Case 1

In practice, many of the people responsible for committing or overseeing the most serious
abuses in the context of natural exploitation are those who have also committed other types of
human rights abuses, especially in the context of the conflict. For example, some of the leaders
of armed groups who have since been arrested, including some of those indicted by the
International Criminal Court for crimes committed in Ituri, have been directly implicated in illicit
natural resource exploitation, yet none of them have been charged with these crimes. Other
leaders of armed groups have never been arrested for any of the crimes they have committed.
Instead, they have been given positions of responsibility in the Congolese national army.
The search for justice in this context poses a significant challenge. The intertwining of high level
political, military and economic interests has meant that it has been extremely difficult for
victims to seek justice for these crimes; combined with the lack of independence of the
judiciary, it has ensured that impunity has prevailed. The influence of private companies has
also obstructed the search for justice, as illustrated by the Kilwa case.
The case could have set an important precedent in terms of corporate accountability. Instead,
interference and obstruction by high level business interests prevented justice from taking its
course; the judges failed to take into account strong eye-witness testimony at the trial and
witnesses were intimidated. All the defendants were acquitted of the charges relating to the
events in Kilwa, in a trial by a military court which failed to meet international standards of
fairness. The scope of the Commission’s work was restricted and it did not investigate incidents
of human rights abuses in detail.

Case 2
First, one of the most non transparent passages in Article II of the Genocide Convention, where
the crime of genocide is defined, is the phrasing “to destroy, in whole or in part.” How big a
part is a part? There is consensus that the genocides that occurred on a very large scale, like
Rwanda and the Nazi genocides, reach this threshold. These genocides involved large numbers
of victims and large proportions of the populations of the targeted groups. Concrete standards
are needed to establish thresholds for the definition of genocide.
Second, all existing verdicts on genocide have been rendered by ad hoc tribunals against
individuals. This in fact is the only type of verdict these tribunals could hand down, as only
individuals can be tried before them. But on some level this record makes little sense. Genocide
is not a crime planned, organised or carried out by an individual. Its scale and scope require a
state, or at least an institution that resembles a state.
Third, the case raises the question of what sorts of issues international courts are willing or able
to make rulings on. International law begins its history from a narrow foundation, dedicated to
regulating activities like shipping. Its move into political questions and questions of
humanitarian law comes late, and in most cases has been taken hesitantly.
Fourth, although ICJ is not able to impose penalties – its authority is limited to determining
whether a state has violated an international agreement – the verdict invites discussion about
what states are obliged to do for victims of crimes. While it is hard to answer the question of
what would an appropriate penalty for genocide would be, it is reasonable and necessary to
consider how states ought to respond. In this case, the ICJ’s response was limited.

Case 3
Although the harm suffered by Mexico and Mexican nationals because of the failure of U.S.
officials to provide notification of consular rights under article 36 and the U.S. court system
seemingly blind eye to such failures is considerable in its own right, it also carries significance in
a broader context. For example, despite Mexico’s legal, philosophical, and Doctrinal opposition
outlined above to Mexican nationals facing criminal prosecution abroad, extradition relations
between Mexico and the United States have been improving. This progress and its continuation
are particularly crucial to the war on drugs, which is hampered by Mexico’s restrictive
extradition policy creating a safe haven for drug traffickers in Mexico.7 Furthermore, one
author has noted that despite the recent signs of increased cooperation on this matter, the
existence of several practical and theoretical obstacles stand in the way of making the extradi
tion of Mexican narcotics traffickers a common practice.

Case 4
Sahrawi, although coming from a former Spanish colony, are not included in the privileged
system for naturalisation and dual nationality which applies to citizens from countries with
historical ties with Spain. This can be easily explained by the fact that the majority of the
international community still does not recognise Western Sahara is as a sovereign state. In such
a case, the principle of reciprocity in applying the same rules as used for other former Spanish
colonies cannot be implemented, as there is no partner to negotiate with on equal terms. The
likelihood is that no change in current Spanish nationality legislation will be enacted to include
Sahrawis in the privileged system for naturalization, unless the international conflict is resolved
either by the self-determination of the Western Sahara or by an internationally recognised
incorporation into Morocco.
However, if the procedure is perceived as being recovery of nationality, then it would attract
immigration by Western Saharans to Spain, or even to other EU countries. The legislation
remains unclear, and its interpretation is currently mainly in the hands of civil registry and
courts. In other words, this case proves that at the edges of EU citizenship, the terms of
inclusion and exclusion have no clear definition, but are subjected to the ups and downs of
Member States’ international relations, especially with respect to their past his tory. As a
consequence of this, these terms are subject to the discretion of authority ties which apply
contradictory criteria.

Case 5
Conclusion The opinion of the IC that there is no prohibition in international law on declarations
of independence per se, without providing any commentary on possible entitlements to such a
declaration, unfortunately does very little to further the jurisprudence on sovereignty and
statehood, arguably creating more questions than it answers. It would appear at this point in
time that the law is of little use in determining disputes over sovereignty, leaving states
rehanton principles of effective control and international recognition:
The narrow configuration of the Security Council Resolution, however, to exclude actors, such
as the Assembly of Kosovo, when acting in a slightly different capacity, is a controversial movies
that may well have larger ramifications if the comments of Judges Bennouna and Skotnikov are
to be followed.
Meanwhile, the debate over the independence of Kosovo continue. On 9 September 2010, the
UN accepted a Resolution by Serbia and the EU. The Resolution affirmed that Serbu does not
and shall not recognise the unilateral Declaration of Kosovo’s independence, however, Serbia is
prepared to enter into a dialogue with Kosovo, facilitated by the EU. At the time of writing
these dialogues had yet to commence. The ICJ has passed up a rare opportunity, not only to
provide guidance on the status of Kosovo and the effect of their Declaration, but to contribute
to the international jurisprudence on statehood and sovereignty.