16),
thesearealreadysubjectsofdialectic(995bl8-25). AtMetaph1004a31-b4,
Aristotleeven asks if the investigation of all thesethingsis not the
function ofthephilosopher, whosefunction is it?Sincehe has already
said thatthesequestionsbelongto dialecticians, we have reasonsto
believethatitis dialecticthatis takenoverbythephilosopher. He shifts
hisnotionof'philosophy'.41
Metaphysics IV 2 does distinguish betweendialecticand philosophy,
butthedistinction is abouttheirrespective goalsratherthanaboutthe
subject-matter. 'Dialecticis merelycriticalwherephilosophyclaimsto
know'(1004b25-6). Thiscontrast, however, has tobe qualified.Dialectic
has different sensesand functions in theOrganon.42 It is describedas
critical,examining, testing(SE 170a20-bll, 172al7-b4)and even 'de-
structive'(££,1217bl6),but is also describedto be 'in the spiritof
inquiry'(Top 159a25-37),and leadingto the discoveryof truth.'For
dialecticis a processofcriticism whereinliesthepathto theprinciples
ofall inquiries'(101b3-4). Accordingly, thedialecticwhichis contrasted
154):'In theOrganon
41 Cf.Irwin{FirstPrinciples, he [Aristotle]
normallyappliesthe
terms"philosophy" and "philosopher" tothedemonstrative incontrast
scientists,
tothedialectician.'
42 Cf.Kirwan, IV,V,VI,84-5.
Metaphysics
tothescienceofbeinginMetaphysics IV is onlythenegativefunction of
Whatis,then,therelation
dialectic. betweenthepositiveorconstructive
function of dialecticin the Organonand the scienceof being in the
Metaphysics? Aristotlehimselfdoes notsay,and theconstructive roleof
as a consequence,
dialectic, has beena topicofcontroversy.43Neverthe-
less,giventhesimilarsubject-matters thatdialecticand thescienceof
beinghave, and given continuity see in thediscussionsofbeing
the we
fromtheCategories totheMetaphysics, itcouldnotbe completely wrong
to suggesta continuity fromthepositivedialecticin theOrganon to the
scienceof being in the Metaphysics. The scienceof being,although
formallyestablished inMetaphysics IV andpursuedina farmoresystem-
aticand refined way in theMetaphysics, can traceitsbasicframework,
blocks,and timbers in theearlierworks.ComparedwiththeOrganon,
theMetaphysics presentsa farmorerichand profoundtheoryofbeing
through its discussion of formand matter,and of potentiality and
actuality.44
43 In answeringthe questionof why Aristotle's earlierworksseem to rejectthe

possibilityof a universalscience, and the Metaphysics sucha science,
establishes
Irwin'ssolutionis thatAristotle changesthenotionof'dialectic',fromthe'pure
dialectic'whichproceedsindiscriminately fromcommonbeliefs,to the 'strong
dialectic'whicharguesfrom'an appropriately selectedsubsetofcommonbeliefs'
andcanthereby reachobjectivelytrueknowledge offirst (First
principles Principles,
ch.1.6,andch.8).Irwinsuggests thatAristotle'sdefenceoftheprincipleofnon-con-
tradictionisexemplary ofthestrong anda modelofargument
dialectic inAristotle's
firstphilosophy. The defenceshowsthatalthoughno positivedemonstration is
possible,thetruthoftheprinciple ofnon-contradiction canbeshownonthegrounds
thatno onecanreasonably rejectit.ButI am notconvinced thatthedefenceofthe
principleofnon-contradiction exemplifies a universal
methodology thatAristotle's
first
philosophy has.Formostdiscussionwe findintheMetaphysics doesnotseem
tohavesucha quality. Moreover,R.Boltonhaspersuasively demonstrated thateven
in theproofoftheprinciple ofnon-contradiction, Aristotle's
argument is charac-
teristicof peirasticelenchus,as describedin theSE ('Aristotle's Conceptionof
Metaphysics as a Science',in T. Scaltsas,D. Charles,and M.L. Gill,eds., Unity,
and Explanationin Aristotle'sMetaphysics[Oxford:Clarendon Press 1994]
Identity,
321-354).
to notethesubtlechangeofOwen'sattitudeat thispoint.In his
44 It is interesting
'Logicand Metaphysics', Owenfirmly deniesthatthereis anything similartothe
scienceofbeinginAristotle's earlierworks:'TheinquirydescribedinMetaphysics
IV is notmentioned intheOrganon, noris ithiddeninAristotle'ssleeve'(178).Yet
inhis'TheSnaresofOntology', he modifies hisposition:'Thenewscienceis notan
axiomatic system;and lestitseemcuriously likethosenon-departmental inquiries
230 JiyuanYu
To conclude,I would liketomakea briefsuggestion regarding why

Aristotle expandshis notionof science.We have mentionedthatthe
studyofbeingas we findintheCategories and theTopicsshouldbelong
toan areaofstudy(dialectic)whichdealswithmaterialthatis common
to all thedepartmental sciences.In theOrganon, thisarea of studyis
lowerin itsepistemicstatusthanthe'singlegenus'and demonstrative
science.Itis notscience,and notphilosophy either.
Thestudyofcatego-
ries,important as it is, is notrelatedto theproblemof foundation of
demonstrative science.In contrast, inMetaphysicsIV we aretoldthat
Noneoftheseothers dealsgenerally
[specialsciences] withbeingas
being.They cut a
off of and
part being investigate the
attributes
ofthis
part- thisis whatthemathematical sciences
forinstance
do. Now
sinceweareseeking thefirst and
principles the causes,
highest clearly
theremustbe something towhichthesebelonginvirtue ofitsown
nature... Therefore
itisofbeingas beingthatwealsomustgraspthe
first
causes.(1003a23-31)
The studyofbeingis now said to enjoyan epistemicpositionwhichis

higherthanthedepartmental demonstrative sciences.Whereasall these
departmental sciences cut offa part beingand studiestheattributes
of
of thispart,thestudyofbeing,qua being,seeksto understand what
demonstrative sciencesassumebutdoesnotstudy.Indoingso,itreveals
'thefirstprinciplesand thehighestcauses'. Thus,thestudyofbeing
becomesfoundational. The demonstrative scienceis describedto be
autonomousin theOrganon. Butin theMetaphysics Aristotleseemsto
recognize thatthe demonstrative sciencehas a of
problem ontological
foundation tobe clarified,and thatthisis precisely
thejob ofthestudy
ofbeing.Consequently, hisviewoftheepistemic positionofthestudy
of beingis changed,forit is reasonableto thinkthata studyof the
foundation of thesciencesmustalso enjoythestatusof 'science'.In
Metaphysics thescienceofbeingis said tobe a scienceoftheultimate
IV,
cause. In Metaphysics I, Aristotlehas alreadyclaimedthat'all men
suppose whatis calledwisdom(sophia)to deal withthefirst cause and
the principlesof things'(981b29-30),and that 'wisdom is science
whichAristotlehad previously or "logical"and brandedas

dubbed"dialectical"
is quietlydemotedtoonedepartment
dialectic
unscientific, ofitsoldprovinceso as
toleaveroomforthenewgiant(cf.1004bl7-26 withSE 169b25etc.)'(146).
aboutcertaincausesand principles'(982al). Itis truethatthe

(epistênïé)
studyofbeingis notabouta singlegenusand is notdemonstrative, and
henceitremainsnota first-order demonstrativescience.Butthestudy
ofbeingis abouttheontological foundation ofdemonstrative sciences,
and is thusa 'scienceofsciences',ora second-order
science.45
DepartmentofPhilosophy
ofNew Yorkat Buffalo
StateUniversity
NY 14260
Buffalo,
U.S.A.
e-mail:jyyu@acsu.buffalo.edu
45 Anearlierversionofthispaperwas readat themeeting oftheSocietyforAncient

GreekPhilosophy withtheCentralDivisionoftheAmerican Asso-
Philosophical
ciation,New Orleans,May,1998.1wishtothanktheProgram Committee ofSAGP
forthehelpfulcomments itprovided.I am also grateful
to JohnKearns,Gareth
Matthews, CharlesLambros, JonathanSanford, David Kaspar,RogerShinerand
twoanonymous forApeiron
referees A specialthanks
fortheirvaluablecriticisms.
isduetoJorge J.E.Graciawhooffereddetailedandchallengingcomments onseveral
earlierversionsofthepaper.Theremaining shortcomingsare,ofcourse,mysole
responsibility.

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What is the Focal Meaning of Being in Aristotle?

At theoutsetofhis recentlaudable Aristotle's BooksZ andH,

1003a33-4), thatis,substance.In interpreting

(1) The'focalmeaning'treatment ofbeingcontradictsandreplaces

(2) The 'focalmeaning'treatment of beingmakesit possiblefor

BothOwen and Bostockclaim thatAristotlehas two incompatible

AccountA and AccountB respectively the'focalmeaningaccount'and

Aristotle is moreconcerned withtheontological relations

It mightbe helpfulto startwitha briefsummaryof Owen's main

The associationbetweenfocalmeaningand logicalpriority is indis-

Butwe are nottoldby Owen how theproshenofbeingcauses other

7 Owen himselfrecognises thattheidea of focalmeaningand theidea of logical

unexplainedtheprecisedifference betweenfocalmeaningand synon-

thathe has notelucidatedit fully,but claimsthatAristotle

II TopicsI 9 and Categories

Usuallythesetwotextsare viewedas presenting differentprocedures

Aristotle thencontinues: 'eachofthesekindsofpredicates, ifeitheritbe

hereafter callthistypeofpredication, inwhichbothsubject-expression

21 TheGreekword'kategoria', fromwhichtheword'category' is fromthe

Now letus proceedtothelistofcategories inCategories 4. Itis usually

and Kinds',Journal ofPhilosophy69 [1972]149-157).Thesentence canbe translated

whya categorycan classifydifferent beings.25 Whatsubstance-subject

25 In APrI 37,49a6-8Aristotle says thatthephrase'thisbelongsto that''mustbe

itis foreachcategorytobe, isolatedin abstract

Furthermore, sinceTopicsI 9 and Categories 4 are complementary

Ill FocalMeaningand thePriorities

Earlierit was mentionedthatthefocalmeaningofbeingis not fully

priority seemstobe toonarrow.So faras therelation betweensubstance

29 MetaphysicsVII 1 dealsexclusivelywiththerelation betweensubstance and other

categories.Hence,itseemsmorereasonableto understand theproshen

IV Beings:PerSe and PerAccidens

Substanceis the subject,and otherbeingsare its attributes. In this

To answerthis,we havetounderstand inwhichsensea beingis said

ries4-5 indicates.Everynon-substance categoryis predicatedof sub-

So far,in ourdiscussionoftheproshenstructure ofbeing,all theitems

32 APo 83bl8-25,90al0ff;SE 167alff;Metaph1028a29-31

Here,thingsthatare said to be prosheninclude,in additionto other

33 MetaphV 7, VI 2, 1026a34-b3,and IX 10, 1051a33-b2

Accordingly, potential/actualbeingsare thepotentiality and actuality

In thisfinalsection,we discussOwen's othermajorclaim thatthe

only'to a studywhichis abouta singlegenus,'butalso' to a studythe

Now inMetaphysics IV thestudyofbeingcanbe called'science',but

43 In answeringthe questionof why Aristotle's earlierworksseem to rejectthe

To conclude,I would liketomakea briefsuggestion regarding why

The studyofbeingis now said to enjoyan epistemicpositionwhichis

whichAristotlehad previously or "logical"and brandedas

aboutcertaincausesand principles'(982al). Itis truethatthe

45 Anearlierversionofthispaperwas readat themeeting oftheSocietyforAncient

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