PEOPLE VS.

SIMON

FACTS:

The respondent was sentenced with the punishment of reclusion perpetua for violating
the Dangerous Drug Act (RA No. 6425). He allegedly sold four tea bags of marijuana to
a Narcotics Command during a buy-bust operation which was sold for P40.00. The said
buy-bust operation was executed on or about October 22, 1988.

In this case, the respondent was praying for a lesser punishment under the Revised
Penal Code (RPC).

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent can avail of the lesser punishment pursuant to Art. 22 of
the RPC.

RULING:

Yes, the respondent can avail of the lesser punishment prescribed by Art 22 of the RPC.

Republic Act No. 7659 already took effect on December 31, 1993 after its publication on
December 16, 1993 while the respondent was still serving his sentence.

Hence, the respondent was given an indeterminate penalty of arresto mayor or prision
correctional instead of serving its full sentence of reclusion perpetua.

LADONGA vs. PEOPLE

FACTS:
Evangelina and Adronico Ladonga and spouse, conspiring and knowing fully well that
they did not have sufficient funds deposited with the United Coconut Planters Bank
(UCPB), drew and issue UCPB Check No. 284743 postdated July 7, 1990 in the
amount of P9,075.55), payable to Alfredo Oculam, and thereafter, without informing the
latter that they did not have sufficient funds deposited with the bank to cover up the
amount of the check, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously pass on,
indorse, give and deliver the said check to Alfredo by way of rediscounting of the
aforementioned checks; however, upon presentation of the check to the drawee bank
for encashment, the same was dishonored for the reason that the account of the
accused had already been closed, to the damage and prejudice of Alfredo.
The RTC rendered a joint decision finding the Ladonga spouses guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22. Adronico applied for probation which was
granted. On the other hand, petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing
that the RTC erred in finding her criminally liable for conspiring with her husband as the
principle of conspiracy is inapplicable to B.P. Blg. 22 which is a special law; moreover,
she is not a signatory of the checks and had no participation in the issuance thereof.

ISSUE:
a.) Whether conspiracy is applicable in violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, by
invoking art. 10 of RPC?
b.) Whether or not the cases cited by the CA in affirming in toto the conviction of
petitioner as conspirator applying the suppletory character of the RPC to special laws
like BP 22 is applicable?

RULING:
A.) YES. Some provisions of the Revised Penal Code, especially with the addition of
the second sentence in Article 10, are applicable to special laws. It submits that B.P.
Blg. 22 does not provide any prohibition regarding the applicability in a suppletory
character of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code to it.
Article 10 of the RPC reads as follows: ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions
of this Code. – Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special
laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary
to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.
The article is composed of two clauses. The first provides that offenses which in the
future are made punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of the
RPC, while the second makes the RPC supplementary to such laws
B.) B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory application of the
provisions of the RPC. Thus, in the absence of contrary provision in B.P. Blg. 22, the
general provisions of the RPC which, by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be
applied suppletorily. Indeed, in the recent case of Yu vs. People the Court applied
suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary imprisonment under Article 39 of the RPC to
B.P. Blg. 22.
The suppletory application of the principle of conspiracy in this case is analogous to the
application of the provision on principals under Article 17 in U.S. vs. Ponte. For once
conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is
the act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each
of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals. BUT In the
present case, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed any overt act in
furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. Conspiracy must be established, not by
conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence. Thus, Petitioner Evangeline
Ladonga is ACQUITTED of the charges against her under B.P. Blg. 22 for failure of the
prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. No pronouncement as to
costs.

REPUBLIC vs. COJUANCO Jr.

G.R. No. 139930 June 26, 2012

FACTS:
In 1977, Regala, Lazatin, et al incorporated the United Coconut Oil Mills, Inc.
(UNICOM). On August 29, 1979 the Board of Directors of the UCPB, composed of
respondents Cojuangco et al, authorized UCPB to invest not more than P500 million
from the fund in the equity of UNICOM for the benefit of the coconut farmers. On
September 4, 1979 UNICOM increased its authorized capital stock to 10 million shares
without par value. On September 18, 1979, a new set of UNICOM directors, composed
of respondents Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., et al approved another amendment to
UNICOM’s capitalization by increasing its authorized capital stock to one billion shares.
The paid-up subscriptions of 5 million shares without par value were then converted to
500 million Class A voting common shares without par value per share.

Respondents amended again UNICOM’s capitalization on September 18, 1979, giving

the incorporators unwarranted benefits by increasing their 1 million shares to 100 million
shares without cost to them. And UNICOM filed its Certificate of Filing of Amended AOI
with the SEC on February 8, 1980, making public respondents acts as board of
directors.

On March 1, 1990 the Office of the Solicitor General filed a complaint for violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019 against respondents, the 1979 members of the
UCPB board of directors, before the PCGG. Nine years later, the Office of the Special
Prosecutor issued a memorandum that the action has already prescribed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents alleged violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 already
prescribed.

RULING:
R.A. 3019 being a special law, the 10-year prescriptive period should be computed in
accordance with Section 2 of Act 3326 which states that “prescription shall begin to run
from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known
at the time, from the discovery thereof xxx”

That investment does not, however, appear to have been withheld from the public. The
transaction left the confines of the UCPB and UNICOM board rooms when UNICOM
applied with the SEC to accommodate UCPB’s investment. Changes in shareholdings
are reflected in the General Information Sheets that corporations have been mandated
to submit annually to the SEC.

Reckoning the 10-year prescriptive period from the commission of the violation of law,
the last day for filing the action was, at the latest, on February 8, 1990. Hence, the
action has already prescribed.

SIERRA VS. PEOPLE

FACTS:
Petitioner was 15 years old when he raped a minor. He was convicted of rape
and was imposed a penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and a fine. He
elevated the case to CA and during the pendence of the case, RA 9344 took effect. CA
affirmed the conviction and denied the defense of minority since the age was not
established by presenting the birth certificate but only alleged in the testimonial of the
petitioner and his mother. According to them the burden of proof of age is upon the
prosecution.
ISSUES:
Who has the burden of proof in establishing the age of the accused?
Whether the law be given retroactive application.
RULING:
The duty to establish the age of the accused is not on the prosecution but on the
accused. Age can be established by birth certificate. Sec. 7 provides that in the absence
of such document, age may be based from the information of the child, testimonies of
other persons, physical appearance and other relevant evidence. Also in case of doubt,
minority should be in favour of the child. In the case at bar, minority was established by
the testimonies of the petitioner and his mother. This was not objected by the
prosecution and did not even presented contrary evidence. Thus, minority is
established.
 The law should be given retroactive application since this favors the accused as
provided for in the Revised Penal Code – penal laws favouring the accused should be
given retroactive effect. Hence the accused is considered a minor with an age of not
above 15 years old. The case is dismissed and the petitioner is referred to the
appropriate local social welfare.

ORTEGA vs. PEOPLE

FACTS:

At the time of commission of rape, the accused was only 13 years old, while the victim
AAA was 6, both minors. It was alleged that petitioner raped her three times on three
different occasions in 1996. The lower courts convicted him of rape with criminal and
civil liability imposed. The case was pending when Republic Act 9344 (R.A. No. 9344)
or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, was enacted amending the age of
criminal irresponsibility being raised from 9 to 15 years old. Said law took effect on May
20, 2006. At the time of the promulgation of judgment, the accused already reached the
age of majority. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claimed that petitioner is not
exempt from criminal liability because he is not anymore a child as defined by R.A. No.
9344. The OSG further claimed that the retroactive effect of said law is applicable only if
the child-accused is still below 18 years old.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is exempt in the crime alleged by reason of minority

HELD:

Yes, the petitioner is exempt from criminal liability. For one who acts by virtue of any of
the exempting circumstances, although he commits a crime, by the complete absence
of any of the conditions which constitute free will or voluntariness of the act, no criminal
liability arises. Hence, while there is a crime committed, no criminal liability attaches.

By virtue of the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. 9344), the age of
criminal irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15 years old. Petitioner was only 13
years old at the time of the commission of the alleged rape. The first paragraph of
Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 clearly provides that, a child fifteen (15) years of age or
under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability.
However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20
of this Act. The Court gives retroactive application insofar as it favors the persons guilty
of a felony. While the law exempts the petitioner from criminal liability, however, he is not
exempt from civil liability. For this reason, petitioner and/or his parents are liable to pay
AAA civil indemnity.

MADALI vs. PEOPLE

August 2009

FACTS:

Raymund, 14 years old, and Rodel Madali, 16 years old, along with Jojo Bernardino,
were charged with homicide for the killing of AAA of Romblon.
Jovencio, a cousin of the victim who witnessed the killing, claims that on the night of
April 13, 1999 Raymund and Rodel Madali, Bernardino, AAA and him were gathered
near the National high school up in the hagdan-hagdan. Bernardino blindfolded AAA
with a handkerchief from Raymund. Bernardino gave the first blow using a coconut
frond, next by Raymund and when AAA wobbled, Rodel punched him while wearing
brass knuckles. All Jovencio could muster was say “enough” twice. Yet the three did not
stop but instead hanged AAA on the tree using the handkerchief and the dog chain.
Before leaving the area, Rodel threatened Jovencio to not tell anyone or else he will be
next. The corpse of AAA was found a few days later. The body was decomposing and
stinking.
Jovencio filed an information against the three but recanted it and refiled it again.
After the final judgement was pronounced, Bernardino filed for probation. Raymund’s
case on the other hand was dismissed due to RA 9344 also known as Juvenile Justice
and Welfare Act of 2006 for being only 14 years old at the time of the commission of the
offense. Rodel’s case however, was sustained but was suspended pursuant to RA
9344.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners should be exempted from criminal liability.

RULING:

Yes, the petitioners should be exempted from criminal liability by virtue of RA 9344.

Petitioners should be exempt from criminal liability due to the provisions of RA 9344.
Although it was only passed on 2006, it can be applied to petitioners since laws
favorable to the accused can have retroactive effect. Section 38 of the act also provides
for the automatic suspension of sentence. The exemptions however, differ. Raymond’s
case is dismissed for being only 15 years old at the time of the commission of the crime.
Rodel’s case was sustained since he was 16 at the time of the commission. His
sentence was however suspended. And since he acted with discernment, he shall be
under an intervention program.

PEOPLE vs. JACINTO,

FACTS:
Accused-appellant Hermie Jacinto, is charged and convicted in the lower courts of
raping a 5-year old child, AAA. Jacinto is neighbours with the family of AAA for a long
time and he was friends with the victim's father. The victim AAA knew Jacinto well, as
she calls him Kuya. On January 2003, the victim's father sent his other daughter, CCC,
to the store to buy cigarettes and the victim followed her older sister but did not return
with the latter. The father thought that she was left behind to watch television at another
house. A witness saw Jacinto with the victim later on, at the store where the latter was
seated in his lap. The victim testified that when she left the store with the accused
Jacinto, he had carnal knowledge of her. She went home crying after the incident. The
victim's father confronted Jacinto and called the police. AAA underwent a physical
check-up which leads to findings that she had been raped. For his defence, Jacinto
interposed an alibi, that he attended a birthday party at the time of the incident and that
the victim merely followed him when he went to the store. The RTC found Jacinto guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. Thereafter, the defence moved to reopen the trial for
reception of newly discovered evidence. It is stated that appellant Jacinto was born on
March 1, 1985. This means that at the time of the alleged commission of the crime, he
was merely 17 years old. The RTC appreciated the new evidence and reduced the
penalty. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not accused appellant Jacinto should be convicted of rape. What is the
imposable penalty on the appellant?

RULING:
Yes, SC confirms conviction. However due to the retroactive effect of RA9344, and it
being
proven that Jacinto was a minor at the time the crime was committed.
The rape that took place has been sufficiently proven in the court. Therefore, the
Supreme Court found sufficient ground for conviction. In 2003, at the time of the
commission of the crime, Jacinto was 17 years old. Though the RA9344 took effect only
in 2006, it is given a retroactive effect. Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 exempts a child
above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen(18) years of age from criminal liability,
unless the child is found to have acted with discernment, in which case, "the appropriate
proceedings" in accordance with the Act shall be observed. In the present case, Jacinto
showed discernment in committing the crime as proven by the facts that he chose an
isolated and dark place to perpetrate the crime, to prevent detection andhe boxed the
victim to weaken her defense. These are indicative of then 17 year-old appellants
mental capacity to fully understand the consequences of his unlawful action.To give
meaning to the legislative intent of the Act, the promotion of the welfare of a child in
conflict with the law should extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit of
twenty-one (21)years, so long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a
child. The offender shall be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and
reintegration in accordance with the Act in order that he/she is given the chance to live a
normal life and become a productive member of the community.

The age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of the
judgment of conviction is not material. What matters is that the offender committed the
offense when he/she was still of tender age. RA No. 9344 warrants the suspension of
sentence of a child in conflict with the law notwithstanding that he/she has reached the
age of majority at the time the judgment of conviction is pronounced.

According to the law, the appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp or any other
training facility in accordance with Sec. 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.

ISLAW , Not applicable to Escapee

PEOPLE vs. MARTINADO
G.R. No. 169872. October 19,1992

FACTS:
On November 14,1986 in Caloocan City, conspiring together and mutually helping one
another they attacked and stabbed Juan Matias y Reyes with a sharp pointed
instrument and feloniously rob and carry away some articles belonging to the victim.
Eliseo and Hermogenes were arraigned with the assistance of a counsel and pleaded
“not guilty”. While Rolly, has not been formally identified and is still at large. The trial
court concluded that the prosecution convincingly established the special cimplex crime
of Robbery with homicide. At the outset, this Court, has to resolve the propriety of the
interposed appeal insofar as accused Eliseo Martinado, which the promulgation was
made in his absence because he had escaped on August 6,1988, exactly five (5) days
after the defense rested its case, from Kalookan City Jail. The escape, however, was
reported to the trial court on August 8,1988. Consequently, the trial court issued a
warrant of arrest for him, which was returned unserved per information that accused
cannot be seen for a long period of time.Eliseo was re-arrested in Palo,Leyte by
Speacial Action Team of Kalookan Police station.

ISSUE:
WON Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW) is applicable to an escapee.

RULING:
NO.
Accused Eliseo Martinado, however, shall not be entitled to the benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law as he had escaped from confinement.Accordingly, he is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of Seventeen(17) years, four(4)
months and one(1) day reclusion temporal maximum.

VILLAREALvs. PEOPLE

FACTS:

In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University
School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila
Fraternity). Hazing was pre-requisite in joining for which Lenny was one of few who had
undergone the process. After the initiation, Lenny’s condition worsened due to the blows
he received, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on
arrival.

Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the 35 Aquilans. Four of
the accused (Tecson, et. al.) were found to be guilty of homicide by the trial court but
was reduced to crime of slight physical injuries and sentenced to 20 days of arresto
menor by the Court of Appeals. However, upon appeal to the Supreme Court by the
Office of the Solicitor General, the Supreme Court ruled that they should be liable for
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide instead.

In Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration, Tecson et. al. clarified the effect of the
decision of the Supreme Court to their criminal liability. According to Tecson et. al., they
immediately applied for probation after the CA rendered its Decision lowering their
criminal liability from the crime of homicide, which carries a non-probationable sentence,
to slight physical injuries, which carries a probationable sentence. Hence, they have
already been discharged from their criminal liability and the cases against them closed
and terminated by virtue of their granted Applications for Probation for which the terms
therein are already been complied with.

ISSUE:

Whether Tecson et. al. can be covered by the Probation Law despite their appeal of
conviction?

RULING:

Yes. First, the Court in resolving this issue ruled that the RTC Branch 130 had no
jurisdiction to act on the probation applications of Tecson et. al. for the law requires that
an application for probation be filed with the trial court that convicted and sentenced the
defendant, meaning the court of origin (Branch 121). Hence, its grant of probation with
Tecson et. al. is void.

However, the Court abandoning its previous stance on ineligibility of those who have
appealed their conviction to probation, citing the then recent case of Colinares vs.
People that the Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation
through no fault of his. Had the RTC done what was right and imposed the correct
penalty, he would have had the right to apply for probation. Moreover, the Court was
quick to clarify that it remains that those who will appeal from judgments of conviction,
when they have the option to try for probation, forfeit their right to apply for that
privilege.

SORIANO v. CA
G.R. No. 123936
March 4, 1999
Payment of civil indemnity is not violative of the equal protection clause as this is
imposed by law as a consequence of the commission of a crime

FACTS:
Petitioner Ronald Soriano was convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting
to homicide, serious physical injuries and damage to property after being involved in a
vehicular accident which killed Isidrino Daluyong. His application for probation was
granted and among the terms and conditions imposed were: (a) he shall meet his family
responsibilities; (b) devoting to a specific employment or pursuing a prescribed secular
study or vocational training; (c) indemnify the heirs of the victim Daluyong in the amount
of P98,560.

A motion to cancel his probation was filed due to his failure to indemnify the heirs of the
victim and a supplemental motion alleging petitioner’s commission of another crime
while he was awaiting arraignment. The trial court denied the motion and instead
directed petitioner to submit a program of payment of the civil liability imposed on him.
Based on the information provided by the heirs of Daluyong, petitioner still failed to
satisfy his civil liability. Soriano was made to explain his non-compliance and to submit
his program of payment immediately otherwise he would be cited for contempt. For
continuous failure to comply with the orders, his probation was revoked on October
1994 for his failure to: (a) meet his family responsibilities; (b) engage in a specific
employment, (c) satisfy his civil liability to the heirs of the victim, and (d) cooperate with
his program of supervision.

Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals claiming that
respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in holding petitioner contempt
and revoking his probation. The CA dismissed the petition holding that Soriano’s
“stubborn unwillingness” to comply with the orders of the trial court “shows his refusal to
reform himself and to correct a wrong.” A motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the revocation of petitioner’s probation is lawful and proper

RULING:
YES. Revocation of probation is lawful and proper. Probation is not an absolute right. It
is a mere privilege whose grant rests upon the discretion of the trial court subject to
certain terms and conditions. Having the power to grant probation, the trial court also
has the power to revoke it in a proper case and under appropriate circumstances. Since
petitioner admitted in violating the terms and conditions of his probation, he cannot
anymore assail the revocation of his probation.

Soriano claims that his non-compliance was due to his poor financial condition and that
it was impossible for him to formulate a program as he only relies on his parents for
support and he was in no position to comply with the same. He even questioned the
constitutionality of the requirement imposed as this harped on his alleged poverty. –
This requirement is NOT violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Payment of civil liability is not a condition precedent to probation. The trial court could
not have done away with imposing civil liability as it is not an arbitrary imposition but
one required by law. Petitioner may be poor, but this is precisely the reason why the trial
court gave him the chance to make his own program of payment in contrast to the cited
Salgado case where a program of payment was already imposed upon the petitioner
therein.

Petitioner also asserts that his non-compliance with the orders of the trial court to
submit a program of payment was not deliberate as the notice was received by his
counsel and did not notify petitioner immediately. – NO MERIT. His refusal to comply
with said orders cannot be anything but deliberate as petitioner had notice of both
orders and refused to comply with the trial court’s directive. Petitioner’s counsel has not
been shown to be grossly irresponsible as to cause prejudice to petitioner’s rights. The
fact that petitioner submitted a motion for reconsideration of the said order, shows proof
that he received the notice but still failed to provide the required program of payment.