Excessive Fines and Cruel and Inhuman Punishments

Excessive Fines and Cruel and Inhuman Punishments
Republic of the Philippines v. N. Dela Merced & Sons, Inc., G.R. No. 201501,
January 22, 2018 - Torres
Echagaray v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601, October 12, 1998 - Yabut
Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011) - Flores
Corpuz v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014 (Read also the
Dissenting Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio) - Abad
11
Maturan v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 227155, March 28, 2017 - Arre
16
Republic of the Philippines v. N. Dela Merced & Sons, Inc., G.R. No.
201501, January 22, 2018 - Torres
Excessive Fines
Republic of the Philippines, Represented by the Pollution Adjudication Board, petitioner, v. N.
Dela Merced & Sons, Inc, respondent
Jan. 22, 2018 GR No. 201501 Sereno, C.J.
Recit Ready Synopsis
Relevant Provisions/Concepts/Doctrines
For a penalty to be considered obnoxious to the Constitution, it needs to be more than
merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe.
To come under the prohibition, the penalty must be so flagrantly and plainly oppressive;
or so disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of all
reasonable persons as to what is right and proper under the circumstances.
US v. Borromeo: The fixing of penalties for the violation of statutes is primarily a legislative
function, and the courts hesitate to interfere, unless the fine provided for is so far excessive as
to shock the sense of mankind.
FACTS
The Guadalupe Commercial Complex is a commercial building owned and operated by Dela
Merced & Sons. situated alongside the Pasig River; the complex operates a wet market and
houses eateries or kitchenettes in the same building.
In July 2006, the Environmental Management Bureau-NCR (EMB-NCR) of the DENR

inspected the Guadalupe complex and found that Dela Merced & Sons had violated the
following:
reasonable persons as to what is right and proper under the circumstances.
US v. Borromeo: The fixing of penalties for the violation of statutes is primarily a legislative
function, and the courts hesitate to interfere, unless the fine provided for is so far excessive as
to shock the sense of mankind.
FACTS
The Guadalupe Commercial Complex is a commercial building owned and operated by Dela
Merced & Sons. situated alongside the Pasig River; the complex operates a wet market and
houses eateries or kitchenettes in the same building.
In July 2006, the Environmental Management Bureau-NCR (EMB-NCR) of the DENR

inspected the Guadalupe complex and found that Dela Merced & Sons had violated the
following:
1. Sec. 1 of DENR Admin. Order No. 2004-26 (For operating air pollution source
installations, i.e. generator set without a permit to operate)
2. Sec. 27 (i) of RA 9275 (For operating a facility that discharged regulated water
pollutants without a discharge permit)
The EMB-NCR served a notice of violation in August 2006 upon Dela Merced & Sons, stating
the charges and ordering them to comply with the requirements. Dela Merced & Sons
requested and was granted an extension of time to comply with the requirements.
However, when the EMB-NCR conducted another inspection of the Guadalupe complex to
monitor Dela Merced & Sons’ compliance with RA 8749 (The Clean Air Act of 1999) and RA
9275 (The Clean Water Act of 2004), the inspection team collected effluent samples from the
facility, and the results of the laboratory tests showed that the sample failed to conform to the
DENR Effluent Standards.
Due to this, the DENR Secretary issued a cease and desist order to Dela Merced & Sons for
their violation of RA 9275. In the same order, the company was informed that no temporary
lifting order (TLO) would be issued in their favor unless it would submit the documents required
under the law.
Subsequently, Dela Merced & Sons submitted the required documents for the issuance of a
TLO and the DENR-PAB issued the TLO. Additionally, the EMB-DENR issued a Certificate of
Non-Coverage (CNC) to Dela Merced & Sons pursuant to PD 1586 (Philippine Environmental
Impact Statement System).
By November 2007, another effluent sampling was conducted and after laboratory analysis and
verification, the findings showed that the effluent conformed to the DENR Effluent Standards.
Thus, the DENR-PAB issued a Notice of Technical Conference to Dela Merced & Sons for a
discussion of the imposition of fines during the period of violation of RA 9275.
Attached to the notice was an initial computation of the fine in the total amount of P3.98
million. The notice also directed Dela Merced & Sons to submit its position paper regarding
the fine. The fine covered the alleged 398 days that Dela Merced & Sons had violated RA
9275.
The period covered was from Oct. 12, 2006, when the collected effluent from the
Guadalupe complex failed the DENR Effluent Standards, up until Nov. 13, 2007, which
marked the end of the period when, by the next day, the sampling gathered by the EMB-NCR
had already passed the DENR Standards.
Dela Merced & Sons prayed that the fine be discarded for being imposed without due process
of law. It argued that the fine was violative of Sec. 1 and Sec. 19 of Art. III of the Constitution.
On appeal, the CA denied the Dela Merced & Sons’ prayer for the issuance of a TRO and its
Motion for Reconsideration. However, the CA did lower the fine to P2.36 million, claiming that
the fine should be reduced in view of the EMB-NCR’s unreasonable delay in complying with
the order to conduct an effluent sampling of Dela Merced & Sons’ Wastewater Treatment
Facility.
ISSUE
1. Whether Dela Merced & Sons was denied due process
2. Whether Sec. 28 of RA 9275 on the imposition of fines is unconstitutional under Sec.
19, (1), Art. III of the Constitution
3. Whether the amount of the fine imposed was correct, assuming that its
imposition was proper
RULING
1. No. The opportunity to be heard was made completely available to Dela Merced &
sons who participated in all stages of the administrative proceedings before the DENR-
PAB.
On appeal, the CA denied the Dela Merced & Sons’ prayer for the issuance of a TRO and its
Motion for Reconsideration. However, the CA did lower the fine to P2.36 million, claiming that
the fine should be reduced in view of the EMB-NCR’s unreasonable delay in complying with
the order to conduct an effluent sampling of Dela Merced & Sons’ Wastewater Treatment
Facility.
ISSUE
1. Whether Dela Merced & Sons was denied due process
2. Whether Sec. 28 of RA 9275 on the imposition of fines is unconstitutional under Sec.
19, (1), Art. III of the Constitution
3. Whether the amount of the fine imposed was correct, assuming that its
imposition was proper
RULING
1. No. The opportunity to be heard was made completely available to Dela Merced &
sons who participated in all stages of the administrative proceedings before the DENR-
PAB.
They were not denied due process. In a real sense, they were able to take advantage of the
available opportunities to explain its side and to question the acts and orders of the DENR-
PAB.
In administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one’s side

suffices to meet the requirements of due process. Administrative due process cannot be fully
equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. A formal or trial-type hearing is not always
necessary.
1. The constitutionality of Sec. 28 of RA 9275 was not properly questioned.

Dela Merced & Sons’ attempt to assail the constitutionality of Sec. 28 of RA 9275 constitutes a
collateral attack. This is contrary to the rule that issues of constitutionality must be pleased
directly. Unless a law is annulled in a direct proceeding, the legal presumption of the law’s
validity remains.
Even if the issue of constitutionality was properly presented, Dela Merced & Sons still failed to
satisfy the lis mota requirement for the Court to undertake a judicial review. They failed to show
that the case cannot be legally resolved unless the constitutional issue it has raised is
resolved. Hence, the presumption of constitutionality of Sec. 28 of RA 9275 stands.
1. Yes. The fine imposed is not excessive under the Constitution.

Dela Merced & Sons’ invocation of Sec. 19 (1), Art. III of the Constitution is erroneous. The
constitutional prohibition on the imposition of excessive fines applies only to criminal
prosecutions.
In contrast, this case involves an administrative proceeding and the fine imposed is not a
criminal penalty. Hence, it is inapplicable to this case. Besides, even if it was applicable, the
fines under RA 9275 cannot be classified as excessive.
For a penalty to be considered obnoxious to the Constitution, it needs to be more than

merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe.
To come under the prohibition, the penalty must be so flagrantly and plainly oppressive;
reasonable persons as to what is right and proper under the circumstances. Dela Merced
& Sons failed to satisfy these jurisprudential standards.
In questioning the constitutionality of the fine, Dela Merced & Sons merely alleged that the
amount is exorbitant, arbitrary, unconscionable, and too excessive as to cause grave impact on
the business operations and the very survival of the business entity as a whole. These
unsubstantiated allegations are not enough to strike down the fine as unconstitutional
for being excessive.
Also, it should be noted that the basis for the amount of fine imposed by the PAB and the CA
(i.e. 10,000 per day of violation) is the minimum imposable amount under the law. Since
penalties are prescribed by statute, their formulation is essentially and exclusively
legislative.
Having no authority to modify the penalties already prescribed, the courts can only interpret
and apply them. The fixing of penalties for the violation of statutes is primarily a
legislative function, and the courts hesitate to interfere, unless the fine provided for is
so far excessive as to shock the sense of mankind.
Clearly, the legislature has the need to protect and conserve our water resources. To this end,
it formulated rules with concomitant penalties to ensure compliance with the law. We will not
interfere with its wisdom in drafting the law, especially since the presumption of its
Also, it should be noted that the basis for the amount of fine imposed by the PAB and the CA
(i.e. 10,000 per day of violation) is the minimum imposable amount under the law. Since
penalties are prescribed by statute, their formulation is essentially and exclusively
legislative.
Having no authority to modify the penalties already prescribed, the courts can only interpret
and apply them. The fixing of penalties for the violation of statutes is primarily a
legislative function, and the courts hesitate to interfere, unless the fine provided for is
so far excessive as to shock the sense of mankind.
Clearly, the legislature has the need to protect and conserve our water resources. To this end,
it formulated rules with concomitant penalties to ensure compliance with the law. We will not
interfere with its wisdom in drafting the law, especially since the presumption of its
constitutionality has not been overturned.
Hence, the Court upholds the P3.98 million fine on Dela Merced & Sons for their violation of RA
9275.
Additional Notes
Effluent: Liquid waste or sewage discharged into a river or the sea; this is the waste material
which was discharged from any industrial or business processes.
Echagaray v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601, October 12,

1998 - Yabut
LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO, petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE and

THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, THE EXECUTIVE
JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY AND THE
PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY,
BRANCH 104, respondents.
[Date] [Case Number] Per Curiam
Sec. 16. NOTIFICATION AND EXECUTION OF THE SENTENCE AND ASSISTANCE TO THE
CONVICT.—The court shall designate a working day for the execution of the death penalty but
not the hour thereof. Such designation shall only be communicated to the convict after sunrise
of the day of the execution, and the execution shall not take place until after the expiration of at
least eight (8) hours following the notification, but before sunset. During the interval between
the notification and execution, the convict shall, as far as possible, be furnished such
assistance as he may request in order to be attended in his last moments by a priest or
minister of the religion he professes and to consult his lawyers, as well as in order to make a
will and confer with members of his family or of persons in charge of the management of his
business, of the administration of his property, or of the care of his descendants.
Section 1, third paragraph of R.A. No. 8177 requires that all personnel involved in the
execution proceedings should be trained prior to the performance of such a task, Thus there is
a presumption that the public officials entrusted with administering the lethal injection will
carefully avoid inflicting cruel punishment.
It is well settled in jurisprudence that death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment. In Harden v. Director of Prisons, the court previously held that
“[p]unishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of
death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution.
Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out the execution
of the death penalty and does not fall within the constitutional proscription against
cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.
The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent
Section 1, third paragraph of R.A. No. 8177 requires that all personnel involved in the
execution proceedings should be trained prior to the performance of such a task, Thus there is
a presumption that the public officials entrusted with administering the lethal injection will
carefully avoid inflicting cruel punishment.
death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution.
cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.
The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent
in the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method
employed to extinguish life humanely.
What is cruel and unusual “is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as
public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice” and “must draw its meaning
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.
The primary indicator of society’s standard of decency with regard to capital

punishment is the response of the country’s legislatures to the sanction. Hence, for as
long as the death penalty remains in our statute books and meets the most stringent
requirements provided by the Constitution, we must confine our inquiry to the legality of
R.A. No. 8177, whose constitutionality we duly sustain in the face of petitioner’s
challenge.
FACTS
On June 25, 1996 the court affirmed the conviction of Leo Echegaray for the crime of rape of
the 10 year old daughter of his common-law spouse and the subsequent imposition of death
penalty for said crime. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration raising factual issues, and
on its heels, a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raising the constitutionality of RA 7659
(The Death Penalty Law) and the imposition of death penalty for rape.
The court denied these on February 1988 and held that Congress duly complied with the
requirements for re-imposition of the death penalty and therefore, the death penalty law is not
unconstitutional. In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of the
execution of the death penalty from electrocution, to lethal injection and passed RA 8177 (AN
ACT DESIGNATING DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ART. 81 OF THE RPC, AS
AMENDED BY SEC 24 OF RA 7659) Pursuant to the provisions of said law, the SOJ
promulgated the Rules and Regulations to Implement RA 8177, and directed the director of
Bureau of Corrections to prepare the lethal injection manual.
On March 2 1998, petitioner filed a petition for Prohibition, Injunction and or TRO to enjoin
(The Death Penalty Law) and the imposition of death penalty for rape.
The court denied these on February 1988 and held that Congress duly complied with the
requirements for re-imposition of the death penalty and therefore, the death penalty law is not
unconstitutional. In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of the
execution of the death penalty from electrocution, to lethal injection and passed RA 8177 (AN
ACT DESIGNATING DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ART. 81 OF THE RPC, AS
AMENDED BY SEC 24 OF RA 7659) Pursuant to the provisions of said law, the SOJ
promulgated the Rules and Regulations to Implement RA 8177, and directed the director of
Bureau of Corrections to prepare the lethal injection manual.
On March 2 1998, petitioner filed a petition for Prohibition, Injunction and or TRO to enjoin
respondents SOJ and Director of the Bureau of Prisons from carrying out the execution by
lethal injection of petitioner under RA 8177 and its IRR as these are unconstitutional and
void for being (A) Cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment per se, as well as by
reason of its being (B) arbitrary, unreasonable, and a violation of due process, (C) a violation
of the Philippines’ obligations under international covenants, (d) an undue delegation of
legislative power by Congress, ( E ) an unlawful exercise by respondent SOJ to legislate, (F)
an unlawful delegation of delegated powers by SOJ to respondent director
On March 3, 1998, the Court resolved, without giving due course to the petition, to require the
respondents to COMMENT thereon within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from notice,
and directed the parties “to MAINTAIN the status quo prevailing at the time of the filing of this
petition.”
On March 16, 1998, petitioner filed a Very Urgent Motion (1) To Clarify Status Quo Order, and
(2) For the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order expressly enjoining public respondents
from taking any action to carry out petitioner’s execution until the petition is resolved.
On March 16 1998, OSG filed a comment: stating that (1) this Court has already upheld the
constitutionality of the Death Penalty Law, and has repeatedly declared that the death
penalty is not cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment; (2) execution by lethal
injection, as authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the questioned rules, is constitutional,
lethal injection being the most modern, more humane, more economical, safer and
easier to apply (than electrocution or the gas chamber); (3) the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights does not expressly or impliedly prohibit the imposition of
the death penalty; (4) R.A. No. 8177 properly delegated legislative power to respondent
Director; and that (5) R.A. No. 8177 confers the power to promulgate the implementing rules to
the Secretary of Justice, Secretary of Health and the Bureau of Corrections.
On March 25, 1998 CHR filed a motion for leave of court to intervene and/or appear as Amicus
Curiae alleging that death penalty imposed under RA 7659, which is to be implemented by
RA 8177 is cruel, degrading and outside the limits of civil society standards, further
invoking:
(a) Article II, Sec 11 of the Constitution which provides: “The state values the dignity of
every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights”;
(b) Article III of the UDHR which states that “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security
of person” and Article V thereof, which states that “No one shall be subjected to torture or to
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” ;
(c) The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in particular, Article 6, and the
Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Aiming at
the Abolition of the Death Penalty;
(d) Amnesty International statistics showing that as of Oct 1996, 58 countries have abolished
eath penalty for ordinary crimes, and 26 countries are abolitionists de facto (which means that
they have retained death penalty for ordinary crimes, but are considered abolitionists in
practice in that they have not executed anyone during the past ten years or more, or in that
they have made an international commitment not to carry out executions
( e ) Pope John Paul II’s encyclical “Evangelium Vitae”
On March 27, 1998 petition filed a reply (for the OSG) stating that (1) The court is not barred
from exercising judicial review over death penalty per se, the death penalty for rape and lethal
injection as a mode of carrying out the death penalty; (2) Capital punishment is a mode of
carrying out the death penalty; (3) lethal injection is cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment,
and that being “ the most modern” does not make it less cruel or more humane, and that the
Solicitor General’s aesthetic criteria is short-sighted, that lethal injection is not risk free nor is it
easier to implement; and (4) the death penalty violates the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, considering that the Philippines participated in its deliberation and voted
they have retained death penalty for ordinary crimes, but are considered abolitionists in
practice in that they have not executed anyone during the past ten years or more, or in that
they have made an international commitment not to carry out executions
( e ) Pope John Paul II’s encyclical “Evangelium Vitae”
On March 27, 1998 petition filed a reply (for the OSG) stating that (1) The court is not barred
from exercising judicial review over death penalty per se, the death penalty for rape and lethal
injection as a mode of carrying out the death penalty; (2) Capital punishment is a mode of
carrying out the death penalty; (3) lethal injection is cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment,
and that being “ the most modern” does not make it less cruel or more humane, and that the
Solicitor General’s aesthetic criteria is short-sighted, that lethal injection is not risk free nor is it
easier to implement; and (4) the death penalty violates the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, considering that the Philippines participated in its deliberation and voted
for its Second Optional Protocol.
In sum, Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection constitutes cruel, degrading
and inhuman punishment considering that (1) R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for the
drugs to be used in carrying out lethal injection, the dosage for each drug to be
administered, and the procedure in administering said drug/s into the accused; (2) R.A.
No. 8177 and its implementing rules are uncertain as to the date of execution, time of
notification, the court which will fix the date of execution, which uncertainties cause the
greatest pain and suffering for the convict; and (3) the possibility of “botched
executions” or mistakes in administering the drugs renders lethal injection inherently
cruel
ISSUE
W/N RA 8177 and its implementing rules pass constitutional muster for violation of
constitutional proscription against, cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment- Yes, it
does.
RULING
In lethal injection, the condemned inmate is strapped on a hospital gurney and wheeled into
the execution room. A trained technician inserts a needle into a vein in the inmate’s arm and
begins an intravenous flow of saline solution. At the warden’s signal, a lethal combination of
drugs is injected into the intravenous line. The deadly concoction typically includes three drugs:
a non lethal dose of Na thiopentothal, a sleep inducing barbiturate, lethal doses of
pancuronium bromide, a paralytic drug, and potassium chloride, which stops the heart within
seconds. The first two are commonly used as anesthetic agents during surgery, and the third is
used in heart bypass surgery.
death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies
there is something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of
life.” Would the lack in particularity then as to the details involved in the execution by lethal
injection render said law “cruel, degrading or inhuman”? The Court believes not . Further, the
court posits that the Implementing details of RA 8177 are matters which are properly left
to the competence and expertise of administrative officials
I. Petitioner contends that Sec. 16 of RA 8177 is uncertain as to

which court will fix the time and date of execution, and the date of
execution and time of notification of the death of the convict.
I. Petitioner contends that Sec. 16 of RA 8177 is uncertain as to
which court will fix the time and date of execution, and the date of
execution and time of notification of the death of the convict.
Court: The court which designates the date of execution is the trial court which
convicted the accused, after this Court has reviewed the entire records of the case, and
has affirmed its judgement. Thereupon, the procedure is that the “judgment is entered
fifteen (15) days after its promulgation, and 10 days thereafter, the records are remanded to
the court below including a certified copy of the judgement for examination. to the date of
execution nor the time of notification. As to the date of execution, Section 15 of the
implementing rules must be read in conjunction with the last sentence of Section 1 of R.A. No.
8177 which provides that the death sentence shall be carried out “not earlier than one (1) year
nor later than eighteen (18) months after the judgment has become final and executory, without
prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive clemency powers at all times.”
Hence, the death convict is in effect assured of eighteen (18) months from the time the
judgment imposing the death penalty became final and executory, wherein he can seek
executive clemency and attend to all his temporal and spiritual affairs.
II. Petitioner further contends that the infliction of “wanton pain” in

case of possible complications in the intravenous injection,
considering and as petitioner claims, that respondent Director is an
untrained and untested person insofar as the choice and
administration of lethal injection is concerned, renders lethal
injection a cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment.
Such supposition is highly speculative and unsubstantiated. Petitioner has neither alleged nor
presented evidence that lethal injection requires the expertise only of phlebotomists and not
trained personnel and that the drugs to be administered are unsafe or ineffective. What the
petitioner did is simply cite situations in the US wherein execution by lethal injection allegedly
resulted in prolonged and agonizing death, without any other evidence.
Petitioner overlooked Section 1, third paragraph of R.A. No. 8177 which requires that all
personnel involved in the execution proceedings should be trained prior to the performance of
such a task, Thus there is a presumption that the public officials entrusted with administering
the lethal injection will carefully avoid inflicting cruel punishment.
cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment. “In a limited sense, anything is cruel which is
calculated to give pain or distress, and since punishment imports pain or suffering to the
convict, it may be said that all punishments are cruel. But of course the Constitution does not
mean that crime, for this reason is to go unpunished. The cruelty against which the
Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment,
not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life
humanely. In the US, no court has found lethal injections to implicate prisoner’s Eight
Amendment rights. After reviewing medical evidence that indicates that improper doses or
improper administration of the drugs causes severe pain and that prison officials tend to have
little training in the administration of the drugs, the courts have found that the few minutes of
pain does not rise to a constitutional violation.
convict, it may be said that all punishments are cruel. But of course the Constitution does not
mean that crime, for this reason is to go unpunished. The cruelty against which the
Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment,
not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life
humanely. In the US, no court has found lethal injections to implicate prisoner’s Eight
Amendment rights. After reviewing medical evidence that indicates that improper doses or
improper administration of the drugs causes severe pain and that prison officials tend to have
little training in the administration of the drugs, the courts have found that the few minutes of
pain does not rise to a constitutional violation.
public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice” and “must draw its meaning
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.
The primary indicator of society’s standard of decency with regard to capital

punishment is the response of the country’s legislatures to the sanction. Hence, for as
long as the death penalty remains in our statute books and meets the most stringent
requirements provided by the Constitution, we must confine our inquiry to the legality of
R.A. No. 8177, whose constitutionality we duly sustain in the face of petitioner’s
challenge. We find that the legislature’s substitution of the mode of carrying out the
death penalty from electrocution to lethal injection infringes no constitutional rights of
petitioner herein.
Additional Notes
Long case, but I focused on just the pertinent topic at hand the rest deals with Human Rights,
and Delegation of Powers, not discussed in this digest.
Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011) - Flores
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Governor of California, et al., Appellants v. Marciano Plata, et al.
May 23, 2011 563 U.S. 493, 581 Justice Kennedy
Prisoners are dependent on the State for food, clothing, and necessary medical care. A
prison's failure to provide sustenance for inmates "may actually produce physical 'torture or a
lingering death. If government fails to fulfill this obligation, the courts have a responsibility to
remedy the resulting Eighth Amendment violation. Courts must not shrink from their obligation
to "enforce the constitutional rights of all 'persons,' including prisoners."
FACTS
This case is about serious constitutional violations in California's prison system. The violations
are the subject of two class actions in two Federal District Courts. The first involves the class of
prisoners with serious mental disorders. That case is Coleman v. Brown. The second involves
prisoners with serious medical conditions. That case is Plata v. Brown.
1. During trial of the subject cases, the prison population of California was 156,000,
almost double of the capacity of its prison system.
2. In Coleman v. Brown, filed in 1990, the District Court found that prisoners with serious
mental illness do not receive minimal, adequate care.
a. The district court appointed a Special Master to oversee remedial efforts
(construction of prison facilities, hiring of mental health personnel, etc.).
However, the special master reported 12 years later that the state of mental
health care in California's prisons was deteriorating due to increased
overcrowding.
3. In Plata v. Brown, filed in 2001, the State conceded that deficiencies in prison medical
care violated prisoners' Eighth Amendment rights and stipulated to a remedial
injunction (same construction of more prison facilities, etc.).
prison's failure to provide sustenance for inmates "may actually produce physical 'torture or a
lingering death. If government fails to fulfill this obligation, the courts have a responsibility to
remedy the resulting Eighth Amendment violation. Courts must not shrink from their obligation
FACTS
This case is about serious constitutional violations in California's prison system. The violations
are the subject of two class actions in two Federal District Courts. The first involves the class of
prisoners with serious mental disorders. That case is Coleman v. Brown. The second involves
prisoners with serious medical conditions. That case is Plata v. Brown.
1. During trial of the subject cases, the prison population of California was 156,000,
almost double of the capacity of its prison system.
2. In Coleman v. Brown, filed in 1990, the District Court found that prisoners with serious
mental illness do not receive minimal, adequate care.
a. The district court appointed a Special Master to oversee remedial efforts
(construction of prison facilities, hiring of mental health personnel, etc.).
However, the special master reported 12 years later that the state of mental
health care in California's prisons was deteriorating due to increased
overcrowding.
3. In Plata v. Brown, filed in 2001, the State conceded that deficiencies in prison medical
care violated prisoners' Eighth Amendment rights and stipulated to a remedial
injunction (same construction of more prison facilities, etc.).
a. But when the State had not complied with the injunction by 2005, the court
appointed a Receiver to oversee remedial efforts. Three years later, the
Receiver described continuing deficiencies caused by overcrowding.
4. Then after the years of litigation, it appears that the constitutional violations are still
prevalent. Therefore, in accordance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(PLRA), the Coleman and Plata District Judges independently requested that a three-
judge court be convened. And the Court of Appeals granted that request and convened
the three-judge court, consolidating the two cases.
5. After hearing and making extensive findings of fact, the three-judge court ordered
California to reduce its prison population to 137.5% of design capacity within two
years. Because it appears all but certain that the State cannot complete sufficient
construction to comply fully with the order, the prison population will have to be
reduced to at least some extent. The court did not order the State to achieve this
reduction in any particular manner. Instead, the court ordered the State to formulate a
plan for compliance and submit its plan for approval by the court.
The State of California contested the order of the three-judge court and appealed it to the
United States Supreme Court:
1. It contends that the three-judge court was prematurely convened.
a. It was error to convene the three-judge court without affording it more time to
comply with the prior orders in Coleman and Plata. The State claims that the
second condition, the reasonable time requirement of the PLRA, was not met
because other, later remedial efforts should have been given more time to
succeed.
2. The State objects to the substance of the three-judge court order, which requires the
State to reduce overcrowding in its prisons.
a. State contends that the three-judge court did not allow the state to present
evidence of current prison conditions.
b. Lastly, the State argues that the violation could have been remedied through a
combination of new construction, transfers of prisoners out of State, hiring of
medical personnel, and continued efforts by the Plata Receiver and Coleman
Special Master.
ISSUE
a. Whether the convening of the three-judges court is valid
b. Whether the order imposing a population limit in jail systems is valid
RULING
Note that there is a clear violation of the Eight Amendment due to the lack of medical facilities
in the California Prison System, amounting to inhumane punishment. The issues raised are
with regard to the validity of court intervention in ordering the State of California to reduce the
population of prisoners.
Preliminaries:
A. As a consequence of their own actions, prisoners may be deprived of rights that are
fundamental to liberty. Yet the law and the Constitution demand recognition of certain
other rights. Prisoners retain the essence of human dignity inherent in all persons.
Respect for that dignity animates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment. "'The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing
less than the dignity of man."'
RULING
Note that there is a clear violation of the Eight Amendment due to the lack of medical facilities
in the California Prison System, amounting to inhumane punishment. The issues raised are
with regard to the validity of court intervention in ordering the State of California to reduce the
population of prisoners.
Preliminaries:
A. As a consequence of their own actions, prisoners may be deprived of rights that are
fundamental to liberty. Yet the law and the Constitution demand recognition of certain
other rights. Prisoners retain the essence of human dignity inherent in all persons.
Respect for that dignity animates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment. "'The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing
less than the dignity of man."'
B. To incarcerate, society takes from prisoners the means to provide for their own needs.
prison's failure to provide sustenance for inmates "may actually produce physical
'torture or a lingering death
C. If government fails to fulfill this obligation, the courts have a responsibility to remedy
the resulting Eighth Amendment violation. Courts must not shrink from their obligation
D. By its terms, the PLRA restricts the circumstances in which a court may enter an order
"that has the purpose or effect of reducing or limiting the prison population."
1. The convening of the three-judges court is valid

A. Before a three-judge court may be convened to consider whether to enter a population
limit, the PLRA requires that the court have "previously entered an order for less
intrusive relief that has failed to remedy the deprivation of the Federal right sought to
be remedied. It is satisfied if the court has entered one order, and this single order has
"failed to remedy" the constitutional violation. The defendant must also have had "a
reasonable amount of time to comply with the previous court orders." § 3626(a)(3)(A)
(ii).
B. The first of these conditions, the previous order requirement, was satisfied in Coleman
by appointment of a Special Master in 1995, and it was satisfied in Plata by approval of
a consent decree and stipulated injunction in 2002. Both orders were intended to
remedy the constitutional violations. Both were given ample time to succeed. When the
three-judge court was convened, 12 years had passed since the appointment of the
Coleman Special Master, and 5 years had passed since the approval of the Plata
consent decree.
a. These efforts had been ongoing for years; the failed consent decree in Plata
had called for implementation of new procedures and hiring of additional staff;
and the Coleman Special Master had issued over 70 orders directed at
achieving a remedy through construction, hiring, and procedural reforms. The
Coleman Special Master and Plata Receiver were unable to provide
assurance that further, substantially similar efforts would yield success absent
a population reduction. Instead, the Coleman Special Master explained that
"many of the clinical advances... painfully accomplished over the past decade
are slip-sliding away" as a result of overcrowding.
2. The order imposing population limit in jail systems is valid
A. Once a three-judge court has been convened, the court must find additional
requirements satisfied before it may impose a population limit. The first of these
requirements is that "crowding is the primary cause of the violation of a Federal right."
The second requirement is that the three-judge court was also required to find by clear
and convincing evidence that "no other relief will remedy the violation of the Federal
right."
B. The three-judge court found the primary cause requirement satisfied by the evidence
at trial. The court found that overcrowding strains inadequate medical and mental
health facilities; overburdens limited clinical and custodial staff; and creates violent,
unsanitary, and chaotic conditions that contribute to the constitutional violations and
frustrate efforts to fashion a remedy. The three-judge court also found that "until the
problem of overcrowding is overcome it will be impossible to provide constitutionally
compliant care to California's prison population."
a. The three-judge court acknowledged that the violations were caused by factors
in addition to overcrowding and that reducing crowding in the prisons would
not entirely cure the violations. This is consistent with the reports of the
Coleman Special Master and Plata Receiver, both of whom concluded that
even a significant reduction in the prison population would not remedy the
violations absent continued efforts to train staff, improve facilities, and reform
procedures. The three-judge court nevertheless found that overcrowding was
the primary cause in the sense of being the foremost cause of the violation.
b. This understanding of the primary cause requirement is consistent with the text
of the PLRA. The State in fact concedes that it proposed this very definition of
primary cause to the three-judge court.
problem of overcrowding is overcome it will be impossible to provide constitutionally
compliant care to California's prison population."
a. The three-judge court acknowledged that the violations were caused by factors
in addition to overcrowding and that reducing crowding in the prisons would
not entirely cure the violations. This is consistent with the reports of the
Coleman Special Master and Plata Receiver, both of whom concluded that
even a significant reduction in the prison population would not remedy the
violations absent continued efforts to train staff, improve facilities, and reform
procedures. The three-judge court nevertheless found that overcrowding was
the primary cause in the sense of being the foremost cause of the violation.
b. This understanding of the primary cause requirement is consistent with the text
of the PLRA. The State in fact concedes that it proposed this very definition of
primary cause to the three-judge court.
c. If Congress had intended to require that crowding be the only cause, it would
have said so, assuming in its judgment that definition would be consistent with
constitutional limitations.
C. Note that the order in fact permits the State to comply with the population limit by
transferring prisoners to county facilities or facilities in other States, or by constructing
new facilities to raise the prisons' design capacity. And the three-judge court's order
does not bar the State from undertaking any other remedial efforts. If the State does
find an adequate remedy other than a population limit, it may seek modification or
termination of the three-judge court's order on that basis. The evidence at trial,
however, supports the three-judge court's conclusion that an order limited to other
remedies would not provide effective relief.
a. The State's argument that out-of-state transfers provide a less restrictive
alternative to a population limit must fail because requiring out-of-state
transfers itself qualifies as a population limit under the PLRA.
b. Construction of new facilities, in theory, could alleviate overcrowding, but the
three-judge court found no realistic possibility that California would be able to
build itself out of this crisis.
i. Particularly in light of California's ongoing fiscal crisis, the three Judge
court deemed "chimerical" any "remedy that requires significant
additional spending by the state."
D. Ultimately, the court concluded that it would be possible to reduce the prison
population "in a manner that preserves public safety and the operation of the criminal
justice system." The PLRA's requirement that a court give "substantial weight" to public
safety does not require the court to certify that its order has no possible adverse
impact on the public.
Final note:
The State has already made significant progress toward reducing its prison population,
including reforms that will result in shifting "thousands" of prisoners to county jails. As the State
makes further progress, the three-judge court should evaluate whether its order remains
appropriate. If significant progress is made toward remedying the underlying constitutional
violations, that progress may demonstrate that further population reductions are not necessary
or are less urgent than previously believed. Were the State to make this showing, the three-
judge court in the exercise of its discretion could consider whether it is appropriate to extend or
modify this timeline.
The medical and mental health care provided by California's prisons falls below the standard of
decency that inheres in the Eighth Amendment. This extensive and ongoing constitutional
violation requires a remedy, and a remedy will not be achieved without a reduction in
overcrowding. The relief ordered by the three-judge court is required by the Constitution and
was authorized by Congress in the PLRA. The State shall implement the order without further
delay.
Dispositive portion: The judgment of the three-judge court is affirmed.

Additional Notes
Corpuz v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014
(Read also the Dissenting Opinion of Senior Associate Justice
Antonio T. Carpio) - Abad
Excessive Fines and Cruel and Inhuman Punishments
LITO CORPUZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
April 29, 2014 G.R. No. 180016 Peralta, J.

This case involves a petition for review on Certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner, Lito Corpuz, was found guilty of Estafa and accordingly sentenced to imprisonment
following the penalties imposed under Art. 315 of the RPC (prior to its modification by RA
10951). The issue related to our topic is whether the penalties imposed under Art. 315 violates
Article III, Sec. 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution.
The Court was heavily divided on the applicability of the penalties currently in place for this
case and even went on to invite several amicus curiae to give their academic opinions on the
matter (See ruling for details). The Court cannot suspend the execution of a sentence on the
ground that the strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would cause excessive or
harsh penalty. All that the Court could do in such eventuality is to report the matter to the Chief
Executive with a recommendation for an amendment or modification of the legal provisions
which it believes to be harsh.
The Court in this case, AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION the RTC’s ruling that the penalty
imposed is the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from THREE (3) YEARS, TWO
(2) MONTHS and ELEVEN DAYS of prisión correccional, as minimum, to FIFTEEN (15)
YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum. Moreover, the Court, in relation to Article 5 of the
RPC, furnished a copy of the decision to the President and Congress to act on the matter. The
Court noted that it should not preempt Congress and usurp its inherent powers of making and
enacting laws. While it may be the most expeditious approach, a short cut by judicial fiat is a
dangerous proposition, lest the Court dare trespass on prohibited judicial legislation.
(See additional notes for Justice Carpio’s dissenting opinion)

Prior to RA 10951:
ARTICLE 315. Swindling (Estafa). — Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prisión correccional in its maximum period to prisión mayor in its minimum
period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and
if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed
in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty
which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with
the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of
this Code, the penalty shall be termed prisión mayor or reclusión temporal, as the case may
be.
Xxx
____________________
Sec. 85 of RA 10951: An Act Adjusting the Amount or the Value of Property and Damage
on Which a Penalty is Based and the Fines Imposed Under the Revised Penal Code,
Amending for the Purpose Act No. 3815, Otherwise Known as "The Revised Penal
Code", as Amended
Section 85. Article 315 of the same Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885, Presidential
Decree No. 1689, and Presidential Decree No. 818, is hereby further amended to read as
follows:
"Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
"1st. The penalty of prisión correccional in its maximum period to prisión mayor in its minimum
Sec. 85 of RA 10951: An Act Adjusting the Amount or the Value of Property and Damage
on Which a Penalty is Based and the Fines Imposed Under the Revised Penal Code,
Amending for the Purpose Act No. 3815, Otherwise Known as "The Revised Penal
Code", as Amended
Section 85. Article 315 of the same Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885, Presidential
Decree No. 1689, and Presidential Decree No. 818, is hereby further amended to read as
follows:
"Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
"1st. The penalty of prisión correccional in its maximum period to prisión mayor in its minimum
period, if the amount of the fraud is over Two million four hundred thousand pesos
(₱2,400,000) but does not exceed Four million four hundred thousand pesos (₱4,400,000), and
if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed
in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional Two million pesos (₱2,000,000); but
the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the
other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prisión mayor or reclusion temporal,
as the case may be.
Xxx
_________________
Article 5, Revised Penal Code:
ARTICLE 5. Duty of the Court in Connection with Acts Which Should Be Repressed but
Which are Not Covered by the Law, and in Cases of Excessive Penalties. — Whenever a
court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not
punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive,
through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act
should be made the subject of penal legislation.
In the same way the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of
Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the
sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the
imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the
injury caused by the offense.
____________________
Even if the impossible penalty amounts to cruel punishment, the Court cannot declare the
provision of law from which the proper penalty emanates as unconstitutional.
⁃ Not only is it violative of due process considering that the State and the concerned
parties were not given the opportunity to comment on the subject matter, it is settled
that the constitutionality of a statute cannot be attacked collaterally because
constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly and not collaterally.
____________________
It has long been held that the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally aimed
at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or
amount, and applies to punishments which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete,
for instance, those inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking
on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like.
⁃ The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel
and unusual. Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come under the ban,
the punishment must be “flagrantly and plainly oppressive,” “wholly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the
community.” Cruel as it may be, as discussed above, it is for the Congress to amend
the law and adapt it to our modern time.
FACTS
Private complainant, Danilo Tangcoy, is engaged in the business of lending money to casino
players. Tangcoy and Corpuz met at Admiral Royale Casino in Olongapo City sometime in
1990. There, Corpuz found out that Tangcoy was selling some pieces of jewelry. Corpuz then
offered to sell them on a commission basis. Tangcoy agreed and turned over the following
items: an 18k diamond ring for men; a woman's bracelet; one (1) men's necklace and another
men's bracelet, with an aggregate value of P98,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt of even
and unusual. Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come under the ban,
the punishment must be “flagrantly and plainly oppressive,” “wholly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the
community.” Cruel as it may be, as discussed above, it is for the Congress to amend
the law and adapt it to our modern time.
FACTS
Private complainant, Danilo Tangcoy, is engaged in the business of lending money to casino
players. Tangcoy and Corpuz met at Admiral Royale Casino in Olongapo City sometime in
1990. There, Corpuz found out that Tangcoy was selling some pieces of jewelry. Corpuz then
offered to sell them on a commission basis. Tangcoy agreed and turned over the following
items: an 18k diamond ring for men; a woman's bracelet; one (1) men's necklace and another
men's bracelet, with an aggregate value of P98,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt of even
date. They both agreed that petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to
return the same items, within a period of 60 days.
The period expired without petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces
of jewelry. When private complainant was able to meet the petitioner, the latter promised the
former that he will pay the value of the said items entrusted to him, but to no avail.
An information for estafa was then filed against petitioner.
Petitioner claimed that he did not have any agreement with Tangcoy. He claimed that he was
just made to sign a blank receipt in 1989 which was then dated 1991 by Tangcoy so that he
could use it as evidence.
RTC found Corpuz guilty of Estafa. Accordingly, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of deprivation of liberty consisting of an imprisonment under the Indeterminate
Sentence Law of FOUR (4) YEARS AND TWO (2) MONTHS of Prision Correccional in its
medium period AS MINIMUM, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS AND EIGHT (8) MONTHS of
Reclusion Temporal in its minimum period AS MAXIMUM; to indemnify private complainant
Danilo Tangcoy the amount of P98,000.00 as actual damages, and to pay the costs of suit.
Corpuz appealed. However, the Court of Appeals, just affirmed the decision of the RTC but
modified the sentence to 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years
of prision mayor, as maximum, plus 1 year for each additional P10,000.00, or a total of 7 years.
ISSUE
Whether or not the penalty imposed for the crime of estafa based on Article 315 par. 1
subparagraph (b) of the RPC should be applied? [Yes, however, what the Court could do in
such eventuality is to report the matter to the Chief Executive with a recommendation
for an amendment or modification of the legal provisions which it believes to be harsh.]
RULING
While this Court's Third Division was deliberating on this case, the question of the continued
validity of imposing on persons convicted of crimes involving property came up. The legislature
apparently pegged these penalties to the value of the money and property in 1930 when it
enacted the Revised Penal Code. Since the members of the division reached no unanimity on
this question and since the issues are of first impression, they decided to refer the case to the
Court en banc for consideration and resolution.
Thus, several amici curiae were invited at the behest of the Court to give their academic
opinions on the matter. Among those that graciously complied were Dean Jose Manuel
Diokno, Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria, Professor Alfredo F. Tadiar, the Senate President, and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The parties were later heard on oral arguments
before the Court en banc, with Atty. Mario L. Bautista appearing as counsel de oficio of the
petitioner.
There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties that the
courts continue to impose on crimes against property committed today, based on the amount of
damage measured by the value of money eighty years ago in 1932. However, this Court
cannot modify the said range of penalties because that would constitute judicial legislation.
What the legislature's perceived failure in amending the penalties provided for in the said
opinions on the matter. Among those that graciously complied were Dean Jose Manuel
Diokno, Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria, Professor Alfredo F. Tadiar, the Senate President, and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The parties were later heard on oral arguments
before the Court en banc, with Atty. Mario L. Bautista appearing as counsel de oficio of the
petitioner.
There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties that the
courts continue to impose on crimes against property committed today, based on the amount of
damage measured by the value of money eighty years ago in 1932. However, this Court
cannot modify the said range of penalties because that would constitute judicial legislation.
What the legislature's perceived failure in amending the penalties provided for in the said
crimes cannot be remedied through this Court's decisions, as that would be encroaching upon
the power of another branch of the government.
The Court cannot suspend the execution of a sentence on the ground that the strict
enforcement of the provisions of this Code would cause excessive or harsh penalty. All that the
Court could do in such eventuality is to report the matter to the Chief Executive with a
recommendation for an amendment or modification of the legal provisions which it believes to
be harsh.
An argument raised by Dean Jose Manuel I. Diokno, one of our esteemed amici curiae, is that
the incremental penalty provided under Article 315 of the RPC violates the Equal Protection
Clause. The equal protection clause requires equality among equals, which is determined
according to a valid classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that
of reasonableness, which has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;

(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
According to Dean Diokno, the Incremental Penalty Rule (IPR) does not rest on substantial
distinctions as P10,000.00 may have been substantial in the past, but it is not so today, which
violates the first requisite; the IPR was devised so that those who commit estafa involving
higher amounts would receive heavier penalties; however, this is no longer achieved, because
a person who steals P142,000.00 would receive the same penalty as someone who steals
hundreds of millions, which violates the second requisite; and, the IPR violates requisite no. 3,
considering that the IPR is limited to existing conditions at the time the law was promulgated,
conditions that no longer exist today.
Assuming that the Court submits to the argument of Dean Diokno and declares the incremental
penalty in Article 315 unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause, what then is the
penalty that should be applied in case the amount of the thing subject matter of the crime
exceeds P22,000.00? It seems that the proposition poses more questions than answers, which
leads us even more to conclude that the appropriate remedy is to refer these matters to
Congress for them to exercise their inherent power to legislate laws.
Even Dean Diokno was of the opinion that if the Court declares the IPR unconstitutional, the
remedy is to go to Congress.Dean Diokno also contends that Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
Admittedly, Congress is aware that there is an urgent need to amend the Revised Penal Code.
During the oral arguments, counsel for the Senate informed the Court that at present, fifty-six
(56) bills are now pending in the Senate seeking to amend the Revised Penal Code, each one
proposing much needed change and updates to archaic laws that were promulgated decades
ago when the political, socio-economic, and cultural settings were far different from today’s
conditions.
Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way that it shall not
usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such application or
construction, it should not make or supervise legislation, or under the guise of interpretation,
modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a construction which
is repugnant to its terms. The Court should apply the law in a manner that would give effect to
Admittedly, Congress is aware that there is an urgent need to amend the Revised Penal Code.
During the oral arguments, counsel for the Senate informed the Court that at present, fifty-six
(56) bills are now pending in the Senate seeking to amend the Revised Penal Code, each one
proposing much needed change and updates to archaic laws that were promulgated decades
ago when the political, socio-economic, and cultural settings were far different from today’s
conditions.
Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way that it shall not
usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such application or
construction, it should not make or supervise legislation, or under the guise of interpretation,
modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a construction which
is repugnant to its terms. The Court should apply the law in a manner that would give effect to
their letter and spirit, especially when the law is clear as to its intent and purpose. Succinctly
put, the Court should shy away from encroaching upon the primary function of a co-equal
branch of the Government; otherwise, this would lead to an inexcusable breach of the doctrine
of separation of powers by means of judicial legislation.
Moreover, it is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a Fine;
hence, it can be increased by the Court when appropriate.
It should be noted that the death penalty was reintroduced in the dispensation of criminal
justice by the Ramos Administration by virtue of Republic Act No. 765940 in December 1993.
The said law has been questioned before this Court. There is, arguably, no punishment more
cruel than that of death. Yet still, from the time the death penalty was re-imposed until its lifting
in June 2006 by Republic Act No. 9346, the Court did not impede the imposition of the death
penalty on the ground that it is a "cruel punishment" within the purview of Section 19 (1), Article
III of the Constitution. Ultimately, it was through an act of Congress suspending the imposition
of the death penalty that led to its non-imposition and not via the intervention of the Court.
Besides, it has long been held that the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is
generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of
duration or amount, and applies to punishments which public sentiment has regarded as cruel
or obsolete, for instance, those inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the
stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like. Fine and imprisonment would not
thus be within the prohibition. It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of
proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. The fact that the
punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual. Expressed
in other terms, it has been held that to come under the ban, the punishment must be "flagrantly
and plainly oppressive," "wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the
moral sense of the community."
One final note, the Court should give Congress a chance to perform its primordial duty of
lawmaking. The Court should not preempt Congress and usurp its inherent powers of making
and enacting laws. While it may be the most expeditious approach, a short cut by judicial fiat is
a dangerous proposition, lest the Court dare trespass on prohibited judicial legislation.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 5, 2007 of petitioner Lito
Corpuz is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution
dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification the
Decision dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, San Fernando City,
finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code, are hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed is the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging
from THREE (3) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ELEVEN DAYS of
prisión correccional, as minimum, to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a Copy of this Decision be furnished the
President of the Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Justice. Also, let a copy
of this Decision be furnished the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives.
Additional Notes
Dissenting opinion, CARPIO, J.:
“I vote to grant the petition in part by declaring unconstitutional that portion of the
first paragraph of Article 315 of Act No. 3815, as amended (Code), mandating the
imposition of maximum penalty based on the amount of the fraud exceeding
P22,000. I do so on the ground that imposing the maximum period of the penalty
prisión correccional, as minimum, to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a Copy of this Decision be furnished the
President of the Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Justice. Also, let a copy
of this Decision be furnished the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives.
Additional Notes
Dissenting opinion, CARPIO, J.:
“I vote to grant the petition in part by declaring unconstitutional that portion of the
first paragraph of Article 315 of Act No. 3815, as amended (Code), mandating the
imposition of maximum penalty based on the amount of the fraud exceeding
P22,000. I do so on the ground that imposing the maximum period of the penalty
prescribed in Article 315(1) of the Code in such a manner, unadjusted to inflation,
amounts to cruel punishment within the purview of Section 19(1), Article III of the
Constitution.”
View that by imposing a level of punishment for estafa equal to more serious crimes such as
homicide and kidnapping,
Article 315’s system of calibrating the maximum penalty based on the amount of fraud is plainly
arbitrary and disproportionate to the severity of the crime punished.—
Article 315 of the Code calibrates the maximum penalty for estafa on an escalated
basis once a threshold amount of fraud is crossed (P22,000). The penalty escalates on
a ratio of one year imprisonment for every P10,000 fraud, with 20 years as ceiling.
Accordingly, for a fraud of P98,000, the trial court sentenced the petitioner to a
maximum term of 15 years. This punishment, however, is within the range of the
penalty imposable on petitioner under the Code had he “killed the [private
complainant] jeweler in an angry confrontation.” The same penalty would also be
within the range prescribed by the Code had the petitioner kidnapped the private
complainant and kept him detained for three days.
By any objective standard of comparison, crimes resulting in the deprivation of life or
liberty are unquestionably more serious than crimes resulting in the deprivation of
property.
By imposing a level of punishment for estafa equal to more serious crimes
such as homicide and kidnapping, Article 315’s system of calibrating the
maximum penalty based on the amount of fraud is plainly arbitrary and
disproportionate to the severity of the crime punished.
View that the constitutional infirmity not only of Article 315 but also of related provisions in the
Code calls for a
comprehensive review by Congress of such 82-year old legislation.—
The constitutional infirmity not only of Article 315 but also of related provisions in the
Code calls for a comprehensive review by Congress of such 82-year old legislation.
Pending such congressional review, this Court should decline to enforce the
incremental penalty in Article 315 because such continued enforcement of the
incremental penalty violates the Cruel Punishment Clause.
Indeed, the Filipino people who ratified the present Constitution could not have intended to
limit the reach of the Cruel Punishment Clause to cover torture and other forms of
odious punishments only because nearly four decades before the present Constitution took
effect, the Philippine government joined the community of nations in approving the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948 which bans “torture or x x x cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.”21 In 1986, shortly before the Constitution took effect, the
Philippines ratified the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) containing
an identically worded prohibition. These international norms formed part of Philippine law as
generally accepted principles of international law and binding treaty obligation, respectively.
Maturan v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 227155, March 28,

2017 - Arre
[TOPIC FROM OUTLINE]
JOEL T. MATURAN , petitioner, vs .
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ALLAN PATIÑO, respondents
March 28, 2017 G.R. No. 227155 BERSAMIN, J
Section 19 (1), Article III,1987 Constitution
Section 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
inflicted.
FACTS
On October 16, 2015, the petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
Provincial Governor of Basilan to be contested in the 2016 National and Local Elections. Allan
Patiño, claiming to be a registered voter of Basilan, filed a petition for the disqualification of the
petitioner on the ground that based on the list issued by the COMELEC Campaign Finance
Officer the latter had failed to file his SOCE corresponding to the 2010 and 2013 elections.
The petitioner opposed the petition for his disqualification by arguing that the petition had been
rendered moot on account of his withdrawal from the mayoralty race during the 2013 elections;
and that, consequently, he could only be held accountable for the failure to file his SOCE
corresponding to the 2010 elections when he ran for Provincial Governor of Basilan, and for
which he had already paid a fine of P15,000.00.
The COMELEC First Division issued a resolution declaring perpetually disqualified to hold
public office. In its resolution, the Court cited the case of Pilar v. COMELEC:
Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and
expenditures because he was a 'non-candidate,' having withdrawn his certificate of candidacy
three days after its filing. Petitioner posits that "it is . . . clear from the law that the candidate must
have entered the political contest, and should have either won or lost." Petitioner's argument is
without merit. Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 states that "every candidate" has the obligation to file
his statement of contributions and expenditures.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bench, as the law does not make any distinction or qualification as to whether the
candidate pursued
his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term "every candidate" must be deemed to refer not
only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his
candidacy. The COMELEC, the body tasked with the enforcement and administration of all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall,
issued Resolution No. 2348 in implementation or interpretation of the provisions of Republic Act
No. 7166 on election contributions and expenditures. Section 13 of Resolution No. 23488
categorically refers to "all candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy." Furthermore,
Section 14 of the law uses the word "shall." As a general rule, the use of the word "'shall" in a
statute implies that the statute is mandatory, and imposes a duty which may be enforced,
particularly if public policy is in favor of this meaning or where public interest is involved. We apply
the general rule.
The petitioner appealed the case to COMELEC en banc, but was also denied hence this
petition. Petitioner submits:
1. That he only failed to submit his SOCE once, in 2010. He pleads good faith because
he thought that he was no longer required to submit his SOCE for the 2013 elections
because of his having withdrawn from the mayoral race in that year.
2. That the penalty of perpetual disqualification is excessive, harsh and cruel, and,
consequently, unconstitutional since failure to file SOCE is a less grave offense than
the crimes under the RPC and under the civil service laws.
ISSUE
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion for imposing perpetual
disqualification on petitioner? (NO)
Whether or not the imposition of perpetual disqualification to hold public office for those who
failed to file their SOCE more
than once is gravely excessive and disproportionate ? (NO)
petition. Petitioner submits:
1. That he only failed to submit his SOCE once, in 2010. He pleads good faith because
he thought that he was no longer required to submit his SOCE for the 2013 elections
because of his having withdrawn from the mayoral race in that year.
2. That the penalty of perpetual disqualification is excessive, harsh and cruel, and,
consequently, unconstitutional since failure to file SOCE is a less grave offense than
the crimes under the RPC and under the civil service laws.
ISSUE
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion for imposing perpetual
disqualification on petitioner? (NO)
Whether or not the imposition of perpetual disqualification to hold public office for those who
failed to file their SOCE more
than once is gravely excessive and disproportionate ? (NO)
RULING
1. COMELEC acted within their jurisdiction coming from the provisions of Sec. 14 of RA
7166 (see provision in notes). The petitioner should have paid heed to the 1995 ruling
in Pilar v. Commission on Elections, which the COMELEC properly cited in its assailed
resolution. Based on Pilar, every candidate, including one who meanwhile withdraws
his candidacy, is required to file his SOCE by Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166. Accordingly,
the petitioner could not invoke good faith on the basis of his having withdrawn his
candidacy a day before the 2013 elections.
2. The law would always enforce a statute like R.A. No. 7166 unless there is a clear
showing that it contravenes the Constitution. The petitioner has not demonstrated
herein how R.A. No. 7166 could have transgressed the Constitution. On the
contrary, a review of R.A. No. 7166 convincingly indicates that perpetual
disqualification from public office has been prescribed as a penalty for the repeated
failure to file the SOCE and does not constitute cruel, degrading and inhuman
punishment. We have already settled that the constitutional proscription under the Bill
of Rights extends only to situations of extreme corporeal or psychological punishment
that strips the individual of his humanity. In Lim v. People: SDHTE
Settled is the rule that a punishment authorized by statute is not cruel, degrading or
disproportionate to the nature of the offense unless it is flagrantly and plainly
oppressive and wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the
moral sense of the community. It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of
proportion or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. Based on this
principle, the Court has consistently overruled contentions of the defense that the
penalty of fine or imprisonment authorized by the statute involved is cruel and
degrading. In People vs. Tongko, this Court held that the prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment is generally aimed at the form or character of the
punishment rather than its severity in respect of its duration or amount, and applies
to punishments which never existed in America or which public sentiment regards as
cruel or obsolete. This refers, for instance, to those inflicted at the whipping post or in
the pillory, to burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling and the like.
The fact that the penalty is severe provides insufficient basis to declare a law
unconstitutional and does not, by that circumstance alone, make it cruel and
inhuman.
Moreover, that Congress has deemed fit to impose the penalty of perpetual
disqualification on candidates who repeatedly failed to file their SOCEs cannot be the
subject of judicial inquiry. Congress has the absolute discretion to penalize by law with
perpetual disqualification from holding public office in addition to administrative fines
the seekers of public office who fail more than once to file their SOCEs. Such penalty
is intended to underscore the need to file the SOCE as another means of ensuring the
sanctity of the electoral process.
Additional Notes
Section 14. Statement of Contributions and Expenditures: Effect of Failure to File Statement. —
Every candidate and treasurer of the political party shall, within thirty (30) days after the day of the
election, file in duplicate with the offices of the Commission the full, true and itemized statement of
all contributions and expenditures in connection with the election.
xxx xxx xxx
Except candidates for elective barangay office, failure to file the statements or reports in connection
with electoral contributions and expenditures are required herein shall constitute an administrative
offense for which the offenders shall be liable to pay an administrative fine ranging from One
thousand pesos (P1,000.00) to Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00), in the discretion of the
Commission. The fine shall be paid within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of such failure;
otherwise, it shall be enforceable by a writ of execution issued by the Commission against the
properties of the offender.
xxx xxx xxx
For the commission of a second or subsequent offense under this section, the administrative fine
shall be from Two thousand
pesos (P2,000.00.) to Sixty thousand pesos (P60,000.00), in the discretion of the Commission. In
disqualification on candidates who repeatedly failed to file their SOCEs cannot be the
subject of judicial inquiry. Congress has the absolute discretion to penalize by law with
perpetual disqualification from holding public office in addition to administrative fines
the seekers of public office who fail more than once to file their SOCEs. Such penalty
is intended to underscore the need to file the SOCE as another means of ensuring the
sanctity of the electoral process.
Additional Notes
Section 14. Statement of Contributions and Expenditures: Effect of Failure to File Statement. —
Every candidate and treasurer of the political party shall, within thirty (30) days after the day of the
election, file in duplicate with the offices of the Commission the full, true and itemized statement of
all contributions and expenditures in connection with the election.
xxx xxx xxx
Except candidates for elective barangay office, failure to file the statements or reports in connection
with electoral contributions and expenditures are required herein shall constitute an administrative
offense for which the offenders shall be liable to pay an administrative fine ranging from One
thousand pesos (P1,000.00) to Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00), in the discretion of the
Commission. The fine shall be paid within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of such failure;
otherwise, it shall be enforceable by a writ of execution issued by the Commission against the
properties of the offender.
xxx xxx xxx
For the commission of a second or subsequent offense under this section, the administrative fine
shall be from Two thousand
pesos (P2,000.00.) to Sixty thousand pesos (P60,000.00), in the discretion of the Commission. In
addition, the offender shall be subject to perpetual disqualification to hold public office.

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